# Jurisdictional Statement — City of Parma v. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 1013

## Text

8 Q i ] & 0 v Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

rrits Dp
MAR 3 1981
In the Supreme Court of the United States.’

October Term, 1980

«=

THE CITY OF PARMA, OHIO et al. and THE
CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO et al.,
Appellants,

V.

RECORD REVOLUTION, NO. 6, INC. and ALEXANDER
J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,
Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CourRT oF APPEALS
For THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

ANDREW Boyko, Counsel of Record
Law Director, City of Parma
STEPHEN P. Bonp
Assistant Law Director
Parma City Hall
6611 Ridge Road
Parma, Ohio 44129
(216) 886-2323
WILLIAM E. BLACKIE
Law Director, City of Lakewood
Lakewood City Hall
12650 Detroit Avenue
Lakewood, Ohio 44107
(216) 521-7580

Counsel for Appellants

THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

1. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, as promulgated
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice and adopted by appellants
herein, defines “drug paraphernalia” as all equipment,
products and materials of any kind which are used, in-
tended for use, or designed for use in connection with a
controlled substance. The first question presented is
whether the phrase “designed for use” is so vague or over-
broad as to render the definition and, hence, the entire
Model Act unconstitutional.

2. The definition portion of the Model Drug Para-
phernalia Act contains a listing of a variety of items which
may be illicit if the requisite criminal intent is also present.
The question presented is whether the terms “roach clips”
and “miniature cocaine spoons”, as contained in that listing,
are so vague as to render the definition and, hence, the
entire Model Act unconstitutional.

3. The definition portion of the Model Drug Para-
phernalia Act contains a listing of factors which, in addi-
tion to all other logicially relevant factors, should be con-
sidered in assessing whether a defendant has the requisite
criminal intent. The question presented is whether those
factors expressly stated in the listing are so overbroad as
to render the definition and, hence, the entire Model Act
unconstitutional.

4. The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act makes it un-
lawful for any person to place any advertisement, know-
ing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should
know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or
in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or in-
tended for use as drug paraphernalia. The question pre-

II

sented is whether, in view of the territorial and constitu-
tional restrictions inherent in municipal legislation gen-
erally and in these ordinances specifically, this prohibition
impermissibly violates First Amendment rights.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Three cases were consolidated for hearing in the Court
below.

Appellant in the first case was Record Revolution No.
6, Inc. Appellees were: The City of Parma, Ohio; the
Council for the City of Parma, Ohio; John Petruska
(Mayor); Andrew Boyko (Law Director); Kenneth G.
Kuczma, Victor J. Labutta, Frank J. Houdek, Jack P.
Krise, Jr., Joseph A. Molodec, Evelyn M. Kopchak, Gerald
M. Boldt, Edward Lonjak, Doris P. Krawczyk, and William
R. Obuch (Council members); Francis Szabo (Police
Chief).

Appellant in the second case was Alexander J. Luka
d/b/a Daystar Boutique. Appellees were: The City of
Lakewood, Ohio; the Council for the City of Lakewood,
Ohio; Anthony C. Sinagra (Mayor); William E. Blackie
(Law Director); Thomas O. McBride, John G. Salmon,
Edward M. Graham, John P. Gallagher, Thomas C. Brown,
William F. Chinnock, Trudy Wendling (Council members) ;
Charles Petro (Police Chief).

Appellant in the third case was The Right Place, Inc.
Appellees were: The City of North Olmsted, Ohio; the
Council for the City of North Olmsted, Ohio; Robert W.
Swietyniowski (Mayor); Michael R. Gareau (Law Direc-
tor); Donald P. Albenze (Prosecutor); Marion R. Taylor
(Police Chief). This third case is not being appealed be-
fore this Court.

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL. ............ I
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW .................. II
RRR GI TTR asain ne hseciesnsnsncdncacceliegeieleeaieres Iv
UU NN a an 1

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION ISINVOKED 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND _ ORDI-

SORWRD GRU WUT NT iacsescndocsonecasccnnrcsnsadedioassedlociiclesien 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ooun.ncccccccccccceccocscscsoscccssecesase 4
THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL .................... 8
i 8 ERMAN ia adds tuo Pan Ct eo 19
APPENDIX:

Opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ........ Al

Opinion and Judgment of the District Court, Rec-
ord Revolution, No. 6, Inc. vs. City of Parma,
SE en eee eg eh Tee A54

Opinion and Judgment of the District Court, Alex-
ander J. Luka d/b/a Daystar Boutique vs. City of

RATING, TI, GE Ea once escrencccescssncosnntocoosdacsccies A103
Judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ......A114
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court .................... A116
Parma Ordinance, No. 242-79 ooo. ccccceeeccecee. A119
Parma Ordinance, No. 103-80 oo... ccccccccccccceeceoeee A127
Lakewood Ordinance, No. 5-80 2.00.0... occcccccccccccceecceeee- A130

Lakewood Ordinance, No. 29-80 .o.....ooococcccccccccecccoceeee A138

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) ...... 18
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) oo. 10, 11
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
I ashi rsiaieieeapes as scctriesssnoesesdidintesntntlccestumsinvianidiotococicions 17

Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S, Ct. 2545 (1979) 13
Cincinnati v. Rost, 92 Ohio App. 8 (1952), appeal dis-

missed 158 Ohio St. 144 oon cece ceseeccecceeeseceeeeeeees 18
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) .... 3
City of Sedalia v, Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193

Ie CIEE sensi cesettssteretscctonctsinsottaneieohvooetedcaces 18
Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 357 F.

Supp. 564 (S.D. Olio 1973) on. eeeccececccceceseceees 14

Danovitz v. United States, 281 U.S. 389 (1580). ........ 11,12
Delaware Accessories Trade Association v. Gebelein,

No. 80-285 (D.Del. Aug. 15, 1980) o........ececesecececeeeeeeeee 8, 15
Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104
Reais Waa eerste Sehr SN ela glenn aT ee ERT 14

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) 13

Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of
Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D.Fla. Aug.

OOP TRIE Sendhil clase Sesto uc epcca ahha esdicustacasiausothacss 8
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979) .... 17
Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) ... 9
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373

IE. = Soalcchscancceiataticoiicamnecscstcbdonctenscncnsssercniontcdbinepeailinnieds 13
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ...... 14

Indiana Normal v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C (S.D.
DN TEI neh stetieacateic nara st Te 15

Vv

Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Mary-
land, No. H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, paar 8,17

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) ..17-18
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-

man Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) 0 10, 11
Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp.

Sa q
Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 ( | 17
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) 0 16
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) 2. 13
Stroh Products Co. v. Davis, 8 F.2d 773 (E.D. Mich.

tei atnontenissessvchteicnnincsesaninesrinierenninmeuncane 12
The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept.

ae ee 8, 14, 16
Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, Civil No. 80-3372 (E.D.

am. Oot. 38, 19080) 9
Tower Realty v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710 (6th

Cir. 1952) ...... Ssasaeierhleteelasceieeisbeadiniinaipnneneseiseniasscncnitanamanaran 13

United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D.Mo. 1931) ....12
United States v. Hamilton, 626 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1980) 12
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972) _..11
United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965),

cert. denied 383 U.S. 967 00 17
United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied 414 U.S. 831 2 13
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372
US. 29 (1963) nnn ecceceececcecccencencseececeseeoceceoeeoeeeccc. 13
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105 16-17
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) oo. 16

United States v. 2265 One-Gallon Paraffined Tin Cans,
260 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1958) oo 12

VI

United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) 13

World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, No. 80-

1414 (D.N.J. Jume 8, 1980) occ cccccccccceececceeceeee 8,9
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
First Amendment, United States Constitution ............ 3,5, 7
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution .... 3,5
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254(2) .000.0000...... 3
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331 ...................... 2
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343(3) 00.00.0000... 2
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2201 ..................... 2
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2202 ...................... 2
Lakewood Ordinance, No. 5-80 20..0....c.ccececesececccceceseceseeeees 2,3
Lakewood Ordinance, No. 29-80 .0..0.0....-.-ccccccecceceseoceeeeceoeen 3
Parma Ordinance, No. 242-79 .o.0...........cececccsssosccscoseccosesesee 2,3
Parma Ordinance, No, 103-80 o....0.oo.ococcccccceccecceceeeseeeeeceeee 3
Other Authorities

McQuILLIN, 5 MunicrpaL Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.)
etal toribasincsosasenoniiccsdsvucescenveeresicreocenceceseece. 18

Model Drug Paraphernalia Act by the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration of the United States Depart-

Neen acces inssscensanssneavensinncosnocet passim
Rule 10.6, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
sect tesc etn snctecsecectnssoecooveeveracovecesnsvceerees. 1

WEBSTER’S NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY DicTIONARY (2d
scenes. sanpccncecoveveceseoseceuceconsaseree 15

October Term, 1980

THE CITY OF PARMA, OHIO et al. and THE
CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO et al.,
Appellants,

V.

RECORD REVOLUTION, NO. 6, INC. and ALEXANDER
J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,
Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CourT oF APPEALS
For THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

These appeals are prosecuted by the City of Parma,
Ohio and the City of Lakewood, Ohio, and their respective
officials, from final judgments of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversing judgments en-
tered in their favor by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio. As the two cases involve
identical questions and were consolidated by the Court of
Appeals, a single jurisdictional statement is submitted in
accordance with Rule 10.6 of this Court.

THE OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has not been officially reported but ap-
pears in the Appendix, p. Al.

2

The opinion of the United States District Court, North-
ern District of Ohio, for ihe City of Parma case, is of-
ficially reported at 492 F. Supp. 1157 (1980), and further
appears in the Appendix, p. A54. The District Court opin-
ion for the City of Lakewood case has not been officially
reported but appears in the Appendix, p. A103.

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION
IS INVOKED

On January 7, 1980, the City Council of Parma, Ohio
enacted its Ordinance No. 242-79; on January 21, 1980, the
City Council of Lakewood, Ohio enacted its Ordinance
5-80. As subsequently amended, the two ordinances are
the same in almost all respects; and both are virtually
identical to the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice.

The initial action was filed in the District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio by Record Revolution, No.
6, Inc., against Parma and its officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201, and 2202; it challenged the con-
stitutionality and sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the Parma Ordinance. Following a
hearing on the request for permanent injunction, the
District Court concluded that Parma Ordinance 242-79 is
constitutional as construed by that Court; and it entered
final judgment for the defendants.

Thereafter, a second action was brought by Alexander
J. Luka, before the same court, against Lakewood and its
officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 2201, and
2202; he also challenged the constitutionality and sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of

3

the Lakewood ordinance. On the basis of the Court’s prior
decision in the Parma case, the District Court entered final
judgment for the defendants.

An appeal was taken in both cases to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; and the two cases
were consolidated, together with a third case not presently
before this Court. The Appeals Court reversed the District
Court in a judgment entered December 8, 1980. A notice
of appeal to this Court was filed on February 4, 1980, in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
ORDINANCES INVOLVED

First Amendment, United States Constitution:

Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech ....

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution:

Section 1. * * * No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law....

Parma Ordinances 242-79 and 103-80 and Lakewood
Ordinances 5-80 and 29-80 are set forth consecutively in the
Appendix, beginning at p. A119.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the fall of 1979, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion of the United States Department of Justice, at the
request of the President, drafted a “Model Drug Para-
phernalia Act” (Model Act) as a proposal for states and
municipalities across the country to adopt in coping with
the paraphernalia problem. The Cities of Parma and
Lakewood, Ohio were among the first in the country to
do so.

The Model Act can best be understood when viewed
in four essential parts. First, there is a definition which
provides that “ ‘drug paraphernalia’ means all equipment,
products and materials of any kind which are used, in-
tended for use, or designed for use” in connection with a
controlled substance. Second, as a part of the definition,
there is a list of many common forms of property that
can be paraphernalia if ‘used, intended for use, or de-
signed for use” to violate drug laws. Third, as a part of
the definition, the Act sets out several relevant factors
to be considered in determining whether the necessary
criminal intent is present, so as to constitute an object
as illicit paraphernalia. Finally, there are substantive of-
fenses, essentially prohibiting the possession, manufacture,
or delivery of paraphernalia. In the case of manufacture
or delivery, it is specifically provided that no person do
so knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably
should know, that the paraphernalia will be used in connec-
tion with a controlled substance. It is further made un-
lawful for any person to place any advertisement knowing,
or under circumstances where one reasonably should
know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or
in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or in-
tended for use as drug paraphernalia.

