# Petition — SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY v. RAYMOND J. J. DONOVAN (Nos. 80-1155, 80-1134, 80-1170)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981

## Text

| . Supreme Court, U.S.

80-1155 la: FILED

Sat 9 198)

IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

>

SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, ef al.,
Petitioners,
—against—
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, F.

RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, and EULA BINGHAM,

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia

CARL F. GOODMAN
Surrey & Morse
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 935-7700
Attorney for the Petitioner South
Central Bell Telephone Company
and Bell System, Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JAMES A. DEBOIS
JAMES E. BARDEN
American Telephone &
Telegraph Company
295 N. Maple Avenue
Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920

January 9, 1981

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioners herein join in the questions presented in the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the Lead Industries Association,
Inc. (“LIA”), and concur in the reasons set forth in that
Petition as to why it should be granted. In addition, Petitioners
believe that the following two additional questions are worthy
of certiorari.'

1. Where OSHA has failed to explain its action in applying a
standard to an industry and, has failed to make a threshold
finding of “significant risk of harm at the workplace” in such
industry, must the standard be vacated as to said Industry?

2. Does a court of appeals have authority to require an
industry to comply with an OSHA standard during the period
of remand of such standard to the agency, when there is no
substantial evidence in the record to support the standard at
issue?

LIST OF PARTIES

The names of the petitioners or intervenors who sought
review of the revised permanent standard for occupational
exposure to lead issued by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration on November 13, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 53007-14
(November 14, 1978) are set forth in footnote 2 below.’ The

1 The questions presented herein, while relevant to some of the
Petitioners in Petition No. filed by the Lead Industries Associa-
tion et. al., do not form the main concern of most of the separate
industries joining in said Petition.

2 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC; International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America; National Constructors Association; Oil, Chemi-
cal and Atomic Workers International Union; and Cast Metals Federa-
tion (No. 79-1048); American Iron & Steel Institute, Inc.; Bethlehem
Steel Corp.; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.; National Steel Corp.;
Republic Steel Corp.; United States Steel Corp.; and The Shipbuilders

é

ii

respondents are F. Ray Marshall (Secretary of Labor), Dr. Eula
Bingham (Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health) and the Occupational Safety & Health
Administration.

Council of America (No. 79-1054); Lead Industries Association, Inc.;
Chloride, Incorporated; Standard Industries; Dixie Metals Co.; Schuyl-
kill Metals Corp.; and Bunker Hill Co. (No. 79-1078); Battery Council
International, Inc. (No. 79-1079); ASARCO Incorporated (No. 79-
1080); Southwire Co. (No. 79-1081); National Paint & Coatings Asso-
ciation, Inc. and Sigma Coatings, Inc. (No. 79-1082); PPG Industries,
Inc. (No. 79-1083); South Central Bell Telephone Co., Inc.; Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.;
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Bell Telephone Co. of
Nevada; The Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania; The Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co.; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.
of Maryland; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virgi-
nia; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia;
Cincinnati Bell Incorporated; The Diamond State Telephone Co.;
Empire State Subway Co. (Limited); Illinois Bell Telephone Co.;
Indiana Bell Telephone, Inc.; Michigan Bell Telephone Co.; The
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Malheur Home Tele-
phone Co.; The Ohio Bell Telephone Co.; New England Telephone and
Telegraph Co.; New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.; New York Telephone
Co.; Nortnwestern Bell Telephone Co.; Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Co.; The Pacific Telephone Co.; The Southern New England
Telephone Co.; Wisconsin Telephone Co.; Bell Telephone Laborato-
ries, Inc.; Transoceanic Communications, Inc.; Transoceanic Cable
Ship Company, Inc.; and Transpacific Communications, Inc. (No. 79-
1084); General Motors Corp. (No. 79-1106); Ford Motor Co. (No. 79-
1107); Chrysler Corp. (No. 79-1108); National Association of Recy-
cling Industries, Inc.; Inland Metals Refining Co.; Keystone Resources
Corp.; and RSR Corp. (No. 79-1111); Ethyl Corp. (Nos. 79-1114 and -
1145); Corning Glass Works (No. 79-1120); St. Joe Minerals Corp.
(No. 79-1121); and RSR Corp. (No. 79-1146).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Reasons for Granting the Writ... ......cccccscccscoes

