# Petition — NICHOLAS DENUCCI v. UNITED STATES (No. 80-770)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0774%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980

## Text

io’ 0 -77 0 Supreme Ta a |

FILED
CT 17 1900
NO.
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner
V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

KENNETH E. AARON, ESQUIRE
ALFONSO TUMINI, ESQUIRE,

OF COUNSEL
DAVISON, AARON & TUMINI
Attorneys for Petitioner
Suite 900 Lafayette Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
(215) 629-1100

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the goods in question, copper cathodes
shipped from Antofagosta, Chile and discharged in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, and at that location released to the
consignee, Cerro Sales, Inc., were part of foreign or inter-
state commerce necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. §659?

2. Whether Appellant was denied a fair trial when the
Court admitted in evidence a videotape re-enactment con-
ducted by the government?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No

S65. 6'o wh win Nn 0.0 b's 0 KOK eR SOOO Oe ii.
Ce acs nc boa ew pee 5 Ohne es eed ]

EE NNN 6 6 ok occ aves co ctcnnvensaees ]

NT GRAN Rh cio Wis ocbe cos 6Genewh aegwneuens 2
gg SPST PTT TT eer ee TT ere 2-4
Reasons for Granting the Writ..................... 5-9
IGN 65 wins 0 0de'ce dosed dcdnevnheneuws 5-9
a os. 65 snd cid wnws pecaew ecb davon 10

Appendix I — Opinion of U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit........... A-1 - A-28

Appendix II —Opinion of U. S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

DE eveeteesesededaae A-29 - A-33
Appendix III —18 U.S.C. §659.............. A-34 - A-36

i Ne Be

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Collins v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908
BE renee ry ee ee 8
Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1972) ..... 8

Pacheo v. United States, 367 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1966)... ‘8

United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974)............... 5

United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1971) ... 5
United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1970).... 5

United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976)................ 6

United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973)................ 6

United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968)... 6 ©
United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310(2d Cir. 1968) .... 6
Statutes:

ge a err re er eee re Pere eee 5

Other Authorities:

WIGMORE, Evidence §798A (Third Edition 1940).. 8

othe

——— er eee ee ee re ~— = —

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS DENUCCTI, Petitioner, prays that a Writ
of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered in this
case on July 74 1980.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals below (Appendix,
infra, page A-1) is not yet reported. It affirmed a judgment of
conviction of Petitioner for theft from a foreign shipment in
violation of 18 U.S.C §659 and conspiracy. Petitioner was
tried in District Court by a jury.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
was entered on July 25, 1980; Petition for Rehearing denied
on August 18, 1980. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

rr rr ee

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Statute involved is 18 U.S.C. §659. Because the
provisions are lengthy, the entire text is set forth as
Appendix II, p. A-29. In relevant part, the Statute provides
as follows:

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes,
Carries away, or conceals, or by fraud or deception
obtains from any pipeline system, railroad car, wagon,
motortruck, or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage
facility, station, station house, platform or depot or from
any steamboat, vessel, or wharf, or from any aircraft, air
terminal, airport, aircraft terminal or air navigation
facility with intent to convert to his own use any goods
or chattels moving as or which are a part of or which
constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight,
express, or other property .. .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on four (4)
Counts under Criminal Indictment No. 78-149 charging
him with theft irom interstate or foreign commerce in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (Count I); possession of the same
goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (Count II); theft from
customs custody and control in violation of 18 U.S.C. §549
(Count IIT); and conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371
(Count IV). The District Court sentenced Petitioner to con-
current one-year terms of imprisonment on Counts I, II, and
III, and to a subsequent five-year term of probation on Count
IV.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the convictions for possession (Count
II) and theft of goods from customs custody and control
(Count III), and affirmed the convictions of theft from
foreign commerce (Count I) and conspiracy (Count IV ),

2

During February, 1978, after experiencing labor
problems, Cerro Sales Corporation, which had imported
copper cathodes from the country of Chile, was forced to
divert these goods originally intended for delivery in Bridge-
port, Connecticut to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for
discharge. The date of arrival was February 22, 1978.

Because Cerro Sales Corporation determined that the
freight costs of shipping these cathodes to Bridgeport, Con-
necticut was prohibitively expensive, the goods were stored
in Philadelphia at Northern Metals Pier. The theft of the
copper cathodes allegedly began on March 22, 1978, some
twenty-eight (28) days after their arrival.

At the time of the theft, the copper had been released to
the consignee, Cerro Sales Corporation, in Philadelphia,
who exercised full control and dominion over the goods. The
goods had not been sold at this time nor had Cerro located a
purchaser for the merchandise. In fact, at the time of
Petitioner’s trial, some six (6) months later, the merchandise
was still being stored in the warehouse at Northern Metals
Pier.

Philadelphia had been designated as the final
destination of the copper cathodes on the United States
Custom Inward Foreign Manifest. Mr. Harold Pratt, a
representative of Cerro Sales Corporation, had testified that
Philadelphia was now its designated port of delivery; that
Cerro had abandoned all intent to sell the goods in Con-
necticut or New York; that the Company had taken the
copper for itself and was holding it pending a sale to a willing
buyer; and that the copper could effectively have remained in
Philadelphia indefinitely. The goods were no longer being
held under the original bill of lading.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Denucci, a Philadelphia
Police Officer, and co-Defendant, Marvin Garber, who were
observed patrolling the area where the copper had been
stored during the fourth week of March, 1978, were subse-
quently arrested for the thefts.

At trial the Court permitted the government to intro-
duce a videotape re-enactment of the alleged crime for the
avowed purpose of showing that the crime was possible of

being committed. The only foundation for the tape was the
testimony of Francis Cunningham, a Custom’s Agent, who
conducted the experiment. The tape portrayed two (2) men
easily lifting a copper cathode weighing more than three
hundred (300) pounds into the trunk of a car and then closing
the trunk, and was markedly dissimilar from how the crime
actually happened.

The case was tried before a jury and Petitioner found
guilty on all four (4) Counts.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The Statute under which Appellant was convicted, 18
U.S.C. §659, makes it a crime to embezzle, steal, or
unlawfully take or carry away from any storage facility,
station, stationhouse, platform or depot any goods moving as
or which are a part of or which constitute an interstate or
foreign shipment. United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275,
279 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974). The
test for determining whether or not a shipment is in inter-
state commerce and thus within the ambit of Section 659 is
“a practical one, depending upon the relationship between
the consignee, consignor, and carrier, the indicia of inter-
state commerce at the time the theft occurs, and the pre-
servation of the congressional intent.’’ United States v.
Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1970). It should be
emphasized that the relationship between the consignee,
consignor and the carrier is most important. See, United
States v. Astolas, supra.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is inconsistent with the prior decisions of that Circuit
Court and the case le. of various Circuit Courts and is
clearly distinguishable irom the cases upon which this Court
had relied for its determination.

Unlike the factual situation in U “ited States v. Augello,
452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir 1971) and United States v.
Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), upon which the
Circuit Court relies, where the merchandise was temporarily
stored until delivery at its final destination in fulfillment of
orders previously given, the facts in this case do not establish
a temporary delay pending delivery to its final destination.
For all practical purposes, the final destination was Phila-
delphia, the merchandise having remained in place for more
than six (6) months. Furthermore, there was not evidence of
intent of Cerro Corporation to resume shipment after a brief
pause. The only intent evidenced by the consignee was to
locate a purchaser which it had been unable to do.

In United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (Sth Cir.)
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976), the consignee had
refused delivery of the merchandise and the delivery, thus,
was never effectuated. The goods were still in the hands of
the consignor. In the instant case, unlike Gates, supra, the
goods had been released to the consignee who exercised full
control over them.

