# Joint Appendix — United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 1016

## Text

JUL 31 1961

ALEXANU<:? L STEVAS,
.

Nos. 80-1640, 80-1656

In the Supreme Cuurt uf the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioners
V.

STEVEN SHOLLY, ET AL.

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.,
Petitioners
v.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO JHE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI FILED MARCH 30, 1981
AND APRIL 2, 1981
CERTIORARI GRANTED MAY 26, 1981

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1640

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioners
Vv.

STEVEN SHOLLY, ET AL.

No. 80-1656
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.,
Petitioners
V.

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1691) ......................... 1
Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1783))))))))) 8
Docket Entries (D.C. Cir. No. 80-1784) 15

10 C.F.R. Part 50, at 27 Fed. Reg. 5491 et seq. (June
9, 1962)—Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities—Technical Specifications 20

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Statement of
Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Program-
matic Environmental Impact Statement, November
21, 1979, published 44 Fed. Reg. 67738 (1979) .........

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated Feb-
ruary 11, 1980, in Metropolitan Edison Co. et al.
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), Dkt.
No. 50-820 at 45 Fed. Reg. 11282 (1980) ..................

Excerpts from NUREG-0482, Three Mile Island Nu-
clear Station, Unit 2, Technical Specifications, Ap-
pendix A to License No. DPR-7 333

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission “Order Denying
Motion for Reconsideration of CLJ-80-25 and Order
for Temporary Modification of License,” dated June
26, 1980, in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), Dkt. No. 50-320

Excerpt from General Public Utilities, Inc. “Planning
Study for Containment Entry and Decontamination,”
July 2, 1979, Sections 6. 0-6. 1.2

Excerpts from Three Mile Island Cleanup,“ Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of
the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public
Works, November 9, 1979, Transcript pages 1-2, 5-7,
F nn ....

Excerpts from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
Response to Letters from Senators Hart and sal
son, January 2, 1980, pages 2-3 sis

Excerpts from General Public Utilities, Inc.’s Response
to Questions from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, January 4, 1980, page ..................22-...--..<--+-

Excerpts from Report of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission’s Special Task Force, “Evaluation and Clean-
up Activities at Three Mile Island,” February 28,
1980, pages IV-5, IV-9, and IV-22nd!˖e.mn! eee

36

39

48

55

70

78

79

80

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
Page

Excerpt from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
Response to Questions from Senators Hart and Simp-
ESCA SARE ̃ ¾ 0. 84

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted
by tke U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March
D ¼ TTT. 85

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March
e ̃ TI.... 86

Excerpt from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Staff’s “Final Environmental Assessment for Decon-
tamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2, Reactor
Building Atmosphere,” NUREG-0662, May, 1980,
seen RAO rl 88

Memorandum from Donald P. bin to William M.
Regan, Jr. of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Staff regarding telephone call from Dr. Bruce P.
Dohrenwend, May 1, 1980 Ue De a 90

Excerpt from Transcript of Public Hearing Conducted
by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 5,

RLU NEE SS TM RO EOS 93
Excerpt from Transcript of Meeting of Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safety, June 10, 1980, pages 5-7.... 94

“Measurement of Strontium 90 Released in Venting of
the TMI Unit 2 Containment Atmosphere: June 28-
July 11, 1980,” by Joan Harvey, Ph. D., Richard
Piccione, Ph. D., and Daniel Pisello, Ph. D., reprinted
in Final Programmatic Environmental Impact State-
ment related to decontamination and disposal of
radioactive wastes resulting from March 28, 1979,
accident, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2,

March 1981, pp. A-178 to A-180 _ oo... 97
Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari a“
80-1640) 109

Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (No.
80-1656) 110

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

(The opinion (Pet. App. la-27a) and judgment (id. at
47a-48a) of the court of appeals, the statement dis-
senting from the denial of rehearing en banc (id. at
29a-46a), the June 12, 1980 “Memorandum and
Order” of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (id.
at 49a-Gla) and the Commission's June 12, 1980,
“Order for Temporary Modification of License” (id.
at 62a-67a) are printed as appendices to the petition
for a writ of certiorari in No. 80-1640)

COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES
D.C. Cir. No. 80-1691

STEVEN SHOLLY, DONALD E. HOSSLER, PETITIONERS
V.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, ET AL., and the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL., INTERVENORS

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS
06-23-80 Petitioners’ petition for review of an order of the
NRC

06-24-80 Certified copy of petition for review was mailed to
the NRC & Attorney General

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion for injunctive, declaratory and
other relief

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion requesting expeditious consid-
eration of petition for review of final NRC orders

6-24-80 Petitioners’ motion for argument and hearing on
motions

6-25-80 Motion of Metropolitan Edison Company, et al.
for leave to intervene

6-26-80 Respondent’s (USA) response to petitioners’ motion
for injunction pending appeal

6-26-80 Respondent’s (NRC) opposition to petitioners’ mo-
tion for injunction pending appeal (Volumes I and II of
a blue book attached)

6-26-80 Certified Index to Record
6-26-80 Clerk’s order - granting the motion of Metropolitan
Edison Company, et al. for leave to intervene

(1)

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

6-27-80 Intervenor's opposition to motion for an injunction
pendente Lite and other relief

6-27-80 Per Curiam order denying the motion for oral argu-
ment and denying the motion for injunctive, declaratory
and other relief, and granting motion for expeditious
consideration. The certified index to record and briefs of
the parties shall be filed under a schedule to be developed
by the parties provided only that the final brief is filed no
later than August 29, 1980; CJ Wright, Tamm (who did
not participate) and MacKinnon, CJs

6-27-80 Petitioners’ petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc

6-27-80 Petitioners’ motion requesting expeditious consider-
ation of petition for rehearing

6-27-80 Per Curiam order denying petitioners’ petition for
rehearing; CJ Wright and MacKinnon, CJ

6-27-80 Per Curiam order, en banc, denying petitioners’
suggestion for rehearing en banc; CJ Wright; McGowan,
Tamm, Robinson, MacKinnon, Robb, Wilkey, Wald, Mikva
and Edwards, CJs

6-28-80 Petitioners’ motion to amend petition and motion
for 5 day injunction pendente lite to allow oral argument
on petitioners’ motion for an order of mandamus direct-
ing the holding of public nuclear regulatory hearing, etc.

6-28-80 Petitioners’ formal demand for an adjudicatory
hearing prior to venting gases from Three Mile Island
Unit 2

6-28-80 Petitioners’ motion for 5 day TRO stopping the
effectuation of the NRC’s two 6/12/80 orders until
7/3/80 at 5:00 PM

6-28-80 Per Curiam order denying petitioners’ motion to
amend petition, etc; petitioners’ formal demand, etc; and
petitioners’ motion for 5 days TRO, etc.; CJ Wright; Mac-
Kinnon and Wilkey, Cs

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

7-2-80 Intervenor’s notice of filing of executed affidavit of
Michael P. Morrell

07-16-80 Intervenor’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691,
80-1783 & 80-1784

7-17-80 NRC's motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783
& 80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

7-28-80 Clerk's order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783
and 80-1784

7-81-80 Clerk’s order that the following briefing schedule is
approved :
Petitioners main brief—8/1/80; Respondents’ brief—
20 days after petitioners’ brief; Intervenors’ brief—5
days after respondents’ brief; Reply brief—8/29/80

07-81-80 Petitioners’ brief

07-31-80 Appendix

07-31-80 Exhibit

08-08-80 Intervenors’ motion to dismiss petitions and to
suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-15-80 Petitioners’ opposition to intervenors’ motion to
dismiss and suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-18-80 NRC’s response to motion to dismiss

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-
pend briefing and oral argument and all briefing and

oral argument are held in abeyance pending consideration
by the Court on the pending motion to dismiss

08-20-80 Intervenors' reply to petitioners’ opposition to mo-
tion to dismiss

08-20-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/18/80
is vacated; the briefing will proceed on the previous
schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80; Oral
argument on intervenors’ motion to dismiss will also be
heard on 9/8/80

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS
08-22-80 Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file brief in
typewritten form, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk's order granting respondent’s (US) motion
to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times
are allotted for the oral argument of these cases: Peti-
tioners—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes (Vacated
9-5-80)

08-26-80 Intervenors’ brief
08-26-80 Intervenors’ appendix
08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-00 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to re-allocate time allotted for oral
argument

09-03-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion dated Au-
gust 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for
leave to file reply brief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brief

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,
1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted
for the oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—
20 minutes; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ’s

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

09-10-80 Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)
11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

11-19-80 Judgment by the Court, that the Court declares
that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing
in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-
cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein this
date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees
12-03-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion
for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to raotion for award of at-
torneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed
by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-86 NRC's motion for leave to file petition for rehear-
ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file motion for issuance
of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioner's motion to award costs as penalty for
frivolous petition for rehearing

12-19-80 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-
tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file
the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the Clerk
is directed to file the petition for rehearing and sug-
gestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;
and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response
to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing, en banc; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ’s ;

6

DATE FILINGS PROCEEDINGS

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing—filed per above order

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-
ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per
order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 NRC's Nsponse to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing, en
bance—filed per order of 1-6-81

61-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file
the motion of the NRC for stay of mandate; and that
the Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court’s
mandate through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva
and Edwards, CJ’s

91-06-81 NRC's motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed
per above order

01-06-81 Petitioner's opposition to NRC’s motion to stay is-
suance of mandate

02-08-81 NRC’s motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay
mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-
date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the
pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-
hearing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

03-08-81 Per curiam order by this Court amending the opin-
ion for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see or-
der for details).

08-04-81 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is
hereby denied.

03-04-81 Circuit Judge Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wil-
key would grant rehearing en banc. Their statement is
attached (Opinion form).

08-04-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions
for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities; the afore-
said petitions are denied.

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

02-12-81 Intervenors' motion to stay issuance of mandate
pending applications for certiorari

08-18-81 NRC's motion for further extension of stay of
mandate

03-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitioners’ motion for an
award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’
motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,
Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-08-81 Notice from Clerk, SC that petition for writ of cer-
tiorari was filed on 8/30/81 in SC No. 80-1640

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court
that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed on March
80, 1981 in SC No. 80-1640 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the
issuance of mandate (filed by intervenors Metropolitan
Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and the
Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein prior
to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition
for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on
April 2, 1981

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the opinion filed on
11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order for
details).

