# Petition — Greenawalt v. Pawlak

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 449 U.S. 1083

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,

80-803 fi ied Dp

ae NOV 18 1980

AK, JR. CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

GREENAWALT, CHARLES E.., LOCAL UNION No. 764,
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL No. 53,
AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
m Petitioners,
PAWLAK, JOHN A. AND STAFFORD, JAMES,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DAVID PREVIANT
ROBERT M. BAPTISTE
Counsel of Record

GARY S. WITLEN
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Area Code (202) 624-6945

IRA WEINSTOCK
301 Market Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Area Code (717) 238-1657

Attorneys for Petitioners
International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, et al.

a
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

cE 60

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does Section 101(a) (4) of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 411(a) (4),
preclude a labor organization from recovering its ex-
penses from a member who filed a lawsuit against the
union prior to exhausting available internal union reme-
dies and the case was dismissed for that reason where:

1) the labor organization’s constitution requires ex-
haustion of internal union remedies prior to re-
sorting to the judiciary;

2) the labor organization’s internal union remedies
have been found by a court to be adequate;

3) the labor organization’s constitution specifically
authorizes collection of the union’s expenses from
the member who filed the premature suit; and,

4) no effort is made by the union to collect its ex-
penses until after a court has determined that the
member had an obligation to exhaust the avail-
able internal union procedures.

PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

The parties before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
were Charles E. Greenawalt, President of Local Union
No. 764; Local Union No. 764, Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers; Teamsters Joint Council
No. 53; and International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
(Petitioners in this Court); and John A. Pawlak and
James Stafford (Respondents in this Court).

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................. i
PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ................ i
ES iy 6. 9 yt: eee iv
SE 1
ESSE Sie a 2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................. 2
I oc eeeccccacnccncccncccecoees 3
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT .............. 5
DECISION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT ................ 6
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................... 6

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Has

Decided Important Questions of Federal Law

Based Upon An Erroneous Interpretation of A
Ne cc cccesescescccccscccsccesces 6
CONCLUSION ............. Tea oa ce cncccninopiciesonense 10

;

(iii)

_ PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
IBEW Vv. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ....................... 10
NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuild-

ing Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968) ...................- passim

Operating Engineers Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417
F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
RS CTI cklescetea i askdeeenttincci ene ncciaingevaametenion 6,8
Pawlak v. Teamsters, Local Union 764, 444 F.
Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 571 F.2d 572

CBE Ce TIFT aoaccicctasececsedenectennceigpstnatonnsighornesdiins 8
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
DID isiiceckncccicivervtecpentnintbtecnanecssosioniincnaaitasactnacensets 10

STATUTORY AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
Judicial Code:

Oe IDs i sanhaidacscesbnulcsentnbeecntenbuotasasese 5
ek foe B's 5 Ragen a eeeeenren eeenpe eas 2
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959:
Section 101(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. 411(a) (4) ...... passim
me BE Ee. | eRe een 2
National Labor Relations Act, as amended:
, mie Ts AE) 5 See errenmcsene 7
SS A Se RE Ae et ce oe 8,9
Congressional Record:
105 Cong. Rec. 15835 (1959) ............................ 9
105 Cong. Rec. 18152 (1959) ............................ 9
105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959) ...............-.........-.. 9

MISCELLANEOUS:

Fox and Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of
Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage,
+ 2, ere! UM 6 OR} ) Pee 9
Robbins, Limits of Union Disciplinary Power
Under Federal Law, 24 Fla. L. Rev. 308 (1972) .. 10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No.

GREENAWALT, CHARLES E., LOCAL UNION No. 764,
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL No. 538,

AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,

. Petitioners,
PAWLAK, JOHN A. AND STAFFORD, JAMES,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, its affili-
ated Local Union 764, Joint Council No. 53, and Charles
E. Greenawalt (collectively “Teamsters”) petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered
in this case on August 20, 1980.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit is not officially reported but is printed

2

in the Appendix at la and is unofficially reported at
105 L.R.R.M. 2169. The decision of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
is officially reported at 477 F. Supp. 149. (A. 18a)*

JURISDICTION

The decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals was
entered on August 20, 1980. (A: 25a) The Jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent provisions of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), Section 101(a) (4)
and 102, 29 U.S.C. 411(a) (4) and 412, are reproduced
in the Appendix. (A. 27a)?

1 References to pages in the appendix to this petition are desig-
nated “A”.

2 Section 101(a) (4) provides:

PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO SUE.—No labor organiza-
tion shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any adminis-
trative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organi-
zation or its officers are named as defendants or respondents
in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a
labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, ad-
ministrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legis-
lature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That
any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hear-
ing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)
within such organization, before instituting legal or adminis-
trative proceedings against such organizations or any officer
thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer
or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance,
encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action,
proceeding, appearance, or petition.

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1977, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennslyvania dismissed a suit brought
under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185, against Teamsters Local Union 764 be-
cause it found that plaintiff, John Pawlak, had “made no
attempt whatsoever to challenge the flouting of his griev-
ance by invoking the steps through which a rank-and-
file employee can bring charges against a local union
officer.” Pawlak v. Teamsters, Local Union 764, 444
F. Supp. 807, 810 (M.D. Pa. 1977). The district court
took special notice of the provisions of Article XIX of
the Teamsters’ constitution which permit any member
of a local union to file internal union charges against any
other member or officer and found that “the Union’s in-
ternal machinery does make it feasible for Pawlak to
overcome the Local’s recalcitrance to have his grievance
processed without the aid of this Court.” Jd. at 811.

Pawlak subsequently filed an appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which sum-
marily affirmed the decision of the district court. 571
F.2d 572 (8rd Cir. 1978).

