# Petition — Currey v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0995%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1981 - **Citation:** 451 U.S. 935 ## Text Bd > U: $ g0-1010 |~ Fite = ie DEC 19 18aQ IN THE ' | MICHAEL RODAK, JR cy cme ; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES : OCTOBER TERM, 1980 NO. ¥ P.W.CURREY AND MRS. JAMES D. CURREY d/b/a CURREY & CURREY a/k/a CURREY, SHIELDS & CURREY, Petitioners, VERSUS CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., Respondents PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA © Space ae LARRY R. BOYD ile Bank Bldg. i. Floor, Heritage Square Dallas, Texas : 75201 5001 L.B.J. Freeway Dallas, Texas 75233! (214) 742-2551 (214)661-5402 Counsel For Petitioners December, 1980 QUESTION PRESENTED May the State of Oklahoma regulate oil and gas exploration operations conducted on restricted Indian lands within its borders? Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1980 NO. P.W.CURREY AND MRS. JAMES D. CURREY d/b/a CURREY & CURREY a/k/a CURREY, SHIELDS & CURREY, Petitioners, VERSUS CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., Respondents PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW Petitioners are P. W. Currey and Mrs. James D. Currey who, at all material times, were members of or successors to a partnership doing business as Currey & Currey and also known as Currey, Shields & Currey. Page 2 —f% Respondents are the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma and its Director of Conservation, Dan R. Dunnett. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented 1 Parties to Proceeding Below 2 Table of Contents Table of Authorities 4 Official Report of Opinion Below 7 Jurisdiction g 9 Pertinent Constitutional, Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Statement of the Case 10 Reason for Allowance of the Writ 14 Appendix A: Findings and Order App. of the Corporation Commission Appendix B: Petiton in Error App. Appendix C: Opinion of Supreme Court App. of Oklahoma Appendix D: Petition for Rehearing App. Appendix E: Correction Order of App. Supreme Court of Oklahoma Appendix F: Order Denying Petition App. Page 3 for Rehearing Appendix G: Mandate of the Oklahoma App. Supreme Court Appendix H: Applicable Provision of App. the United States Constitution Appendix I: Applicable Provisions App. of Federal Statute Appendix J: Applicable Provisions of App. Federal Regulation Appendix K: Applicable Provisions of App. the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma . Appendix L: Applicable Provisions of App. Oklahoma Statutes TABLE OF AUTHORITIES a Cases: Bryan v. Itasca County, 1976, 16,32 a 96 S.Ct. 2102, 426 U.S. 373, 48 L.Ed. 2d 710 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 20 , 367 74 L. Ed. 478, 50S. Ct. 121 (1930) E Cockran v. Teehee, 40 Okl. 388, 19 138 P. 563 (1914) : F.B. Collins Inv. Co. v. Beard, 18 46 Okl. 310, 148 P.346, 850 (1915) DeCoteau v. District Court, 1975, 24 95 S.Ct. 1082, 410 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300, reh den. 95 S. Ct. 1667, 421 U.S. 939, 44 L.Ed. 2d 95. Page 4 Fisher v. District Court, 1976, 96 S.Ct.424 U.S. 382, 943, 47 L. Ed. 2d 106, reh. den., 96S. Ct. 1524, 425 5 U.S. 926, 47 L. Ed. 2d 772. Franz v. Autry, 18 Okl. 56l, 91 P. 193 i907) Kennerly v. District Court, 1971, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission 1973, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 4ll U. S. 164 at 168, 36 L.Ed. 2d 129 at 133 Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Okl. 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1943) Mattz v. Arnett, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 412 U.S. 481, 37 L. Ed. 2d 92. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 411 U.S. 145, 36 L.Ed 2d 114 at 4 U.S. 149 (New Mexico) Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 1976, 95 yee 1634, 424 U.S. 463, 4&8L. Ed. 2d 96 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ~ §tate Corporation Commission of Kansas, 1962, 835. Ct. 646, 373 U.S. 84, 9 3 Ed 2d 601, reh. den. 83 S.Ct. 10ll, 371 U.S. 960, 10 L.Ed 2d 14 Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962) Page 5 24 18 26,27, 28,29 14,16, 20 18 23 16,18,23 24 32 12,15,17, 19,20,22, 23,24 . Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County | 16 CA9) 532 F. 2d 655 (1975) Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, 67 Oki. 106, 19 169 P. 483 (1917) Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6, 100 21 L. Ed. 883, 76 S. Ct. 611 (1956) State v. Huser, 76 Okl. 130, “18 184 P, 113 (1919) Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 17 ISM, 31 S.Ct. 578, 221 U.S. 286, 55 L.Ed. 738 Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax 16,21,23 Commission, 1965, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 380 U.S.685, 14 L.Ed 2d 165 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 17,18,21,22 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) Worchester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 16,17,22 8 L.Ed 483 (1832) U. S. Constitution (APPENDIX H) Art. I, Section 8, clause 3 9 - Art. IV, clause 2 9 Federal Statutes (APPENDIX I) Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267-278, 9,17 "Oklahoma Enabling Act" Act of August 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 731, 9,13, Pub.L. 80-336, Cc. 459, 29,30,34 Section 11 Page 6 Act of August 15, 1953, 9,13,25,26, Pub.L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 590 27 ,28,33 Act of April 11, 1968, Pub.L. 90-284, 25,26, Title IV, Sections 402, 404 27,28, 72 Stat. 79, "Civil Rights Act 33 of 1968". 25 U.S.C.Sect. 1321 et.seq. Oklahoma Constitution (APPENDIX K) ~ Art. 1, Section 3, Oklahoma 9,13,18,29 Constitution ; Oklahoma Statutes (APPENDIX L) Title 17, Okla. Statutes 1971, 10 Sections 51-53, inc. Title 52, Okla. Statues 1971, 10 Section 243 Title 52, Okla. Statutes 1971, 10 Section 273 Title 75, Okla. Statutes 1971, 10,19 Section 184 25 C.F.R. Part 1, Section 1.4 14 OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINIONS BELOW This Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma is officially reported as P. W. Currey et al. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al., Okl., 617 P. 2d 177 (1980). : Page 7 JURISDICTION On January 10, 1978, the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with an Order, the contents of which are attached as "Appendix A". An appeal from the Order was filed in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Appendix B). The initial Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma (Appendix C) was issued June 12, 1979. A Petition for Rehearing was filed in a timely manner (Appendix D). A "Correction Order" of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma (Appendix E) was issued September 22, 1980, simultaneously with its Order Denying Petition for Rehearing attached as "Appendix P*. Jurisdiction is invoked under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257 (3), by reason that (1) the statutes of the State of Oklahoma, to the extent that the Corporation Commission is vested with jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas exploration on restricted Indian lands, are repugnant to the constitution, laws and regulations of the United States and (2) Petitioner claims an immunity from State Page 8 action under the Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States. PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS These proceedings involve the application of Article 1, Section 8, clause 3, the "Commerce Clause", and Article 6, clause 2, the "Supremacy Clause" of the United States Constitution, quoted in pertinent part in "Appendix H". The federal statutory provisions involved are Pub.L. 83-280, c.505, Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat.590, Sections 6,7; Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78 25 U. S. C. Sections 1321-1326; Pub.L. 80-336, Section ll, Act of August 14, 1947, c.459, 61 Stat. 731; and the "Oklahoma Enabling Act," Act of June 16, 1906, c. 3335, Section 1, 34 Stat. 267. The pertinent federal Statutory provisions are cited in "Appendix I." Code of Federal Regulation provisions involved are found generally as 25 CFR, Part |; 25 CFR, Part 183 (1954 Ed.) and 30 CFR Part 221 (1949 Ed.), pertinent sections of which are attached as "Appendix J." . Applicable Oklahoma constitutional and statutory provisions are as follows: the "disclaimer" provisions of Article 1, Section 3, Oklahoma Constitution, attached as Page 9 “Appendix K;" statutes of authority of the Corporaiton Commission as found in Title 17, Oklahoma Statutes 1971, Sections 51-53; Title 52, Oklahoma Statutes 1971, Sections 243 and 273; and the Oklahoma 1971 "Codification" statute found at Title 75, Oklahoma Statutes 1971, Section 184; pertinent portions of the statutes are attached as "Appendix L." STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioners, a Texas partnership, obtained leased rights to certain restricted Choctaw lands located in Stephens County, Oklahoma in the early 1950's. The lease was obtained through the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") a bureau of the Department of Interior, and granted Petitioners the right to explore for oil and gas. Upon execution of the lease and the posting of required surety, BIA turned the supervision of the exploration activities to the United States Geological Survey ("USGS"), also a subdivision of the Department of Interior. » Petitioners entered the lands pursuant to the lease and drilled three (3) wells, at all times complying with the regulations and under the supervision of USGS. Page 10 In the mid 1950's, each of the wells were the subject of a "Notice of Intent to Abandon", which notice contained a description of the method by which Petitioners intended to "plug" the wells. The plugging methods were approved by USGS. The wells were plugged and the fact and method of the abandonment were duly reported to and approved by USGS. The plugging of each of the three (3) wells complied in all respects with the applicable USGS regulations. Following the abandonment of the wells, USGS inspected the well sites, approved the plugging and surface restoration and recommended to BIA that Petitioners bond be released. Petitioners were thereafter released by, BIA. In 1974, one of the wells experienced a “surface break out". Attempts by third parties (not parties here or ’ below) to replug the well were unsuccessful and, in 1976,a — representative of the Corporation Commission inennbted | the site and filed his complaint