04-29-81 ORDERED, BY THE Court that the Statement
on Denial of Rehearing En banc filed 3/4/81 is amended
as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640
on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1656
on 06/26/81

8
COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES

D.C. Cir. No. 80-1783
(Transferred from the Third Circuit)

PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, PETITIONER
v.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION;
JOHN AHEARNE; VICTOR GILINSKY; RICHARD T. KEN-
NEDY; JOSEPH M. HENDRIE; and PETER A. BRADFORD,
in their individual capacities; and the UNITED STATES,
RESPONDENTS

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY
CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, and
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INTERVENORS

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Original proceedings transferred from USCA for
the Third Circuit (with 2 black binders)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for temporary stay or sus-
pension of the operation of two 6/12/80 NRC orders
pending the hearing on petitioner’s application for stay
pending review, and for early hearing thereafter (filed
in 8rd circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for stay (filed in 3rd Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order setting aside the
NRC’s two 6/12/80 findings (filed in 8rd Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order setting aside the
NRC’s 6/12/80 order making final its 6/12/80 order
(filed in 3rd circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for entry of declaratory judg-
ment (filed in 8rd Circuit)

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Petitioner’s motion for an order granting request
for expedited briefing, oral argument, etc. (filed in 3rd
Circuit)

07-11-80 Petitioner's motion for an order directing that
briefs be submitted within 3 days and that hearing be
held in 5 days (filed in 3rd Circuit)

07-16-80 Intervenor's motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691,
80-1783 & 80-1784

07-17-80 NRC’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783
& 80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

07-17-80 Intervenor’s opposition to petitioner’s requests for
emergency relief

07-28-80 Clerk’s order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783
and 80-1784

07-31-80 Clerk’s order that the following brief schedule is
approved: Petitioner’s main brief—on or before 8/1/80;
Respondents’ brief—20 days after petitioners’ brief; In-
tervenors’ brief—5 days after respondents’ brief; peti-
tioners’ reply brief —8/29/80

07-31-80 15-Petitioners’ brief
07-31-80 7-appendix
07-31-80 4-Exhibits

08-08-80 4-Intervenors’ motion to dismiss petitions and to
suspend briefing and oral argument schedule

08-15-80 4-Pelitioners' opposition to intervenors’ motion to
dismiss and to suspend briefing and oral argument
schedule

08-18-80 4-NRC’s response to motion to dismiss

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-
pend briefing and oral argument and all briefing and oral
argument are held in abeyance pending consideration by
the Court on the pending motion to dismiss (vacated
8/21/80 order)

10

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

08-20-80 Intervenor’s reply to petitioners’ opposition to mo-
tion to dismiss

08-20-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/19/80
is vacated; The briefing will proceed on the previous
schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80;
Oral argument on intervenors’ motion to dismiss will also
be heard on 9/8/80

08-22-80 Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file type-
written brief, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk's order granting respondent’s (US) motion
to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 7-Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times
are allotted for the oral argument of these cases: Peti-
tions—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes. (Vacated
per 9-5-80 order)

08-26-80 Intervenors’ brief
08-26-80 Intervenors’ appendix
08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to re-allocate time allotted for oral
argument

09-08-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motions dated
August 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

11

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for
leave to file reply Lrief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brie*

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,
1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted
for oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—20
minutes ; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ’s

09-10-80 15-Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)

11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

11-19-80 Judgment by the Court, that the Court declares
that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing
in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-
cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein this
date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees
12-08-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion
for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to motion for award of
attorneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed
by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-80 NRC's motion for leave to file petition for rehear-
ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC's motion for leave to file motion for issuance
of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioner’s motion to award sts as penalty for
frivolous petition for rehearing

12

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

12-19-80 Intervenor (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-
tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file
the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the Clerk
is directed to file the petition for rehearing and the sug-
gestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;
and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response
to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing, en banc: CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing filed per order of
01-06-81

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-
ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per or-
der of 1-6-81

01-06-81 NRC's response to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing,
en banc, filed per order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file
the motion of the NRC for stay of mandate; and that
the Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court’s
mandate through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva
and Edwards, CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed
per above order

01-06-81 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion to stay
issuance of mandate

02-08-81 NRC’s motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay
mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-
date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the
pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehear-
ing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

13

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

02-03-81 Per Curiam order by this Court amending the
opinion for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see
order for details).

08-04-81 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is
hereby denied.

08-04-81 Circuit Judge Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey
would grant rehearing en banc. Their statement is
attached (Opinion).

03-04-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions
for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities, the afore-
said petitions are denied.

03-12-81 Intervenors’ motion to stay issuance of mandate
pending application for writ of certiorari

08-18-81 NRC's motion for further extension of stay of
mandate

08-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitiop ers“ motion for an
award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’
motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,
Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-03-81 Notification from Clerk, SC that petition for writ
of certiorari was filed on 08/30/81 in SC No. 80-1640

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court
that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in SC
No. 80-1640 on March 30, 1981 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the is-
suance of the mandate (filed by intervenors Metropolitan
Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and the
Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein prior
to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition
for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on

April 2, 1981

14

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the Opinion filed
on 11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order
for details).

04-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court that the Statement on
Denial of Rehearing En Banc filed 3/4/81 is amended
as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640
on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1656
on 06/26/81

15
COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET ENTRIES
D.C. Cir. No. 80-1784
(Transferred from the Third Circuit)

IN RE: PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY, PETITIONER

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

07-11-80 Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandamus—trans-
ferred from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit

07-17-80 NRC’s motion to consolidate Nos. 80-1691, 80-1783,
80-1784 and opposition to request for emergency relief

07-23-80 Clerk’s order consolidating Nos. 80-1691, 80-1788
and 80-1784

07-81-80 Clerk’s order that the following briefing schedule is
approved: Petitioners’ main brief—on or before 8/1/80;
Respondents’ brief—20 days after petitioners’ brief; In-
tervenors, brief—5 days after respondents’ brief; peti-
tioners reply brief—8/29/80

07-31-80 Petitioners’ brief

07-31-80 Appendix
07-81-80 Exhibit

08-19-80 Clerk’s order granting intervenors’ motion to sus-
pend briefing and oral arguments and all briefing and
oral argument are held in abeyance pending considera-
tion by the Court on the pending motion to dismiss
(vacated 8/21/80 order)

08-20-80 4-Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-21-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the order of 8/19/80
is vacated; The briefing will proceed on the previous
schedule and oral argument will be heard on 9/8/80;
Oral argument on intervenovs’ motion to dismiss will
also be heard on 9/8/80

16

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS
08-22-80 4-Respondent’s (US) motion for leave to file type-
writen brief, pending printing

08-25-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s (US) motion
to file brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Respondent’s (US) brief in typewritten form

08-25-80 Clerk’s order, sua sponte, that the following times
are allotted for the ora! argument of these cases; Peti-
tioners—30 minutes; Respondents—30 minutes (Vacates
per 9-5-80 order)

08-27-80 Respondent’s (NRC) brief

08-27-80 Respondent’s Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement—Lodged for convenience of Court

08-29-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file reply brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief to respondents’ brief
08-29-80 Petitioners’ reply brief on mootness

09-02-80 NRC’s motion to reallocate time for oral argument

09-03-80 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motions filed Au-
gust 29, 1980 and September 2, 1980

09-04-80 Clerk’s order granting respondent’s motion for
leave to file reply brief

09-04-80 Respondent’s reply brief

09-05-80 Clerk’s order that this Court’s order of August 25,
1980 is vacated and that the following times are allotted
for oral argument: Petitioners—30 minutes; NRC—20
minutes ; USA—20 minutes

09-08-80 Argued before CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ's

09-10-80 15-Respondent’s (USA) brief (memorandum)
11-19-80 Opinion Per Curiam

17

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

11-19-80 Judgment by this Court, that the Court declares
that NRC acted unlawfully in refusing to hold a hearing
in connection with requested Venting Order, all in ac-
cordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein
this date

12-01-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees
12-08-80 Petitioners’ bill of costs

12-05-80 Intervenors’ (Metropolitan Edison, et al.) motion
for leave to file petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc with attached affidavit

12-09-80 Respondents’ opposition to motion for award of
attorneys’ fees

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file response to petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed
by Metropolitan Edison, et al.

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file petition for rehear-
ing out of time

12-10-80 NRC’s motion for leave to file motion for issuance
of stay of mandate

12-11-80 Petitioners’ motion for award of costs as penalty
for frivolous petition for rehearing

12-19-80 4-Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) opposition to peti-
tioners’ motion to award costs

01-06-81 Per Curiam order that the Clerk is directed to file
the petition for rehearing of the NRC; and that the
Clerk is directed to file the petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing, en banc, of the Public Utilities;
and that the Clerk is directed to file the NRC’s response
to Public Utilities petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing, en banc; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
Cl’s

01-06-81 NRC’s petition for rehearing filed per above order

18

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

01-06-81 Intervenor’s (Public Utilities) petition for rehear-
ing and suggestion for rehearing, en banc—filed per
order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 4-NRC’s response to intervenor’s (Public Utilities)
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing, en
banc—filed per order of 1-6-81

01-06-81 P Curiam order tnat the Clerk is directed to file
motion ? the NRC for stay of mandate; and that the
Clerk is directed to stay the issuance of this Court man-
date through February 10, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and
Edwards, CJ’s

01-06-81 NRC’s motion to stay issuance of mandate—filed
per above order

01-06-81 Petitioners’ opposition to NRC’s motion to stay
issuance of mandate —

02-03-81 NRC's motion to extend stay of mandate

02-12-81 Per Curiam order granting NRC’s motion to stay
mandate and Clerk is directed to stay issuance of man-
date for a period of 30 days after disposition of the
pending petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-
hearing en banc; Wright, Mikva & Edwards, CJs

8-8-81 Per curiam order by this Court amending the opinion
for the Court filed on 11/19/80 as follows: (see order
for details).

3-481 ORDERED by the Court, en banc, that the sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc of the Public Utilities is
hereby denied

8-4-81 Circuit Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey
would grant rehearing en banc. Their Statement is
attached (Opinion).

8-4-81 Per Curiam order on consideration of the petitions
for rehearing of the NRC and Public Utilities, the
aforesaid petitions are denied.

19

DATE FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS

03-12-81 Intervenors’ motion to stay issuance of mandate
pending application for certiorari

03-18-81 NRC’s motion for further extension of stay of
mandate

03-23-81 Per Curiam order that petitioners’ motion for an
award of attorney’s fees is denied; and that petitioners’
motion to award costs as a penalty is denied; Wright,
Mikva and Edwards, CJ’s

04-08-81 Notification from Clerk, SC that petition for writ
of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1640 on 8/30/81

04-06-81 Certified copy of notice from Clerk, Supreme Court
that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in SC
No. 80-1640 on March 30, 1981 and is now pending

04-09-81 Per Curiam order that the motions to stay the
issuance of the mandate (filed by intervenors Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., et al. and respondent) are granted and
the Clerk is directed not to issue the mandate herein
prior to May 5, 1981; CJ Wright, Mikva and Edwards,
CJ’s

04-09-81 Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court that a petition
for writ of certiorari was filed in SC No. 80-1656 on
April 2, 1981

4-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court, that the opinion filed
on 11/19/80 is hereby amended as follows: (see order
for details).

4-29-81 ORDERED, by the Court, that the Statement on
Denial of Rehearing En Banc filed 3/4/81 is amended
as follows: (see order for details).

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-1640
on 05/26/81

06-08-81 Certified copy of order from Clerk, Supreme Court
granting petition for writ of certiorari in SC No. 80-
1656 on 05/26/81

20
TITLE 10—ATOMIC ENERGY
Chapter I—Atomic Energy Commission

PART 50—LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND
UTILIZATION FACILITIES

Technical Specifications

Statement of considerations. The following amend-
ments are designed to clarify the extent to which licensees
may make changes, and conduct tests and experiments,
which are not specifically provided for in their facility
licenses. The amendments reflect consideration of com-
ments received following publication of an earlier draft
of these amendments in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April
8, 1961. The amendments substantially revise § 50.36
Designation of technical specifications, add a new § 50.59
Authorization of changes, tests and experiments; and
add on Appendix A, “Contents of Technical Specifica-
tions”. The revisions for §§ 50.36 and 50.59 are based
upon the provisions incorporated in License No. DPR-1
pursuant to the Commission’s Memorandum and Order
dated November 2, 1960 (in the matter of General Elec-
tric Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, Docket No. 50-18).