After this litigation had been concluded, Pawlak ini-
tiated proceedings within the union to redress his alleged
grievances but failed to pursue them. Thereafter, four
members of Local 764 filed charges against Pawlak with
the Local Union Executive Board alleging that. Pawlak
had violated Article XIX, Section 12(b) of the Inter-
national Constitution.* Specifically, Pawlak was charged

3 Article XIX, Section 12(b) provides:

Where a member, officer, elected Business Agent, Local Union,
Joint Council or other subordinate body, before or following
exhaustion of all remedies provided for within the Interna-
tional Union, resorts to a court of law and loses his or its
cause therein, all costs and expenses incurred by the Inter-

4

with having unsuccessfully sued Local 764 without hav-
ing first exhausted the available internal union remedies
as required by Article XIX, Section 12(a),* thereby
causing the union to incur expenses to defend the suit in
the amount of $2,635. Following a hearing before the
Local Union Executive Board, Pawlak was directed to pay
the sum of $2,635 to cover the Local’s litigation expenses.
Pawlak pursued his internal union appeals to Joint Coun-
cil 53 and the General Executive Board, both of which
affirmed the reimbursement of Local 764’s legal expenses.

Thereafter, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
on October 23, 1978, by Pawlak and another member of
Local 764, alleging a violation of Section 101(a) (4) of
the LMRDA as well as of other provisions of that stat-

national Union may be assessed against such individual, Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body, in the nature
of a fine, subject to all penalties applicable where fines remain
unpaid.

Where such court action is by an individual or by a Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body against a Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body, the foregoing
provision in respect to the payment of costs and expenses shall
be applicable in favor of the Local Union, Joint Council or
other subordinate body proceeded against in court.

4 Article XIX, Section 12(a) provides:

Every member, officer, elected Business Agent, Local Union,
Joint Council or other subordinate body against whom charges
have been preferred and disciplinary action taken as a result
thereof, or against whom adverse rulings or decisions have
been rendered or who claims to be aggrieved, shall be obliged
to exhaust all remedies provided for in this Constitution and
by the International Union before resorting to any court,
tribunal or agency against the International Union, any sub-
ordinate body or any officer or employee thereof.

5

ute, not here relevant, and seeking injunctive and other
forms of equitable relief.®

DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT

The unresolved issues in this case were presented to
the district court on cross motions for summary judg-
ment. The district court issued a memorandum opinion
on September 27, 1979, granting Pawlak’s motion for
summary judgment and holding that Article XIX, Sec-
tion 12(b) of the Teamsters’ constitution could not be
enforced in any circumstances. (A. 28a) The district
court, relying on NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), held that
the Teamsters’ constitution violated the statute because it
placed members “in a position of having to guess whether
the Court will require exhaustion in a particular case.”
(A. 17a) Accordingly, the district court enjoined en-
forcement of Article XIX, Section 12(b) of the Constitu-
tion and ordered the Teamsters to publish a notice of the
court’s decision in the official monthly publication of the
International Union.

In a separate Order entered on November 16, 1979, the
district court specified the content and form of the notice
to be published. (A. 20a) However, the district court
denied other requested relief, finding that “there is noth-
ing in the record to justify Plaintiffs’ contention that
union members have or will be subject to threats and in-
timidation by officials of Teamsters locals.” (A. 21a)

The International Union complied with this Order by
publishing the prescribed notice in the January, 1980
issue of the “International Teamster” magazine.

5 The district court’s jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1381.

6
DECISION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

In affirming the district court’s decision, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Operating Engineers Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970), and
found that the distinction set forth by this Court in
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, supra, between suits
involving “internal” union and “external” matters was
inapplicable to LMRDA disputes. (A. 9a) The Third
Circuit rejected the Teamsters’ argument that collection
of the union’s litgation expenses after a court had de-
termined that a member had an obligation to exhaust the
available internal union remedies was permitted by the
statute and was not prohibited by the Marine and Ship-
building Workers, supra, decision. As had the district
court, the Third Circuit found that the “prospect that
a union member who sues his union would risk liability
under 12(b) for attorneys fees incurred by the union,
in the event the court required the member to exhaust in-
ternal remedies, would, we believe, chill union members
in the exercise of their statutory right to sue the union.”
(A. 10a)

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Has Decided

Important Questions of Federal Law Based Upon An
Erroneous Interpretation of A Decision of This Court

The Third Circuit has decided that this Court inter-
preted Section 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA in the Marine
and Shipbuilding Workers, supra, case as precluding
a union from recovering the expenses it incurred in suc-
cessfully defending against a lawsuit brought by a mem-
ber who has failed to exhaust the available internal
union remedies after a court, not the union, has decided

7

that those internal union remedies should have been
invoked prior to the institution of litigation. In fact,
this Court’s decision in the Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers, supra, case established only that Section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
158(b) (1) (A), precluded a union from expelling a mem-
ber for filing a charge with the National Labor Relations
Board prior to exhausting internal union remedies. Id.
at 425-426. In that case, the union decided that the mem-
ber had an obligation to exhaust available union remedies
and imposed a punitive sanction upon him for failing to
do so. With respect to the tangential issue of Section
101(a) (4) of the LMRDA, the Court did no more than
resolve in favor of the judiciary the question of whether
the unions or the judiciary had the authority to determine
if internal union remedies had to be exhausted before
bringing a suit against a union. Jd. at 426-428.