with the Commission. A second well was made the subject of a complaint later in 1977. Notice of the complaints was given to Petitioners and a hearing was conducted by a Corporation Page 11 . Commission trial examiner. Neither the Indian landowner nor the Department of Interior appeared as or were made parties to the hearing. Petitioners answered the Complaint. inter alia denying the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission to impose requirements upon Petitioners because Petitioners were subject to federal not state regulation. The trial examiner and, subsequently, the Corporation Commission noted the objection to jurisdiction of Petitioners, but found jurisdiction (Appendix A, paragraph 2,3). The Corporation Commission entered its Order directing Petitioners to enter the lease and replug the wells. Appeal from the Order was taken to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma by Petition in Error asserting inter alia the failure of Commission jurisdiction over oil and gas exploratio. on restricted Indian land. (Appendix B, paragraph 5.a.l). The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the Commission's finding of jurisdiction. (Appendix C). The Court, in summary, held (1) that Oklahoma's constitutional "disclaimer (Art. 1, Section 3, Appendix K) affected "proprietary" rather than governmental interests, relying on Organized Village of Page 12 | Kake v. E an, 1962, 82 S.Ct. 562, 369 U.S. 60, 7 L.Ed 2d 573, and (z) that the language of permissive assumption of jurisdiction in Pub. L. 83-280, Section 6, Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590, together with the provisions of Pub. L. 80-336, Act of August 14, 1947, c. 459, 61 Stat. 7331, permitted the Corporation Commission to exercise its regulatory authority to Indian lands. Concluding, the Court said: * eee We hold that the power of the Corporation Commission to regulate oil and gas conservation measures under the laws of the state on restricted Indian lands and order appellant to replug purging wells, is not precluded by the federal jurisdiction. Our Constitutional mandate contained in O.S. 1971 Art. | Sec. 3 stating that Indian lands "shall be remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States", envisions undiminished and not exclusive jurisdiction. We so hold. *eex-t-** From that holding and affirmance of juisdiction, Petitioners seek this Court's relief. Page 13 . | REASON FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT HAS UNCONSTITU- TIONALLY AND UNILATERALLY IMPOSED ITS REGULATORY LAWS UPON INDIAN LANDS WITHIN ITS BORDERS IN DEROGATION OF ASSIGNED STATE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS AND IN CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL PLENARY AND PREEMPTIVE AUTHORITY. Petitioners seek this Court's relief in vacating the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirming the Corporation Commission's unilateral assumption of jurisdiction over oil and gas operations on Indian lands within its borders. Relying upon the same authority as did the Arizona Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, infra, the Oklahoma Court excised itself from the historical position taken by this Court in deciding state-federal jurisdictional litigation regarding Indian land. The narrow issue in McClanahan, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 4ll U. S. 164 at 168, 36 L.Ed. 2d 129 at 133, was whether a State may tax a reservation Indian for income earned exclusively on the reservation. The narrow issue presented here is whether a State may impose its Page 14 conservation measures upon Indian lands in face of pervasive federal regulation on the same subject. Petitioners do not claim that they are subject to no regulation. They do not claim that neither the Indian landowner nor his trustee, the United States government, is without remedy to correct any perceived conditions which allegedly exist. What Petitioners do claim is that, given the abundant expressions of this Court of federal exclusivity and preemptive regulatory supremacy of Indian land use and control, Petitioners are not required to respond to both State and federal regulation with respect to their lease obligations. Particularly is this so where, as found below, the regulations of both federal and State agencies are identical. In this connection, it is helpful to recall that, while federal regulatory agencies were aware of the proceedings below, no appearance by the federal agency or the Indian landowner precipitated or gave vicarious support to the position of the State of Oklahoma. Petitioners respectfully suggest that this Court put at final rest the propensity of the several States to rely upon the expressions of this court in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 1962, 82 S.Ct. 562, 369 U.S. 60, 7 L.Ed. 2d Page 15 573, expressions which admittedly this Court has attempted to limit or place in perspective in subsequent opinions. Eg., McClanahan, supra, 411 U.S. 176, n. 15; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, 1965, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 380 U.S.685, 14 L.Ed 2d 165; Mascalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 4ll U.S. 145, 36 L.Ed 2d 114. It is abundantly clear that when courts speak of "Indian land," no real distinction is made between tribal lands, trust lands or alloted lands. Indian lands are, simply, Indian lands. Historically and in present practice, Congress has _ constitutionally exercised plenary jurisdiction over Indian lands, U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec.8, | Clause 3, whether under a concept of exclusivity Worchester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed 483 (1832), or, more recently, under a notion of preemptive regulation. Bryan v. Itasca County, 1976, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 426 U.S. 373, 48 L.Ed. 2d 710. Indeed, in Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County (CA9) 532 F. 2d 655 (1975), the Ninth Circuit said at 658: e*eeet At the outset, we emphasize that this suit involves an attempt to regulate Indian use of Indian trust lands. We are clear, regardless of the modification worked in the exclusive Federal Page 16 e\ ie jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty doctrines of Worchester v. Georgia, 3] U.S. (6 Pet. 515) 350, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), by subsequent Court decisions such as Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (a) and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), that in any event any concurrent jurisdiction the states might inherently have possessed to regulate Indian use of reservation lands has long ago been preempted ‘by extensive Federal police and legislation. (Citations omitted). That the federal government has exclusive authority "to deal with, control and protect the property of the Indian, where not expressly abandoned, is no longer open to controversy." Tiger v. Western Investment Co., I9ll, 31 S.Ct. 578, 221 U.S. 286, 55 L.Ed. 738 I THE OKLAHOMA ENABLING ACT AND SUBSEQUENT LAWS PRECLUDE # ASSUMPTION OF STATE JURISDICTION. in the Oklahoma Enabling Act, Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267-278, Congress conditioned § Dklahoma's statehood upon a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands, requiring that the new State include the following language in its Constitution: * * * Provided, that nothing contained in said constitution shall be construed to . . . limit or affect the authority of the Government of the United States to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property or other rights * * * (34 Stat. 267). Oklahoma complied with that condition precedent to Page 17 statehood in Art.1l, Sec.3 of its constitution. Parenthetically, the Enabling Act affecting Oklahoma also enabled the new states of Arizona and New Mexico to join the Union, subject to the same disclaimer conditions. Act of June 16, 1906, supra; Sec. 25, Second; Williams v. Lee, 1959, 79 S.Ct. 269, 358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed 2d 251, n. 10 at 358 U.S. 222 (Arizona Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 4ll U.S. 145, 36 L.Ed 2d l4 at 411 U.S. 149 (New Mexico). The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma has acknowledged and given its own meaning to the effect of their State's Constitutional limitations with respect to Indian lands. It has held, variously, that Oklahoma must look solely to the. acts of Congress with respect to restrictions on Indian lands, F.B. Collins Inv. Co. v. Beard, 46 Okl. 310,148 P.846, 850 (1915); that the plenary authority of Congress to legislate for Indian lands cannot - be impaired by Oklahoma, State v. Huser, 76 Okl. 130, 184 P. 113 (1919); that the cession of jurisdiction to the federal government was not restricted, but absolute, Franz v. Autry, 18 Okl. 561, 91 P. 193 (1907); that where a conflict exists between state and federal authority, state law is superceded, Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Okl. Page 18 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1943). See also Cockran v. Teehee, 40 Okl. 388, 138 P. 563 (1914); Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, 67 Okl. 106, 169 P. 483 (1917). Moreover, the Oklahoma Legislature, in making its decennial codification of statutes, maintains the disclaimers. 