Basically the amendments provide that:

(1) Certain significant design and operating limita-
tions and procedures will be designated as technical spec-
ifications which must be adhered to in the absence of
specific authorization from the Commission. The tech-
nical specifications will reflect in such form limits in
design and procedures approved by the Commission. They
will represent in essence those parameters which define
the boundaries of licensed activity which the Commission
has evaluated and approved from a safety standpoint.

(2) The licensee may make changes in the facility,
make changes in the procedures described in the hazards
summary report, and conduct tests or experiments, unless
the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change

21

in the technical specifications or “an unreviewed safety
question”, as defined. Records of changes, tests and ex-
periments which do not involve a change in the technical
specifications or “an unreviewed safety question” must
be kept and included in those made available for inspec-
tion by authorized representatives of the Commission and
summarized in reports to be periodically submitted to the
Commission.

(3) If a proposed change, test or experiment involves
a change in the technical specifications or an unreviewed
safety question, it may not be carried out unless author-
ized by the Commission. The request for such authoriza-
tion must include an appropriate hazards analysis.

(4) Except as noted in paragraph (5), the Commis-
sion may authorize any proposed change, test or experi-
ment upon finding that there is reasonable assurance that
the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.

(5) With respect to power and testing reactors, the
Commission may authorize a proposed change, test or
experiment and a change in technical specifications upon
determining that it does not present significant hazards
considerations not previously described or implicit in the
hazards summary report and upon finding that there is
reasonable assurance that the public health and safety
would not be endangered. If the proposed change in-
volves significant hazards considerations not previously
described or implicit in the hazards summary report, the
proposed change, test or experiment must be referred to
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for re-
port and must be scheduled for public hearing.

In conjunction with the adoption of these proposed
amendments, the Commission plans to delegate app, opri-
ate authority to the staff to determine whether proposed
changes, tests and experiments involve a significant haz-
ards considerations [sic] not described or implicit in the
hazards summary report and to issue authorization for
changes which the rules does not require be referred to
the ACRS and to public hearing.

All reports, requests, determinations and authoriza-
tions will be made part of the public record of the li-
censing proceedings.

In order to provide guidance to licensees and appli-
cants, the proposed amendments would add an Appendix
A to Part 50 containing a list of matters which are
typical of those the Commission would generally expect
to be covered by technical specifications in operating
licenses. It is emphasized, however, that considerable
variation from the subjects listed in Appendix A may
be warranted in any particular case. The wide varia-
tions found in facility design and operation prevent any
listing from being complete. Conversely, it is anticipated
that some of the items listed would not be covered in
specific operating licenses because of the nature of the
particular design or proposed operation.

The proposed amendments would apply to all reactor
operating licenses. With respect to existing licenses
which do not designate particular portions of the hazards
summary report as “technical specifications”, the entire
report would be designated as “technical specifications”.
The proposed rules permit amendment of the license
upon application by the licensee, or on the Commission’s
own motion, to designate as “technica! specifications”
appropriate portions of the hazards summary report.

Notice is hereby given that pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act and the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, the following amendments are pub-
lished as a document subject to codification, to be effective
80 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

1. Section 50.36 is amended to read as follows:
§ 50.86 Designations of technical specifications.

(a) Each applicant for a license authorizing opera-
tion of a production or utilization facility shall, and each
applicant for a construction permit may, designate those
provisions of his hazards summary report which he pro-

23

poses be incorporated as technical specifications in the
license or construction permit.

(b) Each license authorizing operation of a produc-
tion or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21
or § 50.22 will include technical specifications. The tech-
nical specifications incorporated in a license will be de-
signed to include those significant design features, operat-
ing procedures and operating limitations which are con-
sidered important in providing reasonable assurance that
the facility will be constructed and operated without un-
due hazard to public health and safety. Appendix A is
provided as a guide to the type of matters which the
Commission would generally expect to be covered by the
technical specifications. The Commission may include
technical specifications on such additional matters as the
Commission finds appropriate to provide reasonable as-
surance that the facility will be constructed and operated
without undue hazard to public health and safety; and
may omit items listed in Appendix A if such omission
is consistent with the protection of the health and safety
of the public.

(e) This section shall not be deemed to modify the
technical specifications included in any license issued prior
to the effective date of this section. A license issued
prior to the effective date of this section in which tech-
nical specifications have not been designated, shall be
deemed to include the entire hazards summary report as
technical specifications. At the initiative of the Com-
mission or the licensee, any license may be amended to
include technical specifications of the scope and con-
tent which would be required if a new license were
being issued.

2. Add the folljowing new § 50.59:
§ 50.59 Authorization of changes, tests and experiments.

(a) The holder of a license authorizing construction
or operation of a production or utilization facility may
(1) make changes in the facility as described in the

24

hazards summary report, (2) make changes in the pro-
cedures as described in the hazards summary report,
and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in
the hazards summary report, unless the proposed change,
test or experiment involves a change in the technical
specifications incorporated in the license or an unre-
viewed safety question, as defined in paragraph (c) of
this section. If the proposed change, test or experiment
involves a change in the technical specifications or an
unreviewed safety question, it shall not be carried out
unless authorized by the Commission pursuant to the
procedures set forth in this section.

(b) The licensee shall maintain records of changes in
the facility and of changes in procedures made without
prior Commission approval pursuant to this section, to
the extent that such changes constitute changes in the
facility as described in the hazards summary report or
constitute changes in procedures as described in the haz-
ards summary report. The licensee shall also maintain
records of tests and experiments carried out without
prior Commission approval pursuant to this section. The
licensee shall furnish annually to the Commission, or at
such shorter intervals as may be specified in the license,
a report containing a brief description of such changes,
tests and experiments.

(c) A proposed change, test or experiment shall be
deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if (1)
the probability of occurrence of an accident previously
analyzed in the hazards summary report may be in-
creased; or (2) if consequences of an accident previously
analyzed in the hazards summary report may be in-
creased; or (3) if a possibility for a nuclear accident of
a different type than any analyzed in the hazards sum-
mary report may be created.

(d) The licensee shall file a request for authorization
of a change in technical specifications or of any change,
test or experiment which requires authorization by the
Commission pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

25

The request shall include an appropriate hazards analy-
sis. Each such request shall be filed with the Atomic
Energy Commission, Attention: Director, Division of
Licensing and Regulation. The licensee shall file three
signed originals and 19 additional copies.

(e) With respect to request for changes, tests or ex-
periments or for changes in technical specifications for a
facility of a type described in § 50.21 (b) or § 50.22, or
a testing facility:

(1) If the Commission determines that the proposed
change, test or experiment presents significant hazards
considerations not described or implicit in the hazards
summary report it will refer the request to the Ad-
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and will order
a public hearing in accordance with applicable proce-
dures. The Commission will promptly notify the licensee
of any referrai to the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards

(2) If the Commission determines that the proposed
change, test or experiment does not present significant
hazards considerations not described or implicit in the
hazards summary report, it may authorize such change,
test or experiment, without referral to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards for a report and without
a prior public hearing, upon finding that there is reason-
able assurance that the health and safety of the public
will not be endangered.

(f) With respect to requests for changes, tests or ex-
periments or for changes in technical specifications for a
production or utilization facility which is not of a type
described in § 50.21 (b) or § 50.22 or a testing facility,
the Commission may authorize the proposed change, test,
or experiment upon finding that there is reasonable as-
surance that the health and safety of the public will not
be endangered.

(g) Any report or request for authorization submitted
by a licensee, and any determination by the Commission,
or authorization issued by the Commission, pursuant to

26

this section, will be made a part of the public record of
the licensing proceeding. An authorization issued by the
Commission will ineiude appropriate changes in the tech-
nical specifications.

8. Add the following Appendix A:

APPENDIX A—GUIDE TO CONTENTS OF TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS

1. This Appendix is a guide to matters which are
typical of those the Commission would generally expect
to be covered by technical specifications in operating li-
censes for nuciear reactors. The generalized form of the
guide results in inclusion of items not common to all
reactors, and should be used in preparation of technical
specifications for a particular facility only to the extent
the matters listed are applicable. Conversely, technical
specifications are expected to include items other than
those listed if such matters could have an effect on the
safety of operations comparable in significance to the
effect of the following items:

A. Site. 1. Physical location of the reactor plant.

2. Minimum distance to boundary of the exclusion
area.

8. Principal activities carried on within the exclusion
area.

B. Containment. 1. Design pressure and maximum
total leakage rate at design pressure of the containment
vessel (including penetrations).

2. Overall dimensions, materials of construction and
approximate free volume of containment barrier.

8. Principal types of containment vessel penetrations,
and for each type, the approximate number and methods
of closure and sealing (including piping, duct work, and
access openings).

4. Shell maximum design pressure under minimum
temperature conditions and methods of protection against
the cold.

27

5. Frequency, pressure, and methods of testing of the
containment vessel and penetrations.

C. Primary coolant system. 1. General system speci-
fications, and major primary system components in-
cluding:

(a) Number of loops.

(b) Number of isolation and check valves per loop.

(e) Number of steam generators per loop.

(d) Method of coolant circulation and heat removal.

(e) Number of pumps per loop.

(f) Reactor coolant piping material and size.

(g) Volume of primary coolant.

2. Principal reactor vessel design features including:

(a) Temperature and pressure rating (design and
operating).

(b) Materials of construction (base metal and clad-
ding).
(c) Overall dimensions.

(d) Types and locations of nozzle connections with re-
spect to core.

(e) Number of and types of penetrations.

(f) Type of closure and any limiting features.

3. Primary coolant specifications:

(a) Materials.

(b) Method of pressurization.
(e) Coolant chemistry limits.
(d) Impurity limits.

4. Operating variables, including:

(a) Minimum core inlet pressure.

(b) Maximum and minimum flow rate through the
core.

(e) Maximum core exit bulk temperature.

(d) Maximum heat up and cool down rates of major
components.

(e) Reactor vessel pressure limitations as a function
of temperature and integrated neutron flux.

5. Principal design features of major components, in-
cluding:

(a) Primary heat exchanger type and rating.

(b) Type of pump and pump drive.

(e) Isolation valve type and modes of operation.

(d) Check valve type and pressure design.

6. Materials and general configuration of primary sys-
tem shielding.

D. Primary plant auxiliary systems. 1. Principal de-
sign features of major components including:

(a) Relief valve types, minimum capacity, relief set-
tings, points for pressure discharge.

(b) Demineralizer type and product specifications.

(c) Pressurizer type and surge capacity.

(d) Coolant charging pump, number, charging rate
and pressure design.

(e) Core water injection and containment spray sys-
tem pumps, number, capacity, injection rate and design
pressure,

(f) Reactor plant component cooling system pumps
and heat exchanger, number, capacity and pressure de-
sign.

(g) Reactor plant control air design pressure, com-
pressor type and rating.

2. Operating limitations, including:

(a) Water chemistry.

(b) Minimum reserve capacity of core water injection
and containment spray systems.

(e) Maximum and minimum ambient operating tem-
perature of reactor room.

(d) Minimum level of primary shield tank water level.

E. Secondary coolant system. 1. General system de-
sign specifications, including:
(a) Coolant.

(b) Maximum pressure, operating and design.

(c) Maximum temperature, operating and design.

(d) Coolant flow rate—maximum and minimum.

