# Respondents Brief — United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 1016

## Text

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Nos. 80-1640, 80-1656 ER L. STEVAS,
Aa Maras ret

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM-
MISSION,

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
AND
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioners

V.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY,
STEVEN SHOLLY AND DONALD E. HOSSLER,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

ROBERT HAGER
Counsel of Record

DANIEL P. SHEEHAN
JOHN CLEWETT
Christic Institute
1324 N. Capitol St.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 797-8106

Counsel for People Against
September 2, 1981 Nuclear Energy, et al.

THE CASILLAS PRESS, INC.-1717 K Street. N W.-Weshington, 0. C.-223-1220

(i)
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether § 189 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the
NRC to deny to affected persons a duly requested hear-
ing before giving effect to a license amendment which ir-
reversibly impacts health and the environment but is sum-
marily found by the NRC to involve “no significant
hazards consideration.”

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .. 0.00.50. cescccccccccsvcccccvcccss i
Ee PAT PRE LAE ns ona c coy ccadacecaueadeigbas scone iv
I Nos ed lek cine aka wear bal we Oi Hae e Hed 2
ee URN EEED. oiled hd Use eo kpinlain s Peeves vetoes ieee 2
Ee A TU CPU ois ons beeen riedcdvpeedncee eewaa 3
SEAR Y Gr INI 6 obs Mea k ceeds teen ceaenaew ns 15
PUI cw eN Wo eC UN Nn et aS 0 abe DK RBME ES Cones Co aane 17
1. The Plain Meaning of § 189 Forbids Any Interpreta-
tion That a Duly Requested Hearing May Be Denied
Upon a Summary Finding by the NRC That a
License Amendment Invoives “No Significant
Hazards Consideration.” . . «61... . cece cere ec emme eens 19
2. The Legislative History of § 189 Lends No Support
to the Notion That Congress Intended to Authorize
the NRC to Deny a Duly Requested Hearing............ 24
3. The NRC’s Own Administrative Practice Does Not
Support Its Denial of a Requested Hearing Prior to
Taking an Irreversible Act Pursuant to a License
Amendment Found by the NRC to Involve “No
Significant Hazards Consideration.” .................. 28

4. This Court’s Upholding of the Plain Meaning of
§ 189 So As To Accord Requested Hearings on “No
Significant Hazards Consideration” Amendments In-
volving Irreversible Action Will Not Introduce The
Overwhelming Administrative Burdens Imagined by
POMONE oie cod iaedcsinteteeaheRaee Were e¥es vane 33

(iv)

5. The Important Interests of Due Process and Fun-
damental Fairness Require That § 189 Be Strictly and
Faithfully Construed to Preserve the Public’s Right
to a Hearing Before Suffering the Irreversible Effects
of Radiation, In the Absence of Clear and Un-
mistakable Evidence of Congressional Intent to Deny

IMENT Via died oh ata bh Os FeO CS AK A440 08 o reese 36
TEN iicicin Wu rebel db a Race MERE c VERKESs ¥ emn,e ROUN 46
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page

Armstrong v. Manzo,
Rs ENE oo Raids a0 058 cas aawedvawenedctaknekeee 39

Brooks v. AEC,
Sr Es Cees STEP SaSka dr heOa sed eOkehoeesavnune 21

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.
REI PERE ETORC cass PEMA OPR CRE CSS hs heen canes aed 38, 42

Fuentes v. Shevin,
EE CUED b Grkid ba GAs Seed Kee se wade ced 'ee-oud he ee 33

Greene v. McElroy,
SE CP SRE G0 0s Vik CES a Cae e disc hdeuneoesseeee 39

Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst.
Oe WS NT CE soc ed Cea iis esate oth caecaneeskennhs 44

Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
AR CE Uae CEMORD Pha Sls dine a By Wa Males 'a in BBG om kenwacloue 39

Mahoney v. United States,
220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd 339 F.2d
te FOE ck 6 kee eae bo EPAPER Lei pleetcn> Canne nes 43

Mathews v. Eldridge,
PRR CERIO (snk ewe A PeUN ee dean os eceeccane bebe ts 39

NeNabb v. United States,
BEG Ue SO CEES 6 aceon eo

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tru:
539 U.S. 306(1950) ..........

Nader v. NRC,
513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

Northern States Power Co. v. M
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
405 U.S. 1035 (1972) ........

Oklahoma v. Bernstein,
5 Media L. Rep. 2313 (1980) ..

Office of Communication of the
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir

Pacific Legal Foundation v. Stat
& Dev. Com., 472 F. Supp. 191

Siegel v. AEC,
400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 19

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
585 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. |

Susquehanna Valley Alliance v.
619 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1980) ..

Train v. Colorado PIRG,

Pl 8 Et |
Statutes and Regulation:
PEPER ED: oo Oh0C8 che cece
MBUD.G. ZERO ove vc cvcecc:

42 U.S.C. 2021(k) ............

(vi)

42 U.S.C. 2239 (Atomic Energy Act, § 189)........... 2 and passim
MRIS. SHOT) i icici sinrice cou debebe ceiced onus canes esis 42
SEMCCOPENERT): ov Gees cheba vee Gh edelascudecvee dice spinpey 42
MEMOS MEE, 45 5 5 s vA C aud a CARERS TS ots ay Cobo aay 42
NS BLO Eis v.kow vee be'sb (CRAPO MS GAIWKGS © be airy ane bagels Vey 29
DTI UNO is wskk Conde UV USER MORON Reap eccecee'e'y Mpg waN’s 19
SMO Secu eo REE O ERK GG OME w ah we Reaver dscns Sane. 34
AIF OE: coins hh kr dirs amnriien DV aN RE! vhke' vestige cesenat 34
BOR BA TOe as Piece ko RIN oho yb eaeWGEW olen be cviss Heh eue pues 34
bk. | SE ee Dee ee One PT ewe pe ye ete wenn SS 34
Ee | | Ree Per CORE TERT. (COLT RRET ERLE le ee 34
SOG PRL csdads vate ane cvrendbbee aero cskestivba dippers 29
6 ig SVG ia cae bee dee eR b ba en bah sn een valves 9, 12
TR SAR ice shire ver cues her eceeeisoebrebudhracceeent® 10
SOT FOF i ia i caste Fin 0 Gis’ oct ncaens ncbee csv oeewsion eye 19
IOCER Amp. LSE TRIV: cc iciiicciecedescceeteediee 10, 11, 13
QO GTR BGG 1O 8s hue Sabin ccceenwescipe aged ileees opiniecceeen chine 42
Miscellaneous: :

K. DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1978) ..... 44

Green, “Safety Determination in Nuclear Power Licensing:
A Critical View,” 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633, (1968) .......... 37

(vii)

Monaghan, “Of ‘Liberty’ and ‘Property’”

62 Cornell L. R. 405 (1977)... ces ccecccceseees SAcdaweeah yes 38
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) ..... 42
Wright, “Beyond Discretionary Justice,”

BE J. SISTA 6c eictdvdevccocudenesevesses demons 40
100 Cong. Rec. 10730 (July 16, 1954) ...... 6. cece cece eee eenees 36
25 Fed. Reg. 11015 (November 18, 1960) ..........:eeeeeeeeeee 26
26 Fed. Reg. 8469 (September 1, 1961) ........- eee eeeeeeeeee 27
27 Fed. Reg. 5491 (June 9, 1962) ........-sccccccecrervecceees 26
44 Fed. Reg. 45271 (August 1, 1979) ...... 2.0 cee eee e eee ee eens 5
44 Fed. Reg. 67738 (November 27, 1979) ........cceeeeeeeeeeeee 6
45 Fed. Reg. 20265 (March 27, 1980) .........seeee eee eeeeenees 8
45 Fed. Reg. 30760 (May 9, 1980) .......-- cece cece eee eneeeees 8

Senate Report, “Nuclear Accident and Recovery
at Three Mile Island,” June, 1980, Ser. No. 96-14.
Dts Come BOG B88 isis oo cals eelewg eed e iced s cocesecosaee 7

Consumers Power Co., 7AEC 297 (1974) 2.0... ccc cece rece cena 34

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1640
No. 80-1656

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Et AlL.,
Petitioners
Vv.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, Ei. Al,
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS PEOPLE AGAINST
NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

People Against Nuclear Energy, Steven Sholly and Donald
E. Hossler, respondents in 80-1640 and 80-1656 submit
this brief on the merits in these consolidated cases.

2

OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 651
F.2d 780. The denial of rehearing en banc and dissent
therefrom appear at id. 792.'

STATUTE INVOLVED

THE Atomic ENERGY AcT, SECTION 189(a) (“§ 189”), pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:

Sentence One; In any proceeding under this Act, for
the... amending of any license... the Commission
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose
interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall ad-
mit any person as a party to such proceeding. . .