In still another case, upon which the Court of Appeals
relied for the proposition that the goods need not be ear-
marked for a specific buyer, United States v. Thomas, 396
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968), the facts of that case indicate, and
the Thomas Court emphasized, that buyers had been
procured at the time of the theft; that of the sixty-seven (67)
cartons in the shipment, fifty-six (56) orders had already
been taken and forty-three (43) of these were destined out of
state. In this case, at no point had a buyer been located or an
order received for the copper.

Finally, in the case of United States v. Gimelstob, 475
F.2d 157 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), the
Third Circuit held that one of the crucial tests of whether or
not federal jurisdiction still attached is whether or not the
goods were still being held under the original bill of lading at
the time of the theft. In the present case, the goods were
delivered to the consignee and no longer being held under its
original bill of lading. The Court of Appeals in the instant
case, by failing to even consider this factor, abandoned the
Circuit’s position in Gimelstob and concluded that federal
jurisdiction would attach presumably until the goods
ultimately came to rest in the hands of the final consumer.
While the Courts have adopted a liberal interpretation of
what constitutes interstate and foreign commerce, the
holding of the Court of Appeals is unwarranted and an over-
extension of federal jurisdiction. The language of the Court
in United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d at 164, recognizing
the design of § 659 was to promote free flow of goods in inter-
state and foreign commerce, and that the carrying out of this
purpose is not to be hampered by technical legal con-
ceptions, is not an invitation for the Courts to assume juris-
diction in every case of theft based on some remote nexus.

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
conflicts in the above cited decisions and to define the extent
and limits of interstate and foreign commerce as to when a
shipment arrives at its final destination, marking the termina-
tion of an interstate or foreign shipment.

Il.

The Petitioner’s rights to a fair trial were severely
prejudiced by the introduction in evidence of a videotape re-
enactment of the crime. The avowed purpose of the govern-
ment in offering the film was to attest that such a crime was
possible of commission. However, the prejudice which
flowed from this re-enactment overwhelmingly outweighed
any probative value it may have had.

Numerous differences exist between the government
Staged re-enactment of the crime and the actual circum-
stances under which the theft is alleged to have occurred.
First, in order for the copper cathode to fit in the trunk of the
test car, the government had a frame platform built upon
which the cathode was slid into the trunk. Additionally, the
grounds at Northern Metals Pier were “cleaned up”’ in order
to provide easy access and sure footing from the copper to
the car during the re-enactment, while the terrain was
normally cluttered and treacherous. The weather was ideal
for the re-enactment which was filmed in broad daylight
while the alleged theft took place on a rainy cold night. The
test vehicle that was used for the demonstration was not the
police vehicle alleged to have been used for the thefts.
Instead, the car used was a different model, number and
year. While an actual demonstration of the alleged theft
would have been a much more accurate depiction of what, in
fact, really happened, this request by defense counsel was
refused,

There was no foundation laid before the introduction of
the tape except that of the limited testimony of Francis
Cunningham, a Customs Agent.

Before evidence of experiments may be admitted in
evidence, it must be shown that the test or demonstration was

conducted under conditions substantially similar to the
actual conditions. Collins v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d
908 (8th Cir. 1977). The evidence must be relevant and
probative, that is, the conditions are identical with or similar
to the conditions of the occurrence re-enacted. Glick v.
White Motor Cv., 458 F.2d 1287, (3d Cir. 1972).

In Pacheo v. United States, 367 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.
1966), the Court stated that the party offering evidence of an
out-of-court experiment must lay a proper fourwation by
showing a similarity of circumstances and conditions. The
Court went on to caution that such evidence should be
received with caution and be admitted only when it is
obvious to the Court from the nature of the experiment that
the jury would be enlightened rather than confused. A slight
change may wholly distort the demonstration and render the
evidence harmful and prejudicial.

Courts have been reluctant to justify the use of films in
re-enactment of crimes. The reasons are obvious. As
Wigmore aptly states:

“Theoretically, of course, the moving picture can
never be assumed to represent the actual occurrence;
what is seen in it is merely what certain witnesses say
was the thing that happened . . . and yet any moving
picture is apt to. . . impress the jury with a convincing and
partiality of nature itself. In view of these inherent risks
of misleading, the trial Judge might well deem a picture
unsafe and inadmissible when the introductory evi-
dence has not convinced him that the risk is negligible.”
WIGMORE, Evidence, §798 at page 203 (Third
Edition 1940).

In this case, the trial Court abused its descretion in
allowing the use of this videotape re-enactment with all its
inherent harms rather than permitting an actual on-the-scene
demonstration. Because of the strong reliance the jury may
place on a film, the need for the Court to enunciate standards
and principles governing the use of such films is clear.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons aforesaid, it is respect‘ully prayed that a
Writ of Certiorari be granted to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
DAVIDSON, AARON & TUMINI

By

‘KENNETH E. AARON
Attorneys for Petitioner

BY: ma a
ALFONSO TUMINI
of Counsel

Suite 900 Lafayette Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

(215) 629-1100

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of October, 1980,
three (3) copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit .were
served by First Class United States mail upon the Solicitor
General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530,
as counsel for the Respondent. I further certify that all
parties required to be served have been served.

DAVIDSON, AARON & TUMINI

BY:
KENNETH E. AARON
Counsel for Petitioner
900 Lafayette Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
(215) 629-1100

BY:
ALFONSO TUMINI
of Counsel

10

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 79-2511

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GARBER, MARVIN, Appellant
(D. C. Crim. No. 78-00149-02) j

No. 79-2517

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DENUCCI, NICHOLAS, Appellant
(D. C. Crim. No. 78-00149-01)

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Argued May 22, 1980

Before: ADAMS, VAN DUSEN and HIGGINBOTHAM,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 25, 1980)

Joseph N. Bongiovanni, III, Esq. (Argued)
Bongiovanni and Reagoso

Philadelphia, Pa.
Attorney for Appellant Garber

A-1

Alfonso Tumini, Esq. (Argued)
Davidson, Aaron & Tumini
Philadelphia, Pa.
Attorney for Appellant Denucci

Luther E. Weaver, III, Esq. (Argued)
Assistant United States Attorney
Philadelphia, Pa.

On the Brief:

Peter F. Vaira,
United States Attorney

Water S. Batty, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney,
Chief, Appellate Section

Lynell N. Staton,
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Defendants Marvin Garber and Nicholas Denucci
were charged in a four-count indictment with various
offenses arising out of the theft of copper cathodes from
the Northern Metal Company (Northern Metal) pier in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in March 1978. Count I
charged that Garber and Denucci stole from Northern
Metal’s storage facility eight copper cathodes which
were part of an interstate or foreign shipment of freight
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976). Count II charged
that they unlawfully had the same copper cathodes in
their possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976).
Count III charged that they unlawfully removed copper
cathodes from customs custody and control in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §549 (1976). Count IV charged that they
conspired with each other to violate §§659 and 549 in

A-2

FR SRS Sn Se RE A NT TE ATT, AT TY TT Te fe

violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (1976). After a lengthy trial,
a jury found both Garber and Denucci guilty on all four
counts. The district court sentenced each defendant to
concurrent one-year terms of imprisonment on Counts I,
II and III, and to a subsequent five-year term of proba-
tion on Count IV. The defendants were also ordered to
make restitution. Garber and Denucci filed timely ap-
peals, based on several legal claims. After considering
each contention raised by the defendants, we affirm the
§659 conviction of theft from foreign commerce (Count
1), reverse the conviction of receipt and possession of
goods stolen from a foreign shipment (Count II), reverse
the conviction of removal of goods from customs custody
and control (Count III), and affirm the conviction of con-
spiracy (Count IV).

I.