THE DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW IS IN-
CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND IN THE FIRST
OSHA CASE TO BE DECIDED BY A COURT OF
APPEALS SINCE THIS COURT’S DECISION IN
AMERICAN PETROLEUM’ INSTITUTE SE-
RIOUSLY MISCONSTRUES THAT DECISION
CREATING SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY ON
ISSUES RELATING BOTH TO ADMINSTRATIVE
LAW IN GENERAL AND THE PROPER IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT. acccccisvoccesoves

A. The court below allowed OSHA to apply a stan-
dard to the telecommunications industry without
explaining its reasons for such action and without
requiring that OSHA make a preliminary finding
of significant risk of harm at the worksite in that
odo G.v ka sR neenhd ockx a hees Che ines a

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B. OSHA Failed to Demonstrate that a PEL of 50
ug/m? is Relevant to an Industry Characterized by
Intermittent Exposure, and There is no Evidence
in the Record, Let Alone Substantial Evidence, to
Justify Application of Such a PEL to the Telecom-
IS TIE 8 oc Sine dia vedbenvenitenrs.

Appendix A—Listing of Subsidiaries and Affiliates of
American Telephone & Telegraph Company

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE
AFL v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975)......... 7
ee ee es GD Fc, BOW CERISD occ cveccccccccces 7
Dry Color Manufacturers Association v. Department of
Labor, 485 F.2d 98, 105 (3rd Cir. 1973)............. 7
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246
OEE OE ee er 7
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute, 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980) .............. earn s
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)........... 6, 7
Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630
I I i oak vt ed caesavcavescecacs 6, 8

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
PTE each vaccecccccntecccacccscccec’s 8

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
Docket No.

_>

SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, et al.,
Petitioners,
—against—
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, F.
RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, and EULA BINGHAM,

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia

OPINION BELOW

The opinions of the Court of Appeals are unofficially re-
ported at 8 O.S.H.C. 1810 (August 28, 1980) and appear in the
Appendix to the petition of the Lead Industries Association
(pages la to 286a).’ The standard for occupational exposure to
lead (the “Standard”) which was issued by OSHA on Novem-
ber 13, 1978, is found at 43 Fed. Reg. 53007-14 (Nov. 14,
1978); OSHA’s preamble and explanatory text appear in vol-

3 ~The majority decision was written by Chief Judge Wright, with
Judge Robinson concurring, and is cited to the Appendix in LIA’s
petition as “Maj. Op. at ___”; the dissent was written by Judge
MacKinnon and is cited “Diss. Op. at ___”.

2

ume 43 of the Federal Register at pages 52952-53007 (Nov. 14,
1978) and pages 54354-509 (Nov. 21, 1978), and are cited by
Federal Register page and column (e.g. 52952/1).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
August 15, 1980. Petitions for rehearing were filed by National
Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. on August 29, 1980,
and, as permitted by the lower court, by South Central Bell
Telephone Co. (Bell System Petitioners), and others on Sep-
tember 25, 1980. On October 16, 1980, certain industry peti-
tioners moved for a stay of the Standard until 30 days after the
final determination of the rehearing petitions, advising the
Court of Appeals that “the industry petitioners in this action
intend to seek review by the Supreme Court in the event that
their Rehearing Petition is denied.” By order dated October 24,
1980, the lower court denied all pending motions and directed
that the mandate become effective immediately. Subsequent
applications to this Court by NARI, the American lron and
Steel Institute, LIA and others for a stay of the standard were
granted on December 8, 1980 with respect to provisions relating
to engineering and work practice controls, compliance plans,
new hygiene facilities ZPP tests, multiple physician review
procedures, signs and certain start up dates. This Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved in this case are: Sections
3(8), 4(b)(4), 6(b)(5), 6(b)(7) and 6(f) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8),
653(b)(4), 655(b)(5), 655(b)(7) and 655(f). The relevant text of
these provisions is set forth at pages 287a through 290a of the
Appendix to the Petition of the Lead Industries Association
No.

rw

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners adopt the statement of the case appearing in the
Petition for Certiorari of the LIA and other Petitioners No.
. This statement of the case is limited to those matters
which are of special significance in connection with the ques-
tions presented herein.

