# Petition — Ellis v. Ellis

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1652%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 452 U.S. 940

## Text

8 0 i 1 a v4 9 Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
Pits PRP
a APR 24 1981

SSS STEVAS,
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Howarp ELLIs,
Petitioner,

VS.

LomeR ELLIs, Sr.; and IRENE ELLIS, his wife;
and Lomer ELLIs, Jr.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF KENTUCKY

JOHN D. MILLER
MILLER, TAYLOR, BURLEW
AND MEYER
218 Masonic Building
227 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, KY 42301
Telephone (502) 926-2621

Attorney for Petitioner

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

i)

7%

*?

QUESTION PRESENTED

I. WHETHER A STATE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
DENY A DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO PROVE HIS OWN
CHARACTER, IN DEFENSE OF A CIVIL SUIT ALLEGING
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT AND SEEING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

f

INDEX

Page

I iia he 5 6 se wd seo Ne ea eRek Sues i

Table Of Cases And Authorities .................... iv

SL DIONNE cs c's ob O'eik on eh Beed «00 ov eaaenns ae |

PINNED Sched «ck ua o's ons Vedwelestancdetny Une 2

Ons PIII sos iiss v b'd's wb b0 v0 0'p 0 bw Se hee eee 2

ea Ol TR COS ik ios cng dies ee aa, Oe 2

Reasons For Granting The Writ..................06: 4

CONN Hr a. ethane o vig ebancehecehienes cae weeee 5
Appendix One, Complaint of February 13, 1979, filed in

McLean Circuit Court, Action 79-CI-O12 ........ A-l
Appendix Two, Answer of March 16, 1979, filed in Mc-

Lean Circuit Court, Action 79-CI-O12 ........... A-4
Appendix Three, Trial Order and Judgment, entered
November 16, 1979, in Action 79-CI-012 in the

pci con Circ Ome 6 8 ob ieee ee a A-6
Appendix Four, Opinion of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, Reversing and Remanding, rendered

PO RRE Fi SOU os 0 0d hos. dane vid deantues cies A-9
Appendix Five, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing,
entered February 13, 1981, in Court of Appeals of

Kentucky, No. 80-CA-792-MR .............005- A-13
Appendix Six, Order Denying Motion for Discretionary
Review, entered March 24, 1981, in Supreme Court

of Kentucky, File 81-SC-133-D ................. A-14

| PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK |

iv

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Colker v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, 224 Ky.
837, 7 SW2d 502 (1928)

Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 84 SE 968 (1918)

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constiix-
tion

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Howarp ELLIs,
Petitioner,

VS.

LomMER ELLIs, Sr.; and IRENE ELLIs, his wife;
and Lomer ELLIs, Jr.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF KENTUCKY

Petitioner, Howard Ellis, respectfully prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue, to review the Opinion Reversing And Remand-
ing, of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, rendered in this pro-
ceeding on November 7, 1980; and that said Opinion be reversed.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, sought to be
reviewed, was rendered November 7, 1980, and is reported in
—___._SW 2d ___.. The Opinion is contained in Appendix Four
of this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

The Order of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, denying
rehearing, was entered on February 13, 1981, and appears in
Appendix Five.

7.

-%

conn tag

The Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court, denying discre-
tionary review, was entered March 24, 1981, and appears in Ap-

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked, under 28 U.S.C.
1257 (3).

The Opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, reversing
and remanding, was rendered November 7, 1980. It is reported
in ___ SW2d ___., and is attached, as Appendix Four.

A timely motion for extension (rehearing) was made by ap-
pellee (petitioner), which motion was denied, by Order dated
February 13, 1981 (Appendix Five).

A timely motion for discretionary review by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, was made by the appellee (petitioner),
which motion was denied, by Order dated March 24, 1981 (Ap-
pendix Six).

This Petition For Writ Of Certiorari is timely, under 28
U.S.C. 2101 (c).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The brothers, Lomer Ellis and Howard Ellis, are grain
farmers, in McLean County, Kentucky. There is enmity be-
tween them.

The Ellis lands adjoin. Their lands are large, flat, fertile, and
productive. A singular curse of grain farmers, is that of the nox-
ious grasses, ‘Wild Cane’”’ and ‘‘Johnsongrass’’.