Cerro Sales Corporation (Cerro) represents the
country of Chile in the sale of Chilean copper in the
United States. Each year Cerro sells about 70,000 tons
of Chilean copper to various corporations in the United
States. In 1978 one of Cerro’s long-term contracts re-
quired it to sell 1200 tons of copper cathodes! per month
to Anaconda American Brass Company (Anaconda).
One of the monthly shipments of copper consigned to
Anaconda was enroute from Chile to Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, in February 1978 when the steamship com-
pany carrying the copper experienced labor problems at
several locations, including Bridgeport. Under the ocean
bills of lading, the steamship company had the right to
divert the cargo to other ports. In this instance the
steamship company chose to discharge the cargo in
Philadelphia. Cerro found that the freight costs for ship-

1. Copper cathodes are large sheets. weighing approximatel\
300 pounds each. To facilitate shipping and handling. 14 sheets are
bound together in a bundle.

A-3

ping the copper from Philadelphia to Connecticut were
prohibitive, making delivery to Bridgeport impracticable.
Cerro was thus forced to try to find other buyers for the
copper. In the interim the copper cathodes remained at
the Northern Metal pier, where the cargo had arrived on
February 22, 1978.

In the fourth week of March 1978, a number of
cathodes disappeared during the night from the ware-
house at Northern Metal’s pier. During that week,
Garber and Denucci, while on duty as Philadelphia po-
lice officers, drove their patrol cars onto the pier on sev-
eral nights and parked next to the area where the copper
was stored. At these times Garber was away from his as-
signed police district. Garber and Denucci always left
the pier at the same time, approximately 20 to 30 min-
utes after they had arrived. Subsequent investigations
revealed that traces of copper were found in the trunks
of both defendants’ patrol cars and on their police uni-
forms.

If.

The defendants first challenge their conviction un-
der §659, asserting that the copper cathodes were not
part of foreign or interstate commerce when they were
stolen. They argue that the foreign shipment had come
to an end when the cargo was unloaded in Philadelpnia.

Without question, a conviction under §659 can only
be sustained if there is evidence that the stolen items
were goods “moving as or which are a part of or which
constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight.”

2. 18 U.S.C. §659 provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries
away or conceals, or by fraud or deception obtains trom any
pipeline svstem, railroad car, wagon, motortruck, or other vehi-
cle, or from any tank or storage facility, station, station house,
platform or depot or from any steamboat. vessel, or wharf, or
from anv aircraft. air terminal. airport. aircraft terminal or air

A-4

There is no requirement of literal movement; goods
which are part of or constitute an interstate or foreign
shipment are covered by the statute even if not in motion
at the time of the theft. United States v. Gollin, 176 F.2d
889, 893 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Richman v.
United States, 338 U.S. 848 (1949); United States v.
Wills, 593 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. ), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964
(1979); United States v. Williams, 559 F.2d 1243 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275, 279
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Edin v. United
States, 416 U.S. 955 (1974). The test for determining
whether goods are part of an interstate or foreign ship-
ment is a practical one based on common sense and ad-
ministered on an ad hoc basis. United States v. Astolas,
487 F.2d at 279. In order to make this determination,
courts look to a variety of factors, such as the relation-
ship between the consignee, consignor, and carrier; the
indicia of interstate or foreign commerce at the time of
the theft; and the preservation of the congressional in-
tent in enacting this statute. United States v. Gimelstob,
475 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828

navigation facility with intent to convert to his own use any
goods or chattels moving as or which are a part of or which con-
stitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, express, or
other property; or

*. ° *

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes by any
fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any railroad car, bus,
vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft operated by any common
carrier moving in interstate or foreign commerce or from any
passenger thereon any money, baggage, goods. or chattels, or
whoever buys, receives, or has in his possession any such mon-
ey, baggage, goods, or chattels, knowing the same to have been
embezzled or stolen—

“Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten vears. or both; but if the amount or
value of such money. baggage, goods or chattels does not ex-
ceed $100. he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one vear, or both.” (Emphasis supplied. )

A-5

(1973); United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045, 1047
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United
States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d at 279. The delivery
of goods to a carrier before the. theft occurred, if applica-
ble, and the physical location of the shipment when sto-
len are important considerations, United States v.
Astolas, 487 F.2d at 279, but no one factor is conclusive.
United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974). Rather, each
case must be evaluated on its own particular facts, Unit-
ed States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d at 164, recognizing that
§659 was designed to promote the flow of goods in inter-
state and foreign commerce, and that “the carrying out
of this purpose is not to be hampered by technical legal
conceptions.” United States v. Waroneck, 582 F.2d 1158
(7th Cir. 1978), quoting United States v. Astolas, 487
F.2d at 279.

Both parties agree that the copper cathodes involved
in this case constituted a foreign shipment at least until
the ship docked in Philadelphia. They also agree that a
foreign or interstate shipment does not lose its charac-
teristic as such “until it arrives at its final destination
and is there delivered.” United States v. Yoppolo, 435
F.2d 625, 626 (6th Cir. 1970). Garber and Denucci con-
tend, however, that once the shipment of copper was di-
verted to Philadelphia and it became clear that the cop-
per cathodes could not be delivered to their original
destination in Connecticut, Philadelphia became the fi-
nal destination of that particular shipment. The Govern-
ment, on the other hand, argues that Philadelphia was
only a temporary stop, occasioned by an unforeseen
change in route by the shipping company.*® The Govern-

3. Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976) can be based on
shipments which are either interstate or foreign. Both parties char-
acterize the shipment in question as foreign. The key fact is that it
originated in Chile and ‘terminated in the United States. Since tk

A-6

ment emphasizes that the evidence demonstrated that
Cerro did not seek to have the copper delivered to Phila-
delphia, did not intend to keep it there, intended to sell
all the copper cathodes it imported, and at the time of the
theft was seeking another party to replace Anacorda as
purchaser of that specific lot of copper. We believe that a
common sense view of the facts in this case requires us
to agree with the Government’s position. Although, at
the time of the theft, Cerro did not have another specific
purchaser in mind, there was uncontradicted evidence
that Cerro had no use for the copper cathodes at its dock
in Philadelphia, and was attempting to sell the shipment
to companies located elsewhere.

Despite this evidence, the defendants vigorously as-
sert that Philadelphia must be viewed as the final desti-
nation of the copper. Their primary argument is that the
cathodes remained in Philadelphia for such an extended
period of time that the shipment could not have been
considered temporarily delayed. The cases explicitly
hold that in determining whether interstate or foreign
commerce is involved under §659, the crucial time is the
time of the theft. United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); United
States v. Tyers, 487 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973); cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 971 (1974); Winer v. United States, 228

alleged jurisdictional basis is provided by the journey from outside
the United States, whether it crosses state lines once it arrives in
the United States is irrelevant so long as the cargo from the foreign
port has not yet reached its final destination. Thus, if a shipment of
goods from Chile to Pittsburgh is shipped via Philadelphia and
hijacked on the leg of the journey from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, a
theft from a foreign shipment has occurred. Under the Govern-
ment’s theory, the copper was stolen during a temporary delay in
the trip moving the copper from Chile. Whether this copper was
destined for Pennsylvania or some other state was inconsequential.
The crucial point is that Cerro did not intend the journey from Chile
to end at the Philadelphia waterfront.

A-7

F.2d 944 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 906 (1956);
United States v. Hardaway, 455 F.Supp. 226 (N.D. Ill.
1978), affd, 593 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 964 (1979). Delays enroute do not deprive ship-
ments of continued characterization as interstate or for-
eign so long as the goods have not yet reached their des-
tination, United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1141
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972), and
the shipper or carrier intends to resume the journey.
United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).

