# Amicus Brief — Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1171%3A5 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1981 - **Citation:** 452 U.S. 155 ## Text No. 80-1205 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1980 Forp Motor Crepir Company, Petitioner, vs. JANET CENANCE, et al., Respondents. Motion for Permission to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Ciruit and Brief Amicus Curiae Autmon B. McCaiium 650 California Street Suite 1001 San Francisco, California 94108 (415) 433-1894 Attorney for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association Of Counsel: Lorine E. ToccHin1 650 California Street Suite 1001 San Francisco, California 94108 (415) 433-1894 SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105 No. 80-1205 In the Supreme Court of the United States Ocroser TERM, 1980 Forp Moror Crepir Company, Petitioner, VS. JANET CENANCE, et al., Respondents. Motion for Permission to File Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit To tHE Honorasie, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME Court OF THE UNITED STATES: Pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, the California Bankers Association (hereinafter referred to as “CBA”) moves this Court for permission to file a Brief Amicus Curiae in this ease in support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cireuit filed by Petitioner. In support of this motion, CBA respectfully alleges as follows: ) 1, CBA is a trade association, and al! banks doing business in California are members of CBA, 2. Banks in California provide wholesale financing to automobile dealers and purchase retail installment sale contracts from automobile dealers covering prod- ucts sold by them. 3. These retail installment sale contracts are sub- ject to the Truth in Lending Act (15 USC, Section 1601 et seq.) and Regulation Z (12 CFR Section 226), 4. The terms of sale, price, down payment, finance charge, payment and other credit terms of installment sale contracts purchased by banks are negotiated by the automobile dealer with the buyer. ). As a general rule, banks have no contact with the buyers signing installment sale contracts econcern- ing the contract until after purchasing the contract on an assignment from the dealer who made the sale, 6. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco advises that during April, 1979, banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District purchased installment sale contracts for the purchase of automobiles totaling $312,000,000, and held a total of such contracts amount- ing to $7,465,000,000. 7. In order to purchase automobile installment sale contracts, banks need to know: (a) whether or not they are to be treated as “creditors” or “subsequent assign- ees,” (b) if they are treated as “creditors,” how they must be identified on the disclosure statement, (¢) who must make disclosures, and (d) if they are to be treated as creditors, what disclosures they must make. 8. There is ambiguity and conflict among the deci- sions of the various United States Courts of Appeals regarding these issues. 3 9, CBA is familiar with the factual and legal issues raised in this case, and believes that the decision in this case has added to this ambiguity and conflict. 10. CBA has read the Petition for a Writ of Cer- tiorari filed herein and wishes to add additional argu- ment in support of the Petition concerning the impor- tance of resolving the ambiguity and conflict concern- ing these issues. 11. CBA has attempted, but has been unable, to obtain the consent required by Rule 36.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. CBA respectfully requests that this Court grant it per- mission to file an Amicus Curiae Brief in support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The Brief, which is sub- mitted with this Motion and has been served upon Peti- tioners and Respondents, is limited in scope to setting forth the reasons why the Petition should be granted. Dated: February 11, 1981. Respectfully submitted, Autmon B. McCattum Attorney for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association Of Counsel: LorinG EF. ToccHIni IL. IIT. IV, TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Interest of CBA................c.cc.cccccssccssesecescsecseesensees 1 The Issues and Conflicts. ...0.....0..0.202...2:-2cceeceeceeeeeeeeeee 4 A. Creditor or ASSigmee ..00..00.00.000..cceecceesceseeeeeeeeeee 5) B. If Bank Is Creditor, Must It Be Identified as I oc ccniitntincsansinecneasincasssiseseessseesoosesee 7 C. Who Must Make Disclosures... 10 D. What Disclosures Must a Bank Make.............. 11 rr 13 CONCIUSION ooo... eeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeececeeeeeeceveecceeseeeceeceeceeceseeeeee 14 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CasEs Pages Augusta v, Marshall, 614 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1979)...... 9 Boerner v. Colwell Co., 145 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)........ 6 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 12 L.ed 2d Neen ns consescocedseneecnscecccenss + Cenance v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 621 F.2d 130 (5th ov oancsecnceseracececneceeeceeeecee 7 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 Hinkle v. Rock Springs National Bank, 538 F.2d 295 Ne isivsacecceesimasesnesséoveesevessusssensnseosecevecsecess 10 Joseph v. Norman’s Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86 cc cdevecencaséssvescscnccsevesscorecereceoeee 12 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 83 L.ed 888 eel sis dene ceckecénceorvccsenseccocnsccscceceness 4 Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., Ine., mae wee 202 (Sra Cir, 1976)............................0.0.20........ 