Sentence Two; The commission shall hold a hearing
after thirty days’ notice and publication once in the
Federal Register, on each application . . . for a construc-
tion permit... .

Sentence Three; ...{[T]he Commission may, in the
absence of a request therefor by any person whose interest
may be affected, issue . . . an amendment to an operating
license without a hearing, but upon thirty days’ notice and
publication once in the Federal Register of its intent to
do so.

Sentence Four; The commission may dispense with such
thirty days’ notice and publication with respect to any ap-

'The officially reported opinion differs in several material respects
from that printed in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of the
government (“Pet.”) and in that of Metropolitan Edison ef al.
(“Met Ed”).

3

plication for... an amendment to an operating license
upon a determination by the Commission that the amend-
ment involves no significant hazards consideration.
(Sentence enumeration added)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 28, 1979 the now-famous Three Mile Island
nuclear power reactor accident began. Due to a partial
meltdown of the reactor core of Three Mile Island Unit 2
(“TMI-2”), radioactive gas and radioactive particulate mat-
ter was released into the atmosphere. This release of radia-
tion caused, among other things the evacuation of some of
the local residents.

In addition to this release of radiation to the at-
mosphere, radioactive gases such as Krypton gas (Kr-85)
accumulated in the crippled reactor’s containment
building, along with radioactive particulate matter such as
Strontium-90, Plutonium-239 and Carbon-14. See NRC
Staff Report, “Final Environmental Assessment for
Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor
Building Atmosphere”, May, 1980, Record, Vol. V, Tab
69, p.3-1, line 6, (“NRC Final Assessment”); Institute for
Energy and Environmental Research, Heidelberg, FRG,
“Radiation Exposure Due to Venting TMI-2 Reactor
Building Atmosphere”, June 12, 1980, (Attachment B,
Petition for Review of Final NRC Orders, No. 80-1691)
p.4, (“Heideloerg Report”); cf J.A. 61.

These radionuclides were eventually ordered by the
NRC to be released into the atmosphere, in two Orders
from which these consolidated lawsuits arose.
Respondents Sholly and Hossler petitioned for review of
the NRC orders stating that law and regulation required 30

4

days prior notice before these NRC orders could be made
effective, since they both effected amendments to
Metropolitan Edison’s operating license, and since they
both involved “significant hazards consideration”. And in
a second petition, People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE)
stated that hearings on both NRC Orders were required
under § 189 since both Orders effected license amend-
ments and since a hearing had been requested by persons
“whose interest may be affected by” the amendments.

The NRC opposed any notice or hearing on either of the
two Orders. The NRC contended that the Order entitled
“Memorandum and Order” was not subject to the § 189
notice and hearing requirements because it was not a
license amendment. The NRC then claimed that both
notice and a duly requested prior hearing could be waived
on the “Order for Temporary Modification of License”
(“Modification of License”) because a summary finding of
“no significant hazards consideration” had been made by
the NRC. Pet. 49a, 62a.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia rejected this reasoning. It found that a hearing
had been duly requested and was required by law to be
granted on both orders. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether 30
days’ notice was required prior to effectuating the NRC
orders. 651 F.2d 786, note 16. Therefore the Court of Ap-
peals did not need io resolve the question of whether the
NRC orders did involve “significant hazards considera-
tion.” The Court of Appeals held that the “Memorandum
and Order” did effect a license amendment and according-
ly a hearing should have been held on the matter of releas-
ing radiation into the environment. The Court of Appeals
also held that the hearing should have included the matter
contained in the “Modification of License” since the Court

5

found nothing in the legislative history of § 189 to suggest
that the plain language of the provision should be
modified as to permit a waiver of hearing upon an NRC
finding of “no significant hazards consideration.”
Moreover the Court found that the “administrative prac-
tice” offered by the NRC to support its interpretation of
the statute was not unambiguous and in any event could
not “avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands
as to leave nothing for construction.” 651 F.2d 789, note
26, quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U.S.,
288 U.S. 294, 315 & 1933). The Court of Appeals entered a
declaratory judgment on both of these two holdings.

The Petitioners sought certiorari in this Court only on
the second, and lesser, of the holdings, i.e. that § 189 does
not authorize the NRC to deny a requested hearing on the
basis of a “no significant hazards consideration” finding.

The NRC Orders from which these consolidated cases
arose followed a series of NRC actions. The first of these
appeared about four months after the beginning of the
Three Mile Island crises, when the NRC issued on July 20,
1979 an “Order for Modification of License”, 44 Fed. Reg.
45271, which said the NRC was reviewing the TMI-2
operating license to see what license modifications were
needed to “assure the continued maintenance of the cur-
rent safe, stable, long-term cooling condition of the facili-
ty.” It stated that “[t]his evaluation will be set out in a for-
thcoming Safety Evaluation which will address the imposi-
tion of new and/or revised Technical Specifications. It is
expected that this effort will be completed in about 30 days
at which time a further Order will be issued.”

Pending a second Order the NRC suspended the
“authority granted by the TMI-2 Operating License No.
DPR-73 to operate Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

6

Unit 2”, but provided that the “licensee shall maintain the
facility in a shutdown condition.” Further, the NRC found
that the “public health, safety and interest require that this
suspension be effective immediately” and promised that
the subsequent Order would state the time for requesting a
public hearing “on this matter.” Id.

A second Order imposing new or revised Technical
Specifications and other license modifications was not
forthcoming within the promised 30 days. Instead, on
November 21, 1979, the NRC issued a “Statement of
Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement,” 44 Fed. Reg. 67738.
This Statement announced the decision of the NRC to
prepare a “programmatic environmental impact statement
on the decontamination and disposal of radioactive wastes
resulting from the March 28, 1979 accident” at TMI-2.
J.A. 36 The Statement goes on to say that if the NRC
decides it to be in the public interest to purge the contain-
ment building of radioactive gases before the “program-
matic” EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] is complete
“the Commission will consider CEQ [The Council on En-
vironmental Quality]’s advice as to the Commission’s
NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] respon-
sibi .ies.” CEQ’s advice was that venting the radioactive
gas prior to preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement would be inconsistant with NEPA. J.A. 83. The
Statement concludes that with “the help of the public’s
comments on our proposals we intend to assure, pursuant
to NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act, that the cleanup of
TMI-2 is done consistently with the public health and safe-
ty, and with awareness of the choices ahead.”

On February 11, 1980 the NRC issued its second
“Order,” 45 Fed. Reg. 11282, February 20, 1980. J.A.°
39-45. This Order recognizes that

7

in the present post accident status of the facility,
the license itself does not include explicit provi-
sions or technical specifications for assuring the
continued maintenance of the plant in a safe,
stable condition . . . [P]rovisions [concerning oper-
ation] are now simply inapplicable to the facility
in its present post-accident condition. J.A. 40

Therefore, the Order modified the operating license to,
among other things, “prohibit venting or purging or other
treatment of the reactor building atmosphere” or other
waste disposal until “approved by the NRC” in accordance
with the November 21, 1979 Statement (44 Fed. Reg.
67738).

The second Order also proposed new “Appendix A”
Technical Specifications as a forma! amendment of the
license which was not to take effect until after holding any
requested hearing. (This Order did not change the license’s
Appendix B “Environmental Technical Specifications”
which set maximum limits on effluent releases and
discharges.) But paradoxically, the Appendix A changes
were also made immediately effective by amendment of
the July 20, 1979 Order for Modification of License, and
the NRC stated that the operation of this amendment
would not be stayed by a request for a hearing. The sub-
ject matter of any requested hearing was limited to: (a) the
new Appendix A technical specifications; and (b) “whether
the provisions of this Order would significantly affect the
quality of the environment.”

In response to this February 11, 1980 Order, hearings
were requested by the Environmental Coalition on
Nuclear Power, and by two individuals. See “Nuclear Ac-
cident and Recovery at Three Mile Island,” S. Report,
Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, June, 1980, Ser.

No. 96-14, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 208. One of these in-
dividuals was Respondent Steven Sholly. Hearings on this
Order had still not been held by the time the venting occur-
red, on June 28, 1980.

On March 27, 1980, the NRC published a notice in the
Federal Register on the “Availability of Environmental
Assessment for Decontamination of Three Mile Island
Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,” 45 Fed. Reg.
20265. This notice announced that a draft of an NRC staff
report “recommends that the building atmosphere be
decontaminated by purging to the environment” and that
it concludes, based “on its estimate of doses to the public,”
that “this action does not constitute a significant en-
vironmental impact.” This notice did not provide for any
public hearings, although it did allow written comments if
they were submitted by April 11, 1980 (i.e. within two
weeks of the publication date of the notice). A later “Ad-
dendum 2” to this draft report was made available on
April 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 21760, and again, written com-
ments were allowed if they were submitted within two
weeks, by April 17, 1980. Numerous people, including the
Governor of Pennsylvania, Richard Thornburgh, criticis-
ed these short periods for public comment, since the NRC
had taken an entire year in preparing its report, and since
there had not been any general publicity about the staff
report. As a consequence, the NRC published a notice en-
titled “Extension of Comment Periods,” 45 Fed. Reg.
30760, May 9, 1980, which extended the comment period
by one week from the publication of that notice, until May
16, 1980. See S.Rep., “Nuclear Accident,” supra at 206.

