# Petition — Hospital Central Services Ass'n v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 450 U.S. 911

## Text

Supreme Court, U, ea
p ks Ii ae
CROGk Fire we
No. - |
ae DAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

HospriTAL CENTRAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Tuomas S. ZILLY

LANE, POWELL, Moss &
MILLER
Counsel for Petitioner

3800 Rainier Bank Tower
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: 223-7016

CRAFTSMAN @ MET PRESS c@@BO SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Whether a non-profit corporation, whose members
are all tax-exempt charitable hospitals within the meaning
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended, (the “Code” ), and whose only activity
is providing linen and laundry services to those tax-exempt
members, is a charitable organization within the meaning
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt
from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.

(2) Whether an organization, which is exempt from
taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code, is denied ex-
emption because of the later enactment of Section 501(e)
of the Code.

(3) Whether Section 501(e) of the Code is the ex-
clusive section under which tax-exempt hospitals may
jointly organize and operate a non-profit shared laundry
and obtain federal tax-exempt status.

‘i
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Questions Presented for Review ...............-.csc-ce-0c0s0000--. i
ttn Nl DAT 5 ea ae 1
Ny | A Ue 2
Statutes and Regulations Involved ...................:.0c0c0000--- 2
Statement of Ge Ce... 5
Pare ccc in hcielctcsennccanneveteeen 8
Comet ...ciicrcei ee 17
Appendices:
Ai pepemte Boose rset scercinnceaoeee A-1l
Apprentices eet thceceicneesencnceccnceee. B-1
Pippen 0 icicle eetcaccn cose enocecenee C-1

TABLES OF AUTHORITY
Table of Cases

Associated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. No. 17 (May 6, 1980), appeal docketed,
No. 80-3596 (5th Cir. June 4, 1980) 00.00... 14

Chart Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C.
1979), appeal docketed, Nos. 80-1138 and 80-1339

(D.C. Cir. geil 14, 1080) 0 .............. 15
Children's Hospital Medical Center v. The Board of

Assessors, 353 Mass, 35, 227 N.E. 2d 908 (1967)...... 16
Coeur d Alene Country Club v. Viley,

64 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Idaho 1946) 20.2. 16

Community Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States,

43 AF.T.R. 2d 79-934, 79-1 US.T.C. § 9301

ry Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1286
6th Cir, May 29, 1979) o.cccccccccecccccsesccsesseeccssssssoee 15

iii

Page

HCSC-Laundry v. The United -States of America,

473 F, Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd,

624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980) .0.00.2....e eee 8, 9, 14, 15
Hospital Bureau of Standards & Sup. v. United States,

158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl, 1958) ....-...sseess00e0-e 9, 11, 12
Hospital Purchasing Service v. City of Hastings,

11 Mich. App. 500, 161 N.W.2d 759 (1968) ............ 16

Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc. v.
United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25,
1978) and No, 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978)....9-10, 15

Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States,

. Es | Rt} e+ A’, } nee neineee 8, 9, 12, 14
Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc, v. United States,

SOB FD TER CRG, BTR) eke icscctiirnctineecse 11
United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States,

384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974) ssc... 9, 11, 12, 15
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) .................. 10
United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963) cesses... 14
Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation v.

Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164 (D. D.C. 1979) ........ 16

Statutes
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.050 ...................c-ccscssceececeeceees 7
Wash. Rev. Code § 84.36.0480 ..............0:sses.cceccscsorsneseeee 7
Lie Tk fe meme MEAD tea tes 2, 8, 9, 10
RR Fe fy PRRmmeberen anmnmner es: i, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 et seq.
OD Pas OAL Sciciccnnn cece nena 8
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (Internal Revenue Code

|) eae eem ete nt Haber Seles i, 2, 3, 4, 5 et seq.
BO USC. 5 TORS) cba cdcncae i, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 et seq.

OSC LANHAM) Ss 7, 8

iv

Page

EN RE Sea SMR ONE: LORE ne SS 9

I a rk 9

A 8 & PEER aE SIERO Oe 2

I a 7
Other Authority

BI RE Fi TAR COD le cttrcnicsccckedecicderesecesocmnsens 10

Conf. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. Code Cong, & Ad. News 2373, 2390.... 10

Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 C.B. 127 ooo... eeecseeseeseeseees 12
Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 C.B. 147 .0......eeecececeeeeeeeees 10, 12

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

No. -

HospiraL CENTRAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

To The Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices

Of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Hospital Central Services Association, a Washington
non-profit corporation, by its attorneys, respectfully prays
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
filed July 21, 1980.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington dated August 8, 1977 in favor of
Hospital Central Services Association, is printed at pages
A-1 to A-13, infra, and reported at 40 A.F.T.R. 2d 77-5646;
77-2 USTC § 9601 (W.D. Wn. 1977). The Opinion of the

2

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versing the District Court was filed July 21, 1980 (No. 77-
3701), is printed at pages B-1 to B-3, infra, and is reported
at 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980). The Judgment of the
Court of Appeals filed July 21, 1980 is printed at page
C-1, infra, and is not officially reported.

