# Petition — Quick v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 450 U.S. 920

## Text

. Supreme Court, v, S,
FILE D

—DEC 28 1980

80-1053

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

NO. 80-1053

in the
Supreme Court

of the
United States

JACK V. QUICK,
Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD A. DION, ESQ.
ENTIN, SCHWARTZ, ANGERT
& DION

Attorneys for Petitioners

2020 N.E. 163rd St.,

Suite 300

No. Miami Beach, Florida 33162
Tel. No.: (305) 944-9100

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to instruct
the Jury on the essential elements of the crime of
conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF CITATIONS. .cissocscissesustvinanstesmacnneanian ili
OPINION. BELOW .....ccccoscossicssedivenosechaniaibaocabensbbliains 2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..u..........cescsscsssscsseseesees 4
STATEMENT OF THE PACTS .0..0.......cscsscsssescesesoees 5
BIR UREENT : ascrccssesssossshicconeosestinsehetnanoieanttaiiaimnialan 6
CONCLUSION ..receccsoccessissiimipsséntiubinieisiiominmamainl 10
APPEND IA, sesrrrresccsoascecnscassansdnnsonserecccre nr nnnntnnnnn App. 1

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Page

United States v. Beasley,
GED FG Bee CR Cir, 19 TG) cerervciseresoosssncssnserssegneese 8

United Staies v. Febre,
ADS F.2d 107 nd Cir, 19GB) ..ceccorccocerssessescocccosssccsesos 8

United States v. Martinez,
Fe ee Tee Gt 5 BIE) ccinscncocsncunsseiscdtovcachooness 8

ill

NO. 80-1053

in the
Supreme Court

of the
United States

JACK V. QUICK,
Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FIFTH CIRCIUT OF APPEALS

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued
to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in the above
styled case on November 7, 1980.

RONALD A. DION, ESQ.
ENTIN, SCHWARTZ, ANGERT
& DION

Attorneys for Petitioners

2020 N.E. 163rd St.,

Suite 300

No. Miami Beach, Florida 33162
Tel. No.: (305) 944-9100

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is printed at
printed in the Appendix.

F.2d and is

JURISDICTION

The ju ‘gment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was enterea on November 7, 1980.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 USC
1254.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was indicted on July 31, 1979. Convictions
were returned by the Jury on numerous offenses including
Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana.
An Appeal was taken to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed by said
Appellate court by decision rendered November 7, 1980.
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court follows:

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts which are required for this Court’s
understanding of the questions presented in this Petition
for Writ of Certiorari are that the Petitioner was charged
and convicted of Conspiracy to Possess Marijuana with
Intent to Distribute. At the time of charging the Jury,
the Trial Court failed to instruct as the elements of the
underlying offense upon which the Conspiracy was
based; to wit: possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute. Since the validity of said instruction is the
sole issue presented before this Court, further facts
need not be set forth. However, additional facts are
contained in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision rendered below and incorporated herein
by reference. See Appendix.

ARGUMENT
I

The Defendant was charged and convicted, along
with other charges, with Conspiracy to Possess Marijuana
with Intent to Distribute. In the Jury instructions, the
Trial Court failed to instruct as the elements of the
underlying substantive offense, possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. Rather, the only instructions
which were given by the District Court were as follows:

What is charged now in Count Three is that
the defendant, Mr. Quick, together with others
conspired to knowingly and intentionally possess
with intent to distribute approximately a
thousand pounds of marijuana. That’s what ‘s
charged in court Three of the indictment. . .

* * * * *

What is charged here is that the defendant,
Mr. Quick, in conspiracy with others, conspired
to knowingly and intentionally possess with
intent to distribute, with intent to sell or give

away, distribute in some way, one thousand
pounds of marijuana in violation of this statute

He is charged with conspiring with others to
possess a thousand pounds of marijuana with
intent to distribute it.

* * * * *

What the evidence there, with regard to Count
Three, must show before you find the defendant
guilty is: One, two or more persons in some
way or manner came to a mutual understanding
to try to accomplish a common unlawful plan
to possess marijuana for the purpose of
distributing it. That’s what the evidence must
show...

Thus, the Court instructed the Jury that the
Defendant was charged with Conspiracy to Knowingly
and Intentionally Possess with Intent to Distribute
Marijuana, but never instructed the Jury as to the
legal definition of possession with marijuana with intent
to distribute.