In the instant case, at the time the thefts began, the
copper had been in Philadelphia for 28 days.* The de-
fendants argue that this demonstrates that there was
more than a brief delay in the journey.*® Under the cir-
cumstances present in this instance, we do not perceive
28 days to be such an extended length of time that it
necessarily converts a temporary destination into a final
one. In United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir.
1971), a shipment first entered the United States when
it arrived at the docks in New York. Its final destination
was a warehouse located elsewhere within the state of
New York. It was stolen 11 days after arrival while
enroute to the warehouse. The court held that this ship-
ment, though somewhat delayed, was still in foreign
commerce at the time of the hijacking.® Moreover, Unit-

4. The copper arrived February 22, 1978; the thefts apparent-
ly began the night of March 22, 1978.

5. The defendants emphasize that the copper cathodes were
still in Philadelphia six months later at the time of the trial. This fact
is deprived of its apparent relevance, however, by the defendants’
concession that the time of the theft is the critical time for determin-
ing whether a shipment is foreign or interstate, and by the absence
of anv indication that Cerro had ceased its active pursuit of other
purchasers.

6. The intended route for the shipment from the dock to the

warehouse was intrastate. The court viewed the situation as an
uncompleted foreign journey, and based its jurisdiction solely on
the fact that the goods were still in foreign commerce at the time of
the theft. United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir.

1971).

A-8

—_

ed States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), upon
which Garber and Denucci rely, is not to the contrary. In
Maddox, a sugar broker regularly purchased large
quantities of sugar from Puerto Rico. The sugar was
shipped to Baltimore and stored temporarily in a ware-
house. Maddox stole bags of sugar from the warehouse
over a three-month period. The court upheld his convic-
tion under §659, despite Maddox’s claim that the sugar
in the warehouse had lost its character as foreign or in-
terstate commerce. The court stated:

“The deposit of cargo in a warehouse may un-
der certain circumstances constitute a coming to
rest, marking the termination of an interstate or for-
eign shipment. At other times, however, the stop-off
at the warehouse may be only a pause in the course
of an uncompleted journey. Standing alone, the re-
moval of goods to a warehouse is not conclusive; nor
is the consignee’s power to divert the goods from the
intended interstate commerce. See Champlain Re-
alty Company v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366,
43 S.Ct. 146, 67 L.Ed. 309 (1922). These are merely
factors to be considered, but there is no rigid rule of
law that mandates a holding either way. The answer
in any particular case must depend on a factual as-
sessment.”

‘“.. . There is no absolute requirement that the
flow of commerce be continuous if there is the clear
intention to resume after a brief pause.”

Id. at 299-300. After reviewing the record, the court con-
cluded that the sugar was part of a “continuing, though
interrupted, shipment in commerce.” Id. at 300. Garber
and Denucci seize on the statement in Maddox that the
flow of commerce may be interrupted so long as there is
the intention to resume the journey after a brief pause.
The linchpin of their argument is that 28 days cannot be
considered a brief pause. Our reading of Maddox does

A-9

not lead to such an inelastic definition of “brief pause.”
First, we point out that Maddox is silent as to the length
of time the sugar had been in the warehouse at the time
of the theft. Second, we note the Maddox court's remon-
stration that there are no rigid rules in determining
whether goods have come to rest, and that ad hoc deci-
sions must be made based on the particular facts of each
case. In light of these considerations, we conclude that
the 28 days the copper cathodes were in Philadelphia be-
fore the time of the theft did not in themselves deprive
the shipment of its foreign character. ’

Furthermore, in a slightly different context courts
have often ruled that a substantial delay in one state
does not necessarily cause an item to lose its interstate
character. For example, to support a conviction under 18
U.S.C. §2313 (1976), which outlaws the sale or receipt
of stolen vehicles, the Government must show that at
the time of the crime the vehicle in question was moving
in the “stream of interstate or foreign commerce” and
had not yet come to rest within a state. United States v.
Hiscott, 586 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1978). In United
States v. Baker, 452 F.2d 21 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert. de-
~ied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972), a truck was stolen and trans-
ported across state lines to its destination state. It re-
mained there for three months and was used personally
during that time by a dealer in stolen goods. He “re-
vealed no intention of keeping it,” however, and sold it to

7. We emphasize once again that at the trial there was
undisputed evidence that Cerro continued its active pursuit of pur-
chasers for the copper throughout this period. While it may be that
’ in other circumstances, e. g., if the seller made no attempt to seek
other buyers or if the shipment consisted of a non-fungible com-
modity without a steady market, a period of 28 days might be seen
as evidence of something other than a temporary pause, we do not
have such a case before us.

A-10

Baker, /d. at 24. The court upheld Baker’s conviction un-
der §2313, stating:

“Admittedly, [the dealer] had ihe vehicle in his pos-
session for three months. Time, however, is not con-
clusive but rather one of the facts to be considered
in determining whether a vehicle is in interstate
commerce. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that
the vehicle in this case lost its interstate character.”

Id. Similarly, in United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978), the de-
fendants attacked as invalid their convictions under 18
U.S.C. §2315 (1976) for receiving and selling stolen
property which was moving in interstate or foreign com-
merce by emphasizing that two years had elapsed since
the stolen items had crossed state lines and entered the
destination state. They argued that this definitively
proved that the stolen items had come to rest and thus
had lost their interstate character. The court ruled that
simply because goods reach the state where they are in-
tended to be sold does not deprive the goods of their in-
terstate character. Jd. at 692. Rather, so long as the
transfer of goods can be considered a continuation of the
movement that began outside the state, the interstate
commerce jurisdictional requirement is fulfilled. Id. Ad-
ditionally, long delays do not necessitate a finding that
items left interstate commerce. Specifically, the Tobin
court that the two years which had elapsed between the
time the items entered the destination state and the time
of the attempted sale did not require a finding that the
items had come to rest before the sale.

In light of the cases interpreting §659 and similar
jurisdictional provisions in §§2313 and 2315, we con-
clude that in this case the 28 days between arrival of the
copper in the United States and the theft do not require
that the shipment be viewed as one which had lost its
foreign character.

A-11

Garber and Denucci base their secondary attack on
the jurisdictional prerequisite for §659 on the fact that at
the time of the theft Cerro had no specific purchaser of
the copper in mind. They acknowledge that Cerro pre-
sented uncontradicted testimony that it could not use
the copper cathodes iiself in Philadelphia and was trying
to locate buyers for the copper. Nevertheless, Garber and
Denucci reiterate that unless there is a clear intention to
resume, storage at a warehouse constitutes the termina-
tion of a foreign or interstate shipment. They further as-
sert that in order for there to be sufficient intent to re-
sume the journey, there must be a specific ultimate
destination in mind. We are not persuaded by this argu-
ment. Although generally shippers will have a specific fi-
nal destination in mind, there are instances —- and this
case is one of them — when this will not be so.®

Case law provides us with other telling examples.
United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976), presents a factual situation
quite similar to the one at hand. In Gates, a carton was
shipped from New York to Georgia for delivery to the
consignee in Atlanta. The consignee, however, refused
to accept delivery. The carton was stolen in Atlanta
while the truck was enroute to the local terminal. The
defendant attacked his conviction under §659, asserting
that the goods were in local transit at the time of the

8. Defendants’ insistence that in order to characterize a ship-
ment as one involved in an ongoing journey, rather than as one
which has come to its final destination, the seller must in every in-
stance have a specific purchaser in mind is too inflexible. It would
lead to such anomalous results as sustaining a conviction under
§659 if goods were stolen from a pier so long as the shipper thought
that the consignee intended to come pick up the shipment, but re-
versing a conviction under §659 if the same goods were stolen one
hour after the consignee had just cancelled the contract and re-
fused to pick up the shipment, suddenly leaving the shipper without
a consignee.