750.S. 1971 Sec. 184. Perhaps, the historical attitude of the State of Oklahoma can be summed in the language of Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, supra, 191 Okl. 505: We have referred to state and federal authorities outlining the policy and purpose of the law with respect to the lands and property of the Indians. None of these authorities discloses an inclination to limit in any degree the broad and comprehensive powers reserved to the federal government by the all-inclusive language of section | of the Enablin Act. Specifically, the power reserved was the power to make any law or regulation which it would have been competent to make "if this act had never been passed." Prior to statehood, the power of Congress to legislate with respect to the Indians, their lands and property, was plenary. This plenary power was fully preserved to the Congress by the Provisions of the Enabling Act and the acceptance of said provisions by the people of this state. (Emphasis added). In face of the historical expressions of the Oklahoma judiciary, the Oklahoma Supreme Court now States, relying on Organized Village, supra, *nenre tt Oklahoma's disclaimer of right and title to Indian lands is a disclaimer of proprietary rather than governmental interests. *eet & Page 19 #% The Oklahoma Court ignored, however, what this Court was required to restate in McClanahan, supra, 4ll U.S. 176, note 15: x* keer * * *In (Organized Village of Kake v. Egan), we held that "absolute™ federal jurisdiction is not invariable exclusive jurisdiction," and that this language in federal legislation did not preclude the exercise of residual state authority. See (369 U.S. 68, 7 L.Ed. 2d 573). But that holding came in context of a decision concerning the fishing rights of nonreservation Indians. See (369 U.S. 62, 7 L. Ed. 2d 573). It did not purport to provide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas set aside by treaty for the exclusive use and control of Indians. (Emphasis by the Court). ett & Nor did the Oklahoma Court look to the impact of McClanahan upon the disclaimer language of the Arizona Enabling Act, identical to that of Oklahoma (McClanahan, supra, commencing at 4ll U.S. 174): * etek It is circumstances such as these which have led this Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the general rule that "(d)oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 74 L. Ed. 478, 50 S. Ct. 121 (1930). When this canon of construction is taken together with the tradition of Indian independence described above, it cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos Page 20 under general federal supervision. It is thus unsurprising that this Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law -- including state tax law -- to Indians on the Navajo Reservation. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n 380 U.S. at 687, 690, 14 L. Ed. 2d 165; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 221-222, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251. Moreover, since the signing of the Navajo treaty, Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that the State lacked jurisdiction over the Navajos living on the reservation. (Footnote 13 by Court). Thus, when Arizona entered the Union, its entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that the State would "forever disclaim all right and title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat.557, 569. (Footnote omitted) Nor is the Arizona Enabling Act silent on the specific question of tax immunity. The Act expressly provides that "nothing herein, or in the ordinance herein provided for, shall preclude the said State from taxing as other lands and other property are taxed any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation owned or held by an Indian." Id. at 570 (emphasis added). It is true of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a general rule, be clearly expressed. But we have in the past construed language far more ambiguous than this as providing a tax exemption for Indians. See, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6, 100 L. Ed. 883, 76 S. Ct. 611 (1956), and we see no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or restrictive meaning. (footnote 15 by Court, quoted supra). *eete Footnote 13 is quoted for convenience as follows: Page 21 ee eee t 13. “Congress has... acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation. ... Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had denied." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S., at 220-221, 3 L. Ed. 251 (footnote omitted). xe If Organized Village can be said to stand for any proposition relevant here -- since the case did not involve state regulatory jurisdiction over Indian lands -- it can only be used as a summary of all criteria, the absence of which must exist before a state may assert such jurisdiction. By way of summary, state jurisdiction over . Indian lands under the guise of regulatory authority cannot exist: 1. If state action infringes upon the right of Indians to make their own laws; 2. If there exists a treaty obligation excluding state authority; 3. If there is an impairment of federal law or regulation; 4, If Congress has reserved regulatory authority to itself; or 5. If there exists any legal impediment to the state law prohibiting it. Illustrative of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court Page 22 has not tended to relax restrictions against state regulatory power since Organized Village ‘are the following expressions of what state may not do in a regulatory capacity as against Indian lands (reminding this Court that Organized Village concerned itself with non-Indian lands): 1. The State of Arizona could not impose a tax on gross proceeds of sales to Indians on an_ Indian reservation. Warren Trading Post Co. v Arizona Tax Commission, supra. Again, note that Arizona has the same disclaimer requirement as does Oklahoma. 2. The State of New Mexico could not impose a use tax on personality installed in the construction of ski lifts by Indians even. though the lift was on off-reservation land. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra. The State of New Mexico has the same disclaimer requirement as does Oklahoma and Arizona. Additionally, . Mescalero Apache Tribe limits the effect of Organized Village to "off-reservation activities." 411 U.S. 153, 36 L. Ed. 2d 122. 3. The mere fact that land is allotted does not terminate federal supervision of Indian Country. Mattz v. Arnett, 1973, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 412 U.S. 481, 37 L. Ed. 2d 92. Page 23 4, Only where Congress clearly terminates its supervisory status does a state assume jurisdiction. ‘DeCoteau v. District Court, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 410 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300, reh den. 95 S. Ct. 1667, 421 U.S. 939, 44 L. Ed. 2d 95. 5. Where Congress has vested jyrisdiction over adoption preceedings of reservation Indians in a tribal court, a state may not assert jurisdiction since the overriding federal policy defeats that assertion. Fisher v. District Court, 1976, 96 S.Ct.424 U.S. 382, 943, 47 L. Ed. 2d 106, reh. den., 96 S. Ct. 1524, 425 U.S. 926, 47 L. Ed. 2d 772. 6. The State of Montana could not tax personal property located on a reservation, or require a cigarette vendor's license or collection of sales tax for products sold to on-reservation Indians. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 1976, 95 S. Ct. 1634, 424 U.S. 463, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96. Montana is also a disclaimer state. Such language does not bespeak of limitations of the Oklahoma disclaimer to a mere "proprietary" interest as the Oklahoma Supreme Court states in this instance. The court below improperly relied upon Organized Village, supra, for its implied assertion that the Enabling Act Page 24 disclaimer is now something less than what it was immediately after Statehood. Having done so, the Oklahoma Court has invaded traditional federal sovereignty. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA HAS NOT ASSUMED JURISDICTION ON RESTRICTED INDIAN LANDS The opinion issued by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, by way of summary, reasoned (I) that the disclaimer provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution applied to "proprietary" powers and not political or police power; (2) that Pub. L. 83-280, (hereafter Pub. L. 280), 67 Stat. 588 1953) (and its successor Civil Rights Act of 1968) empowered a state, without more, to enlarge its jurisdiction to Indian lands to the same extent as the federal governments withdrew its jurisdiction; and (3) that Congress, in requiring a State to "amend" its constitution or statutes, only imposed such an obligation to do that affirmative act "where necessary," that is, where the constitution or statutes pose impediments to assumption of sovereignty. An analysis of the general relinquishment of federal jurisdiction over restricted Indian lands, through State Page 25 consent, was treated extensively in Kennerly v. District Court, 1971, 91 S. Ct. 480, 400 U.S. 423, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507. By way of summary, the U. S. Supreme Court limited the application of Pub L. 280, extending criminal jurisdiction extending civil jurisdiction to the five states enumerated. Montana (as Oklahoma) was not an enumerated State. Said the Court, at 400 U.S. 424, 425: “ett "Prior to the passage of Title IV of the Civil Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U.S.C. Sections 1321-1326 (1964 ed., Supp. V)... state assumption of civil jurisdiction -- was governed by Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590. Section 7 of that siatute provided: 'The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other state not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act (referring to Sections 2 and 4, see n. |, supra), to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such a manner as the people of the State shall, affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind State to assumption thereof.’ (Emphasis added). * et The Kennerly Court, faced with an action to enforce a debt incurred within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation by members of the tribe, noted that the Montana legislature, by legislative enactment, had extended criminal, but not civil, jurisdiction over the lands of the Flathead tribe, Page 26 i * eet "But Montana never took ‘affirmative legislative action'-- concerning either civil or criminal jurisdiction -- with respect to the Blackfeet Reser vation." x*ert The Blackfeet tribe, however, had adopted as part of its tribal law an enactment which, unilaterally, granted the State concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal courts over civil suits. Hence, the Kennerly Court was faced with Pub. L. 280. In discussing the necessity of State "affirmative legislative action" to extend its jurisdiction over Indian lands, the Kennerly Court stated, 400 U.S. 427: eek t "Nor was the requirement of affirmative legislative action an idle choice of words; the legislative history of the 1953 statute shows that the requirement was intended to assure that state jurisdiction would not be extended until the jurisdiction to be responsible for the portion of Indian country concerned manifested by political action their willingness and ability to discharge their new responsibilities." enone added). * ek & Nor did the pre-1968 tribal action constitute the requisite consent required under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. Sections 1321-1326. Said the Court, 400 U.S. 428: Page 27 "=> *xeet Title IV of the 1968 statute repealed Section 7 of