In so ruling, this Court implicitly approved discipline
in cases involving “internal union matters,” a finding
criticized by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion.
He disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that “a union
may punish a member for his invocation of his remedies
before a court or agency ‘where the complaint or griev-
ance ... concern[s] an internal union matter,’ and
thus does not touch any ‘part of the public domain covered
by the Act....’” Id. at 429.

Although both the Ninth and Third Circuits concluded,
relying upon the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers,
supra, decision, that subjecting a union member to the
possibility that he might be liable for the payment of his
union’s litigation expenses incurred in defending against
his premature lawsuit had a chilling effect on his
LMRDA protected right to sue his union, that question
was never decided by this Court. In fact, this Court’s
opinion clearly imposed upon a union member seeking
judicial review of alleged grievances the responsibility

g

to determine, in advance of litigation, whether his dispute
involved purely “internal union matters” or impacted
on the “public domain.” Again, Mr. Justice Harlan de-
parted from the majority’s analysis and noted that:

Assuming arguendo that there are member-union
grievances untouched by the various federal labor
statutes, this dichotomy has, it seems to me, pre-
cisely the disadvantage that the Court has found
in the Third Circuit’s construction of the proviso:
it compels a member to gamble his union member-
ship, and often his employment, on the accuracy of
his understanding of the federal labor laws. Id.
at 429.

Neither the Ninth Circuit in Burroughs, supra, nor
the Third Circuit in the instant case was justified in
focusing upon Mr. Justice Harlan’s reservations in
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, supra, and relying
upon them, as though Mr. Justice Harlan were reflecting
the views of the majority of this Court, effectively to
eliminate the proviso to Section 101(a) (4). The question
of whether a union can recover its reasonable costs, after
a court has ruled that a member had an obligation to ex-
haust the available internal union remedies prior to in-
stituting litigation against his union, not only was left
open by this Court but also is fundamental to the appli-
cation of Section 101 (a) (4).

The Third Circuit’s negative answer effectively elimin-
ates the proviso to Section 101(a) (4) from the statute.
Such a development invites union members to disregard
the four-month exhaustion period contained in the pro-
viso, in favor of immediate review by the judiciary of
internal grievances against their unions. From the mem-
ber’s viewpoint, if he goes directly to court with an in-
ternal union grievance, at worst, the court may require
him to go back to the union to exhaust those available
procedures before returning to the court for ultimate

9

resolution of the dispute. At best, the court will resolve
his complaints against the union in the first instance.

It is clear from the legisiative history that the proviso
was carefully considered, extensively debated, and was not
intended to replace existing doctrine supporting the con-
cept of exhaustion of internal remedies. For example,
Senator John Kennedy, co-sponsor of S. 1555 and a Senate
conferee, declared that the proviso was not intended “to
invalidate the considerable body of State and Federal
court decisions of many years standing which require, or
do not require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior
to court intervention depending upon the reasonableness
of such requirements in terms of the facts and circum-
stances of a particular case.” 105 Cong. Rec. at 17899
(1959) .*

Elimination of the proviso to Section 101(a) (4) will
have the undesirable effect of not only increasing ju-
dicial intervention in the purely internal affairs of unions
but will also tend to erode the exhaustion doctrine in those
cases involving employer-employee disputes. The courts
will be inundated by suits brought under Section 301 (a)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), involving disputes
which are presently resolved by contractual grievance pro-
cedures.” The ince~tive for a member to avoid grievance
procedures in favor of seeking relief from a court is even
greater in the Section 301 context than in the Section 101
(a) (4) situation, for the simple reason that decisions
made under contractual grievance procedures most often
are final and binding and are subject to a limited review

6 Also, statements of Representatives John McCormack and
Griffin at 105 Cong. Rec. 15835 and 18152 (1959), respectively.

7 Indeed, the total elimination of the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine in the Section 301 context has been advocated by counsel
for Pawlak. See, Fox and Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion
of Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 Pa. L. Rev.
989, 1035 (1980).

10

by the courts. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddow, 379 U.s
650 (1965) .°

Not only is the burden of this increased litigation on
the judiciary obvious and undesirable, but, as this Court
has recognized, the cost of litigation can “impair the
financial stability of unions,” “deplete union treasuries”
and impair the “effectiveness of unions as collective bar-
gaining agents.” IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48, 50-
51 (1979). Exhaustion of union remedies may result in
favor of the union member and conclude the dispute
without litigation.

The proviso io Section 101(a) (4) should not be ju-
dicially eliminated by an erroneous interpretation of the
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, supra, decision. If
significant changes are to be made in the statutory struc-
ture to reallocate the respective responsibilities of the
judiciary and unions for resolving internal union dis-
putes, it is for the Congress to legislate that reallocation
of responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID PREVIANT
ROBERT M. BAPTISTE
GARY S. WITLEN
IRA WEINSTOCK

Attorneys for Petitioners
DATED: November 18, 1980

8 See: Robbins, Limits of Union Disciplinary Power Under Fed-
eral Law, 24 Fla. L. Rev. 308, 324 (1972).

la
APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 79-2587 & 79-2780

JOHN A. PAWLAK AND JAMES STAFFORD
Vv.

CHARLES E. GREENAWALT; LOCAL UNION No. 764, TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS;
TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL No. 58; AND INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America,

Charles E. Greenawalt and Local Union No.
764
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(C.A. No. 78-1035)

Argued June 10, 1980

2a Biase

Before: ADAMS, VAN DUSEN and HIGGINBOTHAM,
Circuit Judges

(Filed August 20, 1980)

PAUL ALAN LEvy (Argued)
ARTHUR L. Fox, II
ALAN B. MORRISON
Public Citizens Litigation Group
Washington, D.C.