JURISDICTION
The date of the Judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals sought to be reviewed is July 21, 1980 which is
also the date of its entry. Jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1),.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

(1) Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Title 26 United
States Code, Section 501 the pertinent portions of which
are as follows:

§ 501. Exemption from tax on corporations, certain
trusts, etc.

(a) Exemption from taxation.—An organization de-
scribed in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a)
shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle un-
less such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.

* * &

(c) List of exempt organizations.—The following

organizations are referred to in subsection (a):
* ©

(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund,
or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safe-
ty, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the
net oe of which inures to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual, no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except
as otherwise provided in subsection (h) ), and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the

3

publishing or distributing of statements ), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

* @ ©

(e) Cooperative hospital, service organizations.—
For purposes of this title, an organization shall be
treated as an organization organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes, if—

(1) such organization is organized and operated
solely—

(A) to perform, on a centralized basis, one or
more of the following services which, if performed
on its own behalf by a hospital which is an organi-
zation described in subsection (c)(3) and exempt
from taxation under subsection (a), would con-
stitute activities in exercising or performing the
purpose or function constituting the basis for its ex-
emption: data processing, purchasing, warehousing,
billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial en-
gineering, laboratory, printing, communications,
record center, and personnel (including selection,
testing, training, and education of personnel) ser-
vices; and

(B) to perform such services solely for two or
more hospitals each of which is—

(i) an organization described in subsection
(c)(3) which is exempt from taxation under sub-
section (a),

(ii) a constitutent part of an organization
described in subsection (c)(3) which is exempt
from taxation under subsection (a) and which, if
organized and operated as a separate entity, would
constitute an organization described in subsection
(c)(3), or

(iii) owned and operated by the United
States, a State, the District of Columbia, or a pos-
session of the United States, or a political subdivi-
sion or an agency or instrumentality of any of the
foregoing;

(2) such organization is organized and operated
on a cooperative basis and allocates or pays, within
812 months after the close of its taxable year, all

(2)

4

net earnings to patrons on the basis of services
performed for them; and

(3) if such organization has capital stock, all of
such stock outstanding is owned by its patrons.
For purposes of this title, any organization which,
by reason of the preceding sentence, is an organiza-
tion described in subsection (c)(3) and exempt
from taxation under subsection (a), shall be treated
as a hospital and as an organization referred to in
section 170(b) (1) (A) (iii).

Treasury Regulations Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)

provides in pertinent part:

(3)

(2) Charitable defined. The term “charitable” is
used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted
legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as
limited by the separate enumeration in section 501
(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall
within the broad outlines of “charity” as developed
by judicial decisions. .. .

Treasury Regulations Section 1.502-1(b) provides:

(b) If a subsidiary organization of a tax-exempt
organization would itself be exempt on the ground
that its activities are an integral part of the exempt
activities of the parent organization, its exemption
will not be lost because, as a matter of accounting
between the two organizations, the subsidiary derives
a profit from its dealings with its parent organization,
for example, a subsidiary organization which is op-
erated for the sole purpose of furnishing electric pow-
er used by its parent organization, a tax-exempt edu-
cational organization, in carrying on its educational
activities. However, the subsidiary organization is
not exempt from tax if it is operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business which would
be an unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated
to exempt activities) if regularly carried on by the
parent organization. For example, if a subsidiary or-

anization is operated primarily for the purpose of
urnishing electric power to consumers other than its
parent organization (and the parent’s tax-exempt sub-
sidiary organizations ), it is not exempt since such busi-
ness would be an unrelated trade or business if regu-

5

ry! carried on by the parent organization, Similarly,
if the organization is owned by several unrelated ex-
empt organizations, and is operated for the purpose
of furnishing electric power to each of them, it is not
exempt since such business would be an unrelated
trade or business if regularly carried on by any one
of the tax-exempt organizations. For purposes of this
paragraph, organizations are related only if they con-
sist of —

(1) A parent organization and one or more of its
subsidiary organizations; or

(2) Subsidiary organizations having a common
parent organization.