the 1953 Act (Pub. L. 280, supra) and substituted a new regulatory scheme for the extension of state civil and criminal jurisdiction to litigation involving Indians living in Indian country." * tt The provisions of the 1968 Act, Pub. L. 90-284, Title IV, Sections 402, 404, 82 Stat. 79 (April ll, 1968), 25 U.S.C. Sections 1321, 1324, enabled a state to assume civil jurisdiction upon the occurrence of two contingencies: (1) "consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof," 25 U.S.C. Section 1321, and (2) amendments to constitutions and statutes for the removal _ of legal impediments, 25 U.S.C. Section 1324. By way of summary, therefore, the assumption of State jurisdiction over restricted Indian lands in Oklahoma must, according to Kennerly, supra, have come about in one of two ways if the 1953 and 1968 congressional enactments are to furnish a basis of jurisdiction: l. If assumed under authority of Pub. L. 280 such assumption of jurisdiction must flow from "affirmative legislative action" of the State of Oklahoma; or 2. If assumed under authority of the Civil Rights Page 28 Act of 1968, such assumption must be preceeded by the electoral consent of Choctaw tribe and the affirmative assertion of jurisdiction of the State. There is nothing in the record nor has research developed the criteria precedent to the Corporation Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over oil wells on Indian land. Requisite consent of the Choctaw tribe is not evident in the record below and none is believed to exist. Legal research has uncovered no "affirmative legislative action" wherein the State of Oklahoma " manifested by political action (its) willingness and ability to discharge their new responsibility." Kennerly, supra, 400 U.S. 427. Assuming this discussion to be a accurate reflection of the law, then it follows that the restrictions of Oklahoma law impose more than a mere proprietary disclaimer, but an unqualified constitutional impediment. Okla. Const. Art. 1, Section3. Ill PUB. L. 80-336 TRANSFERS NO FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO THE CORPORATION COMMISSION IN VIEW OF EXISTING FEDERAL OIL AND GAS REGULATIONS AND ABSENCE OF FEDERAL APPROVAL OF ORDERS. Page 29 Rt The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited no authority wherein Congress has yielded to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission an independent power to regulate oil and gas exploration activities on Indian lands except that which may be said to exist in the provisions of Pub.L. 80-336, c.459, Sec.ll, Act of August 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 731: * ket All restricted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to all oil and gas conservation laws of Oklahoma: Provided, that no order of the Corporation Commission affecting restricted Indian land shall be valid as to such land until submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative. (Emphasis original) x*reet A condition precedent, however, to the application of Oklahoma law is the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The Court below entirely disregarded the regulations of the Department of Interior which specifically preclude the application of State or local law with respect to the regulation of Indian lands. 25 CFR Part 1 Sec.1.4(2): x*eet & (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, none of the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other regulations of any State or political subdivision thereof limiting, zoning or otherwise governing, regulating, or Page 30 ¢% controlling the use or development of any real or personal proper including water rights, shall be applicable to any such propert leased from or held or used under agreement with and belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or cummunity that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against aliention imposed by the United States. (30 Fed. Reg. 7520 (June 9, 1965). eek Moreover, the record below does not reflect and there is not known to be an application by the Corporation Commission to the Interior Department for an approval of its Order in this case. The Department of Interior, however, knew of the pending action before the Commission; the District Engineer for USGS testified at the hearing (Appendix A, para 25). The Findings of Fact of the Commission reflect that, at all Stages of their activities, Petitioners complied with all federal regulations, both regulations of BIA and USGS, and were released from federal obligations under the lease. (Appendix A, paras. 25-36; See Appendix J for regulations under which Petitioner was bound). In short, the abundant and pervasive regulatory scheme adopted and exercised by the Department of Interior has pre-empted whatever authority the Corporation Commission may have had _ under Page 31 Pub.L.80-336, supra. Bryan v. Itasca County, supra. The Corporation Commission's order to Petitioners to enter into Indian land and to perform acts with respect to that land is an invalid invasion of the exclusive domain of federal authority Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas, 1962, 83S. Ct. 646, 373 U.S. 84,9 L.Ed 2d 601, reh. den. 83 S.Ct. 10ll, 371 U.S. 960, 10 L.Ed 2d 14, an authority upon which Petitioners were entitled to rely. By way of summary, Petitioners contend that, having submitted to and complied with federal regulatory requirements imposed to date, they should not be subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction. Petitioners state that the body of law recited above -- indeed, the body of legal history. left uncited because of limitations of space -- make clear that the State of Oklahoma has entered upon a course of enforcement which it is constitutionally unable to do, assuming a power of regulation clearly given to and yet retained by the federal government and invading, without authority of law, the preempted field of federally regulated concerns. Petitioners may well be subject to the same order from federal authority; they may well be subject to landowner action; they cannot be, given the Page 32 status of the law, subject to actions by the State of Oklahoma. CONCLUSION Given the extensive oil and gas _ exploration activities required to meet national energy needs, the relative role of state and federal government in regulating the nature and manner of such activities on Indian lands must be clearly defined. To Petitioners' knowledge, this Court has never expressed itself as to the extent, if any, to which a State may assume regulatory authority for development of minerals located on Indian lands. Hence, Petitioners present a case of new impression. Moreover, while this Court has spoken to a need for affirmative action by disclaimer States to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 and the 1968 Civil Rights Act, it is clear from the rather cursory treatment of Petitioner's cause by the court below that this court should once again express itself to (I) the manner by which federally imposed and required state constitutional disclaimers may be removed, (2) the extent Page 33 y - to which a removal permits States to assert its police power and other regulatory schemes and (3) the conflict between apparent delegations of federal authority over Indian lands in the nature of Pub. L. 80-336 and the pervasive federal regulations affecting both State and federal interests. Petitioners pray, therefore, that this Court grant their Petition and, upon review of the merits, reverse the decision below. Respectfully submitted, WESNER COKE & BOYD Geos By f arry R. Boyd 8th Floor, Heritage Square II 5001 L.B.J. Freeway Dallas, Texas 75234 (214)661-5402 Attorney for Petitioners CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL On the 19th day of December, 1980, I, Larry R. Boyd, a member of the Bar of the State of Texas and of the Supreme Court of the United States, certify that, in accordance with Rule 28.3 of the Rules of the Supreme Page 34 e% Court, mailed to the following named counsel of record below, at the addresses shown, three (3) copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, by depositing the same in a United States mailbox, first class postage prepaid: Corporation Commission of Oklahoma by serving: Harvey Cody, Attorney Oil and Gas Conservation Division Oklahoma Corporation Commission Jim Thorpe Office Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 Attorney for Respondents * cemented to the surface. Ten sacks of cement pumped to the bottom; mud was used to fill the hale. 32. Admittedly, most of Oklahoma Corporation Commission required forms in this case were not filed with the Commission. Reports were filed with the U. S. Gedlogical Survey. At the time of filing, the requirements of the USGS for completion and plugging were evidently the same as those of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. However, since most of the required forms were not filed with the Commission, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the wells were properly plugged. 33. The evidence shows that in the case of the B-2 Well, Halliburton records indicate that the casing was cemented to the surface. The report Gundry Notices and Reports on Wells) filed with the USGS and signed by a J. Wayne Johnson indicates that casing was left in the hole, five sacks of cement placed in the bottom and three sacks placed in the top to cover the hole. Although this report was approved by the Deputy Supervisor, it is noted that the actual plugging operations were not witnessed. APPENDIX A y » * 34. The Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells - filed with the USGS for Well No. 1-B indicates that surface casing was set to a depth of 40 feet below ground level and cemented to surface. Ten sacks of cement were pumped to the bottom of the hole, mud added and after settling for 3 days surface casing cut off at li inches below ground level and three sacks of cement pumped into the top. The notice filed also indicates that the plugging operations were not witnessed. 35. A letter dated November 21, 1958, to the Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs from the Acting District Engineer states that a lease inspection made November 20, 1958, indicated wells on the Sophie Harrison Lease, NW/4 NE/4 NW/4 and © NW/4NE/4NW/4NE/4NW/4 NW/4 andS/2NW/4NW/4NW/4 were plugged and surface remedial work completed. 