# Opposition — Nesbitt v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 984

## Text

, Rh de te 1d

No. 80-1256 { APR 17 198)
Sn. saunas —senwen ee OS

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcTORER TERM, 1980

MARIE D. NESBITT, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Wape H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

JOHN F. MURRAY
Acting Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM S. ESTABROOK
JOAN |. OPPENHEIMER
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the priority under Section 3466 of the Revised
Statutes for “the debts due to the United States” from an
insolvent person defeats the lien of a judgment creditor
under 26 U.S.C. 6323(a), as amended by the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966, where the judgment lien was filed prior to
the federal tax lien and the insolvency of the debtor, but the
judgment creditor failed to enforce her lien by execution.

(1)

os

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Opinions Below ...... ccc meccccceseeeccsecccvcees |
eer re Terre rr rrr rr rere Teer tT
Statute and regulations involved ........+.0+eeeeee: I
SIRO og nnn v cree a sstk savages spessveseweres 2
err ere rer ee ee 3
eee ree rer ee Pr rrr rT rere res ee 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust &

Savings Bank, 388 F. 2d 156 ......-- eee eeee 7
Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375,

a ee 2 Arr rerrT Ss ery cries 8
Commonwealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543.

EE Fee OF ok cc ch eae canes kde ee Ane ees 8
Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107,

6! or rE hen rr rrr? Se ere re a &
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of

Revenue v. United States, 383 F. 2d 13. .....-. 7
Decker’s Estate, In re, 355 Pa. 331.

49 A.2d 714. cert. denied. 331 U.S. 807 ..... 7-8

Estate of Adolph P. Berretta, In re,
Nos. 11, 12:¢Pa. Mar. (3, 1960) 2.006 cc ccnvees &

Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs
Mfe. Co., 246 F. 2d 141. cert. denied,

ROP Se Shs occa e ae eae as reese eras &
National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe,
i oe eee oe 8 Breer err ye 7
I]

~ PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK

as

lV

Page
Cases—(Continued):
New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 ........... 4.8
Sapero v. O'Connell, No. 799

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 13, 1981) .......... 7
Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)

NACE BES A RR Ne, Ae i BAS AR > Ne ED 4
United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 ........... 4
United States v. Gilbert Associates.

SINR ge ee ee 4
United States v. Kimbell Foods. Ine..

MEE ESE ee Be ee 5
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S.77 .......... 3-4
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S.81 ....... s
United States v. South Carolina.

Bat Oe. WOT, OT SUSI on cnccccccccceces 7
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 ....... 35

Statutes:
Act of Mar. 3, 1797. ch. 20. Section §.

DR MIRE eal ee eS ee ie eo ee 3
Act of Mar. 4, 1913. ch. 166.

REE aS ee eee 6
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Pub. |

No. 89-719. Section lOl(a). 80 Stat. L128 2... .. a

Page
Statutes— (Continued):
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.):
So : ar a ner eer: A. NY |
re ee a kn ce ea hes © oe 2 eS 07
SL I A a ae ee © ee 6
Rev. Stat. 3466, 31 U.S.C.
8 Laser a: See, Ale eae re Vea Se ee

Miscellaneous:

ABA, Final Report of the Committee on Federal

Oa) Bee re ae ee 6
105 Cong. Rec. (Index) (1959):
Lee A re aces ee oe 6
ONE Eon ah es an Caer yr a ie a ae 6
117 Cong. Rec. 1650 (Index) (1971) ............ 7
H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 62d Cong..
et ee ERE ys Fe a Tle a ee ae ae 6

H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong..
ee ee a he ee ie ee ON ware OO 6
Priority of Federal Tax Liens and Levies:
Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th

Cong... 20 SONS. (1900) occ ci ee ccc sins 6.7
S. 2497, 920 Cone... 1st Rees. (U9 1) csc cee res: 7