After this, the NRC staff issued its report, “Final En-
vironmental Assessment for Decontamination of the
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,”
NUREG-0662, May 1980 (Record, Vol. V, Tab 69). This

9

Final Assessment discussed several alternative methods for
decontaminating the TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere.
These methods included cryogenic processing (i.e. freez-
ing) of the gas, gas compression, a fluorocarbon absorp-
tion process developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
and other processes which would remove the radioactive
contaminants from the reactor containment building at-
mosphere for ultimate storage aid isolation from the en-
vironment. Each of these methods presented alternatives
which would meet in varying degrees the objective of
maintaining “radiation exposures, and releases of radioac-
tive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is
reasonably achievable”, 10 CFR Section 20.1(c). The NRC
staff also presented another alternative: to turn %n the
TMI-2 ventilation system so as to simply release the Kryp-
ton gas into the ambient air, along with all of the radioac-
tive particulates that would pass through the system’s
filters with the gas. These radioactive materials would then
be disseminated throughout the air and deposited on the
land, including valuable farm property, near the plant,
where they would remain as sources of radiation for
periods determined by the half-lives of each radionuclide.
The half-life of Kr-85 is over 10 years, that of Pu-239, for
example, over 24,000 years. The venting, or “purge”, alter-
native was clearly the cheapest of all the alternatives. It
was this alternative that the NRC staff recommended for
adoption by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the
grounds that it was the one which could be executed most
quickly.

No public hearings were ever held on the NRC staff
recommendation, though written coments from the public
and some interested parties were received. Some of these
were included in Volume 2 of the NRC staff report.
NUREG- 0662. The Comments from the public over-

10

whelmingly opposed the purge alternative, as did an
enraged public at a “meeting” held by the NRC on March
19, 1980. Record, Vol. IV, Tab 46, p. 16 and passim; J.A.
85.

On June 5, 1980, the five NRC Commissioners met to
consider the staff report. Although the public could attend
this meeting, there was no opportunity for any of the peo-
ple who would be affected by the NRC staff recommend-
dation, or any other members of the public, to be heard.
At this meeting a summary of a report prepared by the In-
stitute for Energy and Environmental Research, of
Heidelberg, FRG, was presented to Commissioner John F.
Ahearne, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion. This summary stated the conclusions of the
Institute’s final report, published on June 12, 1980, that
the proposed venting could cause four additional cancer
cases and an equivalent level of genetic damage.
Heidelberg Report, pp. 6 and 13.

On June 12, 1980, the NRC issued the two final orders
which gave rise to these consolidated lawsuits, authorizing
the venting of radioactive materials into the environment
as recommended by the NRC staff. The “Modification of
License” provided that the “Environmental Technical
Specifications,” (Appendix B of the TMI-2 Operating
License DPR-73, dated February 8, 1978) would be
amended to suspend the detailed limitations on releases of
radioactive materials contained in Section 2.1.2. Appendix
B of the license titled “Gaseous Effluents”. This affected
portion of the license is intended to implement the “design
objectives” set out in 10 CFR Part 50, App. I, § II (B& C)
and 10 CFR Section 50.36a for operating reactors, which
permit flexibility by allowing quarterly averaging of high
releases into the environment so as to assure that “unusual
operating conditions that temporarily result in releases

higher” than those normally allowed do not interfere with
“a dependable source of power.” 10 CFR Part 50, App I,
§ IV. The releases thus authorized by the NRC for the
TMI-2 cleanup therefore exceeded even the amounis
allowed for an operating reactor, even after allowing for
unusual operating conditions. See Pet 64a note.

The “Modification of License” was made “effective im-
mediately” (Pet 65a), and the venting of radioactive
materials was authorized starting 10 days after June 12 (Pet.
58a). The “Modification of License” specifically stated
that a request for a hearing would not stay its effectiveness
(Pet. 66a) and officially stated its summary conclusion that
the change in Appendix B of the Operating License “involves
no significant hazards consideration” (Pet. 64a, 65a).

The reason given for the finding of “no significant
hazards consideration” was not, however, a scientific or
technical one, but rather a legal argument. The NRC did
not contend that the releases would not exceed the approx-
imately 1300 curies of Kr-85 monthly that the reactor
would normally release while in operation, nor did the
NRC contend that the releases would not exceed the ap-
proximately 100 curies of Kr-85 monthly that the reactor
was releasing to the environment at that time. J.A.31. Nor
did the NRC argue that the offsite doses of radiation to
people in the Three Mile Island area would not increase
with the purging — as indeed they did increase.

Instead, the NRC simply contended that these increased
doses of radiation to the public would still fall “within the
limits that would apply if the reactor were operating nor-
mally” (Pet. 64a, emphasis added). The NRC then con-
cluded that since the doses resulting from venting would
not exceed the standards for radiation doses applicable to
an operating reactor and therefore would implement “the

same concept of limiti:
amount in mind, th
hazards consideration”
sider whether the ventir
damental standard for
of radioactive material
achievable” (ALARA)
very face the alternati\
the highest possible rel
than the lowest possibl
tended that a release c
reactor which yields d
(Pet. 65a) no greater t
dards for an operati,
hazards consideration”
a specified low amount
an absolute regulato
although it is not in fa
amount either for ope
this specific cleanup of

The NRC bifurcatec
that the “Modification
the release of radia
authorization was give
“Memorandum and Or
avoid a hearing by tl
release of radiation fro
quire licensing action |
authorizes releases of 1
of the reactor to pro
license does provide rel
any releases normally «
the license also provid
environment are to be
License No. DPR-73, I

13

The “Modification of License” was intended to provide
the NRC maximum flexibility in administering the venting
operation so as to allow releases of even greater amounts
of radiation to the environment than those already
substantial amounts nominally allowed by the operating
license. Since this required an explicit license amendment
it was isolated in a separate order. Petitioners have
mischaracterized the “Modification of License” as “replac-
ing” limits on releases of radiation with “new limits ex-
pressed in terms of actual radiation dosages.” U.S. Brief,
pp. 3 & 6. However the limits on dosages were neither
“new” nor did they relate to “actual” doses received by the
people around Three Mile Island. The dosage limits pro-
vided by the Modification of License, Pet. 65a, — 15
mrem skin dose and 5 mrem total body dose — are the
same as the limits provided by 10 CFR Part 50, App. I,
§ I1.B(2)(b) for annual offsite doses that will be
“deemed” to comply with the ALARA requirement for
operating light water reactors. The additional provision
that 20% of these limits should not be exceeded in any one
hour period compares with the reporting requirement con-
tained in id., § IV. A that attaches if half of these limits is
exceeded in any one quarter. It is readily apparent that the
dosage limits provided in the Modification of License are
very little different than those already applicable to TMI-2
under Appendix I of Part 50. Accordingly the NRC did
not “replace” the suspended release limits with “new”
dosage limits, but rather left the old dose standards
roughly the same, thereby leaving only half of the former
protection against radiation in place. Similarly, the dose
standards were not based on actual measurements of doses
to real individuals but rather were based on hypothetical
doses calculated from a limited number of sampling sta-
tions.

14

An independent team of scientists performed their own
radiation sampling and measurements during the full
course of the venting operation. These scientists tracked
the “plume” of materials released from TMI-2 and placed
their instruments at the point where the radioactive ef-
fluent reached ground level. J.A. 98-99. On the basis of
their independent measurements these scientists calculated
that 7 millicuries of Strontium-90 had been released —
four million times the amount expected by the NRC. J.A.
102,104. These independent scientists calculated that this
amount of Strontium-90 was sufficient to cause long term
health effects of 50 to 300 additional fatal cancers as well
as other genetic effects. J.A. 104. The people who will die
from these cancers and who will suffer from genetic
defects will have no recourse against petitioners for the
damages done them solely for purposes of cutting the ex-
pense of the cleanup. The trail of causation from these in-
juries back to petitioners’ action in June and July 1980
becomes lost in the myriad alternative causes of cancer
and genetic defects. The hearing which the Court of Ap-
peals below held to have been illegally denied was the only
recourse available to the people exposed to these dangers.