A-12

theft. The Fifth Circuit sustained the conviction, stating
that the fact that the consignee had refused delivery did
not mean the goods lost their interstate character.
“There is no need to employ complex fictions
about legal title to arrive at an artificial result. The
facts of this case strongly indicate that the stolen
goods were part of a continuing interstate shipment.
Final delivery was never effected. In fact, the goods
were stolen before they were ever removed from the
truck by an employee of the carrier. That Baron's
initially rejected the shipment is not controlling.
The carton retained its interstate character despite
the aborted delivery and the fact that were it not for
the theft, the carrier would have been forced to
make arrangements to dispose of the shipment, pre-
sumably at the direction of the consignor.

Id. at 1047-48. In United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d at
299, discussed above at pages 8-9, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed a conviction under §659 for theft of sugar from a
warehouse. A sugar broker regularly imported large
quantities of sugar from Puerto Rico. It arrived in the
United States at Baltimore, where regular customers
picked up 40% to 60% of each shipment directly from
the pier. The rest of the sugar was stored temporarily in
a warehouse in Baltimore. Approximately 70% of the
warehoused sugar was held to meet pre-existing con-
tracts with buyers in surrounding states. The defendant
stressed that the sugar stolen from the warehouse was
no longer in foreign commerce since the individual bags
were not earmarked for any particular buyer, the sugar
broker could do with the sugar as he saw fit, and a sig-
nificant portion of the sugar had not yet been sold. De-
spite these facts, the court held that an assessment of all
the circumstances of the case indicated that the sugar
had not left interstate commerce. In United States v.
Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968), 67 cartons arrived
in New York from Japan pursuant to the order of an im-

A-13

rr an =

porter located in New York City. Seven days later a
trucking company, acting as agent for the importer, re-
moved the cartons from the pier and took them to the
trucking company’s warehouse. That same day two car-
tons were stolen. The cartons were not earmarked for
specific buyers. At the time of the theft, the importer had
received orders for 56 cartons. The remaining 11 were to
be held at the importer’s New York warehouse pending
further orders. Under these facts, even though it was
unclear whether the two cartons stolen were those for
which orders had been received or not, the court sus-
tained convictions for violacing §659.°

In the case at bar there was, in effect, an aborted de-
livery to Anaconda. Cerro was, therefore, forced to make
other arrangements to dispose of the shipment. The fact
that these arrangements had not been made at the time
of the theft, when coupled with the fact that Cerro was
unexpectedly faced with the arrival of a shipment of ap-
proximately 500 tons’° of copper cathodes in a port with
no purchasers situated nearby, does not, in our view, de-
prive the shipment in question of its foreign character.

To summarize, taking a common sense approach to
the realities of this situation, we do not believe that the
unforeseen delivery to Philadelphia, with the conse-
quent cancellation of the agreement that this particular
shipment would go to Anaconda in Connecticut, thus
necessitating that Cerro attempt to find alternative pur-

9. The court in United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1968), emphasized the fact that many of the cartons were ultimate-
ly destined for delivery out of state. Nonetheless, in light of the fact
that the journey originated in Japan and was continuing, though it
had been temporarily interrupted in the United States, the court af-
firmed the trial court’s finding that “the cartons were ‘in interstate

- or foreign commerce’ when they were |[stolen].” Id. at 315.

10. There was testimony that the shipment of copper consist-
ed of 3,262 cathodes. App. at 124a. Each cathode weighs approxi-
mately 300 pounds. Id. Therefore, the total shipment of copper
weighed approximately 978,600 pounds, or nearly 500 tons.

A-14

chasers for the copper, deprived this shipment of its for-
eign character. Nor do we think that the fact that at the
time of the theft Cerro had been unsuccessful for the
previous 28 days in locating buyers for the cathodes re-
quires a finding that the shipment had come to rest at its
final destination. Rather, we are persuaded that, in the
circumstances of this case, Cerro’s active pursuit of al-
ternative purchasers demonstrates Cerro’s intent to re-
sume the shipment as soon as possible. This intent is
dispositive and supports the conclusion that, at the time
of the theft, the shipment of copper cathodes had not
reached its final destination and had not lost its foreign
commerce character. Because we conclude that the de-
fendants’ challenge to the jurisdictional basis of their
convictions for violating §659 fails, we affirm the judg-
ment of conviction of Count I.

II].

The defendants also challenge their conviction for
possession of stolen goods under §659.'' Garber and
Denucci assert that they could not properly be convicted
of both theft from an interstate shipment and possession
of goods stolen from an interstate shipment when the
same goods were at issue in both charges. We agree with
their argument insofar as it attacks the sentences for
possession of stolen goods under §659. A review of the
recent cases reveals that courts have carefully examined
this and similar statutes to determine the congressional
intent in punishing multiple aspects of the same crimi-
nal act. The Supreme Court in Heflin v. United States,
358 U.S. 415 (1959), was faced with a defendant who
had multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. §2113 (1976)

11. The text of the pertinent provisions of §659 appears at note
2. supra.

A-15

arising from one bank robbery. The defendant was con-
victed of violating §2113(d) in unlawfully taking the
funds and of violating §2113(c) in unlawfully possessing
the same funds. The Court, stating that “we resolve an
ambiguity in favor of lenity when required to determine
the intent of Congress in punishing multiple aspects of
the same criminal act,” id. at 419, held that subsection
(c) was designed to reach a new group of wrongdoers,
those who only received the money from the robbers, not
to increase the punishment of those who actually robbed
the bank. Therefore, only one conviction was allowed to
stand. A similar situation presented itself in United
States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976). The defendants
had been convicted of robbing a bank and of possessing
the funds stolen in the robbery. The appellate court held
that it was plain error to allow the jury to convict an indi-
vidual both of taking and of possessing the money ob-
tained in one robbery, reversed the judgments of convic-
tion, and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed
that the defendants could not be convicted of both
counts, ruling that the trial judge should have instructed
the jury to consider, first, the theft charge, and only con-
sider the possession charge if they found insufficient
proof that the defendants actually participated in the
robbery. The Court, however, disagreed that a new trial
was necessary, and held that the error could be fully cor-
rected by simply vacating the conviction and sentence
under the possession count. Id. at 549, 552.

The Sixth Circuit adopted this approach in review-
ing multiple convictions under §659 in an opinion by our
colleague, Judge Adams, sitting with the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Solimine,
536 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429
U.S. 990 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Sclafani v. Unit-
ed States, 430 U.S. 918 (1977). Finding “no indication
in the sparse legislative history of section 659 that Con-

A-16

———

gress intended to regard each theft from interstate ship-
ment as a multiplicity of discreet offenses so that the
punishment for such thett could be enhanced,” id. at
710, the court concluded that the section of the statute
outlawing possession of goods stolen from an interstate
or foreign shipment was an attempt to bring within the
scope of the criminal law a different class of wrongdoers
from the actual participants in the theft. Holding that
convictions of theft from interstate shipment and of re-
ceipt and possession of the same property could not both
stand, the court vacated the conviction and sentence
with respect to the possession count. Id. at 711. In Unit-
ed States v. Gilbert, 553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1977), the
Fifth Circuit explicitly followed Solimine and held that
under §659 the defendant could not properly be convict-
ed of both theft from interstate freight shipments and
_ possession of the proceeds of the theft. Even more re-
cently, the Second Circuit has taken a similar approach.
In United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. ),
cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 180 (1979), the court held that
the defendants’ convictions of interference with inter-
state commerce by means of robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. §1957 (1976) and of knowing receipt and posses-
sion of goods stolen from interstate commerce in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §659 were improper. Acknowledging
that convictions under two different statutes were in-
volved, unlike the situations presented by Heflin,
Gaddis, and Solimine, the court nonetheless ruled that
the convictions were multiplicitous. It viewed the charge
of theft under §1951 as the functional equivalent of a
charge under the theft provisions of §659. Finding no
support in the legislative history of either statute for the
proposition that Congress wanted to “punish separately
and cumulatively the crimes of robbing a truck of its
contents and receiving the stolen goods,” id. at 751, the
court vacated the conviction and sentence with respect

A-17

to the possession count.!* See Busic v. United States, 48
U.S.L.W. 4535, 4538 (May 19, 1980), citing Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).