S. Rep. No. 1708. 89th Cong..
BSS | ae ae ere eee ea ee 6

In the Supreme Court of the Mnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1256
MARIE D. NESBITT, PETITIONER
v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 4A-34A) ts
reported at 445 F. Supp. 824. The opinion of the court of
appeals (Pet. App. 1A-3A) is reported at 622 F. 2d 433.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June
26. 1980 (Pet. App. 35A-36A), and a petition for rehearing
was denied on October 2. 1980 (Pet. App. 37A-38A). By
order dated December 15, 1980. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
extended the period in which to file a petition fora writ of
certiorari to January 23. 198t.and the petition was filed on
that date. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of Rev. Stat. 3466. 31 U.S.C.
I91 and Section 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ot
1954 (26 U.S.C.) are set forth at Pet. App. 39A-66A.

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z

STATEMENT

The question presented in this federal income tax collec-
tion case involves the resolution of the competing claims of
petitioner, a judgment creditor, and the United States,
against the net proceeds of the sale of real property of an
insolvent debtor.

The pertinent facts are undisputed and may be summar-
ized as follows: The United States assessed tax liabilities
against the debtor, Franklyn K. Brann, who died on May
26, 1976, in the amount of $89,160.06 for income taxes for
1974, 1975, and 1976, and for withholding and F.1.C.A.
taxes for the taxable periods ending December 31, 1974,
March 31, 1975, June 30, 1975, September 30, 1975, March
31, 1976, and June 30, 1976 (R. 28-30).! On September 7,
1976, January 17 and 25, 1977, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice filed notices of tax liens in the aggregate amount of
$55,872.72. Petitioner holds a default judgment against
Brann in the amount of $225,061 which she recorded on
April 28, 1976. However, petitioner never executed on her
judgment (Pet. App. 6A-7A, 27A).

At the time of his death, the debtor Brann and his wife
owned an individual 13% interest in real property. That
interest was sold pursuant to agreement of the parties, and
the proceeds are being held for distribution as determined in
this proceeding. It is agreed that the decedent’s estate is
insolvent, /.e., “insufficient to pay all the debts due from the
deceased” within the meaning of Rev. Stat. 3466, 31 U.S.C.
191 (Pet. App. 6A-9A, IIA).

Petitioner brought this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court forthe Northern District of California seeking a
determination that her claims as a judgment creditor under
26 U.S.C. 6323(a) to certain proceeds from the sale of the
debtor’s real property had priority over the tax claims of the

'“R.” refers to the record in the court of appeals.

3

United States under Rev. Stat. 3466, 31 U.S.C. 191. The
district court upheld the priority of the government’s tax
claim. After reviewing the authorities, it concluded that “a
lien, including a judgment lien, will only be excepted from
the operation of §3466 if it has been reduced to possession,
thereby divesting the judgment debtor of either title or
possession” (Pet. App. 32A). Even on the assumption that
perfected and specific liens are excepted from the rule of
absolute priority established by Section 3466 (a question
the district court declined to address), the court concluded
that “[petitioner’s] lien, not being sufficiently perfected and
specific, does not qualify under such an exception” (Pet.
App. 33A). The court of appeals affirmed for the reasons
stated in the district court’s opinion (Pet. App. 1A-3A).
ARGUMENT

The decision below correctly held that the government’s
tax claim under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes
against an insolvent estate had priority over petitioner’s
unperfected judgment lien.

1. Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, 31 U.S.C. 191,
provides in pertinent part that “[w]henever any person
indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors
or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due
from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall
be first satisfied * * *.”

The statute has its roots in the early enactments of the
Republic, /.e., the Act of Congress of Mar. 3, 1797. ch. 20.
Section 5, | Stat. 515. By its broad terms, it admits of no
exceptions in conferring absolute priority for debts due the
United States from an insolvent person or estate. United
States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357 (1964). As the Court
recently affirmed, “ ‘Lo]nly the plainest inconsistency would
warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation

of socleara command as that of $3466." ° United States v.