The question of whether the hearing on the release of
radiation from TMI-2 to the environment was illegally
denied by the NRC is not before this Court. That question
has not been appealed and therefore must be taken as
settled. It was unlawful for the NRC to deny a public hear-
ing on the decision to release radioactive materials from
TMI-2. The narrow question before this Court is whether
it was also unlawful for the NRC to refuse to include as
part of such a hearing the matters addressed in the
Modification of License, i.e. the suspension of the limits
on release of radiation contained in the operating license.

15
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Sentence One of § 189, which has been in effect since
1954, provides as follows:

In any proceeding under this Act, for the...
amending of any license... the Commission
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any per-
son whose interest may be affected by the pro-
ceeding...

A 1962 amendment to § 189 made the following changes
with respect to hearings on licensing actions under the
Atomic Energy Act:

Sentence Two — retained a mandatory hearing
requirement for construction permits while
eliminating mandatory (i.e. unrequested) hear-
ings on other licensing actions such as license
amendments;

Sentence Three — provided that in the case
where a hearing had not been requested such
other licensing actions could be taken only after
30 days’ prior notice and publication in the
Federal Register;

Sentence Four — excepted from this 30 days’
prior notice and publication requirement those
license amendments which the NRC finds to in-
volve no significant hazards consideration.

Petitioners in this case attempt to read into Sentence
Four language that Congress did not choose to write and
even petitioners admit “189(a) does not expressly
mention.” U.S. Brief 14. Petitioners argue that Sentence
Four might somehow be read to authorize the denial of a
requested hearing. But the arguments offered for this im-

16

aginative reading of § 189 lack cogency, boiling down
essentially to the non-sequitur assertion that to authorize
waiver of notice and publication when a hearing has not
been requested necessarily implies authority to deny a
hearing when one has been requested. This ignores the fact
that economy of prose if nothing else would lead a
legislative draftsman intent on authorizing the denial of a
requested hearing to simply say as much and thereby make
any reference to notice and publication unnecessary. The
ambiguity petitioners seek in § 189 as the essential founda-
tion for their case is simply not to be found there.

Petitioners also fail to present a single exampie of
legislative history or relevant administrative practice that
is in any way inconsistent with the principle that a mean-
ingful hearing must be held on request made at some time
after the initial decision is issued on a “no significant
hazards consideration” license amendment. Nor do peti-
tioners cite any legislative history or administrative prac-
tice whatsoever even bearing on the principle embodied in
the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case that to be mean-
ingful a hearing on an amendment involving irreversible
action such as release of radiation into the environment
must be held prior to final issuance and effectuation of the
license amendment.

Petitioners seek to supplement a statutory construction
argument riddled with empty reasoning, confusion and ir-
relevance by offering wholy disingenuous predictions
about the dire consequences that the relatively infrequent-
ly invoked due process rights involved in this proceeding
might speculatively have upon NRC administrative effi-
ciency. The speculation that props up this policy argument
is readily revealed to be as unreliable as petitioners’
idiosyncratic approach to statutory construction.

17

The due process rights at stake — infrequently invoked
as they may be — are nevertheless too important in the
context of protection of the public against hazards of
radiation to be so lightly revoked as by the judicial legisla-
tion sought by petitioners in this case. The unique and vast
discretion already reposed in the NRC over matters that
hazard grievous loss of life, liberty and property precludes
the judicial erosion of the minimal due process rights ac-
corded by a strict and faithful construction of the plain
language of the statute by which Congress sought to struc-
ture otherwise unbounded agency discretion’ with pro-
cedural safeguards.

ARGUMENT

The resolution of this case will turn on the interpreta-
tion given by the Court to the fourth sentence of § 189 of
the Atomic Energy Act. The fourth sentence of § 189
refers back to and can only be understood in reference to
the third sentence of § 189 which provides that in the
absense of a request for a hearing on certain licensing ac-
tions, a hearing may be omitted prior to issuance of the
amendment, but only after a 30 days’ notice and pv’slica-
tion of the NRC’s intent to so proceed without such an
(unrequested) hearing. The fourth sentence goes on to pro-
vide that “such 30 days’ notice and publication” may be
dispensed with, in the case of amendments, “upon a deter-
mination by the Commission that the amendment involves
no significant hazards consideration.” It is this language
which petitioners seek to turn into authority for denying
requested hearings upon a finding of “no significant
hazards consideration.” Such authority would provide a
powerful weapon in the hands of an agency seeking to con-
duct its affairs outside of public view. Strategic use of this
weapon can effectively paralyze representatives of the pub-
lic who would seek to contest controversial issues involving

18

nuclear safety by requiring them to litigate first in the
Court of Appeals an ultimate question of fact on a barren
record. Because of problems of timing, because a “court
more often than not will decline to grant emergency relief,”
651 F.2d 784 note 14, and because of the sheer expense of
litigation for public interest plaintiffs who stand to make
no financial gain from the litigation, even a victory in
Court will typically be Pyrrhic — as it was in this case.

In order to craft such a weapon from the otherwise in-
nocuous language of § 189 petitioners must of necessity
prevail in persuading this Court, as it failed to persuade
the Court of Appeals, of the following:

1. That the fourth sentence of § 189 contains
some ambiguity which might allow an inter-
pretation that the NRC has authority to deny a
requested hearing on the basis of a “no signifi-
cant hazards consideration” finding, and

2. Legislative history exists that indicates that
Congress intended § 189 to authorize the NRC to
deny a requested hearing on the basis of a “no
significant hazards consideration” finding, or

3. Consistent administrative practice inter-
preted § 189 to permit the NRC to deny a re-
quested hearing on the basis of a “no significant
hazards consideration” finding.

In addition petitioners attempt to fashion a “public policy”
argument in support of granting the NRC the authority it
seeks to deny duly requested hearings.

The arguments offered by the petitioners in their briefs
on these issues constitute an unbroken tissue of dis-
ingenuous assertion, speculation and non-sequitur. Each of
these arguments is answered in turn below.

19

1. The Plain Meaning of § 189 Forbids Any In-
terpretation That a Duly Requested Hearing May
Be Denied Upon a Summary Finding by the NRC
That a License Amendment Involves No Signifi-
cant Hazards Consideration.

in its brief presented to the Court of Appeals the United
States gave a cogent exegesis of the plain meaning of § 189
(Justice Department Brief pp. 4-8, 12-4. In its brief before
this Court the United States attempts to turn the tables to
assert that the “plain language” of the statute supports the
NRC’s position. (U.S. Brief 38). The petitioners’ “plain
language” arguments are as weak here as the United States’
arguments were strong below.

a) The principal argument relied upon by Met Ed and the
NRC below was that since a right to hearing is not mean-
ingful without an attendant right to notice, Congress’
authority to waive notice must have carried with it an im-
plicit waiver of the right to hearing. However, as the Court
of Appeals found, this seeming “paradox” is theoretical
only, it did not occur in this case, and it is unclear whether
it would ever occur. First the notice required under 10
CFR 2.106 probably must be given before an issued
amendment is effectuated so as to provide an opportunity
for appeal. Second, and more important the Government
in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b (1976) provides that
every meeting at which the Commissioners dispose of
agency business must be open to public observation. Ac-
cordingly the interested public and the press have ample
means to learn of decisions that might affect their in-
terests. Even the repealed 10 CFR 50.59 so heavily relied
upon by petitioners, in subsection(g) (J.A. 25-26) required
that both the request for a license change and the
authorization issued by the Commission must be made

20

part of the public record of the licensing proceeding.
Again any persons following the proceedings would have
actual notice of the licensing action.

Both briefs of petitioners cite the case of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) for the proposition that a right of hearing without
notice is meaningless. U.S. Brief 38; Met Ed Brief 24 note
18. But both briefs ignore the type of notice that is being
waived under § 189, i.e. publication in the Federal
Register. The significance of such notice was tellingly
described, on the very next page of text in Mullane from
that cited by petitioners, as follows.

It would be idle to pretend that publication
alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable means of
acquainting interested parties of the fact that
their rights are before the courts . . . [Compared
to] actual notice we are unable to regard this as
more than a feint . . . . Chance alone brings to
the attention... an advertisement in... a
newspaper. Id. 315 (sentence order modified).

Persons having the economic and scientific resources re-
quired for participation in a hearing on a license amend-
ment would not likely find out about the amendment by
casual perusal of the Federal Register. It is far more likely
that they would be monitoring the proceedings by which
they are affected and learn about the amendment directly
or indirectly from the public record. The purpose and ef-
fect of sentence four is to save 30 days of administrative
time on each of the overwhelming number of amendments
where it can be reasonably expected that no hearing will be
requested, i.e. whereof the NRC fairly determines there to
be “no significant hazards consideration.” Given peti-
tioners’ estimate of about 400 “no significant hazards con-

2!

sideration” amendments a year, this technique saves about
12,000 days of administrative time annually. The due pro-
cess cost of so expediting the overall administrative
licensing process is that any affected party seeking a hear-
ing On an irreversible action has the burden of requesting a
hearing promptly before the issued amendment is given ef-
fect.

