# Appendix — Southern California Financial Corp. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 937

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
CLAIMS.

PAUL J. HALL,
MANATT, PHELPS, ROTHENBERG,
& TUNNEY,

1888 Century Park East,
Twenty-First Floor,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90067,
(213) 556-1500,

Counsel for Petitioner.

MARSHALL MANLEY,
FINLEY, KUMBLE, WAGNER,

HEINE, UNDERBERG & MANLEY,
2029 Century Park East, |
Suite 2600,

Los Angeles, Calif. 90067,
(213) 557-0111,
Of Counsel.

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

bisied

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Page
Appendix A. Opinion ..............cceee eee ee ee App. p. 1
Appendix B. Opinion ...............ccescseceeseeeeeeeees 40
PAE Mas MIOUEE wovshesconcccddsguegppoodcednceansévars 50
_ Appendix D. Complaint in Condemnation and De-
UE FOE FU LOGI ce veiionivcsece cpecedetaneepsasexes 51
Appendix E. Declaration of Taking ................... 57
Appendix F. Answer to Complaint in Condemnation
CONE BP ee ion, cswadbdicideccsscostchicstcvacevpecs 62

Appendix G. Motion to Strike Answer of Defendant
Southern California Financial Corporation to Com-
| plaint in Condemnation, Notice Thereof, and Mem-
orandum of Points and Authorities (As to Tract D-
WMA Tel ide dso ancndtedbencclbeabnrcine bebepesvagceieondses 66
Appendix H. Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to
Strike Answer of Southern California Financial
SINR Ata KudundavccanssScbvasehinndvseyeseseckpanahess 78
Appendix I. Order Striking Portions of Answer of
Defendant Southern California Financial Corporation
to Complaint in Condemnation (As to Tract D-496-
Matias had cnUeeerelGacebs vel oeveetientsseses Lc coatings een 81

Appendix J. Constitutional Provision and Statutes .. 84

APPENDIX A.

Opinion.
In the United States Court of Claims, Trial Division. No.
79-74.
(Filed: October 1, 1979).

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United
States. Taking; Inverse Condemnation; Successive Term
Leaseholds.

Marshall Manley, attorney of record, for plaintiff.
Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, of counsel.

C. David Redmon, with whom was Assistant Attorney
General James W. Moorman, for defendant.

OPINION*

SCHWARTZ, Trial Judge: Plaintiff sues for an inverse
condemnation of a tract of land adjoining that part of March
Air Force Base, near Riverside, California, which is used
as a bomb and ammunition storage area. The Government’s
motion for summary judgment was denied on December 20,
1974, and the case was remanded for trial. The case has
been tried, and plaintiff is here held to prevail on the issue
of liability. The amount of compensation remains to be
determined.

From 1949 to 1961, the United States had possession of
the tract as a tenant of plaintiff's predecessor, pursuant to
non-exclusive leases for periods of a year or less, each lease
extendible for four or five periods of a year. All the renewal
options were exercised through 1961. In 1962, the owner
declined to lease the land at the offered rental, and so the
Government condemned a 6-months lease, extendible for

*The opinion and conclusion of law are submitted together with
accompanying findings of fact in accordance with rule |34(h). The
necessary findings of fact are stated in the opinion.

wails

periods of | year each. A similar condemnation took place
in 1967.

Plaintiff bought the land in 1969. When the 1967 lease
as extended expired in 1972, plaintiff would not agree to
another lease, and asked that the Government buy the fee.
The Government thereupon instituted another proceeding
to condemn a lease of the same kind as before. A defense
in the condemnation proceeding that the series of leases
amounted to a condemnation of the fee, for which full pay-
ment ought to be made, was dismissed by the district court,
on the Government's motion contending that such a defense
could not be raised in the court in which condemnation
proceedings were instituted.

The condemnation proceeding continued in the district
court and culminated in a leasehold similar to those in the
past, beginning in 1972. Plaintiff brought suit here in 1974
for an inverse condemnation of the fee, or more properly,
of plaintiff's reversion. Another leasehold, similar to those
in the past, was condemned in 1977, extendible until 1981.

I. Jurisdiction

A preliminary argument is that only the district court has
jurisdiction. The Government having in the district court
sought and obtained a ruling which left only this court with
jurisdiction to award compensation as for the taking of a
fee, that ruling is now the law of the case and the Govern-
ment will not be heard to argue the contrary. Peerless Coal
Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1045, 1046 (1978). Cf.
Nager Electric Co. v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 390, 399-
401, 396 F.2d 977, 981-83 (1968). At least one other
district court, in granting a motion to strike a defense to
condemnation of a lease on the ground of a taking of the
fee valued at more than $10,000, has held that this court
has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims. United States v.

ual Miia

1440.35 Acres of Land, 438 F. Supp. 1070, 1073-74 (D.
Md. 1977). Accord, United States v. Gila River Pima-Mari-
copa Indian Community, 391 F.2d 53, 55-56 (9th Cir.
1968). The Supreme Court has often referred to the avail-
ability in the Court of Claims of the remedy of a suit for
just compensation for an alleged unconventional, authorized
taking. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978); Regional
Rail=Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 125-36
(1974); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647, n.8 (1962).

Il. The Claimed Taking

The plaintiff contends that it has suffered a taking of the
fee by reason of valid governmental action which has de-
prived it of the economically reasonable use of the land. -
The contention is sustained, on these followiny, facts.

The bomb and ammunition storage area of the March Air
Force Base is located in its northwest corner. The tract in
question, some 119.5 acres, abuts this corner on both the
north and the west, and serves the base as a buffer or safety
zone for the event of a possible explosion of the stored
bombs and ammunition. It has appeared that March Air
Force Base, one of the oldest and largest of its kind, will
remain indefinitely a major air force base and that so long
as ‘bombs and ammunition are used, and stored as they
presently are, the plaintiff's land will be needed as a buffer
and safety zone. Further, it is agreed that there are no plans
to change the place of bomb storage; the storage installation
is a permanent one.

The basic |-year term of the successive condemnations
is no indication of any temporary character of the Govern-
ment’s need for the property. The duration of the leases is
designed to conform to the 1-year availability of the relevant
appropriations. The Government in fact plans to condemn

a7

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l-year leases into the indefinite future. This has been its
intention, apparently, for many years. In sum, the Air Force
uses the property as a permanent buffer zone and intends
to use it as such indefinitely, and to pay for it by means of
the l-year rentals set in the condemnation proceedings.

While the leases are non-exclusive, and reserve to plain-
tiff the right to conduct agricultural operations, the land
cannot be farmed with profit. Residential development and
substantially all other use is forbidden under the terms of.
the leases; structures for ‘‘human habitation’’ may not be
built or maintained, and gatherings of more than 25 persons
are forbidden.

On trial, plaintiff made proof that the highest and best
use of the land is to hold it for speculation for future de-
velopment as a residential area. The speculative potential
is somewhat dubious for a number of reasons, among them
the noise of overflying planes, the proximity of the land to
the ammunition dump and the restrictive zoning, under
which residential development is not possible. But exact
value aside, the fact remains that the use to which the Gov-
ernment puts the land, coupled with the intention to con-
demn an indefinite series of leases, deprives the plaintiff
of the highest and best use of the land, and gives the Gov-
ernment an interest tantamount to a fee or a perpetual ease-
ment, without payment therefor.

The Government’s motive is simply economy. The Air
Force, recognizing that its need was permanent, has at times
considered the relative cost of leasing and buying, concluded
that leasing would be cheaper, and dropped the idea of
acquisition of a fee. Moreover, it is administratively easier
to pay the modest annual rent fixed in the condemnation
proceedings than to obtain an appropriation of the money
to pay for a fee or a permanent easement. Annual rents can
be paid from a non-specific appropriation for maintenance.

per ar

Condemnation of the fee or a permanent easement, on the
other hand, would require the Air Force to seek an appro-
priation in competition with all other capital improvements
for which Congress must be asked for money. The reluc-
tance to seek a large enough appropriation to pay for the
interest actually taken is seen in the present record. A so-
phisticated commentator has suggested that such reluctance
is found in other, similar cases. See H. Pittle, Suits Against
the United States For Taking Property Without Just Com-
pensation, 55 Geo. L.J. 631, 646 (1967).

The facts establish an inverse taking comparable to that
found in Benenson v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 375, 548
F.2d 939 (1977), and Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States,
191 Ct. Cl. 389, 424 F.2d 574 (1970). In those cases the
court held that a taking took place where without ‘‘physical
invasion or ouster’’ (VBH Land Co. v. United States, 217
Ct. Cl. __, —_, 576 F.2d 317, 319 (1978)), the conduct
of the Government has deprived the owner of any reasonable
use of the property.

In Benenson, the conduct was primarily that of Congress.
In the case of Drakes Bay, the conduct was that of the
Executive Branch. While the conduct constituting the taking
in those cases was far different from plaintiff's case, the
decisions are much in point on principle. Perhaps more in
point factually is Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329 (1922), where the infre-
quent shooting of cannon over plaintiff’s hotel in peacetime,
on an artillery practice range, was held to be ‘‘ ‘the im-
position of such a servitude [as] would constitute an appro-
priation of property for which compensation should be
made.’ ’’ The threat of an ammunition explosion over the
present plaintiff's land is as much an inhibition of use of
the land as was the occasional cannon shot for the hotel on
the island in Portsmouth harbor.

ela

Details of the interference with use in the cases in federal’
and state’ courts which find a taking by deprivation of use,
would serve no purpose, for each case is different from the
others, and from this one. What is important is that the facts

'The first and leading federal case on a taking by interference with
use by flooding was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
The learning underlying the application of the flooding rule to the instant
case is derived from the cases cited in the text, from Pumpelly, from
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and from the
following cases: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S.
333 (1910); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Richmond
Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327
(9th Cir. 1977); Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.
Mich. 1966), affd 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. United
States, 210 Ct. Cl. 467, 538 F.2d 865 (1976); Pete v. United States,
209 Ct. Cl. 270, 531 F.2d 1018 (1976); Eyherabide v. United States,
170 Ct. Cl. 598, 345 F.2d 565 (1965); Bydlon v. United States, 146
Ct. Cl. 764, 175 F. Supp. 891 (1959). Cf. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (just
compensation for removal or prohibition of interstate highway bill-
boards).

*Behiman v. Ci iy of Florissant, 548 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1977);
Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N. #4 107, 343
A.2d 408 (1975); Grasso v. Bd. of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61
A.2d 167 (1948); Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Pa. Dep't of Transp.,
456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d 598 (1974).

The California and New York courts follow a different rule by which
an unlawful deprivation of all use by state or local regulation in the
exercise of the police power is remediable not by an action for just
compensation but by injunctive or declaratory relief. See Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-77, 598 P.2d 25, 28-31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 375-78 (1979), time to appeal to U.S.Sup.Ct. extended to
Oct. 12, 1979, Justice’s Order of July 13, 1979, U.S.Sup.Ct.; Charles
v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 329, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 1303, 392
N.Y.S.2d 594, 602-03 (1977); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. N.Y., 39
hh 587, 593-95, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-10
(1976).

Pointing in the other direction entirely—against any remedy—is the
view which, in the interest of land-use and other types of regulation,
emphasizes the itted scope of the wor power at the expense of
the affected | wner’s claim of an illegal taking. See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887); F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking
Issue (G.P.O. 1973) passim. An interplay between regulation and taking
is not present in the instant case, which involves a taking for the direct
benefit of the Government itself, as proprietor.

ORs, Wise

of the present case satisfy the rule laid down, that property
is taken when ‘‘the acts of the defendant have so impeded
and restrained the plaintiffs as to deprive them of any rea-
sonable use of their property.’’ Benenson v. United States,
212 Ct. Cl. at 388, 548 F.2d at 947. Accord, United States
v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).

