# Opposition — Puerto Rico v. Regan

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1557%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 983

## Text

FILED

No. 80-1647 APR 17 99)
IN THE ALEX ‘8977 1. STHVAS,

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,
Ve

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico, Respondent.

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,
¥a

VIRGIN ISLANDS, Respondent.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION

MICHAEL J. HENKE - Counsel of Record
CHARLES D. TETRAULT
VINSON & ELKINS
1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-6500

Attorneys for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

ARTHUR LAZARUS, JR.
MILTON EISENBERG
Henry A. HUBSCHMAN
FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS,
SHRIVER & KAMPELMAN
600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 342-3624

Attorneys for the Virgin Islands
April 17, 1981

a tateiienaeall

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

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CONCLUSION ....cccscscvectovenceus ue ee anne nn = aEEnE 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: PAGE
City of Santa Clara vy. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979) .........-. 3
Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.

1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955) ....... 4

Driver v. Helms, 456 F. Supp. 496 (D.R.I. 1978) ....... 2

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ........eeeeeeenee 2

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization vy. Simon,
506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ........sceeeeeeeeeeee 23

Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920) ........-.-0ee-

Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 662 (194D) . oo ccc ccccsccctsunes se enenere :

Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608
F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921

CIGGD) onc cnccvecctvcsecceshes teh e bene e mane 2
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) 4-5
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902)........... 3
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers

v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) .... 3

Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev’d on other grounds, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1GTD) oc ccnvdvcusaaceceeuness¥eeae eee eeeee eee

Table of Authorities Continued

CASES: PAGE

Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 619
F.2d 1132 (Sth Cir, 1900) .0 ici eueus see eee 2

Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136
(i+) ee 3

1978). os ee cecnve one vucsis eeyaiemnnnannn 4

STATUTES:

Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 68 Stat. 497..
$ U.S.C. SPOR oo 0csde v0 ekn oe ee
26 U.S.C. S742 1(R). . .. 0500000 0es eee
28 U.S.C. $2201 ow. ccccunshs5eease ee
4B U.S.C. §736 noc cas 000s nun sence es ee

uf FN UY

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL:
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) .... 2

\y, .

No. 80-1647
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,
Ve

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Respondent.

DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Petitioner,
Vv.

VIRGIN ISLANDS, Respondent.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION

Petitioner recognizes that the petition in the caption-
ed case is, in effect, a cross-petition for certiorari in
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Regan, No. 80-1252
and Virgin Islands v. Regan, No. 80-1253. Petn. at 1,
14-15. Although respondents are prepared to show that
there is no merit in the Secretary’s position on the ques-
tions set forth in his cross-petition, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands do not oppose
Supreme Court review of those questions. The fact that
the Secretary felt compelled to file a cross-petition on
issues not considered by the Court of Appeals only
serves to highlight the overall importance of these cases
and to provide additional reason for granting the
Original petitions for certiorari filed by Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands. Certainly, nothing in the Secretary’s
cross-petition is in any way inconsistent with the reasons
for granting the writ advanced by Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands.

2

Though respondents are content to await the briefs
on the merits to respond to most of petitioner’s
arguments, we do wish to demonstrate now the frailty of
the threshold arguments lest this Court be lulled into
believing that is lacks jurisdiction over these cases.

a. Contrary to the Secretary’s argument, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity does not bar these actions.
The October 21, 1976 amendments to the Administrative
Procedure Act explicitly waive that defense in actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief and mandamus. 5
U.S.C. §702, as amended. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 6121. (Section 702 was amended ‘“‘so as to
remove the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to
judicial review of Federal administrative action otherwise
subject to judicial review.’’) See Sheehan v. Army and
Air Force Exchange Service, 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Sth
Cir. 1980). And the waiver occasioned by the 1976
amendments is applicable to litigation pending at the
time of their enactment. Legal Aid Society of Alameda
County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1332 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); Driver v. Helms, 456
F. Supp. 496, 497, n. 1 (D.R.I. 1978). In addition, these
cases fall within the well-established exception that an
action against an officer of the federal government is not
barred by sovereign immunity if the officer’s challenged
acts are ultra vires. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609 (1963); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Contrary
to the Secretary’s assertion, the relief sought by
respondents will not require an affirmative act of the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign

property, but only that the Secretary cease the
unauthorized withholding of funds which Congress has
appropriated and ordered to be covered into the
treasuries of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. See Ci-
ty of Santa Clara vy. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 679 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979); Schafly v.
Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1974); National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers v.
Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D.D.C. 1973); Penn-
sylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (D.D.C.
1973), rev’d on other grounds, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1974).

