# Petition — Drummond v. Stahl > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1107%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1981 - **Citation:** 450 U.S. 967 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S, rtiLe @ 80-113¢ JAN 6 1981 MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1980 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Petitioner, VS. LOUIS A. STAHL and MARY K. STAHL, Husband and Wife and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON & FRENCH, a Professional Association, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA DonaLp R, Kunz (Counsel of Record) 3003 North Central Avenue Suite 2600 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Counsel for Petitioner E. L. Menpenwatt, Ixc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030 THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This petition requests the Court to review two sep- arate questions. Can a state, consistently with the due process require- ments of the Fourteenth Amendment, confer on a lawyer “absolute” privilege to file charges of unethical conduct against another lawyer (his litigation opponent) which were concededly groundless and which were made for the concededly malicious purpose of delaying the litigation: Question 1—where the charges were made to the bar association? Question 2—where the charges are made to the court in which the litigation was pending? The effects of the mere acts of filing of these two sep- arate charges—without regard to their merits—were: (a) to deprive the accused lawyer’s client of his ex- perienced, knowledgeable counsel in the midst of major litigation; and (b) to deprive the accused lawyer of his long-time, very valuable client without any remedy what- ever for this injury. By a 3-2 split decision,* the Supreme Court of Arizona has refused to review these questions. *A. 23. Il THE PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner Drummond and Respondent Louis A. Stahl are practicing lawyers, both members of the State Bar of Arizona. Respondent Streich, Lang, Weeks, Cardon & French, P.A., is the law firm of which Stahl is a partner. Respondent Mary K. Stahl is the wife of Louis Stahl and is joined only as a member of that marital community. The State Bar of Arizona filed an amicus curiae brief below, but was not a party to the proceedings. Ii TABLE OF CONTENTS PETITION—- The Questions Presented for Review ..............:-....-. I The Parties to the Proceeding ....................:.:s0sssese0-- II MI OE FARA ong ane sese cesses conics ibilabuidaside IV ee Re Eee 1 Statement of Jurisdiction ......22.....2.......ccccoceccssocesese 2 The Constitutional Provisions Involved ................ 3 ONIN OE IN naan cseasn ssn ss ctssheninenenerancocs 3 Reasons for Granting the Writ 20000000... 9 I RR aac n OR Se Sk Rac OL ERR EI 14 APPENDIX— TN a ee he Al Other Orders Below and Excerpts Showing How Constitutional Questions Were Raised and De- Ne cscs cls doasasasien teachin tas esesceeictediaeenciissoscutcncsioaslvaaides Al0 a EEE MET REE EE Al0 Motion for New Trial (Excerpt) 2.0.0.0... All Order Denying New Trial .....0.0..0.0...........ccese0e- Al2 Appellant’s Opening Brief (Excerpt) .............. Al13 Appellant’s Reply Brief (Excerpt) .................. Al7 Opinion Below (Excerpt) ..............:cccececcssesseeeeeees Alg Motion for Rehearing (Excerpt) 0.000000... A20 Order Denying Rehearing ....00...............escssce- A22 Order Denying Review ....0..........:.ccccccccceccsseceeeeee A23 OE ihc eskiic itis ostincaniietititanendaaints seek cent A24 Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved .... A25 IV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 2 Angle v. Chicago St. M. & O. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 ........ 9 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 ............ 14 Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage MT, I is Uy UO acne cccsectccccsecntceccssccereeye 9 Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326-0... 9 Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426 0000... 9 Kelly v. Perry, 111 Ariz. 382, 531 P.2d 139 ............ 11 Middleton v. Wallichs Music & Entertainment Co., Inc., 24 Ariz.App. 180, 536 P.2d 1072 (1975) ........ 9 Ue hy, I OT, TI encase cates ccscieccneceencee 10 Republic National Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. EE SOE ES LOT ARNEL eee TA Re 3 Saf-Gard Products, Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 532 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.den. 429 U.S. 896 4 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 .o......n.n..-ncccccescceseseceeee 10 Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz.App. 149, 481 P.2d 519... 11 Zecen ©. Arizona, 419 U.S, 361 ................................... 3 Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Department, ‘ 119 Ariz. 243, 580 P.2d 704 (1978) 200. 9 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 0.000.000.0000... 3, 7,9 STATUTES es 2 SERRE i nae aaa 2 Re CD ova crecshncnceesssvquseissocundicciisecaestie 2 I Nat dcotesthabesioncnnonsusscessteicidessesnisinesnn 2 OTHER AUTHORITIES 12 Moore on FEDERAL PrRacTIcE— 1508.01[3] Ce RI, i oiciealiiceinains Rest. (2d) Torts §587 | __, RRCaeT : In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1980 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Petitioner, VS. LOUIS A. STAHL and MARY K. STAHL, Husband and Wife and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON & FRENCH, a Professional Association, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA William H. Drummond, your Petitioner, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona expressed in its man- date issued October 24, 1980, in the above-entitled case. THE OPINION BELOW The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona has not been reported but is set forth in the Ap- pendix, pp. Al-9. Og STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona has original jurisdiction of all civil appeals from the state’s trial court of original jurisdiction, the Superior Court. On appeal from the Superior Court, the Court of Appeals entered its decision adverse to Petitioner on August 19, 1980. A timely Motion for Rehearing? was denied* on September 24, 1980. Petitioner then filed a timely Petition for Review‘ in the Supreme Court of Arizona. By a 3-2 decision, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 15, 1980.° The Court of Appeals then issued its mandate on October 24, 1980.