Attorneys for Appellees

RoBERT M. BAPTISTE (Argued)
GARY S. WITLEN
Washington, D.C.

JOHN J. DUNN, SR.
Scranton, PA

Attorneys for International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffers, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America

IRA WEINSTOCK

PAUL DELLASEGA
Harrisburg, PA

Attorneys for Appellants
Greenawalt and Local Union

764

OPINION OF THE COURT

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29

8a

U.S.C. § 401-531 (1976), prevents a union from fining
one of its members, pursuant to a provision in the
union’s constitution, for suing the union without first
exhausting internal union procedures. The district court,
in granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, held
that such a fine is invalid under the Act. We affirm.

I,

John Pawlak, a member of Local Union No. 764, Team-
sters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, filed an action
three years ago in the district court contesting a change
in the working conditions at his place of employment. He
alleged that his employer, in instituting the change, had
violated the applicable collective bargaining agreement
under which Pawlak worked. Pawlak further charged
that Local 764 had violated its duty of fair representa-
tion by failing to process his grievance concerning the
change in conditions. The district court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Pawlak had not exhausted
internal union remedies before filing suit. Pawlak v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No.
764, 444 F. Supp 807 (M.D. Pa. 1977); aff'd mem. 571
F.2d 572 (3d Cir. Ty78).

Pawlak then attempted to pursue his grievance through
the union’s internal channels, but his charges were dis-
missed by the Executive Committee of Local 764, and he
did not pursue them further. Thereafter, Local 764 filed
internal charges against Pawlak, accusing him of violat-
ing Article XIX §6(1) and 12(b) of the Constitution of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.’ Specifically,

1 Article XIX, Section 12(a) provides:

Every member, officer, elected Business Agent, Local Union,
Joint Council or other subordinate body against whom charges
have been preferred and disciplinary action taken as a result
thereof, or against whom adverse rulings or decisions have

4a

Pawlak was charged with having sued Local 764 without
exhausting internal remedies, thereby causing the union
to expend $2,635 defending the suit. Following a hearing
before the Local Union Executive Board, Pawlak was
fined the sum of $2,635. On appeal, both the Joint Coun-
cil and General Executive Board of the Union affirmed
the imposition of the fine.

On October 23, 1978, Pawlak and James Stafford, also
a member of Local 764, filed a complaint in the district
court against Local 764, Charles Greenawalt, President
of the Local, the Teamsters Joint Council, and the In-
ternational Union. The complaint challenged the validity
of the fine on the grounds that: (1) the fine unlawfully
limited Pawlak’s right to sue under the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act § 101(a)(4) and
(2) Pawlak had been denied a fair hearing by the union
tribunals. Pawlak and Stafford also sought injunctive

been rendered or who claims to be aggrieved, shall be obliged
to exhause all remedies provided for in this Constitution and
by the International Union before resorting to any court,
tribunal or agency against the International Union, any sub-
ordinate body of any officer or employee thereof.

Article XIX, Section 12(b) provides;

Where a member, officer, elected Business Agent, Local Union,
Joint Council or other subordinate body, before or following
exhaustion of all remedies provided for within the Inter-
national Union, resorts to a court of law and loses his or its
cause therein, all costs and expenses incurred by the Interna-
tional Union may be assessed against such individual, Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body, in the nature
of a fine, subject to all penalties applicable where fines remain
unpaid.

Where such court action is by an individual or by a Local
Union, Joint Council, or other subordinate body against a Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body, the foregoing
provision in respect to the payment of costs and expenses shall
be applicable in favor of the Local Union, Joint Council or other
subordinate body proceeded against in court.

5a

relief against enforcement of § 12(b) of the Constitution
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, an order
requiring that notice of the decision be published in the
monthly International Teamsters magazine, and punitive
damages.

The district court denied a motion by Local 764 and
Greenawalt to dismiss Pawlak’s complaint, although it
did dismiss the fair hearing allegations. As to the latter
point, the court believed that because the underlying facts
were not in dispute, a transcript of the proceedings was
not necessary for the court to decide whether Pawlak’s
statutory rights had been violated. Pawlak v. Greenawalt,
464 F. Supp. 1265, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1979).? Local 764 then
filed a counterclaim seeking an order directing Pawlak to
pay the fine of $2,635 that had been imposed by the union
tribunals.

All parties thereafter moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and de-
nied the defendants’ motion. Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 477
F’. Supp. 149, (M.D. Pa. 1979). We affirm.

II.

Section 101(a) (4) of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 411(a) (4) (1976), also
referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act, specifically pro-
tects the right of a union member to sue his union. The
Act provides that:

No labor organization shall limit the right of any
member thereof to institute an action in any court

The only restriction on this protection is contained in the
clause which states:

2 Because of our decision that the Union could not lawfully
fine Pawlak for failing to exhaust internal procedures, we need not
reach the issue whether Pawlak was denied a fair hearing.

6a

Provided, that any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to
exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such or-
ganization, before instituting legal or administra-
tive procedures against such organizations or any
officer thereof...

The union contends that the fine imposed on Pawlak for
his failure to exhaust internal remedies was lawful un-
der the above proviso.