36. Against this information, we have the testimony that a hale located where the Harrison B-2 Well should be is purging salt water. That Continental Oil Company dug a pit 25 feet deep around this location attempting to find the surface APPENDIX A 7% "SS 2 casing and that none was located. There was also testimony indicating that casing was noted lying on the ground at the time the plugging of the B-2 was being accomplished. 37. The Commission finds that the Sophie Harrison B-2 Well and the Sophie Harrison B-1 Well were not plugged in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation Com mission, APPENDIX A ey ORDER IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Corporation Com mission of Oklahoma that Curry & Curry plug the Sophie Harrison B-2 Well, located in the SW/4 NW/4 NW/4 and the Sophie Harrison B-1 Well Located in the SE/4 NW/4 NE/4 NW/4 of Section 10, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, Stephens County, Oklahoma within 90 days of the date of the Order and to file report of Plugging within 10 days after completion of Plugging. DONE AND PERFORMED this _10_ day of. January, 1978. CORPORATION COMMISSION OF OKLAHOMA S/Rex Privett REX PRIVETT, CHAIRMAN amp Baker HAMP BAKER, VICE-CHAIRMAN an Eric Cart JAN ERIC CARTWRIGHT, COMMISSIONER ATTEST: S/ Ed Overhciser ED OVERHOLSER, SECRETARY APPENDIX A -% APPENDIX B IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA P.W. CURREY AND MRS. JAMES D. CURREY d/b/a CURREY & CURREY, ) ) ) Appellants, vs. ) NO. 51906 ) CORPORATION COMMISSION ) FILED OF OKLAHOMA; DAN R. ) SUPREME COURT DUNNETT, DIRECTOR OF ) STATE OF , CONSERVATION FOR ) OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION ) ROSS N. LILLARD, OF OKLAHOMA ) JR., CLERK A ) January 31, 1978 PETITION IN ERROR Appellants state: L This Appeal is brought to review the decision of the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, said decision being issued on the 10th day of January, 1978 as Order No. 137283 in Cause P.D.No. 8236 by the Com mission styled as fallows: COMPLAINT OF DAN R. DUNNETT, DIRECTOR OF CONSERVATION, FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING CURRY & CURRY TO PLUG WELLS LOCATED IN THE SW/4 NW/4 NW/4 OF SECTION 10 TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, STEPHENS COUNTY, OKLAHOMA. APPENDIX B * #3 Xx A true and correct copy of the “Report of the Com mission" incorporating the Order Complained of is attached as "Exhibit A" and incorporated herein by reference, 2. The’ style and number assigned to proceedings below is as contained with Exhibit A. a: Sie proceedings below were initiated upon the Complaint of Appellee Dan R. Dunnett (hereafter "DUNNETT") in his capacity as Director of Conservation for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma (hereafter "Commission") wherein DUNNETT sought an Order from the Commission to compel Appellants, Respondents below, to plug certain oil and gas wells located in Stephens County, Oklahoma, one or more of which wells were said to be “purging”. Upon hearing, the Acting Trial examiner for the Commission issued his "Report of the Trial Examiner," which inter alia recommended that Appellants be required to "properly plug” the alleged offensive wells, although the evidence indicated that the wells had once been plugged. Appellants took exception to the "Report of the Trial Examiner" and, upon hearing, the Commission, APPENDIX B *% in effect, affirmed the Trial Examiner's Report, finding that two of the wells "were not plugged in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation Commission and ordering Appellants to "pluc" the two wells within ninety (90) days of the date of the Order and to file appropriate plugging reports. 4. The decision and Order appealed from was rendered on the 10th day of January, 1979, with compliance by Appellants to be accomplished on or before ninety (90) days thereafter. 5. Appellants complain of the following error by the Com mission in its decision and Order: a. The Commission lacked jurisdiction to enter said Order as against Appellants for one or more or the following reasons: } The wells in question are located on restricted Indian land and, as such, drilling and Plugging operations are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States government to the exclusion of the Com mission; 2) Assuming that the Commission had, to some degree, a superintending jurisdiction APPENDIX B | in the plugging of wells on restricted Indian lands, such jurisdiction did not extend to exceed or contravene the plugging requirements imposed by federal regulatory agencies; 3) Assuming that the Commission had, to some degree, a superintending jurisdiction in the plugging of wells, it had no authority under applicable plugging statutes to compel Appellant to re-enter the wells and replug or repair plugs on the wells, b. The findings and conclusions made by the Commission are not supported by evidence or law, to-wit: }) All creditable evidence support a finding that each of the wells was plugged in a manner which complied with existing federal and State regulations and the custom and practice of the industry; 2) The applicable “plugging” statute, 52 O.S. 1951 Sec. 53, did not authorize the Commission to compel Appellant to re-enter, replug or repair plugs when, once having done ™, Appellants had abandoned the wells; APPENDIX B 7% 3) Such statutory authority which may have been enacted subsequent to the plugging of the wells and which purports to grant authority to the Commission to compel Appellants to re-enter and replug the wells constitute, as a matter of law, ex post facto legislation and may not be applied to Appellants; 4) The compulsive order of the Commission as against Appellants was barred by the Statute of Limitatons; and 5) No evidence exists which will Support a conclusion that the manner or method of Plugging by Appellants did not comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation Com mission. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Appellants pray this Honorable Court to grant the fallowing relief: lL =«*‘To set aside and vacate the Order of the Commission wherein the Commission compels Appellants to "...plug the Sophie Harrison B-2 Well, located in the SW/4 NW/4 NW/4 and the Harrison B-l Well located in the SE/4 NW/4 NE/4 NW/4 of Section 10, Coca” Gilet ame as a a County, Oklahoma within 90 days of APPENDIX B ‘*> date of the Order and to file report of Pluggin within 10 days after completion of plugging;" 2. To dismiss Appellants from this and any other proceedings before the Commission or other tribunal to abate or correct such conditions as may now or may hereafter exist at the sites of the wells described in the Report of the Com mission; 3. To order costs of this appeal to be assessed against and paid by the Com mission, and 4. Such other and further relief as to which Appellants are entitled. P, W. CURREY AND MRS. JAMES D. CURREY G/b/a CURREY & CURREY a/k/a CURREY,SHIELDS& CU RREY,Appellants s/Manville T. Buford MANVILLE T. BUFORD Buck, Crabtree, Ransdell & Buford 1700 Park Harvey Center Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Appellants APPENDIX B 7% CERTIFICATE OF MAILING On this 31 day of January, 1978, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma and mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: Honorable Larry D Attorney General of the State Oklahoma Capitol Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 Nathan Sherman Assistant Conservation A Oklahoma Corporation Com mission Jim Thorpe Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 John R. Robertson, Jr. Attorney for Continental Oil Company 1000 Fidelity Plaza Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Charley W. Nease District Engineer U. S. Gedlogical Survey 50 Penn Place Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73112 Don B. Edinger Acting Trial Examiner Oklahoma Corporation Com mission Jim Thorpe Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 S/Manville T. Buford MANVILLE T. BUFORD APPENDIX B et APPENDIX C IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA P. W. Currey and Mrs, James D. Currey G/b/a Currey & Currey a/k/a Currey, Shields & Currey, Appellants, vs. Corporation Com mission of Oklahoma; Dan R. Dunnett, Director of Conservation for Corporation Com mission of Oklahoma, Appellees. me me ee ee ee ee eee ee ee ee eee No. 51,906 FILED June 12, 1979 ROSS N. LILLARD, JR. Clerk, SUPREME COURT STATE OF OKLAHOMA Appeal from Order of Corporation Commission directing Appellants to replug abandoned oil and gas wells which are purging salt water onto the surface of the land. ORDER OF THE CORPORATION COMMISSION AFFIRMED Manville T. Buford, Buck, Crabtree, Ransdell & Buford Oklahoma City, Oklahoma APPENDIX C For Appellants; *% Harvey Cody, Conservation Attorney, Nathan S. Sherman, Assistant Conservation Attorney, Oklahoma Corporation Com mission, For Appellees. WILLIAMS, J. Appeal is taken by P. W. Currey and Mrs, James D. Currey d/b/a Currey & Currey a/k/a Currey, Shields & Currey (Appellant/Currey) from Order No. 137273 of the Corporation Commission (Commission) directing Currey to replug two wells located in Stephens County. Appellant obtained oil and gas exploration lease rights to restricted Choctaw lands located in Stephens County, Oklahoma. The lease was obtained throught the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which then turned direct supervision to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Evidence adduced before the Trial Examiner for the Commission disclosed further that Currey Grilled three wells, "Sophie Harrison No, 1,” "Sophie Harrison No. B-l" and Sophie Harrison No. B-2" (wells). All three wells were abandoned in the mid-1950's. The wells were thereafter plugged, and APPENDIX C ‘FX appropriate reports made to USGS. Parties disagree as to the degree of compliance with Commission filing requirements, but both agree that Currey did not fully comply with all Commission filing requirements, In 1976 Continental Oil Company, an adjacent and contiguous lessee, discovered salt water purging from one of Currey'’s wells. Continental informed the Commission, which thereafter inspected the site, found one well to be purging and issued a complaint. The complaint was later amended to encompass another well found to be purging. Extensive testimony was taken by the trial examiner regarding compliance with USGS plugging requirements and conformity to Commission filing requirements, The degree of compliance is not deter minative. It is not disputed that the wells were drilled and operated by Currey over twenty years ago, and that now two of these wells are spewing forth salt water in excess of forty barrels a day onto the ae APPENDIX C *% Appellant contends generally that the Corporation Commission has no jurisdiction to order reworking or replugging of wells because the wells are located oon restricted Indian lands under exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Appellant Currey further argues that even if the Federal Government lacks exclusive jurisdiction, still the Commission is without statutory authority to compel replugging. We shall deal with the second argument first. Appellant relies heavily on Minshall_ v. Corporation Commission, OkL, 485 P.2d 1058 (97)), which has been further clarified by Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Corporation Commission, __P.24 _. Ashland supra clarifies Minshall and addresses itself more specifically to such facts as are invalved in the case at bar as fallows: Ashland urges on appeal that Minshall v. Corporation Commission, Ok. 485 P.2d 1058 (971) controls. In Minshall, the Corporation Commission found that a well drilled, plugged, and abandoned by Minshall was leaking gas through and onto the ground. Apparently APPENDIX C relying upon 52 0.S. Supp. 1965, $3101 the Commission ordered Minshall to replug the well On appeal, the Minshall cour: stated in its syllabus: ‘Neither 17 0O.S. 1961, §53, nor any of the provision of Senate Bill No, 396 of the Thirtieth (1963) Oklahoma Legislature (Chapter 191 O.S.L. 1965; 52 O.S. Suppe. 