Petitioners herein are operating telephone companies, re-
search facilities and their subsidiaries who constitute a major
segment of the telecommunications industry. Unlike most of
the Petitioners in Lead Industries Association, Inc. Petition
No. , they are not industries with factories, smelters, or
other industrial establishments having a fixed work place.
Petitioners maintain, repair and replace the telecommunica-
tions cable which runs underground or on telephone poles in
the open atmosphere. To the extent that employees in this
industry have any exposure to lead, such exposure arises from
activities involving the handling of telecommunications cable.
Such cable is but one method by which telecommunications are
transmitted. Most telecommunications cable is sheathed in a
form of “plastic.” Occasionally a telecommunications worker
may have to perform repair operations or replacement opera-
tions involving lead-sheathed cable. The employees who per-
form such work are a highly mobile work force who move from
place to place, sometimes working at several different worksites
during the same day. Unlike factory workers Bell System
linespeople and splicers perform their services either in the
open air on telephone poles or near ditches where cable is
buried, or in manholes under the streets of cities.

During the course of the OSHA proceedings herein, OSHA
considered whether to apply a permissible exposure limit of 100
ug/m’ to airborn occupational exposure to lead. Without
notifying the various industry groups which had appeared at
the earlier hearings, and without publishing notice of the fact
in the Federa! Register, OSHA ultimately adopted a permissible
exposure limit of 50 ug/m’. OSHA purported to justify the 50

yy?

4

ug/m’ PEL on the basis of a theoretical (but demonstrably
incorrect) model which was prepared by the Center for Policy
Alternative (CPA) to predict blood-lead levels from occupa-
tional air-lead concentrations. This model, as well as all the
industrial studies contained in the administrative record dealing
with the issue of a permissible exposure limit, focused on
assumptions involving workers in a factory environment who
come in contact with airborn lead on a five-day week, eight-
hour a day basis. None of the scientific studies in the record or
any theoretical models based thereon dealt with an industry in
which exposure to lead was low level and intermittent, nor does
the administrative record contain any extrapolation of data
from the CPA model to an industry with intermittent expo-
sure.‘

OSHA issued the standard for occupational exposure to lead
on November 13, 1978. On November 14, 1978, OSHA
published the standard, preamble and some explanatory mate-
rial concerning such standard. On November 21, 1978 further
explanatory material was published. While the preamble and
explanatory material occupy several hundred pages of the
Federal Register, there is no reference anywhere in such mate-
rial to the telecommunications industry. However in a reference
in such material to an industry characterized by intermittent
exposure and a mobile work force, OSHA set forth such
characteristics as grounds for excluding the construction in-
dustry from the scope of the standard’s reach.

Bell System Petitioners herein joined with other industry
petitioners in the proceedings below challenging the standard.
In addition, petitioners argued inter alia, that OSHA had failed
to adequately explain its action in applying the standard to the
telecommunications industry and that the record failed to
contain any evidence that the standard is feasible for the

4 We do not wish to imply that OSHA properly utilized the CPA
model in connection with other industries; indeed, we would submit
that OSHA did not. We simply note here that there was no record
evidence which was applicable to the circumstances found in the
telecommunications industry.