'

ayy

On February 13, 1979, the appellants (Lomer Ellis, Sr.; and
Irene Ellis, his wife; and Lomer Ellis, Jr. — the three
hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘‘Lomer’’), filed suit in the
McLean County Circuit Court, at Calhoun, Kentucky, alleging
that Howard Ellis, the defendant, trespassed upon the plain-
tiffs’ lands and cast or threw Johnsongrass and Wild Cane seed.
The complaint alleged that the act was done intentionally,
willfully, and maliciously. Lomer sought damages, compen-
satory and punitive (Complaint, Appendix One).

Lomer’s case was circumstantial. Howard denied the allega-
tions, and the inferences of circumstance (Answer, Appendix
Two).

Upon trial, the Circuit Court of McLean County, Kentucky,
permitted Howard Ellis to produce character witnesses, who of-
fered testimony before the jury, as to Howard’s own character
traits, based upon a good community reputation. The jury
returned a verdict for the defendant, Howard Ellis (Appendix
Three, Trial Order and Judgment of November 16, 1979).

Lomer Ellis appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals; and
that Court reversed (Appendix Four, Opinion Reversing and
Remanding, dated November 7, 1980), holding that the in-
troduction of character evidence on behalf of Howard was er-
roneous. Howard Ellis then petitioned for a rehearing of the
case, in order to consider the Constitutional implications. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky denied said petition (Appendix
Five, Order of February 13, 1981).

Howard Ellis then moved the Supreme Court of Kentucky for
discretionary review. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied
review (Appendix Six, Order of March 24, 1981).

Howard Ellis now brings this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Court Of Appeals Of Kentucky.

-%

oe i

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Kentucky law does not permit a defendant to prove his own
character, in defense of a civil suit alleging willful and malicious
acts and seeking punitive damages. Colker v. Connecticut Fire
Insurance Company, 224 Ky. 837, 7 SW2d 502 (1928).

The foregoing rule was applied to the petitioner, Howard
Ellis, by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the decision sought
to be reviewed (Appendix Four).

Petitioner insists that the rule denying the right to prove his
own character, in defense of a civil allegation of wrongdoing
wherein punitive damages are prayed, abridges his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides as follows:

. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Under our system, the last ditch in protecting one’s property
in resort to the courts of law. It is fundamental, that due process
requires the proceedings be fair and adequate.

Where one citizen seeks to punish another in a civil pro-
ceeding, the latter ought to be able to have the triers of fact con-
sider and evaluate his own character. This much of compurga-
tion should remain if a defendant is to have a fair and adequate
opportunity to resist punishment in a civil proceeding. See, for
example, Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 84 SE 968 (1918),
where the West Virginia court reasoned that there is no distinc-
tion between a criminal proceeding and a civil proceeding that
seeks to punish.

In the case sub judice, the proof on behalf of the plaintiffs
was circumstantial. The defendant, Howard Ellis, entered a

general denial. If the defendant cannot have the jury consider

Zee *

‘eis Whit

and evaluate his own character, he has no defense at all! Cer-
tainly, in these days of reckless accusations, there is merit in per-
mitting a defendant to have his character evaluated by the triers
of fact, as a defense to an allegation of wrongdoing and as a
prelude to punishment.

If the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate such, then
no man’s property is safe from seizure.

CONCLUSION

The American people are increasingly using civil proceedings
to punish their fellow man. It is urged, that the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates that a civil defendant in a claim for
punitive damages may defend by proof of his own relevant
character traits.

There should be no difference in punishment by one’s fellow
man, and that emanating from the State. Either way, it encom-
passes the judicial process of the State.

Petitioner prays that this writ be granted, and that the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky be reversed.

This, the 16th day of April, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

MILLER, TAYLOR, BURLEW
AND MEYER

By John D. Miller
218 Masonic Building
227 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, KY 42301
Telephone (502) 926-2621

Attorneys for Petitioner

APPENDIX

is sie ask

APPENDIX ONE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT

No. 79-CI-012

Lomer Ellis, Sr., Irene Ellis, his wife, and
Lomer Ellis, Jr.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Howard Ellis
Route 1
Sacramento, Kentucky 42372,

Defendant.