5

The Parma Ordinance was the first to be challenged,
by a broad complaint alleging, inter alia, that the Ordi-
nance is vague and overbroad under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the edvertising
prohibition is violative of the First Amendment. Unre-
butted testimony at the hearing for permanent injunction
was that a law such as the Parma Ordinance would assist
in law enforcement efforts against drug abuse. Extensive
testimony was elicited by plaintiff as to how various wit-
nesses would interpret or apply the Ordinance; however,
this evidence was rejected by both the trial court, 492
F. Supp., at 1168, and the appeals court, Slip Op., at 22,
n.15, on the theory that the Ordinance speaks for itself.
The evidence did not disclose any specific design char-
acteristic which could consistently be attributed to any
particular type of drug paraphernalia.

The trial court construed each of the three elements
of the definition, “used, intended for use, or designed for
use,” as implying and requiring a general criminal intent
on the part of a defendant. 492 F. Supp., at 1169. This
criminal intent is what separates the innocuous object
from the illicit paraphernalia. 492 F. Supp., at 1166. And,
since each of the substantive offenses relies on the term
“drug paraphernalia,” that criminal intent is also made
an element of the mental state required to convict under
any offense. 492 F. Supp., at 1167. In particular, the
trial court held that an item is designed for use with
drugs if the defendant intentionally designed or adapted
the item for use with drugs. 492 F. Supp., at 1170, n.5.

With regard to the list of items which may be para-
phernalia, the trial court held that none of the items is
per se drug paraphernalia; rather each item becomes para-
phernalia only if the requisite intent is present. There
was no iinding of vagueness since all the terms listed in
“subpart L” are generic examples of what commonly are
used with controlled substances but are not illicit unless

6

criminal intent is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. 492
F. Supp., at 1170-1, n.6.

In the case of the indicia of criminal intent, the trial
court held all but one to be valid, to the extent applicable
rules of evidence would permit their use. The sole factor
which he held to be vague he ordered severed from the
Ordinance.

As for the substantive offenses, the trial court held
that the combined requirements that the City prove both
a general criminal intent, by virtue of the definition, and
actual knowledge by the seller of the ultimate use of an
object he distributes save the Ordinance from claims of
vagueness. In doing so, however, he ordered that the
“reasonably should know” standard be stricken from the
substantive offenses. 492 F. Supp., at 1175, 1173.

Finally, with regard to the prohibition on advertising,
the trial court held that the speech which the Ordinance
restricts is not constitutionally protected, and further held
that the territorial limitations inherent in the City’s au-
thority compelled a restrictive view of the intended scope
of the Ordinance. Therefore, this restriction was not over-
broad. 49 F. Supp., at 1178-9.

In sum, the trial court held that, subject to its inter-
pretation and the severance of the two provisions noted,
the Parma Ordinance was constitutional. Subsequently,
the City of Lakewood amended its Ordinance to reflect the
deletions ordered by the court. Parma also deleted the
single indicator of intent and the “reasonably should
know” standard from one substantive offense; that stan-
dard was not deleted from the advertising prohibition.*
In all other respects, the Ordinances are now the same.

*Parma did not contest the trial court’s ruling in this regard
and does not do so before this Court. For purposes of this case.
appellants concede the vagueness of the “reasonably should
know” standard in the Parma Ordinance.

7

Following the decision in the Parma case, a second
action was brought against enforcement of the Lakewood
law, making the same allegations of unconstitutionality.
No evidentiary hearing was held. The trial court also
entered judgment in favor of Lakewood, based on its opin-
ion in the Parma case.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, the cases were consolidated and ex-
pedited. The District Court decisions were reversed and
the case vas remanded for issuance of a permanent in-
junction against enforcement of the Ordinances.

The Sixth Circuit first held that the terms “used”
and “intended for use” were not vague or overbroad;
however, focusing on the term “designed for use”, the
Court held that it referred, not to subjective intent, but
to objective design characteristics. Since no such design
characteristics were demonstrated at the trial level, this
phrase was deemed vague and overbroad. Slip Opinion,
at 26-7.

In dealing with the list of items which are common
forms of drug paraphernalia, the Appeals Court agreed
that the listing does not make the items per se parapher-
nalia; nevertheless, it held the terms “roach clips” and
“miniature cocaine spoons” to be vague. Slip Op., 30.

With reference to the listing of logical’y relevant
factors for determining what items are drug paraphernalia,
the Court held that several factors listed create the pos-
sibility of convicting on the basis of guilt by association,
and thus implied that they were unconstitutionally over-
broad. Slip Op., 32.

Finally, with regard to the advertising restriction, the
Court rejected the limitations inferred by the trial court
and, therefore, held that the Ordinance unconstitutionally
violates the First Amendment. Slip Op., at 38-9.

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

The manufacture and merchandising of drug para-
phernalia has become a multi-million dollar industry in
this country which facilitates and glamorizes the use of
controlled substances, most often preying on the drug
fantasies of our nation’s youth. Previous attempts by
state and local authorities to control this problem through
legislation were, in large part, unsuccessful when chal-
enged on grounds of vagueness, overbreadth or a variety of
other ingenious allegations. The Model Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, as drafted by the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion of the United States Department of Justice, was pain-
stakingly worded to deal with this problem while still care-
fully providing for the constitutional rights of parapher-
nalia devotees.

At the time of the District Court’s opinions in the cases
before this Court, there were no other authoritative court
opinions considering the Model Act’s constitutionality.
However, on the strength of the trial court’s well-reasoned
interpretation, at least ten states and untold municipal
legislatures have proceeded to adopt the Model Act. To
date, at least six United States District Judges have held
the Model Act to be constitutional. Four decisions have
held the Model Act constitutional in its entirety. Mid-
Atlantic Accessories Trade Association v. Maryland, No.
H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, 1980); Florida Businessmen for
Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-6157-Civ-
NCR (S.D.Fla. Aug. 29, 1980); Delaware Accessories Trade
Assoc. v. Gebelein, No. 80-285 (D.Del. Aug. 15, 1980);
World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, No. 80-1414
(D.N.J. June 8, 1980). The court in The Casbah, Inc. v.
Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), agreed with
the court in the case at bar in holding the Act constitutional

9

with the same two deletions. And, in Tobacco Accesso~ies
v. Treen, Civil No. 80-3372 (E.D.La. Oct. 28, 1980), a Loui-
siana statute based on the Model Act was upheld.

The same district judge decided Record Museum v.
Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979) and
World Imports, Inc., supra. Yet, in the former case, deal-
ing with a locally-created law, the ordinance was held
unconstitutional; in the latter, the Model Act was upheld.
And, in Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.
1980), dealing with a non-Model Act law, the Model Act
was cited as an example of a properly drawn ordinance.
618 F.2d, at 28, n.4.

In sum, to date every court in the country which has
considered the Model Act has followed the reasoning of
the district court below—except the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals.

Moreover, testimony presented in the trial court, and
the judgment of legislators across the country, was that
this Model Act would aid in the fight against the epidemic
problem of drug abuse. Yet, enforcement of that Act is
enjoined in Parma and Lakewood, and held in abeyance in
countless other jurisdictions, on the basis of one uncor-
roborated decision.

Furthermore, appellants are informed that the Model
Act is presently being considered by the Courts of Ap-
peals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.
In view of the unanimity of the district court decisions, the
likelihood of a conflict arising among the Circuits would
seem great. Certainly this is a situation which cries out
for clarification by this Court, as the final arbiter among
the Circuits; and appellants should not be penalized simply
because they cannot presently point to the specific: Circuit
decision which will ultimately create the conflict with
the Sixth Circuit.

10

Clearly then, this case is of such importance as to
warrant plenary consideration by this Court.

But, in addition to the case’s significance in present-
ing this Court with the opportunity to rule upon the Model
Act, the individual issues are substantial and important
in their own right and warrant this Court’s consideration
in full.

First, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), this
Court stated, at 825, 828:

We need not decide in this case the precise ex-
tent to which the First Amendment permits regula-
tion of advertising that is related to activities the
State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.

* * * * *

No claim has been made, nor could any be sup-
ported on this record, that the advertisement .. . re-
lated to a commodity or service that was then illegal
in either Virginia or New York, or that it otherwise
furthered a criminal scheme in Virginia."

* * * * *

14. We are not required to decide here what the First
Amendment consequences would be if the Virginia advertise-
ment promoted an activity in New York which was then
illegal in New York. An example would be an advertise-
ment announcing the availability of narcotics in New York
City when the possession and sale of narcotics was pro-
scribed in the State of New York.

This case squarely presents to the Court for review these
questions, left unanswered in Bigelow. The decision in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), established the principle that
advertising to promote illegal acts does not constitute pro-
tected speech. ‘We have no doubt that a newspaper con-
stitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad pro-
posing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.” 413

11

U.S., at 388. And see, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459
F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972). That principle formed the basis
for the decision of all the courts which have upheld the
Model Act’s prohibition on placing an advertisement to
promote the sale of paraphernalia.

And, using the Virginia-New York analogy of the
Court, this case does present the situation in which the
activity promoted is illegal in Virginia (Parma) and may
well be illegal in New York (Lakewood, for example).
In other words, if the Court of Appeals was correct in re-
fusing to adopt the limiting construction of the Ordinances
urged by both the Cities and the district court, then this
Court is plainly faced with the questions left open in
Bigelow as to how far jurisdictions may go in legislating
against advertising which promotes illegal acts, as they
are entitled to do under this Court’s teachings in Pittsburgh
Press.

The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation that the phrase ‘‘de-
signed for use” necessarily refers to design characteristics
which can objectively be discerned also raises a substantial
question. Specifically, that interpretation directly contra-
venes the decision of this Court in Danovitz v. United
States, 281 U.S. 389 (1930). Danovitz was a forfeiture
action under the National Prohibition Act for items de-
signed for the manufacture of contraband liquors. In up-
holding the forfeiture, this Court refused to divorce the
product from the intent of the purveyor.

... [I]f the empty containers and other objects seized
were offered for sale in such a mode as purposely
to attract purchasers who wanted them for unlawful
manufacture, as we interpret the word, they were
designed for that manufacture and could be seized.
281 U.S., at 397.

12

An entire line of cases from the Prohibition era relied
on that interpretation by this Court. See United States
v. 2265 One-Gallon Paraffined Tin Cans, 260 F.2d 105,
108-9 (5th Cir. 1958), and cases cited therein. Consistently,
the terms “intended” and “designed” have been used in
tandem to refer to the purpose of the vendor accused.
See, e.g., United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 231 (W.D.
Mo. 1931). And the rationale behind that interpretation
has been very simply explained:

It seems to me that whatever difference there may
be in the meaning of the words “designed” and “in-
tended” is fully explained by the multiplicity of sub-
jects which the two adjectives serve; it being more
natural to say that a still is designed for the manu-
facture of unlawful liquor, and that a preparation
or compound is intended for use in the manufacture
of unlawful liquor. Stroh Products Co. v. Davis, 8
F.2d 773, 777 (E.D.Mich. 1925).

Moreover, in refusing to apply this common sense
approach, the Sixth Circuit not only challenges Danovitz,
and the Prohibition cases which followed it, but also raises
doubts about the meaning of “designed” and similar terms
as used in other contexts. For example, United States
v. Hamilton, 626 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1980), concerned
whether a broom handle may be a weapon or thing de-
signed to kill or injure. The court rejected the dissenting
judge’s argument that “designed” refers to objective stan-
dards and instead relied on the intent with which the
item is used, by the individual being charged.

Thus, both for its rejection of Danovitz and the ques-
tions it raises about the use of the term in other contexts,
the lower court’s construction of “designed for use” war-
rants a more complete examination by this Court.