Although the language of the clause left unclear
whether Congress intended the courts or the unions to
implement it, the proviso has since been interpreted as
empowering the courts to enforce it. The Supreme Court
addressed the issue in NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
There, an employee was expelled from the union for fil-
ing charges with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) without first utilizing internal union proce-
dures. The Supreme Court concluded that his expulsion
violated § 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations
Act. In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the leg-
islative history of § 101(a) (4) of the Landrum Griffin
Act and interpreted the proviso as follows:

We conclude that “may be required” [the words in
the proviso] is not a grant of authority to unions
more firmly to police their members but a statement
of policy that the public tribunals whose aid is in-
voked may in their discretion stay their hands for
four months, while the aggrieved person seeks relief
within the union. We read it, in other words, as in-
stalling in this labor field a regime comparable to
that which prevails in other areas of law before the
federal courts, which often stay their hands while a
litigant seeks administrative relief before the appro-
priate agency. (emphasis added)

7a

In Operating Engineers Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417
F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916
(1970), which followed Marine Workers, an employee was
fined by his union because he had brought an action
against the union without first exhausting internal pro-
cedures. The district court held that any discipline im-
posed on the employee for having sued the union was
void. In affirming, the court of appeals declared:

Once it is established that the proviso in 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a) (4) is a policy guide for the courts and not
a grant of authority for the union, and we think
that at least that much is established by Marine
Workers, supra, then for the purpose of examining
the limits of permissible union discipline we are left
with these words: ‘no labor organization shall limit
the right of any member thereof to institute an action
in any court or in any proceeding before any admin-
istrative agency... .’”

417 F.2d at 372. See also, Lacy v. Highway & Local Mo-
tor Freight Employees Local 667, No. C-74-454 (W.D.
Tenn., filed Apr. 3, 1978), aff'd, Nos. 78-1254, 1255 (6th
Cir., filed Apr. 29, 1980) (holding union discipline for
failure to exhaust unlawful).

The district court in the present case relied on Ma-
rine Workers and Burroughs in deciding that the fine
imposed on Pawlak was an unlawful limitation on his
right to sue the union. The union contends, however,
that this case is distinguishable from Marine Workers
and that Burroughs was wrongly decided.

Specifically, the union argues that in Marine Work-
ers the Supreme Court differentiated suits concerning
purely internal matters (“internal” suits) from those
which “touched a part of the public domain” (‘external”’
suits). According to the union, Marine Workers holds
that a member is exempt from discipline for failing to ex-

8a

haust union remedies only if his suit is of the latter type,
pertaining to the public domain, and not, as in this case,
if the suit is strictly internal.

The issue before the Court in Marine Workers was
whether the union had violated § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act by expelling an employee for
the earlier charges he had filed with the NLRB which
alleged that the union unlawfully caused his employer to
discriminate against him. In the context of that case, a
distinction between external and internal suits was rele-
vant. As the Supreme Court noted, the proviso to § 8
(b) (1) (A) preserves to a union “the right of a la or or-
ganization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein” and
“thus § 8(b) (1) (A) assures a union freedom of self reg-
ulation where its internal affairs are concerned.” 391
U.S. at 423, 424. The Supreme Court determined, how-
ever, that “the proviso in § 8(b) (1) (A) ... is not so
broad as to give the union power to penalize a member
who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is
in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of
the union.” 391 U.S. at 425.

In its Burroughs decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the distinction between internal and external suits for
the purpose of § 101(a) (4). Because of this, the union
here urges that Burroughs was wrongly decided. Bur-
roughs arose in the context of a suit under § 101(a) (4)
rather than § 8(b) (1) (A). The court there noted that
§ 101(a) (4) refers to “an action in any court,” and that
nothing in the statute distinguishes between external
and internal actions. Further, the Burroughs court
stated that the right to sue under § 101(a) (4) would be
less than fully protected if a member were required to
make a pre-suit determination as to whether the action
was internal or external. See also, Ross v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 544 F.2d 1022, 1024
(9th Cir. 1976).

9a

We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the internal/
external distinction is not relevant to suits brought under
the Landrum-Griffin Act which, unlike the National
Labor Relations Act, was designed specifically to regulate
internal union affairs. Thus we hold that Pawlak’s right
to sue in this case was fully protected by § 101(a) (4)
regardless of whether the suit is considered external or
internal.*

The union’s final argument in support of the validity
of §12(b) of the International Constitution is that the
section is a compensatory measure that is necessary to
advance the public policy favoring exhaustion of union
remedies. Although we recognize the importance of the
exhaustion doctrine, we do not agree that §12(b) is
indispensable to its operation, in light of the adequate
safeguards that already exist.

As evidenced by this case, a member who cannot
produce a valid reason for failing to exhaust union reme-
dies is likely to have his suit dismissed. Moreover, if the
member acted in bad faith in suing prior to exhausting
internal procedures, the court might award attorneys
fees to the union.* Here, the district court specifically
found that the suit was not initiated in bad faith. 477 F.
Supp. at 151.

Nor are we pursuaded by the union’s argument that
it imposed the fine as a compensatory matter only after

3 Even if the internal/external distinction were applied in this
case, Pawlak’s original suit might be classified as an external one.
In Marine Workers, the suit was considered external because it im-
plicated the employer as well as the union, and raised issues that
could not be fully explored in internal union proceedings. Here, too,
the employer was named as a defendant in the original complaint
and thus the suit included issues that were not purely internal to
the union.

*Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).

10a

the district court had dismissed Pawlak’s original com-
plaint for failure to exhaust. Allowing the union to re-
cover attorneys fees in a case where the member acted in
good faith would significantly limit the protections af-
forded by § 101(a) (4). The exhaustion requirement is
not absolute; rather, its application is left to the dis-
eretion of the district court, based upon the facts of the
particular case, Marine Workers, 391 U.S. at 426 fn. 8;
see generally J. Bellace & A. Berkowitz, The Landrum
Griffin Act Twenty Years of Federal Protection of Union
Members’ Rights 58-63 (University u! Pennsylvania, The
Wharton School, Industrial Research Unit 1979).