Plaintiff has been deprived of more than reasonable or
profitable use. Plaintiff has been deprived of all use. All
that is left in return is the annual rent. The Government’s
use is complete. It gets the benefit of a fee or a permanent
easement, without paying for it. Full payment for the fee,
actually taken and in use by the Government, is to be
‘‘deferred interminably.’’ Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United
States, 191 Ct. Cl. at 411, 424 F.2d at 586.

That the Government may not have intended to take the
fee of the property is no matter. An explicit or deliberate
intention to take is not necessary for a finding of taking;
the intent may be implied from an act the natural conse-
quence of which is to take. Barnes v. United States, 210
Ct. Cl. 467, 476, 538 F.2d 865, 871 (1976); Eyherabide
v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 601, 345 F.2d 565, 567
(1965).

The conclusion is that the acts of the Government in
condemning term leases of the plaintiff's land for a public
purpose—for use as a safety zone around a permanent am-
munition dump—with the intention to continue to condemn
such leases for the same purpose, into the indefinite future,
so subordinate the land to the public use as to constitute a
taking for which just compensation must be made. Whether
the taking is that of the entire fee or, if the use reserved to
plaintiff has some value, only an easement, may be settled
in the proceedings to determine the value of what has been

Bee ace

taken. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267-68
(1946).
The result will not, despite the Government’s protests,
intrude on the Government’s undoubted power to condemn
terms for years. It is not here decided that the condemnee
_of a term or even successive terms for years may, without
more, demand compensation for the entire fee. The decision
here is only that successive condemnations of terms for
years, coupled with a permanent need for the property and
a fixed determination to continue condemnations indefi-
nitely for the foreseeable future, amount to a taking of the
fee or a permanent easement. No other decision is possible
by the test of fairness, which, subjective.as it may be, is
the vital part of the Fifth Amendment command that property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923):

This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider plain-
tiff’s alternative contention that the Government acted in
bad faith in condemning terms for years instead of a fee.
In fairness to those concerned, however, it should be added
that there is no evidence of such conspiracy or intent to
injure the plaintiff as ordinarily would warrant a conclusion
of bad faith. Grasso v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 584-77,
Order of September 9, 1978; Kalvar Corp. v. United States,
211 Ct. Cl. 192, 197-201, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-03 (1976);
Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 489-90, 78 F.
Supp. 126, 127-128 (1948). The Air Force did all that it
did with economy as its motive, and in the belief that its
conduct was lawful. The error as to the law is not bad faith.
The present decision is apparently one of first impression,
and ignorance of the rule now laid down cannot be char-
acterized as bad faith.

maT we"

III. Authority

The defense that the taking is without authority is rejected.
Authority there was in plenty, for the location of the am-
munition dump at the corner of the base, for the decision
that a buffer zone was needed and that it should encompass
plaintiff's land, and for the successive condemnations to
obtain the needed buffer zone. The net result was a taking
of the fee.

There was as much authority for each of the acts consti-
tuting the taking as there was for the flooding in Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871); for the airplane
overflights in Causby; and for the cannon fire in Portsmouth
Harbor Land & Hotel Co. The words of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Portsmouth are apposite: ‘‘As the United States built the
fort and put in the guns and the men, there is a little natural
unwillingness to find lack of authority to do the acts even
if the possible legal consequences were unforeseen.’’ 260
U.S. at 330. See also International Paper Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 399, 406 (1931); Oro Fino Consolidated
Mines, Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 18, 22-23, 92 F.
Supp. 1016, 1019 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948
(1951).

NBH Land Co. v. United States, relied upon by the Gov-
ernment on the issue of authority, lays down no rule that
authority to take inversely cannot be grounded on executive
action. The conclusion there that authority was lacking was
grounded on the deliberate rejection by Congress of the
acquisition for which plaintiff sued. The court described
Benenson and Drakes Bay as takings which were ‘‘a natural
consequence of Congressionally approved measures.’’ 217
Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319. The present case is such
a case. The authority to take follows from the authority of
the Air Force to perform all the acts constituting the taking.

—_

BY ae:

IV. The Defense of Limitations.

Lastly, the Government contends that the action accrued
‘‘prior to 1968,’ beyond the 6-year period of limitations
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The precise date is not more
closely fixed than by a loose reference to its occurrence
during ‘‘the long history of successive renewals of one-year
leaseholds, the continuing need for the property as a buffer
zone for the munitions storage area, and the frequent refusals
of the Government to purchase or exchange the property.”’

The cause of action for an inverse condemnation accrues
not when the actual or physical taking occurs but when it
is determinable by the plaintiff. Limitations do not run until
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know both that his land
has been taken and the extent of the taking. Braude v. United
States, 218 Ct. Cl. .... , .... , 585 F.2d 1049, 1051-52
(1978); Barnes v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. at 480, 538
F.2d at 873; Castro v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 534, 544-
45, 500 F.2d 436, 440-41 (1974); Japanese War Notes
Claimants Ass'n v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 634,
373 F.2d 356, 358-59 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971
(1967). Cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749
(1947); Oro Fino Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. United States,
118 Ct. Cl. at 22, 92 F. Supp. at 1018. But cf. Kabua v.
United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 160, 164-67, 546 F.2d 381, 383-
85 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1977).

Until 1961 all that plaintiff and its predecessor could
know was that the Government was leasing the land for
periods of a year at a time, certainly little evidence of a
condemnation of the fee. The first two eminent domain
proceedings in 1962 and 1967 were not seriously contested
by plaintiff's predecessor and added little to the evidence
of the earlier voluntary leases. A condemnation of a lease,
even leases, extendible for a total of 10 years, is not com-

aes, Solio

pelling evidence of a permanent taking cf the entire prop-
erty. Besides, in the various condemnation proceedings the
Government alleged that the estate to be taken was a re-
newable term for 1 year. It may be too much to say that the
Government’s intention was concealed. Cf. Braude v.
United States, supra. But it is fair to say that the Govern-
ment’s allegations were representations and that plaintiff
was entitled to rely on them until the contrary plainly ap-
peared. Where there is uncertainty whether and how much
the Government has taken, ‘‘it would be unfair if the statute
had started running against plaintiff at a time when there
was no way of knowing the duration of the interest taken.”’
Oro Fino Consolidated Mines Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct.
Cl. at 22, 92 F. Supp. at 1018.

Realization of the intention of the Government came only
in 1973, in the course of the 1972 condemnation proceeding.
At that time the attorney for the Government, in a conference
in judicial chambers, advised plaintiff that ‘‘it was his un-
derstanding that the United States Government intended to
continue to condemn the property which was the subject of
the action continuously in the future in similar manner in
which they had done in the past and that * * * they had no
intention to release the property to the owners and * * * as
far as they could determine, they would continue to condemn
the property in the future ad infinitum.’’

Plaintiff was entitled to wait until it learned, from such
an authoritative source and for the first itme, that the Air
Force wanted and needed the property permanently, and
planned to keep possession by the condemnation of suc-
cessive leaseholds, indefinitely. Suit came soon thereafter
in 1974, well within the 6 years allowed.

The intelligence from the Government’s lawyer gave
plaintiff to understand and grounds upon which to allege,
for the first time, that the Government was actually intent

|

pee

upon a taking of the entire use of the land. Castro v. United
States, 205 Ct. Cl. at 544-45, 500 F.2d at 440-41. Cf.
United States v. Dickinson, supra, (continuous flooding;
held, plaintiff entitled to postpone suit ‘‘until the conse-
quences of inundation have so manifested themselves that
a final account may be struck’’); Oro Fino Consolidated
Mines, Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. at 21, 92 F. Supp.
at 1018 (wartime governmental closing of gold mines; held,
cause of action accrued on reopening of mine, when duration
of taking became known).

The time of accrual of the cause of action is often difficult
to determine. The fixing of the exact date of taking must
often be done in the intuitive manner in which a jury reaches
its verdict. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 191 Ct.
Cl. at 414, 424 F.2d at 587; Barnes v. United States, 210
Ct. Cl. at 480, 536 F.2d at 873. The date is here fixed at
1973, on the available evidence. The conclusion is con-
firmed by the Supreme Court’s caution not to deny the
constitutional guarantee of just compensation by an over-
restrictive setting of a date of taking. United States v. Dick-
inson, supra.

Accordingly, it is adjudged that an authorized inverse
condemnation of the plaintiff’s tract of land took place in
1973, within the period of limitations, and that plaintiff is
entitled to just compensation, upon the delivery to defendant
of an appropriate deed, the amount of compensation and the
nature of the interest to be conveyed by the deed to be
determined in further proceedings in accordance with rule
131(c).

Findings of Fact

1. This action for inverse condemnation was instituted
on March 18, 1974. The property which is the subject of
the case is on the map of the March Air Force Base known

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as Tract D-496-2 and on the topographic Geological Survey
map Riverside East, Calif. , included in Tract 17. It contains
119.5 acres of land, more or less. It has been owned in fee
simple by plaintiff Southern California Financial Corpora-
tion since September 12, 1969, and it is part of a larger
parcel owned by plaintiff. County land-use maps and March
AFB maps show the subject property as part of the Base.

Voluntary Leases of the Property, 1949-1962

2. (a) The subject property abuts the northwest corner
of the March Air Force Base, Riverside, California. The
bomb and ammunition storage area of the Base is located
in that corner.

(b) In order to secure a buffer zone of vacant land
around the bomb and ammunition storage facility of the
Base, the defendant leased the subject property from the
then owners, known as the Trautwein Group, together with
adjacent parcels, for a term of 1 year effective October 1,
1949. The lease provided that the lessor retained joint use
of the property, for agricultural purposes only.

(c) Thereafter, the defendant leased the subject
property from the Trautwein Group, together with various
adjacent parcels, through an unbroken series of similar,
1-year leases which extended through and included Decem-
ber 31, 1961.

3. Onor about September 12, 1969, plaintiff purchased
the subject property from the Trautwein Group as part of
a larger transaction which included purchase of approxi-
mately 6,200 acres for a total consideration of approximately
$9,000,000.

4. In or about the fall of 1961, the Trautwein Group
and the defendant failed to reach agreement on a renewal
lease because the Group would not accept the amount of

ee,’

rent offered by the defendant. Upon rejection of its final
offer, the defendant took the steps described in the following
finding.

Condemnation of 1-Year Leases, 1962—to Date.

5. (a) On February 27, 1962, the United States filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Cal-
ifornia, Central Division, Civil Action No. 62-338-S, en-
titled United States of America v. 239.82 Acres of Land,
to condemn successive leaseholds in the subject property
and in several adjacent parcels.

(b) As authority for the condemnation the com-
plaint stated that:

The authority for the taking is the Act of Congress
approved February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C.
258a) and acts supplementary thereto and amendatory
thereof, and under the further authority of the Act of
Congress approved August 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357, 40
U.S.C. 257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10,
United States Code, which authorize the acquisition
of land for military purposes; the Act of Congress ap-
proved August 17, 1961 (Public Law 87-144), which
act authorized the acquisition and appropriated funds
for such purposes.

(c) The complaint and the declaration of taking
provided for a lease for 6 months, extendible for five periods
of 1 year each at the election of the United States, as follows:

The estate taken for said public uses is a non-exclu-
sive term for years beginning January 1, 1962 and
ending June 30, 1962, extendible for yearly periods
thereafter at the election of the United States until June
30, 1967, notice of which election shall be filed in the
proceeding at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of
the term hereby taken, or subsequent extensions
thereof, together with the right to remove, within a

ais

reasonable time after the expiration of the term taken,
or any extension thereof, any and all improvements
and structures heretofore placed thereon by or for the
United States; reserving to the lessors, their heirs, ex-
ecutors, administrators and assigns the right to cultivate
the land for any and all crops which may be grown
thereon; provided, however, that no structures for hu-
man habitation shall be constructed and maintained on
the land; provided, further, that no gathering of more
than twenty-five persons shall be permitted thereon;
the above estate is taken subject to existing easements
for public roads and highways, public utilities, rail-
roads and pipelines.