13

Finally, the Sixth Circuit disregarded accepted rules
of construction in interpreting the Ordinances, unneces-
sarily striking them down and creating a serious problem
for any state or local government which legislates on a
matter which may be tested in court.

This Court has consistently sought an interpretation
which supports the constitutionality of legislation before
it. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 32 (1963); Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682,
99 S. Ct. 2545, 2553 (1979); George Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933). Only where there
is no constitutional construction available can the legisla-
tion be found unlawful. Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 100 (1945).

In addition, this Court has recognized that there are
limitations in the English language inherent in all legisla-
tion, which must be taken into account in testing the
constitutionality of a law. United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 578-9 (1973). Thus, a court presumes that the
legislative body acted constitutionally, United States v.
Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1973); and, therefore,
reasonable interpretations which support the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance are to be indulged. Tower Realty
v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 1952).

The Sixth Circuit disregarded these principles, draw-
ing a distinction between interpreting federal and state
legislation. “Our reasoning and decision in this case is
shaped by our lack of power to put a limiting construction
on the municipal ordinances.” Slip Opinion, at 19. But
that distinction is not supported by prior federal case
law. As this Court plainly stated in Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975):

14

[W]hen considering a facial challenge it is necessary
to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation
may result in unnecessary interference with a state
regulatory program. In accommodating these com-
peting interests the Court has held that a state stat-
ute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it
is not readily subject to a narrowing construction. ...

In the absence of a binding state decision, this Court has
refused to adopt an interpretation which would render
a state law unconstitutional. Driscoll v. Edison Light &
Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 114-5 (1939). Rather this Court
has espoused Justice Frankfurter’s notion of extrapolating
what a state law means in order to provide the widest
latitude consistent with the United States Constitution.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972),
relying on Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174 (1961).
And, we submit, such a rule becomes exceedingly im-
portant in a situation, such as the one before the Court,
where the federal courts refuse to abstain and also stay
enforcement of the law in question, thereby effectively
eliminating any opportunity the state agency may have
to obtain a narrowing construction from a state court.
Cf. Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 357
F. Supp. 564, 572, n.1 (S.D.Ohio 1973).

This matter of construing the Ordinances becomes
paramount when we realize that each of the district courts
which have considered the Model Act have had no diffi-
culty in finding a construction which rendered it constitu-
tional. For example, with respect to the first issue pre-
sented to this Court, the decision in The Casbah, Inc.
v. Thone, No. 80-0271 (D.Neb. Sept. 26, 1980), states, at
8-9:

Plaintiffs claim that the “designed for use” phrase
in the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague. They

15

cite an Indiana drug paraphernalia case where the
judge was troubled by the term. Indiana Normal
v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-C p.13 (S.D.Ind. 1980). The
Court finds that the term is not vague when it is
read in the context of the entire statute. “Designed
for use” in L.B.991 refers not to the physical char-
acteristics of an object but to the subjective intent
or plan of the person controlling the object. The
whole tenor of the statute makes clear that any ob-
ject, depending upon its use, can be drug parapher-
nalia. In fact, section two of the statute sets out
fourteen factors which are to be considered in deter-
mining if any given object is paraphernalia; those
factors focus not on the physical features of the sus-
pected item but on the context in which the item
is found. The factors are an aid in determining
whether a person “designed” the object as parapher-
nalia. The physical properties of an item may not
offer a clue about its illicit use. As the court in
Delaware Accessories Trade Assn. v. Gebelein, No.
80-285 p.5 (D.Del. 1980) said “the statute itself indi-
cates that ‘designed for use’ refers not to structure
but to intent.” In short, when “designed for use”
is integrated into the statute it is not vague nor even
easily susceptible to misunderstanding.

WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DicTIONARY (2d ed.
1969) simply defines “designed,” at 493: ‘formed or done
according to design; planned; purposed; intended.” In other
words, the Ordinances plainly were subject to a readily
available narrowing construction; the Sixth Circuit refused
to adopt it.

Similarly, in considering the list of objects which may
be paraphernalia when the requisite intent is present, the
lower court admits, Slip Op., at 29, that the listed items are

16

not “per se” paraphernalia. “Because the ordinances de-
fine drug paraphernalia in terms of its use, intended use
or designed use, and because the phrase ‘such as’ introduces
the lists, the statutory language indicates that the listed
items are only examples of items which could be drug
paraphernalia.” The lower court expressed no concern
over items listed such as scales, balloons, or envelopes,
presumably because of the element of criminal intent. Yet,
the court singled out “miniature cocaine spoons” and “roach
clips” as being vague. Quite obviously, the same intent
requirement that applies to every other listed item applies
to these two as well, Again, as the Casbah court held,
at 11:

Plaintiffs complain that the statute impermissibly out-
laws items and punishes their innocent users because
of the criminal intent of others. * * * Only when
an object is used, intended for use, or designed for
use with a controlled substance does it become pro-
hibited.

Since it is agreed that there are no objective design char-
acteristics by which paraphernalia can be defined, the
terms “chillums” or “bongs” which the Sixth Circuit ap-
proved, at 29, can be no more definite than the terms
roach clips or miniature cocaine spoons. In both cases
it is the intent which is the distinguishing feature.

Once again, in considering the listing of relevant fac-
tors contained in the definition, the lower court deemed
some proper and singled out others as unlawful on the
basis of hypothetical applications of the factors. But, we
submit, such reasoning disregards the fundamental rule
that Due Process requires only “fair warning.” Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975). Marginal cases are not
the proper test for determining a law’s constitutionality.
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947); United

17

States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 442 (2d Cir. 1974). Doubt
as to certain hypothetical cases which may never arise
is not sufficient basis for declaring a law unconstitutional.
Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945). See
also Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
340 (1952); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d
Cir. 1965).

Thus, once again, the lower court went needlessly
far afield rather than making a close reading of the Ordi-
nances and rendering a decision on that basis alone. As
the court held in Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Associa-
tion v. Maryland, No. H-80-1343 (D.Md. Nov. 11, 1980) :

The simple answer to these contentions is that
none of these factors is dispositive. These listed cri-
teria do not define drug paraphernalia but are merely
to be considered by a court or other authority along
with other relevant factors in determining whether
an object is covered by the statutory definition. They
are therefore only guides for determining whether
the necessary criminal intent exists. To convict under
the statute, a jury must still find beyond « reasonable
doubt that a defendant had the requisite criminal in-
tent. That these factors are relevant evidence does
not negate the fact that the statute clearly requires
proof of specific intent before a violation can be found.
Slip Op., at 20.

Finally, in the case of the prohibition against adver-
tising, the lower court again relied on hypothetical exam-
ples as the test of the Ordinances’ constitutionality. The
advisability of doing so is immediately called into question
as a result of this Court’s holdings that “overbreadth”
analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the commercial speech
context. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 887,
894, n.9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S.

18

447, 462, n.20 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 381 (1977). But, in any event, the lower court
again refused to apply that limiting construction of the
Ordinances which was readily available. In particular,
the potential problems raised by this Court’s decision in
Bigelow are of small concern when one notes that the
Model Act focuses on the act of placing an advertisement,
giving the criminal act a specific situs, and further notes
that all municipalities, including those in Ohio, have lim-
ited territory and limited legislative authority. See, e.g.,
McQUuILLIn, 5 MunIcIPpAL CorPORATIONS (3d ed. rev.) § 15.30
at 108; Cincinnati v. Rost, 92 Ohio App. 8, 10-11 (1952).
It is presumed that the governing body of the city was
legislating with reference to the conduct of business within
the territorial limits of the city. City of Sedalia v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193, 196-7 (8th Cir. 1936).

In sum, we submit that the lower court was obliged
to give the Ordinances that construction by which they
could be rendered constitutional, as a result of repeated
decisions by this Court. The authorities noted above, and
others, make it plain that such a constitutional construction
was readily available on the basis of the language used
in the Ordinances. Yet, by failing to follow the dictates
of this Court, enforcement of these laws was needlessly
enjoined; and similar laws throughout the nation have
been held in abeyance. Again, we submit that this is
a substantial question which warrants this Court’s full
review.

19

CONCLUSION

The questions presented by this appeal are substantial
and of broad public importance. Probable jurisdiction
should therefore be noted.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW Boyko, Counsel of Record
Law Director, City of Parma
STEPHEN P. Bonp
Assistant Law Director
Parma City Hall
6611 Ridge Road
Parma, Ohio 44129
(216) 886-2323

WILLIAM E. BLACKIE
Law Director, City of Lakewood
Lakewood City Hall
12650 Detroit Avenue
Lakewood, Ohio 44107
(216) 521-7580
Counsel for Appellants

Al

APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(Filed December 8, 1980)
Nos. 80-3308, 80-3352, 80-3353

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THF SIXTH CIRCUIT

RECORD REVOLUTION NO. 6, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.

THE CITY OF PARMA, et al.,
Defendant-Appellee (80-3308),
ALEXANDER J. LUKA d/b/a DAYSTAR BOUTIQUE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

THE CITY OF LAKEWOOD, et al.,
Defendant-Appellee (80-3352),
THE RIGHT PLACE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

THE CITY OF NORTH OLMSTED, OHIO, et al.,
Defendant-Appellee. (80-3353).

AppEAL from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.

Before: Epwarps, Chief Circuit Judge, and MARTIN
and Jones, Circuit Judges.

Jones, Circuit Judge. Business owners in the cities
of Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted, Ohio have chal-

A2

lenged the constitutionality of ordinances prohibiting the
use, sale and manufacture of “drug paraphernalia.”! The
district court, in a very thoughtful and well written opin-
ion, sustained the constitutionality of the ordinances af-
ter severing certain phrases and construing the meaning
or scope of other language. Being convinced that parts
of the ordinances are vague and overbroad, in violation
of the First Amendment right of free speech and the
Fourteenth Amendment right of dues process, we reverse
and enjoin enforcement of the ordinances.

ae
A. Rationale for Model Act

The “drug paraphernalia” ordinances in Parma, Lake-
wood, and North Olmsted are based almost verbatim on
the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted by the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. At the request of the Drug Policy Office
of the President’s Domestic Policy Council, DEA prepared
the Model Act as an amendment to the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act. In the Prefatory Note to the Model Act,
DEA described graphically the severity of the national
problem to which the Model Act responds:

[T]he availability of Drug Paraphernalia has reached
epidemic levels. An entire industry has developed
which promotes, even glamorizes, the illegal use of
drugs by adults and children alike. Sales of Drug
Paraphernalia are reported as high as three billion
dollars a year. What was a small phenomenon at
the time the Uniform Act was drafted has now mush-
roomed into an industry so well-entrenched that it
has its own trade magazines and associations.

App. 1230.

1. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal.

A3

The Justice Department determined that the law en-
forcement campaign against businesses selling drug para-
phernalia should be fought mainly by state and local offi-
cials. Statement of Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, before the H. R. Se-
lect Com. on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control, November
1, 1979. App. 1216-17. The Model Act attempts to avoid
or minimize the constitutional problems of previous stat-
utes and municipal ordinances, yet to provide an effective
law to curb the sale of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 1217-18.

Mr. Nathan strongly espoused the enactment of the
Model Act by states and cities in his statement to the
House Committee on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Control.
He stated:

The positive features of such a bill are apparent.
Outlawing the open advertisement and sale of drug
paraphernalia will send a clear message to impression-
able adolescents and others that society does not con-
done the use of drugs. Governmental authority will
present a more consistent and reasoned face to the
community by refusing to let the paraphernalia in-
dustry mock the law by thriving off the wide spread
[sic] use of illegal drugs. Communities will no longer
be offended by the presence of open symbols of illegal
activity in their midst.

App. 1221-22.

In closing, Mr. Nathan added several cautionary re-
marks on the potential problems of constitutionality and
feasibility. First, he noted that ‘enforcement of such an
act by state and local authorities may prove difficult and
may divert scarce resources from more pressing drug con-
cerns.” App. 1223. Mr. Nathan further warned:

A4

Even if there were resources to permit vigorous en-
forcement, there is a significant potential for mistakes
and abuse by local authorities. There may be addi-
tional invasions of privacy if law enforcement person-
nel need see only an implement such as a pipe, rather
than any actual evidence of the drug itself, in order
to make an arrest and conduct a search. Moreover,
the prevalence of drug paraphernalia may leave law
enforcement personnel in the difficult position of hav-
ing to engage in selective enforcement, with the poten-
tial for disparate treatment of similarly situated in-
dividuals.