It is generally accepted that the failure of the
Tria! Court to instruct the Jury as to the definition of
the underlying conspiracy is reversible error. The Jury
must be instructed on all of the essential elements.

“Failure of the Trial Court to instruct the
Jury on the elements of the substantive crimes

constituting the objects of the charge conspiracy,
i.e. (1) to import marijuana and (2) to possess
same with intent to distribute. There is nothing
in the charge to the Jury which apprise them
of the definition, character or nature of the
acts of importing, possessing, or distributing
marijuana. Moreover, the Trial Judge omitted
any reference to the substantive crime of
possessing with intent to distribute marijuana,
one of the objects of the charge conspiracy.
Only once, during the entire charge, did the
Court attempt to inform the Jury of the crime
with which appellants were charged, when it
instructed: “You, the Jury, determined from
all the facts and circumstances whether or not
a criminal conspiracy existed between these
two persons and others to import marijuana
from Mexico into the United States.”

United States vs. Martinez, 496 F.2d 664 (5th Circuit
1974).

Thus, it is reversible error to fail to instruct the
Jury as to the legal definition of possession and possession
with intent to distribute marijuana when it forms the
underlying objects of the conspiracy charged. This is
not a case as in United States vs. Beasley, 519 F.2d 233
(5th Circuit 1975), wherein the legal definition of the
underlying conspiracy has previously been charged to
the Jury as part of separate substantive offenses. The
record in the case of Bar fails to reveal any instructions
as to the legal definition of possession or possession
with intent to distribute marijuana. Nor is this a case
as in United States vs. Febre, 425 F.2d 107 (2nd Circuit
1969), wherein the Jury is specifically charged as to the

7.

underlying statutory offense upon which the conspiracy
is based and said underlying statute is read to the
Jury.

Rather, this is a case where no legal definitions of
any substantive related offense nor statutes were read
to the Jury. The sole instructions as to the definition of
the underlying object of the conspiracy was that the
Defendant together with others “conspired to knowingly
and intentionally possess with intent to distribute. . .
marijuana.

In the absence of reference to particular statutory
offenses or definitions of related substantive offenses,
said mere instruction without including the legal definition
of possession and possession with intent to distribute
marijuana is insufficient as a matter of law. See United
States vs. Martinez, supra.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons and authorities cited herein,
it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court
grant its Writ of Certiorari and enter its Order quashing
the decision hereby sought to be reviewed and grant
such other and further relief as seems right and
appropriate to this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

BY:

RONALD A. DION, ESQ.

ENTIN, SCHWARTZ,
ANGERT & DION

Attorneys for Petitioners

2020 N.E. 163rd St.,

Suite 300

No. Miami Beach F1. 33162

Tel. No.: (305) 944-9100

10

Appendix

Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

_— =

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-5729
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

versus

JACK VERNON QUICK,
Defendant-A ppellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia

( NOVEMBER 7, 1980)
Before GODBOLD, REAVLEY and ANDERSON, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Jack Vernon Quick was charged in a six
count indictment for kidnapping, drug conspiracy, and
Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted Quick on the
kidnapping charges, but convicted him on the conspiracy
to possess marijuana for distribution charge, 21 U.S.C.
§846, and the three Travel Act charges, 18 U.S.C. §1952.
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict,

App. 1

sentencing Quick to five years on the drug conspiracy
count, with a two year term of special parole, and to
concurrent five year terms on the Travel Act counts.’
Although he does not contest the sufficiency of the
evidence as to the drug conspiracy charge, Quick argues
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the Travel
Act violations, specifically that he travelled in interstate
commerce or used a telephone in interstate commerce
to facilitate the marijuana conspiracy. Quich. also contends
that the trial court’s instructions were plainly erroneous
as to the essential elements of the offenses involved.
We affirm.

Facts

The evidence adduced in the trial below revealed
that in August of 1978 Quick and Patrick Robinson
discussed the possibility of making money be selling
marijuana. Robinson informed Quick that he knew of
someone, Jim Ricks, who had three thousand pounds of
marijuana for sale. Quick told Robinson that he would
be able to raise a large sum of money for such a deal.

'Tn Bifuleo v. United States, __ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 2247 (1980),

the Supreme Court held that §406 of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §846, does
not authorize the imposition of a special parole term even though
that sanction is included within the penalty provision of §401(a) of
the Act, 21 U.S.C. §841(a). Since appellant was convicted of conspiracy
to possess marijuana for distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846
and was sentenced to five years imprisonment with a two year
period of special parole, we note that he may move the district
court to correct his sentence as being illegal under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35(a).