6. In the succeeding 5 years the defendant exercised
each of its 1-year renewal options and thus retained pos-
session of the subject property through and including June
30, 1967.

7. In 1967, the Trautwein Group rejected as insufficient
the defendant’s final offer of compensation for a voluntary
lease of the subject property for the period following June
30, 1967, and the defendant again elected to condemn the
property for a similar term.

8. (a) On June 30, 1967, the defendant filed in the
U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Civil
Action No. 67-923-PH, entitled United States of America
v. 219.23 Acres of Land, in order to condemn the subject
property and several adjacent parcels.

(b) As authority, the complaint in condemnation
stated that:

The authority for the taking is the Act of Congress
approved August 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 356, 40 U.S.C.
257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10, United States
Code, which authorize the acquisition of land for mil-
itary purposes; funds for the payment of rental for the
term beginning July 1, 1967, and ending June 30, 1968,

aes. 7 a

will be made available from the Department of Defense
Appropriation Act of 1968 when enacted into law.

(c) The complaint in condemnation and the deciaration
of taking described as taken for public use the same estate
which had been taken in the 1962 condemnation action. The
term of the taking was described as follows:

The estate taken for said public uses is a nonexclusive
term for years beginning July 1, 1967, and ending June
30, 1968, extendible for yearly periods thereafter at
the election of the United States until June 30, 1972
*_* *

9. (a) In the succeeding 4 years the defendant exer-
cised each of its 1-year renewal options and thereby con-
tinued uninterrupted possession of the property through and
including June 30, 1972.

(b) The elections for the first of the 4 years took
place prior to plaintiff's purchase of the property. Plaintiff
bought the property during the lease year ending June 30,
1970, the second of the 4 renewal years. Thereafter the
defendant made similar elections for the years June 30, 1971
and June 30, 1972. Plaintiff received compensation for the
defendant’s possession during the period of plaintiff's own-
ership.

10. (a) On June 30, 1972, the defendant again exer-
cised its power of eminent domain to take the subject prop-
erty and some adjacent parcels by instituting in the U.S.
District Court, Central District of California, Civil Action
No. 72-1505-JWC, entitled United States of America v.
214.69 Acres of Land.

(b) The complaint in condemnation invoked the
authorities cited in the complaint in 1962, substituting for

the 1961 appropriation act an expected appropriation act for
1973.

(c) The complaint and the declaration of taking
further described as taken the same estate as that taken in
the 1962 and 1967 condemnation actions.

11. In the succeeding 4 years, the defendant exercised
its options to renew the lease for successive 1-year terms
and thereby continued uninterrupted possession of the prop-
erty through and including March 31, 1977.

12. On March 8, 1978, the defendant again exercised
its power of eminent domain to take the subject property
and some adjacent parcels by instituting in the U.S. District
Court, Central District of California, Civil Action No. 78-
0890-WPG, entitled United States of America v. 214.69
Acres of Land. The complaint again invoked the authorities
cited in the prior actions, substituting for earlier appropri-
ation acts a 1976 appropriation act. The term of the taking
was described as from April 1, 1977, and ending March 31,
1978, extendible for yearly periods thereafter, at the election
of the United States, until March 31, 1981.

13. The defendant moved for and obtained an order
confirming its right to continued possession of the subject
property effective April 1, 1977, and the defendant elected
to extend the term of its possession from April 1, 1978 to
March 31, 1979.

14. The defendant has continued in uninterrupted pos-
session of the subject property by means of successive con-
demnations, as described above, from February 27, 1962,
to the present.

15. The subject property has at all times pertinent been
acquired and used by the defendant for the public purpose
of providing a necessary buffer/safety zone adjacent to the
bomb and ammunition storage area of March Air Force
Base.

as

16. The bomb and ammunition storage area at the Base
is located on land owned in fee simple by the United States,
and all construction in that area since 1955 has been of a
permanent type.

17. Since no later than 1953, the intended use and an-
ticipated need for the subject property as a part of March
Air Force Base has not changed. As of 1953, and continuing
to the present, the defendant has had a need for the property
for an indefinite term contingent upon the existence of an
ammunition storage area in its present location.

18. March Air Force Base is now and will be for the
foreseeable future a major military installation of the U.S.
Air Force. So long as ammunition storage areas are nec-
essary to its function, a buffer zone surrounding the storage
area will be required. There are no plans to discontinue the
use or location of the existing ammunition storage facility.

The United States thus has a permanent need for the
subject property.

Government Consideration of Acquisition of a
Fee, 1953-63.

19, In 1953, and at several times prior to 1969, the
defendant studied the feasibility of acquiring either a per-
manent restrictive easement or a fee interest in the subject
property and adjacent lands. In each case, the decision was
made to continue acquisition of 1-year renewable term in-
terests.

20. In a letter dated June 29, 1956, from the Chief
Staff, by George A. Lavallee, Chief, Realty Operations
Section, to the Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Air Com-
mand, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, the Chief
of Staff stated:

In reviewing the above mentioned report, it appears
that the 1,851 acres presently under lease in connection

winless

with the ammunition storage area at that installation
{March Air Force Base] are a permanent requirement
and that the possibilities of acquiring a more permanent
interest in the property should be explored due to its
location in relation to the main installation.

21. By memorandum dated on or about July 17, 1956,
the Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force
Base, Omaha, Nebraska, directed the Commander, 15th Air
Force, March Air Force Base, California, as follows:

1. Itis requested that a study be made to determine
the advisability of acquiring a more permanent real
estate interest in the 1,851 acres comprising the March
Air Force Base Ammunition Storage Annex, which
area is presently under ease to the government.

2. Your comments and recommendations in this
regard are requested. If it appears to the best interest
of the government to acquire fee title to this area, this
headquarters will request the Corps of Engineers to
prepare a revised real estate planning report and take
action to include a land acquisition fee line item in a
future military construction program.

22. Thereafter, at a date not shown in the record, the
Commander-in-Chief, SAC, directed the District Engineer,
Los Angeles District, P.O. Box 17277, Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia, as follows:

1. Request that a Real Estate Requirements Esti-
mate [for Fiscal Year 1960 Military Construction Pro-
gram] be prepared to cover fee acquisition of land and
restrictive easement acquisition over land required to
Satisfy quantity safety distance criteria for the existing
ammunition storage facilities at March Air Force Base.

23. As of November 14, 1958, the Air Force stated in
the Fiscal Year 1960 Military Construction Program a plan
to acquire permanent rights in the subject property to replace

as “aa

the leasehold of the subject property and other related lease-
holds.

24. In 1963, at one stage of the planning of the Fiscal
Year 1965 Military Construction Program, there was in-
cluded a cost study for acquisition of permanent land in-
terests in the buffer zone around the March AFB bomb and
ammunition storage area.

Abandonment of Consideration of Acquisition
of a Fee, 1963

25. Outright acquisition of these land interests was,
however, deleted from the Program in or about June 1963,
on the ground that leasehold interests were more econom-
ical.

26. On April 2, 1963, Floyd D. Bender, Deputy Civil
Engineer, March Air Force Base, reported to the 15th Air
Force that:

2. Based on advice furnished by Headquarters
SAC on the reduction of required space for a demolition
disposal area, a cost comparison to acquire these land
areas versus leasing has been accomplished with the
following results:

a. Total cost to acquire land areas,
as indicated below: $95,751.00.

Restrictive Easement 610.53 AC

R/W Road to Ammo Area 3.00 AC
R/W Road to Demolition Area 1.72 AC
Fee-Demolition Area 5.55 AC
TOTAL 620.80 AC

b. Total annual costs to lease

on a joint use basis 615.25 AC

and exclusive use 5.55 AC
TOTAL 620.80 AC

$4,054.63

Dae, aa

27. Onor about April 12, 1963, the Commander, March
Air Force Base, by Clare H. Royce, Lt. Col., USAF, and
Chief, Base Development Division, Directorate of Civil
Engineering, reported to SAC that:

2. A cost comparison survey to acquire the per-
manent land interests recommended by your head-
quarters, in lieu of land interests requested by this
headquarters in the FY 65 Military Construction Pro-
gram, has been accomplished. The cost to acquire these
reduced land interests, compared to leasing this land
on a joint-use basis, reveals it is not economically
feasible to purchase permanent interests. This survey
shows that it will take 23'2 years to amortize the cost
of permanent acquisition, based on the cost to lease

this land on a joint-use basis.
* * * * *

4. In view of the above, request subject land items
be deleted from the FY 65 Military Construction Pro-
gram.

28. Thereafter, in June 1963, Headquarters, SAC,
Omaha, reported to Headquarters, USAF, concerning the
relative costs of acquiring temporary and permanent inter-
ests in a total of 620.80 acres, including the subject property.
It was estimated that the annual expense for leasing the
lands comprising the safety/distance area around the March
Air Force Base Ammunition Storage Area on a joint-use
basis would be approximately $4,050.00. Comparatively,
it was estimated that the cost of acquiring a restrictive ease-
ment over the 620.80 acres needed would be $93,120.00.
The study concluded that:

4. In view of the above, we consider that it is more
economical to lease all lands comprising the March
Ammo Safety Area on a joint-use basis, with land-

owners’ operations limited to agriculture and grazing.
* * *

a, a en

ees, , we
6. Land items referred to in paragraph 4 of pre-
ceding Ist Indorsement have been deleted from the FY
1965 Military Construction Program.

29. On June 11, 1963, the Chief of Staff, USAF, by
Donald L. Black, Deputy Chief, Air Force Real Estate
Agency, Director of Civil Engineering, reported to Head-
quarters, SAC, that:

Concur in your recommendation that the requirement
for a restricted area around the March Air Force Base
Ammunition Storage Area be met by leasing the re-
quired restrictions only, and therefore, allowing limited
joint use of the land involved.

30. The basis for the 1963 decision to continue leasing
the land required for the March Air Force Base Bomb and
Ammunition Storage Area buffer zone on a joint-use basis
rather than acquire permanent interests in that land was that
leasing was more economical for the United States. As one
witness, an Air Force lawyer, put it, ‘‘leasing was regarded
as, to put it accurately, a better deal for the Government
than purchase.”’

The 1967 Condemnation—The Decision Not to
Acquire a Fee

31. On or about March 29, 1967, during the precon-
demnation negotiations for acquisition of a leasehold on the
subject property from the Trautwein family, the owner’s
attorney informed the negotiator for the Corps of Engineers
that the owner’s expenses for taxes and water assessments
on the subject property exceeded the annual rental of $1,120
offered by the United States.

32. (a) On about April 5, 1967, an appraisal report
on the subject property, prepared by the Corps of Engineers,
U.S. Army Engineer District, Los Angeles, California,

mo, One

stated the fair rental value of the subject property on a joint-
use basis as $1,120 per annum.

(b) The report also appraised the fair market value
of the property at $255,156, and stated that ‘‘[t]he present
value of the land is for speculation and not immediate de-
velopment.’’ ,

(c) The report further acknowledged that the ac-
quisition of the proposed restrictive easement ‘‘will affect
the liquidity of the property in event a sale were contem-
plated.’’

33. The defendant did not raise its offer for annual rental
of the subject property above $1,120 and by report dated
August 3, 1967, the Corps of Engineers’ negotiator rec-
ommended that a declaration of taking should be filed with-
out further delay.