° This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 United States Code §1257’ to review the judgment below, in that: (a) The Court of Appeals is the “highest court” of Arizona “in which a decision could be had”, since the Supreme Court of Arizona denied review (Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209; 12 Moore on FepERAL Practice {/509.01) ; (b) the mandate of the Court of Appeals is a “final judgment” since it effectively determines this liti- gation, leaving nothing to be decided in the Arizona courts (12 Moore on FepERAL Practice {[508.01[3] ) and nothing remains to be done there except the ministerial act of entry of judgment on the man- ARS §12-120(A) (A25); ARS §12-120.21(A)(1) (A26). ARS §12-120.24 (A26). A22. ARS §12-120.24 (A26). A23. A24-25. A27, —~FFrPPre 3 date (Republic National Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62); and (c) Petitioner’s privileges and immunities under the Constitution, set up and claimed in this petition, were set up and claimed at every stage of the pro- ceedings below (Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351; 12 Moore on FEDERAL Practice 510.01). THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED This case involves the application of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Preface This is not a libel, slander or defamation case. Pe- titioner’s cause is based on Respondent’s acts of initiating court and bar association proceedings and the effects of these acts on Petitioner’s pocketbook, not upon his profes- sional or personal reputation. The wider effects of Respon- dent’s acts are felt in the public arena—the proper and efficient administration of the judicial system. 7% 4 Stahl’s Groundless Acts and Their Effects Drummond and Stahl are lawyers who were opponents in a major lawsuit. In the midst of this litigation, Stahl did two things: (1) he filed conflict of interest charges against Drummond with the State Bar of Arizona, and (2) he moved the court in which the case was pending to disqualify Drummond as counsel for plaintiff. Each of these acts had two effects: the litigation came to a complete halt, costing Drummond’s client over $100,000 in lost income, and Drummond lost his valuable client of many years. The charges filed by Stahl were investigated by the State Bar of Arizona and found to be groundless. In fact, the way this case comes up,® Stahl’s acts must be taken here as malicious, taken for the totally improper purposes of delaying the pending litigation by depriving Drum- mond’s client of his knowledgeable, experienced attorney, at the very time he was most needed. Background Facts Drummond, a registered patent attorney, had repre- sented a talented inventor,® Walter Avrea, for many years until the events of 1976-77 which precipitated this case. In 1975, Drummond represented Avrea in negotiating a major contract with Saf-Gard Systems, Inc., to com- mercially exploit all of Avrea’s patented inventions. Saf- Gard requested Drummond to represent both Avrea and Saf-Gard in litigation involving infringement of these patents by others. Drummond agreed to represent both 8. A2. 9. See, eg., Saf-Gard Products, Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 532 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.den. 429 U.S. 896. 5 Avrea and Saf-Gard, but only after the potential for a con- flict of interest was discussed and resolved and only after Saf-Gard, separately represented, agreed that if a conflict did arise, Drummond would continue to represent Avrea, his long-time client. In 1976, the conflict arose. For reasons not material here, Drummond filed a suit on Avrea’s behalf against Saf-Gard. This suit involved the title to the Avrea patents which Drummond was also attempting to enforce on behalf of both Avrea and Saf-Gard in the infringement litigation with third parties. Stahl appeared as attorney for Saf- Gard in the action filed by Drummond involving the title question. Several months after Drummond filed the Avrea v. Saf- Gard suit, Drummond noticed the deposition of the owner- president of Saf-Gard. Only then did Stahl first raise the question of Drummond’s supposed conflict of interest. He threatened that, unless Drummond immediately with- drew as Avrea’s attorney in the title litigation, he (Stahl) would file charges of unethical conduct with the Bar and with the court. Stahl, though new on the scene, declined Drummond’s invitation to first discuss the matter and filed (1) charges with the Bar Association, and (2) a mo- tion in the court to disqualify Drummond as Avrea’s at- torney. The Bar thoroughly investigated Stahl’s charges and “concluded that there was no conflict of interest and the Bar found no probable cause to proceed against Drum- mond”.'® But, in the meantime, Stahl’s tactics were suc- cessful: Avrea’s litigation with Saf-Gard was stalled and he lost his royalty income. As Avrea put it: A. (Mr. Avrea) That regardless of whether there was any conflict of interest or not, I think you 10. Ad4. 6 and I discussed it, it allowed them to delay us eight or ten months without being able to proceed and get back my only source of income as my patents. I believe that eight or ten month delay cost us well over $100,000 income from those patents. I think you realize that. I think the expense of having to go through and bring some- body else up to date while the Arizona Bar As- sociation was hearing this conflict charge, that I had to pursue and I had to start from ground zero and educate people of the things that hap- pened over a period of time when you were my representative whereas all this time I counted on you being there because you were present in all these meetings and see the negotiations in the various things. Q. (Mr. Drummond) When you say bring other peo- ple up to date, you mean other attorneys? A. Replacement counsel, yes, and as I say, losing eight or ten months while the Arizona Bar de- cided what in the hell to do. Because of this delay, Avrea was forced to obtain other counsel to continue the litigation and, as a direct consequence, his attorney-client relationship with Drum- mond, which had existed for many years, was destroyed. History of This Litigation After Drummond lost his long-time client, he filed this action against Stahl in the state courts of Arizona. The suit alleged that Stahl tortiously interfered with the at- torney-client contractual relationship between Drummond and Avrea, that Stahl’s acts were malicious and that these acts were the direct and proximate cause of the destruction 7 of the contractual relationship between Drummond and his client. Stahl moved for summary judgment, claiming ‘“abso- lute privilege”. Drummond resisted this motion on the ground that Stahl’s acts were, at most, conditionally priv- ileged and that such conditional privilege required the trier of fact to determine Stahl’s state of mind, a fact placed in sharp dispute by the motion papers and Drummond’s re- sponse. The trial court granted summary judgment," denied a new trial’* and Drummond appealed to the Court of Ap- peals for the State of Arizona. In this appeal, Stahl and the State Bar of Arizona, amicus curiae, argued that he was en- titled to “absolute privilege”. Drummond argued (1) that the privilege, if any, was “conditional”, (2) that summary judgment was inappropriate in view of the sharp dispute as to Stahl’s state of mind, and (3) that if the court ignored Stahl’s state of mind and applied “absolute privilege” in the face of malice, this‘would violate Drummond’s privilege against deprivation of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals" applied “absolute privilege” to b. th of Stahl’s acts, the bar complaint’ and the motion in court to disqualify Drummond,"* notwithstanding that mal- ice was assumed as a fact. In his motion for rehearing, Drummond specifically pointed out that the Court of Ap- peals had erred on the Constitutional question."* The Court 11. Alo. 12. Al2. 13. Al-9. 14. Av. 15. Aé6. 16. A20. 