COMPLAINT

Come the plaintiffs for their complaint against the defendant
and state as follows:

1. The ‘plaintiffs and- the defendant are all residents of
McLean County, Kentucky.

2. Plaintiffs own and at all time mentioned herein have been
in possession of two (2) tracts of land located near Sacramenio in
McLean County, Kentucky, known as a 21.33 acre tract which
was acquired by Lomer Ellis, Sr., and Irene Ellis, his wife, from
John Heltsley, et ux, by deed dated February 19, 1949, and
recorded in Deed Book 40, page 593, in the McLean County
Court Clerk’s Office and hereinafter referred to as the 21 acre
tract, and a tract known as a 33.97 acre tract acquired by Lomer
Ellis, Sr., and Irene Ellis, his wife, from Frank Garst, et ux, by
deed dated February 28, 1952, and recorded in Deed Book 44,
page 50, in the McLean County Court Clerk’s Office which is
hereinafter referred to as the 34 acre tract.

a yi

3. Lomer Ellis, Jr., joins in this action as a plaintiff because
during all times pertinent hereto, he has been a business partner
with Lomer Ellis, Sr., in agricultural operations conducted on
the above referred to tracts, and with the permission of the
owners he has shared possession of the land in question.

4. On or about October 6, 1977, the defendant without per-
mission of the plaintiffs and knowingly and willfully trespassed
on and entered upon the 21 acre tract and the 34 acre tract of
land in a pick-up truck motor vehicle and willfully, intentionally,
maliciously, and wantonly spread, threw, cast, placed or seeded
the two tracts of land with Johnsongrass seed and Wild Cane
seed with malicious intent to damage the plaintiffs and the said
land.

5. At all times pertinent hereto, the plaintiffs were using the
said 21 acre tract and 34 acre tract for agricultural purposes.
Said tracts were under cultivation and have been for many
years.

6. As a direct and proximate result of the intentional and
malicious trespass of the defendant, the plaintiffs were damaged
in that they were required to take expensive measures to attempt
to prevent the germination or growth of the Johnsongrass and
Wild Cane seed placed upon the land by the defendant. They
were required to purchase and spread a chemical called Treflan
on the land and expend much time and labor in attempting to
prevent the growth of the Johnsongrass and Wild Cane seed.
They were required to purchase and assemble a Chem-farm
spray, tanks, pumps, nozzels and attachments, and they were
required to use tractors, discs and other equipment in the pro-
cesses which were necessary and reasonable to attempt to pre-
vent the germination and growth of the Johnsongrass and Wild
Cane seed.

7. The plaintiffs special damages directly and proximately
resulting from the trespass of the defendant include, but are not
limited to the following:

‘\

ny ee

Reduced production of soybeans on the af-

fected tracts in 1978 $ 4,000.00
Chem-farm spray, tanks, pumps, nozzels
and attachments 3,000.00
Treflan used in 1978 680.00
Time spent in preparing land for and apply-
ing chemicals to land in 1978 720.00
Use of two tractors, discs and labor to
operate equipment during 1978 1,500.00
Total Special Damages $ 9,900.00

8. As a direct and proximate result of the trespass of the
defendant the plaintiffs will suffer future damages to the land in
question and its productivity in the amount of $12,000.00 as a
result of reduced productivity of the land, and expenses which
will be incurred in continuing to treat the land to avoid the
growth and spread of Johnsongrass seed and Wild Cane seed.

WHEREFORE the plaintiffs pray judgment against the
defendant in the amount of $21,900.00 for general and special
damages and is. the amount of $50,000.00 addition for ex-
emplary and punitive damages. Further the plaintiffs pray that
they recover their costs herein expended and have such other
and further relief to which they may appear entitled. Plaintiffs
demand trial by jury.

This 13 day of February, 1979.

SANDIDGE, HOLBROOK &
CRAIG, P.S.C.

By: /s/ Ronald M. Sullivan
100 St. Ann Building
Owensboro, Kentucky 42301
(502) 926-4000

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

*%

Se an

APPENDIX TWO

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT

No. 79-CI-012

Lomer Ellis, Sr., and Irene Ellis, his wife, and
Lomer Ellis, Jr.,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Howard Ellis,
Defendant.

ANSWER

Comes the defendant, by and through counsel, and for his
answer to the plaintiffs’ Complaint, states as follows:

1.

The plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a cause of action
against the defendant for which relief can be granted.

2.

The defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 and 2 of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

3.

The defendant is without knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
in Paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore, the
allegations contained in said Paragraph 3 should be taken as
denied, pursuant to Civil Rule 8.02.

si fi

4.

The defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plaintiffs’ complaint; and also
specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph six (er-
roneously numbered Paragraph 5); and the allegations contained
in Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

WHEREFORE, the defendan: prays that the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint be dismissed and that they take nothing thereby; for the
defendant’s costs herein expended; and for any other just and
proper relief to which this honorable Court deems the defen-
dant entitled.

This, the 16th day of March, 1979.

John D. Mille.., Attorney for Defendant
MILLER, TAYLOR, BURLEW
AND MEYER
218 Masonic Building
227 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, Kentucky 42301
Telephone: (502) 926-2621

prey eS

APPENDIX THREE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT

No. 79-CI-012

Lomer Ellis, Sr., Irene Ellis, his wife, and
Lomer Ellis, Jr.,
Plaintiffs,

vs

Howard Ellis,
Defendant.

TRIAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

This matter came on for trial before jury on October 23,
1979; and the respective parties appeared with counsel. Eighteen
jurors were empaneled to answer truthfully upon voir dire; the
respective parties conducted voir dire examination and exercised
their respective challenges, whereupon twelve jurors were seated
to truthfully try the matters in issue:

Billy Murphy
Harry Gatton, Jr.
Gary W. Capps
J. Bodo Loyd
Bobby G. Girvin
Hugh T. Miller
Kenneth Luck
Judy Stratton
Paul E. Graham
Wendell Ray Smith
Bruce Floyd

Ollie Jeffries

sins hilt ak

Evidence was offered by the parties, first by the plaintiffs and
then by the defendant.

A transcript of the entire proceeding was had.
The trial was continued from day to day until completed.

At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, each party moved for a
directed verdict, which motions were overruled. Said motions
were renewed at the close of the entire case and were against
overruled. Whereupon, the case was submitted to the jury for
deliberation.

After deliberation, the jury returned to the Courtroom with a
verdict in the following form, to-wit:

2. We, the jury, find for the defendant.
9-3

For Plaintiffs We the undersigned
hold for the defendant
For Defendant

/s/ Billy Murphy /s/ J. Bodo Loyd
/s/ Harry Gatton, Jr. /s/ Bobby G. Girvin
. /s/ Gary W. Capps /s/ Hugh T. Miller

/s/ Kenneth Luck

/s/ Judy Stratton

/s/ Paul E. Graham
/s/ Wendell Ray Smith
/s/ Bruce Floyd

/s/ Ollie Jeffries

<b hiduc

JUDGMENT

Now therefore, the Court being sufficiently advised and in
conformance with the foregoing verdict of the jury; IT IS —
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be, and is,
hereby entered for defendant and the plaintiffs’ complaint is
ordered dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.

Further, the Court order not.
This 14th day of November, 1979.

/s/ JUDGE B. R. PAXTON
PREPARED BY:

/s/ John D. Miller
Attorney for Defendant

HAVE SEEN:

/s/ Ronald M. Sullivan
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Ps Ses

APPENDIX FOUR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
COURT OF APPEALS

FILE NO. 80-CA-792-MR

Lomer Ellis, Sr., Irene Ellis, his wife, and
Lomer Ellis, Jr.,

Appellants,
v.

Howard Ellis,
Appellee.

Appeal from McLean Circuit Court
Honorable Arthur T. Iler, Special Judge
Civil Action No. 79-CI012

REVERSING AND REMANDING

BEFORE: COOPER, HOWARD and VANCE, Judges.

COOPER, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment for the ap-
pellee, defendant below, in an action for intentional trespass.
The question presented herein is whether the trial court erred in
allowing the appellee to introduce evidence with respect to his
reputation for truth and honesty. On review, we find that the
trial court so erred and reverse and remand.

In February of 1979, the appellants, Lomer Ellis, Sr., Irene’
Ellis, and Lomer Ellis, Jr., filed this action against the appellee,
Howard Ellis, for intentional trespass. Specifically, the ap-
pellants alleged that in October of 1977, the appellee willfully
trespassed on land owned by them, and damaged said land by

— A-10 —

spreading seeds of Johnson Grass and wild cane on it. The ap-
pellants sought both compensatory and punitive damages.
Thereafter, the action was tried, with the appellants’ evidence
against the appellee being primarily circumstantial. In defend-
ing the action, the appellee acted as a witness in his own
behalf. During his cross-examination, the appellee was im-
peached by the use of a prior inconsistent statement. The ap-
pellee then sought, over the objection of the appellants, to in-
troduce evidence of his good reputation for truth and veracity
as well as honesty and fair-dealing. This testimony, in the form
of numerous character witnesses, was permitted by the trial
court. The jury subsequently found for the appellee and it is
from this judgment that the appellants now appeal.