App. 1224. He was concerned about the possibility of “in-
creased public corruption” resulting from enforcement of
the Act. App. 1224. He also questioned the potential ef-
fectiveness of drug paraphernalia statutes. App. 1222-23.
Finally, Mr. Nathan listed several options in lieu of the
comprehensive prohibition against the use, sale or manu-
facture of drug paraphernalia, such as licensing, zoning,
forbidding sales to minors, and regulating the form of ad-
vertising. App. 1225.

B. Structure of Model Act?

The Model Act contains two main sections. The first
section sets forth at great length the definition of “drug
paraphernalia.” In the first subsection, drug paraphernalia
is defined as anything which is “used, intended for use, or
designed for use” in introducing controlled substances into
the body. A number of specific examples ere then given,
each described by the phrase “used, intended for use, or
designed for use.” One example of drug paraphernalia is
“testing equipment used, intended for use or designed for

2. The entire ordinance as codified in Parma before its
amendment is reprinted as an Addendum to our opinion.

A5

use in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effective-
ness or purity of controlled substances.” The list of ex-
amples concludes with the catchall category of “objects
used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting,
inhaling or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine,
hashish, or hashish oil into the human body,” followed by
another list of thirteen items, such as water pipes, roach
clips, chillums, and bongs.

The second subsection of the first main section of the
Model Act delineates fourteen factors that a “court or other
authority should consider, in addition to all other logically
relevant factors,” “in determining whether an object is
‘drug paraphernalia.’” These factors include the state-
ments by an owner about the item’s use, prior convictions
of the owner, national or local advertising, and the ex-
istence of lawful uses for the item.

In sum, the Model Act uses three techniques to define
“drug paraphernalia.” First, it uses the repeated phrase
“used, intended for use, or designed for use.” Second, it
lists by way of example a number of objects that could be
drug paraphernalia. Third, the Model Act sets forth nu-
merous factors to be considered in determining whether
or not an object is drug paraphernalia.

Following the extensive definition of “drug para-
phernalia,” the second main section of the Model Act de-
fines the substantive criminal offenses. The use, or the
possession with intent to use, of drug paraphernalia is pro-
hibited. Also proscribed is the delivery or manufacture of
“drug paraphernalia,” when the deliverer or manufacturer
knows or should reasonably know that the drug parapher-
nalia will be used with controlled substances. The Model
Act makes criminal the placing of any advertising in the
print media promoting the sale of objects designed or in-
tended for use as drug paraphernalia, when the person

A6

placing the advertising knows or should reasonably know
the purpose of the advertisement. The Model Act provides
for the civil forfeiture of all drug paraphernalia and a
special offense for the delivery of drug paraphernalia to
aminor. Finally, the Act states that its sections or sub-
sections are severable; in the event that any part is de-
clared unconstitutional the remaining parts can still be
given effect.

II.
A. City of Parma Ordinance No. 242-79

The City of Parma, Ohio, has long expressed its desire
to curb drug abuse in its community. In 1977, the Parma
City Council enacted a resolution urging that the possession
and private use of marihuana not be legalized. Depo. of
Victor LaButta, App. 1088. In 1978, Doris Krawczyk,
Councilwoman in Parma, received a copy of a petition
addressed to the manager of Parmatown Shopping Mall
from constituents who were angry at the sale of novelty
items, called drug paraphernalia, by the plaintiff in this
case, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. Depo. of Doris Kraw-
ezyk, App. 924, 1043. Krawczyk requested the city law
department in April, 1978, to draft legislation to ban the
sale of drug paraphernalia, but the law department ad-
vised her that “no basis or foundation” for legislation then
existed. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 924. Krawczyk’s
interest in drug paraphernalia legislation revived in Octo-
ber, 1979, when she read an article on an ordinance enacted
in Lakewood, California that banned the sale of drug para-
phernalia to minors. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 926-27.
Then on November 14, 1979, an editorial in The Cleveland
Press informed her of the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act.
App. 1044. She obtained a copy of the Model Act and re-
quested the city law department to draft similar legisla-
tion. App. 1045.

A7

On January 7, 1980, the Parma City Council enacted
Ordinance No. 242-79, which is almost identical to the
Model Act.* The ordinance was passed as an emergency
measure and became effective immediately upon the
mayor’s signature on January 9, 1980. The Parma City
Council did not commission a study of the drug abuse
problem, but based its conclusions on the need for the
legislation on the personal experience of its members, the
statements of DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger and
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nathan, and the testi-
mony before the Council of two Parma police officers.
Testimony of Doris Krawczyk, App. 662; Depo. of Doris
Krawezyk, App. 929-35, 941, 944; Depo. of Victor Labutta,
App. 1098-99, 1101, 1116-19. Counsel for Record Revolu-
tion No. 6, Inc. testified against the enactment of the or-
dinance before the City Council.

On January 10, 1980, Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.
filed an action in the federal district court alleging the
unconstitutionality of the Parma Ordinance and seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Record Revolution No.
6, Inc. is an Ohio corporation which sells retail records,
magazines, jewelry, T-shirts, and “novelty items,” such
as various kinds of pipes. At a hearing on the temporary
restraining order the next day, the City agreed not to
enforce the ordinance until the district court reached a
final decision on the merits. The district court held a
consolidated hearing on the preliminary and permanent
injunction on January 28 and 30, 1980. After allowing
time for the submission of post-trial briefs, the district

3. The ordinance is codified as §§ 620.01(dd) and 620.04
of the codified ordinances of Parma, Ohio.

4. The Parma ordinance added the term “sell” to § 620.04
(b); added all of § 620.04(e), which exempts certain medical
and other individuals from the ordinance; and limited the sever-
ability clause in § 620.04(g) to § 620.04.

A8

court issued its lengthy, comprehensive memorandum opin-
ion on April 14, 1980.

The testimony at the injunction hearing can be sum-
marized briefly. Francis Szabo, Chief of the Parma Police,
testified that the police had notified the one retailer of
suspected drug paraphernalia in Parma of the ordinance;
the police had not been trained yet to enforce the ordi-
nance; and no attempt at enforcement had been made.
App. 642-45.

Doris Krawczyk, through her in-court testimony and
her deposition, stated that the ordinance was based entirely
on the language and research of the Model Act. App.
662, 940-41, 976, 994. She also testified that she could
not identify items which violated the ordinance and that
such a determination was the responsibility of the police.
App. 673, 675, 682-83, 928-30, 933, 969, 984, 994, 997, 1003.
In her opinion, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an item
turned on the purchaser’s intent. App. 683-84, 691, 993,
995-96.

Clarence D. Bennett, Detective of the Parma Police
with the duty of investigating organized crime and nar-
cotics, testified that the ordinance would aid the fight
against drug abuse, but that it still had not been enforced.
App. 1173, 1175. He identified certain items as drug para-
phernalia, such as all pipes with screens, all chamber pipes,
small-bowled pipes, and very small pipes, and stated that
the seller’s intent could be inferred from the item itself.
App. 712-13, 715, 717-18, 728, 731, 743, 1178, 1183, 1185-
86. He would enforce the ordinance, when other common
items were involved, only if residue of an illegal drug
were discovered on the item. App. 722, 730, 1183, 1188-
89, 1206-07. He also concluded that a policeman would
not know how to enforce the ordinance with respect to
circumstances in which the seller reasonably should have

A9

known that the purchaser would use the item with illegal
drugs. App. 742.

Herbert J. Bessai, a pipe maker and retail merchant
for 31 years, and a collector and appraiser of pipes, testi-
fied as an expert witness for plaintiff. According to his
testimony, the design of a pipe gives no indication of
whether it will be used or legal for illegal purposes. For
example, he stated that water pipes have long been used
to give the dryest, coolest smoke and that screens serve
to keep the tobacco away from the moisture in the bottom
of the pipe. App. 750, 752-53, 757. He did say on cross-
examination that he had never made a pipe out of plastic
and that plastic pipes were normally sold in “head gear
shops.” App. 773-74. He also stated on redirect examina-
tion that he was certain some of the pipes which he has
sold have been used to smoke marijuana. App. 777-78.

After Parma’s motion for dismissal at the close of
plaintiff’s case was denied, Parma called two witnesses.®
Charles J. Carter, Special Agent of the DEA in charge
of the Cleveland office, testified that the drug parapher-
nalia ordinance would assist law enforcement efforts
against drug abuse. App. 835-36.

Richard Rutt, a detective in the narcotics unit of the
Cleveland Police Department, testified as an expert in
narcotics law enforcement. In his opinion, the drug para-
phernalia ordinance would reduce drug abuse somewhat.
App. 847. He stated on cross-examination that the design
of almost every item listed in § 620.01 (L), such as a
water pipe or a screen in a pipe indicates an intent to
design, sell or use the item with illegal drugs. App. 849-

5. Bernard Survoy, Clerk of the Parma City Council, was
also called as a witness. The attorneys then stipulated to his
testimony on the authenticity of the Parma ordinance.

A10

51, 857-59, 861-62, 869-71, 875, 878-81. However, he also
testified that any pipe could be used to smoke marijuana,
that he would not call Bessai’s testimony incorrect, and
that some sellers could believe in the lawfulness of an
item on the basis of its patent. App. 852, 871.

B. City of Lakewood Ordinance No. 5-80°

The City of Lakewood enacted its drug paraphernalia
ordinance, Ordinance No. 5-80 on January 21, 1980. The
Lakewood ordinance, before its amendment on April 21,
1980, was identical to the Parma ordinance, except that
it did not provide a special offense for sales to minors.
The amending Ordinance, No. 29-80, added this special
offense and repealed original § 513.01 (cc) (2)(K) in its
entirety and the phrase “under circumstances where one
reasonably should know” from § 513.04(b), (c).

The City of Lakewood participated as amicus curiae
in the injunction hearing on the Parma ordinance. On
May 6, 1980, after the district court issued its opinion
sustaining the constitutionality of the Parma ordinance,
Alexander Luka, doing business as Daystar Boutique in
Lakewood, filed his complaint attacking the constitutional-
ity of the Lakewood drug paraphernalia ordinance and
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Daystar Bou-
tique is a retail establishment similar to Record Revolution
No. 6, Inc. No evidentiary hearing was held. The district
court entered summary judgment on May 8, 1980 for defen-
dants on the basis of its opinion in Record Revolution
No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma.

6. The ordinance is codified as §§ 513.01(cc) and 513.04
of the General Offenses Code of the Codified Ordinances of the
City of Lakewood.

All

C. City of North Olmstead Ordinance No. 80-287

The City of North Olmsted enacted its drug parapher-
nalia ordinance, Ordinance No. 80-28, on May 6, 1980.
Being an emergency measure, the ordinance became effec-
tive on May 7, when signed by the mayor. The North
Olmsted ordinance is identical to the Parma drug para-
phernalia ordinance as amended. On May 7, 1980, the
Right Place, Inc., a retail establishment similar to Record
Revolution No. 6, Inc., filed a complaint challenging the
constitutionality of the North Olmsted drug paraphernalia
ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
No evidentiary hearing was held. The district court en-
tered summary judgment for the defendants on the basis
of its decision in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City
of Parma.

D. District Court Opinion

The district court held that the Parma ordinance was
not vague or overbroad as construed. The inclusion of
“use, intended for use and designed fcr use” in the def-
inition of “drug paraphernalia” in § 620.01(dd)(1) was
held to save the ordinance from vagueness. The district
court also construed § 620.01(dd) ( 1) to refer to the
detendant’s use, intent, or design. The district court de-
clared that the ordinance dces not make the items listed
in § 620.01 (dd) (1)(A)-(L) drug paraphernalia per se,
since the element of the defendant’s use, intent, or design
must be proven. Finally, with respect to § 620.01, the
district court ruled that subsection (K) was vague, because
it created a danger of discriminatory and arbitrary enforce-
ment. Therefore, the district court severed subsection (K)
from § 620.01, pursuant to the severability clause in
§ 620.04(g).