App. 2

Thereafter, a sale of one thousand pounds of marijuana
was negotiated between Robinson and Ricks for a price
of $150,000 with $68,500 to be paid on delivery as a
partial down payment. In his efforts to raise the $68,500,
Quick borrowed $30,000 from Walker Register, a father
of a friend, under the pretext of needing it for a real
estate deal. He borrowed another $1,500 from Robert
Withers and collected the rest from a group of investors,
including Matt Madson, James Irvin and Jerry Anderson.

The deal was to take place on August 17, 1978. On
that day, Madson, acting for the buyers, gave the money
to Ricks in Thomasville, Georgia. Ricks told Madson
the marijuana was coming by truck and that he would
contact him when it arrived. Madson left with Carl
Roberts, an associate of Ricks, and waited along with
the other buyers at a house near Tallahassee, Florida.
Ricks telephoned that evening and told the buyers that
the marijuana could be picked up at an abandoned
welcome station between Monticello, Florida and
Thomasville, Georgia. When Madson and Roberts arrived
at the designated location, they found no one and no
marijuana. They drove as far north as Thomasville
looking for Ricks and the marijuana, but they were
unsuccessful and returned to the house in Florida where
Quick, Anderson and Irvin were waiting.

When Irvin learned that the money had been lost,
he threatened to kill Roberts. Quick interceded and
took Roberts to his farm in Florida. Quick told Roberts
that he wasn’t going to get out of Quick’s sight until
they recovered their money or received the marijuana.
Once at Quick’s farm he and Roberts both made a
number of phone calls in a vain attempt to locate Ricks

App. 3

or the marijuana. The next day, Quick drove Roberts
back into Georgia looking for Ricks. They were again
unsuccessful. Subsequently, Roberts was allowed to
leave. Some weeks later Quick hired a private investigator
to locate Ricks. The investigator revealed the marijuana
conspiracy to the FBI. When confronted by the FBI,
Quick signed a waiver after being advised of his rights
and admitted his part in the scheme.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Quick first argues there was insufficient evidence
that he violated the Travel Act because there was no
evidence that he possessed any marijuana. This argument
is without merit. The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a),
clearly prohibits interstate travel or the use of any
facility in interstate commerce to commit any crime or
unlawful activity, or any attempt to do the same.’ “Proof
that the unlawful objective was accomplished or that
the referenced law has actually been violated is not a

*18 U.S.C. §1952 provides in pertinent part:

§1952. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses
any facility in interstate commerce, including the mail, with intent
to —

(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or

(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful
activity; or

App. 4

Footnote (continued)

(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or
facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity,

and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts
specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

(b) As used in this section “unlawful activity” means (1) any
business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal
excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances
(as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or
prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which
they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion,
bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which
committed or of the United States. (Emphasis added.)

necessary element of the offense defined in section
1952.” United States v. Pomponio, 511 F.2d 953, 957
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); accord,
United States v. Lisner, 524 F.2d 1263, 1264 (5th Cir.
1975) (§1952 “does not require that an accused be successful
at gambling in order to be found guilty of having travelled
interstate in the business of gambling”). Cf. United
States v. Villarreal, 546 F.2d 1145, 1146 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977) (because success is not an
essential element for a conspiracy conviction, court
upheld conviction for conspiracy to possess heroin for
distribution where conspirators were unable to obtain
the heroin).’

*Quick’s argument that a completed offense must be shown
relies primarily on United States v. Leslie, 411 F.Supp. 215 (D.

App. 5

Footnote (continued)

Del. 1976), which interpreted 21 U.S.C. §843(b) (prohibiting use of
a communication facility to facilitate a drug conspiracy). Leslie
held that even though a telephone was used in an attempt to
facilitate the possession and distribution of a controlled substance,
in order to obtain a conviction under §843(b) the felony alleged to
be facilitated must have reached fruition. However, §843(b), unlike
§1952, does not expressly cover attempts to violate the law.
Notwithstanding that distinction, the district court’s view in Leslie
has been repudiated by its own circuit, United States v. Pierorazio,
578 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978), and has
likewise been rejected by other circuits to have considered the
question. See United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1343 (10th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, U.S.__, 100 S.Ct. 206 (1979). United
States v. Gomec-Tostado, 597 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1979).