(e) Minimum makeup coolant temperature.

(f) Maximum differential temperature and pressure
between primary and secondary systems.

(g) Coolant chemistry limits.

2. Principal operating limitations established from
considerations of nuclear safety, including:

(a) Loading.

(b) Turbine control.

(e) Steam dumping or bypassing.

(d) Power network interconnections.

(e) Maximum radioactivity.

F. Reactor core. 1. Principal core design features,
including:

(a) Moderator material.

(b) Reflector material and thickness.

(c) Fuel material, enrichment, and melting or boiling
point.

(d) Minimum number of fuel thermocouples, where
provided as a safeguard.

(e) Clad material and method of bonding.

(f) Minimum number of clad thermocouples where
provided as a safeguard.

\g) Brief fuel element description including nominal
ditaensions, overall and internal element supports and
ori eing.

(h) Maximum total mass of core and of fuel in the
core.

(i) Maximum number of fuel elements in the core.

(j) Maximum fuel burnup (MWD).

(k) Meximum or minimum void coefficient of reac-
tivity, and maximum operating void fraction.

(1) Temperature and pressure reactivity coefficients,
ambient to operating.

(m) Form of burnable poison and method of attach-
ment.

(n) Maximum and minimum reactivity worth of burn-
able poison.

(o) Brief description of source including minimum
initial «trength and type.

(p) Number of passes and flow direction through the
core.

2. Principal design core temperatures and thermal
characteristics, including:

(a) Maximum thermal power.

(b) Maximum local core heat flux (maximum with re-
spect to all variables at rated power).

(e) Minimum burnout safety factor (on heat flux)
and correlation method used.

(d) Maximum fuel surface and central temperatures
at designated points.

G. Control and safety systems. 1. Reactivity control
system design and operating limits, including:

(a) Number installed and minimum number of op-
erative control elements and drives.

(b) Principal design features including control ele-
ment materials, control rod guides, minimum operating
clearances, use of followers, limits on allowable operating
temperatures and pressures and rod coupling method.

(c) Maximum reactivity worth of automatic control
systems and of entire control systems for both operating
temperatures (hot) and cold plant conditions.

(d) Maximum reactivity worth of any individual con-
trol system component or gang, for hot and cold con-
ditions.

(e) Minimum shutdown control margin for hot and
cold conditions.

(f) Minimum number of least reactive control ele-
ments corresponding to minimum shutdown margin.

(g) Maximum reactivity addition rate by control ele-
ments.

31

(h) Maximum excess reactivity above cold clean eriti-
cal.
(i) Automatic modes of reactivity insertion and shut-
down and maximum total scram delay time and safety
element insertion time.

(j) Type, minimum reactivity worth, conditions of
use, and principal design features of auxiliary poison
systems.

(k) Rod position indication method and minimum ac-
curacy limits.

(1) Minimum worth of safety control elements cocked
during startup, fuel loading and other core manipula-
tions.

(m) Minimum reactor power for automatic control.

2. Nuclear instrumentation system design and oper-
ating limits including:

(a) Brief description of the system including ranges,
types, and sensitivities of instrument channels and de-
tectors, their degree of independence of operation, and
use of redundancy or coincidence circuitry.

(b) Mirimum number and ranges of operative level
safety and period safety channels during startup and
power operation.

(c) Setting of scram points.

(d) Automatic control system inputs.

8. Characteristics of safety control systems auxiliary
to the reactivity control and nuclear instrumentation sys-
tems including:

(a) Emergency power supply availability, and total
loading with respect to minimum capacity.

(b) Devices which are activated on automatic build-
ing closure.

(c) Type, functions, and conditions of use of inter-
locks.

(d) Items which may be bypassed, method of bypass-
ing, and conditions under which bypassing will be used.

32

(e) Conditions which would automatically cause re-
actor scram or building closure and activation points for
these actions.

(f) Devices causing scram or partial insertion of rods
and scram point settings.

(g) Instrumentation primarily or solely provided for
analysis of conditions following an accident.

H. Monitoring systems. General design features and
specific operating limits, including:

1. Stack activity discharge rate averaged over a year
and minimum number and sensitivity of operating moni-
tors.

2. Maximum instantaneous stack activity discharge
rate.

3. Fuel element failure detection equipment sensitiv-
ity, localization and sampling interval (if not continu-
ous).

4. Minimum number and sensitivity of monitors for
radiation level detection in accessible areas.

5. Minimum number and sensitivity of monitors of
liquid radioactive effluents including primary coolant
leak detectors.

6. Criticality monitors in fuel storage areas.

I. Waste disposal systems. Design and operating fea-
tures including:

1. Principal features of equipment for removal of
gases or other materials from primary and secondary
coolant, moderator, reflector, or shield; equipment ca-
pacity and mode of use (continuous or intermittent).

2. Stack height.

3. Minimum waste holdup capacities, storage and
processing methods and maximum radioactivity inven-
tories during normal operations, maintenance and refuel-
ing.

J. Ventilation systems. 1. Brief description of prin-
cipal features of systems providing safeguards functions,
including:

33

(a) Fans used, capacities and approximate numbers.

(b) Direction of atmospheric pressure gradient across
walls, doorways, and other important barriers of the
facility and minimum atmospheric pressure differentials
across principal barriers where pertinent to contamina-
tion control.

(c) Minimum ventilation rates where applicable.

(d) Provisions for ventilation system closure.

(e) Provisions for relief of positive or negative pres-
sures within the enclosed areas upon ventilating system
closure.

(f) Location of ventilation system inlets and outlets.

(g) Location, type, and procedures for maintenance of
filtering or other air cleaning systems.

K. Emergency cooling and decay heat removal sys-
tems. 1. Principal system design features.

2. Minimum capacity of emergency heat exchangers.

3. Type, minimum coolant supply, flow rate, and
power requirement of emergency cooling systems.

4. Total cooling time made available by emergency
cooling systems.

5. Conditions which would automatically cause emer-
gency actions.

6. Source and availability of emergency power.

L. Fuel storage. 1. Brief descriptions of physical
means by which fuel elements are to be transported with-
in the facility, and conditions under which they are
stored.

2. Amount and arrangement (spacing) of special nu-
clear material to be stored.

8. Basic method or methods by which nuclear safety
against inadvertent criticality is assured (mass, geome-
try).

4. Procedural limitations on quantities to be removed
or inserted in storage area at any one time.

5. Means of providing personnel protections against
radiation hazards from spent fuel.

34

M. Experimental facilities including. 1. Brief descrip-
tion of principal design features of experimental facili-
ties.

2. Maximum excess reactivity allowed for experiments.

8. Maximum individual reactivity increase to be al-
lowed for any experiment or experimental facility by
flooding, draining, poison removal, fueled experiment ad-
dition, or other method.

4. For each loop or other experimental facility:

(a) Types of sensors for process variables, output ac-
tions, and redundant or coincidence provisions.

(b) Minimum cooling capacity to each experiment,
method of cooling, and emergency cooling provisions.

(e) General geometry, minimum pressure resistance,
and maximum leak rate of experiment containment bar-
riers.

(d) Significant controls, signals, or other safety mech-
anisms by which experiments or experimenters (manu-
ally or automatically) may shutdown the reactor.

(e) Types of experiments to be conducted and limits
on experimental programs, considering such effects as
corrosion, explosion, and instrument shadowing.

5. Argon and other activation product limitations.

N. Administrative and procedural safeguards. 1.
Brief coverage of the following: .

(a) The availability of detailed written procedures
for operations that might affect nuclear safety and for
emergencies.

(b) The manner whereby operating procedures are re-
viewed and approved for use.

2. Brief description of the following controls proce-
dures and tests: :

(a) Administrative organization and controls to the
extent that these have potential effect on safety.

(b) General operating principles having a potential
effect on safety, including those for initial startup, rou-
tine operation, maintenance, refueling, conduct and oper-

35

ation of experiments, power escalation from criticality
to full design power, and emergencies; minimum staffing
requirements for such operations where applicable.

(e) Posteritical schedule of maintenance and recali-
brating tests of safety system components, monitors, and
other equipment having a potential safeguards function
including items such as reactor control instruments, con-
trol rod systems, effluent release monitors, personnel pro-
tection monitors, portable detectors, building leakage and
emergency systems.

(d) Procedures for the review within the licensee’s
organization of proposed modifications in the facility or
in operating procedures, and of the design and conduct
of experiments.

(Sec. 103, 68 Stat. 936, sec. 104, 68 Stat. 937, sec. 161,
68 Stat. 948, sec. 182, 68 Stat. 953, sec. 183, 68 Stat.
954; 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233)

Dated at Germantown, Md., this 31st day of May 1962.
For the Atomic Energy Commission

WooprorD B. McCoo.,
Secretary.

[F.R. Doc. 62-5615; Filed, June 8, 1962; 8:45 a.m.]

36

STATEMENT OF POLICY AND NOTICE OF
INTENT TO PREPARE A PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ACTION: Statement of Policy

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
decided to prepare a programmatic environmental im-
pact statement on the decontamination and disposal of
radioactive wastes resulting from the March 28, 1979
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. For some time
the Commission’s staff has been moving in this direction.
In the Commission’s judgment an overall study of the
decontamination and disposal process will assist the Com-
mission in carrying out its regulatory responsibilities
under the Atomic Energy Act to protect the public health
and safety as decontamination progresses. It will also
be in keeping with the purposes of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act to engage the public in the Commis-
sion’s decision-making process, and to focus on environ-
mental issues and alternatives before commitments to
specific clean-up choices are made. Additionally, in light
of the extraordinary nature of this action and the ex-
pressed interest of the President’s Council on Environ-
mental Quality in the TMI-2 clean-up, the Commission
intends to co-ordinate its actions with CEQ. In particu-
lar, before determining the scope of the programmatic
environmental impact statement the Commission will
consult with CEQ.

The Commission recognizes that there are small areas o“
uncertainty regarding the clean-up operation. For exam-
ple, the precise condition of the reactor core is not known
at this time and cannot be known until the containment
has been entered and the reactor vessel has been opened.
For this reason, it is unrealistic to expect that the pro-
grammatic impact statement will serve as a blueprint,
detailing each and every step to be taken over the com-

87

ing months and years with their likely impacts. That
the planned programmatic statement inevitably will have
gaps and will not be a complete guide for all future ac-
tions does not invalidate its usefulness as a planning
tool. As more information becomes available it will be
incorporated into the decision-making process, and where
appropriate supplements to the programmatic environ-
mental impact statement will be issued. As the decon-
tamination of TMI-2 progresses the Commission will
make any new information available to the public and to
the extent necessary will also prepare separate environ-
mental statements or assessments for individual portions
of the overall clean-up effort.

The development of a programmatic impact statement
will not preclude prompt Commission action when needed.
The Commission does recognize, however, that as with
its Epicor-II approval action, any action taken in the
absence of an overall impact statement will lead to argu-
ments that there has been an inadequate environmental
analysis, even where the Commission’s action itself is
supported by an environmental assessment. As in set-
tling upon the scope of the programmatic impact state-
ment, CEQ can lend assistance here. For example should
the Commission before completing its programmatic
statement decide that it is in the best interest of the
public health and safety to decontaminate the high level
waste water now in the containment building, or to purge
that building of its radioactive gases, the Commission
will consider CEQ’s advice as to the Commission’s NEPA
responsibilities. Moreover, as stated in the Commission’s
May 25 statement, any action of this kind will not be
taken until it has undergone an environmental review,
and furthermore with opportunity for public comment
provided.