The compromise struck by the fourth sentence of § 189
between administrative efficiency and administrative due
process has apparently been an eminently workable one.
In the 19 years since this provision was enacted only one
other dispute involving the provision has reached the
courts, Brooks v. AEC, 476 F.2d 924 (1973). Both in
Brooks and in the instant case the cause of the dispute over
the fourth sentence of § 189 was generated less by any am-
biguity in the provision itself than by the NRC’s attempt to
cover more serious violations of other provisions of § 189
that were coupled with the NRC’s violation of this provi-
sion.

b) The other argument offered by petitioners in hopes of
reading some ambiguity into § 189 is based on a non-
sequitur. The government’s brief at 36, the last two
sentences, states correctly that the words “such thirty days’
notice and publication” in the fourth sentence refers back
to the notice and publication required when the NRC in-
tends to issue a license amendment without a hearing. This
action is of course by the very terms of sentence three only
permitted “in the absence of a request” for a hearing.
However, petitioners conclude, in what must be a minor
classic of ilbgic, that if the NRC is allowed, upon making a
no significant hazards consideration finding, to dispense
with the notice required when a hearing has been omitted
because one has not been requested, “it necessarily follows
that the Commission is in fact entitled to dispense with a

22

hearing”. Ibid. The simple answer to this notion is that
sentence three provides that a hearing may indeed be
dispensed with when one has not been requested. Sentence
four says nothing about and does not remotely suggest the
possibility of dispensing with a hearing that has been re-
quested. Its use of the words “such notice” makes it
clear that sentence four is only a qualification of, and is
therefore limited to the subject matter of, sentence three,

Petitioners attempt to explain away this obvious rela-
tionship between sentences three and four of § 189 in a str-
ing of non-sequiturs. U.S. Brief 36 note 30. First peti-
tioners state that respondents’ recognition of this relation-
ship somehow conflicts with the interpretation of the
Court of Appeals. But petitioners do not explain how they
came to believe the Court of Appeals’ view differed from
that of the respondents. Several references are provided
(id. 37 & note 31) suggesting that the Court of Appeals
assumed the “sentence three” notice of NRC intent to issue
a license amendment without a hearing would also be the
first notice that a license amendment would issue at all.
This identity between the two possible kinds of notice not
only exists in fact, since the law nowhere requires any
other published notice of the action prior to the notice re-
quired by sentence three, but it is also the very premise
upon which petitioners argument discussed in 1(a) above is
based. If some notice other than that required in sentence
three were to be given by the NRC of the issusance of a
license amendment, then there would be no basis what-
soever for the argument that waiver of “sentence three”
notice implies waiver of hearing. However, in the argu-
ment of petitioners now under discussion a wholly dis-
ingenuous attempt is made to discover some error of in-
determinate consequence in the Court of Appeals’ decision
by suggesting that the notice of action without a hearing is

23:

somehow distinct from the notice of the action, without
anywhere stating that there is any practical difference bet-
ween the two. This attempt can only be understood as an
effort to import the confusion and ambiguities of peti-
tioners’ own arguments into the statute.

Next (id. 37 note 30) petitioners seek to base a similarly
confused argument on the use of the word “any” in the
sentence four phrase that the “Commission may dispense
with such thirty day notice and publication with respect to
any application for an amendment...” It requires no
elaborate argument to show that the word “any”, just as
the whole sentence, is qualified by the words “such notice”
which in turn refer back to the waiver of hearing when one
is not requested per sentence three. So again an attempt to
find ambiguity through analysis of the words of the statute
leads nowhere.

Next petitioners state that “respondents’ suggestion fails
to account for” the omission of the issuance of an
operating license from the coverage of sentence four. (Id
note 30.) The simple answer to this argument is that the
omission accounts for itself. It is only too obvious that an
operating license could never under any circumstances “in-
volve no significant hazards consideration” and therefore
there is no need to include operating licenses within the
scope of sentence four.

Finally petitioners close out this pointless string of
arguments on the plain meaning by repeating the ever-
ready assertion that the legislative history of § 189 “adopts
the Commission’s practice under 10 CFR 50.59.” Id. This
assertion is irrelevant to a discussion of the plain meaning
of § 189 and is dealt with below. Legislative history —
even if it did support petitioners’ interpretation, as 10 CFR
50.59 fails to do — could not create ambiguity in the text

24

of the statute. This exhausts the arguments proffered by
petitioners to undermine the clear and plain meaning of
sentence four. In their lack of persuasiveness, and even
logic, these frivolous arguments only serve to reinforce the
plain meaning which a simple reading of sentence four
unambiguously conveys, i.e. that sentence four of § 189
pertains to notice and publication and has nothing remote-
ly to do with authorizing the denial of a duly requested
hearing on a license amendment.

2. The Legislative History of § 189 Lends No
Support to the Notion That Congress Intended
to Authorize the NRC to Deny a Duly Requested
Hearing on the Basis of a “No Significant
Hazards Consideration” Finding.

Petitioners devote the greatest portion of their argument
to a discussion of legislative history. U.S. Brief 15-35.
Although many fragments from the legislative record are
quoted and discussed nothing is found to modify the con-
clusion of an exhaustive discussion of the legislative
history of § 189, set forth in the brief of the United
States before the Court of Appeals, explaining the view
that § 189 does not authorize the NRC to deny a duly re-
quested hearing:

The legislative history of the 1962 amendment is
the most compelling reason for our holding this
view. Throughout the legislative history, at
crucial points, are authoritative statements that
the effect of the amendment would be only to
eliminate hearings when none was requested. It
was repeatedly said that the amendment would
not affect the right of any person to obtain a
hearing on request. Memorandum of Respon-
dent United States of America 14;

25

In fact, as admitted by petitioners, the legislative history
on sentence four of § 189 is sparse. U.S. Brief 34. Most of
the discussion of legislative history presented by peti-
tioners is simply padding in no way inconsistent with the
conclusion of the United States quoted immediately
above. Once this padding is pared away petitioners case is
seen to depend upon the following simple, though
untenable, chain of argument:

a) The Committee Report statement that the
“significant hazards consideration . . . criterion
is presently being applied by the Commission
under the terms of AEC Regulation 50.59” is
asserted by petitioners to “incorporate by
reference” all of 50.59, U.S. Brief 32, 34, rather
than at best simply adopt the administrative in-
terpretation of the “significant hazards con-
sideration” criterion apparently borrowed by
Congress from 50.59.

b) Regulation 50.59 and the Vollecitos deci-
sion which it codified is asserted to stand for the
proposition that a duly requested hearing can be
denied by the NRC on a license amendment
found by the NRC to involve no “significant
hazards consideration.”

Proposition (a) above requires little discussion to refute
the wildly expansive claim made by petitioners for what is
rather modest language. There is simply no indication
anywhere in the legislative history that Congress intended
to adopt all of 10 CFR 50.59 (1963) by reference when it
mentioned that the “significant hazards consideration”
criterion adopted by Congress in sentence four of § 189 is
also applied by the NRC under 50.59. The purpose of
Congress in including this brief allusion to 50.59 is clear

and unexceptionabl
that the term of a
cumulated a fuller

ferent context of 5
helpful reference w

While a simple re
cient to reveal that t
reference” 50.59 int
were such an intent
Vallecitos decision
the proposition tha
hearing upon maki
tion” finding.

Both Vallecitos a
datory hearing req

amendments of § 18
proceeding, i.e. on
Both the Vallecitos «
1960) and the new 1
9, 1962) were intenc
hearings on every li
requested. Both co

should order a heari
quested by an affe
50.59 anywhere sug
denied on the basis «
tion” finding. Since
required the holding
been unthinkable fo
to denying requestec
ment to that effect.
codify the Vallecitc
unrequested, hearin
find no “significant

27

result of the fourth sentence of § 189 this would mean that
affected persons would, theoretically, not necessarily have
prior notice of the authorization of the changes permitted
under the 50.59 provisions, while the right to a requested
hearing would remain unchanged. In practice however it
was clear that the Vallecitos approach, codified in 50.59,
provided both notice and opportunity for hearing. The
best evidence of the NRC’s practice under the Vallecitos
decision are actions taken with respect to license amend-
ments in the Vallecitos proceeding itself subsequent to the
November 18, 1960 decision later codified as 50.59. For
example, a September 1, 1961 license Amendment N. 17
to the Vallecitos license DPR-1 stated that,

prior public notice of proposed issuance of this
amendment is not necessary in the public interest
since [it] would not present any substantial
change in the hazards to the health and safety of
the public... .