With respect to sufficiency of evidence challenges,
we must view the evidence adduced at trial and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Hawkins,
614 F.2d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1980), (citing Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) ). “All reasonable inferences
and credibility choices must be made in support of the
jury verdict.” United States v. De Jean, 613 F.2d 1356,
1358 (5th Cir. 1980). If, when examined in that light, the
evidence is sufficient so that a jury might reasonably
conclude it is inconsistent with the hypothesis of the
defendant's innocence, then the jury’s verdict of guilty
must stand. Hawkins, 614 F.2d at 87.

In count four of the indictment, Quick was charged
with using the telephone from his house in Tallahassee,
Florida to communicate with Walker Register in Adel,
Georgia in order to raise money for the marijuana
purchase. Register testified that he had received two

App. 6

or three telephone calls from Quick in August of 1978
regarding a loan of $30,000 for an alleged real estate
deal. Register stated that at least one of these calls
was made a day or two before the cashier's check for
$30,000 was prepared. The check was dated August 17,
1978, and Quick’s telephone records demonstrated that
a call had been made from Quick’s residence in Florida
to Register’s home in Georgia on August 16, 1978.
Register gave Quick the cashier’s check for $30,000,
and through a series of transactions, Quick converted
the check into cash, which was in turn given to Ricks
on August 17. Under these circumstances, the evidence
was sufficient to show that Quick used his telephone in
interstate commerce to facilitate a drug conspiracy.

In count five, Quick was charged with travelling in
interstate commerce from Tallahassee, Florida to
Valdosta, Georgia to facilitate the marijuana conspiracy.
This count was based on the trip Quick made on August
18 in an attempt to locate Ricks or the marijuana.
Quick argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction on this count for two reasons: (1) because
the trip was not taken to promote a “business enterprise,”
which §1952 requires, and (2) because the trip was
undertaken without intent to further the marijuana

conspiracy, but merely in an attempt to recover his
money.

Section 1952(b\1) defines “unlawful activity” to
include “any business enterprise involving . . . controlled
substances ... .” Therefore, in order to sustain a conviction
under §1952(a) when the “unlawful activity” furthered
by interstate travel is one enumerated in §1952(b)(1),
the government must prove a connection between the
offense and an ongoing “business enterprise.” United

App. 7

States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). If the underlying offense
involves controlled substances, the proof must show
that the defendant acted with the intent to further
something more than an isolated illegal incident. United
States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1257 (3d Cir. 1979).
However, the proof need not establish that the illegal
objective was accomplished. United States v. Pomponio,
511 F.2d. at 957. The evidence herein showed that
Quick was instrumental in bringing together several
investors, raising nearly $70,000 in capital, for the purchase
of a half ton of marijuana. Clearly, Quick and his cohorts
did not intend to buy this quantity of marijuana for
personal use, or for an isolated illegal transaction. The
only plausible inference is that they intended the half
ton of marijuana to be the inventory for a large-scale
retail enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Love,
599 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, US. ,
100 S.Ct. 302 (1979). That the attempt to purchase the
marijuana was only the first step in this enterprise
and, as it turned out, the last, cannot obscure the
obvious fact that a business enterprise was begun. We
hold this proof met the statutory requirement.

As to the second prong of Quick’s argument
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the guilty verdict on the fifth count, ie., a lack of
criminal intent, the evidence establishes that at the
time of the trip Quick was motivated, at least in part
by a desire to locate the missing marijuana.’ This is

‘The evidence shows that after Ricks failed to deliver the
marijuana on August 17, Quick told Roberts (Ricks’ associate),

App. 8

Footnote (continued)

“You are not going to get out of my sight until we get the money
back or we get the marijuana.” Furthermore, Roberts testified
that prior to the time when he made numerous phone calls from
Quick’s residence on the 17th, Robinson told him, “I was. . . to
make all the phone calls I could and try to find out what happened
in this situation and we were going to find the marijuana or the
money.” This evidence is sufficient to establish that Quick's interstate
travel on the 18th and the phone calls his coconspirator, Robinson,
caused to be made the night before were motivated at least in
part by a desire to find the marijuana.

sufficient to establish his intent to further an unlawful
activity. United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 308 (5th
Cir. 1980).