However, consistent with our May 25 Statement, we
recognize that there may be emergency situations, not
now foreseen, which should they occur would require

38

rapid action. To the extent practicable the Commission
will consult with CEQ in these situations as well.

With the help of the public’s comments on our proposals
we intend to assure, pursuant to NEPA and the Atomic
Energy Act, that the clean-up of TMI-2 is done con-
sistently with the public health and safety, and with
awareness of the choices ahead. We are directing our
staff to include in the programmatic environmental im-
pact statement. on the decontamination and disposal of
TMI-2 wastes an overali description of the planned ac-
tivities and a schedule for their completion along with a
discussion of alternatives considered and the rationale
for choices made. We are also directing our staff to keep
us advised of their progress in these matters.

Dated at Washington, D.C. this 21st day of November,
1979.
For the Commission

/s/ Samuel J. Chilk
SAMUEL J. CHILK
Secretary of the Commission

39
[Docket No. 50-320]

Metropolitan Edison Co., et al. (Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 2) ; Order

I

Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central Power
and Light Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company
(collectively, the licensee) are the holders of Facility
Operating License No. DPR-73, which had authorized
operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
2 (TMI-2) at power levels up to 2772 megawatts thermal.
By Order for Modification of License dated July 20,
1979, the licensee’s authority to operate the facility was
suspended and the licensee’s authority was limited to
maintenance of the facility in the present shutdown cool-
ing mode (44 FR 45271). The facility, which is located
in Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsyl-
vania, is a pressurized water reactor used for the com-
mercial generation of electricity.

II

On March 28, 1979, an accident at the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 resulted in substantial
damage to the reactor core and to certain reactor systems
and components. The facility is not capable of normal
operation and is in a shutdown condition with fuel in
the core. Although many systems were damaged or have
subsequently failed, the facility is being maintained in
a safe and stable cooling condition. The July 20, 1979
Order directed that the licensee maintain the facility in
a shutdown condition in accordance with approved op-
erating and contingency procedures with decay heat being
removed by natural convection circulation of primary
coolant through the core with heat rejection through the
“A” steam generator.

Some of the systems and components currently being
used to maintain the facility in its present mode of op-

40

eration were not originally included in the facility’s
Technical Specifications. In fact, in the present post-
accident status of the facility, the license itself does not
include explicit provisions or Technical Specifications for
assuring the continued maintenance of the plant in a
safe, stable condition or for coping with foreseeable off-
normal conditions. Moreover, certain portions of the
facility’s operating license relate to or govern power
operation of the facility, the authority for which was
suspended by the Order of July 20, 1979. These pro-
visions are now simply inapplicable to the facility in its
present post-accident condition. Consequently, the fa-
cility’s operating license’ should be modified so as to:

(1) Define operating parameters for the current safe,
stable, long-term cooling mode for the facility (defined
as the recovery mode), and delete all other permissible
operating modes so as to assure that operation of the
facility in other than the stable shutdown condition of
the recovery mode is precluded:

(2) Impose functional, operability, redundancy and
surveillance requirements as well as safety limits and
limiting conditions with regard to those structures, sys-
tems, equipment and components necessary to maintain
the facility in the current safe, stable shutdown condi-
tion and to cope with foreseeable off-normal conditions.

(3) Prohibit venting or purging or other treatment
of the reactor building atmosphere, the discharge of
water decontaminated by the EPICOR-II system, and the

1 Tho existing Appendix B Technical Specifications imposed for
the protection of the environment upon issuance of the TMI-2 oper-
ating license would be unchanged and would remain in effect, except
that Appendix B Technical Specifications 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, which
identify the licensee’s pre-accident management organization for
activities addressed by the Appendix B Technical Specifications,
are deleted since those requirements will now be performed in
accordance with proposed Technical Specifications 6.1, 6.2 and 6.5
which will set forth the current requirements for the licensee’s
management organization for all licensed activities.

41

treatment and disposal of high-level radioactively con-
taminated water in the reactor building, until each of
these activities has been approved by the NRC, consistent
with the Commission’s Statement of Policy and Notice
of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Im-
pact Statement (44 FR 67738).

III

For the above reasons, the Facility Operating License
has been reviewed and a new set of Technical Specifica-
tions has been developed to account for the present con-
dition of the facility and to assure the continued main-
tenance of the current safe, stable, long-term cooling con-
dition of the facility. The Staff’s safety assessment ad-
dressing the requirements of the proposed Technical
Specifications is set forth in the concurrently-issued
Safety Evaluation.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has also per-
formed an environmental evaluation of the requirements
that would be imposed by these proposed Technical Speci-
fications as reflected in the Environmental Assessment,
also issued concurrently. It vas determined that since
the limits on effluent releases and discharges contained
in Appendix B to the Facility Operating License are not
being changed and remain in effect, and the proposed
Technical Specifications attached to this Order do not
authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts
nor an increase in power level that the proposed Tech-
nical Specifications will not result in any significant en-
vironmental impact. Accordingly, a negative declara-
tion is being issued concurrently pursuant to 10 CFR
51.5 (e) (1) of the Commission’s regulations.

Proposed Technical Specification 6.8.1, regarding Ad-
ministrative Controls, requires that written procedures
implementing certain requirements of the modified Tech-
nical Specifications be prepared by the licensee. Pro-
_ posed Technical Specification 6.8.2 provides that these

written procedures are to be svbmitted to, and are sub-

ject to approval by the NRC prior to implementation.
Since these written procedures will implement certain re-
quirements of the proposed Technical Specifications, some
period of time will be required after its effective date for
the licensee to prepare the appropriate written proce-
dures. Based on discussions with the licensee and an
evaluation of the scope of the written procedures re-
quired, it has been determined that a period of 30 days
from the date of this Order will be sufficient for the
licensee’s preparation of the written procedures required
by proposed Technical Specification 6.8.1.

Incorporation into the license of the proposed Tech-
nical Specifications would both impose necessary require-
ments on the licensee to reflect the present condition of
the facility and to assure continued maintenance of the
current safe, stable, long-term cooling condition of the
facility, and facilitate the Commission’s enforcement pro-
gram by providing a single and readily available com-
pilation of enforceable requirements. For these reasons,
it is proposed that the license be amended so as to in-
clude the Technical Specifications set forth in Attach-
ment 1 hereto. The formal license amendment incor-
porating these proposed Technical Specifications will be-
come effective on the expiration of the period specified
below, during which the licensee or any other person
whose interest may be affected may request a hearing
or, in the event a hearing is requested and granted, on
the date specified in an order made following the hearing
or other disposition of such proceeding.

As indicated above, the July 20, 1979 Order directed
the licensee to maintain the facility in a shutdown con-
dition in accordance with approved operating and con-
tingency procedures. This Order is still in effect. The
operating and contingency procedures referred to have
evolved over the course of the past several months and
are now reflected in the requirements that have been
included in the proposed Technical Specifications set
forth in Attachment 1.

43

a order to eliminate any possible uncertainty as to the
nature and requirements of the operating and contin-
gency procedures referred to in the July 20, 1979 Order,
the public health, safety and interest require that that
Order be amended effective immediately, as set forth
below, pursuant to section 161.b of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, to include the requirements
in Attachment 1. When the proposed Technical Specifi-
cations become effective as a result of the formal amend-
ment of the Facility Operating License, they will super-
sede the July 20, 1979 Order, as amended, since there
will be no need to maintain a duplicate set of legal re-
quirements on the licensee.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, it is ordered that (1) Effective im-
mediately, the Director’s Order for Modification of Li-
cense of July 20, 1979 is amended by deleting paragraph
(2) and substituting the following:

(2) Pending further amendment of the Facility Op-
erating License, the licensee shall maintain the facility
in accordance with the requirements set forth in Attach-
ment 1 to the Director’s Order dated February 11, 1980.

(2) Effective March 21, 1980 or, in the event a hear-
ing is requested and granted, on the date specified in an
order made following the hearing or other disposition
of the proceeding, all Appendix A Technical Specifications
and Appendix B Technical Specifications 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3
to Facility Operating License No. DPR-73 in effect on
March 28, 1979 and all changes thereto issued between
that date and the date of this Order are superseded by
the propcaed Technical Specifications set forth in Attach-
ment 1 hereto.

(3) The written procedures required by proposed
Technical Specification 6.8. in Attachment 1 hereto shall
be completed and submitted to the NRC 30 days after
the date of this Order. Pending approval of the written

4d

procedures by the NRC, the licensee shall follow the
previously approved procedures.

V

The licensee or any person whose interest may be
affected may, on or before Merch 21, 1980, file a request
for a hearing with respect to this Order, pursuant to
10 CFR § 2.714. As indicated, a request for a hearing
with regard to paragraph (2) of this Order shall op-
erate to stay the effectiveness of that paragraph. Ac-
cordingly, any such hearing regarding paragraph (2)
shall be conducted prior to the adoption of the formal
license amendment incorporating the Technical Specifica-
tions set forth in Attachment 1 hereto. However, a re-
quest for hearing with regard to paragraphs (1) and/or
(3) shall not operate to stay the effect of those para-
graphs. In the event a hearing is held with regard to
paragraph (1) and/or (3), however, such a hearing shall
be consolidated with any hearing that may be requested
pursuant to paragraph (2). In the event a hearing is
held, the issues shall be: (1) whether the requirements
set forth in Attachment 1 hereto (summarized in Part
II above) are necessary and sufficient for the main-
tenance of the facility to protect health and safety or to
minimize danger to life and property; and (2) whether
the provisions of this Order would significantly affect the
quality of the human environment.

A request for a hearing must be filed with the Office
of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Serv-
ice Section, by the above date. A copy of the request
for a hearing should also be sent to the Executive Legal
Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wash-
ington, DC 20555 and to George F. Trowbridge, Esq.,
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge, 1800 M Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20086, attorney for the licensee.
Any questions regarding the contents of this Order should
be directed to the Chief Hearing Counsel, Office of the

45

Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, Washington, DC 20555.

For further details respect [sic] to this action, see (1)
Operating License DPR-73, as amended, (2) NUREG-
0557, “Evaluation of Long-Term Post-Accident Core Cool-
ing of Three Mile Island, Unit 2.” NRC Staff Report,
dated May, 1979, (3) Memorandum to R. Vollmer from
A. Ignatonis, “TMI-2 Plant Modifications for Cold Shut-
down, Rev. 2,” dated June 8, 1979, (4) letter to R.
Vollmer, NRC, from R. C. Arnold, Metropolitan Edison
Co., “Reactor Containment Building Atmosphere Clean-
up,” dated November 18, 1979, (5) the Commission Staff’s
related Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment
(NUREG-0647), and (6) the Director’s Order for Modi-
fication of License dated July 20, 1979. All of the above
documents are available for inspection at the Commis-
sion’s Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash-
ington, DC and at the Commission’s Local Public Docu-
ment Room at the State Library of Pennsylvania, Gov-
ernment Publications Section, Education Building, Com-
monwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania 17126.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 11th day of Febru-
ary, 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

HAROLD R. DENTON.
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.