7. The ordinance is codified at §§ 513.01(bb) and 513.04
of the Codified Ordinances of the City of North Olmstead.

Al2

The district court found § 620.04 not vague or over-
broad, except for the phrase “reasonably should know” in
§ 620.04(b) and (c). The district court severed this phrase
from those subsections. The district court held that the
transferor’s knowledge of the transferee’s intended use of
an item sufficiently protects the innocent and preserves the
section from vagueness and overbreadth. In doing so, it
rejected plaintiff's contention that due process required
proof of specific intent. The district court construed
§ 620.04(c) to apply only to advertisements placed in Parma
about “drug paraphernalia” available in Parma. As such,
this subsection was held not to infringe upon speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. The district court did not
find any constitutional problem with § 620.04(d), (e), (f)
and (h)."*

E. Issues on Appeal

Plaintiffs raise four main arguments on appeal. First,
they contend that the district court lacked the power to
add to, sever, and construe the statutory language of the
municipal ordinances. Second, the definition of “drug
paraphernalia” is vague and overbroad, they argue, be-
cause the proscribed items are not adequately described
and the definition relies on transferred intent. Plaintiffs’
third contention is that the offenses are vague and over-
broad because proof of specific intent is not necessary,
knowledge can be inferred from facts which do not support
the inference, and the proscription on advertising includes
protected speech. Finally, they argue that the list of items

7a. On May 5, 1980, the City Council of Parma amended
its drug paraphernalia ordinance to agree in part with the district
court’s opinion. App. 1258-59. The amending ordinance, No.
103-80, repealed the original § 620.01(dd)(2)(k) and the phrase
“under circumstances where one reasonably should know” from
§ 620.04(b) only.

Al3

in § 620.01(dd)(1)(A)-(L) creates mandatory or rebut-
table presumptions, which do not rest on supportable in-
ferences.

The plaintiffs have not appealed the district court’s
other conclusions of law, which held that the ordinances
did not violate the equal protection clause, the commerce
clause, the Fourth Amendment, the impairment of con-
tracts clause, the bill of attainder clause, or the supremacy
clause through federal pre-emption.

Parma contests two adverse rulings by the district
court. The district court held that it had subject matter
jurisdiction, in that an actual case or controversy was pres-
ent. Parma has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for
lack of an actual case or controversy. The district court
also denied Parma’s motion to abstain in order to allow the
state courts an initial opportunity to construe the ordi-
nance.

III.
A. Case or Controversy
(1) Threat of Prosecution

The City of Parma argues that this Court and the dis-
trict court lack subject matter jurisdiction because plaintff
has not been threatened with prosecution under the drug
paraphernalia ordinance.® Parma relies on the testimony
of Police Chief Szabo and Councilwoman Krawczyk. Ac-
cording to their testimony, the ordinance has still not been
enforced because Parma agreed to withhold enforcement

8. Though defendants-appellees did not file a cross-appeal,
they are permitted to advocate any ground in the record that
will require affirmance of the district court’s judgment.

9. Lakewood and North Olmstead have not challenged the
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court or the district court.

Al4

pending the district court’s hearing of the case. After that
this Court granted an injunction pending appeal. They
also testified that the ordinance would not ve enforced
until the police had been trained in its provisions and busi-
ness owners had been given public notice.

Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. seeks a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief. Though the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, cannot remove the
jurisdictional requirement of Article III, § 1 of the Consti-
tution, a genuine threat of criminal prosecution under legis-
lation that allegedly is constitutionally defective does pre-
sent an actual case or controversy. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1974). The Declaratory Judgment
Act represents Congress’ judgment that, in these circum-
stances, it is unfair and may deter the exercise of consti-
tutionally protected rights to compel a person to wait
for an actual arrest or prosecution before allowing that
person to test the legislation in court.

The facts in this case demonstrate that the threat
of prosecution of Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. under
the Parma drug paraphernalia ordinance is not “imagi-
nary,” “speculative,” or “chimerical,”’ and that the threat
continues to exist at this stage of the proceedings. Id.
at 459. Councilwoman Krawczyk’s first reported desire
to enact drug paraphernalia legislation arose from the re-
ceipt of a petition from her constituents protesting the
sale of “drug paraphernalia” by Record Revolution No.
6, Inc. Depo. of Doris Krawczyk, App. 924, 1043. Kraw-ezyk
visited Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. and concluded that
the store was selling drug paraphernalia. Depo. of Doris
Krawczyk, App. 924, 928-34. The ordinance explicitly de-
cries the business activity of head shops. Though
Krawczyk testified that the ordinance was not aimed at
any particular store, she knew only one store, Record

Al5

Revolution No. 6, Inc., that would be subject to the ordi- -
nance. Depo. of Doris Krawzcyk, App. 935. The deposi-
tion testimony of Councilman Labutta and Detective Ben-
nett confirms that Record Revolution No. 6, Inc., would
be a primary target for enforcement of the ordinance.
App. 1103-04, 1106-07, 1111-12, 1114, 1180-81, 1201. Police
Chief Szabo stated that there is only one retailer in Parma
subject to the ordinance and that this retailer had received
notice of the ordinance. App. 644. According to Chief
Szabo, he had not told Record Revolution No. 6, Inc.,
that the police had no intention of enforcing the ordinance.
App. 644. In fact, every testifying police officer identi-
fied as drug paraphernalia items sold by Record Revolu-
tion No. 6, Inc. The only reason for the lack of enforce-
ment to date is the injunction pending appeal. Depo.
of Doris Krawczyk, App. 1018; Depo. of Clarence D. Ben-
nett, App. 1175. Under these circumstances, Record Revo-
lution No. 6, Inc. has plainly demonstrated a sufficient
threat of prosecution to establish the presence of an actual
case or controversy. See High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee,
621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1980); Tobacco Road v. City
of Novi, No. 79-71000 (E. D. Mich., June 21, 1979): Riddle
v. Clack, No. CA-3-77-0525-D (N.D. Tex, August 25, 1977).

(2) Mootness

Defendants’ amendments of their ordinances to com-
ply with the district court’s opinion raises the question of
mootness. We note, first, that the defendants have not
completely harmonized their ordinances with the district
court’s opinion. The ordinances proscribe the placement
of advertising in any printed material of prohibited items
available anywhere. In contrast, the district court con-
strued the ordinances to apply only to advertisements
placed in printed material in the three cities about pro-
hibited items available in the three cities. Also, North

Al6

Olmsted and Parma, unlike Lakewood, deleted the phrase
“or under circumstances where one reasonably should
know” from § 620.44(b) only. The district court severed
this phrase from § 620.04(c) as well.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the ordi-
nances as originally enacted and as amended. The con-
tinuing vitality of these ordinances prevents this case
from being moot and distinguishes Indiana Chapter,
NORML, Inc. v. Sendak, No. 80-1305 (7th Cir., July 22,
1980) (State of Indiana repealed statute in entirety while
appeal pending).

Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs have demonstrated
an actual case or controversy. Consequently, appellees’
motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is denied.

B. Abstention

A substantial hurdle to the exercise of our jurisdiction
is the branch of abstention doctrine elaborated in Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).?°
The Pullman doctrine counsels abstention in “narrowly
limited special circumstances,’ “where the challenged
state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state
judiciary that would avoid or modify the necessity of
reaching a federal constitutional question.” Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306
(1979), quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973).
To justify abstention, the questions of state law must
be uncertain and amenable to a construction by the state

40. Since no state criminal prosecution is pending against
plaintiffs, we do not face a question of abstention under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny.

A separate question, which we shall address later, is the pro-
priety of granting injunctive relief as opposed to simply awarding
a declaratory judgment.

Al7

courts that would resolve or substantially alter the federal
constitutional issues. High Ol Times, Inc. v. Busbee,
621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1980); D’Iorio v. County of
Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3rd Cir, 1978). Another
factor is whether the federal court’s decision would un-
duly interfere with important state policies or regulatory
programs. 621 F.2d at 139; 592 F.2d at 686.

As a general rule, abstention is not appropriate in
cases challenging the constitutionality of ‘a statute on
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, for the reasons
that such statutes often are not subject to a saving con-
struction, which would eliminate or narrow the federal
constitutional issues, and that delayed resolution of state
law questions implicating important federal constitutional
rights should be avoided. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 537 (1965); 621 F.2d at 140 n. 6; 592 F.2d at 692
n. 19. Also, the federal court should not abstain if lengthy,
piecemeal litigation in the state courts would be necessary
to define or resolve the issues of state law. Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964). These principles of
abstention should be applied to effectuate the more gen-
eral concerns of avoiding needless constitutional litigation
and needless friction with state adjudication and policy-
making. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-30 (1979) ;
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 54.

The district court did not state its reasons for denying
the motion to abstain, but it did reach the correct result.
The state court could not construe ‘the ordinances to
eliminate the problems of vagueness and overbreadth.
The constitutional defect, which we will discuss later, in
the definition “drug paraphernalia” necessarily infects the
entire ordinance. Furthermore, the overbreadth of the
proscription on advertising deters business owners from
engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Though

Al18

the Ohio courts are very capable of applying federal con-
stitutional principles, and can hear declaratory judgment
actions, Ohio Rev. Code § 2721.03, their powers of con-
struction are not limitless. State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.
2d 370, 374, 406 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1980). The Ohio courts,
like federal courts, cannot rewrite the language of a stat-
ute. Id, Only such judicial rewriting of the drug para-
phernalia ordinances could save their constitutionality.
This factor strongly undercuts the argument for absten-
tion. Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp.
1040, 1048-49 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (3-judge district court).

~ Abstention is also inappropriate in these cases because
the ordinances are challenged on their face and the ques-
tions raised are predominantly questions of federal con-
stitutional law. Steffel v.-Thompson, 415 U.S. at 474-75.
The questions of state law have a very minimal impact
on the issues before us. Finally, we must review the
constitutionality of only one ordinance in each of three
cities. Our decision will not disrupt a comprehensive
state regulatory program or ongoing procedures in state
agencies or state courts. Compare Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415 (1979); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pull-
man, Inc., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Parker v. Turner, No.
78-1063 (6th Cir., July 3, 1980).

Therefore, we hold that the Pullman doctrine does
not require abstention from deciding the constitutionality
of the drug paraphernalia ordinances."

11. Accord, High OV Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135,
139 (5th Cir. 1980); Indiana Chapter, NORML, Inc. v. Sendak,
No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind., February 4, 1980) (3-judge district
court), vacated as moot as the time of appeal, No. 80-1305 (7th
Cir., July 22, 1980); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481
F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979).

Alg

IV.

A. Lack of Power to Construe Ordinances

Before discussing the merits of the vagueness and
overbreadth issues, we must first consider the extent of
our power to give a saving construction to the drug para-
phernalia ordinances. The district court construed the
drug paraphernalia ordinances by adding to, deleting from
and defining the statutory language. A federal court,
however, has very limited powers in construing state stat-
utes or municipal ordinances. For the federal court’s
interpretation of state or municipal legislation is “not
binding on the state courts and may be discredited at
any time—thus essentially rendering the federal court
decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaning-
less.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 428. See State v.
Young, 62 Ohio St.2d at 375 n.2, 406 N.E.2d at 503 (After
citing to a federal court decision on the same state stat-
ute, the Ohio Supreme Court declared: This federal case
is not binding upon this court, and we note the decision
rendered in that case only as supporting authority). Con-
sequently, a federal court must take the state statute or
municipal ordinance as written and cannot find the stat-
ute or ordinance constitutional on the basis of a limiting
construction supplied by it rather than a state court.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
As stated in Hynes v. Mayor and Council of the Borough
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976), “[e]ven assuming
that a more explicit limiting interpretation of the ordi-
nance could remedy the flaws we have pointed out .. .
we are without power to remedy the defects by giving
the ordinance constitutionally precise content.” See also
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Gooding v.

A20

Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).!2 The proper course
for a federal court to follow, if a limiting construction
will save the constitutionality of a state statute or munic-
ipal ordinance and the statute or ordinance is fairly sus-
ceptible to such a construction, is to abstain pursuant to
the Pullman doctrine.