The prospect that a union member who sues his union
would risk liability under §12(b) for attorneys fees
incurred by the union, in the event the court required
the member to exhaust internal remedies, would, we be-
lieve, chill union members in the exercise of their statu-
tory right to sue the union. This would undermine the
very purpose of § 101(a) (4). See Ryan v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 361 F.2d 942 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 9385 (1966). Consequently,
we conclude that §12(b) of the International Constitu-
tion is invalid in that it restricts the right of a union
member to sue his union in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with the Landrum-Griffin Act. The fine imposed on
Pawlak by the union, pursuant to § 12(b), is also invalid.

III.

In its order of September 27, 1979 the district court
permanently enjoined the Teamsters from enforcing § 12
(b) of the International Constitution. The union ob-
jects to the scope of the injunction and requests that it
be narrowed in two respects. First, the union asks that
the injunction be applied only to individual union mem-
bers, and that it not prohibit the union from imposing a
fine against an officer, local union, joint council, or other

lla

subordinate body. Second the union asks that the in-
junction be restricted so that it is applicable only in the
United States, thereby permitting § 12(b) to be enforced
against members and subordinate union bodies located
in Canada.

We do not believe that the district court erred in en-
joining the union from enforcing § 12(b). The district
court found § 12(b) facially invalid because it unlawfully
restricted the right of Pawlak and other union members
to sue the union. Consequently, it enjoined the union
from enforcing that section. Nothing in the district
court’s opinion indicates, however, that the court either
addressed or decided the question whether officers, local
unions or other union bodies were “members” protected
by § 101(a) (4). We do not read the opinion of the dis-
trict court as holding that a more narrowly drawn pro-
vision dealing only with officers and other union bodies
would be unlawful, nor do we find it necessary to pass
upon that important question at this time.®

Nor do we consider it necessary to limit application
of the injunction to the United States. This suit con-
cerns only an American union member; the union’s abil-
ity to fine non-American members is not at issue. We do
not interpret the injunction as prohibiting the union
from enacting and enforcing a provision similar to
§ 12(b) but applicable solely to foreign members. Ac-
cordingly, we need not reach the question whether the
union could be so enjoined under the Landrum-Griffin
Act.

5 It should be noted the union neither raised this objection be-
fore the district court nor moved the court for an amendment of
the injunction in this respect. Such an objection should have been
raised with the district court in the first instance. See Rhoads v.
Ford Motor Company, 514 F.2d 981, 983-84 (3d Cir. 1975).

12a

IV.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

A True Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

13a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil No. 78-1035

JOHN A. PAWLAK, et al.,

Plaintiffs

vs.

CHARLES E. GREENAWALT, et al.,
DefenJlants

Complaint Filed 10/23/78
(Judge Muir)
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs

Bruce F. Bratton, Esq.

224 North Second St.
Harrisburg, Pa. 17101

Paul Alan Levy, Esq.

Arthur L. Fox, III, Esq.

Public Citizen Litigation Group
Suite 700

2000 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

For Defendant Teamsters Joint Council No. 53

Edward Davis, Esq.
1300 Two Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

For Defendants Greenawalt and Local Union 764

Ira Weinstock, Esq.

Handler, Gerber & Weinstock
Suite 500

301 Market St.

Harrisburg, Pa. 17101

14a

For Defendant International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America

John J. Dunn, Sr., Esq.
Robert Mariani, Esq.
Dunn, Byrne and Coviello
234 Scranton Life Bldg.
Scranton, Pa. 18500

Robert M. Baptiste, Esq.
Gary S. Witlen, Esq.

25 Louisiana Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

15a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil No. 78-1035

JOHN A. PAWLAK, et al.,
Plaintiffs
vs.

CHARLES E. GREENAWALLT, et al.,
Defendants

Complaint Filed 10/23/78
(Judge Muir)

OPINION

MUIR, District Judge.

Plaintiffs have brought this action alleging violations
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (the Act). Plaintiffs
contend that the Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 411(4)
(a) by fining Pawlak $2635.00 to recover the costs to
Local 764 in defending a federal court action brought by
Pawlak and dismissed because Pawlak did not exhaust
internal union remedies. Plaintiffs initially sought com-
pensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory
and injunctive relief. On June 26, 1979, the Court, upon
consent of all parties, issued an order which preserved as
the only issue for decision the Defendants’ authority to
impose and collect the fine.

On June 11, 1979, Plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment accompanied by a brief. On June 26,
1979, defendants Greenawalt and Local 764 filed a brief
in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment. On July 5, 1979, defendants Greenawalt and Local

16a

764 filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied
by a brief. On July 13, 1979, Defendant International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America (Teamsters) filed a motion for
summary judgment accompanied by a brief. On July 20,
1979, Plaintiffs filed briefs in opposition to Greenawalt’s
and the Local’s motion and in reply to the brief in op-
position to Plaintiffs’ motion filed by Greenawalt and the
Local. On July 30, 1979, Plaintiffs filed a brief in op-
position to the Teamster’s motion for summary judg-
ment. On August 7, 1979, the Teamsters filed"@ brief in
reply to Plaintiffs’ brief. For the reasons which follow,
the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and deny Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment.

Plaintiffs’ contention can be simply stated. Title 29
§ 411(a) (4) provides:

“Protection of the right to sue—No labor organiza-
tion shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court .. .: Provided, That
any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal .. . proceedings against such
organizations or any officer thereof.”

Plaintiffs maintain that the Teamsters Constitution,
Article XIX, §12(b), which provides that if a union
member institutes a court action without exhausting
internal remedies and is unsuccessful the local may re-
cover all costs and expenses incurred by the Union in
defending the action, is a limit on Pawlak’s right to
institute a court action.