4

Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1975), quoting from United
States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 433 (1941). Accordingly, if
the insolvent debtor is in possession of property, the prior-
ity of Section 3466 defeats unexecuted judgment liens. As
the Court held more than 150 years ago in Thelusson v.
Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396, 426 (1817), “the general lien
of a judgment upon the lands of an insolvent debtor ts
subordinate to the preference established by the statute
unless seizure by a marshal or some other equivalent act has
made the lien specific and brought about a change of title or
possession.” New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 293-294
(1933).

Moreover, Section 3466 applies to all the insolvent’s
debts to the government, whether or not arising from taxes,
and whether or not secured by a lien. In United States v.
Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953), the Court
accorded priority under the statute to subsequently arising
claims of the United States against an insolvent debtor even
though the identity of a prior existing lienor, the amount of
the lien, and the property subject to the lien were all clearly
established. As the Court observed, “[i]n claims of this type,
‘specificity’ requires that the lien be attached to certain
property by reducing it to possession, onthe theory that the
United States has no claim against property no longer in the
possession of the debtor * * *. The taxpayer has not been
divested by the Town of either title or possession. The
Town, therefore, had only a general, unperfected lien” (/d.
at 366). Here, too, petitioner’s competing lien did not
reduce the debtor’s property to her possession. The court of
appeals therefore correctly concluded that petitioner's lien
was “not sufficiently perfected and specific to come within
any such exception [to Section 3466]" (Pet. App. 3A).

2. Petitioner’s claim to priority for her unperfected

judgment lien rests upon Section 6323(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.), as amended by the

5

Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. That statute provides that
federal tax liens “shall not be valid as against any purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment
lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the require-
ments of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary.”
Since petitioner’s judgment lien was recorded prior to the
filing of the federal tax lien of the United States, she claims
priority under Section 6323. In petitioner’s view, that provi-
sion overrides the rule of absolute priority in favor of the
government provided by Section 3466 of the Revised Sta-
tutes. In support of this argument, petitioner cites this
Court’s decision in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715 (1979).

sut Section 6323 has no application to a case where, as
here, the debtor is insolvent and the government’s claim

’ derives from Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes. Petition-

er’s claim under Section 6323 would be accorded priority if
the government’s claim derived from an after-arising tax
lien. As this Court stated in United States v. Vermont,
supra, 377 U.S. at 358, it is “quite clear that different
standards apply where the United States’ claim is based ona
tax lien arising under §§6321 and 6322 (footnote omitted).”
See also United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).

Nor does United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra,
require a different result. There, the Court held that in the
absence of a federal statute setting priorities, a uniform
national rule was unnecessary to protect the federal inter-
ests underlying federal loan programs with respect to the
question whether contractual liens arising from the loan
programs take precedence over private liens. The Court
accordingly adopted state law as the appropriate federal
rule for establishing the relative priority of these competing
federal and private liens. Here, on the other hand, Congress
has long evidenced its intention in Section 3466 to establish
a uniform national rule of absolute priority in favor of the

6

federal government for its claims against insolvent debtors.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. therefore has no application to this
case.

There is, moreover, no basis for petitioner’s suggestion
(Pet. 27-30) that Congress intended to modify Section 3466
by the amendments to Section 6323 of the Code contained
in Section 101(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125. Section 3186 of the Revised
Statutes, the antecedent of Section 6323(a), was amended
by the Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016, to accord
a mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor priority over
a federal tax lien. However, nothing in the underlying legis-
lative history of that enactment or of the 1966 legislation
diminishes the Section 3466 priority of the United States in
insolvency. H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912):
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966): S. Rep.
No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).