34. (a) In about October 1967, the Office of the Sec-
retary of the Air Force, by Louis E. Turner, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary (Installations), requested an investigation
of the economic feasibility of acquiring perpetual easements
in the 219.23 acre buffer zone adjacent to March AFB. In
response to this request, Headquarters, SAC, requested that
the Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, Los Angeles
District, investigate the economic feasibility of acquiring
perpetual restrictive easements for the March AFB Ammo
Storage Area and, for comparison purposes, to include the
estimated cost of fee purchase of these land areas.

(b) The decision, however, was not to acquire the
fee or a perpetual easement but to condemn a lease, as
before.

(c) The decision was made for the reasons (1) that
it was less expensive to lease than to purchase, and (2) that
the purchase of the subject property had not been authorized
in that year’s Military Construction Authorization Act.

pam, eae

35. (a) Air Force acquisitions of interests in land with
a value in excess of $50,000 must be approved under the
annual Military Construction Authorization Act. Authori-
zation for a purchase of an interest in land in excess of
$50,000 for March Air Force Base would require the ap-
proval of the intermediate command, the 15th Air Force;
the SAC; the Director of Civil Engineering, Headquarters,
USAF; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Re-
sources and the Air Force Council; the Office of the Sec-
retary of the Air Force, specifically the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Installations; the Office of the Secretary of
Defense; the Office of Management and Budget; the Budget
of the President of the United States; and, ultimately,
Congressional authorization through the annual Military
Construction Appropriations Act.

(b) Processing a request through the procedure of
the Military Construction Program requires, at a minimum,
approximately 1 year. When the determination had to be
made as to whether to continue the condemnation of a lease-
hold in the subject property that had begun in 1962, it was
already too late to include an appropriation for purchase of
the subject property in the 1967 Military Construction Pro-
gram. For instance, a July 1967 purchase request could not
result in authorization for funding to purchase before July
1968.

36. Air Force acquisition of any interest in land that has
a cost of under $50,000 can be handled as a minor land
acquisition funded from the annual operation and mainte-
nance program, and such an acquisition under $50,000 does
not require authorization under a Military Construction Pro-
gram.

37. In reaching the decision in 1967 to condemn suc-
cessive 1-year leasehold interests in the subject property,
the Air Force considered that the expected use of the subject

EUR. WF

property would exceed a 5-year period. The technique of
condemning a l-year leasehold renewable for a 5-year pe-
riod was chosen because leaseholds are funded under annual
funds which cannot be used to enter into an obligation for
longer than 1 year. This procedure allowed acquisition of
the subject property without involvement in the annual
Military Construction Program.

The 1972 Condemnation—No Consideration
of Acquisition of a Fee

38. In 1972, when the Department of the Air Force
decided to institute another 5-year condemnation of a lease
of the subject property, the issues that were discussed in
1967 (including whether to lease or to buy) were not re-
raised, and the condemnation action was processed rou-
tinely.

The Contested 1972 Condemnation

39. (a) On July 20, 1972, the United States served
the Notice of Filing Complaint in Condemnation and related
documents in Civil Action No. 72-1505-JWC on Peter F.
McAndrews, plaintiff's secretary and legal counsel, whose
duties included general supervision of the legal affairs of
the company. At the same time, the defendant also for-
warded to plaintiff a proposed Notice of Appearance in a
franked return envelope.

(b) Plaintiff served and filed 2 a Notice of Appear-
ance on July 26, 1972.

40. At the time plaintiff filed the Notice of Appearance,
its counsel did not know the specific location of the subject
property, and Mr. McAndrews asked the Assistant U.S.
Attorney handling the case for assistance in locating the
property. Plaintiff's counsel had not previously directed his
attention to the property, nor had he had any discussion with

—26—

other officers of the plaintiff regarding any legal action to
be taken with respect to the property.

41. On July 31, 1972, following telephone communi-
cations, plaintiff requested that the defendant enter into ne-
gotiations to arrange for a sale to the Government or have
a condemnation in the traditional and more normal sense
of the word.

42. Plaintiff's request that the United States either pur-
chase or condemn a fee interest in the subject property had
not been formulated before receipt of the 1972 complaint
in condemnation.

43. By letter of October 12, 1972, plaintiff requested
that the United States state whether ‘‘there [is] any possi-
bility of an outright purchase of the property by the Gov-
ernment or the exchange of the property for other land now
owned by the Government in the area.”’

44. Ina letter of November 15, 1972, Assistant U.S.
Attorney Bryan N. Freeman responded in the negative as
follows:

This is in response to your letter dated October 12,
1972, wherein you inquired as to the possibility either
of a purchase of the above-referenced tract by the Gov-
ernment or the exchange of the property for other land
owned by the Government.

The Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District,
has informed us that requests for an outright purchase
or an exchange of the tracts occupied by the Air Force
under lease or leasehold condemnation have been in-
stituted on frequent occasions both by the former own-
ers of Tract D-496-2 and other landowners similarly
situated, at least as far back as 1967. In each instance
the response of the Air Force to these inquiries has
been in the negative on the ground that the proposals
were not militarily feasible.

me ee
* * * %* *

The Corps further pointed out that there is always
the possibility that at some future date the Air Force
could determine the lands under lease to be excess to
its military requirements in which case they would be
released to the owners.

45. Following receipt of Mr. Freeman’s letter of No-
vember 15, 1972, Mr. McAndrews turned the matter over
to outside counsel, Mr. Marshall Manley.

46. The Notice of Appearance previously filed in Civil
Action No. 72-1505-JWC by Mr. McAndrews limited plain-
tiff’s rights to litigation of the question of valuation of the
subject property. Upon appearing in the action, Mr. Manley
made a motion for an order permitting plaintiff to file an
answer. The motion was granted, after an opposition by the
Government in which it was said that ‘‘The Estate Taken
is a Temporary Interest by the Terms of the Taking.”’

47. (a) In early 1973, after the hearing on plaintiff's
motion for leave to file an answer, Mr. Manley attended
a status conference in the chambers of Judge Jesse Curtis.
There a representative of the Department of Justice stated
that ‘‘it was his understanding that the United States gov-
ernment intended to continue to condemn the property which
was the subject of the action continuously in the future in
similar manner in which they had done in the past and that
* * * they had no intention to release the property to the
owners and * * * as far as they could determine, they would
continue to condemn the property in the future ad infini-
tum.”’

(b) This statement was Mr. Manley’s first notice
from a representative of the United States that the United
States intended to condemn the subject property for the
indefinite future.

i *

ion, Sal

48. (a) After filing of plaintiff's answer to the com-
plaint in condemnation, the Government moved to strike
plaintiff’s affirmative defenses. Among the grounds, as
stated in the captions of points 2 and 4 of the argument,
respectively, were that ‘“The Estate Taken Is a Temporary
Interest By the Terms of the Taking’’ and that ‘‘The De-
fendant May Not Challenge the Estate Taken in This Pro-
ceeding [in the district court].’’

(b) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a notice of non-
Opposition to the motion to strike answer. The notice re-
served plaintiff's right to pursue the issues raised in its
answer in the United States Court of Claims.

(c) The district court on June 15, 1973, granted
the United States’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s
answer; and this action was on March 18, 1974, filed in this
court.

Plaintiff s Agricultural Expert: The Property Is Not Suited
for Agriculture

49. Plaintiff's expert witness, Mr. Sherman G. Bab-
cock, is an expert agricultural consultant who is familiar
with soils, agricultural development in the Riverside area
and the costs of conducting agricultural operations in that
area.

50. He testified to his opinion that the subject property
is not economically suitable for the conduct of any agri-
cultural operations.

51. His opinion was in part based on the following facts
and considerations:
(a) The soil types on the property range from ‘‘not
suited to agriculture’’ to ‘‘severe limitations for agricul-
ture.”’

(b) There is no agricultural water available.

a

(c) There is presently a crop of barley being dry-
farmed on the property, i.e., using rainfall water.

(d) Even excluding consideration of return on in-
vestment in the !and, dry farming barley on the subject
property would produce a loss.

(e) There is no ciop that may be dry farmed that
would be more profitable than barley for farming on the
subject property.

(f) Citrus culture is technically possible on the sub-
ject property with ‘‘foreign water,’ and citrus culture has
been practiced on adjacent land. Citrus culture would pro-
duce an even greater loss than dry farming of barley.

52. (a) From and after 1975, plaintiff has not been a
party to any agricultural lease for the property, and it does
not receive any remuneration from the person who is pres-
ently growing barley on the subject property.

(b) The reason plaintiff has not entered into an
agricultural lease for the property is that the amount of rental
offered by the prospective lessee, $5.00 per acre per year,
would not compensate plaintiff for the administrative costs
attendant to such a lease and because plaintiff does not wish
the property to be encumbered by the financing statement
that is frequently filed as a consequence of a farmer’s com-
mercial borrowing.

(c) Plaintiff has not evicted the person who is
growing barley on the subject property because the farming
operation abates the growth of weeds and tends to prevent
people from dumping refuse on the subject property.

Plaintiff s Appraiser: The Highest & Best Possible Use Is
to Hold for Speculation With Ultimate Development
Into 1-Acre Residential Lots

53. Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Raynor J. Klaris, ts an ex-
pert real estate appraiser with experience in analysis of un-
developed land and agricultural and grazing properties.

ae me

54. His opinion is that, while the subject property is not
suitable for immediate residential development, it is eco-
nomically suitable for eventual development into |-acre res-
idential lots and that at the present time the economically
feasible best use for the subject property is to hold for
speculation with ultimate development into 1-acre residen-
tial lots.

55. His opinion is based on the assumption that (a) a
zoning change from 20-acre to l-acre residential sites can
be eventually obtained from the local government; (b) that
the property was not restricted by a safety hazard presented
by reason of proximity to the March AFB bomb and am-
munition storage area and the existing condemnation by
defendant.

56. He testified that:

(a) In analyzing the potential highest and best use
of undeveloped property, appropriate procedure for an ex-
pert real estate appraiser is to make the basic assumption
that the property is not restricted by zoning and then de-
termine what the highest and best use of the property would
be based upon the character and development of the area.

(b) After the real estate appraiser has determined
the potential highest and best use of undeveloped property,
the owner implements or attempts to implement that change
in the use of that property. It does not make sense to seek
a zone change before one knows whether or not the con-
templated zone change would make a given parcel of prop-
erty economically useful.

(c) Under the circumstances of this case. ‘‘there
would be no point * * * in going through a development
plan for the subject property with this [condemnation] re-
striction on the property, and potentially on the property in
perpetuity."

ex Wen

57. The bases for his opinion as to highest and best
possible use are the following facts and considerations:

(a) The property lies to the west of Interstate 15
and is near Alessandro Blvd. on the north, Trautwein Road
on the west and Van Buren Blvd. on the south. An easement
for Barton Road, which runs south to Van Buren Blvd., lies
at the eastern edge of the subject property, and an easement
for John F. Kennedy Road runs across the southern part of
the subject property.

(b) The property is located in the community of
Woodcrest, in an unincorporated area of the western portion
of Riverside County, and lies to the southeast of the central
urban area of the City of Riverside, and to the west of March
AFB.

(c) The Riverside County General Plan mistakenly
includes the property as part of the March AFB. The prop-
erty is shown to be surrounded by two types of land-use
classifications: (1) Agricultural Reserve, and (2) Open
Space and Other Agricultural Lands. While the Board of
Supervisors would have no zoning jurisdiction if the prop-
erty was actually part of March AFB, it is not. The subject
property is zoned R-A-20, which requires 20-acre lot sites.

(d) The subject property is currently zoned
R-A-20, which indicates Residential Agricultural with a
minimum lot size of 20 acres. One-acre residential lots
would not be permitted on the subject property under
existing zoning.

(e) A zone change from R-A-20 to 1-acre residen-
tial lots would require an amendment to the Riverside
County General Plan.