.

telecommunications industry. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision below, recognized both that OSHA had failed to
explain its action in applying the standard to the telecommuni-
cations industry and also that the record failed to contain
evidence of feasibility as to said industry. While the Court of
Appeals remanded the standard for reconsideration on the
feasibility issue, it nonetheless held that the telecommunica-
tions industry was required to comply with most parts of the
standard during the period of remand.’ Accordingly, Peti-
tioners are presently subject to most parts of the standard.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW IS INCON-
SISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW AND IN THE FIRST OSHA CASE
TO BE DECIDED BY A COURT OF APPEALS SINCE
THIS COURT’S DECISION IN AMERICAN PETRO-
LEUM INSTITUTE SERIOUSLY MISCONSTRUES THAT
DECISION CREATING SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY
ON ISSUES RELATING BOTH TO ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN GENERAL AND THE PROPER INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE ‘OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT.

The recent activities of the American Bar Association’s
prestigious Commission on Law and the Economy attest to the
fact that our society is greatly concerned over the appropriate
role of administrative agencies in regulating conduct. With
increasing vigor, our society is demanding that administrative
agencies explain their actions. The court below, in rejecting

5 The majority of the panel below lumped the telecommunications
industry in with a group of some 30 other industries and ordered that
during the period of the remand “these industries, however shall be
immediately required to meet the PEL of 50 ug/m’ by some combina-
tion of engineering, work practice, and respirator controls.” (Maj. Op.
at 245)

6

established principles of administrative law requiring such ex-
planation, See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947), has turned back the clock of administrative democracy
and has rejected the learning of other courts of appeals specifi-
cally holding that such rule applies in OSHA standard setting.
The rejection by the court below of this Court’s decision in
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,
100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980) by permitting an OSHA standard to
remain in effect although there has been no finding that there
exists a substantial risk to health at the worksite in the telecom-
munications industry, when coupled with the agency’s failure to
explain its action in applying the standard to such industry,
brings the regulatory process into disrepute and creates confu-
sion in the courts of appeals and a conflict with the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth circuit in Texas Independent
Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (Sth Cir. 1980) as
to how to apply this Court’s ruling in American Petroleum
Institute.

The confusion created by the holdings of the court of
appeals below in applying this standard to the telecommunica-
tions industry, notwithstanding the total failure of the agency
to explain why that industry should be subject to the standard
and notwithstanding the complete failure of the agency to
make any determination that risk exists at worksites in said
industry, extends beyond OSHA standard setting. Such confu-
sion extends to all notice and comment rulemaking by adminis-
trative agencies. Given the pervasive nature of regulatory ac-
tion in today’s society, this uncertainty should be resolved as
quickly as possible.

7

A. The court below allowed OSHA to apply a standard to the
telecommunications industry without explaining its rea-
sons for such action and without requiring that OSHA

make a preliminary finding of significant risk of harm at
the worksite in that industry.

The court of appeals below, in requiring the telecommunica-
tions industry to comply during the period of remand with the
standard governing occupational exposure to lead, notwith-
standing the fact that, as the court of appeals itself noted,
telecommunications was “never even mentioned in the Pream-
ble [of the lead standard]” (Maj. Op. at 224 n. 162) has placed
itself in direct conflict with the decision of the Third Circuit in
Dry Color Manufacturers Association v. Department of Labor,
485 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1973) and AFL v. Brennan, 530 F.2d
109 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit has specifically held that
section 655(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29
U.S.C. § 655(e)) is a codification of the well-established ad-
ministrative law principle that an agency must explain its
actions. The rationale for this rule is several fold. By requiring
an agency to explain itself, an internal check on arbitrary
agency action is created, informed public criticism of agency
decisions is facilitated and an important part of the record for
review by a reviewing court is created. Dry Color Manufac-
turers Asso~‘ation v. Department of Labor supra. It has long
been recognized that an agency’s orders may not be upheld by
a court on any basis other than that basis set forth by the
agency itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra; FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972). Unless the agency’s
action can be supported on the explanation set forth by the
agency itself, the proper course for a reviewing court to take is
to vacate the agency order and remand the matter for further
proceedings. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).