Principally, the appellants argue that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error in allowing the introduction of character
evidence in behalf of the appellee. We agree. As a general rule,
evidence of character is inadmissible in civil litigation. West v.
Mason, 2 Ky. Opin. 316 (1868). As a corollary to this rule, it has
been held that evidence of a party’s good character is inadmissi-
ble in a civil action in which the party is charged with wrong-
doing. Northern Assurance Co. v. Griffin, 236 Ky. 296, 33
S.W.2d 7 (1930); Colker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 224A Ky.
837, 7 S.W.2d 502 (1928). Such a rule derives from the principal
that only relevant evidence should be admissible. Where the
pleadings in an action raise an issue of fact rather than one of
the character of a party, evidence of that party’s character is ir-
relevant and therefore inadmissible. Hignite v. Nantz, 254 Ky.
214, 71 S.W.2d 442 (1934).

This rule excluding evidence of a party’s character where
character is not an issue derives as well from the concept of fun-
damental fairness and impartiality. To allow a party to in-

roduce evidence of his reputation when such is not an issue is to
allow for the possibility of unnecessary prejudice. Such evidence
of no probative value to the factual questions at issue can only

-%

— A-ll —

result in unfairness to the other party. Here, the issue before the

jury was not the appellee’s honesty, but whether he committed
the act of intentional trespass. In allowing the appellee to in-
troduce abundant character witnesses, the trial court in-
advertedly transformed an impartial judicial proceeding into a
swearing contest. Such was clearly prejudicial to the appellants.
Leahman v. Broughton, 196 Ky. 146, 244 S.W. 403 (1922).

Aside from the question of fundamental fairness, the trial
court’s action clearly violated established rules of evidence. The
credibility of a witness or party may not be rehabilitated by
character evidence until after it has, in fact, been attacked. Shell
v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 223, 53 S.W.2d 524 (1932);
Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §4.5 (A)(3) 1976.
Furthermore, a witness or party who has been impeached by the
use of a prior inconsistent statement may not seek to be
rehabilitated through the introduction of evidence of his good
reputation for truth and veracity. See Lawson, supra,
§4.10(C)(3); Vance v. Vance, 59 Ky. 581, 8 Ky. Opin. 399
(1859).

Here, the appellee sought to rehabilitate his credibility by the
introduction of character evidence after he had been impeached
by the use of a prior inconsistent statement. And, he sought to
introduce evidence of his reputation for honesty and veracity
when his reputation had not been attacked. Given these facts,
together with the inevitable prejudice which resulted to the ap-
pellants, we are bound to reverse the judgment below, and
direct the trial court to enter a new trial for the appellants.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, with
directions that a new trial be entered for the appellants.

ALL CONCUR.

‘\%

— A-12 —
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
Ronald M. Sullivan
P.O. Box 727

100 St. Ann Building
Owensboro, KY 42301

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

John D. Miller

Suite 216-221

Masonic Building

227 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, KY 42301

— A-13 —

APPENDIX FIVE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
COURT OF APPEALS

FILE NO. 80-CA-792-MR

Lomer Ellis, Sr.; Irene Ellis; and
Lomer Ellis, Jr.,

vs.
Howard Ellis.

Appeal From McLean Circuit Court
Action No. 79-CI-012
Honorable Arthur T. Iler

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
BEFORE: VANCE, COOPER and HOWARD, Judges.

The Court having considered the Petition for Rehearing and
being sufficiently advised, it is ORDERED that the same is
hereby DENIED.

ENTERED: FEBRUARY 13, 1981

Roy D. Vance
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

— A-14 —

APPENDIX SIX

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
81-SC-133-D
(80-CA-792-MR)

Howard Ellis,
Movant,

Vv.

Lomer Ellis, Sr., Irene Ellis and Lomer Ellis, Jr.,
Respondents.

McLean Circuit Court
#79-CI-012

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW

The motion of Howard Ellis for a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals is denied.

ENTERED March 24, 1981.

John S. Palmore
Chief Justice

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1652%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