(f) While there is no agricultural water available

for the subject property, residential water or domestic water
is available from the Western Municipal Water District.

oP

(g) The subject property does not have access to
sewers. Septic tanks and leach lines with minimum |-acre
lot size are the typical means of sewage disposal for indi-
vidual residences in the area.

(h) The total value of building permits issued for
Riverside County increased by 91.5 percent from 1976 to
1977, and the unincorporated areas of the County showed
a 78.5 percent increase in the value of building permits
issued during the same period.

(i) The City of Riverside imposed a moratorium
on building of new single-family homes from November
1977 to October 1978, which caused demand for housing
to shift to surrounding areas. The value of building permits
in unincorporated areas of Riverside County was up 64
percent in January of 1978, during which time there was
very little building activity in the City of Riverside.

(j) Since the early 1960’s the Riverside area has
become increasingly urbanized, and agriculture is being de-
emphasized. Agricultural acreage in Riverside County de-
creased by 3.2 percent from 1974 to 1977. The tax rate and
the rising cost of agricultural water have created a situation
where ‘‘[t]he continued increase in operating costs encour-
age or even force the agricultural property owner to convert
his property from agriculture to an urban use.”’

(k) As evidenced from the development and growth
which have taken place within the general area, there is an
apparent gradual trend or transformation of rural land to
urban type use. The slow growth pattern is extending toward
the subject area from both the developed portion of Wood-
crest on the west and from the City of Riverside on the
northwest.

(1) The nearest development to subject property is
in an area which almost abuts the northeast corner of the

fae,

property. This development dates from the late 1960’s and
consists of a trailer park on the eastern portion and 1-half
acre lots on the western portion. Several of the lots which
had been vacant until a year ago now contain homes because
of the increased demand for housing.

(m) There is currently being developed a section
of the county about | mile north, northwest of subject prop-
erty. There are 12 to 15 homes, on 1 to 2'%-acre sites
completed, with three under construction. The developer
has 60 additional acres which he is trying to get the county
to rezone to l-acre building sites. This county area is similar
to subject property in most respects, with the exception of
proximity to March AFB.

(n) The typical residential development in the
Woodcrest area is large, ranch-type parcels, typically on 1
to 2'%-acre lots.

Defendant's Land Use Expert: Residential Development Is
Unlikely for a Variety of Stated Reasons

58. (a) Defendant’s witness, Mr. Richard J. Smith,
is an expert by education and training in the field of land-
use planning, zoning, state and local land-use regulation
and development trends in Riverside County.

(b) His opinion is that plaintiff’s land is unsuitable
and undesirable for residential development, now or in the
future.

59. His opinion is based on the following facts and
considerations:

(a) Holding real property for speculation entails a
business judgment that the short-term losses incurred in
holding property that has a negative income flow are jus-
tified by the expectation of future profits to be derived from
the development of that real property.

7s

eer ae

(b) That portion of section 17 (which section in-
cludes the subject property) that is not subject to condem-
nation by the United States has value for holding for spec-
ulative purposes.

(c) Given the presently existing condemnation by
the United States, an expert real estate appraiser would not
advise a client to incur the expense of a plan of development
for the subject property.

(d) The Riverside County General Plan and present
zoning preclude plaintiff's property from being used for
l-acre residential lots.

(e) The Riverside County General Plan could be
amended to allow residential development on plaintiff’s land
only after an environmental assessment is prepared by the
county, pursuant to the California Environmental Quality
Act. Such environmental assessment would be a very im-
portant factor in the determination as to whether the General
Plan should be amended. The assessment would confirm
all the adverse effects of noise, the ammunition storage area,
leap-frog development and the inconsistency of an amend-
ment with open space and conservation policies.

60. (a) The witness analyzed a recent attempt to
amend the General Plan for property, similar to that of
plaintiff, which would have allowed low density residential
development. The amendment was denied by the Board of
Supervisors of Riverside County in June 1977, on the basis
of reports recommending denial from the County Airport
Land Use Commission, the Environmental Impact group
and the Riverside Planning Commission.

(b) The desired maximum noise levels adopted by
the County Board of Supervisors in October 1975, for the
desired type of low density development was 60 dbl.dn.
The subject property was in an area tested at 65 to 75 dbl.dn

-~

noise levels, which was found to be unacceptable to persons
residing in the vicinity of the airport. Noise levels at the
subject property in suit are in the area of 70 to 75 dbl.dn.

(c) The noise level of the subject property was
considered to be somewhat higher than the laboratory-tested
noise levels since it is about 150 feet higher than runway
elevation.

(d) The similar property lies under the flight pat-
tern of March AFB, which could not be changed without
adversely affecting existing residents or flying safety. The
subject property is also located under the flight patterns of
March AFB.

(e) Soils at the similar location severely limit septic
tank use, and the location might have detrimental effects
on wildlife in the reserve south of the site. Plaintiff’s site
location contains no evidence of these limitations, but it has
not been tested for these possibilities.

61. One of the unsuitable aspects of subject property
for low density residential development is that noise levels
on this property of 70 to 75 dbl.dn exceed the desired max-
imum adopted by the Riverside County Planning Commis-
sion in October 1975. Because of these noise levels Federal
Mortgage Insurance would not be available, if desired, for
possible low cost development requiring such a subsidy.
Federal housing standards would require expensive building
improvements which would reduce noise levels by 30
decibels.

62. Another aspect of plaintiff's property that indicates
its undesirability for residential development is its proximity
to the March Air Force Base and the ammunition storage
facility. The safety considerations and the outward appear-
ance of the facility with its bunkers, large tower and barbed

sins

wire fences make residential development less than desir-
able.

63. Plaintiff's property would not be an ideal property
to zone for residential development because this would re-
quire altering the open space and conservation element of
Riverside County’s General Plan. Such an alteration would
be contrary to the desires of the local population which
wishes to keep the present open space and agricultural char-
acter.

64. Residential development on plaintiff's property at
this time would constitute a ‘‘leap frog’’ effect whereby the
development in this remote area would require the expensive
extensions of streets, sewers and other services, even though
there is an abundance of vacant land more ideally located
for such development.

Agreement That the Property Is Not Suitable for Immediate
Residential Development

65. Both parties agree the subject property is not suit-
able for immediate residential development.

Defendant's Appraiser: Assuming Defendant’ s Easement Is
Temporary, Highest and Best Possible Use Is Specu-
lative for Future Development

66. Defendant’s witness, Mr. Robert G. Hill, is by ed-
ucation and experience an expert appraiser of real estate,
land development patterns, and the real estate market in
Riverside County, California. His research for this suit in-
cluded consultation with the Riverside County Assessor,
real estate brokers, planners and planning consultants. He
has personal experience in real estate speculation and in-
vestment.

67. His opinion is that, assuming that defendant’s ease-
ment were only temporary, the highest and best use of the

ica ik

subject property is holding for speculation on future devel-
opment.

68. The bases for his opinion are the following facts
and considerations:

(a) The subject property, comprising 119 acres, is
generally undulating, with numerous outcroppings of rock -
and large boulders and washes. It has historically been
planted in barley, or grazed. It is now planted in barley.

(b) The 500-acre unencumbered tract owned by
plaintiff is zoned R-A-20, as is the subject property, but has
not been developed in any way by plaintiff since its purchase
in 1969.

(c) Development potential for the subject property
is directly affected by the economic influences of Riverside
County and March AFB, zoning and other legal restrictions,
availability of utilities, environmental controls, the prox-
imity of the March AFB ammunition storage dump and
flight operations.

(d) There is substantial commercial and residential
development presently to the east and northeast of March
AFB in the Sunnymead and Edgemont areas. Plaintiff had
developed some of these areas for residential and recrea-
tional use.

(e) Unlike the immediate vicinity of the subject
property, the Edgemont and Sunnymead areas are devel-
oping, in part, because they are near established commercial
centers, are not severely influenced by noise from March
AFB and are not near an ammunition storage agea.

(f) Market demand for commercial or residential
development of the subject property and the surrounding
area is very unlikely to arise within the next 5 years. One
cannot be specific, but such a demand is more likely in the
5-10 year period.

a, tare

69. (a) Inreaching his opinion of the highest and best
use and development potential of the subject property, de-
fendant’s expert appraiser researched and evaluated 22 land
transactions in the general area.

(b) During the period 1966-78 and continuing to
the present, the land sales market in the subject area has
been uniformly speculative. Most of the tracts have changed
hands twice or more during the period. Foreclosure actions
were filed on 11 of the 22 tracts and deeds in lieu of fo-
reclosure were given by the buyers of several other tracts.
There is a trend of residential development down along
Alessandro Blvd., from the City of Riverside, toward the
subject property.

(c) Of these properties, those on the north, or op-
posite, side of Alessandro Blvd. are more suitable for even-
tual development than the subject property. They are more
appropriately zoned, have better access, are within the Riv-
erside City limits and are not near the ammunition storage
area.

(d) Two of the sales of comparable properties were
made by plaintiff and within 2 years were foreclosed upon
by plaintiff when the buyer defaulted.

(e) The real estate market in the vicinity of the
subject property has since 1967 remained highly specula-
tive. Most properties were sold with small down payments.
Typically, buyers soon realized that the anticipated market
for development would not materialize in the near future.
Most grew disenchanted with their purchases and allowed
the title to revert to the seller, either by deed or foreclosure.

Intermediate Conclusions of Law and Fact

70. The highest and best possible use of plaintiff's land
is to hold it for speculation for future residential develop-
ment.

par ae

71. Defendant’s possession of the subject property since
1949, and its condemnations of leaseholds of the subject
property since 1962, and its intention, held since no later
than 1953, to condemn similar leaseholds indefinitely into
the future to satisfy its permanent need for a safety or buffer
zone surrounding the ammunition and bomb storage area
of the March Air Force Base, a public purpose, constitute
a taking of an interest such as a perpetual easement or a fee
for which just compensation is payable.

72. The taking was authorized.
73. The cause of action arose in 1973.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the findings and foregoing opinion, which are
adopted by the court, the court concludes as a matter of law
that plaintiff is entitled to recover just compensation for the
taking of a permanent interest such as a perpetual easement
or the fee over the land which is the subject of the case,
upon the tender to the Attorney General, in a form satis-
factory to him, of a deed to the interest taken, and judgment
is entered to that effect, with the exact amount of the re-
covery and the exact nature of the estate to be conveyed by
deed to be determined in further proceedings under rule
131(c).

aie,

APPENDIX B.
Opinion.

In the United States Court of Claims, No. 79-74 (Decided
September 10, 1980).

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United
States.

Paul J. Hall, for plaintiff; Marshall Manley, attorney of
record. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, of counsel.

C. David Redmon, with whom was Assistant Attorney

‘General James W. Moorman, for defendant. Nancy E. Stan-

ley, of counsel.
OPINION

Before Cowen, Senior Judge, Davis and Nichols, Judges.
DAVIS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: -

Plaintiff Southern California Financial Corporation sues
for an inverse condemnation of a tract of land adjoining that
part of March Air Force Base, near Riverside, California,
which is used as a bomb and ammunition storage area. The
Government’s motion for summary judgment was previ-
ously denied and the case was remanded for trial. The case
has been tried before Trial Judge Schwartz, and we now
hold, reversing the trial judge’s opinion, that plaintiff is not
entitled to prevail in this suit.'

From 1949 to 1961, the United States had possession of
the tract as a tenant of plaintiff's predecessor, pursuant to
nonexclusive leases for periods of a year or less, each lease
extendible for four or five periods of a year. All the renewal
options were exercised through 1961. In 1962, the owner
declined to lease the land at the offered rental, and so the
Government condemned a 6-months lease, extendible for

'The necessary findings of fact are contained in this opinion.

alll

periods of 1 year each. A similar condemnation took place
in 1967.