8 of Appeals denied Drummond’s motion for rehearing.” A petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court of Ari- zona, which considered the matter on the basis of the record before the Court of Appeals,’* which included Drummond’s motion for rehearing which had emphasized the Constitu- tional issue. By a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Arizona de- nied review.’® The Court of Appeals then issued its man- date” directing entry of judgment against Petitioner. Statement Under Rule 21.1(h) Petitioner raised the federal questions on which he seeks this review, as follows: (1) in the court of first instance, by a timely Motion for New Trial,” which was denied;”? (2) in the intermediate Court of Appeals, by arguments in Appellant’s Opening Brief*® and in Appellant’s Reply Brief** which were rejected in the opinion below** and by a timely Motion for Rehearing” which was denied;”" and (3) in the Supreme Court of Arizona, by a timely Peti- tion for Review, which was denied.”8 17. A22. 18. A23. 19. A23. 20. A24, 21. All. 22. Al2. 23. A13-16 24. A17-18 25. Al1-9. 26. A20. 27. A22. 28. Ad23. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT Background Principles The law has historically provided a cause of action for damages for tortious interference with contract rela- tionships (Angle v. Chicago, St. M. & O. Ry., 151 U.S. 1) and such an action is routinely recognized under Arizona law (Middleton v. Wallichs Music & Entertainment Co., Inc., 24 Ariz.App. 180, 536 P.2d 1072 [1975]). Constitutional Principles A cause of action is “property” under the Fourteenth Amendment which is beyond the power of the state to take without due process of law. Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426 (cause of action for amount due under con- tract)s Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage District, 258 U.S. 338, 339 (cause of action for tolls unlaw- fully collected under state statute); Angle v. Chicago, St. M. & O. Ry., supra, 151 U.S. at 25-26 (cause of action for tortious interference with contract). The Constitution does not require a state to provide a damaged party any particular remedy for a cause of action, nor does it require that a state provide any particular pro- cedure to obtain that remedy, but the Fourteenth Amend- ment does guarantee the preservation of some substantial right to redress by some effective procedure (Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326) or, as the Arizona Supreme Court, sitting in banc, said (following Gibbes): “an efficacious remedy.” (Emphasis added). (Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Department, 119 Ariz. 243, 580 P.2d 704 [1978]). 10 The Private Effect of the Decision Below The State of Arizona, through “state action” by its courts (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1; Paul v. David, 424 U.S. 693) has violated this fundamental tenent of Constitu- tional law by judicially conferring absolute privilege on Stahl, depriving Dr«mmond of any remedy whatever in any forum under any process of law under any conceivable state of fact. The Public Effect of the Decision Below The “public policy” reasons advanced by the court be- low for conferring this “absolute privilege” are so shallow as to be “all surface”, and we respectfully submit, are legally unsound and factually uncompelling. The result of the holding below will not subserve but will actually sub- vert strong public interests. The Decision and Its Ramifications in Litigation The present decision of the court below announces two new “rules of the road” in litigation practice. The first new rule says that an attorney can, with impunity, without any truthful cause, in violation of his sworn duty as an officer of the Court, and directly con- trary to both Federal and State Rule 11(a) of Civil Pro- cedure, delay any court proceeding by the simple device of moving the court to disqualify opposing counsel on false allegations of conflict of interest. He is “absolutely privileged” to do this. To reach this result, the court below had to abolish the distinction between wholly different causes of action (i.e., defamation, on the one hand, as against tortious inter- ference on the other hand) which has been recognized 11 in Arizona” and by the REesTaTEMENT® for decades and which has been recognized at common law for perhaps centuries. The court below recognized the distinction but dismissed it with the following few words: “Although these Arizona cases*' (involving libel and slander) do not directly involve a case of tortious interference ... (they) control the disposition of this case.” (A6, paraphrased) The second new rule says that an attorney who is schooled in, tested by bar examination upon, and expected to thoroughly understand the principles of legal ethics can, with impunity, knowingly and for improper purposes, file false charges of unethical conduct with the state bar against his litigation opponent, cause the most significant professional and financial damage to his fellow lawyer, and, most importantly, effectively deprive the opposing party of his experienced, long-time counsel! Again, he is “absolutely privileged” to do this, and neither the lawyer thus accused nor the client thus deprived has any remedy! This second new rule of the “litigation road” is again based on the abolition of the previously clear distinction between a cause of action for defamation and a cause of action for tortious interference and upon the further ground of “public policy”. 29. Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz.App. 149, 481 P.2d 519, cited with approval by the Arizona Supreme Court in Kelly v. Perry, 111 Ariz. 382, 531 P.2d 139. 30. The RESTATEMENT provides absolute privilege for de- famatory statements in court proceedings [REST. (2d) Torts §587] but only a conditional privilege for “wrongful institution of pro- ceedings” [ResT. (2d) Torts §674]. 31. All of the other cases from other jurisdictions cited in the decision below are, similarly, libel and slander cases rather than cases dealing with tortious interference or wrongful insti- tution of proceedings, civil malicious prosecution, etc. Ls 12 The “public policy” argument (advanced by the State Bar of Arizona as amicus curiae and adopted by the court below) is an abject confession of the inability or the failure of the court below to distinguish between “conditional” and “absolute” privilege—concepts which are routinely ap- plied when the litigants are private parties—when the litigation instead involves lawyers. The second new rule goes far beyond what is required to avoid “chilling” effects and even further beyond what is required to enable the bar to - “continue to enjoy the privilege of a self-regulating profession.” (A8) An “absolute” privilege may need to be extended, as we acknowledged below, to complaints by laymen—but why to lawyers? Are not lawyers to be held to the highest standards, in view of the powers which their privileges as lawyers entitle them to wield? And if that be true, despite those privileges as lawyers, are lawyers then simply to be “lumped together” with the “general public” so far as immunities are concerned? The State Bar of Arizona, in its brief amicus curiae below, urged just that: “We are not concerned with just the immunity of lawyers but of the public generally, of which the lawyers constitute but a small part.” (Emphasis added) The court below agreed with the position of amicus curiae by drawing no distinction between a lawyer, on the one hand, and the “general public” on the other hand, thus conferring upon lawyers the same immunities belonging to the general public. We respectfully disagree with that premise. It is just plain wrong for lawyers, as a class, to claim the powers of that class, which in no sense are enjoyed by the general public, but then to attempt to seek the immunities of the “general public” when called to account for the wrongful exercise of those powers. 