Furthermore, as the district court correctly conclud-
ed, the claims in these cases fall squarely within the
traditional principles governing actions for mandamus.
Indeed, this Court has itself, in a long line of cases,
specifically affirmed the appropriateness of mandamus
relief to compel federal officers to pay monies out of the
public treasury, where the duty was clear and ministerial.
E.g., Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 472 (1920); Min-
nesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902). The
Secretary’s cross-petition suggests that this line of cases
was Overruled by the dictum found in a footnote in Lar-
son v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra,
337 U.S. at 692, n. 11, thereby implying that sovereign
immunity is applicable whenever a court order could af-
fect the disposition of sovereign property even if the
government Official is acting in violation of a mandatory
statutory duty. While this Court has not squarely ad-
dressed this issue, see Train v. Campaign Clean Water,
Inc., 420.U.S. 136, 138 (1975), at least one court of ap-
peals has expressed the view that it is ‘‘inconceivable
that the Court would take such a step without mention-
ing the rule of those cases or the cases themselves, and

4

particularly that it would take such sweeping action in a
footnote to an opinion which did not involve the point.”’
Clackamas County v..McKay, 219 F.2d 479, 493 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See
also Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1255
(7th Cir. 1978).

The claims in these cases are based on explicit
statutory provisions mandating the payment into the
treasuries of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands of ‘‘all taxes collected under the internal
revenue laws of the United States’’ on articles produced
in the respective islands and transported to the United
States, and, in the case of the Virgin Islands, of ‘‘[t]he
proceeds of customs duties ... less the costs of collec-
ting all of said duties.’”’ The language of the statutes
relied upon is peremptory. No issues of fact or matters
of policy are involved. If the statutes embrace the
disputed taxes and duties, the Secretary is under a clear
duty to deposit the sums collected in the treasuries of
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and he never has
suggested otherwise. Only if sovereign immunity bars all
suits for mandamus affecting the disposition of federal
funds can the claims in this case be deemed jurisdic-
tionally deficient.

b. Nor is there any merit to the Secretary’s argu-
ment that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§2201, bars these actions. It is well settled that the
Declaratory Judgment Act is coterminous with the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §7421(a), which proscribes
suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or col-
lection of any tax. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization v. Simon, supra, 506 F.2d at 1284-1285;
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D.D.C.

5

1972) (three-judge court). The instant actions clearly are
not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, and hence not by
the Declaratory Judgment Act, because they have
nothing to do with restraining the assessment or collec-
tion of taxes. The Secretary already has assessed and col-
lected the taxes which are at issue. The only questions
presented are whether 48 U.S.C. §734 and section 28 of
the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 68 Stat.
497, require that the taxes which have been assessed and
collected be covered into the treasuries of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for certiorari in Nos. 80-1252 and
80-1253 and the cross-petition in No. 80-1647 should be
granted, and writs of certiorari should issue to review
the judgments and opinions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL J. HENKE - Counsel of Record
CHARLES D. TETRAULT
VINSON & ELKINS
1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-6500

Attorneys for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

ARTHUR LAZARUS, JR.
MILTON EISENBERG
HENRY A. HUBSCHMAN
FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS,
SHRIVER & KAMPELMAN
600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 342-3624

Attorneys for the Virgin Islands
April 17, 1981

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael J. Henke, attorney for respondent and a
member of the Bar of this Court, certify that on this
17th day of April, 1981, the foregoing Brief in Response
to Cross-Petition has been served upon petitioner by
hand-delivering three copies thereof to David English
Carmack, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., at-
torney for petitioner, and by mailing three copies,
postage prepaid, to the Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530. I further certify that
all parties required to be served have been served.

MICHAEL J. HENKE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1557%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