In accordance with the Commission’s rules of
practice (10 CFR Part 2) the Commission will
direct the holding of a formal hearing on the
matter of issuance of the license amendment
upon receipt of a request therefor from the
licensee or an intervenor within 30 days after the
issuance of the amendment. 26 Fed. Reg. 8469.

This administrative practice makes clear that the NRC
accorded a hearing upon request after Vallecitos on the
kinds of issues that presented no significant hazards con-
sideration. That Congress did not “incorporate by
reference” § 50.59 in its statutory scheme did not therefore
mean that Congress disapproved the Commission’s prac-
tices — the straw man that petitioners would set up. See
U.S. Brief 34 note 27. Congress simply achieved a similar

28

result in a different manner. Once sentence three did away
altogether with mandatory hearings past the construction
permit stage, 50.59 no longer had the same pertinence to
NRC proceedings that it had before the 1962 amendments
and the portions relevant to this proceeding were eventual-

ly repealed.

Finally, the notion that “the court of appeals’ interpreta-
tion of the legislative history . . . fails to ascribe any in-
dependent purpose or effect to the fourth sentence” of
§ 189 is simply absurd. See U.S. Brief 33. The Court of
Appeals gave to the fourth sentence precisely the effect its
words and Congress intended, i.e. to permit the NRC to
waive notice and publication of amendments found to in-
volve no significant hazards consideration. If Congress
had intended to permit the NRC to deny a requested hear-
ing as well as waive notice and publication it could easily
have found the words to do so.

3. The NRC’s Own Administrative Practice
Does Not Support Its Denial of a Requested
Hearing Prior to Taking an Irreversible Act Pur-
suant to a License Amendment Found By the
NRC to Involve “No Significant Hazards Con-
sideration.”

Petitioners raise the issue that the “court of appeals er-
roneously failed to defer to the Commission’s long-
standing interpretation of Section 189(a).” U.S. Brief 39.
However the administrative practice offered in support of
this proposition simply will not bear the weight assigned to
it. Petitioners rely again principally upon the Vallecitos
decision and its codification in 50.59 which as shown
above both addressed the problem of mandatory, unre-
quested hearings and did not at all suggest that the NRC
had authority to deny requested hearings. Met Ed Brief

29

27. At the time of this administr ative practice the only pro-
blem the NRC had encountered concerning its single con-
tested proceeding was the NRC’s own failure to provide
adequate notice and hearing which, as Intervenors noted,
subjected the agency to considerable attack in Congress.
Met Ed Brief 13.

Aside from these two over-used props to petitioners’
case, both of which actually predated the enactment of
sentence four and accordingly could be of no use in
discovering administrative practice under that statute,
petitioners offer very little that can be considered even
relevant to the interpretation of sentence four.

Intevenors cite one lonely example of pure dicta from an
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decision which sup-
ports the petitioners’ interpretation in this case. Met Ed
Brief 29-30. But this decision is simply not the practice of
the Commission itself which might be deferred to by a
court. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board members are
selected from outside the agency and do not include
members of the Commission. Cf. 10 CFR 1.11 & 2.721.
They do not form a permanent administrative organ
creating a body of precedent out of a coherent fund of ex-
perience, but rather are selected from a panel to sit as ad
hoc boards constituted for particular licensing hearings.
The boards are not involved in administering the statute
but rather take evidence and issue decisions on technical
matters. One statement, which was in fact dicta, from one
of these part time ad hoc boards in 1974 is not the kind of
administrative practice that might justify the NRC’s un-
precedented denial of a requested hearing in this case.

From the Commission itself petitioners can only offer
the bare statement that “Section 189 does permit im-
mediate effectiveness” of amendments found to involve

30

“no significant hazards consideration.” Met Ed Brief 29.
Of course this statement says no more than that prior
notice may be waived when issuing an amendment pur-
suant to the fourth sentence of § 189. Intervenor goes on
io claim that “the Commission has consistently applied its
interpretation of the Act thousands of times . . . to make
license amendments effective immediately without notice
or opportunity for a prior hearing.” Ibid. The sense in
which this statement is partially true lends no support to
petitioners’ attempt to overturn the decision of the Court
of Appeals. There is no dispute that the NRC has authori-
ty to make “license amendments effective immediately
without notice.” Similarly the proposition that a prior
hearing may also be omitted can be made literally true if
“prior” means only prior to the authorization that may be
issued without notice and does not refer to the case where
a hearing may have been requested. Taken in any other
sense this assertion is siasoly untrue. Petitioners have been
unable to provide a‘1y single instance before Three Miie
Island where the Commission denied a hearing that had
been duly requested or where request for a hearing on an
irreversible action did not suspend the effectiveness of the
amendment. This would be the only kind of administrative
practice relevant to this case, and it simply does not exist.

Because the petitioners offer, as examples of ad-
ministrative practice supportive of their attempt to over-
turn the Court of Appeals’ decision, matters that are wholly
irrelevant to the issues at stake in this case it is important,
finally, to set forth very clearly just what are the areas of
difference between petitioners and respondents.

Respondents clearly do not contend that where no hear-
ing has been requested prior to the authorization of a “no
significant hazards consideration” license amendment the
NRC must hold a hearing prior to the authorization. But

31

this nevertheless apparently forms tthe straw man at
which much of petitioners’ argument is misdirected.
Respondents simply contend, first, that in every case
where an affected party duly requests a hearing on a
license amendment a hearing cannot be denied on the
grounds of a “no significant hazards consideration” fin-
ding. Numerous references to the right to some hearing in
the petitioners’ briefs suggests that the petitioners do not
disagree with this proposition. See U.S. Brief pp. 21, 35
notes 28 (“opportunity to intervene does not necessarily re-
quire a hearing prior to initial action by the Commission”)
and 29 (§ 189 fourth sentence “does not necessarily require
that a hearing be held prior to action by the Commission”)
Met Ed Brief 16 line 4, 17 line 13, 21 lines 5-6, 25 note 21
lines 3-5. Both briefs point out that the NKC’s practice is
that it “remains willing to entertain requests for a hearing
filed after” it issues a license amendment. U.S. Brief 40
and note 33; Met Ed Brief 29. In fact the NRC followed its
practice of offering some hearing in this very case.The
problem in this case is that the offer of hearing was totally
meaningless because it involved actions that were irreversi-
ble and the NRC made the novel ruling that a request for a
hearing would not stay the effectiveness of the amend-
ment. Pet. 66a. There is nothing in any legislative history
even suggested by petitioners or any administrative prac-
tice of any kind prior to 1980 which would authorize the
NRC to issue such a ruling under any circumstances, much
less where the action authorized is irreversible.

Respondents herein have recognized from the beginning
that where a “no significant hazards consideration” find-
ing is made the basis for waiving notice, and no prior re-
quest has been made for a hearing, it will not be necesary
under § 189 for the NRC to hold a hearing priofto “initial
action approving the amendment” by the NRC.
Respondents have insisted only that a hearing on an ir-

52

reversible action be held on request prior to the final is-
suance of the amendment (after any stay) and prior to the
licensee’s taking any irreversible action pursuant to the
amendment. Therefore it appears that the “Argument” of
petitioners stated at pp. iii & 15 of the United States’ Brief
is in no way inconsistent with the respondents’ position
consistently held in the Court of Appeals and before this
Court and can be easily reconciled with the Court of Ap-
peals’ holding on the facts of this case. The hearing re-
quired to be held upon request by § 189 in the case of a
“no significant hazards consideration” finding may be
held “after initial action approving the amendment” pro-
vided it is held prior to final issuance and effectuation of
the amendment. In the case presently before this Court the
NRC contemplated a hearing only after the full and ir-
reveSible effectuation of the admendment by release of
radioactive materials into the environment. Such a hearing
would have been nothing other than meaningless.