Rejecting these established principles, the court of appeals
below in the name of (but as its rejections of American
Petroleum Institute shows, not in the reality of) concern for
employee health, has substituted its judgment for that of the

8

administrative agency. Congress did not provide that the court
of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should impose
Occupational Safety and Health standards on industries where
the agency itself had not made a reasoned determination that
such industries should be covered. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1977). By ordering the
telecommunications industry to comply with the standard for
occupational exposure to lead notwithstanding the fact that the
agency has never set forth a reasoned explanation as to why the
standard should be applied to the telecommunications industry,
the court below has usurped the functions of the administrative
agency and has superimposed its own will over that of both
Congress and the agency.*°

Shortly before the decision rendered by the majority below,
this Court rendered its decision in Jndustrial Union Depart-
ment v. American Petroleum Institute, supra. In that case, a
plurality of this court specifically held that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act required that OSHA must make a
threshold finding of significant risk to health at the workplace
before promulgating a standard for occupational health. In the
instant case, since the telecommunications industry was “never
even mentioned in the Preamble [to the standard]” it is obvious
that no finding as to this industry could have been made by
OSHA. The unique circumstances of the telecommunications
industry where employees are highly mobile, where worksites
are typically exposed to the atmosphere, where length of
duration of a single operation is very shor., and where expo-
sure to lead is intermittent, all command that the required
finding of risk from exposure to lead must be specific to the
telecommunications industry and cannot be extrapolated from

6 The agency explicitly excluded the construction industry from cov-
erage of the lead standard. The reasons for excluding the construction
industry apply with equal force to the telecommunications industry.
While recognizing the similarity between the construction and telecom-
munications industries (footnote 168) the court of appeals nonetheless
sanctioned, without explanation, the application of this standard to the
telecommunications industry during the period of remand.

9

generalized concepts regarding industrial uses of lead. Unlike
this Court which vacated the benzene standard because of
OSHA's failure to make this threshold finding, and the Fifth
Circuit’s rejection of extrapolation of cotton dust studies in
cotton yarn manufacturing to cotton ginning operations, Texas
Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398
(Sth Cir. 1980) the court below has continued the lead standard
in effect as to the telecommunications industry notwithstanding
this failure.

Both the Occupational Safety & Health Act and this Court’s
decision in Jndustrial Union Department v. American Petro-
leum Institute, supra, require that OSHA engage in reasoned
decision making and explain the reasons for its actions. The
lower court’s decision, on the other hand, permits OSHA to
adopt unreasoned and unexplained standards.

B. OSHA failed to demonstrate that a PEL of 50 ug/m’ is
relevant to an industry characterized by intermittent expo-
sure and there is no evidence in the record, let alone
substantial evidence, to justify application of such a PEL
to the telecommunications industry.

The heart of the OSHA standard dealing with occupational
exposure to lead is the establishment of a 50 ug/m’ exposure
limit. The establishment of such a limit was justified in the
preamble to the standard on the basis of the theoretical model
utilized by the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) to correl-
late air lead levels with blood lead levels. In upholding OSHA’s
adoption of a 50 ug/m?’ standard, the court of appeals like
OSHA relied on the CPA study. (Maj. Op. at 132-140) As both
the CPA study and the opinion of the court of appeals below
show, the duration of exposure to lead was a critical factor in
establishing the 50 ug/m’ level. Thus, “a great deal of evidence
suggests that during continuous exposure to lead the lead levels
in some organs of the body increase slowly and inexurably.”
(Maj. Op. at 133), and “relying on a physiological model. . .
CPA attempted to describe the response of blood lead levels to