1965-1969, §§309 through 317) imposes upon any - one an obligation to replug, or repair, an abandoned well that has been plugged but is Presently leaking salt water, oil, gas, or other deleterious substances,' ~»-At page 1061 of Minshal, we read: *** If the well has been plugged, the question of whether or not it was properly Plugged in accordance with the then-effective rules and regulations is not invalved.' Additionally, as the Commission correctly points out, the Court in Minshall clearly limited its consideration to the 7 “oo L Amended by Laws, c.217, § 2. APPENDIX C Powey cS a + =. ae 2. application of 52 O.S. Supps. 1965-1969, §§309-315 on the question of an operator's responsibility and did not concern itself with amendments to that Act enacted subsequent to the order of the Commission or with any other existing statuLes, For purposes of the instant action it is important td note that the Court did not consider the impact of the 1970 Amendment to §310 (Laws 1970, ch. 217, §2) which provides: '*** (b) that the operator or any other person responsible for plugging, replugging or repairing the well in such manner as is necessary to prevent further pollution cannot be found, or is financially umable to pay the cost of performing such work.* **' Without question, this provision supplies the ve im of the Operator's liability for ‘plugging, _repilugaing or which was found m at the time of Minshall was decided. Consideration of this provision together with numerous other statutory declarations” 17 OS. 1971, §§5l, 53; 52 OS. 1971, §§ 86.2, 86.3, 271-279, 309-320; 52 O.S. Supp. 1975, §102. APPENDIX C = ahs leaves absolutely no room for doubt that the Corporation Commission has the Statutory power to order an operator to replug wells which were improperly Plugged.*** (Emphasis added). The record reveals the Commission's finding that the wells were not properly plugged was Supported by substanial evidence. ett Cole 4s 8 required to weigh the evidence on appeal, but to review the evidence and affirm the order where the finding and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by law and substanial evidence. 0S. 1971 Const. Art. 9 §20; Superior Oil Co. v. Oklahoma _ Corporation Commission, OkL, 242 P.2d 454 (1952). Assuming Oklahoma has jurisdiction over wells drilled on restricted Indian land, _ the Commission has the authority to order reworking or replugging of these wells, and we so hald, Next requiring attention is appellant's second Major argument that because the wells were drilled on restricted Indian lands Oklahoma is_ without jurisdiction. APPENDIX C *% Currey cites as _ authority OS. 1971 Const. Art. 1 sec. 3 as follows: The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to any wunappropriated public lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States. and Public Law No. 83-280, 67 Stat 588 (1953), which in pertinent part states: Sec. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, thei: State constitution or exisiting statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction § in APPENDIX C LS * accordance with the provisions of the Act **%*. (Emphasis added. Appellant simply argues that the Constitutional impediment under Sec. 3 supra has not been properly removed by any Constitutional amendment. Appellant proceeded on the assumption that if a right is held by the Federal Government and later abrogated, then there must be an affirmative corresponding state enactment to fill the void. This assumption is erroneous, A federal district court held? in construing P. L. 280 supra that "Congress, under the constitutional power to regulate commerce with the Indians, has preempted the field of regulation of Indian land to the extent that such is necessary to protect the Indians’ rights therein and to preserve title thereto until the day when the Indian has developed culturally to a point where he can deal and manage his own affairs." The Court goes on further to say that, "Congress in recent years has recognized that 3. the Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians’ Tribal Council et al, v. The City of Palm Springs, etc., et al, (D.C., Cal), 347 F. Supp. 42, (1972). APPENDIX C ey Indians in some states, .. . have reached a state of acculturation where some federal controls might properly be relaxed.*** Public Law 280, like other Similar laws in recent years, is a withdrawal by Congress from its preemption in this field. It has done so in this case by express grant to the state of authority, among other things, to exercise its police power in such a way as to impose upon Indian lands the same regulations imposed upon all lands within the boundaries of the state. To the extent that any further’ withdrawal by the Federal Government occurs, the sovereignty cf the state becomes enlarged to that extent.” (Emphasis added). In 1947, prior to the drilling and plugging of the wells in question, Public Law 80-336, found in 61 Stat. 731, Act of August 4, 1947 Ch. 459, was passed by the Congress of the United States, Section IL of said Act specifically withdraws Congress from preemption in the field of oil and gas conservation and thereby enlarged the sovereignty of Oklahoma to that extent. I+ reads: "1 AD restricted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to all Of APPENDIX C ** and Gas Conservation laws of the State of Oklahoma; . +. "(Emphasis added). No affirmative statutory enactment was necessary for Oklahoma to assume jurisdiction abrogated by the federal government. The United States Supreme Court in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), in an Opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, construed an Alaskan conservation law, in light of a Constitutional provision similar to Oklahoma's Article 1, Sec.3. Indian communities brought an action against the Governor of Alaska to enjoin enforcement of the Alaska Anti-Fish Trap Conservation Law. ! The principal dispute concerned,” ... the meaning of sec. 4 of the Statehood Act, in which the State disclaimed all right and title to and the United States retained absolute jurisdiction and control over, inter alia, ‘any lands or other property ..., the right or title to which may be held by any Indians ...' o is held by the United States in trust for said natives." Organized Village of Kate, supra, at p. 565. APPENDIX C 7. The Court states further at page 567 that: Although the reference to fishing rights is unique, the _ retention of ‘absalute’ federal jurisdiction over Indian lands adopts the formula of . nine _ prior Statehood acts. Indian lands in Arizona remained ‘under the absolute jurisdiction and control’ of the United States, 36 Stat. 557; Yet in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 272, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, we declared that the test of whether a state law could be applied on Indian reservations there was whether the application of that law would interfere with reservation self government. The identical language appears in Montana's Admission Act, 25 Stat. 676, 677. Yet in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 17 S.Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419, the Court held that a non-Indian who was accused of murdering another non-Indian on a Montana Reservation could be prosecuted only in the state courts, *** Draper and Williams indicate that ‘absolute’ federal is not invalably ve (Organized Village Kake, supra.) (Emphasis added). Oklahoma's disclaimer of right and title to Indian lands is a disclaimer of proprietary rather than governmental interests, "The State may well waive its claim to any right or title to the lands and stil have all of its political or police power with respect to the actions of the people on those APPENDIX C lands, as long as that does not affect the title to the land." Kake, supra. We hald that the power of the Corporation Commission to regulate oil and gas conservation measures under the laws of the state on restricted Indian lands and order appellant to replug purging wells, is not precluded by the federal -urisdiction. Our Constitutional mandate contained in O.S. 1971 Art, 1 Sec, 3 stating that Indian lands “shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States", envisions undiminished and not exclusive jurisdiction. We so hald. CONCUR: Hodges, Barnes, Simms, Dodlin and Hargrave, JJ. CONCUR BY REASON OF STARE DECISB: Lavender, C.J. and Opala, J. APPENDIX C APPENDIX D IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA P. W. CURREY and MRS. JAMES D. CURREY G/b/a CURREY & CURREY ) a/k/a CURREY, SHIELDS ) & CURREY ) ) Appellants, Vv. ) NO.51,906 ) FILED CORPORATION ) JUNE 25, 1979 COMMISSION OF ) ROSS N. LILLARD, JR. OKLAHOMA, et.aL, ) CLERK ) SUPREME COURT Appellees. ) STATE OF OKLAHOMA PETITION FOR REHEARING Appellants, by and through counsel and pursuant to Rule 28, Rules of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, respectfully petition the Court for rehearing in the captioned cause. In support thereof, Appellants state: de The Opinion issued and filed June 12, 1979, involved matters of first impression in this r jurisdiction and constitute, apart from the novel APPENDIX D nature thereof, matters on considerable concern to the parties and the implementation and enforcement of oil and gas conservation laws of the State. 