Petitioners attempt to explain away the absurdity of
holding a hearing on an action irreversibly taken, as the
NRC proposed to do in this case, with the not quite rele-
vant observation that the “vast majority of operating
license amendments are reversible.” Met Ed Brief 34.
While it may very well be true that “[a]Jmendments deter-
mined to entail no significant hazards considerations are
not generally irreversible, thereby making meaningful the
opportunity to seek an after-the-fact hearing and judicial
review,” U.S. Brief 40 note 34, it is just as clear that for
those albeit few cases where the action authorized by an
amendment will be irreversible a hearing after effectuation
of the amendment will be meaningless. This case is not one
of the “vast majority” but rather involves, as conceded by
petitioners (Met Ed Brief 34), an action that was irreversi-
ble. Accordingly the interesting question of whether or not
a hearing on an amendment authorizing an action that is

33

not irreversible may be held after effectuation of the
amendment is not presently before the Court on the facts
of this case. The only question is whether a hearing
granted after effectuation of an admittedly irreversible ac-
tion is a meaningful hearing, assuming — as it appears —
that petitioners concede some hearing to be required by
§ 189. As the Court of Appeals simply held,’§ 189(a) re-
quired a hearing upon request on the Venting Order before
it went into effect; a hearing after the venting had been
completed would not have satisfied the statute’s require-
ment.” 651 F.Zd 791 note 28. See also Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972)

4. This Court’s Upholding of the Plain Meaning
of § 189 So As To Accord Requested Hearings
on “No Significant Hazards Consideration”
Amendments Involving Irreversible Action Will
Not Introduce The Overwhelming Ad-
ministrative Burdens Imagined By Petitioners

Petitioners attempt to fashion a public policy argument
that if § 189 is interpreted as the Court of Appeals did in-
terpret it below to require a hearing when requested on a
“no significant hazards consideration” amendment, there
will as a result occur such a flood of hearing requests as to
“threaten the viability of the existing system of
regulation.” U.S. Brief 41. With all respect, this argument
is patent nonsense. Petitioners mention no requests for
hearings on “no significant hazards consideration amend-
ments” since the November 19, 1980 decision in this case.
Petitioners fail to cite one instance other than this case
where intervenors have ever requested a hearing on a “no
significant hazards consideration” amendment, except for
the Consumers Power Co. case where the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board found that the hazards considerations
could be significant and granted a hearing, 7 AEC 297,

34

298 (1974). Met Ed Brief 29-30. The Court of Appeals rul-
ing in this case has in fact been the law of the District of
Columbia Circuit since the Brooks decision in 1973
without stirring a flood of hearing requests. Since peti-
tioners seemingly concede that some hearing is required,
just not a prior hearing, the grant of a meaningfully timely
hearing will not require more resources but simply better
planning. Finally, this case only deals with amendments
involving irreversible action. Petitioners themselves con-
cede that such amendments are relatively rare. This con-
cession considerably deflates their assertions about the
vast consequences of the decision in this case. Peti‘ioners’
argument about the dire consequences of the Court of Ap-
peals decision simply does not hold up against actual ex-
perience or petitioners’ own statements about the rarity of
irreversible amendments.

Not only do the circumstances of this case — a request
for a hearing on a “no significant hazards consideration”
amendment which is irreversible — seldom arise, but
numerous techniques exist for expediting the NRC pro-
ceedings which are in no way compromised by the Court
of Appeals’ decision. In any situation where the “public
health, safety or interest so requires,” the NRC is permit-
ted by regulation to make a license modification effective
immediately. See 10 CFR § 2.204. The NRC enforces a
rigorous standing requirement for intervenors. 10 CFR
§ 2.714.

Hearing examiners have authority to dispose of issues
on the pleadings where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, 10 CFR § 2.749 and may otherwise expedite
proceedings, e.g. 10 CFR §§ 2.757, 2.761.

The most telling reason why the fears proffered by the
’ NRC may be substantially discounted was well stated by

35

then Circuit Judge Burger in the context of standing
before the FCC. The following sage observation of Chief
Justice Burger is equally applicable to the petitioners’
“parade of fantasized horrors” in this case:

The fears of regulatory agencies that their pro-
cesses will be inundated by expansion of standing
criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining
factor is the expense of participation in the ad-
ministrative process, an economic reality which
will operate to limit the number of those who will
seek participation; legal and related expenses of
administrative proceedings are such that even
those with large economic interests find the costs
burdensome. Moreover, the listening public
seeking intervention in a license renewal pro-
ceeding cannot attract lawyers to represent their
cause by the prospect of lucrative contingent
fees, as can be done, for example, in rate cases.
Office of Communication of the United Church
ot Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir.
1966)

Petitioners’ “man bites dog” report that such intervenors
are going to “threaten the viability of the existing system
of regulation of nuclear power production, power produc-
tion itself, or both,” U.S. Brief 41, strains credulity.

36

5. The Important Interests of Due Process and
Fundamental Fairness Require That § 189 Be
Strictly and Faithfully Construed to Preserve the
Public’s Right to a Hearing Before Suffering the
Irreversible Effects of Radiation, In the Absence
of Clear and Unmistakable Evidence of Congres-
sional Intent To Deny That Right.

The public has a profound interest in NRC licensing ac-
tions. In the course of deliberation on the Atomic Energy
Act, Senator Humphrey stated:

I think it is fair to say that no single development
in the nation is more public in nature than the
atomic development, for it has been paid for by
all the taxpayers. 100 Cong. Rec. 10730 (1954).

Because of the continuing symbiotic relationship between
government and the nuclear industry (see findings of fact
in Oklahoma v. Bernstein, 5 Media L. Rep. 2313 (1980))
government has more direct responsibility for injuries suf-
fered by the public in the context of nuclear regulation
than would be the case ii: other regulatory contexts.

Because of the peculiar nature of radiation, prior
regulation to prevent releases of radiation is the chief
remedy available to those subjected to its hazards. The
NRC has been given vast discretion to balance risks and
benefits in this area, and the procedural rights granted the
public constitute the chief means by which Congress has
structured the discretion it has delegated to the NRC.
Although the procedural rights at stake in this case have
been accorded by statute, they are of a kind traditionally
considered fundamental and have been accorded a high
degree of protection by this Court.

37

i) The hearing right denied by the NRC was essential to
elemental fairness and due process for those affected by
the radiation releases.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits the Federal government from depriving any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
The intentional release of radioactive materials into the
earth’s atmosphere, whether from the containment
building of the partially melted-down Three Mile Island
reactor or from any operating power reactor, adversely af-
fects human life, burdening the public with debilitating
disease and afflicting the genetic heritage of humanity
with irreversible mutations and chromosomal aberrations.
The assault of radiation on the human cell is a sub-
microscopic event, its consequences, though serious, are
remote in time and attributable to diverse possible
etiologies. Accordingly, the precise causal relation-
ship between known quantities of radicactive mate-
rials dispersed into the environment and any particu-
lar human pathology is virtually unprovable, though
epidemiological, biostatistical, and public health studies
are showing that the generalized effects of low level radia-
tion are seriously underestimated by the radiological
theories of the NRC.

Though the injury inflicted upon life, liberty and pro-
perty interests by releases of radioactive materials into the
petitioners’ environment may not be easily identified to
particular individuals, there is no uncertainty that life in
human cells will be damaged by this radiation,? the liberty

“(I]t is generally believed that any exposure to radiation, however
small, has adverse genetic effects and those effects are cumulative.”
Green, Safety Determination in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical
View,” 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633, 645 (1968).

38

to be free of disease may well be infringed, and nearby
property values may decline as animals die and suffer in-
jury. Meanwhile, those who evacuated their homes to
avoid possible injuries are deprived of their liberty of
movement and peace of mind. As the Supreme Court rul-
ed in Duke Power in light of the uncertainties about its
health and genetic effects, the emission of radiation itself
is a cognizable present injury to these interests. Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). The nature of the interests involved
here, especially protection from physical assault by radia-
tion, are profound. There are few Due Process cases that
involve tort-like interferences with life and liberty interests
in the physical integrity of the person because,

prior hearings might well be dispensed with in
many circumstances in which the State’s conduct,
if not adequately justified, would constitute a
common-law tort. This would leave the injured
plaintiff in precisely the same posture as a
common-law plaintiff.... Monaghan, “Of
‘Liberty’ and ‘Property,’” 62 Cornell L.R. 405,
431 (1977).

However, the nature of low level radiation injuries, the
long latency period and problems of proving causation all
but preclude tort recovery outside the workplace, except in
such an exceptional factual circumstance as was present in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 585 F.Supp. 566 (W.D.
Okla. 1979), virtually the sole tort recovery for radiation
injury (autopsy conducted shortly after plutonium facility
worker’s substantial off-site contamination, which was
discovered by monitors at workplace).