46
[Docket No. 50-320]

Negative Declaration Regarding Proposed Technical
Specifications for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit No. 2

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has deter-
mined that the public health, safety and interest require
Modification of Facility Operating License No. DPR-73,
issued to Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. for opera-
tion of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2
located in Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Penn-
sylvania. This action would modify the Technical Specifi-
cations of the Facility Operating License to more accu-
rately reflect the present condition of the facility result-
ing from the March 28, 1979 accident. Some of the sys-
tems and components currently being used to maintain
the facility in its present mode of operation were not
originally included in the facility’s Technical Specifica-
tions. In fact, in the present post-accident status of the
facility, the license itself does not include explicit provi-
sions or Technical Specifications for assuring the con-
tinued maintenance of the plant in a safe, stable condi-
tion or for providing for foreseeable off-normal condi-
tions. Moreover, certain portions of the facility’s operat-
ing license relate to or govern power operation of the
facility, the authority for which was suspended by Order
for Modification of License of the Director, Office of Nu-
clear Reactor Regulation, dated July 20, 1979. These
provisions are simply inapplicable to the facility in its
present post-accident condition. Consequently, by Order
dated February 11, 1980, the Director (1) amended the
Order of July 20, 1979 effective immediately, to require
that the licensee maintain the facility in accordance with
the requirements set forth in Attachment 1 to the Order,
and (2) proposed to formally amend the Technical Speci-
fications accordingly, in the following areas: Nuclear
Safety; Core Cooling, Water Inventory and Reactor Cool-
ant System Pressure Control; Instrumentation; Contain-
ment Systems; Fire Detection and Fire Suppression;

47
Electrical Power; Control of Radioactive Materials in
Liquid and Gaseous Effluents; and, Review and Audit
Functions.

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation prepared a
combined Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assess-
ment (NUREG-0647) in connection with this action. It
was determined that since the limits on effluent releases
and discharges contained in the environmental Technical
Specifications for the Facility Operating License (Ap-
pendix B) are not being changed and remain in effect, the
actions encompassed by this Order do not authorize a
change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase
in power level and will not result in any significant en-
vironmental impact. In addition, the Technical Specifi-
cations include prohibitions against the purging or other
treatment of the reactor building atmosphere, the dis-
charge or other disposal of water decontaminated by the
Epicor-II system and the treatment and discharge or
other disposal of the high-level radioactively contaminated
water now in the reactor building without further Com-
mission approval. Thus, in accordance with this finding,
no Environmental Impact Statement will be prepared.

The Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment
(NUREG-0647) and the Director’s Order issued Febru-
ary 11, 1980 are available for public inspection at the
Commission’s Public Document Room, 1717 H Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Three Mile Island
Unit No. 2 Local Public Document Room in the Govern-
ment Publications Section, State Library of Pennsyl-
vania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut
Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Copies may be ob-
tained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Richard Vollmer, Director TMI-2 Support, NRR.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 11th day of Febru-
ary, 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

HAROLD R. DENTON.
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.

48

NUREG-0432
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION
UNIT 2
Technical Specifications
Appendix “A”
to

License No. DPR-73

INTRODUCTION

On March 28, 1979, an accident occurred at the facility
which resulted in damage to the reactor core and to
certain reactor systems and components. The reactor is
being maintained in a stable cooling mode removing decay
heat by natural convection circulation of primary coolant
through the core and the “A” steam generator. The “A”
steam generator is producing steam which is condensed
in the condenser and recirculated to the “A” steam gen-
erator. An alternate means of removing decay heat from
the primary coolant is through the “B” steam generator.
The steam side of the ‘B” steam generator has been
modified to provide a water solid, closed loop cooling
system which is in turn cooled by the secondary services
closed cooling water system. Either steam generator cool-
ing mode is adequate to remove decay heat from the
primary coolant.

As a result of the core and equipment damage, various
requirements set forth in the Technical Specifications
governing operations are no longer appropriate. For
example, certain equipment required to be operable is no
longer operable as defined in the technical specifications.
Other systems not generally relied on for safe shutdown
of the reactor are being used to maintain the facility in
the stable mode of heat removal. High radioactivity in
containment and in the reactor coolant and radioactivity
in certain auxiliary areas have limited access to certain

49

components or have limited the ability of certain systems
or components in their original design mode. A number
of systems and components have been modified in order
to respond to the initial emergency condition.

These revised Technical Specifications are to provide as-
surance that the facility in its present status will provide
adequate safety while certain additional work activities
are carried out at the facility during the forthcoming
period of core cooling.

In addition to continuing to maintain core cooling, cer-
tain work is planned for the period during which these
revised specifications will be applicable.

(1) Systems and components presently functioning
to maintain core cooling may be modified to en-
hance their operability and reliability, and new
systems may be added to maintain recovery func-
tions.

(2) Presently non-functioning systems or compo-
nents useful to enhance safety are being re-
stored to operable status or modified to function
appropriately.

(3) Activities to maintain control over radioactive
effluents from the facility will continue with
modifications as necessary to enhance such con-
trol.

(4) Decontamination and cleanup of areas to reduce
exposure and to control radioactive materials
will continue.

These activities and modifications will be performed dur-
ing the period in which these revised specifications are
effective.

The revised Technical Specifications have been prepared
to cover the functional capability or performance levels
of systems or components required for the safe operation
of the facility. The revised Technical Specifications shall

50

however, in no way medify the obligation of the licensee
to take all appropriate steps needed to assure public
health and safety in connection with the facility at all
times; and shall not be deemed to prohibit or restrict the
licensee from taking any emergency action necessary to
protect the health and safety of the public in the event
of any emergency conditions that may arise during the
period governed by these revised Technical Specifications.

Detailed surveillance requirements for implementing
these specifications are set forth in the Recovery Opera-
tions Plan. The specific plant operating procedures which
are subject to review and approval by the NRC staff are
identified in Section 6.8 of the Technical Specifications.

These revised Technical Specifications will remain in
effect until superseded, and may be supplemented,
amended or modified from time to time.

* * * * *

page 3. 6-1]
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

8.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall
be maintained and all containment penetrations, includ-
ing at least two OPERABLE containment isolation valves
or a double barrier in each penetration, shall be closed
when not required open per procedures approved pursu-
ant to Specification 6.8.2. Purging or other treatment of
the containment atmosphere shall be prohibited until ap-
proved by the NRC.

51

APPLICABILITY: RECOVERY MODE.
ACTION:

With one containment isolation valve per containment
penetration open or inoperable, maintain the affected
penetration(s) closed with either:

a. At least one deactivated automatic valve secured
in the isolation position, and

b. At least one closed manual valve, or a blind
flange.

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE
with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is be-
ing used for transit entry and exit through the
containment, then at least one air lock door shall
be closed.

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or
equal to 0.05 L. at P., 56.2 psig.
APPLICABILITY: RECOVERY MODE.
ACTION:

With an air lock inoperable, maintain at least one door
closed and restore the air lock to OPERABLE status
within 24 hours.

— — = 7 7

52

BASES
FOR
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
AND
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE

The summary statements contained in this section pro-
vide the bases for the specifications of Sections 3.0 and
4.0 and are not considered a part of these technical
specifications as provided in 10 CFR 50.36.

@ * * * *

53
Ip ge B 8/4-6-1]
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY must be
maintained to ensure that the radioactive materials
which were released to the containment atmosphere dur-
ing the March 28, 1979 incident will not be released to
the atmosphere.

On November 21, 1979, the Commission issued a State-
ment of Policy and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Pro-
grammatic Environmental Impact Statement addressing
the overall decontamination and cleanup activities at
TMI-2, including, among other things, the purging or
other treatment of the containment atmosphere (44 F.R.
67738). The Commission recognized in its Statement
that it may be in the best interest of the public health
and safety to purge the containment during the develop-
ment of the programmatic statement. If the need to take
such prompt action arises the Commission has stated that
it will consider the advice of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) as to the Commission’s NEPA
sponsibilities [sic], and moreover, will not take such action
until the activity has undergone an environmental review
with opportunity for public comment. The Commission
further recognized that there may be emergency situa-
tions, not at this time forseen, which could require rapid
action. In these situations, the Commission has indicated
its intention to consult with CEQ to the extent practic-
able. Accordingly, the purging or other treatment of the
containment atmosphere is prohibited until approved by
the NRC consistent with the foregoing.

54

8/4.6.13 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The containment air locks must be maintained OPER-
ABLE to provide CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. These
air locks will be used during future entries into the con-
tainment to ensure that the containment atmosphere will
not be released to the environs.

3/4.6.1. 4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The negative pressure limit provides assurance that
the containment will not exceed its design negative pres-
sure differential. The positive pressure limit provides
assurance that leakage from the containment will be
limited for dose considerations.

55

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Commissioners: John F. Ahearne, Chairman
Victor Gilinsky
Richard T. Kennedy
Joseph M. Hendrie
Peter A. Bradford

Docket No. 50-320

IN THE MATTER OF
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF CLI-80-25
AND ORDER FOR TEMPORARY
MODIFICATION OF LICENSE

On June 12, 1980, the Commission issued a Memo-
randum and Order, CLI-80-25, which approved purging
of the TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere as proposed
by the NRC staff. The staff’s proposal was described
in detail in the “Final Environmental Assessment for
Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor
Building Atmosphere,” NUREG-0662, May 1980. This
purging can be carried out in such a manner (a “slow
purge”) that the release of radioactive effluents, pri-
marily krypton-85, will lie within the limits allowed by
the technical specifications which are part of the TMI-2
operating license. A faster rate of purging is advan-

56

tageous, however, for reasons discussed in the Memoran-
dum and Order. To permit a faster purge the Commis-
sion issued an accompanying Order for Temporary
Modification of License, which temporarily imposed dose
limits in place of the noble gas instantaneous and quar-
terly activity release limits contained in the TMI-2 tech-
nical specifications. Purging of the TMI-2 containment
is presently expected to begin on June 28, 1980.

The Commission received on June 23, 1980 a “Joint
Motion for Reconsideration of CLI-80-25 and Order for
Temporary Modification of License,” submitted by Steven
C. Sholly, the Newberry Township Three Mile Island
Steering Committee, and People Against Nuclear Energy
(“PANE”). The Commission has also received a study
entitled “Radiation Exposure Due to Venting TMI-2
Reactor Building Atmosphere,“ prepared by Bernd
Franke and Dieter Teufel of the Institute for Energy
and Environmental Research, Heidelberg, West Germany,
for the Three Mile Island Legal Fund, and dated June
12, 1980. The Franke/Teufel study, which arrived too
late to be included in the administrative record for the
Memorandum and Order, takes issue with the Commis-
sion’s conclusion, otherwise widely supported, that the

1 For the period of the purge the modified license will control
releases of radioactive gazes to the atmosphere by limits on the
radiological dose which car, result from such releases, in particu-
lar by requirements that doses to maximally exposed individuals
as a result of purging not exceed 15 mrem skin dose, 5 mrem
total body dose, or 20% of either of those limits over any one-hour
veriod. These offsite dose limits are in effect equivalent to the
objectives set out in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, which implement
the Commission’s policy that radiation doses from nuclear power
plants shall be kept ‘‘as low as reasonably achievable” (“ALARA”).
The Commission’s Order for Temporary Modification of License
thus aimed at achieving the same level of health protection intended
by the superseded release limits while at the same time permittirg
a rapid completion of the purging process.

2 The Commission received a very brief handwritten summary
of the conclusions of this study on June 5, 1980 but was not given
the full report until June 16, 1980.

