# Opposition — Missouri v. Crews > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1346%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition - **Published:** January 1, 1981 - **Citation:** 452 U.S. 957 ## Text See a3 Number 80-1393 RE IN THE CEIVED SUPREME COURT OF THE unrTeD stareg APR 17 1981 OFFICE OF THE CLERK STATE OF MISSOURI, eS SUPREME COURT, U.S. _| Petitioner, TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL., ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Respondents. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Comes now TIMOTHY CREWS through his attorney, Leonard W. Buckley, Jr., and moves this Court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis and for his reasons states: 1. That there has been filed with the Supreme Court of the United States a Petition for Writ of Certiorari by the State of Missouri; « 2. That Respondent is a citizen of the United States incarcerated in the Missouri Department of Corrections, Jef- ferson City, Missouri;.and without property or money with which to pay the costs of defending an appeal and is unable to pay costs or fees on appeal as more fully appears from the affiJdavit attached hereto. I 1 r Leonard W. Buckley, Jr. Attorney for Respondent Timothy Crews 1215 Pine Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 314/421-1008 STATE OF MISSOURI, TIMOTHY CREWS, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Petitioner, ~~ ee ee ee ee ee ee eee Se Respondent. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS I, TIMOTHY CREWS, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am a Respondent in the above-entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed on appeal without being required to prepay fees, costs, or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe . I am entitled to redress; and that the issues which I desire to present On appeal are none save to defend the decision of the Court of Appeals. I further swear that the responses whicn I have made to the questions and instructions below relating to my ability to pay the costs of prosecuting the appeal are true. l. 5. Are you presently employed? No. I have been an inmate in the State Penitentiary since 1978. Have you received within the past twelve (12) months any income from a business, profession, or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest, dividends, or other source? No. Do you own any case or checking or savings accounts? No. Do you Own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)? No. List the persons who are dependent upon you for sup- port and state your relationship to those persons. None. I understand that a false statement or answer to any questions in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for perjury. | oy fF of Cee Timothy Crews Missouri Department of Corrections P.O. Box 900 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 1 1 1981 an day of Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1981. PPO Dy he CP, Notary Public ; REID H. BAKER re eee NOTARY PUGLIC STATE OF MISSOURI My Commission Expires Oct. 31, 1982 Let the applicant proceed without prepayment of costs or fees or the necessity of giving security there- for. Justice, United States Supreme Court . es tel. ee Le a - ee ee sisal Number 80-1393 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES STATE OF MISSOURI, Petitioner, -vs- TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL., Respondents. APPIDAVI? Comes now Leonard W. Buckley, Jr., duly deposed and sworn, states as follows: 1. I am Leonard W. Buckley, Jr., attorney for Timothy Crews, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the attorney of record for the Respondent in the petition for Writ of Certiorari styled State of Missouri v. Timothy Crews, et al.; 2. On April 16, 1981, I, on behalf of Respondent Timothy Crews, placed in the mail at the United States Post Office in St. Louis, Missouri, the appropriate number of petitions, Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and Affidavit of Indigency addressed, first class postage prepaid, to the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D. C. On that date I also placed in the mail copies of each of these items addressed, first class postage prepaid, to the following: Joseph Webb Assistant Public Defender 1320 Market Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 Mary Kay Wefelmeyer Assistant Public Defender 1320 Market Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 Missouri Attorney General P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 3. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.2 (effective June 30, 1980), the Respondent submits this affidavit to show timely filing and proper service. y r Attorney for Respondent LaGEH 1215 Pine Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 314/421-1008 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of April, 1981. , ‘ Moauceenieory be) Maureen P. White, 'Notary Pu c My Commission Expires: MAUREEN P. WHITE NOTARY P\JSLIC, STATE OF MISSOURI MY COMM 'SSION EXPIRES 10/17/83 SL. Louis county Number 80-1393 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1981 STATE OF MISSOURI, Petitioner, Vs. TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL., Respondents. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Leonard W. Buckley, Jr. 1215 Pine Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 314/421-1008 Attorney for Respondent Timothy Crews 2B Bros ce: = —_ SE er aE -—— a ve > INDEX Table of Authorities 1 ‘ Brief in Opposition to Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2 4 Questions Presented 2 . ‘i 4 . Reason for Denying the Writ 3 L is ; 4 ¥ Conclusion 9 Appendix : “"y , : RS a a ‘ ‘ | My Vig “it TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Albernaz v. United States, No. 79-1709 (March 9, 1981). Brintley v. Michigan, 444 U.S. 948 (1979). Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Eastlake v. Forrest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., 242 U.S. 430 (1917). Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). Green v. Elbert, 137 U.S. 615 (1891). _*s. Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Co., 379 U.S. 487 (1965). ; °° Mandel vy. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977). Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1973). O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1973). 593 S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en banc 1980); vacated and esis U.S. ___, 64 L.Ed. 2d 820, affirmed after remand, " "24 592 (Mo. en banc 1980), cert. denied, U.s. ’ No. 80-571 (January 26, 1980). State v. Crews, No. 41073 (Mo. App. April 29, 1980). United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980). United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). -~Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363; mayne centy peseccu ter v. Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374, Whalen v. United States, U.S. » 63 L.Ed. 2d 715 (1980). haccwins vs Soripp Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 53 L.Ed. STATUTES CITED es v. Thirt Rule 21, Rules of the Supreme Court. $359.225 R.S.Mo. (Supp. 1976). | $560.120 R.S.Mo. (1969). §560.135 R.S.Mo. (Supp. 1975). e a Number 80-1393 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1981 STATE OF MISSOURI, Petitioner, Vs. TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL., Respondents. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI The Respondent, Timothy Crews, in opposition to the granting of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case, states as follows: QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Writ of Certiorari should not issue because Petitioner has not established the source of this Court's juris- diction, the threshold inquiry appropriate to the disposition of this case. 2. Whether the Writ of Certiorari should not issue because the decision issued by the Supreme Court of Missouri refusing to transfer the decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals was based upon the authority of Sours v. State, 593 S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en banc 1980); vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. __s, 64 L.Ed. 2d 820, affirmed after remand, 603 S.W. 24 592 (Mo. en banc 1980), cert, denied, U.S. » No. 80-571 (January 26, 1981), which moots the issue raised herein. REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE SOURCE OF THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 21.1(e) OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT. The State of Missouri, Petitioner herein, has filed its Petition for Certiorari which does not set out, as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, the source of this Court's: jurisdiction. Rule 21 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides in perti- nent part: 1. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari shall contain in the order here indicated: (e) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this Court is in- voked showing: (i) The date of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed, and the time * of its entry; (ii) The date of any order respecting a rehearing, and the date and terms of any order granting an extension of time within which to petition for certiorari; and (iii) Where a cross-petition for writ of certiorari is filed under Rule 19.5, reliance upon that Rule shall be expressly noted and the cross-petition shall state the date of receipt of the petition for certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; (iv) The statutory pcévidlis believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to re- view the judgment or decree in question by writ of certiorari. 5. The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready and adequate understand- ing of the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying hi tition phasis supp The threshold inquiry necessary to the disposition of every case that comes before the Supreme Court is the source of this Court's jurisdiction. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1962). . ee) a ee, woe ee ae eee Ny a et eee ee ae Breen) re a This principle is embodied in this Court's rules and reflects the necessity for the proper presentation of matters to this Court in order that it may properly dispose of the vast quantity of mat- ters competing for this Court's time. These rules are obviously necessary, and having been established, must not be ignored. This Court, in Furness, Withy, and Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., 242 U.S. 430 (1917), noted that petitions to the Supreme Court are at the risk of the party making them and then stated: Unless these (petitions) are carefully prepared, contain appropriate references to the record and present with studied accuracy, brevit and clearness whatever is Seeentiet to ge and adequate understanding of points requiring our attention, the rights of inter- ested parties may be prejudiced and the Court will be impeded in its efforts properly to dispose of the causes which constantly crowd its docket. (Emphasis in original). Id. at 434, Furthermore, this Court stated in Green v. Elbert, 137 U.S. 615 (1891): To the