Defendants argue that without the authority to recover
the costs of defending an action such as Pawlak’s the
proviso in 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) will be ineffective to

17a

prevent court actions by union members before they
attempt to exhaust union remedies. In National Labor
Relations Board vs. Industrial Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers of America, 391 U.S. 418, 426 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court held that the provision
in §411(a) (4) relating to exhaustion of reasonable
hearing procedures

“,. . is not a grant of authority to unions more
firmly to police their members but a statement of
policy that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked
may in their discretion stay their hands for four
months, while the aggrieved person seeks relief from
the union.”

It is the Court’s view that inasmuch as a court has dis-
cretion whether to require exhaustion, the Teamsters’
constitution limits the right of a member to sue by plac-
ing the member in a position of having to guess whether
the Court will require exhaustion in a particular case.
The Court recognizes that Marine Workers involved a
complaint to the NLRB which the Supreme Court found
to encompass broader public policy considerations than
an internal union dispute. Because Congress has seen
fit to legislate in the area of internal union rights, the
Court concludes that a dispute of that nature is likely to
be of significant concern.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Oper-
ating Engineers Local Union No. 3 vs. Burroughs, 417
F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916
(1970), held that it was a violation of § 411(a) (4) for a
union to impose a fine upon a member who unsuccess-
fully sued the union without having exhausted internal
union remedies. Defendants seek to distinguish Bur-
roughs on the grounds that the fine in the case presently
before this Court was not punishment because it repre-
sented only the costs incurred by the union in defending

18a

Pawlak’s prior action. It is the Court’s view that the
label attached to the imposition of a monetary penalty
is immaterial. Section 411(a) (4) prohibits a union from
limiting the rights of its members to sue. The imposi-
tion of the Local’s costs of defending the action, a rem-
edy which is granted by a Court in only extreme cases
and which the Local 764 did not request after Pawlak’s
first action was dismissed, is, as a matter of law, a limit
on the member’s right to sue.

Defendants also maintain that Pawlak’s prior action
was instituted in bad faith. There is, however, no evi-
dence in the record to support that assertion. Defendants
concede that the decision whether to require exhaustion
of internal union remedies rests in the discretion of the
court. Inasmuch as Pawlak’s supposed lack of good faith
is based solely on his failure to exhaust internal union
remedies, the Court concludes that the Defendants have
not established that the prior action was commenced in
bad faith. It is also the Court’s view that Pawlak need
not establish that the prior action was commenced in
good faith. To the extent Defendants fear that without a
good faith requirement they will be subject to the
harassment of numerous lawsuits, it is the Court’s view
that the remedies available to all litigants, such as an
award of attorney’s fees in the appropriate case, is suf-
ficient protection for these defendants. The Court finds
no basis in the statute which provides an exception to
the clear language of § 411(a) (4) prohibiting the union
from placing limits on the right of its members to sue.

In addition to a declaratory judgment declaring De-
fendants’ actions unlawful and an injunction prohibiting
Defendants from collecting the fine and enforcing § 12
(b) of Article XIX of the Teamsters constitution, Plain-
tiffs seek an order directing Teamsters to publicize this
order in their monthly magazine as well as other relief
directed toward notifying locals and members of the

19a

Court’s decision. It is the Court’s view that relief of
this kind is necessary because the existence of § 12(b)
has a chilling effect on the exercise of members’ rights
to file suit. Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Teamsters will
be directed to attempt to agree on the form of notice,
and its method of publication, and shall file an agreed
upon notice and proposal for publication within 20 days
of the date of this order. If they are unable to agree,
each party shall file its proposed notice and proposal for
publication within 30 days from the date of this Order.

An appropriate order will be entered.

/s/ Muir
MUIR,
U.S. District Judge

DATED: September 27, 1979

20a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil No. 78-1035

JOHN A. PAWLAK, et al.,
Plaintiffs
Vv.

CHARLES E. GREENAWALT, et al.,
Defendants

Complaint Filed 10/23/78
(Judge Muir)

November 16, 1979
ORDER

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS
FOLLOWS:

On September 27, 1979, the Court issued an order en-
joining the Defendant International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America (Teamsters) from enforcing Article XIX, § 12
(b) of their constitution because § 12(b) violates § 101
(a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4). That order di-
rected counsel for Plaintiffs and the Teamsters to attempt
to agree upon a form of notice and method of publication
whereby the Teamsters would notify its members of the
Court’s decision. Failing agreement, the parties were
to submit their proposals within 30 days of September
27, 1979. Counsel for Plaintiffs filed their proposal on
October 26, 1979. Counsel for the Teamsters timely filed

2la

its proposal on Ociober 29, 1979. Because of clerical
problems, the Teamsters’ proposal did not come to the
Court’s attention until after the Court, on November 8,
1979, issued an order directing the Teamsters to show
cause why it should not be held in contempt for failure to
comply with the Court’s order of September 27, 1979. In
view of the fact that the Teamsters did timely comply
with the Court’s order, the Court will rescind its Rule
to Show Cause.

Plaintiffs request two forms of notification of the
Court’s order of September 27, 1979. They request that
the Court order the Teamsters to publish a notice in the
Teamsters’ magazine, International Teamster, and that
the Court direct the Teamsters to notify officials of
Teamster locals by mail and by means of the Teamsters’
computer system. Plaintiffs contend that the second
notification is necessary to prevent local officials from
intimidating union members. It is the Court’s view that
the record in this case does not support a remedy beyond
notification to Teamster members by means of publica-
tion in the International Teamster. There is nothing in
the record to justify Plaintiffs’ contention that union
members have or will be subject to threats and intimida-
tion by officials of Teamster locals.