Indeed, Congress has refused to enact proposals which
would have explicitly narrowed the sweep of Section 3466
in the circumstances of this case. For example, in 1959, the
American Bar Association proposed a modification of Sec-
tion 3466 to protect the validity of a “lien or security interest
which would have been entitled to priority over the claim of
the United States immediately preceding such divestment
[of title or possession] (ABA, Final Report of the Commit-
tee on Federal Liens 122 (1959) reprinted in Priority of
Federal Tax Liens and Levies: Hearings on H.R. 11256 and
H.R. 11290 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1966) (hereinafter cited as “ House
Hearings”)). Although a bill to this effect was introduced in
the 86th Congress, it was not reported out of committee.
See 105 Cong. Rec. 1030, 1258 (Index) (1959). Moreover,
this proposal was again presented to Congress during its
consideration of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (see

5

House Hearings, supra, at 75-88, 196-201). Neither Section
3466 nor Section 6323 of the Code was so altered.” In light
of the statement in the American Bar Association’s Report
that the proposed provision “would assure, contrary to the
suggestions made in some decisions, that any lien which
would qualify for priority in the absence of insolvency
would continue to enjoy such priority” (see House Hear-
ings, supra, at 199), Congress’ refusal to adopt the ABA
proposal lends further support to the correctness of the
decision below.

3. Contrary to petitioner’s final argument (Pet. 17-20).
there is no present conflict of decisions with respect to the
question presented requiring resolution by this Court. In
Sapero v. O'Connell, No. 799 (Mar. 13, 1981), the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals recently concluded, in con-
formity with the decision below, that the priority in favor of
the United States under Section 3466 was unaffected by
those provisions governing unexecuted judgment lien credi-
tors under Section 6323(a), as amended by the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966. Accord: H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v.
Huntington Trust & Savings Bank, 388 F. 2d 156, 160 (4th
Cir. 1967) (Haynsworth, J., concurring). Although the deci-
sions are not uniform under the pre-1966 law.’ no appellate

7A revised version of the American Bar Association's insolvency
priority recommendation was before the Senate Judiciary Committee
in 1971 as S. 2197, 92d Cong.. Ist Sess. This bill likewise was not
reported out of committee. See 117 Cong. Rec. 1650 (Index) (1971).

‘See Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Revenue v. Uni-
ted States, 383 F. 2d 13 (6th Cir. 1967) (government's priority under
Section 3466 defeats judgment lien creditor). Contra: National Suret\
Corp. Vv. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 35, 72 S.E.2d 109 (1952); United States v.
South Carolina, 227 S.C. 187, 87 S.E.2d 577 (1955).

Despite some language at odds with the analysis of the court below in

this case, the other cases upon which petitioner relies (Pet. 19-20) are
distinguishable. In /n re Decker’s Estate, 355 Pa. 331. 49 A.2d 714

8

court has upheld petitioner’s contention that an unper-
fected prior judgment lien arising under the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966 defeats the absolute priority of the United
States under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes.4

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. McCRrEE, Jr.
Solicitor General

JOHN F. MURRAY
Acting Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM S. ESTABROOK
JOAN I. OPPENHEIMER
Attorneys

APRIL 198]

(1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 807 (1947), the competing claimants were
pledgees who, prior to the insolvency, possessed the stock which was the
subject of the controversy. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg.
Co., 246 F. 2d 141 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957). con-
cerned the competing interests of the government and mortgagees. In
both Decker’s Estate and Exchange Bank the competing claimants
arguably had attained the requisite “title or possession.” See New York
V. Maclay, supra, 288 U.S. at 293-294.

‘In In re Estate of Adolph P. Berretta, Nos. 11,22. (Mar. 13. 1981).
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by an equally divided
court a decision in favor of a prior judgment lienor over a claim of the
United States under Section 3466. This decision, however. has no
binding precedential value as a ruling on the merits. See Common-
wealth v. Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107, 364 A.2d 927 (1976): Commion-
wealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 378 A.2d 84] (1977): Commonwealth vy.
Davenport, 462 Pa. 543, 559 n.3, 342 A.2d 67. 75 n.3 (1975).

DOJ-1981-04

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1217%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