The power of a federal court to sever sections or
phrases from state legislation poses a slightly different
problem of interpreting state law. In anticipation of
litigation on the constitutionality of legislation, a state
legislature or city council may provide expressly in the
legislation for severability in the event that only parts
of the legislation are declared unconstitutional. The task
of the federal court, absent a controlling state decision, is
to ascertain whether the unconstitutional parts of the legis-
lation are so interwoven with the remainder of the statute
that the remainder cannot stand alone. This is a question
of the legislative intent and the interpretation of the legal
effect of the remainder of the legislation standing by itself.
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla-
homa, 286 U.S. 210, 234-35 (1932); Dorchy v. Kansas,
264 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1924). See Emmons v. Keller, 21
Ohio St.2d 48, 254 N.E.2d 687 (1970). Abstention on
the question of severability should be considered. Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. at 291.

12. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)
the Court stated that a federal court could “extrapolate” the
“allowable meaning” of a municipal ordinance. The Court found
that the state court would construe the ordinance narrowly and
concluded that the statutory prohibitions were clear, though the
language permitted some flexibility. In effect, the Court declared
that the language of the ordinance, as it read the ordinance and
the state court would read the ordinance, was not vague. The
Court did not add, delete or narrow statutory terms. The fine
line between “extrapolation” and “construction” was recognized:
“‘Extrapolation,’ of course, is a delicate task, for it is not within
our power to construe and narrow state laws.” Id. at 110.

A21

From these principles, it will become clear from our
discussion of the issues that the district court, in its
sincere desire to uphold the constitutionality of these
municipal ordinances, exceeded the scope of its powers.
The district court should have declared the ordinances
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on the basis of
the defects that it found in the ordinances. Our reasoning
and decision in this case is shaped by our lack of power
to put a limiting construction on the municipal ordinances,

B. Standards of Vagueness and Overbreadth

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and over-
breadth. These two doctrines have distinct meanings and
purposes, though a statute which is vague is also often
overbroad, The void-for-vagueness doctrine commands
any statute to give persons of common intelligence fair
notice of the persons covered and the conduct proscribed.
Colautti v. Franklin, 489 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979). Funda-
mental fairness, as well as a proper regard for preventing
the deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct, re-
quires that persons not be compelled to guess at their
own peril the meaning and application of a statute.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Ascer-
tainable standards of guilt are imperative in order to
protect against arbitrary, erratic, and discriminatory ar-
rests, prosecutions and convictions. Papachristou v, City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). Unless the statute itself
prescribes sufficiently precise standards, basic policy deci-
sions are impermissibly delegated to the personal pre-
dilections of the police, prosecutors and juries. Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108. “Legislators may not so abdi-

A22

cate their responsibilities for setting the standards of
the criminal law.” 415 U.S. at 575. Finally, a greater
degree of precision is required when the statute defines
criminal offenses or impinges on activities protected by
the First Amendment. Hynes v. Mayor and Council of
Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620; Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. at 515; Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327,
1336 (6th Cir. 1978). But see Rose v. Locke, 423 US.
48, 50 (1975) (per curiam).

The overbreadth doctrine prohibits a statute from
making innocent or constitutionally protected conduct crim-
inal. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973);
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The
statutory language may be very clear, yet “sweep un-
necessarily broadly to invade the area of protected free-
doms.” Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
1980). The harm from an overbroad statute is its chilling
effect on constitutionally protected or otherwise lawful
conduct.

C. Application to Drug Paraphernalia Ordinances

(1) Definition of Drug Paraphernalia

If the definition of “drug paraphernalia” is vague or
overbroad in any respect, the ordinances must be declared
unconstitutional. A precise and unambiguous definition
of “drug paraphernalia” is critical because the ordinances
seek to ban in certain circumstances only the sale of
everyday items that have a myriad of innocent, lawful,
and beneficial uses.** To pass constitutional muster, the
ordinances must specify clearly the very limited circum-
stances in which the manufacture, sale or use of these
common items is unlawful.

13. The definition of “drug paraphernalia” includes “all
equipment, products and materials of any kind.”

A23

The key phrase used by the ordinances to separate
lawful from unlawful items is “used, intended for use,
or designed for use.” The definition of “drug parapher-
nalia” turns on the state of mind of a person or his act
act with respect to an object. Plaintiffs contend first
that the ordinances violate due process by allowing a
defendant to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted on
the basis of an act or state of mind of another person.
For example, if the purchaser uses a pipe to smoke
marijuana, do the ordinances permit the seller of the
pipe to be arrested, prosecuted, or convicted on the basis
of the purchaser’s use? If the manufacturer intended
that a chamber pipe be used for ingesting hashish, and
the purchaser so uses the chamber pipe, do the ordinances
permit the seller, who lacks such intent and did not use
the chamber pipe himself to ingest hashish, to be arrested,
prosecuted, or convicted on the basis of the manufacturer’s
intent and the purchaser’s use?

These hypothetical questions explain the problem of
transferred intent. The presence of transferred intent in
the ordinances would infringe the due process clause by
failing to give the defendant proper notice of the items
defined to be drug paraphernalia and by convicting the
defendant for another person’s intent or misdeeds. The
answer to the questions requires an understanding of the
persons to whom the statute is directed. The description
of the substantive offenses informs us that four categories
of persons fall within the scope of the ordinances: manu-
facturers, wholesalers, retailers, and purchasers. Rather
than specifically defining drug paraphernalia in terms of
the state of mind or conduct of each category of person,
the ordinances merely state the proscribed conduct or
state of mind leaving the responsibility to the courts to
apply the definitions to each category.

A24

The reasoning of the district court demonstrates that
the ordinances permit a person to be arrested, prosecuted
or convicted only for that person’s own use, intent, or
design."* Due process requires this interpretation of the
ordinances. Hammerle v. United States, 6 F.2d 144

14, App. 1511, 512-13. The district court opined:

As a general rule, a crime consists of two elements:
(1) an act or omission, and (2) a state of mind - mens rea.
Although the mens rea of an offense may differ from crime
to crime, the general state of mind required is an intent to
perform the criminal act. Of course, the mens rea and the
act must occur simultaneously and the intent must be that
of the criminal defendant. Because the definition of drug
paraphernalia is referenced in each of the criminal offenses
described in this Ordinance, it is an element of each of
these offenses. Specifically, the criminal intent used to
define drug paraphernalia is an element of the mental state
required to convict under this Ordinance. Therefore, the
pertinent intent must be that of the individual charged with
having committed one of the offenses described in section
620.04(a)-(d). The court concludes that “black-letter” crim-
inal law and the intent of the MDPA draftsmen compel the
conclusion that the definition of drug paraphernalia must be
interpreted in terms of the criminal defendant’s intent and

that this construction is reasonable and sensible.
- — *

Defining all drug paraphernalia in terms of the state of
mind of the seller of the item, does not solve the problem
of transferred criminal intent. For example, if a manu-
facturer is prosecuted under section 620.04(b) and the term
“drug paraphernalia” is defined in terms of the seller’s intent,
as Perma suggests, the manufacturer of an innocent item would
be subject to criminal punishment because the seller intends
it to be used with illegal drugs. The Ordinance regulates
the following categories of conduct: use of paraphernalia with
illegal drugs, possession of paraphernalia with intent to so
use, placement of certain drug paraphernalia advertisements,
and manufacture of paraphernalia for sole use with drugs.

Therefore, defining all drug paraphernalia in terms of
the intent of an individual classifiable in any one of these
categories would cause a transferred intent problem when-
ever the definition was applied to the allegedly criminal con-
duct of individuals in one of the other categories. For this
reason the court’s construction, defining drug paraphernalia
in terms of the intent of the individual charged with violat-
ing the Ordinance, is more reasonable and sensible.

App. 511-13 (Footnote deleted).

A25

(6th Cir. 1925) (per curiam). Its conclusion is bol-
stered by the comments to the Model Act, which refer
consistently to the potential defendant as the “person in
control” of the item. App. 1236-37.15 Lest we be accused
of exceeding the scope of our authority to construe the
ordinances to save their constitutionality, it must be noted
that Ohio law would allow no other interpretation of the
ordinances. State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d at 376-77, 406
N.E.2d at 505-506; Chicone v. Liquor Control Comm’n
of Ohio, 20 Ohio App. 2d 43, 251 N.E.2d 864 (Ct. App.
1969). Therefore, we can extrapolate the meaning of
the ordinances on the question of whose use, intent, or
design must be present to allow the arrest, prosecution
or conviction of a person.

The statutory terms “use” or “intended for use” are
not vague or overbroad. Their meaning, as commonly
understood words of the English language, is clear, Ami-
cus suggests that “use” is vague, because the ordinance
does not delineate whether it proscribes the sale of the
same item used by the seller with controlled substances
or the same type of item. Also amicus contends that
the ordinance is vague, because it does not state when,
how long ago, or how often the item must have been
used unlawfully.’* Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning,

15. The district court correctly rejected the testimony of
Councilwoman Krawczyk and others on this point by ruling that
the ordinance speaks for itself. App. 511-12, 671.

16. Amicus argues that this vagueness leads to absurd
results, by proposing the following hypothetical:

Two defendants sell antique ashtrays to customers who
they know will use the ashtrays in conjunction with mari-
juana. Neither defendant intends that the antique ashtray
be used in connection with illegal drugs, and neither has
designed the ashtray for use with illegal drugs, but one of
them, a former marijuana smoker, has actually used the ash-
tray himself, several years prior to the sale at issue, for
holding the butts of marijuana cigarettes. If both are prose-

(Continued on following page)

A26

Inc., 4, 13, 21. These arguments raise very marginal
problems in the application of the ordinances that do not
suggest the vagueness or overbreadth of the ordinances
in their definition of the normal, general class of offenses.
United States Civil Service Comm’n v. National Ass’n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973); United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1947). In most cases, an item
will be defined as drug paraphernalia on the basis of its
use when the substantive offense on which the defendant
was arrested and indicted is use of drug paraphernalia.
Amicus’ hypotheticals, which focus on use by the retailer
and then delivery to a buyer seem improbable and far-
fetched. Even if such a sale would occur, the ordinances
make clear the criminal offense of using an item with
controlled substances and then transferring the item,
knowing that the transferee will use the item with con-
trolled substances. The resolution of amicus’ marginal
hypothetical situations must wait until an actual case
arises,’7

Therefore, we conclude that “used” and “intended
for use” are not vague or overbroad in defining drug
paraphernalia."®

Footnote continued—

cuted for a violation of § 620.04(b), one will presumably
be found innocent (for element no. 2 will not have been
satisfied) while the other, the marijuana user, will presum-
ably be guilty. This result would follow even though both
had precisely the same intent and knowledge.

Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning, Inc., 13.

17. We need not address on this appeal the potential prob-
lems of double jeopardy and of inconsistency with the Ohio statute
on possession of marijuana that may arise upon a criminal convic-
tion under these ordinances.

18. The ordinances of Parma, Lakewood and North Olmsted
avoid the problems of vagueness created by defining drug para-
phernalia in terms of customary or ordinary use. This latter
definition imposes an impossible duty on a person to ferret out
the use of an item that may normally be used in underground,

(Continued on following page)

A27

The phrase “designed for use” is vague and over-
broad.’ The district court in Indiana Chapter, NORML,

Footnote continued—

illegal activity. Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F.
Supp. 768 (D. N.J., 1979); Riddle v. Clack, No. CA-3-77-0525-D
(N.D. Tex., August 25, 1977). This flawed definition also im-
poses liability on a defendant for the use of an item by another,
without the defendant knowing, intending, or participating in that
use. Id.; Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297, 1305
(D. N.J. 1979).