proper conduct of the business of this Court rules are necessary, and, having been prescribed, reasonable compliance with this is expected and must be insisted upon. When they are disregarded, dispensation from the consequences can only be extended where the circumstances fur- nish adequate excuse. Were this otherwise, our he breach regulations might become more honored in tt than the observance, and the recognition of due rocedure would be seriousl TET and impaired. (Emphasis supplied). Id. at 621. This Court dismissed the writ of error in Green v. Elbert, supra, stating that: (m)ere carelessness in the inception may have finally resulted in forgetfulness (in not filing the docket fee); but we cénnot, therefore absolve him from the penalty le itimately attach- ing to this disregard of our op (Emphasis sup- plied). Id. at 623. Petitioner has disregarded this Court's rules and would have this Court, already over-burdened, glean from its Petition for Certiorari the source of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This Court has provided, by case law and its own rules, that it ~4- es AE er = will not countenance such disregard for its rules, and should not countenance such disregard here. II THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER IS IDENTICAL IN ALL RESPECTS TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN SOURS V. STATE, THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF WHICH MOOTS THE ISSUE PRESENTED HEREIN. The issue raised before this Court as a result of the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours v. State, 593 S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en banc 1980) (Sours I) was based on convictions for the crimes of robbery first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, 8560.120, R.S.Mo. 1969 and §560.135, R.S.Mo. Supp. 1975, and armed criminal action, 8559.225, R.S.Mo. Supp. 1976, the identical statutes under which Respondent here was convicted. This Court vacated the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of Whalen v. United States, U.S. , 63 L.Ed. 2d 715 (1980). Missouri v. Sours, U.S. » 64 L.Ed. 2d 820 (1980). Upon remand, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Sours v. State, 603 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo. en banc 1980) (Sours II) noted that no opinion of the Supreme Court had considered a statute that contained wording similar to or identical to that found in Missouri's armed criminal action statute. Id. at 593. The Missouri Supreme Court held, based on its construction of Missouri law, that the under- lying felony, robbery first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, was either an included or lesser included offense of armed criminal action. See generally, Ufited States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 651-55 (D. C. Cir. 1980). The Missouri Supreme Court has definitively decided, which this Court may not dispute, as follows: z ¢ 1. It was the intention of the Missouri General Assembly that separate and multiple punishments be imposed for armed criminal OR err i rn perenne oe tT ae ea RI RR tT action and the underlying felony. 2. Every element of the underlying felony herein, robbery first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, is in- cluded in Armed Criminal Action, that is, proof of robbery first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon does not require proof of any additional elements not needed to prove Armed Criminal Action; that is, Armed Criminal Action includes the underlying felony and that Armed Criminal Action and robbery first degree are in law and fact the same. e.g., Whalen v. United States, supra, Eastlake v. Forrest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1973); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1973); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). This Court denied certiorari with respect to Sours II. Missouri v. Sours, No. 80-571 (January 26, 1981). Petitioner, however, attempts to overlook the effect of the denial of certi- Orari, and seeks to sustain a breath of life to its arguments by stating that this Court's most recent pronouncement in this matter was presumably because the matter was moot. (Petition for Certi- Orari, at 9). The facts belie such an allegation. Only Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist would have dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari as being moot. None of the remaining members of the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari. Missouri v. Sours, No. 80-571 (49 U.S.L.W. 3531, January 27, 1980). It is thus clear that the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours I, affirmed in Sours II, is the law of the State of Missouri and that the decision rendered State v. Crews, No. 41073 (Mo. App. April 29, 1980), must stand. Furthermore, the reliance placed on Brintley v. Michigan, 444 U.S. 948 (1979), by Petitioner and Petitioner's allegations that the decision in Brintley should be controlling because of simi- larities in the Michigan statutes involved in Brintley and the i P Missouri statutes ignores the effect of the holding of the Mis- Z souri Supreme Court that no Supreme Court decision has considered F 4 a statute that contained wording similar or identical to that “ey oo» Se eI ae RN SIN AS: ys te uty beg Vi Ra , ¥ GT ie Mi Ta A ya Ae eR, wy, sf ; in of p>) Sy Ne 5 eee ar Pre hg y george Re ae oe ¥ ES agi 0 ae at's AB FF" pel found in Missouri's armed criminal statute. Sours v. State, 603 S.W. 2d at 593. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Wayne County Prosecutor Vv. Recorder's Court Jud e, 406 Mich. 374, 280 N.W. 2d 794 (1979), held, in essence, that the Michigan felony firearms statute created a separate and distinct crime from the underlying felony so that the two (2) offenses were not the same. This is contrary to the Missouri Supreme Court's holding that, based on state law, the armed criminal action statute and robbery first degree by means Of a dangerous and deadly weapon are the same offen e. The construction of the armed criminal action statute by the Missouri Supreme Court is binding upon this Court because the United States Supreme Court lacks jursidiction to construe state laws. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 924 (1971); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). As was stated in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra at 256, "(I)t is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a state. See also, O'Brien v. Skinner, supra. It is of no import that the Sours court went on to also base its decision on federal constitutional grounds. It is undoubtedly "'the settled rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails is the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment. Fox Film Corporation v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210, (80 L.Ed. ’ . Se . Cramp v. Board of Public instruct , 368 U.S. 278, 281 eE * , ’ 22 Sct. * Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Company, 379 U.S. 487 (1965). In Jankovich, the Indiana Supreme Court invalidated a city bat ordinance as authorizing an unconstitutional taking without compensation. The decision was based upon both the Indiana con- stitution and the United States Constitution. This Court held + et that the ruling was based upon adequate state grounds and there- fore dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. In the same manner, the writ of certiorari should not issue in « a ; Ma os th , ¥ “4 ; R Age a) ie a 5M Te oP ta . - n ~~ the case at hand, Ns, The Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on adequate, independent state grounds. This is not a case . . . where the lower court opinion as a whole “leaves the impression that the court probably felt constrained to rule as it did because of (decisions applying the 14th Amendment) ," Minnesota v. National Tea Compan supra, 309 U.S. at 554-555, 64 L.Ed. at 922, OF bie it felt under complusion of federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold,” Mississippi ex rel. Southern Railroad Company v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5, 95 L.Ed. 3, 8, 71 S.Ct. 1, with the result that the state: cand federal grounds are "so interwoven that we are unable to conclude that the judgment rests upon an independent interpretation of the state law," State Tax Commissioner v. Van Catt, 306 U.S. 51l, 514, L. . 5 ’ ’ 9 S.Ct, Jankovich, supra, at 443. In order to follow the established practice of avoiding con- stitutional decisions where possible, United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), the writ of certiorari should not issue because the lower court's decision is supported by adequate state grounds. The Supreme Court's power "is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions." Zacchini v. Scripp-Howard Broadcasting Company, 433 U.S. 562, 53 L.Ed. 2d 965, 970 (1977). Finally, this Court's summary dismissal of Brintley v. Michigan, supra, does not require the granting of the petition for certiorari in this case, as Petitioner suggests. An unexplicated disposition of a lower court's decision settles the case for the parties but does not necessarily determine the validity of the lower court's reasohing as expressed in its opinion. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977). Brintley, supra, presented the question whether separate convictions and consecutive sentences for both a felony and for felony firearm violate the Michigan and the United States constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The federal constitutional issue was never reached, however, for the case was decided as a matter of Michigan's highest court construing its own statute in light of its own laws. Michigan is entitled to reach a decision different from that reached by Missouri and the principle 2 involved in the two cases remains unchanged -- since the decisions _ were reached by ruling upon adequate, independent state grounds, REN Te a — — ne re re ee ee eee pee ene SE e- See . - a there is no substantial federal question. This Court's recent decision in Albernaz v. United States, No. 79-1709 (March 9, 1981), does not dictate a contrary result with respect to the issues raised herein. The holding in Albernaz was based on the finding of the Supreme Court that the statutes in question represented two (2) separate offenses. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens, who joined in the majority opinion in Whalen, supra, concurred in the judgment in Albernaz, supra, stating that a legislature may not provide cumulative sentences for the same crime. Thus, the result reached by the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours II, remains unchanged by the holding’ in Albernaz. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should not be granted. Respectfully submitted, Leonard W. Buckley, Jr. Attorney for Respondent Timothy Crews 1215 Pine Street St. Louis, Missouri 63103 314/421-1008 28D fat 4 SF 2 ‘ 6” : ay - #. 