13 The public will not be the beneficiary of these two new rules. Instead, it will be the marginal lawyer, who is not ready for trial (or would simply like to compel a change of opposing counsel) or the marginal client, whose only hope is delay, who will benefit. The public will pay, not benefit, from these delays.** These new rules unquestionably invite delay with its increased litigation costs and invite congestion of court calendars and thereby would discourage and defeat the right of the public to ready, speedy access to our courts, and to the services of the attorney of one’s own choosing. Surely the legal profession is not so ineffective in dealing with itself that it cannot fashion rules of conduct for lawyers which will not invite such consequences. The answer, as to lawyers, is clear and apparent: It is conditional privilege. If the delays, increased cost and congestion of litigation calendars invited by the decision below are to be avoided, considerations of sound public policy dictate that counsel who wrongfully utilize court and bar association procedures for such delay be held personally accountable for the damage they cause, a result which can only be reached if conditional privilege is ap- plied. The court below has decided specific, important ques- tions of federal Constitutional law. In so deciding, the court below ignored applicable decisions of this Court be- 32. Report of Bar Counsel to the State Bar of Arizona: “One cannot avoid considering the interest of Avrea [Drum- mond’s client in the case in which Drummond’s disqualifi- cation was urged] in this situation. For many years, he had relied on the advice and guidance of Drummond. He undoubtedly believed that Drummond was his attorney throughout the period of his association with Systems. He should not be told to abandon him and seek other counsel unless strong and compelling reasons under the Code of Pro- fessional Responsibility can be found.” (Emphasis ours) 14 cause, factually, they were not squarely on point. These federal questions should be settled by this Court because (1) this Court has not decided these questions, (2) there is a split of authority among the courts of last resort of the States on these questions (A8), (3) the decision below does not even satisfactorily resolve these questions in Arizona, due to the split 3-2 decision (A23) of the Arizona Supreme Court not to review the decision of the inter- mediate Court of Appeals, and (4) wholly aside from the private effect on petitioner’s constitutional rights, the decision below has broad and unfortunate implications in the public arena which is the direct responsibility of this Court— the effective, timely and efficient administration of the judicial system. CONCLUSION We urge that the court below glossed over and erred on a basic Constitutional issue dressed in the sheep’s cloth- ing of a mere “private” issue. Legally, it is no answer that private interests must give way to “public policy” when the private interests are Constitutionally guaranteed. And, practically, the protection of private Constitutionally guaranteed interests has a curious way of turning out to be the best way of protecting the public interest. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350. We respectfully urge the Court to grant this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. DonaLp R. Kunz 3003 N. Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Counsel for the Petitioner Al APPENDIX THE OPINION BELOW (Filed August 19, 1980) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE 1 CA-CIV 4531 DEPARTMENT C WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, V. LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STRETCH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a Professional Association, Defendants-Appellees. OPINION An Appeal from the Maricopa County Superior Court Cause No. C-362697 The Honorable Rufus C. Coulter, Jr., Judge AFFIRMED OGG, Chief Judge The appellant/plaintiff, William H. Drummend, brought suit in the Maricopa County Superior Court alleg- ing a tortious interference by the appellees/defendants with an attorney-client contractual relationship of which Drummond, as a practicing member of the State Bar of Arizona, was the beneficiary. Drummond asserts the ele- A2. ments of such a cause of action are set forth in the case of Middleton v. Wallich’s Music & Entertainment Company, Inc., 24 Ariz.App. 180, 536 P.2d 1072 (1975). The defen- dant, Louis A. Stahl, is also a practicing member of the State Bar of Arizona. The remaining defendants are Stahl’s law firm, a professional association, and his wife. After all pleadings were filed, the trial judge granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and plaintiff filed this appeal. The State Bar of Arizona was granted permission by this court to file an Amicus Curiae brief and participate in oral argument of this appeal. Drummond sets out the two threshold issues to be de- termined a:: 1. Are Stahl and his law firm “absolutely privileged” to institute disqualification proceedings in the trial court to prevent Drummond’s further participation in pending civil litigation? 2. Are Stahl and his law firm “absolutely privileged” under the facts of this case to file charges of un- ethical conduct against Drummond with the State Bar of Arizona? In this appellate review of the summary judgment, we must view the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the appellant. Poggi v. Kates, 115 Ariz. 157, 564 P.2d 380 (1977); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975). Viewing the evidence in such a manner, it appears that Drummond was hired as a patent attorney by Walter C. Avrea and had a contractual attorney-client relationship with Avrea dating back to 1965. Drummond also represented both Avrea and a corporation, known as Saf-Gard Systems, Inc., in protecting Avrea’s inventions which were licensed to Saf-Gard, and in certain other patent infringement actions A3 where Avrea and Saf-Gard had similar interests. Drum- mond’s representation of both Avrea and Saf-Gard was undertaken only after the possibility of a future conflict of interest was discussed by all parties and their attorneys. It was determined there was no conflict of interest in these limited areas, and if a conflict of interest did arise between Avrea and Saf-Gard, that Drummond would continue to represent his old client, Avrea. On February 25, 1976, Drummond filed a Maricopa County Superior Court action on behalf of Avrea and others against Saf-Gard and others. On May 13, 1976, Stahl, representing Saf-Gard, notified Drummond’s office