This review of the decisional law convinces us that
the convictions of Garber and Denucci under §659 for
both theft from a foreign shipment and receipt and pos-
session of goods stolen from a foreign shipment are
multiplicitous. Since the jury’s verdict indicates that it
made factual findings that both defendants participated
in the theft and then kept the proceeds, we may con-
clude that a properly instructed jury would have stopped
after making the first finding (see discussion of Gaddis
at page 15 above). Therefore, the proper remedy is to va-
cate the conviction and sentence with respect to the pos-
session count. Id. at 711. Accordingly, we must vacate
the judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed
on Garber and Denucci under Count II.

12. Our decision in United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc), is not to the contrary. In Gomez the defendant
was convicted of two offenses under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1976):
distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute co-
caine. The court affirmed both of the convictions, but vacated the
sentences in order “to effectuate the congressional intent to prevent
sentence pyramiding, and to avoid the anomalies of a technical ap-
plication of the merger theory.” Id. at 217. Gomez explicitly noted
that the Supreme Court held in Gaddis v. United States, 424 U.S.
544 (1976), that under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C.
§2113 (1976), “a jury should be instructed that it can convict a de-
fendant for either robbery or receiving, but not for both.” 593 F.2d
at 217 n. 20. This principle applies to the instant case where the
defendants were convicted of theft frorn a shipment in interstate or
foreign commerce and of possession of goods stolen from interstate
or foreign commerce. Gomez, which arises out of a different statute
- concerning drug transactions, as opposed to theft, is factually dis-
tinguishable from the case at hand. In United States v. Dowling,
a (July 9, 1980, 3d Cir. Nos. 79-2130/31 &
80-1444/45), this court vacated in certain situations only the sen-
tences, as opposed to the convictions.

A-18

IV.

Garber and Denucci appeal, in addition, from their
conviction of removing goods from customs custody in
violation of §549. They argue that the copper cathodes
were not in customs custody in March 1978 when they
were stolen. The Government, acknowledging that the
copper was located at the pier outside the north end of
the Northern Metal warehouse and not in a facility oper-
ated by the Customs Service, contends that the cathodes
were in constructive customs custody in March 1978.
Section 549 provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever, maliciously enters any bonded
warehouse or any vessel or vehicle laden with or
containing bonded merchandise with intent unlaw-
fully to remove therefrom any merchandise or bag-
gage therein, or unlawfully removes any merchan-
dise or baggage in such vessel, vehicle, or bunded
warehouse or otherwise in customs custody or
control

* * *

[s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.” (Emphasis
supplied. )

Courts which have interpreted this statute have held
that goods imported into this country are in constructive
customs custody from the moment of their arrival in the
United States until their release by the Customs Service,
regardless of whether the Customs Service has actual
physical possession. United Staies v. Harold, 588 F.2d
1136, 1142 (Sth Cir. 1979); Mungo v. United States, 423
F.2d 1351, 1354 (4th Cir. 1970).

In the instant case the copper had recently arrived
in the United States from Chile. Constructive customs
custody had thereby been established. The dispute cen-
ters on whether four weeks after arrival the Customs
Service had released the shipment, thus extinguishing

A-19

>

customs custody. An examination of the record before us
reveals that the cargo arrived in Philadelphia on Febru-
ary 22, 1978. The copper in question was accepted by
Northern Metal on February 25.'% At the time of
unloading, the steamship company counted the copper
bundles in the cargo. When Northern Metal took deliv-
ery from the ship, it transferred the bundle count onto a
warehouse certificate, which it forwarded to Cerro.'* A
bond for immediate delivery had already been posted un-
der which the Customs Service could release goods prior
to the payment of the exact amount of the duty.!®

As noted earlier, this shipment was originally con-
signed to Anaconda in Bridgeport, Connecticut, but was
discharged in Philadelphia because it had unexpectedly
been rerouted by the steamship company. At the time it
was unloaded in Philadelphia, a substitute consignee
had not yet been located. The Government relies on this
fact, contending that goods are released from customs
custody only when the consignee accepts delivery from
the shipper. Unfortunately, the Government provides us
with no statutory or decisional authority for this conten-
tion.'© Therefore, we have found it necessary to review
the statutory scheme regulating imported goods.

13. Government Exhibit 6, introduced at trial, documents this
fact.

14. App. at 147a.

15. App. at 178a-182a; App. at 143a.

16. The Government asserts that goods are released from cus-
toms custody when they are “permitted,” or authorized to be deliv-
ered to the next consignee, but cites no support for this assertion. It
does not point to a single statute or case involving Customs custody
in which the word “permitted” is used. The Government turns to 19
C.F.R. §158.1 to locate the definition of “permitted.” Unfortunately,
this regulation sheds no light on this issue. It concerns relief from
duties paid on lost, damaged, abandoned, or exported merchandise,
see 19 C.F.R. §158.0 (1979), a different problem from the one at
hand. While it defines “permitted,” it does so solely for the purpose
of Subpart A, that portion of the regulation regarding lost or missing

A-20

The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§1303-1677g
(1976), sets forth an orderly procedure for ascertaining
and collecting duties. A portion of the Act, §1499, while
not phrased in terms of “release,” appears to refer to the
concept involved. It provides in part:

“Imported merchandise, required by law or reg-
ulations made in pursuance thereof to be inspected,
examined, or appraised, shall not be delivered from
customs custody, except under such bond or other
security as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury to assure compliance with all applica-
ble laws, regulations, and instructions which the
Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service is
authorized to enforce until it has been inspected,
examined, or appraised and is reported by the ap-
propriate customs officer to have been truly and
correctly invoiced and found to comply with the re-
quirements of the laws of the United States.” (Em-
phasis supplied)

From this statute we conclude that, generally, customs
custody of imported goods continues until the merchan-
dise has been inspected, found to be correctly invoiced,
and found to otherwise comply with the laws of the Unit-
ed States. See Mungo v. United States, 423 F.2d at 1357.
Further, once the inspection and the requisite findings
have been made — or, if a proper bond is filed, before the
statutory duties are carried out — the goods can be re-
leased from customs custody. !”

packages and deficiencies in contents of packages. It is silent as to
the genesis of the term “permitted.” Furthermore, although there is
reference to theft while in customs custody in Subpart C, the word
“permitted” never appears in that subpart.

17. Another portion of the Act also addresses the issue of re-
lease from customs custody. Section 1484(j) provides in part:

“(j) Merchandise shall be released from customs custody only
to or upon the order of the carrier by whom the merchandise is
brought to the port at which entry is made, except that mer-

A-21

Applying these principles to the facts presented by
this record, we conclude that the copper cathodes had
been released from customs custody at the time of the
theft. We emphasize that a sufficient immediate delivery
bond had been posted, that Northern Metal had accept-
ed delivery from the ship and had transferred the ship’s
bundle count to its warehouse certificate, that 28 days
had elapsed since the cargo had arrived in the United
States, and that there was no representation by the Gov-
ernment that the Customs Service intended to make any
further inspection, examination, or appraisal of the ship-
ment. In view of these circumstances, we believe that
the fact that a specific consignee had not yet been
named is insignificant. Although, in the usual case, a
shipment unloaded at the dock would be earmarked for a

NOTE 17 — (Continued)

chandise in a bonded warehouse shall be released from cus-
toms custody only to or upon the order of the proprietor of the
warehouse. The customs officer shall not be liable to any per-
son in respect of the delivery of merchandise released from cus-
toms custody in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Where a recovery is had in any suit or proceeding against a cus-
toms officer on account of the release of merchandise from cus-
toms custody, in the performance of his official duty, and the
court certifies that there was probable cause for such release by
such customs officer, or that he acted under the directions of
the Secretary of the Treasury, or other proper officer of the Gov-
ernment, no execution shall issue against such customs officer,
but the amount so recovered shall, upon final judgment, be
paid out of moneys appropriated from the Treasury for that
purpose.”