4 > 7 #9 a . wat a ee ORR eR ka NRE Me SRN se eer y 1 a e b Rule 21 The Petition for Certiorari The petition for writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order here indicated: (a) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of the questions | should be short and concise and should not be argumen- tative or repetitious. The statement of a question pre- sented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary ques- tion fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court. (b) A list of all perties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all parties. This listing may be done in a footnote. (c) A table of contents and table of authorities, if required by Rule 33.5. (a) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions delivered in the courts of administrative agency below. (e) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked showing: (i) The date of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed, and the time of its entry; (ii) The date of any order respecting a rehearing, and the date and terms of any order granting an extension of time within which to petition for cer- tiorari; and | (iii) Where a cross-petition for writ of certiorari is filed under Rule 19.5 reliance upon that Rule shall be expressly noted and the cross-petition shall state the date of receipt of the petition for certi- orari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; (iv) The statutory provision believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment or decree in question by writ of certiorari. (f) The constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances, and regulations which the case involved, set- ting them out verbatim, and giving the appropriate cita- tion therefor. If the provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point, and their pertinent text then shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph 1 (k) of this Rule. (g) A concise statement of the case containing the * facts material to the consideration of the questions presented. (h) If review of the judgment of a state court is sought, | the statement of the case shall also specify the state in the proceedings, both in the court of first instance and in the appellate court, at which the federal questions sought to be reviewed were raised; the method or manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed upon by the court; such pertinent quotation of specific por- tions of the record, or summary thereof, with specific reference to the places in the record where the matter appears (e.g., ruling on exception, portion of court's charge and exception thereto, assignment of errors) as will show that the federal question was timely and properly raised so as to give this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of certiorari. Where the portions of the record relied upon under this subparagraph are voluminous, they shall be included in the appendix referred to in subparagraph 1 (k) of this Rule. (i) If review of the judgment of a federal court is sought, the statement of the case shall also show the basis for federal jurisdiction in the court of first instance. (j) A direct and concise argument amplifying the rea- sons relied on for the allowance of the writ. See Rule 17. (k) An appendix containing, in the following order: } (i) Copies of any opinions, orders, findings of fact, _ and conclusions of law, whether written or oral (if , recorded and transcribed), delivered upon the render- ing of the judgment or decree by the court whose decision is sought to be reviewed. (ii) Copies of any other such opinions, orders, find- ings of fact, and conclusions of law rendered by courts Or administrative agencies in the case, and, if refer- ence thereto is necessary to ascertain the grounds of the judgment or decree, of those in companion cases. Each of these documents shall include the caption showing the name of the issuing court or agency and the title and number of the case, and the date of its entry. (iii) A copy of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed and any order on rehearing, including in each the caption showing the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and the date of entry of the judgment, decree, or : order on rehearing. (iv) Any other appended materials: If what is required by this paragraph or by subparagraphs 1(£) and (h) of this Rule, to be included in the petition is voluminous, it may, if more convenient, be separately | , presented. | ’ 2. The petition for writ of certiorari shall be produced in oe a. ee “s conformity with Rule 33. The Clerk shall not accept any petition a for writ of certiorari that does not comply with this Rule and % with Rule 33, except that a party proceeding in forma pauperis may proceed in the manner provided in Rule 46. EE 3. All contentions in support of a petition for writ of cer- tiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as pro- fan eee ~ see ee Ge (eo vided in subparagraph 1 (j) of this Rule, No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari will be received, | ae rah and the Clerk will refuse to file any petition for a writ of cer- | tiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. ‘ee 4. The petition for writ of certiorari shall be as short as Be possible, but may not exceed 30 pages, excluding the subject index, table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph 1 (f) of this Rule, and the appendix. 5. The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready and ade- quate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying his petition. a ‘_ > - y af ‘ s Sy “ rN ‘e — PY gr un ~ *® 3 fae --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1346%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.