10

air-lead exposure by examining the dynamics of blood lead
transport and metabolism in relation to the duration of lead
exposure and the physical properties of airborn lead particu-
lates.” (emphasis added) (Maj. Op. at 134) It is, of course,
axiomatic that inhalation, the critical factor in applying an air-
lead standard to determine bi, od-lead levels, is dependent
upon both the air-lead level and the duration of exposure. Nor
is there any question but that the CPA study dealt with an
“occupational exposure. . . presented for five successive work
days followed by two days of intake from solely non-occupa-
tional sources.” (Ex. 439A, P. 3-8) In the telecommunications
‘industry, however, exposure to lead is intermittent. This, of
course, results in a substantially lower overall exposure and
inhalation of lead, at any chosen PEL, than would a daily
exposure. Petitioners herein pointed out to the court of appeals
that, even if the CPA model were correct (which it demon-
strably was not), there was no evidence in the record which
would correlate a 50 ug/m’ PEL in an industry characterized
by intermittent exposure to lead with any selected blood-level,
and thus there existed no evidence in the record which could
justify application of a 50 ug/m’ PEL to the telecommunica-
tions industry. While the majority of the panel below “ex-
amined LIA’s major criticisms of the CPA analysis and OSHA’s
responses to the those criticisms” (Maj. Op. at 139) the panel
never considered the arguments raised by the telecommunica-
tions industry. Instead, the court chose not to “second guess
the particular way the agency chooses to weigh the conflicting
evidence or resolve the dispute.” (Maj. Op. at 139) However,
the issue presented to the court of appeals below by these
petitions was not one of resolving conflicting evidence in the
record, rather, the issue presented was whether an agency may
apply a permissible exposure limit to an industry characterized
by intermittent exposure when all of the scientific evidence in
the record utilized to support the permissible exposure limit
concerned itself with continuous exposure to lead and when
both the agency and the court of appeals below recognize that
the nature of exposure—i.e. continuous vis-a-vis intermittent—

}1

is a critical factor. In short, the court of appeals below by
lumping your petitioners with more than forty other industries
failed to provide these petitioners with the judicial review to
which they are entitled.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition should be granted,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act standard for
occupational exposure to lead, as applied to the telecommuni-
cations industry, should be vacated.

Dated: January 9, 1981

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Carl F. Goodman

CARL F, GOODMAN
Surrey & Morse
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 935-7700
Attorney for the Petitioner South
Central Bell Telephone Company
and Bell System, Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JAMES A. DEBOIS
JAMES E. BARDEN
American Telephone &
Telegraph Company
295 N. Maple Avenue
Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920

January 9, 1981

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13

APPENDIX A

The subsidiaries and affiliates of American Telephone and
Telegraph Company are:

American Bell Incorporated

American Bell International, Incorporated

/ merican Telephone and Telegraph Company of Arkansas

american Telephone and Telegraph Company of Baltimore
City

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Delaware

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Illinois

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of
Indiana, Inc.

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Michigan

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of New Jersey

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of
Pennsylvania

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Rhode
Island

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of
Virginia

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of
Wisconsin

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Wyoming

AT&T International, Inc.

Bell Telephone Company of Nevada

The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated

195 Broadway Corporation

The Champaign Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of
Maryland

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of
Virginia

_ PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK

~~ eee

4

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West
Virginia

Cincinnati Bell, Incorporated

Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company

The Diamond State Telephone Company

East Pittsburgh Telephone Company

Eastern Telephone and Telegraph Company (Canada)

Empire City Subway Company (Limited)

Illinois Bell Telephone Company

Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated

Malheur Home Telephone Company

Manufacturers’ Junction Railway Company

Michigan Bell Telephone Company

The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company

Muberta Development Company

Nassau Recycle Corporation

New England Telephone and Telegraph Company

New Jersey Bell Telephone Company

New York Telephone Company

Northwestern Bell Telephone Company

The Ohio Bell Telephone Company

The Ohio Telephone and Telegraph Company

Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company

The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company

Sandia Corporation

South Central Bell Telephone Company

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company

The Southern New England Telephone Company

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company of Arkansas

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Oklahoma)

Teletype Corporation

Teletype International Sales Corporation

Texas Compensation Insurance Company

Transoceanic Cable Ship Company, Incorporated

Transoceanic Communications, Incorporated

15

Transpacific Communications, Incorporated
Western Electric Company, Incorporated
Western Electric Company, Limited (London)
Western Electric International, Incorporated
Wisconsin Telephone Company

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1125%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