57

physical health impacts of purging the TMI-2 contain-
ment as proposed will be negligible. This study is cited
in the Joint Motion as evidence of the need for the
Commission to reconsider its decision to permit purging.
In view of the importance to the public of having ac-
curate information on the health risks of purging, the
Commission believes it desirable in the short period 12
maining before the purging begins to make a prompt
though necessarily brief response to the Franke/Teufel
study as well as to the motion for rec~nsideration.

Accordingly, we are attaching to this order a review
of the Franke/Teufel study prepared by the NRC tech-
nical staff. The staff’s review confirms that all radio-
nuclides potentially in the containment atmosphere, not
just krypton-85, were considered by the staff in its as-
sessment of the environmental impacts of purging the
TMI-2 reactor building. Radionuctides other han kryp-
ton-85 will not contribute significantly to offsite doses
from purging. As the staff’s review explains in detail,
the Franke/Tuefel study erred by selecting a single
erroneously calibrated measurement of the radionuclide
concentrations in the containment. This measurement
was clearly inconsistent with previously and subsequently
measured radionuclide concentrations and gave values
too large by factors of ten thousand to ten million. The
corresponding dose calculations made by the Franke/
Teufel study are thus gross over-estimates. Further-
more, the study’s concern about meterological uncertain-
ties and possible inadequacy of monitoring appear to re-
flect unawareness or misunderstanding of how the purg-
ing program is to be carried out. In sum, the Commis-
sion has found that the Franke/Teufel study provides
no reason to modify the conclusion that the proposed
venting of the TMI-2 reactor building involves negligible
impacts on physical health.

Turning now to the motion for reconsideration, we find
that the discussion above deals adequately with the first
reason offered for reconsideration, tat “[t]he Orders
do not consider in any detail the possible presence of

58

radionuclides other than Krypton-85 in the TMI-2 con-
tainment atmosphere.” The environmental assessment,
as well as the staff’s review of the Franke/Teufel report,
confirm that krypton-85 is by far the dominant radio-
nuclide. In any event, it should be noted that the purg-
ing will be conducted so that the dose limits established
by the Commission’s Order for Temporary Modification
of License will not be exceeded. A continual monitoring
of release activity levels and meterological conditions will
be conducted to assure that this requirement is met. Thus
if radionuclide concentrations should exceed presently ex-
pected values, this fact would become quickly apparent
and releases would be controlled or, if necessary, stopped
so that doses will remain within the allowable limits.

The Joint Motion criticized what it terms a “radio-
logical assessment” of the health risks of venting as dis-
tinct from a “public health assessment” by “public health
professionals.“ The joint petitioners also appended to
their mction a letter from Irwin Bross of the Roswell
Park Memorial Institute, Buffalo, New York, to the effect
that the genetic damage and cancer risk estimates used
by the Commission in assessing the risk of krypton vent-
ing are out of date and far too low. The short answer
to the joint petitioners’ concern about the Commission’s
assessment that purging presents ne significant physical
health risks is that there was broad agreement with this
assessment by groups with expertise oriented toward pro-
tection of public health, including the National Council
on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, and the Penn-
sylvania Departments of Health and Public Welfare. The
controversial views of Dr. Bross regarding radiation
health risks are known to the Commission from previous
occasions. To the extent that Dr. Bross would conclude
that purging the TMI-2 containment involves a signifi-
cant physical health risk, his views are clearly at odds
with the spectrum of scientific opinion cited here and in
the Commission’s Memorandum and Order in support of
the contrary conclusion.

59

The Commission thus finds that the Joint Motion pre-
sents no reason to alter the Commission’s key determi-
nation that the proposed purging of the TMI-2 contain-
ment will have a negligible impact on physical health.
The benefits of prompt purging were discussed at lengti
in the Memorandum and Order. To risk these benefits by
selecting an alternative process, which necessarily would
involve significant delay and uncertainty, in order to re-
duce already negligible radiological impacts still further
does not strike the Commission as reasonable. Accord-
ingly, the Commission finds the proposed purging entirely
consistent with the ALARA principle of keeping radia-
tion exposure “as low as reasonably achievable.”

The Joint Motion also urged that the psychological
aspects of purging “should be examined more closely”
but cited no evidence to contradict the Commission’s be-
lief that prompt purging will remove a significant source
of psychological stress related to the presence of the dis-
abled TMI-2 facility. The Commission has admitted its
lack of expertise in psychology and recognizes that more
review and study might further clarify the situation with
respect to psychological stress at TMI-2. We remain
confident, however, that stress is likely to be minimized
by proceeding promptly with a plan that poses no threat
to physical health. The Joint Motion offers no reason to
believe that further study would change that conclusion.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that purging be de-
layed for further examination of pychological stress.

Finally, the Joint Motion criticized our finding that
the temporary license modification involves “no significant
hazards consideration” and therefore may be made im-
mediately effective. We believe the joint peti‘ioners have
misunderstood the scope of this finding, which pertains
only to the question whether changing the TMI-2 technical
specifications from release limits to dose limits involves a
significant hazards consideration. The dose limits aim at
achieving the same level of protection of public health
and safety and, in fact, do so more directly, since it is

8 See note 1 above.

60

the associated doses rather than the radioactive releases
themselves which are the focus of concern. Accordingly,
the Commission reaffirms its determination that the tem-
porary license modification involves no significant hazards
consideration and may therefore be made effective im-
mediately.

With regard to purging itself, the unmodified techni-
cal specifications which allow for purging were adopted
as part of the licensing proceeding for TMI-2 after full
opportunity for a public hearing. There has been ex-
tensive public participation in the purging decision
through public meetings and comments on the environ-
mental assessment. There has thus been ample oppor-
tunity for members of the public to raise any issue which
might have been brought up in an adjudicatory hearing
and to present evidence contradictory to the positions of
the NRC staff or Metropolitan Edison. The joint peti-
tioners complain that there has been no public hearing
specifically devoted to purging, but they have not indi-
cated that any relevant evidence exists which they have
somehow been prevented from bringing to the Commis-
sion’s attention. Accordingly, since the procedures by
which the Commission’s orders were developed met the
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and have pro-
vided for a thorough consideration of the issues, we re-
ject the suggestion that these orders should be withdrawn
on procedural grounds.

For the reasons discussed above, the Commission de-
nies the motion for reconsideration of CLI-80-25 and
Order for Temporary Modification of License.

It is so ORDERED.

For the Commission

/s/ Samuel J. Chilk
SAMUEL J. CHILK
Secretary of the Commission

Dated at Washington, DC,
this 26th day of June, 1980.

61

REPORT BY THE
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH
HEIDELBERG, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the
findings presented in the report titled “Radiation Ex-
posure Due to Venting TMI-2 Reactor Building At-
mosphere” submitted by the Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, dated June 12, 1980. The staff
believes that the major conclusions of this report are
in error and misleading, primarily because they are based
on a highly inflated estimate of the maximum rate at
which radionuclides will be released during the venting
and an apparent lack of understanding of how the vent-
ing will be carried out and controlled.

Heidelberg Finding No. 1

Previous discussion of the venting of radioactive gases
from TMI-2 has concerned only the noble gas krypton-85.
Besides krypton-85, the atmosphere of the reactor build-
ing includes a great number of other radionuclides, some
of which would be released into the environment during
the blow off of the gases. This could lead to radiation
exposures significantly higher than those caused by kryp-
ton-85. The most important radionuclides, which have
not been sufficiently considered so far include: C 14, Co
60, Sr 89, Sr 90, Ru 106, Cs 134, Cs 137, Pu 239, Pu
241 and others. Even allowing for high filter efficiency,
a model calculation for only three of these nuclides showed
that population doses would be high enough to cause
about three additional cancer cases and an equivalent
amount of genetical damage.

Staff Comment

The NRC staff’s analysis (NUREG-0662) of the en-
vironmental impacts associated with purging the TMI-2

62

reactor building atmosphere is based on consideration
of all radionuclides including noble gases, transuranics,
tritium, cesiums and cobalts and other particulates. Air
samples are periodically collected and analysed [sic] to
identify all measureable forms of radioactivity. The domi-
nant and controlling radionuclide is Kr-85. Relative to
Kr-85, all other radionuclides in the reactor building
atmosphere are insignificant contributors to calculated
offsite doses from a postulated purge.

The reactor building particulate samples taken during
January through April of this year indicated Cs-137 con-
centrations ranging from 1.2 X 10* to 2.7 X 10° Ci /
ce. The particulates Co-58, Co-60, Cs-134, Sr-89, and Sr-
90 were measured at levels on the order cf 10 to 10™
pCi/ce or were below minimum detectable levels (10
Ci / ee) for the instrumentation. Gross measurements of
samples of the reactor building atmosphere taken in
April of this year indicate transuranic concentrations
no higher than 2.0 X 10° Ci/ ec. It should also be
noted that, during the postulated purge, the reactor build-
ing atmosphere will be passed through HEPA filters with
a measured filtration efficiency of at least 99.97%.

The Heidelberg group based its particulate source term
(primarily Co-60 and Cs-137), and the resulting dose
calculations and health effects predictions, on the highest
reported values for the concentrations of these isotopes,
ignoring a number of other values listed on the same
table (Table 2.1 of the Met Ed reference). Unfortu-
nately, these single highest values, which were a factor
of 10* to 10’ higher than other reported values, were
erroneous. Particulate concentrations are determined by
measuring the total radioactivity in a sample of air
passed through the particulate sampler, and then divid-
ing by the sample volume. In the case of the erroneous
values, Met Ed personnel failed to record the sample
volume. (Volumes typically were 10* to 107 ce.) A volume

63

of 1 ce was arbitrarily assumed by the licensee yielding
artificially high concentrations of Cs-137 and Co-60 (1.4
X 10° and 7.9% ,»Ci/ce, respectively). This resulted in
calculated dose values which are a million too high for
these isotopes.

It is unfortunate that these erroneous values were re-
ported. Nevertheless, the NRC staff believes that the
Heidelberg group used poor judgment in using these
values and ignoring the many other, lower values avail-
able to it. In estimating potential exposures and doses,
it is properly conservative to use the highest reasonable
source term. However, it is unreasonable to use a single
value or set of values when the numerous other reported
values, determined both before and after the highest
values are consistently so much lower.

Additionally, the Heidelberg group ignored the staff’s
discussion of the most recent reactor building sample
data (i.e., sample data through February 1980) which
was available to them in the staffs draft Environmental
Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island
Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere, NUREG-0662
(March 1980). This discussion (see Section 5.0, Reactor
Building Airborne Activity) indicates that the latest
particulate activity levels are on the order of 1 X 10
pCi/ ce.

Finally, since the Heidelberg dose calculations are based
on a fallacious source term, they, too, are fallacious.

Heidelberg Finding No. 2

Uncertainties inherent in the meteorological models and
dose calculations mean that it is impossible to exclude
that in the proposed purge program individual skin doses
due to krypton-85 could exceed the 100 mrem limit.

Staff Comment

The Heidelberg group’s assertions regarding the uncer-
tainty of predicting dose from meteorological dispersion

64

characteristics at TMI are compensated for by the con-
servatisms incorporated in the actual purge conditions.
Purging the reactor building atmosphere at TMI will be
carried out using real-time meteorological measurements,
containment atmosphere sampling, radiological effluent
measurements, and an elaborate environmental monitor-
ing program. Operators will control the release rate, and
hence the dose rate, based on actual meteorological con-
ditions and these other measurements. Purging would
be stopped at any time that these combinations of meas-
urements and calculations indicate possible dose values
that begin to approach limiting values which themselves
are well below the imposed release limits.