19. The district court concluded otherwise:

Although many if not all of the items described in the Ordi-
nance, as well as those introduced as evidence, have nu-
merous legitimate uses, it is possible that an item which has
an innocent use may be proved to have been designed for
use with illegal drugs. As District Judge Boyle noted in her
analysis of the evidence presented in Tobacco Road v. City
of Novi, _..... F. Supp. -...... (E.D. Mich.; Slip Op. C79-71000,
6/21/79):

Defendant also presented two tobacconists who testi-
fied that “paraphernalia” was the trade name for acces-
sories intended to be sold for use with controlled sub-
stances. Reviewing the Nalpac catalogues, with which
each witness was familiar, both identified many pipes
which they described as unsuitable for tobacco use and
designed for use with controlled substances. These opin-
ions were based on the size of the bowl, the material of
the pipe; and the absence of a stem, among other factors.
Each witness testified that small-bowl pipes produce a
short smoking period while tobacco smokers customarily
seek long-smoking pipes and that non-porous materials,
such as metal, glass, and acrylic, were unsuitable for to-
bacco smoking since they condensed rather than absorbed
the mositure generated by lengthy pipe smoking. Each
witnesses [sic] further testified that certain ite:ns in the
catalogue such as razor blades and a “coke” mirror had
absolutely no use in the tobacco industry.

Defendant’s evidence, on the other hand, established
that there are items clearly identifiable as being primarily
adapted or designed for the use of controlled substances.
Indeed, it is inferable that such items are clearly identified
both by manufacturers and by retailers for the com-
mercial purpose of marketing the items to be used with
controlled substances.

This court does not share the concern that the Indiana Dis-
trict Court expressed in NORML v. Sendak, supra at 12, that
the phrase “designed for use” is not of sufficient clarity to
meet the mandate of due process. An item is designed for

(Continued on following page)

A28

Inc. v. Sendak, supra, described well the unconstitutional
ambiguity of this phrase:

The term “designed” could signify only devices
that have no use or function other than as a means
to ingest a controlled substance. Alternatively, “de-
signed” could include any devices that have a legit-
imate function but could be used for ingestion of
drugs. That is, the term “designed” could sweep into
the definition of paraphernalia any device that could
be altered from its normal function to become a make-
shift drug device, such as a paper clip, tie bar, hand
mirror, spoon, or piece of aluminum foil. The defini-
tion “designed for drug use” gives no hint to those
attempting to comply with I.C. 35-48-4-8 what is in-
cluded in the definition. The definition fails to make
clear what items are included in the statutory pro-
hibition and what items are not.

App. 287. The comments to the Model Act indicate that
the ordinances would apply to items which are not solely
designed to be drug paraphernalia. App. 1237. Vague-
ness enters in our case once the ordinances begin to define
drug paraphernalia in terms of the primary adaption or
dominant purpose of the design. Then the definition
begins to depend upon the ingenuity or purpose of the
purchaser rather than the seller and upon the current
practices of the clandestine society of drug users. Geiger

Footnote continued—

use with illegal drugs within the meaning of this Ordinance
if the defendant intentionally—that is voluntarily and not
because of mistake or other innocent reasons—designed or
adapted it for use with drugs, regardless of any innocent
alternative uses.

App. 533.

However, the fact that some items may have a design solely
adapted for use with illegal drugs does not save the ordinances
as drafted from vagueness and overbreadth.

A29

v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980); Music Stop,
Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich.,
1980).

The major ambiguity in defining drug paraphernalia
in terms of the “design” of items is the lack of any design
characteristics that distinguish lawful purposes from un-
lawful purposes. The type of object that can become,
or be used as, drug paraphernalia is limited only by the
imagination of the user. Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618
F.2d at 29. The record in our cases established the ab-
sence of any unique design characteristics.2° Plaintiffs’
expert, Herbert J. Bessai, testified that the size of a pipe,
the presence of a screen or chamber in a pipe, the mate-
rial from which the pipe is made, or the use of ice, water
or air in a pipe does not indicate a design for unlawful
use. He discussed in some detail the lawful uses of all
of these design characteristics.”! According to Bessai, the
various designed pipes have been used lawfully for cen-
turies. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. at 50. Bessai’s testimony,
as the sole expert at trial on the making and smoking of
pipes, stands unrefuted. When asked directly if Bessai’s
testimony was incorrect, Detective Rutt of the Cleveland
Police Department’s Narcotics Unit testified that he could
not say Bessai was wrong. App. 852. Consequently, we
conclude that defining drug paraphernalia in terms of
“design” is vague and overbroad.

The testimony of Detectives Bennett and Rutt, qual-
ified experts on narcotics law enforcement, shows con-

20. The district court erred in disregarding the evidence in
the record in these cases, and in relying on evidence presented in
another case that was not before it. App. 533 (footnote 5 of dis-
trict court opinion.

21. The District court credited Bessai’s testimony, but did
not use the testimony to find the definition of drug paraphernalia
vague or overbroad. App. 534 (footnote 6 of the district court’s
opinion).

A30

vincingly the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement of the ordinances by the police. Detectives
Bennett and Rutt would arrest any retailer who sold
pipes with screens or chamber pipes, despite the ability
to use these pipes lawfully. App. 712-13, 717-18, 850-51.
Detective Rutt would arrest a retailer operating a “head
shop” if it sold alligator clips or cigarette papers, but
not a drug store owner selling the same items.”* App.
853, 864-65. This testimony suggests that the ordinances
would be enforced only against ‘head shops,” as desig-
nated by the local law enforcement officials. No guide-
lines have been written to prevent such selective dis-
criminatory enforcement. Because the ordinances would
permit at least the arrest and prosecution of persons by
police and prosecutors who claim to know drug parapher-
nalia when they see it, but cannot define it any more
precisely in advance, the definition of drug paraphernalia
is vague and overbroad.”

22. Note the bootstrapping nature of this definition of drug
paraphernalia, because Detective Rutt defined a head shop as a
store selling drug paraphernalia. App. 844.

23. In World Imports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, Civil
No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980), the district court declared:

A number of retail stores commonly called headshops [sic]
specialize in selling drug paraphernalia. Only the naive or
duplicitous would contend that sales of drug paraphernalia by
headshops were intended primarily for such innocent purposes
as making a lamp from a water pipe, fashioning an article of
personal adornment from a cokespoon or feeding wounded
birds with syringes and eyedroppers. The purpose of a head-
shop is to capitalize upon, to perpetuate and augment the cur-
rent interest, particularly among the young, in items which
are obviously intended for the use with illegal drugs.

Tr: 9-10 (oral opinion upholding constitutionality of drug para-
phernalia ordinance based on Model Act). This sentiment is the
driving motivation and the practical theory behind the drug para-
phernalia ordinances. Though based on fact, such an opinion does
not resolve the problem of vagueness in defining drug parapher-
nalia, especially where the record evidence established the ab-
sence of design characteristics peculiar to use with controlled sub-
stances.

A31

The vagueness and overbreadth in the definition of
drug paraphernalia may reflect the failure of the legis-
lators in Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted to investi-
gate or study the drug paraphernalia industry. Parma
Mayor Petruska, Councilwoman Krawezyk and Council-
man Labutta each testified at deposition to their total
lack of familiarity with drug paraphernalia and their in-
ability to define it. App. 928-29, 933, 969, 984, 1130, 1140.
Time and time again, they stated that the definition of
drug paraphernalia was the responsibility of the police.
App. 901-02, 930, 985, 1001, 1003. The record shows be-
yond peradventure the legislators’ conscious delegation of
basic policymaking decisions to the police, prosecutors,
and juries. Due process forbids such delegation of legisla-
tive responsibility. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575;
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108.

Because the definition of drug paraphernalia is vague
and overbroad, the ordinances must be declared unconsti-
tutional. The explicit terms of the ordinances, unlike the
Model Act, limit severability to the section describing the
substantive offenses. Therefore, the defective parts of the
definition cannot be severed. Moreover, the vagueness
and overbreadth of the definition infect the whole ordi-
nance.

Other parts of the ordinances have also been spiritedly
contested. Plaintiffs argue that the ordinances create an
irrebutable or rebuttable presumption that any item listed
in subsection (L) of the definitional section is drug para-
phernalia. They contend that the presumption, whether
irrebutable or rebuttable, is not supported by inferences
based on fact. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140 (1979).

We agree with the district court that the listed items
are not presumed to be drug paraphernalia. World Im-

A32

ports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, Civil No. 80-1414 (D.
N.J. June 8, 1980) at 13. Because the ordinances define
drug paraphernalia in terms of its use, intended use or
designed use, and because the phrase “such ae” introduces
the lists, the statutory language indicates that the listed
items are only examples of items which could be drug
paraphernalia. The comments to the Model Act also ex-
plain the list of items as “a detailed description of common
forms of property that can fall within the definition of
drug paraphernalia if used, intended for use, or designed
for use to violate the drug laws.” App. 1238 (emphasis
added). The statements of Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Nathan and DEA Administrator Bensinger would
tend to confirm, when read as a whole, that the list of
items is intended to serve as examples to help clarify
the definition of drug paraphernalia. App. 1064, 1217, 1219.
Furthermore, since the listed items have many lawful uses,
it is evident that the list could serve only as an example
of possible forms of drug paraphernalia. Interpreting the
listed items as drug paraphernalia per se would clearly
make the ordinances vague and overbroad.

The items listed in subsection (L) as common forms
of drug paraphernalia are described clearly for the most
part. Certain items, such as chillums, bongs, and carbure-
tion tubes and devices, are probably not familiar to the
ordinary businessman or consumer. See Depo. of Victor
Labutta, App. 1140. The comments to the Model Act sug-
gests the common usage and understanding of this
terminology among drug users and drug merchants. App.
1238. Of course, the prosecutor would have to prove the
existence of such trade argot and the defendant’s under-
standing of it. Otherwise, the danger exists that a law-
abiding businessman could be arrested, prosecuted, and
convicted on the basis of definitions known only to drug
merchants and users.

A33

The purpose of listing the common forms of drug
paraphernalia is to lend precision to the definition in order
to give more specific notice to persons potentially subject
to the ordinances. The descriptions of “roach clips” and
“miniature cocaine spoons” do not fulfill this purpose. A
roach clip is defined as any object that can be used to
hold the short end of a burning marijuana cigarette. Only
the imagination of the user limits the number of things
fitting this definition. All of these things, such as alli-
gator clips, tweezers, and paper clips, have predominantly
lawful, beneficial uses. Thus, the description of roach
clips does not identify the objects potentially covered by
the ordinances. Moreover, prohibiting the use or sale of
roach clips leads to absurd results. A smoker of a mari-
juana cigarette is potentially subject to a greater penalty
for using a paper clip to finish smoking the butt, than
for possession of the marijuana itself.

The description of a “miniature cocaine spoon” does
not give any precision to the definition of drug parapher-
nalia. The testimony demonstrates that any spoon used
for ingesting cocaine is very small. App. 861, 1131, 1203.
Does the ordinance intend to proscribe the miniature ver-
sion of an already very small spoon? Another problem
is simply the lack of any objective measure on the size
of a spoon which falls within the definition of drug para-
phernalia. Magnani v. City of Ames, No. 80-229-A (S.
D. Iowa, July 21, 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Fern-
dale, 488 F. Supp. at 393. But see: Tobacco Road v.
City of Novi, supra. Again, the description of a “mini-
ature cocaine spoon” does no+ fulfill the purpose of giv-
ing specific notice of the itezns prohibited by the ordi-
nances.

The ordinances have included a list of “logically rele-
vant factors” to be considered by the court, jury, prose-

A34

cutor, and police in determining whether an object is “drug
paraphernalia.” Plaintiffs argue that several of the factors
violate the state and federal rules of evidence. The draft-
ers of the Model Act set forth this list to minimize the
risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. They
did not intend the list to supercede any rules of evidence
or to interfere with the fact-finding of the trier of fact.
App. 1238. It is most likely that the Ohio courts would
interpret the ordinance in the manner intended by the
drafters of the Model Act.

Nevertheless, two comments are necessary on the proof
of an offense under the drug paraphernalia ordinances.**
First, it is most clear, from our previous discussion of
design characteristics, that the defendant’s intent for an-
other person to use an item for the ingestion of controlled
substances cannot be inferred from the item itself. Wit-
nesses declared numerous times that the intended use of
an object could be inferred from the object itself. App.
850-51, 857-59, 861-62, 865, 867, 869, 878-79, 1137-39, 1186.
However, because the objects have many lawful uses, and
because the design characteristics do not distinguish objects
intended for lawful use from objects intended for unlawful
uses, the object by itself does not provide any basis for
an inference of its intended use. Intent can be inferred
from the defendant’s statements to a purchaser, the man-
ner in which the defendant display or advertised an item,
or the instructions given by the defendant on the use
of an item with drugs.