by a hand-delivered letter that Drummond must withdraw as Avrea’s attorney on the ground of a conflict of interest with Saf-Gard. The letter further notified Drummond that unless he withdrew from the litigation, Stahl would file charges of unethical conduct against him with the State Bar of Arizona. According to Stahl’s affidavit, this letter had been prompted by notification to Stahl by Saf- Gard that Drummond had previously represented Saf-Gard and possessed confidential information that would be de- trimental to Saf-Gard in the pending litigation with Avrea. Before responding to Stahl’s letter, Drummond filed a complaint against Stahl with the State Bar of Arizona and enclosed a copy of such complaint along with his reply letter which stated: “If you want to go ahead and file the complaint, be my guest. However, if you have any interest in confirming whether you have all of the facts, please “call me and we can arrange a time for you to confer with me before taking precipitous action.” When Drummond failed to withdraw as requested, Stahl did not further contact Drummond, but proceeded to A4 file a complaint with the State Bar of Arizona. Stahl also filed a superior court motion to compel Drummond to with- draw from the pending Avrea v. Saf-Gard litigation. There- after Drummond withdrew from representing Saf-Gard in two pending patent infringement actions against third parties, while continuing his representation of Avrea. While the Stahl complaint was pending, Drummond was requested by Saf-Gard to perform certain patent services in other cases which were in fact performed. Sometime later he withdrew from all representation of both Avrea and Saf-Gard. Upon stipulation of counsel, Stahl’s superior court motion to disqualify Drummond was post- poned indefinitely. It appears that prior to Stahl’s complaint with the Bar Association, Drummond had always had a good attorney- client relationship with Avrea, although Avrea owed him substantial unpaid attorney fees. The Stahl complaint and motion caused Avrea delay in his litigation while the State Bar of Arizona investigated the complaint. Because of this delay, Avrea requested that Drummond withdraw as his counsel so that new counsel could be retained to recommence the diligent prosecution of the case. After many months, with no payments on Avrea’s past-due balance, Drummond filed an action to recover past-due attorney fees and expenses. The Drummond complaint against Stahl was dis- missed by the State Bar. The Stahl conflict of interest complaint against Drummond was investigated by counsel for the Arizona State Bar. The Bar counsel concluded that there was no actual conflict of interest and the Bar found no probable cause to proceed against Drummond. In an affidavit filed by counsel for the State Bar of Arizona, the following pertinent conclusions were found: A5 “3. In the course of my investigation as bar counsel, I discussed Mr. Stahl’s complaint with Mr. Stahl and Mr, Jock Patton of Mr. Stahl’s firm. Based upon such discussions and my review of those docu- ments and materials which I considered material and relevant to the complaint, it is my opinion that Mr. Stahl’s complaint was brought in good faith. 4. Based upon my efforts in connection with my activities as bar cuonsel, including both legal and factual analysis, Mr. Stahl’s complaint was not frivo- lous. It is my opinion that reasonable minds of the bar could differ as to whether there existed an ethical breach, even though it was my opinion that there was no actual conflict of interest. The issues were diffi- cult and I did substantial deliberation on this matter.” It is Drummond's position that Stahl, while acting on behalf of his marital community and as agent of his firm, intentionally and maliciously induced or caused a breach or termination of the Avrea/Drummond attorney- client relationship, resulting in the loss of the monetary and professional expectancies to be derived therefrom. It is Stahl’s position that the motion to require Drum- mond to withdraw from the superior court action and the complaint filed with the State Bar of Arizona were abso- lutely privileged and that Drummond has no cause of action. WAS THE SUPERIOR COURT MOTION ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED? It is our opinion that the motion filed by Stahl, on behalf of his client Saf-Gard, to compel Drummond to withdraw as Avrea’s attorney in the pending Avrea v. Saf-Gard litigation was privileged under the facts of this case. A6 An affirmative defense, such as privilege, may be raised and determined on a motion to dismiss, where the facts constituting the defense appear in the pleadings. Si- erra Madre Development, Inc. v. Via Entrada Townhouses Association, 20 Ariz. App. 550, 514 P.2d 503 (1973). From our reading of the pleadings and affidavits filed in the motion for summary judgment, it appears there were suffi- cient undisputed facts from which the trial judge could grant summary judgment. The allegation in the motion to compel Drummond to withdraw on the grounds that he had a conflict of interest is the type of defamatory statement in litigation proceedings that should be absolutely privileged. Defama- tory statements contained in pleadings are absolutely priv- ileged if they are connected with or have any bearing on or are related to the subject of inquiry. Sierra Madre Development, Inc. v. Via Entrada Townhouses Association. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 (1977). Parties to judicial proceedings are generally granted an absolute privilege to use defamatory language in pleadings because of an “overriding public interest” that persons should speak freely and fearlessly in litigation. Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149, 150, 481 P.2d 519, 520 (1971). A statement made in the course of a judicial hearing is absolutely privileged as long as it bears some relation to the subject judicial proceeding. Todd v. Cox, 20 Ariz. App. 347, 512 P.2d 1234 (1973). / Although these Arizona cases do not directly involve a case of tortious interference with a contractual relation- ship, the reasoning and legal principles set out have appli- cation to and control the disposition of this case. The motion to force Drummond to withdraw as counsel had a direct relationship to the superior court proceedings and under the facts of this case was entitled to an absolute privilege. AT WAS THE STAHL COMPLAINT TO THE ARIZONA STATE BAR ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED? Both Lrummond and Stahl make basically the same arguments relative to this issue that they made to the first issue. The State Bar of Arizona contends that public policy dictates that there must be immunity to all persons from any liability arising from the filing of a complaint with the State Bar which charges an attorney with un- ethical conduct. Drummond agrees there is a “conditional” privilege, both as to the making of a report of Drummond's supposed unethical conduct to the Bar Association and as to the initiation of proceedings to disqualify Drummond as Avrea’s counsel in the superior court. Drummond fur- ther argues that these conditions include factual consider- ations such as the truth or falsity of the matters alleged, the motives of the