Thus the Heidelberg group’s statement (p. 11 of the
6/12/80 report) that, given releases of Kr-85 during
unfavorable meteorological conditions, “skin doses could
reach 320 mrem at a distance of 0.5 miles from the
stack,” is incorrect and appears to have been made with-
out knowledge of how the purging will actually be carried
out.

Purging the TMI reactor building atmosphere will be
monitored and controlled to assure that the dose limits
specified by the Commission are not even closely ap-
proached, thus accommodating the discussed uncer-
tainties.

Heidelberg Finding No. 3

Estimates of health damage should consider not only
regional but also global population doses which are an
indication of all health effects caused by the release of
radioactivity. Both can be estimated only with great
uncertainty. The dose effect relation is subject to wide
scientific discussion. We cannot exclude that venting
Krypton-85 alone could cause at least one additional can-
cer case (probably skin cancer) plus one case of genetic
damage within the next century. However, nothing is
known about a potential synergism between krypton-85
beta and ultraviolet radiation.

65

The results calculated in NUREG-0662 do not exclude
the possibility of one cancer case in the world population
within the next 100 years as a result of purging. The
staff has used the most widely recognized radiation risk
estimates to determine the probability of cancer or genetic
effects in the 50 mile population surrounding TMI as a
result of purging. The average risk of radiation induced
fatal cancer to individuals in the 50 mile TMI population
was estimated to be 5 chances in 100 billion. Within the
world’s population, the average risk to individuals, be-
cause of further Kr-85 dilution in the earth’s atmosphere,
would be even smaller than the already negligible risk
to people within 50 miles of TMI. The global collective
dose of 100 person-rem whole body dose due to Kr-85
(in the Heidelberg estimate) is minute compared to the
annual global background radiation dose of 300 million
person-rem. It should be noted that several independent
organizations, including the National Council on Radia-
tion Protection and Measurements, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, have
also concluded that purging would result in negligible
public health risks. Because of the conservatism to be
used in controlling and limiting doses, even a possible
synergism between beta radiation and ultra violet radia-
tion in skin cancer induction would not be expected to
change the health effects picture markedly.

Heidelberg Finding No. 4

The environmental monitoring program cannot ensure
that all significant radiation doses to the community as
a result of decontamination of the atmosphere of the
TMI-2 reactor building atmosphere will be detected. Most
measurements are not frequent enough and are not made
at all in some important localities. Important pathways
and radionuclides are neglected.

66

Staff Comment

The environmental monitoring program for the postu-
lated reactor building purge is one of the most compre-
hensive programs ever developed for monitoring gaseous
effluents from a domestic commercial nuclear power plant.
The program incorporates the expertise and resources of
the EPA, DOE, NRC, State of Pennsylvania (including
trained community monitors), and the licensee. The pro-
gram includes the availability of 6 mobile (3 EPA and
3 licensee) monitoring units as well as the DOE At-
mospheric Release Advisory Capacity (ARAC) which
will provide independent predictions of the dispersion
patterns of the krypton gas. A detailed description of the
monitoring program is contained in Section 8.0 of
NUREG-0662 (final report, May 1980) including the
number and type of radiation monitoring and sampling
devices, their frequency of analysis, and the location of
the measurements. An even more detailed report is given
in the EPA report, “Long-Term Environmental Radia-
tion Surveillance Plan for Three Mile Island,” March 17,
1980. From the comments in the Heidelberg finding and
in the body of their report, it is apparent that they had
considered neither the EPA report nor the final NUREG-
0662. Most, if not all of the Heidelberg group’s comments
and criticisms are addressed in those two reports.

The radiological environmental monitoring program will
be supplemented by direct measurement via the stack
monitor of all gaseous radioactive materials discharged
during the purge as well as real time meteorological dis-
persion measurements (taken at least hourly) from the
onsite meteorological tower. Additionally, the reactor
building atmosphere will be periodically sampled during
the conduct of the purge to verify the releases measured
directly by the stack monitor. In order to verify that no
significant amounts of radionuclides other than Kr-85 are
released to the environment during purging, samples from
the established network of eighteen operating stations will

67

continue to be collected. Samples in the downwind sector
will be cullected' every day, rather than the three times
per week under normal conditions. In addition at least
one sample from “control” stations in each quadrant not
in the downwind trajectory will be collected and analyzed
on a daily basis.

Heidelberg Finding No. 5

As considerable health damage could be caused by vent-
ing the atmosphere of the TMI-2 reactor building, we
strongly advise against this procedure. The report of the
Union of Concerned Scientists concludes that decontami-
nation is not as urgent as stated by Met Ed and NRC.
Therefore, we strongly recommend that the alternative
methods for decontamination proposed by UCS and Prof.
Morgan be used.

Staff Comment

The NRC staff disagrees that purging the TMI-2 reactor
building atmosphere could result in “considerable health
damage.” NUREG-0662, “Final Environmental Assess-
ment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit
2 Reactor Building Atmosphere,” provides an extensive
technical basis for the NRC staff’s recommendation to
purge the reactor building atmosphere.

68

EXCERPT FROM
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES, INC’s,
“PLANNING STUDY FOR CONTAINMENT ENTRY
AND DECONTAMINATION,” JULY 2, 1979

6.0 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC FILTRATION
AND PURGING

6.1 Existing Situation and Design Objectives

6.1.1 Containment Atmosphere Conditions

The release of large quantities of reactor coolant to the
containment coincident with significant fuel failure has
led to extremely high airborne levels within the contain-
ment. These levels must be reduced as much as possible
to minimize operator exposures during containment de-
contamination activities. Table 6-1 presents a summary
of results from numerous containment air samples and
the MPC which is allowed in the air in controlled spaces
to indicate the magnitude of the problem. The primary
contaminants are miscellaneous fission products, noble
gases, iodine, cesium, and tritium, all of which must be
treated and/or released in a controlled manner to assure
the minimum impact on the public health and safety.

It is apparent from analysis of Table 6-1 that the actual
value of the specific activity of each of the primary con-
taminants is not accurately known. A reasonable con-
sistency in the order of magnitude of the primary radio-
isotopes does exist and this information was considered
sufficient for preliminary planning. More accurate and
precise knowledge of the containment atmosphere will be
essential prior to the start of and during cleanup opera-
tions so that an accurate evaluation of the impact of
these releases can be made.

Although the bulk of the containment atmosphere radio-
activity would be removed prior to containment entry
there will still be levels of airborne contamination inside

69

the containment throughout the decontamination activi-
ties. This additional airborne activity is expected from
resuspension of radionuclides which had plated out and
from the dislodging of radioactivity during remote and
manual decontamination activities.

6.1.2 Design Objectives

To evaluate and compare various system designs and
operating alternatives for cleanup of the containment
atmosphere, it is first necessary to establish objectives.
The following objectives are considered appropriate for
this aspect of the containment decontamination:

To minimize the impact on public health and safety
from containment atmosphere cleanup

To assure that operator exposures are ALARA

To comply with the established release technical
specifications

To minimize the impact of containment atmosphere
cleanup operations on the decontamination schedule

70

HEARINGS ON |
THREE MILE ISLAND CLEANUP

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1979

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation of the Committee
on Environment and Public
Works, Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:37 a.m., in room 4200,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Hart (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Randolph, Hart and Simpson.

Senator Hart. The hearing will come to order.

Yesterday, this subcommittee ventured into largely un-
charted territory. We explored the many unknowns of
recovering from a major commercial nuclear accident.
The trip into ths [sic] new regulatory terrain was not ex-
actly a reassuring one.

For example, we learned that nearly eight months
after the Three Mile Island accident there are still no
guidelines, regulations or technical specifications from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to guide the cleanup and
recovery operations at Three Mile Island. We also learned
that without such regulatory guidance the ultimate costs
and duration of the operation remain very much in
doubt. Further, the utility’s ability and willingness to
bear these costs, and to assure the continuity of this
operation also are in doubt. We became familiar with
the intricacies and the hazards of each step of the clean-
up operation—from the initial step of decontaminating
the auxiliary building water to the final crucial step of
dismantling and removing the highly radioactive core.

The major lesson of yesterday’s hearing, for me at

71

least, was the understandable nervousness of the nearby
neighbors of the Three Mile Island plant. To quote the
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Newberry
Township: “Met Ed’s present piecemeal approach,” re-
ferring to the cleanup process, “is driving Newberry
Township residents batty.” Chairman Bruce Smith fur-
ther stated: “A long-range, step-by-step plan could better
prepare the community as well as the community leaders
with the problems and dangers to be confronted with the
cleanup process.”

However, testimony yesterday from utility and NRC
officials indicated that each side is, at least to some de-
gree, waiting for the other to make the first move. * * *

* * * * *
[pages 5-7] :
Senator Simpson.

Senator Simpson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man.

Yesterday, we heard expressed the sincere concerns of
the residents of the local population around Three Mile
Island regarding cleanup and recovery operations at the
site. As Senator Hart has quoted, we had a most refresh-
ing witness who said that up there, the piecemeal ap-
proach was driving them batty, and everyone understood
what he was saying when he said that. It was certainly
precise.

The testimony, on balance, underscored my belief that
a new and more candid planning approach is needed by
the utility and especially by the NRC to manage the re-
covery situation. The utility witnesses stated that a
general plan for recovery and cleanup was under devel-
opment, but that much of the detail would have to be
developed as the recovery effort proceeded and as new
and possibly changing regulatory requirements were im-
posed. The NRC witnesses testified that flexibility was
needed to develop regulatory requirements as the recov-
ery process moved forward. To be sure, I think some

72

flexibility on the part of the utility and NRC may be
needed to tailor the cleanup program to the situation at
the site, particularly as that situation becomes more fully
known.

Nevertheless, I feel that a greater sensitivity to the
needs of the local community is essential here. We are not
dealing, as the Commission normally does, with a new ap-
plication to built [sic] a facility. Rather, we are faced with
a severely damaged plant that is now in stable condition
but which poses continuing risks to the local population
and to the workers at the site. And we are certainly
faced with a community which is already anxious as a
result, of the accident and highly skeptical of the two
organizations directly involved in the cleanup; that is, the
NRC and the utility. Given this situation, it seems to me
prudent, if not essential for the NRC to lay out in detail
for full public review the standards it expects the utility
to meet and the means it will use to ensure the com-
pliance.

Mr. Chairman, we will have the Commission with us
today, and I would be very interested in hearing reasons
why the agency cannot say definitively what it is and is
not willing to allow in terms of releases into the atmos-
phere and river during the cieanup operation, what th::
impact of those release [sic] is likely to be and what limit
should be imposed for the workers and wh it insurances
we should use to ensure the applicable standards are met.
I understand that the NRC stafi prepared a package of
new regulatory requirements somewhat along those lines
several months ago and forwarded them to the Commis-
sion. I hope that we might know the status of those pro-
pose [sic] requirements and what the Commission plans to
do concerning them. As I see it, such a set of regulatory
requirements properly validated through public review
and comment, followed by the preparation of detailed
recovery plans to meet those requirements, again sub-
ject to public scrutiny, would do much to ease the legiti-
mate local concerns.

73

Mr. Chairman, the second issue of our hearing today,
and one we will review carefully, is how the Commission
intends to discharge its responsibilities under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Again, the
question seems to be whether the Commission plans a
piecemeal approach to recovery or whether a more com-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1552%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