An exempt organization is not related to another ex-
empt organization merely because they both engage in
the same type of exempt activities,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a suit for refund of federal income
taxes paid for the taxable year 1974 on the grounds that
Petitioner is a charitable organization within the meaning
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt
from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.

Petitioner, Hospital Central Services Association (“HC-
SA”), a non-profit Washington corporation, was incorpor-
ated in 1966 and is organized and operated to provide
central linen and laundry services solely for its member
and associate member hospitals (“member”). Each mem-
ber hospital is a non-profit charitable hospital within the
meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore
exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.
Petitioner's purposes, as set forth in its Agreement of As-
sociation, are solely charitable, scientific and educational
for the benefit of its members, Only hospitals which are
themselves charitable organizations within the meaning
of Section 501(c) (3) of the Code and exempt from taxation

6

are eligible to become members of HCSA. No net earnings
of HCSA have inured to the benefit of any private person,
firm or corporation, and in the event of dissolution, all of
Petitioner's assets are required to be distributed solely to
hospital members who are charitable organizations within
the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and there-
fore exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the

Code.

HCSA was organized to eliminate the requirement that
each hospital maintain its own laundry facility and to reduce
administrative problems and costs for member hospitals.
HCSA’s linen and laundry services are unique and have
been specifically designed to insure sanitary standards and
controls necessary for the member hospitals. HCSA is an
extension of each participating member hospital. It is
impossible for a hospital to discharge its purposes without
a laundry and linen service.

HCSA derives income from membership fees based on
the amount of services provided to the members. HCSA
maintains a linen inventory and processes approximately
eleven (11) million pounds of laundry per year for its
members, who represent approximately 2,000 hospital beds
in the Seattle area. The services performed by HCSA
have substantially reduced the overall cost of laundry and
linen services to member hospitals, thereby resulting in a
reduction in the overall cost of health care in Seattle,
Washington. HCSA estimates that through 1974 it saved
its members $1,992,250 in investment costs and approxi-
mately 39,000 square feet of operational space, Only offi-
cers, trustees and employees of member hospitals are eligi-
ble to be officers or trustees of HCSA. Petitioner has been

controlled and operated solely and exclusively for the
benefit of its member hospitals.

7

HCSA is exempt from Washington state ad valorem real
and personal property taxes under Wash, Rev. Code § 84.-
36.040. It is further exempt from Washington state sales
tax pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.050, which ex-
cludes from the terms “sale at retail” or “retail sale” all
“sales of laundry service to members of non-profit associ-
ations composed exclusively of non-profit hospitals.”

HCSA commenced this action in the District Court
seeking a refund of federal income taxes paid for the year
1974 and a declaratory judgment that it is a charitable or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and
exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(a)
of the Code. Jurisdiction in the District Court was based
on 28 U.S.C, § 1346. HCSA moved for summary judgment
based on affidavits. The Government opposed the motion
but did not file any controverting affidavits. The facts in this
case are therefore not in dispute. The District Court grant-
ed judgment in favor of HCSA, holding that HCSA was
a charitable organization within the meaning of Section
501(c)(3) of the Code and thereby exempt from taxation
under Section 501(a) of the Code. The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the District Court by a per curiam decision holding
that under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, hospitals may
only create tax-exempt entities to perform services listed
in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of the Code, Laundry services
are not listed in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of the Code. HCSA
has never claimed to be exempt under Section 501(e) of
the Code. Rather, HCSA claims to be a charitable organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and there-
fore exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the

Code.

8
ARGUMENT

The per curiam decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in this case relied upon the Third Circuit decision
in HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of America, 62A
F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980), petition for certiorari filed Sep-
tember 2, 1980, 49 U.S.L.W. 3165 (No. 80-338). Both
decisions erroneously conclude that in 1968, when Con-
gress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code, as evidenced
by that Section’s legislative history, it thereby denied a
non-profit corporation, whose members are all tax-exempt
hospitals, from qualifying for tax-exempt status as a “chari-
table organization” under Section 501(c)(3). This con-
clusion is contrary to Section 501 of the Code and the de-
cision of the United States Court of Claims in Northern Cal.
Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl.
1979), as well as numerous District Court and State Court
decisions. In addition, denial of tax-exempt status to joint
hospital shared laundries, such as Petitioner, will sub-
stantially increase the overall costs of health care services
in the United States.