defendant, the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and the question of whether such con- duct involved legal malice. Drummond concludes that until such factual matters are determined by a trial, the granting of summary judgment is in error. The State Bar answers this argument by stating that to allow a “conditional” privilege would allow the institu- tion of a civil action by the mere addition of an “actual malice” allegations. This would permit a civil action against anyone who has complained to the State Bar and subject such complainant to the full, expensive scope of discovery and litigation, thus “chilling” the motivation of those who believe they have knowledge of improper legal behavior. In our opinion, public policy and legal precedent com- pel us to adopt the position that there is an absolute privilege extended to anyone who files a complaint with the State Bar alleging unethical conduct by an attorney. A8 The State Bar of Arizona is an arm of the Arizona Supreme Court. Bridegroom v. State Bar, 27 Ariz. App. 47, 550 P.2d 1089 (1976). The Supreme Court has directed that written complaints against lawyers are to be filed with the State Bar. Ariz. Sup.Ct. Rule 33(a)1. The State Bar acts in a judicial capacity in dealing with the conduct of attorneys. Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.S.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540 (1968); Baggott v. Hughes, 34 Ohio Misc. 63, 296 N.E.2d 696 (1973). The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), §§ 585-589, grants an absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in a judicial proceeding, so long as such statements bear some relationship to the proceedings. Although there is some authority to the contrary, Lee v. W. E. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies Company, 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d 45 (1929); Sassower v. Himwich, 236 N.Y.S. 2d 491 (1962), the majority of courts that have faced this issue have held there is an absolute privilege for anyone who files a complaint alleging unethical conduct by an attorney with a State Bar Grievance Committee. Wong v. Schorr, 51 Hawaii 608, 466 P.2d 441 (1970); Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953); Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md.App. 628, 329 A.2d 423 (1974); Wiener v. Weintraub; McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933); Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Ore. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959). We must weigh the possible harm to attorneys in the filing of a malicious complaint against the need to encourage the reporting of unethical conduct. In weighing these conflicting interests, it is our opinion that public policy demands the free reporting of unethical conduct if we are to continue to enjoy the privilege of a self- regulating profession. A9 Drummond makes a further argument that any action by the State of Arizona by either legislative enactment or judicial decision to grant an absolute privilege would amount to state action depriving Drummond of due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, and by the parallel provisions of Article 2, §§ 4 and 13 of the Arizona Constitution. We have been cited to no reported cases supporting such a theory and have been unable to find any such cases. The existence of such an absolute privilege has been upheld by the majority of states that have considered this issue, and we see no validity to this challenge on constitutional grounds. The decision of the trial court granting summary judg- ment is affirmed. Jack L. Ogg, Chief Judge Division One Concurring: Joe W. Contreras, Presiding Judge Department C Eino M. Jacobson, Judge Al0 OTHER ORDERS BELOW AND EXCERPTS SHOWING HOW CONSTITUTIONAL QUES- TIONS WERE RAISED AND DECIDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Entered April 12, 1978) THE SUPERION COURT OF ARIZONA MARICOPA COUNTY No. C 362697 (Assigned to the Honorable Rufus C. Coulter - Div. 21) William H. Drummond, Plaintiff, vs. LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON & FRENCH, a professional association, Defendants, JUDGMENT This matter having come before the court on defen- dants’ motion for summary judgment on March 24, 1978, the court having heard at that time oral argument of counsel, the court having taken the matter under advise- ment, and the court having given full consideration to the matter, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants have judgment against plaintiff. DATED this 5 day of April, 1978. Rufus C. Coulter, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court — All EXCERPT FOR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Filed Apri: i8, 1978) IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA No. C-362697 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff, vs. LOUIS A. STAHL, et ux., et al., Defendants. MOTION UNDER RULE 59 A.R.C.P. FOR NEW TRIAL NOW COMES PLAINTIFF and respectfully moves the Court for a new trial of this action on the ground that the Judgment entered April 5, 1978 is contrary to law, in the following respects: + ** * * * 3. The Summary Judgment of April 5, 1978, granting Defendant Stahl absolute immunity (as set forth in ground No. 2 above), is state action depriving Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws and due process of law as set forth in the 14th Amendment (Section 1) of the Constitution of the United States of America and the parallel provisions of the Constitution of the State of Arizona. (Par. 3, p. 2, Motion for New Trial) Al2 ORDER DENYING NEW TRIAL (Entered June 14, 1978) IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA No. C-362697 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff, vs. LOUIS A. STAHL, et ux., et al., Defendants. ORDER Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Defendants’ Response thereto having been considered by the Court, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel thereon, and being fully advised in the premises: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial is denied. DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 14 DAY OF JUNE, 1978. Rufus C, Coulter, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Al13 EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA Division One No. 1CA-CIV 4531 (Maricopa County Superior Court Cause No. C 362967) WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Appellant, vs, LOUIS A: STAHL and MARY KATHLEEN STAHL, hus- band and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON & FRENCH, a Professional Association, Appellees. Plaintiff-Appellant, William H. Drummond, appeals to the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona, Division One, from the Judgment of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Honorable Rufus C, Coulter, Jr., presiding, entered pursuant to an Order granting Summary ~udgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees and from the subsequent Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial. * * * * * V. APPLICATION OF AN “ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE” TO STAHL’S ACTIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE “STATE ACTION” DEPRIVING DRUMMOND OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTEC- TION OF THE LAWS. If the action of the Trial Court in granting Defen- dants’ Motion for Summary J udgment is sustained on a theory of “absolute privilege’, then the granting of sum- Al4 mary judgment by the Trial Court and the affirmance of that action by this Court constitutes state action denying Drummond due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment (Section 1) of the United States Constitution and by the parallel pro- visions (Article 2, §4 and §13) of the Constitution of the State of Arizona. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, inter alia: “ . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is clear that the law of the State of Arizona pro- vides a cause of action for damages for tortious interference with advantageous contractual relationships. See, e.g., Middleton v. Wallichs Music & Entertainment Co., Inc., cited supra page 24. This cause of action is a vested “prop- erty” right which is protected against impairment by state action under the 14th Amendment. Terraccioma v. Magee, 148 A.2d 68, 53 N.J.Super 557 (1959); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973) and it is clear that the action of the Court below and any action of this Court applying an “absolute” immunity rule would constitute “state ac- tion”; Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); National Airport Corp. v. Wayne Bank, 252 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. App. 1977); United States v. Stan- dard Oil Co. of California, 21 F.Supp. 645 (D.C.Cal. 1938), aff'd 107 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1940). While neither the Federal nor the State Constitu- tions require that a state provide any particular procedure or particular -medy to a plaintif who is injured by tor- Al5 tious conduct of another, they do guarantee the preserva- tion of a substantial right to redress by some effective procedure. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 54 S.Ct. 140, 78 L.Ed. 342, 290 U.S. 326 (1933). Applying the foregoing principles, the courts have condoned state action which places limitations upon lia- bility of governmental officers and private persons or firms, so long as the limitations were reasonable. For ex- ample, a reasonable (6-year) period of limitations on a claim for medical malpractice is not a denial of due process or equal protection, Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Az.App. 49, 546 P.2d 26 (1976) but a general and very short (120-day) statute of limitations on tort claims against political sub- divisions and municipalities was held unconstitutional as applied to claims by minors as a denial of due process, Hunter v. North Mason High School, 529 P.2d 898, 12 Wash.App. 304 (1974), aff'd. 539 P.2d 845, 85 Wash.2d 810 (1975). And an Illinois statute conferring conditional immunity from tort liability on employees of a political subivision was held constitutional only as it permitted escape from liability for simple negligence and did not attempt to confer immunity for willful or wanton negligence, Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 52 Ill.2d 271, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972). But state action authorizing immunity from civil damages for libel if a newspaper merely published a ro- traction was invalid as a denial of due process, Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 95 N.E. 917 (Ohio, 1911). As noted above, Plaintiff-Appellant does not seek a ruling of this Court that Defendant Stahl’s activities were wholly unprivileged, and we acknowledge the undoubted existence of a conditional privilege, both as to the making of a report of Drummond’s supposed unethical conduct to the Bar Association and as to the initiation of proceedings Al6 in the Superior Court to disqualify Drummond as Mr. Avrea’s counsel. The “conditions”, however, upon which such privilege must be founded must include factual con- siderations of the truth or falsity of the matters alleged, the purpose or motive of the Defendant, the existence or non-existence of probable cause and, without doubt, the question of whether such conduct involved legal malice. Any action by the State of Arizona, by either legislative enactment or judicial decision, to remove such considera- tions from a determination of the actor’s liability, i.e., the imposition of a theory of “absolute” privilege, would amount to clear “state action” which deprives Drummond of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. (Appellant’s Opening Brief, pp. 37-41) Al17 EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA Division One No. 1 CA-CIV 4531 (Maricopa County Superior Court Cause No. C 362697) WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Appellant, VS. LOUIS A. STAHL and MARY KATHLEEN STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON & FRENCH, a Professional Association, Appellees * *£+ * & & We have but one further comment: This Reply Brief does not address itself to the Constitutional considerations raised in the Opening Brief due only to the fact that that issue was not addressed in the Appellees’ Answering Brief [except for Appellees’ notation that Appellees were aware of no similar case which “has ever been challenged on Con- stitutional grounds”; (AB11)]. Matters of Constitutional- ity are not, of course, confined to matters “heretofore raised”; if they were, Arizona juries in negligence cases would probably still be instructed that they “must” re- Al8 turn a verdict for the defendant if plaintiff was found to be contributorily negligent in any degree (a practice which was consigned to “past history” when this Court first com- prehensively addressed the problem in 1956 in the case of Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pacific Co., 81 Ariz. 302, 305 P.2d 447, notwithstanding that the Constitutional provision re- sulting in the change of practice had been enacted in 1910!) Anpellant respectfully submits, of course, that if disposition of the “threshold issues” of this action involve a conference upon Appellees of “absolute immunity”, then the Constitutional issues raised in Appellant’s Opening Brief ought properly to be met. (Appellant’s Reply Brief, pp. 34-35) Alg EXCERPT FROM THE OPINION BELOW (Filed August 19, 1980) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE 1 CA-CIV 4531 DEPARTMENT C WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a Professional Association, Defendants-Appellees. OPINION * * * * + Drummond makes a further argument that any action by the State of Arizona by either legislative enactment or judicial decision to grant an absolute privilege would amount to state action depriving Druminond of due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, and by the parallel provisions of Article 2, §§ 4 and 13 of the Arizona Constitution. We have been cited to no reported cases supporting such a theory and have been unable to find any such cases. The existence of such an absolute privilege has been upheld by the majority of states that have considered this issue, and we see no validity to this challenge on constitutional grounds. A20 EXCERPT FROM MOTION FOR REHEARING IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE 1 CA-CIV 4531 DEPARTMENT C Maricopa County Superior Court