2. Appellant believes and, in good faith and with all due respect to the Court, states that the Court erred in its interpretation of the provisions cf statute in hdiding that the Corporation Commission had present authority and jurisdiction to compe! an oil operator, operating under federal regulatory restrictions to reenter and = replig abandoned wells once plugged. 3. Appellant believes the Court erred in its determination that federal jurisdiction with respect to restricted Indian lands has_ been withdrawn in a manner so as to enlarge state regulatory jurisdiction in and on such lands, 4. Appellant believes the Court erred in its determination that the federal government has extended to the State of Oklahoma, without affirmative acts of the State, exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over Indian lands so as to authorize the Corporation Commission to exercise APPENDIX D ‘o) = » * regulatory control over oail and gas operations thereon, 5. Appellants believe that the Court either disregarded or misinterpreted what Appellant regards as a fundamental principle of law supporting Appellants’ position, to wit: that the existence of pervasive federal regulation in the area of oil and gas operations on Indian lands, including the reworking and replugging thereon, has preempted the imposition of . state - regulatory power notwithstanding other jurisdictional issues, Such federal regulation, even if operated in conjuction with state jurisdiction, previals over’ state regulations to the extent that a conflict exists, Appellants respectfully believe that such an issue is of such magnitude with respect to Appellants rights and obligations that it would work an injustice not to have the issue treated by this Court, WHEREFORE, Appellants pray the Court, upon consideration, withdraw its Opinion issued and filed June 12, 1979, and issue its Order vacating the Order of the Corporation Commission, for costs APPENDIX D Pa and such other relief as to which Appellants may be os entitled, Respectfully submitted, s/Manville T. Buford Manville T. Buford P. 0. Box 60855 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73106 (405) 521-3921 a , CERTIFICATE OF MAILING On this 25th day of June, 1979, a true and correct copy of the foregaing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the fallowing: Hon, Jan Eric Cartwright Nathan Sherman Attorney General Assistant Conservation Capitol Building Attorney > Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Jim Thorpe Building 73105 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 John R. Robertson, Attorney 1000 Fidelity Plaza n Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102: Manville T, Buford ay APPENDIX D ‘ APPENDIX E > | IN SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA P.W.Currey and Mrs. James D. Currey d/b/a Currey & Currey a/k/a ) Currey, Shields & ) Currey, r Appellants, vs. ) No, 51,906 ) FILED Corporation Commission ) September 22,1980 of Oklahoma; Dan R. ) ROSS N. LILLARD, JR. Dunnett, Director of ) CLERK Conservation for ) SUPREME COURT Corporation Commission ) STATE OF OKLAHOMA of ) ! Oklahoma, ) ) Appellees. ) CORRECTION ORDER Tt is hereby ordered that the typewritten Opinion of this court filed and promulgated in the above styled case on the 12th day of June 1979, be ordered to be corrected and it is corrected as hereinafter set forth, that is to say that in the ninth line of page 6 of such typewritten opinion next following the end of the partial quotation APPENDIX E Pi a i which concludes with the words and grammatical symbol, to-wit: State of Oklahoma; and next preceding the grammatical symbols and words, to-wit: --."(Emphasis added)., there be inserted in lieu of tthe ellipsis symbol) the following words and grammatical symbols, to-wit Provided, That no order of the Corporation Commission affecting restricted Indian land shall be valid as to such land until submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative. | Tt is further ordered that the vote of the Justices shown at the conclusion of such typewritten Opinion ( in addition to the name of the author of the opinion occurring at the commencement of the body thereof) be corrected as fallows: BARNES, SIMMS, DOOLIN, and HARGRAVE, JJ. concur. LAVENDER, C.J., and OPALA, J. concur by reason of stare decisis. HODGES, J., dissents. Tt is further ordered that such opinion with such language added and with said ellipsis symbol APPENDIX E deleted (and as heretofore ordered corrected and so corrected, including correction of the vote of the : Justices), shall otherwise remain in full force and effect, DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE this 22nd day of September, 1980. . s/Robert E. Lavender Chief Justice APPENDIX E ‘ | APPENDIX F © FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 1980 ROSS N. LILLARD, JR. ? CLERK . SUPREME COURT STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Monday, September 22, 1980 THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING ORDERS: ! 51,906 P.W. Currey And Mrs. James D. Currey d/b/a Currey And Currey v. Corporation Com mission of Oklahoma; Dan R. Dunnett, Director Of Conservation For Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, Rehearing denied. (NOTE: Other orders on cases not relevant have been deleted) me S/Robert E, Lavender CHIEF JUSTICE APPENDIX F *% APPENDIX G STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) MANDATE ). &. SUPREME COURT ) P.W.CURREY AND MRS. JAMES D.CURREY d/b/a CURREY &CURREY a/k/a CURREY, SHIELDS & CURREY, vs. No. 51,906 CORPORATION COMMISSION OF OKLA.; DAN R. DUNNETT, Corporation Com mission DIRECTOR OF CONSERVATION of Oklahoma FOR CORPORATION PD-82-36 ee ee ee ee ee eet eet ee eet ee ee ee COMMISSION OF OKLA., THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA: To the Honorable Judge of the Corporation Com mission of Oklahoma in said State of Oklahoma. Whereas, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, did on the 12th day of June, 1980 render an opinion in the above entitled cause, appealed from the Corp. Comm. Court of Oklahoma ORDER OF THE CORPORATION COMMISSION AFFIRMED See Attached Correction Order of September 22, ~ 1980. APPENDIX G > Now, Therefore, you are hereby com manded to cause such Affirmance to show of record in your court and to issue such process and take such other and further action as may be in accord with right and justice and said opinion. Witness, the Honorable Robert F. Lavender, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, at the City of Oklahoma City, this 25th day of September, 1980. ROSS N. LILLARD JR., Clerk By S/Pamela J. Barney Deputy. APPENDIX G a ~ "= APPENDIX "H" APPLICABLE. PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 8, Clause 3: The Congress Shall Have Power keke To regulate Com merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian . Tribes; zkxekerek Article VI, Clause 2: zkeaerk This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall. be bound thereby, any Thing APPENDIX H in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. zxe«eek APPENDIX H APPENDIX I APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL STATUTES OKLAHOMA ENABLING ACT, Act of June 16, 1906, c. 3335, §1, 34 Stat. 267 x*kekk That the inhabitants of all that part of the area of the United States now constituting the Territory of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory, as at present described, may adopt a constitution and become the State of Oklahoma, as_ hereinafter provided: Provided, that nothing contained in the said constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of persons or property pertaining, to the Indians of said Territories (0 long as such rights shall remain unextinguished) or to limit or affect the authority of the Government of the United States to make any law or regulation respecting such APPENDIX I Indians, their lands, property or other rights by treaties agreement, law or otherwise, which it would have been competent to make if this Act had never been passed. (Pertinent portions underscored) xkeek Pub. L. 83-280, c.505, Act of August 15, 1953, §§6, 7, 67 Stat. 590: xkkeetk Sec. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, that the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be. (Emphasis original). APPENDIX I Sec. 7. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not have jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, z obligate and hind the State to assumption thereof, xxketk Pub, L. 90-284, Act of April ll, 1968, Title IV, §404, 82 Stat. 77, 79, 25 U.S. C. §1324. reek Sec. 404. Notwithstanding the provisions of any enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, ‘their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiciton in accordance with the provisions of this title. The provisions of this titile shall not become effective APPENDIX I with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have . appropriately amended their State constitution or Statutes, as the case may be. zxexetk . Pub. L. 80-336, §0, Act of August 14, 1947, c. 459, , 61 Stat. 731 zee All restricted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to all oil and gas conservation laws of Oklahoma: Provided, that no order of the Corporation Commission affecting restricted Indian land. shall be valid as to such land until submitted ole deereees «ty te Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative. (Emphasis original) zxxeek APPENDIX I v4 APPENDIX J APPLICABLE FEDERAL REGULATIONS A, 25 CFR Part 1 §§ _12-14-Applicahility of Rules. §L2 Applicability of regulations and reserved authority of the Secretary of the Interior. The regulations in Chapter I of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations are of general application. Notwithstanding any limitations contained in the regulations of this Chapter, the Secretary retains the power to waive or make exceptions to his regulations as found in Chapter I of Title 25 of the code of Federal Regulations in all cases where permitted by law and the Secretary finds that such waiver or exception is in the best interest of the Indians. §L3 Scope. Chapters I and II of this title contain the bulk of the regulations of the Department of the APPENDIX J Interior of general application relating to Indian affairs. Subtitle B, Chapter I, Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains rules relating to the relationship of Indians to public lands and townsites, Subtitle A of Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations has application to certain aspects of Indian affairs and among other things, contains procedural rules for appellate and other administrative review and for practice before the Department of the Interior, of which the Bureau of Indian Affairs is a part. Indian health matters are covered in 42 CFR Part 36. Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains regulations on ail and gas and other mining operations, which, under certain circumstances, may be applicable to Indian resources, (25 FR 3124, Apr.l2, 1960, as amended at 40 FR 20625, May 12, 1975) §1.4 State and local regulation of the use of Indian property. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, none of the laws, ordinances, codes, rules or other of State APPENDIX J the use or development of any real or personal property, including _water__rights, __shall_be to such leased from or held Or_used under agreement with and belonging to any Indian _or Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a__restriction against alienation imposed by the United States. (b) The Secretary of the Interior ao his authorized representative may in specific cases or in specific geographic areas adopt or make applicable to Indian lands all or any part of such laws, ordinances, codes, resdlutions, rules or other regulations referred to in paragraph (a) of this section as he shall determine to be in the best interest of the Indian owner or owners in achieving the highest and best use of such property. In determining whether, or to what extent, such laws, ordinances, codes, resdlutions, rules or other regulations shall be adopted or made applicable, the Secretary or his authorized representative may APPENDIX J *% consult with the Indian owner or owners and may consider the use of, and restrictions or limitations on the use of, other property in the vicinity, and such other factors as he shall deem appropriate. (30 FR 7520, June 9, 1965) (Pertinent portions underscored) B. 25 CFR Part 183, §183.1 (1954 Ed.) —- "Leasing of Restricted Sands of Members of Five Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma, for Mining.” §182.1 Definitions. The term "Area Director” in this part refers to the officer in charge of the Five Civilized Tribes Indian Agency. Whenever the term "superintendent" is used in this part, the term "Area Director" shall be substituted therefor. The term “supervisor” in this part refers to a representative of the Secretary of the Interior under direction of the Director of the United States Geological Survey Geological Survey, authorized and empowered to supervise and direct operations under on et a x the” etn lease, to furnish ecientific and technical information and advice, to ascertain and record the amount and value of production, and to determine and record rentals and royalties due and paid. APPENDIX J . - (6 F.R. 9192, Sept. Il, 195]) C. 30 CFR, Part 221 §§221L3-22L5 inclusive 0949 Ed.) — “Oil and Gas Operating Regulations,” . §22L3 Jurisdiction. Drilling and producing Operations, handling and gaging of oil and the | measurement of gas and other products, determination of royalty liability, receipt and delivery to those entitiled thereto of rayalty accruing to the lessor and paid in amount and manner Of peyiheck of Camegen ensued ‘unvier akboeiy. cf the regulations in this part for defaults of non-compliance with duties by the lessee and, in general, all operations subject to the regulations in this part are under the jurisdiction of the Supervisor for any district as delineated by the Director. As to producing leases of Indian lands, the officer in charge, and as to lands within naval petraleum reserves, the supervisor shall determine rental liability, record rentals, royalties, and other payments, and maintain lease accounts. Upon request, the supervisor or the Director will advise any person concerning the regulations in this part, and will furnish technical information and advice APPENDIX J relative to oil and gas development and operation on §22L4 General functions. The supervisor is hereby authorized to Heinle compliance with lease terms, with the regulations in this part, and all other applicable regulations, and with applicable law to the end that all operations shall conform to the best practice and shall be conducted in such Manner as to protect the deposits of the leased lands and result in the maximum ultimate recovery of _ oil, gas, or other products with minimum waste, Inasmuch as conditions in one area may vary widely from conditions in another area, the regulations in this part are general, and detailed procedure hereunder in any particular area is subject to the judgement and discretion of the supervisor, and to any areal plan of development that may be adopted pursuant to law. The supervisor may require Satisfactory evidence that a lease is in good Standing, that the lessee or operator is authorized to conduct operations, and that an acceptable bond has been filed before permitting operations on the leased land. APPENDIX J §22L5 Supervision. of operations, The Supervisor shall inspect and supervise operations under the regulations in this part; prevent waste, damage to formations or deposits containing oil, gas or water or to coal measures or other mineral deposits, and injury to life or property; and shall issue instructions necessary, in his judgment, to 7% accomplish these purposes, APPENDIX J APPENDIX K APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION Okla, Constitution, Art. 1, §3 The people inhabiting the State do agree ani declare _ that they forever disclaim all right and title _in_or to any unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such land shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain Subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States. Land belonging to citizens of the United States residing without the limits of the State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the land belonging to residents thereof. No taxes shall be imposed by the State on lands or property belonging to or which may hereafter be purchased by the United States oor reserved for its use. (Applicable provisions underscored). APPENDIX K *.% APPENDIX "L" APPLICABLE. PROVISIONS OF Title 52, Oklahoma Statutes 1971 §243: The Corporation Commission shall have authority to make regulations for the prevention of waste of natural gas, and for the protection of all natural gas, fresh water, and oil bearing strata encountered in any well drilled for oil or natural gas, and to make such other rules and regulations as may be necessary to enforce this act. Title 52, Oklahoma Statutes 1971 §273 ***the Corporation Commission shall have authority to make rules and regulations for the prevention of such waste, and for the protection of all fresh water strata, and oil and gas bearing strata, encountered in any well drilled for oil Title 17, Oklahoma Statutes 1971, §§51-53: (§5) The Corporation Commission is hereby empowered and authorized to create and establish an oil and gas department under the jurisdiction and Supervision of the Corporation Commission, and is APPENDIX L hereby authorized to appoint with the approval and consent of the Governor, a chief oil and gas conservation agent who shall have charge of the oil and gas department herein authorized." (§52) All authority and duties now conferred upon the Corporation Commission or other departments of the State government in reference to the conservation of ail and gas and the drilling and Operating ail and gas wells and the construction and regulation of oil and gas pipe lines, are hereby conferred exclusively upon the Corporation Com mission, (S53) The Corporation Commission is hereby authorized to prescribe rules and regulations for the plugging of all abandoned cil and gas wells. The same shall be plugged under the direction and Supervision of the conservation agents of the Corporation Commission as may be prescribed by the Corporation Commission. All orders and regulations in reference to plugging wells shall be made after general hearing as now presecribed by law for the promulgation of orders by the Corporation Com mission. APPENDIX L Title 75, Oklahoma Statutes 1971 § 184 relating to the decennial codification of statutes. The Oklahoma Statutes 1971, compiled, codified and annotated and indexed under the provisions of House Bill No. 1085, Title 75, Chapter 6A, Oklahoma Session Laws 1971, Page 266, and compiled, codified and annotated under the Supervision of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma and approved by them on November 9, 1971, and promulgated and published by John Rogers, Secretary of State, under proclamation dated January 5, 1972; said Oklahoma Statutes being further identified as four volumes,’ Volume 1 containing pages 1 to 1616, inclusive, Volume 2 containing pages 1617 to 3324, inclusive, Valume 3 containing pages 3325 to 5157, inclusive, and Valume 4 containing pages 5159 to 6604, inclusive, are hereby adopted as the Code and Revised Statutes of the State of Oklahoma t© be known as Oklahoma Statutes 1971, and that all general laws of the State of Oklahoma not therein contained are hereby repealed; Provided, however, that this act shall not be construed to repeal or in any way affect or modify any special or local laws or any law making APPENDIX L *. an appropriation or any law relating to any special dischice, Cc Validating’ ect oc any law. affecting ‘any bond issue or by which any bond issue may have been authorized, not to affect any pending preceedings or any existing rights or remedies, nor the running of the Statutes of Limitations in force at the time of the approval of this act; but all such local and special laws, laws making appropriations, laws relating to special elections, validating acts, and laws relating to or authorizing bond issues, pending yiccaslingk: “Gal diately tips end coewed, ont Statutes of Limitations running and in force at the time of the approval of this act shall continue and exist in all respects as if this act had not been passed. Provided, further, that this act shall not be construed to alter, change, impair, disparage, vest or divest, or_in any way affect any right or interest of the United States, the State of Oklahoma, any of the Five Civilized Tribes, or other Tribes or Nations of Indians within the State of Oklahoma. (Laws 1972, c.. 19, § ll, eff. | Feb, 7, 1972.) (Pertinent portions underscored). APPENDIX L --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0995%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.