11 Meyer’s v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 Neen ee a sccasesecusevwsececsveccenencee 11 Milhollin v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. ee cass ccaveencsdvassecereesocsearesesccesecesees 8 Price v, Franklin Investment Co., Ine., 574 F.2d 594 ST Boo cavoicsscsecsenccrsensecinctsecenvecoceeeceseceorececeesere 10 Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d 423 (7th Nc ccsseesusenccsssnacsssceceseres 8 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ili MISCELLANEOUS Pages California Bankers Association, Articles of Incorpo- gt SOI LEER Aa Se i ee OE EE SPILT NO Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco..................-..--+ 2 Official Staff Interpretation of Regulation Z, 41 Fed. RL ARE NAAM Se NSS re PAL Prior ROE DOS 9 Oversight Hearings on the Simplification of the Truth in Lending Act Before the Subcommittee on Con- sumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. I ecaieiiss yu scsenocuteeespiclateassgeetsoncnnetine-caraabvcnmelanconinbinti 2 Petitioner’s Petition, Appendix D 0.00.0... eeeeeeeeeeeeeees REGULATIONS SA 8) sR enn an en en 2 Regulation Z, Section 226.8(C)..............s.sccsssssssssssesssseeses 11 Regulation Z, Section 226.6(d)...............0...cssccssscsessssssssees 10, 11 STATUTES Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC, Section 1601 ......00..0..... 2 Truth in Lending Act, Sections 112, 130.......00.0000000000... 3 Hg Be A. <6. 5 Renae nee UES 5 Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Public Law 96-221—Mar. 31, 1980... eeeeeeee 5 No. 80-1205 In the Supreme Court of the United States Octroser TERM, 1980 Forp Motor Crepir Company, Petitioner, vs. JANET CENANCE, et al., Respondenis. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit I THE INTEREST OF CBA The California Bankers Association (hereinafter re- ferred to as “CBA”) is a trade association incorporaied under the laws of the State of California, Its primary pur- pose is “to promote, to provide a medium for study and discussion of problems in respect to, and to express opin- ions on questions affecting, the general welfare of commer- cial banking and trust company businesses.” (Articles of Incorporation) All banks doing business in California are members of CBA. » Among their activities, banks purchase a very sub- stantial volume of “automobile dealer paper.” That is to say, that banks, under varying arrangements with automo- bile dealers, purchase the installment sale contracts which automobile dealers have entered into with buyers pur- chasing their products. While figures showing the exact dollar volume of this financing in California are not readily available, the Fed- eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco advises that during April, 1979, banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District purchased automobile sale contracts totalling $312,000,000, and held a total of such contracts amounting to $7,465,000,000. If the average contract was $10,000, it would mean that these banks purchased 31,200 contracts and held a total of 746,500 contracts in April, 1979. The banks in California are genuinely concerned about complying with the laws and regulations governing their business and investments, and make a conscientious effort to do so. Complying with Regulation Z, 12 CFR § 226, (here- inafter referred to as the “Regulation”) is expensive. For example, General Motors Acceptance Corp. has testified before Congress that since the effective date of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC, Section 1601 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”’) and the Regulation, the company has spent more than $3,000,000 to accomplish changes to its forms. (Oversight Hearings on the Simplification of the Truth in Lending Act Before the Subecomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 558, 1978). At the same hearings the National Consumer Finance Association testi- fied that one Cireuit Court decision engrafting a new re- quirement onto the Regulation can cost between $3,000,000 and $6,000,000. 3 The complexity of the Act and the Regulation, with their many judicial and agency interpretations, makes compli- ance a difficult and expensive burden. When the court deci- sions are in conflict, compliance becomes an impossible burden. The Act provides for fines or imprisonment for willful and knowing violations and for civil liability for failure to comply with any requirement of the Act. (Sections 112 and 130). Action may be brought within one year from the date of violation, and civil liability, in the case of individual actions, is fixed at twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, with limits of not less than $100 or more than $1,000. Because the finance charge for an automobile installment sale contract is likely to be at least $500, any civil liability for each of these contracts is likely to be the maximum of $1,000. If we assume that banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District purchased 31,200 contracts in April 1979, as indi- eated above, and that in April, 1980, they purchased only half as many, i.e. 15,600 contracts, and that each of these contracts is required to and fails to disclose the purchasing bank in the manner required by the Fifth Circuit, the civil penalties, aside from the criminal penalties, on these 15,600 contracts could amount to $15,600,000. Furthermore, if this figure of 15,600 represents a monthly average of the number of installment sale contracts purchased during the past 12 months (within the statute of limitations), and if they contain similar violations, the civil penalties for an annual total of 187,200 contracts could amount to as much as $187,200,000. In view of these criminal and civil penalties, banks have the right to know what is required. On many occasions this a Court has recognized the publiec’s right to know what is required to comply with the law. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 12 L.ed 2d 894, 898 (1964), the Court held: “... We have recognized in such eases that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ” In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 83 L.ed. 888, 890 (1939), the Court held: “No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal stat- utes. All are entitled to be inforined as to what the state commands or forbids.” (Emphasis added). II THE ISSUES AND CONFLICTS These cases (hereinafter referred to as the “Cenance” cases) present four Truth-In-Lending issues faced by all banks when they purchase an installment sale contract from a dealer, These issues are: A. Is the bank a “creditor” or an “assignee” within the meaning of the Act and Regulation? B. If the bank is a “creditor,” must it be identified as “ereditor’’? C. Who must make the disclosures? D. If the bank is a “ereditor,” what disclosures must it make? Unlike many Truth-In-Lending cases where the issues deal with what is in a particular contract, these four issues 0» are present in every contract purchased by banks because they relate to the basic structure of installment sales fi- nancing and how disclosures should be made for Truth-In- Lending purposes. Thus, a uniform and logical resolution of these issues is vital and is of importance to the entire industry. Despite the urgent need for certainty and uniformity in the disclosures that must be made in installment sales fi- nancing, the Circuits are hopelessly in conflict on the above issues. The Cenance cases sharply present this conflict. A. Creditor Or Assignee In the Cenance cases the Court held that Ford Motor Credit was not a subsequent assignee. The Act itself recognizes that the original ereditor and a subsequent assignee are separate and different parties, and provides different obligations for them. Section 131 of the Act provides: “Exeept as provided in section 125(¢) and exeept in the ease of actions brought under section 130(d), in any action or proceeding by or against any subsequent assignee of the original creditor without knowledge to the contrary by the assignee when he acquires the obligation, written acknowledgment of receipt by a person to whom a statement is required to be given pursuant to this title shall be conclusive proof of the delivery thereof and, unless the violation is apparent on the face of the statement, of compliance with this chapter. This section does not affect the rights of the obligor in any action against the original creditor.” Financial institutions hav~ relied on this distinction be- tween a creditor and assignee for determining their obliga- tions and in handling installment sale contracts. The legislative history of the Act and the Truth In Lend- ing Simplification and Reform Act, (Public Law 96-221- 6 Mar. 31, 1980) dealing with the liability of assignees and Congress’s intention that assignees in typical installment sales financing transactions are not to be considered “ereditors” within the meaning of the Act, is carefully and pointedly set forth in Appendix D, at page 94 of Peti- tioners’s Petition. The difference between the roles of a creditor and a third party financing institution has been recognized by the Supreme Court of California. In Boerner v. Colwell Co. 145 Cal. Rptr. 380, (1978) the California Supreme Court stated: “. . The question before us, therefore, resolves itself to this: Does the mere participation by a non- exempt financing institution in a transaction such as that before us—no matter how well-intentioned and no matter how fully disclosed to the contracting par- ties—operate to convert what would otherwise be regarded as a bona fide credit sale (such as, for ex- ample, in the case where the builder is able to finance the sale itself without institutional assistance) into a loan subject to the usury laws? “Under the law of this and the significant majority of other jurisdictions the answer is clearly no.” (145 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390) “The role of the financing institution in transactions of this kind is basically a beneficial one, for the essence of their function is that of providing needed financial assistance to sellers unable to handle their own con- sumer financing, thus permitting those sellers to com- pete on a more equal footing with their more estab- lished competitors. While regulation of these activities is essential for the protection of the vital interests of the consumer, the Unruh and Rees-Levering Acts pro- vide ample evidence of the Legislature’s willingness to provide such regulation; we must assume that the ae ‘ lawmakers, in light of the instant opinion, will make haste to treat the narrow, perhaps inadvertently un- regulated area with which this case is concerned. (See fn.12, ante.) In any event, it is our view that the in- strument of the usury laws has no place in the field of bona fide credit sale financing, and that its use must be limited to those cases in which the record clearly reveals that the substantial intent of the parties was to effect the hire of money at an excessive rate of interest rather than to finance a bona fide sale of prop- erty. This is not such a case.” (145 Cal. Rptr. 380, 391) There is a difference between an original creditor and a subsequent assignee, and banks need to know which they are deemed to be in order to determine their obligations. B. If Bank Is Creditor, Must It Be Identified As "Creditor" There is a conflict as to whether or not a financial insti- tution must be disclosed as “creditor.” In the Cenance cases the contract provided as follows: “The foregoing contract hereby is accepted by the seller and assigned to Ford Motor Credit Company in accordance with the terms of assignment set forth on the reverse side hereof.” The Fifth Cireuit Court found that: (1) the dealer had a standing agreement with Ford Motor Credit, (2) the dealer and Ford Motor Credit prearranged for the assign- ment of the contract to Ford Motor Credit, (3) at no time did the risk of finance reside with the dealer, (4) the sale transaction was conditioned upon acceptance of the credit application by Ford Motor Credit, and (5) the credit appli- eation form was prepared by Ford Motor Credit. The Fifth Circuit Court held that: “Disclosure of Ford as subsequent assignee does not clearly identify it as creditor. Additionally, Ford can- not be both a creditor and a subsequent assignee... Accordingly, because Ford is a creditor for Truth-In- 8 Lending purposes and did not disclose that status except by reference to assignment, we hold that Ford violated Section 226.6(d) of Regulation Z...” (621 F.2d 130, 1384) In Milhollin v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), the contract had the same notice of assignment to Ford Motor Credit as in the Cen- ance cases. The Ninth Cireuit Court found that: (1) Ford Motor Credit had a program for purchasing contracts from the dealer, (2) Ford Motor Credit provided forms of credit applications, contracts and rate charts, (3) the contracts were typically assigned to Ford Motor Credit shortly after the sales were consummated, and (4) the dealer may obtain prior approval from Ford Motor Credit for customers with marginal credit ratings. In Milhollin the Ninth Cireuit Court held that: “For our purposes it is unnecessary to decide whether the identification of each creditor is a re- quired disclosure or if Ford Credit is a creditor of Consumers (Plaintiffs). Assuming an affirmative an- swer to these questions, we conclude that the status of Ford Credit, even if it is a creditor, was adequately disclosed.” (588 F.2d 753, 756). In Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1980), the contract had the same notice of assignment to Ford Motor Credit as in the Cenance and Milhollin cases. The Seventh Circuit Court found that: (1) Ford Motor Credit provided financing to dealers by purchasing retail installment contracts, (2) Ford Motor Credit pro- vided dealers with forms of credit applications and install- ment sales contracts, (3) dealers, pursuant to a standing arrangement, typically assigned executed contracts to Ford 9 Motor Credit within a few days after the sales were con- summated, and (4) dealers may obtain prior approval from Ford Motor Credit for customers with marginal credit ratings. In Sharp the Seventh Cireuit Court held that: “Assuming arguendo that Ford and General (the fi- nance companies) were creditors within the meaning of the Act and Regulation Z, we conclude that their statuses were adequately identified to the appellants on the faces of the installment contracts.” (615 F.2d 423, 426) In Augusta v. Marshall, 614 F.2d 1085, (6th Cir. 1979), the contract had the same notice of assignment to Ford Motor Credit as in the Cenance and Milhollin eases, and the facts were nearly identical. The Court held that: “We need not decide whether Ford Credit was, as an assignee, a creditor within the meaning of the Regu- lation and need not decide whether the payment cou- pon book gave timely notice, if such was required. We determine that Judge Krupansky was correct in hold- ing that the installment contract itself gave adequate notice of Ford Credit’s involvement in the trans- action.” (614 F.2d 1085, 1086). Hence, the Fifth Cireuit Court is in conflict with the Ninth, Seventh and Sixth Cireuit Courts as to how the bank is to be identified. Further, the Cenance cases also conflict with the Official Staff Interpretation of Regulation Z, 41 Fed. Reg. 41908 (1976), which provides: “Although the identification of a creditor is a required disclosure under Section 226.8(a) (Regulation Z), this disclosure does not constitute required ‘terminology.’ ” In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 63 L.ed. 2d 22 (1980) this Court held that the Federal 10 Reserve Board’s official staff interpretations are control- ling unless they are demonstrably irrational. As stated by this Court: “That statutory provision signals an unmistakable congressional decision to treat administrative rule- making and interpretation under TILA as authorita- tive. Moreover, language in the legislative history evinces a decided preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation.” (63 L.ed. 2d 22, 32) C. Who Must Make Disclosures There is a conflict as to who must make disclosures. In the Cenance cases the Fifth Cireuit Court affirmed the holding of the lower court that Ford Motor Credit was liable for all disclosure violations. In Hinkle v. Rock Springs National Bank, 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976), and Price v. Franklin Investment Co., Inc., 574 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978) the Tenth and D.C. Cireuit Courts held that the financial institution was a creditor in an installment sale transaction and that both the dealer and the financial institution must make disclo- sures under Section 226.6(d) of the Regulation. Section 226.6(d) of the Regulation provides: “Tf there is more than one creditor or lessor in a transaction, each creditor or lessor shall be clearly identified and shall be responsible for making only those disclosures required by this Part which