Although a litera] reading of this section might indicate that a pre-
requisite to release is an order from the carrier, we believe that this
section is not controlling in the case before us. This provision ap-
pears to concern the liability of the Customs Service in a bailment
situation when actual custody and control is involved. We are con-
fronted with an instance of constructive, not actual, custody. We
find §1484(j) unhelpful in illuminating when release from con-
structive customs Custody occurs.

A-22

particular consignee and that shipment would be re-
leased directly to the consignee or its agent after a short
time on the pier, this is not the usual case. The
unintended delay of the instant shipment while Cerro
sought an alternative purchaser did not increase the
governmental interest in the goods. In the absence of
any indication that the Customs Service intended to
make any further examination or appraisal of the ship-
ment, we hold that in this case the goods had been re-
leased from constructive customs custody at the time of
the theft.

We note that the cases we have reviewed on this is-
sue are not to the contrary. In United States v. Harold,
588 F.2d at 1136-37, the defendant was employed as a
dock foreman. On the very day the cargo was being
offloaded, he removed five cartons from the ship’s cargo
containers and attempted to place them into his car,
rather than into the warehouse where they were to be
stored. The court upheld his conviction under §549, em-
phasizing that there had not even been a chance for the
Customs Service to inspect the goods or authorize them
for delivery. In Mungo v. United States, 423 F.2d at
1352-53, a ship had arrived carrying a container of im-
ported Scotch whiskey. The container was unloaded
from the ship and placed on a flatbed trailer parked next
to the warehouse at the dock. Four or five days later, the
defendants were apprehended removing cases of whis-
key from the container. In sustaining the §549 convic-
tion, the court stated that the final inspection before re-
lease of the whiskey from customs custody had been
scheduled but had not yet taken place at the time of the
theft.'® The short length of time which had passed since
the ships in Harold and Mungo had arrived and the fact

18. The fina] inspection was scheduled to be performed during
the working hours of February 27. The defendants had removed the
cases a few hours earlier, at 12:35 a.m. on February 27. Mungo v.
United States, 423 F.2d 1351. 1357 (4th Cir. 1970).

A-23

that there were specific customs inspections yet to be
performed distinguish these cases from the one at bar.

Therefore, guided by the principle that criminal
statutes should be strictly construed, we conclude that
under the pertinent statutory and decisional authority
the copper cathodes in this case were no longer in cus-
toms custody at the time of the theft. Accordingly, an es-
sential element of the offense prohibited by §549 is miss-
ing, and we must reverse the judgment of conviction on
Count III.

V.

After careful consideration of other grounds for re-
versal advanced by appellants, which are enumerated in
the Appendix to this opinion, we have concluded that
such grounds are without merit.

Vi.

In conclusion and recapitulation, our review of the
issues presented by these appeals convinces us that the
copper cathodes had not reached their final destination
at the time the theft occurred, and therefore were still
part of a foreign shipment. Thus, the convictions for
theft from a foreign shipment in violation of §659 were
proper. Since the defendants were convicted of theft of
the copper, the convictions under §659 on the posses-
sion charge were improper and will be reversed. Fur-
thermore, the facts of this case indicate that the ship-
ment of copper was not still in Customs custody at the
time of the theft. Thus, the convictions under §549 must
be reversed. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgments

A-24

with respect to the sentences imposed for receipt and
possession of goods stolen from a foreign shipment and
for removal of goods from customs custody. In all other
respects, we will affirm the district court judgments of
conviction and sentence.

A True Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

A-25

APPENDIX

Garber and Denucci also advance the following oth-
er ,rounds which they assert warrant reversal of their
convictions:

(A) insufficiency of the evidence to sustain convic-
tions of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §371;'°

(B) jury verdicts contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence and unsupported by substantial evidence which
reasonable men could be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt was true;?°

(C) misconduct of the prosecutor in offering photo-
graphic exhibits representing the scene of the alleged
crime which were not properly authenticated, in intimi-
dating a defense witness while still under oath, and in
introducing co-defendant’s statement which the pros-
ecutor failed to disclose under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16;7'

(D) admission of evidence which should have been
suppressed because the photographic identifications
were impermissibly suggestive, because the consent to
the first search was not voluntarily given, because the
search warrants were not based on probable cause and
lacked the necessary specificity, because the magistrate
who issued the second search warrant was not informed
of the fact that a prior search had taken place, and be-
cause the statements obtained were involuntary and the
product of coercion;?”

(E) admission of statements without a showing that
such statements were in furtherance of a conspiracy and
also in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968);?%

19. Item 4 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517. It is noted that
appellant at No. 79-2511 incorporated, at page 37 of his brief, all the
compatible arguments of appellant at No. 79-2517.

20. Item 5 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

21. Item 6 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517

22. Item 7 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item IV (p.
26) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

23. Item 8 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

A-26

(F) refusal to grant defendant’s motion for bill of
particulars which would have enabled him to prepare
adequately for trial;?*

(G) admission of a video tape re-enactment of the al-
leged crime without a proper foundation, which lacked
probative value and was highly prejudicial, and failure to
give limiting instructions on the evidentiary value of the
video tape film;?°

(H) admission of proof in variance with the indict-
ment;7©

(1) admission of inadmissible evidence in the nature
of legal opinions dealing with the ultimate issue at
trial;?’

(J) undue restriction of defense counsel's cross-ex-
amination of a Government witness regarding his refus-
al to undergo a polygraph examination;”®

(K) admission of photographic exhibits which were
not authenticated;?°

(L) refusal to allow an on-site inspection of the
crime scene or an actual demonstration of the events in-
troduced by the Government through its video tapes;*°

(M) exclusion of relevant and probative evidence
concerning the frequency of thefts which would have ef-
fectively refuted the Government's theory of the case;*!

(N) admission of evidence of defendant's prior
activities; 3?

24. Item 9 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

25. Item 10 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item 11 (p.
16) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

26. Item 11 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

27. Item 12 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

28. Item 13 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item III (p.
24) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

29. Item 14 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

30. Item 15 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

31. Item 16 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

32. Item 17 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

A-27

(O) improper interference by the court with the ex-
amination of witnesses by rehabilitating Government
witnesses and extensively cross-examining defense wit-
nesses;°"

(P) instructions to the jury which erroneously stat-
ed the law and unduly stressed the Government’s
case;*4

(Q) denial of request to interrogate all jurors and er-
roneous restriction of the examination of two jurors.*°

33. Item 18 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.
34. Item 19 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.
35. Item 20 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.

A-28

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FORA NEW TRIAL AND
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT, DITTER,

J. JULY 20, 1979
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES : CRIMINAL NO. 78-

OF AMERICA : 149
vs. ;

MARVIN GARBER and

NICHOLAS DENUCCI

DITTER, July 20, 1979

On August 11, 1978, a jury returned a verdict of guilty
on all counts of an indictment which charged the defendants
in this case with theft of goods in interstate and foreign
commerce, theft of goods in Customs’ custody, and con-
spiracy. Defendants have now made several post-trial
motions, all of which have been denied for reasons that
follow.

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

The court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for
judgment of acquittal. The government proved that the goods
were in interstate or foreign commerce since the evidence
showed that the goods were shipped from Antofogasto, Chile,
and had not yet reached their intended destination of
Bridgeport, Connecticut. See United States v. Angello, 452
F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1971). Moreover, since the goods were
not “permitted” within the meaning of 19 C.F.R. § 158.1,
they remained in Customs’ custody and control at the time of
the theft.

The verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The proof offered at trial established the time and dates of the

A-29

*

crimes. The evidence showed that the defendants were the
only visitors to the area at the times in question, except for
a few taxicabs. It was also shown that particles of copper
were found in the police vehicles used by defendants on the
nights in question and on the clothing worn by the defendants
at the relevant times. The evidence showed that defendant
Denucci twice gave false explanations for defendants’
presence in the area of the crimes. Finally, the government’s
film showed that the crime could have been committed as
charged.

The photographs offered by the government were not
prejudicially inaccurate representations of what they
purported to depict. Both court and jury were informed that
the area had been cleaned and certain obstacles had been
removed after the crimes were committed but before the
photographes were taken.

The defendants have not shown that the prosecutor’s
out-of-court questioning of certain defense witnesses was
improper, and no prejudice has been demonstrated. See
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1975).

The government had no duty to disclose the existence of
defendant Garber’s statement to government witness,
Walters since the statement was neither written nor recorded
and Mr. Walters was not a government agent. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16.

The court did not err in denying defendants’ pre-trial
motion to suppress evidence. The reasons in support of this
denial were fully expressed in my findings delivered from the
bench on July 25, 1978. See Suppression Hearing N.T. p.
715-729.

No fatal variance existed between the indictment and
the evidence offered at trial. The alleged variance did not
modify the elements of the crime charged, and defendants
have failed to show how they were prejudiced. See United
States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942); United
States v. Agnes, 453 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. 1978).

A-30

I have considered defendants’ remaining arguments in
support of their motion for a new trial, and I find them to be
equally without merit.

II. MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT

The indictment in this case was not fatally uncertain or
ambiguous. On the contrary, the indictment informs the
defendants of the charges against them with more than
adequate specificity. Each count of the indictment sets forth
the date and location of the alleged theft, a description of the
goods stolen, the approximate quantity of goods stolen, and
the specific statutes which were violated. The indictment
also sets forth, in Count IV, the specific overt acts which are
alleged to have furthered defendants’ conspiracy.

The argument that this indictment will expose the
defendants to double jeopardy is neither persuasive nor
timely. The law narrowly limits the circumstances under
which a person may be tried by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania after he has been prosecuted by the United
States for crimes arising from the same conduct. 18 Pa.
C.S.A. §111. Before permitting such a subsequent state
prosecution, the court must determine that the Common-
wealth’s interests were not sufficiently protected by the
federal indictment and trial. See Commonwealth v. Grazier,
lve. _.._., 39S A. 2a 3355 (ISIG); Cont
monwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A. 2d 638 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Mascaro, 394 A. 2d 998 (Pa. Superior
1978). Obviously, this inquiry would necessitate a com-
parison of the federal and state indictments in order to
determine whether they charge different crimes and involve
different governmental interests. Since no state indictment
presently exists, the proper inquiry cannot be conducted by
this court. Rather, the resolution of any double jeopardy
issue that may arise must be left to the state court before
which a subsequent state indictment might be brought.

A-31

III. MOTION TO FORMALLY
INTERROGATE JURORS

By my order of June 25, 1979, I granted defendants’
motion to interrogate formally two members of the jury in
this case, Peter D. Kennedy and Walter G. Wisniewski. The
interrogation was conducted at a hearing held on July 9,
1979. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether
the jury’s deliberations had been improperly affected by any
“extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influ-
ence.” See Federal Rules of Evidence 606.

The term “extraneous influence” has been defined to
include “publicity received and discussed in the jury room,
consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in court,
and communications or other contact between jurors and
third persons.” Government of the Virgin Islands v.Gereau,
523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted).

After considering the evidence offered at the hearing on
July 9, 1979, I find that no such extraneous influence
existed. The defendants have not alleged the existence of
prejudicial publicity or contact with third persons, and the
witnesses did not testify to any such influence.

The defendants have alleged that the jury was influ-
enced by extra-record evidence in the form of statements and
commentaries of a scientific nature made during the jury’s
deliberations by a juror with a technical background in
chemistry. There is some question as to whether such
statements and commentaries would constitute “extraneous
influence” within the meaning of the definition set forth in
Gereau, supra, even if they dominated the jury’s delib-
erations and had a significant impact on the verdict. I need
not address that question, however, since I find that these
statements, if they occurred at all, had no effect on the guilty
verdict rendered by the jury. It is clear from the testimony
that any such statements occurred infrequently and were
casual in nature. There is considerable doubt as to whether
they were made at all. I find that any statements of the type
alleged by defendants that were made in this case had no
effect on the verdict and were not “‘extraneous influence”’
within the meaning of Gereau, supra. I hold, therefore, that
the defendants are not entitled to a new trial on the ground of
extraneous influence

A-32

75a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES ;: CRIMINAL NO.
OF AMERICA : NO. 78-149

vs.
MARVIN GARBER and
NICHOLAS DENUCCI

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 1979, for the
reasons expressed in the foregoing memorandum, the de-
fendants’ motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment
are denied. The defendants are ordered to report for sen-
tencing Thursday, September 6, 1979, at 9:30 A.M. in
Courtroom 6A, United States Courthouse, 601 Market
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT:

A-33

APPENDIX III

18 § 659 CRIMES Pt. 1

§ 659. Interstate or foreign shipments by carrier; State
prosecutions.

Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries
away, or conceals,or by fraud or deception obtains from any
pipeline system, railroad car, wagon, motortruck, or other
vehicle, or from any tank or storage facility, station, station
house, platform or depot or from any steamboat, vessel, or
wharf, or from any aircraft, air terminal, airport, aircraft
terminal or air navigation facility with intent to convert to his
own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a part
of or which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of
freight, express or other property; or

Whoever buys or receives or has in his possession any
such goods or chattels, knowing the same to have been
embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes, carries
away, or by.fraud or deception obtains with intent to convert
to his own use any baggage which shall have come into the
possession of any common carrier for transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce or breaks into, steals, takes,
carries away, or conceals any of the contents of such
baggage, or buys, receives, or has in his possession any such
baggage or any article therefrom of whatever nature, know-
ing the same to have been embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes by any
fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any railroad car,
bus, vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft operated by any
- common carrier moving in interstate or foreign commerce or
from any passenger thereon any money, baggage, goods, or
chattels, or whoever buys, receives, or has in his possession
any such money, baggage, goods or chattels, knowing the
same to have been embezzled or stolen—

A:-34

Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the
amount or value of such money, baggage, goods or chattels
does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The offense shall be deemed to have been committed
not only in the district where the violation first occurred, but
also in any district in which the defendant may have taken or
been in possession of the said money, baggage, goods, or
chattels.

The carrying or transporting of any such money, freight,
express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate or foreign
commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall
constitute a separate offense and subject the offender to the
penalties under this section for unlawful taking, and the
offense shall be deemed to have been committed in any
district into which such money, freight, express, baggage,
goods, or chattels shall have been removed or into which the
same shall have been brought by such offender.

Ch.31 EMBEZZLEMENT ANDTHEFT _ 18 § 659

To establish the interstate or foreign commerce char-
acter of any shipment in any prosecution under this section
the waybill or other shipping document of such shipment
shall be prima facie evidence of the place from which and to
which such shipment was made. The removal of property
from a pipeline system which extends interstate shall be
prima facie evidence of the interstate character of the
shipment of the property.

A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits
under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution
under this section for the same act or acts. Nothing contained
in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which provisions
of this section operate to the exclusion of State laws on the
same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this section
be construed as invalidating any provision of State law

A-35

unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes
of this section or any provision thereof.

June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 729; May 24, 1949, c. 139,

§ 13, 63 Stat. 91; Oct. 14,1966, Pub.L. 89-654, § 1(a)-(d),
80 Stat.904.

A-36

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0774%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