Plaintiff bought the land in 1969. When the 1967 lease
as extended expired in 1972, plaintiff would not agree to
another lease, and asked that the Government buy the fee.
The Government thereupon instituted another proceeding
to condemn a lease of the same kind as before. A defense
in the condemnation proceeding that the series of leases
amounted to a condemnation of the fee, for which full pay-
ment ought to be made, was dismissed by the District Court,
on the Government’s motion contending that such a defense
could not be raised in the court in which condemnation
proceedings were instituted.

The condemnation proceeding continued in the District
Court and culminated in a leasehold similar to those in the
past, beginning in 1972. Plaintiff brought suit here in 1974
for an inverse condemnation of the fee, or more properly,
of plaintiff’s reversion. Another leasehold, similar to those
in the past, was condemned in 1977, extendible until 1981.

The trial judge has found the following in this suit: ‘‘The
bomb and ammunition storage area of the March Air Force
Base is located in its northwest corner. The tract in question,
some 119.5 acres, abuts this corner on both the north and
the west, and serves the base as a buffer or safety zone for
the event of a possible explosion of the stored bombs and
ammunition. It [appears most probable] that March Air
Force Base, one of the oldest and largest of its kind, will
remain indefinitely a major air force base and that so long
as bombs and ammunition are used, and stored as they [now]
are, the plaintiff’s land will be needed as a buffer and safety
zone. Further, it is agreed that there are no plans to change
the place of bomb storage; the storage installation is a per-
manent one. * * * While the leases are non-exclusive, and
reserve to plaintiff the right to conduct agricultural opera-

an \, yam

tions, the land cannot be farmed with profit. Residential
development and substantially all other use is forbidden
under the terms of the leases; structures for ‘human habi-
tation’ may not be built or maintained, and gatherings of
more than 25 persons are forbidden.’’ Trial Judge’s Opinion
at 3-6.

The history of the Government’s attitude toward the
length and type of the condemnation of this land is revealing.
It is undisputed that since at least 1953 defendant has had
a need for the property for an indefinite term contingent
upon the existence of an ammunition storage area in its
present location on March Air Force Base. Beginning in
1956 the Air Force considered whether to acquire fee title
to the tract in suit, but by 1963 the acquisition of a fee had
been abandoned and it was decided to continue leasing the
land on temporary renewable terms, because leasing was
more economical for the United States—so the trial judge
has found. This decision was reaffirmed in 1967 and not
again questioned by the acquiring agency. The trial judge
found, and we need not disagree: ‘“The Government’s mo-
tive is simply economy. The Air Force, recognizing that its
need was permanent, has at times considered the relative
cost of leasing and buying, concluded that leasing would
be cheaper, and dropped the idea of acquisition of a fee.
Moreover, it is administratively easier to pay the modest
annual rent fixed in the condemnation proceedings than to
obtain an appropriation of the money to pay for a fee or a
permanent easement. Annual rents can be paid from a non-
specific appropriation for maintenance. Condemnation of
the fee or a permanent easement, on the other hand, would
require the Air Force to seek appropriation in competition
with all other capital improvements for which Congress
must be asked for money. The reluctance to seek a large

ok CO

enough appropriation to pay for the interest actually taken
is seen in the present record’’? Jd. at 5.

At the trial, plaintiff made proof that the highest and best
use of the land is to hold it for speculation for future de-
velopment as a residential area. The speculative potential
is. somewhat dubious for a number of reasons, among them
the noise of overflying planes, the proximity of the land to
the ammunition dump and the restrictive zoning, under
which residential development is not possible. But exact
value aside, the trial judge found that the use to which the
Government puts the land, coupled with the intention to
condemn an indefinite series of leases, deprives the plaintiff
of the highest and best use of the land. This, according to
the trial judge, meant that defendant had taken an interest
tantamount to a fee or perpetual easement for which just
compensation had to be made. The amount was left for
further litigation.

I.

We can assume arguendo (and without deciding) that the
trial judge’s determination of the hard facts is fully correct,
but nevertheless we cannot hold that a compensable taking
of a fee or perpetual easement has occurred. The reason
why we depart from the trial judge is that, unlike him, we
find lack of authority for the Air Force, acting by itself, to
take a fee or perpetual easement of the value involved here.

*In large part the trial judge based his conclusion that the defendant
intended a permanent taking on the following summary of a statement
by a representative of the Department of Justice at a status conference
in the 1972-73 condemnation suit in the District Court: ‘‘it was his
understanding that the United States government intended to continue
to condemn the property which was the subject of the action continu-
ously in the future in similar manner in which they had done in the past
and that * * * they had no intention to release the property to the owners
and * * * as far as they could determine, they would continue to
condemn the property in the future ad infinitum.’’ /d. at 13.

a

That authority could be given only in a Military Construction
Appropriation Act, and the Air Force deliberately refrained
from seeking such congressional sanction. There was there-
fore no authority in the Air Force to take the permanent
interest which the trial judge has found here. In the re-
mainder of this part we spell out these conclusions, step by
step.

First, it is imperative that, before a compensable taking
can be found by the court, there must be some congressional
authorization, express or implied, for the particular taking
claimed. E.g., NBH Land Co. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl.
41, —, 576 F.2d 317, 319-20 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. United
States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 771-72, 572 F.2d 786, 819 (1978);
Coleman v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1030, 1031 (1978)
(order); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct.
Cl. 129, 147-48, 550 F.2d 639, 649 (1977); Huerta v.
United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 473, 484, 548 F.2d 343, 348,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828 (1977); Eyherabide v. United
States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 606-07, 345 F.2d 565, 570 (1965).

Second, in this instance it is clear that a taking of the
permanent or indefinite character now claimed by plaintiff
would have required the specific consent of Congress under
the annual Military Construction Program.’

"The trial ‘s findings, which we adopt on this point, make this
conclusion Jan AA, slain. He found: a1
“Air Force sitions of interests in land with a value in excess
of $50,000 must ved under the annual Military Construction
Authorization Act. A ization for a hase of an interest in land
in excess of $50,000 for March Air Force Base would require the
of the intermediate command, the 15th Air Force; the SAC;
Director of Civil a sapien Headquarters, USAF; the Deput
Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources and the Air Force Council;
the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, specifically the Deputy
Assistant a for Installations; the Office of the § of De-
Office and Budget; the Budget of the President
of the United States; and ultimately, Congressional authorization

ce

Third, in seeking renewable one-year leases, the Air
Force deliberately sought to avoid the need for approval in
an annual Military Construction Appropriations Act, and
no such consent was obtained.*

Fourth, an executive agency is not authorized to take
steps resulting in a compensable taking where Congress has
refused to authorize such a taking or properly expects that
no such taking can occur unless specified procedures in-
volving Congress are followed. In NBH Land Co., supra,
the court rejected an attempt to find an implied taking where
Congress had rejected proposals to acquire the land under
the fiscal 1975 and 1976 Military Construction requests.
The court thought that, to allow judicial compensation for
an inverse taking, ‘‘when the only participation by Congress
has been to reject the acquisition out of hand, would strike
a blow at the power of the purse’’ and held that, by passing

through the annual Military Construction Appropriations Act.’ Trial
Judge's Opinion at 23,

**Processing a request through the procedure of the Military Con-
struction Program requires, at a minimum, approximately | year, When
the determination had to be made as to whether to continue the con-
demnation of a leasehold in the subject property that had begun in 1962,
it was already too late to include an a ation for purchase of the
subject property in the 1967 Military Construction Program. For in-
stance, a July 1967 purchase request could not result in authorization
for funding to purchase before July 1968."' /d.

‘Air Force acquisition of any interest in land that has a cost of under
$50,000 can be led as a minor land acquisition funded from the
annual operation and maintenance program, and such an acquisition
under $50,000 does not require authorization under a Military Con-
struction Program."’ /d.

“The trial judge found in a finding which we also accept:

“In reaching the decision in 1967 to condemn successive |-year
leasehold interests in the subject property, the Air Force considered that
the expected use of the subject yen Pater exceed a 5-year period.
The technique of condemning a |-year leasehold renewable for a 5-year
period was chosen because leaseholds are funded under annual funds
which cannot be used to enter into an obligation for longer than | year.
This procedure allowed acquisition of the subject property without in-
volvement in the annual Military Construction Program."’ /d.

-*%

sasidllii

the Tucker Act, *‘Congress did not strip itself of all control
over the obligation of public funds by land takings without
condemnation.’’ 217 Ct. Cl. at —, 576 F.2d at 319, That
case is closely germane here where the reason Congress did
not act was solely because the Air Force did not wish to
give it the opportunity to decide whether or not to take a
permanent or indefinite interest in the land. Congress and
the Air Force firmly expected Congress to consider all mil-
itary acquisitions of the size for which plaintiff seeks com-
pensation, and we cannot by-pass the congressional will
simply because the Air Force may have thought that it could
do so by condemning successive one-year terms renewable
for five years.

Fifth, it would be an invasion of the letter and spirit of
the Military Construction Program and the Military Con-
struction Appropriation Acts for the Air Force intentionally
to substitute indefinite or permanent one-year renewable
tenancies for the taking of a fee or indefinite interest costing
enough to require inclusion under the Military Construction
Program. Congress had established a procedure for the
larger expenditures which it meant and desired to be fol-
lowed. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2233a (as it existed prior to
December 1974).’ The Air Force could not attain the same
result by camouflaging a larger taking in the guise of suc-
cessive renewable leases which were not reviewable by
Congress.

Sixth, the trial judge relied on the implied authority found,
first, in decisions involving actual physical intrusion onto
or over the claimant's land (like Portsmouth Harbor Land
& Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922), and

‘This suit was brought in May 1974 and the trial judge found that
the asserted ‘‘taking’’ of the larger interest took place in 1973, within
the limitations period.

Tit. A

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)), and, sec-
ond, in cases of a taking through severe regulation or
hemming-in without physical invasion or ouster (like
Benenson v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 375, 548 F.2d 939
(1977), and Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 191 Ct.
Cl. 389, 424 F.2d 574 (1970)). Neither set of precedents
is apt. In those cases there was no congressional limitation
or understanding that Congress itself would have to consider
whether there should be a compensable acquisition of the
magnitude claimed—as there is here. On the contrary, the
takings judicially found were considered to be ‘‘a natural
consequence of congressionally approved measures’’ or
‘the good faith implementation of a Congressional Act.”’
NBH Land Co., supra, 217 Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319.
The express demand in this case that Congress consider and
authorize a permanent or indefinite acquisition of this size
makes all the difference. The Air Force was not empowered
by itself to take a fee or indefinite easement on plaintiff's
land, nor was it authorized to take successive one-year ease-
ments intending those easements to be permanent or without
limit in time. In the face of the express requirement to seek
Congressional consent in a Military Construction Authori-
zation statute, there can be no implied authority to take a
permanent or indefinite interest apart from that route.°

The sum of it is that, even accepting the trial judge’s
findings arguendo, we cannot see the necessary authori-
zation for the acquisition by plaintiff of a fee or indefinite
interest through this Tucker Act proceeding. As NBH Land

*We note in passing (a) that, unlike Portsmouth and Causby, there
was no existing physical intrusion onto plaintiff's land through Air Force
activities on adjacent March Air Force Base, and (b) that it is unlikely
that the mere danger from the adjacent ammunition dump, not involving
any existing invasion of plaintiff's land, would constitute, in itself, a
Fifth Amendment taking. See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 357,
362-66, 330 F.2d 640, 643-45 (1964).

ae eae

Company held, it is important for us to abide by established
limitations calling for congressional scrutiny of acquisitions,
and not to evade those restrictions via the Tucker Act. 217
Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319. We would thwart a specific
congressional desire if we were to hold that the larger in-
terest had been taken despite the absence of the necessary
congressional consent.