No. C-362697 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a professional association, Defendants-Appellees. MOTION FOR REHEARING Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully moves the Court, pur- suant to Rule 22(a), A.R.C.P., for rehearing and reconsid- eration of its decision filed August 19, 1980. The Constitutional Issue As set forth above, we respectfully urge that the Court of Appeals erred in its decisions of “public” issues of this appeal. Just as respectfully, we urge that the Court of Appeals glossed over and erred on a basic constitutional issue dressed in the sheep’s clothing of a mere “private” issue. A21 The clear effect of the present decision of the Court of Appeals is that Plaintiff-Appellant, who suffered undis- puted and significant financial damage at Defendant-Ap- pellee’s hands, is absolutely barred from any remedy. And this result is reached only because he is a lawyer, not a layman. The cases cited in our Opening Brief (please see pp. 37-41) clearly demonstrate that a State cannot, under the 14th Amendment, Section 1, of the United States Constitu- tion, wreak these effects. It may be true that neither we nor the Court could find the “spotted calf” case, but the principles established by the cases we did find and cite are clearly applicable under the facts of this case. Drummond cannot be deprived of some form of rem- edy and he cannot be so deprived either because he is a lawyer or Stahl is a lawyer, when other plaintiffs who are not lawyers have immediate recourse and where other defendants who are not lawyers have, at most, only a conditional privilege. The lack of cases squarely on point is not enough to justify a denial of due process or equal protection. The same might have been and probably has been said in virtually every case where a previously unasserted right sought Constitutional recognition for the first time. It is no answer that a private interest must give way to “public policy” when the private interest is Constitution- ally guaranteed. The protection of private Constitutionally guaranteed interests has a curious way of turning out to be the best way of protecting the public interest, as is amply illustrated by the jurisprudence history of these United States. A22 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REHEARING (Entered September 24, 1980) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE 1 CA-CIV 4531 DEPARTMENT C MARICOPA County Superior Court No. C-362697 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, V. LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a professional association, Defendants-Appellees. ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing and the re- sponse thereto were considered by the Court, Presiding Judge Jack L. Ogg, and Judges Eino M. Jacobson and Joe W. Contreras participating. IT IS ORDERED denying plaintiff-appellant’s Motion for Rehearing. DATED this 24th day of September, 1980. Jack L. Ogg, Presiding Judge Department C A23 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW (Entered October 15, 1980) SUPREME COURT STATE OF ARIZONA October 16, 1980 Supreme Court No. 15089-PR Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CIV 4531 Maricopa County No. C-362697 WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Appellant, vs, LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a Professional Association, Appellees. , “ORDERED: Petition for Review = DENIED.” Vice Chief Justice William A. Holohan and Justice Jack D. H. Hays voted to grant. Record returned to the Court of Appeals, Division One, Phoenix, this 16th day of October, 1980. Maryann Hopkins-Young, Clerk A24 MANDATE OF COURT OF APPEALS (Issued October 24, 1980) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE 1 CA-CIV 4531 DEPARTMENT C WILLIAM H. DRUMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vv LOUIS A. STAHL and JANE DOE STAHL, husband and wife, and STREICH, LANG, WEEKS, CARDON AND FRENCH, a Professional Association, Defendants-Appellees. MANDATE TO: The Honorable Superior Court for MARICOPA County, Arizona in relation to Cause No. C-362697. GREETING: The above cause was presented in your Court and was brought before Division One of the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona in the manner prescribed by law. This Court rendered its opinion and caused the same to be filed on the 19th day of August, 1980. A25 A petition for review was filed. The record was for- warded to the Arizona Supreme Court. By order dated the 15th day of October, 1980, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review, Supreme Court No. 15089- PR. NOW, THEREFORE, YOU ARE COMMANDED that such proceedings be had in said cause as shall be required to comply with the opinion of this Court, a copy of the opinion being attached hereto. WITNESS, THE HONORABLE JACK L. OGG, Pre- siding Judge, Department C, Division One of the Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona, this 24th day of Oc- tober, 1980. Glen D. Clark, Clerk CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, ARS § 12-120(A) There is created a court of appeals which shall con- stitute a single court and such court shall be a court of record. ARS § 12-120.21(A) (1) A. The court of appeals shall have: 1. Appellate jurisdiction in all actions and pro- ceedings originating in or permitted by law to be ap- pealed from the superior court, except criminal actions involving crimes for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment has actually been imposed. ARS § 12-120.24 A party against whom a decision has been rendered or against whom a motion for dismissal of the action has been granted in the court of appeals may file in such court a motion for rehearing after the rendition of the decision or order of dismissal, setting forth with particularity the reasons why he believes the decision or order of dismissal erroneous. The opposite party may file his response to such motion. If the motion is denied, and the party against whom the decision or order has been rendered desires a further review by the supreme court, he shall serve upon the opposite party and file with the clerk of the division a state- ment that he desires such review. The clerk of the division shall thereupon transmit the record in the case to the clerk of the supreme court. The supreme court shall either grant or deny the request for re- view. No further briefs or oral argument shall be filed or had unless the supreme court so directs. If no request for review by the supreme court has been filed, or upon the receipt from the clerk of the supreme court of notification that the request for review has been denied, the clerk of the division shall, if the matter has been decided by formal Opinion, issue the mandate of the court of appeals, if no written formal opinion has been rendered then by certified copy of the order of the court. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 Final judgments or decrees rendered by the high- est court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: (1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity. (2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity. (3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_1107%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.