HCSA is a non-profit corporation organized prior to
1968 when Congress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code.
HCSA is not formed a. a cooperative and has never claimed
to be an organization listed in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of
the Code. Rather, HCSA claims exemption under Section
501(a) of the Code. Section 501(a) of the Code exempts
the income of organizations described in Section 501(c)
from taxation. Organizations described in Section 501(c)
(3) of the Code include “. . . corporations . . . organized
for ... charitable . . . purposes, . . . no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder, or individual .. . .” The purposes of HCSA are

9

“charitable” within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and
it was organized and is operated exclusively for charitable

Section 501(a) of the Code, as it presently exists and as

it existed before 1968, provides:

Exemption from taxation.—An organization described

in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be

exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such

exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
If HCSA is a charitable organization within the meaning
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, its exemption may only
be denied under Sections 502 or 503 of the Code. It cannot
be denied exemption under Section 501(e). Had Congress
intended the result reached by the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits, viz., that failure to qualify under Section 501(e) de-
nies an exemption under Section 501(a), Section 501(a)
would have been modified. Hospital Bureau of Standards &
Sup. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States, 384 F.
Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974). The effect of the Third Circuit
decision in HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of Ameri-
ca, supra, and the Ninth Circuit decision in Petitioner’s case,
is to prevent any charitable organization within the mean-
ing of Section 501(c)(3) that performs hospital services
jointly for more than one non-profit hospital from tax-ex-
empt status unless it is also listed in Section 501(e) of the
Code.

The legislative history of Section 501(e) does not sup-
port the conclusion that Section 501(e) is the exclusive sec-
tion under which Petitioner may claim tax-exempt status.
Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States, supra;
Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc. v. United

10

States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal dock-
eted, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No. 78-
1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978). Rather, when Senators Carl-
son and Tydings co-sponsored a bill to add new subsection
(e) to Section 501 of the Code, Senator Tydings recognized
that the Internal Revenue Service would not grant tax-
exempt status to hospital service organizations and he ex-
pressed his intent of “correcting an unforeseen inequity.”
114 Cong. Rec. 8112 (1968). Section 501(e) was designed
to liberalize, rather than restrict, the classification of charities
under Section 501(c) (3). The Conference Report provides,
in part:

Section 109 of the conference substitute . . . adds a

new subsection to section 501 of the Internal Revenue

Code which, in effect, provides a tax exempt status for
certain cooperative hospitai service organizations. . . .

Conf. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 43 reprinted in
[1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad, News 2373, 2390 (1968-2
C.B. 801, 814). Congressional Reports indicate that laundry
services were intentionally omitted from Section 501(e) of
the Code. It does not follow, however, that the omission
of laundry services from Section 501(e) excludes Petitioner

from tax-exempt status if it is a charitable organization
within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

The fact that the legislative history of Section 501(e)
indicates that Congress believed hospital laundry service
organizations, such as HCSA, were not exempt under Sec-
tion 501(a) is not material, Congressional interpretation
of existing law should be given no weight in this Court's
interpretation of that law. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S.
405 (1962). Moreover, the fact that the Internal Revenue
Service had issued Revenue Ruling 69-160, 1969-1 C. B.
147 holding that an organization providing laundry and

11

other services exclusively to its tax-exempt member hos-
pitals was not exempt from taxation is not binding on this
Court. Revenue Rulings merely constitute an interpreta-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code by the Service and are
not binding on the courts. Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc.
v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971),

A brief history of the efforts of hospital laundry organi-
zations, which are owned exclusively by tax. exempt hos-
pitals, to gain federal tax-exempt status will demonstrate
the substantial conflict in decisions on this important ques-
tion of federal tax law. In Hospital Bureau of Standards &
Sup. v. United States, supra, the Court of Claims held that
a non-profit corporation, formed solely for the purpose of
purchasing and supplying hospital supplies to its tax-ex-
empt hospital members, was a charitable corporation with-
in the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and ex-
empt from taxation under Section 501(a). In 1968 Con-
gress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code to enlarge the
category of charitable organizations exempt under Section
501(a) of the Code. In 1974, United Hospital Services,
Inc. v. United States, supra, held that a central laundry
providing laundry services solely to its tax-exempt hospital
members was exempt under Section 501(a) of the Code.
United Hospital rejected the Government’s argument that
Section 501(e) was the exclusive basis for a hospital
laundry service organization to gain tax exemipuon. The
United Hospital court reasoned as follows:

The clearly expressed Congressional purpose be-
hind the enactment of Section 501(e) was to enlarge
the category of charitable organizations under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) to include certain cooperative hospital

service organizations, and not to narrow or restrict the
reach of Section 501(c) (3). The latter section was not

12

modified by the legislation in any way, and the legis-
lation does not purport to take away charitable status
from a corporation which had already acquired it.
Insofar as this case is concerned, therefore, Section
501(e) is irrelevant.
384 F. Supp. at 781. The Government did not appeal the
United Hospital decision. Despite Hospital Bureau and
United Hospital, the Internal Revenue Service denied
exemption to Petitioner and other similar organizations.
These denials were based on the Government's contention
that such organizations are “feeder” organizations under
Section 1.502-1(b) and that such organizations do not
meet the requirements of Section 501(e) of the Code. See
Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 C. B. 147; Rev. Rul. 54-305,
1954-2 C. B. 127. Prior to 1980, that position had been
rejected by every court that considered this issue.