Il.

Is plaintiff left without a remedy, if the trial judge is right
that the Government’s method of procuring successive tem-
porary interest leads to the virtual use by the Government,
without proper payment, of a full-scale interest equal to a
fee or perpetual easement? We think not. Next time around
(in 1981 or 1982), plaintiff can oppose the Air Force’s effort
to obtain another group of successive one-year easements
by urging the District Court that the Government’s attempt
is not in good faith or in the exercise of proper discretion—
that the Air Force intends in fact to keep a permanent or
indefinite hold on the tract, and the method of successive
leases deprives plaintiff of just compensation. If the District
Court agrees with that contention, it should, we think, reject
the defendant’s condemnation suit on the ground that a
permanent interest is not obtainable by these successive
temporary interests and that the Government is trying to
evade the mandatory requirement of seeking and getting
congressional approval for the greater interest. See United
States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534, 536 (3rd Cir.
1957); Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305, 307 (9th
Cir. 1952); United States v. Meyers, 113 F.2d 387, 392

sities,

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706-07 (1940).’ In that
event, the Government would be unable to secure a per-
manent or indefinite interest in the land without going
through the route of the Military Construction Program. If
despite the court’s refusal to allow condemnation in the
same form as, before, the Air Force tries to implement or
enforce a temporary easement, plaintiff will have the remedy
of an injunction.* If the District Court disagrees with plain-
tiff, the latter will have its right of appeal. We do not think
that plaintiff is on the horns of an insoluble dilemma.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff is
not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.

"In the 1972-1973 District Court condemnation action, present de-
fendant moved to strike present plaintiff's defense that the landowner
may challenge the Government’s denomination of its taking in the Dis-
trict Court proceeding as a succession of one-yer easements. Unfortu-
nately, present plai” uff filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion,
and it was granted by the District Court. Present plaintiff then filed suit
in this court. But plaintiff's mistake in agreeing to the Government's
motion cannot give us authority we do not have. Nor are we estopped
by the proceedings in the District Court from following the course we
believe to be compelled by the law.

‘Ordinarily, whenever there is no authority for a taking or intrusion,
the claimant although unable to obtain compensation, can seek an in-
junction or a declaratory judgment against the unauthorized govern-
mental activities.

4%

nae We

APPENDIX C.
Order.

In the United States Court of Claims, No. 79-74.

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United
States.

Before DAVIS, Judge, Presiding, COWEN, Senior
Judge, and NICHOLS, Judge.

ORDER

This case comes before the court on plaintiff's motion,
filed September 29, 1980, for rehearing en banc pursuant
to Rules 7(d) and 151(b), with reference to the decision
entered herein on September 10, 1980. Upon consideration
thereof, together with the response in opposition thereto,
without oral argument, by the seven active Judges of the
court as to the suggestion for rehearing en banc under Rule
7(d), which suggestion is denied, and further having been
so considered by the panel listed above as to the motion for
rehearing under Rule 151(b),

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s said motion for rehearing
is denied.

OCT. 31, 1980.

BY THE COURT,

/s/)_ OSCAR H. DAVIS,
Oscar H. Davis,

Judge, Presiding

etd dice

APPENDIX D.

Complaint in Condemnation
and Demand for Jury Trial.

United States District Court, Central District of
California.

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 214.69 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of
California, Erwin P. Werner, et al., and Unknown Owners,
Defendants. No. 72-1505 CC Civil.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, United States of America,
by its attorneys, William D. Keller, United States Attorney,
Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
and Bryan N. Freeman, Assistant United States Attorney,
Central District of California, on application of the Secretary
of the Air Force of the United States of America, and by
the authority, and under the airection, of the Attorney Gen-
eral thereof, and for cause of action against the defendants,
and each of them, alleges as follows:

1. That this is an action of a civil nature brought by the
United States of America, at the request of the Secretary
of the Air Force thereof, for the taking of property under
the power of eminent domain and for the ascertainment and
award of just compensation to the owner or owners and
party or parties in interest;

2. That the authority for the taking is the Act of Con-
gress approved February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C.
258a), and acts supplementary thereto and amendatory
thereof, and under the further authority of the Act of Con-
gress approved August |, 1883 (25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C.
257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10, United States
Code, which authorize the acquisition of land for military
purposes. Funds for such purposes will be made available
by the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1973,

_-

mes). wes

or, if not enacted prior to July 1, 1972, by a Joint Resolution
of Congress.

3. The public uses for which said land is taken are as
follows: The said land is necessary to provide for the es-
tablishment of facilities for the use of the Department of the
Air Force and for other military uses incident thereto. The
land has been selected under the direction of the Secretary
of the Air Force for acquisition by the United States for use
in connection with March Air Force Base, Riverside
County, State of California, and for such other uses as may
be authorized by Congress or by Executive Order.

4. A general description of the land being taken is set
forth in Exhibit ‘‘1’’, attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

5. The estate taken for said public uses is a non-exclu-
sive term for years beginning July 1, 1972, and ending
March 31, 1973, extendible for yearly periods thereafter,
at the election of the United States, until March 31, 1977,
notice of which election shall be filed in the proceeding at
least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term hereby
taken, or subsequent extensions thereof, together with the
right to remove, within a reasonable time after the expiration
of the term taken, or any extension thereof, any and all
improvements and structures heretofore or hereafter placed
thereon by or for the United States; reserving to the owners,
their heirs, executors and assigns the right to cultivate the
land for any and all crops which may be grown thereon;
provided, however, that no structures for human habitation
shall be constructed and maintained on the land; provided,
further, that no gathering of more than twenty-five persons
shall be permitted thereon; the above estate is taken subject
to existing easements for public roads and highways, public
utilities, railroads and pipelines.

poe had

6. The persons known to plaintiff who have or claim
to have an interest in the property are those whose names
and their addresses, if known, appear in Exhibit *‘2’’, at-
tached hereto and made a part hereof.

7. In addition to the persons named, there are or may
be others who have or may claim some interest in the prop-
erty to be taken whose names are unknown to plaintiff, and
such persons are made parties to the action under the des-
ignation ‘‘Unknown Owners’’.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment that the
property be condemned and that just compensation for the
taking thereof be ascertained and awarded, and for such
other relief as may be lawful and proper.

DATED: June 30, 1972.
WILLIAM D. KELLER
United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Civil Division

BRYAN N. FREEMAN
Assistant U. S. Attorney

By /s) BRYAN N. FREEMAN,
Bryan N. Freeman

Attorneys for Plaintiff

’*%

=

perm, 7 anes

Trial by jury of the issue of just compensation is de-
manded by plaintiff.

DATED: June 30, 1972.
WILLIAM D. KELLER
United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

BRYAN N. FREEMAN

Assistant U. S. Attorney

By /s/ BRYAN N. FREEMAN,
Bryan N. Freeman

Attorneys for Plaintiff

ee ee

EXHIBIT ‘*1”’
Tract Description
TRACT D-462.

The North one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest
one-quarter. The north one-half of the South one-half of the
South one-half of the Northwest one-quarter. All in Section
16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Bernardino
Meridian, according to the official plat of the survey of said
land on file in the Bureau of Land Management. Situate in
Riverside County, California.

EXCEPTING therefrom the North 75.00 feet thereof.

Containing 55.46 acres, more or less.

TRACT D-468.

The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section
16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Bernardino
Meridian, Riverside County, State of California.

Containing 40 acres, more or less.

TRACT D-496-2.

The South 840 feet of the East 840 feet of the Northeast
quarter, and the East 1,700 feet of the Southeast quarter of
Section 17, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Ber-
nardino Meridian, in the County of Riverside, State of Cal-
ifornia.

Containing 119.23 acres, more or less.

is, ae

EXHIBIT ‘*2”’
Names and Addresses of Purported Owners.

TRACT D-496-2: Mary Hendrick Trautwein

Caroline H. Trautwein

Emily T. Stoddard

Archer I. Schweizer

Margaret T. Stoddard

Kenneth H. Colville

William T. Colville, Jr.

Jessie Colville Powell

Dorothy Colville Dann
c/o Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Attorneys
445 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Southern California Financial
Corporation

9100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1003
Beverly Hills, California 90212

TRACTS D-462 and D-468:
Erwin P. Werner
827 Broadway

P. O. Box 815
Needles, California 92563

i.

APPENDIX E.
Declaration of Taking.

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-
fornia

United States of America, Plaintiff vs. 214.69 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of
California, and Erwin P. Werner, et al., Defendants. Civil
No. 72-1505-JWC.

To the Honorable, the United States District Court:

I, the undersigned, Philip N. Whittaker Assistant Sec-
retary of the Air Force, do hereby make the following dec-
laration by direction of the Secretary of the Air Force:

1. (a) The land hereinafter described is taken under
and in accordance with the Act of Congress approved Feb-
ruary 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a), and acts
supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof, and under
the further authority of the Act of Congress approved August
1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. 257); Section 2663 and
9773 of Title 10, United States Cocie, which authorize the
acquisition of land for military purposes. Funds for such
purposes will be made available by the Department of De-
fense Appropriation Act for 1973, or, if not enacted prior
to July 1, 1972, by a Joint Resolution of Congress.

(b) The public uses for which said land is taken
are as follows: The said land is necessary to provide for the
establishment of facilities for the use of the Department of
the Air Force and for other military uses incident thereto.
The land has been selected under the direction of the Sec-
retary of the Air Force for acquisition by the United States
for use in connection with March Air Force Base, Riverside
County, State of California, and for such other uses as may
be authorized by Congress or by Executive Order.

wet ion

2. A general description of the land being taken is set
forth in Schedule **A’’ attached hereto and made a part
hereof, and is a description of the same land described in
the complaint in the above entitled cause.

3. The estate taken for said public uses is a non-
exclusive term for years beginning July 1, 1972, and ending
March 31, 1973, extendible for yearly periods thereafter,
at the election of the United States, until March 31, 1977,
notice of which election shall be filed in the proceeding at
least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term hereby
taken, or subsequent extensions thereof, together with the
right to remove, within a reasonable time after the expiration
of the term taken, or any extension thereof, any and all
improvements and structures heretofore or hereafter placed
thereon by or for the United States; reserving to the owners,
their heirs, executors and assigns the right to cultivate the
land for any and all crops which may be grown thereon;
provided, however, that no structures for humam habitation
shall be constructed and maintained on the land; provided,
further, that no gathering of more than twenty-five persons
shall be permitted thereon; the above estate is taken subject
to existing easements for public roads and highways, public
utilities, railroads and pipelines.

4. A plan showing the land taken is annexed hereto as
Schedule **B’’ and made a part hereof.

5. The sum estimated by the undersigned as just com-
pensation for the said land, with all buildings and improve-
ments thereon, and all appurtenances thereto and including
any and all interests hereby taken in said land, is set forth
in Schedule **A’’ herein, which sum the undersigned causes
to be deposited herewith in the registry of the said court for
the use and benefit of the persons entitled thereto. The
undersigned is of the opinion that the ultimate award for

a

said land probably will be within any limits prescribed by
law on the price to be paid therefor.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force, hereunto subscribes his name
by direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, this 22nd day
of June A.D. 1972, in the City of Washington, District of
Columbia.

/s/ Philip N. Whittaker
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

ails

SCHEDULE *‘A’”’,

The land which is the subject matter of this declaration
of taking aggregates 214.69 acres, more or less, situate and
being in the County of Riverside, State of California, and
in the same land described in the complaint heretofore filed
in this action, A description of the land taken, together with
the names and addresses of the purported owners thereof,
and a statement of the sum estimated to be the just com-
pensation for the taking of the nonexclusive use and pos-
session for the period beginning July 1, 1972, and ending
March 31, 1973, is as follows:

TRACT D-462.