The parties were able to agree that the notice should
be placed in the first half of the International Teamster.
In addition, the parties agree that the text shall be in
the same black type face as is normally used for news
articles and that the article shall be enclosed by a border.
Parties, however, were not able to agree to the content
of the notice and several other matters relating to its
presentation. After reviewing the proposed notices, the
Court will fashion its own notice based upon the parties’
proposals.

22a

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The Court’s rule to show cause dated November 8,
1979 is rescinded.

2. Defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters
shall publish in the January, 1980 issue of the Interva-
tional Teamster, Volume 77, No. 1, the text of para-
graphs 3 and 4 of the notice set forth in Appendix A,
according to the following specifications:

2.1 The text shall be set in the same black type-
face as is normally used for news articles and the
topical heading, “LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL MEM-
BERS” shall be in red, upper-case letters, no less
than 12-point type, and the headline shall be in
black letters, no less than 18-point type.

2.2 The text shall be boxed within a black border.

2.3 The article shall appear in the first half of
the magazine.

2.4 The article shall be listed by its headline
in the Table of Contents.

2.5 Plaintiffs’ counsel shall be afforded the op-
portunity to see the galley proofs prior to publica-
tion.

/s/ Muir
MUIR,
U.S. District Judge

23a

APPENDIX A
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS

Federal Court Voids Provision In IBT Constitution as
Infringing Upon Right to Sue Union

The United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, by order of Judge Malcolm Muir,
has invalidated as violating the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 a provision in the
IBT Constitution which authorizes the union to require
members to reimburse the union for its attorney fees when
their suits are unsuccessful. The Court not only struck
down Article XIX, Section 12(b), the provision in ques-
tion, but found that its presence in the Constitution un-
lawfully discouraged members from bringing legal ac-
tions. The IBT has taken an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The filing of the
appeal in no way affects the validity of Judge Muir’s
order prohibiting the enforcement of § 12(b). The IBT
was ordered to publish this notice informing the Union
membership that the provision had been set aside.

The invalidated provision reads as follows:

Where a member, officer, elected Business Agent,
Local Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body,
before or following exhaustion of all remedies pro-
vided for within the International Union, resorts to
a court of law and loses his or its cause therein, all
costs and expenses incurred by the International
Union may be assessed against such individual, Local
Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body, in
the nature of a fine, subject to all penalties applic-
able where fines remain unpaid.

Where such court action is by an individual or by
a Local Union, Joint Council or other subordinate

24a

body against a Local Union, Joint Council or other
subordinate body, the foregoing provision in respect
to the payment of costs and expenses shall be ap-
plicable in favor of the Local Union, Joint Council or
other Subordinate body proceeded against in court.

25a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 79-2587 & 79-2780

PAWLAK, JOHN A. AND STAFFORD, JAMES,
V.

GREENAWALT, CHARLES E., LOCAL UNION No. 764, TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL NO. 53 AND INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF 'TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERs,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America,
Charles E. Greenawalt and Local Union No.
764
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 78-1035)

Present: ADAMS, VAN DUSEN AND HIGGINBOTHAM,
Circuit Judges

26a
JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record from
the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania and was argued by counsel on June 10,
1980.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
District Court, filed September 27, 1979, be, and the same
is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against appellants.

ATTEST:

/s/ [Illegible]
Clerk
August 20, 1980

27a
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (4) provides:

No labor organization shall limit the right of any
member thereof to institute an action in any court,
or in a proceeding before any administrative agency,
irrespective of whether or not the labor organization
or its officers are named as defendants or respond-
ents in such action or proceeding, or the right of
any member of a labor organization to appear as a
witness in any judicial, administrative, or legisla-
tive proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to
communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any
such member may be required to exhaust reasonable
hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization, before in-
stituting legal or administrative proceedings against
such organizations or any officer thereof: And pro-
vided further, That no interested employer or em-
ployer association shall directly or indirectly finance,
encourage or participate in, except as party, any
such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.

29 U.S.C. § 412 provides:
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

Section 102. Any person whose rights secured by the

: provisions of this title have been infringed by any

violation of this title may bring a civil action in a
district court of the United States for such relief
(including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any
such action against a labor organization shall be
brought in the district court of the United States
for the district where the alleged violation occurred,
or where the principal office of such labor organiza-
tion is located.

28a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil No. 78-1035

JOHN A. PAWLAK, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.

CHARLES E,. GREENAWALT, ET AL.,
Defendants

Complaint Filed 10/23/78
(Judge Muir)
ORDER
1. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are
denied.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

3. Article XIX, $12(b) of the Teamsters’ Constitu-
tion violates 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4).

4. The fine imposed on Pawlak violates 29 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a) (4).

5. Defendants are permanently enjoined from enforc-
ing Teamsters’ Constitution, Article XIX, § 12(b).

6. Defendants are permanently enjoined from collect-
ing or attempting to collect the fine of $2635 imposed on
Pawlak.

7. Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Teamsters shall at-
tempt to agree on a form of notice of this order to be
published by the Teamsters as well as a proposal for pub-
lication and shall file an agreed upon notice and pro-
posal for publication within 20 days from the date of

29a

this order. If they are unable to agree, each party shall
submit its form of notice and proposal for publication
within 30 days from the date of this order. The Court
will then issue an order with respect to the publication
of the notice.

8. The pre-trial conference for this case scheculed for
November 1, 1979 is cancelled.

/s/ Muir
MUIR
U.S. District Judge

DATED: September 27, 1979

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0807%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.