A second flaw in the list of “logically relevant factors”
is the potential arrest, prosecution, or conviction of a person
on the impermissible theory of guilt by association. See

24. We agree with the district court, for the reasons stated by
the district court, that the factor of being a “legitimate supplier”
is both vague and overbroad. This factor has been deleted from
all three ordinances.

A35

Templeton v. United States, 151 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1945).
The factors include the proximity in time and space to
a direct violation of the drug laws or to the presence
of controlled substances, the statements of others, and
the advertising of others. Thus, a retailer, for example,
to avoid arrest, prosecution, or conviction, must continu-
ously police the national and local media and the activities
and statements of persons in the area of his store. The
retailer could be safe from arrest on Monday morning
when no one congregated near his store or the local nar-
cotics dealer was on the other side of town, yet be very
susceptible to arrest Monday afternoon when, unknown
to the retailer, the narcotics dealer arrived around the
corner from his store, attracting a group of persons who
bought marijuana or other controlled subs’ ances and then
came into his retail store to buy rolling papers, alligator
clips, or pipes. In short, the ordinances permit events
beyond the control of the retail owner to determine his
guilt. The danger is that the ordinances could be applied
to make a crime out of constitutionally protected or inno-
cent conduct because of the actions or statements by per-
sons other than the defendant. It is well established that
guilt must be based on personal action, statements, or
knowledge, not on association with other persons suspected
of criminal conduct. Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311,
316-17 (5th Cir. 1980).*° Because Ohio law naturally in-

25. In Sawyer, the petitioner had been convicted under a
Dade County, Florida loitering ordinance that made criminal “the
act of standing” when “a person... knowingly loiters in any
place with one or more persons knowing that a narcotic or dan-
gerous drug... is being unlawfully used or possessed.” The pe-
titioner was convicted for standing next to a drug dealer while
the dealer sold narcotics. The petitioner did not have any business
association with the drug dealer and knew him only as a friend.
The Fifth Circuit held the ordinance to be overbroad, in that it
unnecessarily infringed on the First Amendment right of as-
sociation. More than association with a felon was required to
sustain a criminal conviction. See also, Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961).

A36

corporates this principle of due process, we need not de-
clare the list of logically relevant factors overbroad on
its face. City of Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St. 2d
163, 166, 285 N.E.2d 714 (1972), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 410 U.S. 920 (1973).

(2) Offenses

Plaintiffs levy two attacks on the definition of the sub-
stantive offenses. First, plaintiffs contend that the standard
of scienter must be “specific intent” to avoid the problem
of vagueness. The ordinances provide for “knowledge” as
the scienter requirement. Second, plaintiffs argue that the
prohibition on advertising is overbroad in its coverage of
area and its impact on content.

Scienter may save a statute from vagueness and over-
breadth by providing fair notice of proscribed conduct and
by distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct. Colten
v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); City of Columbus v. Sch-
warzwalder, 39 Ohio St.2d 61, 313 N.E.2d 798 (1974) (per
curiam). However, scienter by itself may not be sufficient
to save the constitutionality of a statute. “While the Su-
preme Court has held that some statutes must fall as im-
permissibly vague in the absence of a scienter requirement,

. . and while that court has held that the presence of a
scienter element may save a statute which otherwise
would be unconstitutionally vague, ... the Supreme Court
has never to our knowledge held that the imposition of a
scienter element upon a statute necessarily renders the
statute’s prohibitions sufficiently precise to withstand a
vagueness challenge.” Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio,
443 F.Supp. at 1050-51. Accord, State v. Young, 62 Ohio
St.2d at 375-78, 406 N.E.2d at 503-505. Therefore, the effect
of the scienter standard on the vagueness and overbreadth
of a statute must be examined on a case-by-case basis in
the context of the particular statute at issue.

A37

The drug paraphernalia ordinances prohibit the de-
livery or manufacture, the possession with intent to deliver,
and the manufacture with intent to deliver of drug para-
phernalia, “knowing, or under circumstances where one
reasonably should know,” that it will be used with con-
trolled substances.”* The ordinances further make unlaw-
ful the placement of any advertisement in any printed
publication “knowing, or under circumstances where one
reasonably should know,” that the purpose of the advertise-
ment, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects
intended for use or designed for use as drug paraphernalia.”
The ordinances do not define “knowledge” or “reason to
know.” Since municipal ordinances must be consistent with
general state law, presumably the definition of “knowing”
in Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22(B) would pertain. According
to this definition “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of
his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will prob-
ably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when
he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” The
drafters of the Model Act would define “knowledge”
similarly as “actual knowledge” or awareness of a “high
probability” that a certain consequence will follow one’s
action. App. 1241.

The requirement of knowledge on the part of the de-
fendant, when coupled with use or intended for use in the
definition of drug paraphernalia, does provide adequate
notice and does sufficiently prevent arrest, prosecution or
conviction of persons for innocent activities or mistake.
As stated by the district court, “convicting an individual of
selling drug paraphernalia under the ordinance requires
proof of distribution of an item by an individual who in-

26. We perceive no due process problems with the prohibition
=" use of, or possession with intent to use, drug parapher-
nalia,

A38

tends it for use with illegal drugs knowing that it will be
so used. Clearly this is not an innocent transaction.” Un-
like Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, the knowledge is
that of unlawful activities only. 443 F. Supp. at 1051. A
person who acts with knowledge that the action will aid in
criminal conduct can be held criminally responsible.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337 (1952).

Plaintiffs rely primarily on United States v. Bryant,
461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972) and Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945) to argue that due process requires proof
of specific intent to violate or aid in the violation of the
drug laws. Specific intent, in the case of the drug para-
phernalia ordinances, would be manufacture, delivery or
sale of an item to another person with the intent that that
person use the item unlawfully with controlled substances.
Both Bryant and Screws are inapposite. Bryant holds
that specific intent must be proven in a prosecution for
aiding and abetting. Specific intent is necessary in such
cases of derivative criminality, as Circuit Judge Learned
Hand explained so well in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1938). However, the drug paraphernalia or-
dinances do not penalize persons for aiding another person
to violate the drug laws. The person faces criminal li-
ability for his own actions, such as sale or manufacture of
items defined as drug paraphernalia, combined with knowl-
edge that the individual to whom the drug paraphernalia
was delivered will use it to ingest narcotics. Screws re-
quired proof of specific intent for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242, because the range of constitutional rights
protected by these criminal statutes was constantly chang-
ing. 325 U.S. at 104. In contrast, the drug paraphernalia
ordinances are self-inclusive, and the problems of vague-

A39

ness must be cured by precisely defining drug paraphernalia
and the substantive offense.

Amicus argues, by proposing a hypothetical situation,
that the requirement of knowledge is not sufficient to in-
form a person of the criminality of one’s action:

A saleswoman working in the cosmetics section of a
fashionable department store sells a beautiful compact
to a well-dressed woman who, pleased with her new
purchase, announces that the compact and mirror inside
it will be perfect for holding and preparing cocaine.
The saleswoman may have fair warning that her cus-
tomer is planning to engage in illegal conduct but
because of the vagueness of the Ordinance as to the
items covered and the ordinarily innocent nature of
the transaction, she in no sense can be said to have fair
warning that her conduct is criminal.

Amicus Br. of Glassman & Browning, Inc. at 29.

Amicus overlooks the fact that a person is not guilty
unless the item falls within the definition of drug para-
phernalia. Thus, use or intent to use an item in connection
with controlled substances must also be proven. In the
hypothetical situation suggested by amicus, the absence of
use or intended use by the sales clerk results in the com-
pact not being drug paraphernalia as defined by the ordi-
nances. The definition of drug paraphernalia in terms of
“use or intended for use” adds in part the extra measure of
protection sought by plaintiffs in arguing for a scienter
requirement of specific intent.?’

27. We also note that Ohio defines many crimes, such as
voluntary manslaughter and felonious assault, in terms of a know-
ing act. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2903.03, 2903.11. Whether a legisla-
ture requires an intentional act or simply a knowing act is its
prerogative so long as the statute gives sufficient notice of the
conduct made criminal.

A40

The “reason to know” standard is vague and over-
broad.** The district court aptly remarked: “Defining
the offense of knowingly distributing drug paraphernalia
in terms of the weakness of an individual’s ability to per-
ceive rather than his criminal intent provides insufficient
guidance to the distributors covered by this subsection and
to those persons charged wtih the responsibility of en-
forcing it.” See also: Knoedler v. Roxbury Township,
485 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.N.J. 1980). But see: World Im-
ports, Inc. v. Woodbridge Township, supra at 14-15. De-
tective Bennett testified that the police would not know
how to enforce the “reason to know” standard. App. 742.
Because most uses of the outlawed items are lawful and
common, the “reason to know” standard is too open-ended
and too susceptible to misapplication to satisfy the dictates
of due process.*°

Plaintiffs contend that the prohibition of advertising,
which promotes, in whole or in part, the use or sale of
drug paraphernalia, unnecessarily infringes on the First
Amendment right of free speech. The ordinances are
drafted with a broad brush to apply to any person, pub-
lisher, printer or advertiser, who places an advertisement
in the print media. The ordinances also apply without
limitation to the location of the placement of the advertise-
ments or the location at which the advertised items are
available. Plaintiffs argue that the ordinances also would
proscribe protected speech debating the current drug laws

28. This issue is not moot on appeal, since the Parma and
North Olmsted ordinances still incorporate the “reason to know”
standard in § 620.04(c).

29. The district court in World Imports, Inc. reasoned that
the “reason to know” standard could be proven as well as actual
knowledge. However, this reasoning does not respond to the
problems of vagueness or overbreadth.

30. The district court correctly decided to sever this phrase
from the ordinances.

A4l1

or extolling virtues of the use of drugs. Defendants reply
that the limitations on their organic jurisdiction under
state law must be read into the language of the ordinances,
and that, consequently, the ordinances do not exceed per-
missible bounds with respect to the location of the pro-
hibited acts. Defendants argue that the prohibition of
advertising is constitutional, because only the advertising
of illegal activity is proscribed.

Commercial speech is deserving of First Amendment
protection. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Service Comm’n of New York, 48 U.S.L.W. 4783 (June 20,
1980). However, the different nature of commercial
speech from non-commercial speech cricumscribes to some
extent the measure of First Amendment protection af-
forded it. For example, the overbreadth doctrine per-
mitting jus tertii and the prohibition against prior re-
straints have no force in the context of commercial speech.
Id. at 4785 n. 6, 8; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10
(1979). After some initial confusion on the degree of
protection to be given commercial speech, the Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. stated the
definitive rule:

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part
analysis has developed. At the outset, we must deter-
mine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

48 U.S.L.W. at 4785.

A42

Our first question is whether the ordinances prohibit
only unlawful activity.** The ordinances forbid the use, sale,
or manufacture of drug paraphernalia. Because the force
of each ordinance stops at the city limits, the use, sale or
manufacture of drug paraphernalia is unlawful only in
Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted. Consequently, the
ordinances may prohibit the placement of advertisements
only within the city limits about “drug paraphernalia”
available within the city limits. The ordinances, as now
drafted, could infringe on protected speech in at least three
different ways. First, the ordinances could be enforced
against advertisers or publishers who place advertisements
in printed media that circulates in other cities as well as
Parma, Lakewood, and North Olmsted. Second, the ordi-
nances could prevent the residents of these three cities
from receiving information about the availability of items,
defined by the ordinances as drug paraphernalia, in other
cities that do not prohibit the use, sale or manufacture
of those items. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824-25
(1975). Third, the ordinances’ use of the words “promote
in part” may allow the ban of speech discussing the reform
of drug laws or speech glorifying the drug culture. See
Amusement Devices Ass’n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp. at 1051
(“facilitate”). Though the comments to the Model Act
indicate that such speech would not be proscribed, the
statut

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1442%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