The North one-half of the South one-half of the
Northwest one-quarter. The north one-half of the South
one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest one-
quarter. All in Section 16, Township 3 South, Range
4 West, San Bernardino Meridian, according to the
official plat of the survey of said land on file in the
Bureau of Land Management.

EXCEPTING therefrom the North 75.00 feet thereof.

Containing 55.46 acres, more or less.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNER:

Erwin P. Werner
827 Broadway
Needles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $3,396.93

TRACT D-468.

The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San
Bernardino Meridian, Riverside County, State of
California.

Containing 40 acres, more or less

ills tiie

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNER:

Erwin P. Werner
827 Broadway
Needles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $2,450.00
TRACT D-496-2.

The South 840 feet of the East 840 feet of the North-
east quarter, and the East 1,700 feet of the Southeast
quarter of Section 17, Township 3 South, Range 4
West, San Bernardino Meridian in the County of

Riverside, State of California.
Containing 119.23 acres, more or less.

NAMES AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNERS:

Mary Hendrick Trautwein
Caroline H. Trautwein
Emily T. Stoddard
Archer I. Schweizer
Margaret T. Stoddard
Kenneth H. Colville
William T. Colville, Jr.
Jessie Colville Powell
Dorothy Colville Dann
c/o Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Attorneys
445 South Figueroa Street
| Los Angeles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $7,302.84

The gross sum estimated by the acquiring agency to be
the just compensation for the estate hereby taken for the
term beginning July 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973
is THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY

NINE AND 77/100 DOLLARS ($13,149.77).

4

r *

a, ae

APPENDIX H.

Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to Strike Answer
of Southern California Financial Corporation.

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-
fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. 214.69 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situated in Riverside County, State
of California, Erwin P. Werner, et al., and Unknown
Owners, Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC Civil.

TO: ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION will not op-
pose the Motion to Strike paragraphs 3 and 5 of its answer,
the First and Second Affirmative Defenses and paragraphs
1, 2 and 3 on page 4 of its answer. This Non-Opposition
is intended to be without prejudice to Defendant SOUTH-
ERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION’S right
to pursue the issues raised in its answer in the United States
Court of Claims, or to its right to appeal.

Dated: June 7, 1973.

McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH
By /s/ ROBERT E. MANGELS
Robert E. Mangels

Attorneys for Defendant,
Southern California Financial
Corporation

aK, ae

Affidavit of Service by Mail.

State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.

I, Dee Rutherford, being first duly sworn, say: I am a
citizen of the United States and a resident of the county
aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not
a party to the within action; my business address is 3435
Wilshire Boulevard, Twenty-eighth Floor, Los Angeles,
California. On June 7, 1973, I served a copy of the within
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
ANSWER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL
CORPORATION on the parties listed below in said action
by depositing a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope with
postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at
Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

Joseph J. Weissman

Elaine Sperling

6922 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, California 90028

William D. Keller, U.S. Attorney
Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Chief, Civil Division
Bryan N. Freeman, Asst. U.S.
Attorney

1100 U.S. Courthouse

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

™

nike

Executed at Los Angeles, California, on this 7th day of
June, 1973.

/s/) DEE RUTHERFORD
Dee Rutherford, Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of June,
1973.

/s/ LOLA R. KAY
Lola R. Kay
Notary Public in and for
said county and state.

>. | ae

APPENDIX I.

Order Striking Portions of Answer of Defendant South-
ern California Financial Corporation to Complaint
in Condemnation (As to Tract D-496-2).

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-
fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 214.69 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of
California, et al., Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC Civil.

FILED: June 12, 1973.

The plaintiff, United States of America, having filed its
Motion to Strike Answer of Defendant Southern California
Financial Corporation to Complaint in Condemnation on
May 17, 1973, the defendant Southern California Financial
Corporation having filed its Notice of Non-Opposition to
said motion, and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following portions
of defendant Southern California Financial Corporation’s
answer be stricken:

1. Paragraph 3, on pages | and 2;

2. Paragraph 5, on page 2;

3. First Affirmative Defense, paragraph 8, on page 3;

4. Second Affirmative Defense, paragraphs 9 through

13, inclusive, on pages 3 and 4;

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ox, ee

5. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, on page 4.
‘DATED: This 18th day of June, 1973. _

/s/ Jesse W. Curtis
United States District Judge

~

PRESENTED BY:
WILLIAM D. KELLER
United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

By /s/) BRYAN N. FREEMAN,
Bryan N. Freeman
Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America

inl Raden

I, CARON RHODES, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or
employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my busi-
ness address is Office of United States Attorney, United
States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,
California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years,
and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for
the Central District of California who is a member of the
Bar of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, at whose direction the service by mail
described in this Certificate was made; that on June 15,
1973, I deposited in the United States mails in the United
States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles,
California, in the above-entitled action, in an evelope bear-
ing the requisite postage, a copy of ORDER STRIKING
PORTIONS OF ANSWER OF DEFENDANT SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION TO
COMPLAINT IN CONDEMNATION, addressed to
McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH, 3435 Wilshire Blvd.,
24th Floor, Los Angeles, Calif. 90010. ATTENTION:
ROBERT E. MANGELS, ESQ. at their last known address,
at which place there is a delivery service by United States
mail.

This Certificate is executed on June 15, 1973, at Los
Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct.

/s/ CARON RHODES
Caron Rhodes

74

—_Sh—-!

APPENDIX J.
Constitutional Provision and Statutes

This action involves the following constitutional provi-
sion and statutes:

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

‘*No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken Tor public use, without just compensation.”’

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. $1491:

**The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or
implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange
Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast .
Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered
an express or implied contract with the United States. To
provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded
by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and col-
lateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing resto-
ration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty
or retirement status, and correction of applicable records,

-

and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official
of the United States. In any case within its jurisdiction, the
court shall have the power to remand appropriate matters
to any administrative or executive body or official with such
direction as it may deem proper and just. The Court of
Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor arising
under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.

‘*Nothing herein shall be construed to give the Court of
Claims jurisdiction in suits against, or founded on actions
of, the Tennessee Valley Authority, nor to amend or modify
the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933, as amended, with respect to suits by or against the
Authority.”’

The Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §258a:

In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside
of the District of Columbia which has been or may be
instituted by and in the name of and under the authority of
he United States for the acquisition of any land or easement
or right of way in land for the public use, the petitioner may
file in the cause, with the pstition or at any time before
judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority
empowered by law to acquire the lands described in the
petition, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the
use of the United States. Said declaration of taking shall
contain or have annexed thereto—

(1) A statement of the authority under which and
the public use for which said lands are taken.

(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for
the identification thereof.

(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said
lands taken for said public use.

(4) A plan showing the lands taken.

iit

(5) A statement of the sum of money estimated by
said acquiring authority to be just compensation for the
land taken.

Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the
deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto,
of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said
declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute,
or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said
declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and
said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for
the use of the United States, and the right to just compen-
sation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto;
and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in
said proceeding and established by judgment therein, and
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just com-
pensation awarded, interest ai the rate of 6 per centum per
annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property as of the date of taking, from said date to the date
of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much
thereof as shall have been paid into the court. No sum so
paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or
poundage.

Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court
may order that the money deposited in the court, or any part
thereof, be paid forthwith for or on account of the just
compensation to be awarded in said proceeding. If the com-
pensation finally awarded in respect of said lands, or any
parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount of the money so
received by any person entitled, the court shall enter judg-
ment against the United States for the amount of the defi-
ciency.

Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall
have power to fix the time within which and the terms upon
which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender

an om

possession to the petitioner. The court shall have power to
make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents,
taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any,
as shall be just and equitable.

10 U.S.C. $2663:

(a) The Secretary of a military department may have
proceedings brought in the name of the United States, in
a court of proper jurisdiction, to acquire by condemnation
any interest in land, including temporary use, needed for—

(1) the site, construction, or operation of fortifi-
cations, coast defenses, or military training camps;

(2) the construction and operation of plants for the
production of nitrate and other compounds, and the
manufacture of explosives or other munitions of war;
or

(3) the development and transmission of power for
the operation of plants under clause (2).

(b) In time of war or when war is imminent, the United
States may, immediately upon the filing of a petition for
condemnation under subsection (a), take and use the land
to the extent of the interest sought to be acquired.

(c) The Secretary of the military department concerned
may contract for or buy any interest in land, including tem-
porary use, needed for any purpose named in subsection
(a), as soon as the owner fixes a price for it and the Secretary
considers that price to be reasonable.

(d) The Secretary of the military department concerned
may accept for the United States a gift of any interest in
land, including temporary use, for any purpose named in
subsection (a).

pa

10 U.S.C. §9773:

(a) The Secretary of the Air Force shall determine the
sites of such additional permanent air bases and depots in
all strategic areas of the United States and the Territories,
Commonwealths, possessions, and holdings as he considers
necessary. He shall determine when the enlargement of ex-
isting air bases and depots is necessary for the effective
peacetime training of the Air Force.

(b) In determining the sites of new air bases and depots,
the Secretary shall consider the following regions for the
purposes indicated—

(1) the Atlantic northeast, for training in cold
weather and in fog;

(2) the Atlantic southeast and Caribbean areas, for
training in long-range operations, especially those
incident to reinforcing the defenses of the Panama
Canal;

(3) the southeastern United States, to provide a
depot necessary to maintain the Air Force;

(4) the Pacific northwest, to establish and maintain
air communication with Alaska;

(5) Alaska, for training under conditions of
extreme cold;

(6) the Rocky Mountain area, to provide a depot
necessary to maintain the Air Force, and for training
in operations from fields in high altitudes; and

(7) other regions, for the establishment of inter-
mediate air bases to provide for transcontinental move-
ments of the Air Force for maneuvers.

(c) In selecting sites for air bases and depots covered
by this section and in determining the alteration or enlarge-
ment of existing air bases or depots, the Secretary shall
consider the need—

(d)

(1) to form the nucleus for concentration of Air
Force units in time of war;

(2) to permit, in time of peace, training and ef-
fective planning in each strategic area for the use and
expansion of commercial, municipal, and private flying
installations in time of war;

(3) to locate, in each strategic area in which it is
considered necessary, adequate storage facilities for
munitions and other articles necessary to facilitate the
movement, concentration, maintenance, and operation
of the Air Force; and

(4) to afford the maximum warning against sur-
prise attack by enemy aircraft upon aviation of the
United States and its necessary installations consistent
with maintaining, in connection with existing or con-
templated landing fields, the full power of the Air Force
for operations necessary in the defense of the United

States, and in the defense and reinforcement of the

Territories, Commonwealths, possessions, and
holdings.

In carrying out this section, the Secretary, on behalf

of the United States, may acquire title, in fee simple and
free of encumbrance, to any land that he considers neces-

sary—

(1) by accepting title without cost to the United
States;

(2) by exchanging military reservations or parts
thereof for that land, upon the written approval of the
President; or

(3) by purchase or condemnation, if acquisition by
gift or exchange is impracticable.

(e) The Secretary may, by purchase, gift, lease, or oth-
erwise, acquire at desired locations bombing and machine

7’?

—90—

gun ranges necessary for practice by, and the training of,
tactical units.

(f) At each air base or depot established under this sec-
tion, the Secretary shall remove or remodel existing struc-
tures as necessary; do necessary grading; and provide build-
ings, utilities, communication systems, landing fields and
mats, roads, walks, aprons, docks, runways, facilities for
the storage and distribution of ammunition, fuel, oil, nec-
essary protection against bombs, and all appurtenances to
the foregoing.

(g) The Secretary may direct the transportation of per-
sonnel, and the purchase, renovation, and transportation of
material, that he considers necessary to carry out this sec-
tion,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1255%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