For infliction of physical injury by radiation, the only
effective way to accord a potential radiation victim due

39

process is to provide access to a hearing before the injury
is inflicted. In § 189 Congress has struck a delicate balance
between due process and administrative efficiency that has
survived unchanged since 1962 through the most active
period of reactor licensing of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The
basic procedural rights accorded by Congress cannot be
eroded by administrative interpretation without raising
issues of constitutional import. This Court has stated:

The “right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though
it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our
society.” Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concur-
ring). The fundamental requirement of due pro-
cess is the opportunity to be heard “at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner.” Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959) the
Court held:

Where administrative action has raised serious
constitutional problems, the Court has assumed
that Congress . . . intended to afford those af-
fected by the action the traditional safeguards of
due process. (citations omitted) These cases
reflect the Court’s concern that traditional forms
of fair procedure not be restricted by implication
or without the most explicit action by the
Nation’s lawmakers, even in areas where it is
possible that the Constitution presents no inhibi-
tion. (emphasis added) ©

40

While injuries from non-natural low level radiation may
be a novel twentieth century phenomenon, the procedural
rights at stake in these cases are as ancient as the traditions
of a free people. “The history of liberty has largely been
the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, (1943)
(Frankfurter, J.). In a government of laws the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission must also be made subject to the
fundamental and minimal procedural safeguards accorded
by Congress to protect our traditional liberties. Not to do
this much in an area frought with political controversy is
to countenance and encourage the divisiveness, alienation
and stress that happens

. . . when a substantial number of people come
to believe that major decisions have been made
without their consent. If the social fabric is to
survive, the politics of manipulation and delega-
tion simply must be replaced by a politics of in-
formed consent. Wright, “Beyond Discretionary
Justice,” 81 Yale L.J. 575, 586 (1972)

The fallout of psychological stress and alienation which
resulted from the NRC’s handling of the situation underly-
ing this case is part of the record. In hearings on the
cleanup, Senator Simpson, Chairman of the Senate
Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee, noted, after hearing
“residents of the local population around Three Mile
Island,” that it was reported the NRC “approach was driv-
ing them batty.” J.A. 71. Senator Simpson sensed “a com-
munity which is already anxious as a result of the accident
and highly skeptical of the two organizations directly in-
volved in the cleanup; that is, the NRC and the utility.
Given this situation, it seems to me prudent if not essential
for the NRC to lay out in detail for full public review the
standards it expects the utility to meet and the means it will

41

use to ensure the compliance.” J.A. 72. The need for the
NRC to provide a formal means of participation in deci-
sion making about the TMI-2 cleanup was made clear by
two psychololgists. Dr. Bruce Dohrenwend, Head, Social
Psychiatry Research Unit, Columbia University pointed
out to the NRC prior to the venting the “local citizens
needs to be informed and to participate in the decisions on
atmospheric decontamination. He emphasized the rela-
tionship between information and participation and the
level of psychological stress within the population.” J.A.
90. Dr. Colman informed the NRC, after a sham “public
meeting” where the public had no apparent means for in-
fluencing decision making but was rather designed to
“sell” the public a decision already made:

As a Psychologist I am getting scared. Those
Meetings are rowdy .... I think unless some
mechanism can be developed so the people in
that area have a realistic understanding that they
are gaining control over the situation there by
having a clear effect on the Commission about its
decision, that anger level is going to keep on going.
Wherever it goes, I don’t want to speculate, but it
is not healthy, it is not good.

These behavioral scientists are expressing in the language
of their own disciplines what is perhaps the fundamental
constitutive principle of our democratic polity. As a
leading Constitutional law scholar has expressed it in
discussing the due process right to a prior hearing,

rights to interchange express the elementary idea
that to be a person rather than a thing is at least
to be consulted about what is to be done with
one. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1978) 503.

42

ii) The public has virtually no practical recourse
for protection against injurious releases of radia-
tion upon them other than a prior NRC hearing.

The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, has placed vast
powers in the hands of the five person Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, an independent agency whose members are
appointed to five year terms by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, 42 U.S.C. 5841(b)
and (c). The Atomic Energy Act grants the NRC broad
rule-making and adjudicatory powers under “a regulatory
scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which
broad responsibility is reposed in the administering agen-
cy, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall
proceed in achieving the statutory objectives”, Siegel v.
AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

The power granted the NRC under the Atomic Energy
Act in the area of protection against radiation hazards
wholly preempts the police powers of state and local
governments, 42 U.S.C. 2021(k); Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971)
aff'd mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Therefore, the public
must turn to the Federal government, and, within the
Federal government, to the NRC as virtually its sole
source of regulatory protection against radiation hazards.
Cf. Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, (1976); 42
U.S.C. 6903 (27) (1976); with 40 CFR 190.10 and 42
U.S.C. 7602(g) (Supp II, 1978).

The NRC is empowered by the “Price-Anderson Act”,
42 U.S.C. 2210(e) (1976) to confer a limitation of
liability on its licensees for any damages in excess of $560
million, a small fraction of the damage that could result
from a nuclear accident. See Duke Power v. Carolina En-
vironmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, (1978). For

43

the more insidious and less dramatic forms of radiation in-
juries caused by low level radiation, problems of proof,
e.g. Mahoney v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 823 (E.D.
Tenn.) aff'd 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir., 1964), and statutes of
limitations make any hope of receiving compensation for
injuries by damage suits at law highly speculative. The
public is accordingly not only reliant entirely upon the
NRC for its regulatory protection against radiation
hazards, but it is aiso largely dependent upon prior regula-
tion of hazards, as opposed to post hoc legal remedies for
damages, as a form of protection.

Notwithstandine such a scheme which combines in a
single agency vast responsibility for the welfare of the
public with a unique degree of untrammeled discretion, it
is nevertheless true that the remedies which the public has
been given in order to keep the NRC responsible have been
narrow and few. Unlike statutes such as the Clean Air Act
or the Safe Drinking Water Act which permit citizens’
suits, see Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile
Island, 619 F.2d 231, 242 note 12 (3rd Cir. 1980), the
Atomic Energy Act does not create any general public
right for enforcement of environmental standards against
users Of radioactive material, id. 237-39. Licensees of the
NRC are entirely shielded by the Agency from any direct
citizens’ actions in the courts under the Atomic Energy
Act. Preemption prevents the state from creating any
other rights enforceable in state courts. Pacific Legal
Foundation v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev.
Com., 472 F.Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1971). To protect
themselves from radiation hazards created by users of
radioactive materials, the public must rely upon the NRC
licensing and enforcement process. It is only in the narrow
framework of the NRC’s administrative proceedings that
the public is granted a forum within which it may attempt

44

to protect its interest in health and safety. Within this con-
text the public must conform to the rules and regulations
set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and may ap-
peal the final findings and rulings of the Commission only
to a Court of Appeals where those findings, rulings and in-
terpretations are accorded favorable presumptions of ac-
curacy, reasonability, and respect, and the scope of review
and opportunity for fact-finding is narrow. See e.g. Nader
v. NRC, 513 ¥.2d 1045, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
rights accorded the public by Congress in its broad delega-
tion of power to the NRC are exceedingly narrow,encom-
passing only the minimal due process rights of notice,
public adjudicatory hearing and participation contained in
§ 189. Short of electing a sympathetic president who might
gradually replace the NRC Commissioners or electing a
sympathetic Congress which might change the whole
statutory scheme for nuclear regulation, the only remedy
and protection which might be pursued by citizens, such as
the petitioners, residents in the vicinity of TMI-2, who
find themselves victim to the radiation hazards created by
an NRC licensee, is exercise of these narrow due process
rights accorded by § 189.

The authority under which the NRC exercises its discre-
tion to determine radiation hazards and to permit
degradation of the environment as a cost of producing
energy, is essentially similar to the legislative provisions —
which Justice Rehnquist would find to

violate the doctrine against uncanalized delega-
tions of legislative power

in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672, 675 (1980).

45

Where standards are as loose as those provided by the
Atomic Energy Act it is even more essential that all of the
procedural safeguards required by Congress be strictly en-
forced in agency decisionmaking. See K. Davis, I Ap-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, Section 3.15(b) (1978) pp.
209-11. In the present case the NRC is attempting to ex-
pand its discretion so as to weaken the most fundamental
of due process safeguards which were provided by Con-
gress as a guide to agency decision making in an area of in-
herent uncertainty. In lieu of providing firm standards to
guide the substantive decisionmaking of the NRC, Con-
gress at least structured agency procedure so as to assure
that the NRC would take into account all available infor-
mation by according the public the procedural rights of
notice and hearing and participation. In light of the infor-
mation presented in formal adjudicatory hearings Con-
gress expected the NRC to develop its own precedents,
standards and rules. However, in this case the NRC took
its very first decision in the uncharted area of a reactor ac-
cident cleanup without according those procedural rights
Congress erected to assure that decisions would be well-
informed and based on all available information. While
those rights cannot be restored, they may be vindicated by
affirming the declaratory judgment entered by the Court
of Appeals below.

46

CONCLUSION

There is no support in the plain meaning of § 189 of the
Atomic Energy Act, in its legislative history, in ad-
ministrative practice under the provision, in case prece-
dent, or in reason for the NRC’s contention that it can
deny, on the basis of a “no significant hazards considera-
tion” finding, the right of an affected person to have a du-
ly requested hearing prior to final issuance and effectua-
tion of a license amendment.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeais for the
District of Columbia, below, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT HAGER
Counsel of Record

DANIEL P. SHEEHAN
JOHN CLEWETT
Christic Institute
1324 North Capitol St.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 797-8106

Counsel for People Against
Nuclear Energy, et al.

September 2, 1981

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1552%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