In count six of the indictment, Quick was charged
with using or causing to be used a telephone in interstate
commerce to facilitate unlawful activity. This count
refers to phone calls made by Roberts, from Quick’s
residence in Valdosta, Georgia, in an effort to locate
Ricks after the marijuana was not delivered. The evidence
shows that after the aborted delivery of the marijuana,
Quick took Roberts to his farm in Florida and told him
to talk to Robinson. Robinson then told Roberts to
make telephone calls to all persons who might know
Ricks’ whereabouts. Roberts, who had earlier been
threatened, complied with those instructions. Quick
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction on the marijuana conspiracy
charge, and as a coconspirator, he is, therefore, liable
for the acts of his coconspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Tilton, 610 F.2d at 309, (citing Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)). See United

App. 9

States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd,
lt alibi , 100 S.Ct. 311 (1979). We hold the
jury’s verdict is supported by sufficient evidence to
sustain Quick’s conviction on count six.

Jury Instructions

Quick contends that the district court erred in its
instructions on the charge of conspiracy to possess
marijuana with intent to distribute because it failed to
enumerate the elements of the underlying substantive
offense.’ Because Quick failed to object to the court’s
charge, we review his claim under the plain error standard.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

We hold that the trial court’s instructions were
not plainly erroneous. Essentially the same contention
as Quick makes here has already been rejected by this
court on two prior occasions. United States v. Metz,
608 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marino,
562 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, _U.S._, 98
S.Ct. 1647 (1978). The charge fairly informed the jury
of the elements of possession of marijuana with intent
to sell or otherwise distribute. “[A]Ithough a more detailed
definition of the substantive crime underlying the
conspiracy might have been desirable,” Metz, 608 F.2d
at 158, Quick has made no showing that a more detailed
instruction would have aided the jury in assessing his

‘The district court instructed the jury in pertinent part as
follows:

[W]hat is charged now in Count Three is that the
defendant, Mr. Quick, together with others conspired to

App. 10

Footnote (continued)

knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute
“, approximately a thousand pounds of marijuana. That's
what is charged in court Three of the indictment. . . .

What is charged here is that the defendant, Mr. Quick, in
conspiracy with others, conspired to knowingly and
intentionally possess with intent to distribute, with intent
to sell or give away, distribute in some way, one thousand
pounds of marijuana in violation of this statute... .

He is charged with conspiring with others to possess a
thousand pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute
it.

What the evidence there, with regard to Count Three,
must show before you find the defendant guilty is: One,
two or more persons in some way or manner came to a
mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common
unlawful plan to possess marijuana for the purpose of
distributing it. That's what the evidence must show. . .

role in the conspiracy. Under the circumstances, the
charge was adequate. Read as a whole, it adequately
instructed the jury as to the definition, character and
nature of the acts that the conspiracy was designed to

achieve.

Quick’s final contention relates to the trial court’s

instructions on counts four and five of the indictment
— the Travel Act violations dealing with Quick's interstate

App. 11

telephone call to borrow $30,000 and with his trip on
August 18 from Tallahassee, Florida to Valdosta, Georgia.
Quick argues that the court’s charge with respect to
these two counts was erroneous because it failed to
inform the jury that conviction under §1952 required
proof that he performed or attempted to perform some
overt act, after the interestate travel or communication,
in furtherance of the marijuana conspiracy.’ Again,
because there was no objection to the charge, we are
governed by the plain error standard.

‘There are three elements to a violation under §1952(aX3): (1)
interstate travel or communication through an interstate facility;
(2) with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, etc. of an unlawful activity enumerated in §1952(b);
and (3) thereafter performing or attempting to perform the promotion
of an unlawful activity.

With respect to count four, the district court charged the jury in
part:

What the evidence has to show there is that he did use
the telephone as alleged, and that he did it for this purpose
of furthering this illegal activity. That’s what the evidence
has to show, those two things, before you would be
authorized to find him guilty on Count Four.

With respect to count five, the court charged the jury in part:
What the evidence has to show there before you can
find him guilty is that he did travel from Florida into
Georgia with the intention of promoting this alleged illegal
activity and that he did so knowingly and purposely with
intent to do so.

Those things.

App. 12

An overt act in furtherance of the illegal activity
subsequent to an incident of interstate travel or
communication is an essential element of a Travel Act
violation. United States v. Hedge, 462 F.2d 220, 223
(5th Cir. 1972). The requirement of such an overt act
was communicated to the jury by the trial court during
its instructions, in that the relevant portions of the
indictment and §1952 were read to the jurors. Therefore,
when the court’s charge is read as a whole, it is apparent
that this element was included. Although the charge
did not fully emphasize the third element of a Travel
Act violation, we hold it to be adequate under the plain
error standard.

AFFIRMED.

App. 13

---

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