are with- in his knowledge and the purview of his relationship with the customer or lessee. If two or more creditors or lessors make a joint disclosure, each creditor or lessor shall be clearly identified. The disclosures re- quired under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 226.8 shall be made by the seller if he extends or arranges for the extension of credit...” (Hmphasis added) 11 In Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 102 (8rd Cir. 1976), the Court found that: (1) the dealer had arranged for a loan for the plaintiff to purchase an automobile, (2) the lender (Princeton) made the con- sumer loan disclosures to the plaintiff required by Section 129 of the Act, and (3) neither the dealer nor Princeton made the “credit sale” disclosures listed in Section 128 of the Act. The Third Cireuit Court held that credit sale dis- closure should have been made, The Court stated: “Tn short, we hold that if the transaction is one in which the seller arranges credit, the obligation of dis- closure is placed upon him by the third sentence of Regulation Section 226.6(d). In that factual situation the specific direction of the third sentence prevails over the general language limiting the scope of dis- closure to items within the ereditor’s knowledge and the purview of his relationship with the customer.” (5383 F.2d 102, 105). Hence, the Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Cireuit Courts are in conflict with the Third Cireuit Court and the third sentence of Section 226.6(d) of the Regulation. D. What Disclosures Must a Bank Make The Regulation provides specific and differing disclo- sures for credit sales (Section 226.8(¢)) and for loans (See- tion 226.8(d)). In the Cenance cases the contract between the dealer and buyer purported to give the disclosures required in a credit sale transaction. Since the Fifth Cireuit held that Ford Motor Credit was a creditor and liable for all disclosure violations, it must be assumed that the Court determined that Ford Motor Credit should have given credit sale dis- closures. This would be consistent with the Fifth Cireuit Court’s decision in Meyer’s v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 5389 F.2d 12 O11 (5th Cir. 1976) where the Court held that the dealer and the financial institution are both creditors and are jointly obligated to make Truth-In-Lending sale disclo- sures. However, in Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86 (Sth Cir. 1976) where the Court found that the finance company must bear ful! responsibility for all dis- closures required under the Act, the Court held that Truth- In-Lending loan disclosures were required and said: “. . . As we have discussed, the substance of the transactions is the controlling factor. In that light, we find the arrangement a mere pretext for consumer loans which required disclosure under the Act by both the club and the finance companies. Cf. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Association v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969).” (532 F.2d 86, 93) Hence, if banks are deemed to be “creditors,” there is a conflict as to whether they are to make sale or loan dis- closures to buyers. Recharacterizing a sale transaction as a loan transaction, or a loan transaction as a sale transaction, may also cause usury and finance charge problems for dealers and banks. In order to determine if a proper finance charge for a sale or a proper interest rate for a loan is being charged, the party making disclosure must know the nature of the trans- action being disclosed. Finally there is the question of what is best for the consumer. Is the consumer best served if he receives Joan disclosure information when he thinks he is entering into a sale trans- action, or receives sale disclosure information when he thinks he is entering into a Joan transaction, or is he eon- fused? 13 Is the consumer best served when he is given disclosure information by a party he does not know and with whom he has had no dealings, as is the case when he has talked with the dealer only and has had no contact with the finane- ing institution, or is he confused? Is the consumer best served if he is given both sale and loan disclosures, or is he confused? The admonition of this Court in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, (supra) is appropriate: « .. The concept of ‘meaningful disclosure’ that ani- mates TILA ... cannot be applied in the abstract. Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between ‘competing con- siderations of complete disclosure ... and the need to avoid... informational overload.’ ” (63 L.ed. 2d 22, 33) UI SUMMARY To summarize : 1. Banks have substantial investments in dealer paper involving many transactions and millions of dollars. 2. Banks need to know what is required of them when purchasing dealer paper. 3. There are conflicting opinions among the Cir- cuit Courts and confusion as to the status and obliga- tions of banks when purchasing dealer paper. 4. Particularly, banks need and should be able to know: (A) whether or not they are “creditors” or “as- signees,” (B) whether or not they are required to be identi- fied as “creditors,” (C) who must make disclosures, and (D) what, if any, disclosures they must make. 14 IV CONCLUSION The resolution of these matters is important to banks, and CBA respectfully urges this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this matter. Dated: February 11, 1981. Respectfully submitted: Autmon B. McCattum Attorney for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association Of Counsel: Lorine EK. Toccuin1 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1171%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.