In the past 10 years there has been a substantial increase
in the number of central laundry organizations providing
services to their tax-exempt hospital members, It is esti-
mated that there are approximately 36 central hospital
laundry organizations owned and operated by non-profit
tax-exempt hospitals, providing service to over 175 hos-
pitals throughout the United States. The amount of poten-
tial federal income taxes and resulting hospital costs is sub-
stantial, As a result, numerous cases have generated con-
flicting decisions. These cases involve an important ques-
tion of federal tax law which has not been, but should be
settled by this Court.

In 1979 in Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United
States, supra, the United States Court of Claims held that
a non-profit corporation, which provided shared laundry
services to its non-profit tax-exempt hospital members,

13

was a charitable organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and exempt from taxation under Section
501(a) of the Code. The Court of Claims expressly re-

jected the Government's argument that the taxpayer must
qualify, if at all, unde: Section 501(e) of the Code. The
Court of Claims held as follows:

Section 501(e) provides an exemption for some co-
operative organizations which adhere to the require-
ments stated therein. We agree with plaintiff that the
intent of Congress in passing § 501(e) was to broaden
the class of organizations entitled to an exemption as
a “charitable organization,” not to narrow it, and that,
as to laundry services, it left the law as it was.

In considering § 501(e)’s history, it is necessary to
examine not only what Congress did do in 1968 when
it added that provision, but what it did not do. Pro-
ponents of the amendment argued that rigidities in
the law at that time, particularly the “feeder” pro-
vision of § 502, to be discussed below, discouraged the
formation of hospital service organizations, See 114
Cong. Rec. 8112 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tyd-
ings ). But nowhere in the legislative history of § 501(e)
is there a reference to an intent to amend §$ 501(c) (3),
or to alter the then-present interpretation. Indeed the
House Report specifically stated that § 501(e) was
to be an addition to § 501. H.Rep.No. 1533, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News 1968, p. 2341.

_ ae

When Congress passed the present § 501(e) in
1968, though, it did exclude shared laundry services
from its list of exempt service organizations, but made
no attempt to alter Hospital Bureau of Standards’ in-
terpretation of § 501(c)(3) or that section’s applica-
bility to shared laundry services, despite the fact,
above mentioned, that the Congressmen were aware
of Hospital Bureau of Standards, and its holding. Thus,
the interpretation of § 501(c)(3) as rendered by this
court in Hospital Bureau of Standards remains intact.
The provision we interpreted was left untouched, while

14
other law was written to take care of other decisions
by the IRS with which Congress was dissatisfied.
591 F.2d at 623-4.

Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. is in direct conflict with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case and the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in HCSC-Laundry
v. The United States of America, supra. The Third Cir-
cuit disagreed as follows:

In the most recent decision on comparable facts,
Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. United
States, supra, the Court of Claims adhered to its prior
decision in Hospital Bureau. After considering the ef-
fect of section 501(e), it concluded that the intent of
Congress was not to narrow the class of organizations
entitled to an exemption as a “charitable organization”
but to broaden that class, “and that, as to laundry
services, it left the law as it was.” Id. at 624. As noted
in our prior discussion, we believe the legislative his-
tory to show a contrary legislative intent than that
found by the Court of Claims.

624 F.2d at 435-36.

Because of the recurring importance of the issue and the
conflict between the Court of Claims, a court of co-equal
rank with the Circuit Courts, and two Circuit Courts, this
Court should grant certiorari. United States v. Zacks, 375
U.S. 59 (1963). This case presents appropriate reasons
for a review on writ of certiorari under Rule 17 of this
Court.

The Tax Court has done little to quell what it has iden-
tified as the “long and stormy” tax history of hospital laun-
dry service organizations. In Associated Hospital Services,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 17 (May 6, 1980), appeal
docketed, No. 80-3596 (5th Cir. June 4, 1980), the Tax
Court held that a laundry service organization owned and
operated by several tax-exempt hospitals was not tax ex-
empt based upon Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b) relating

15

to feeder organizations. This decision did not reach the
issue relating to Section 501(e) of the Code and is other-
wise of little value in light of the concurring opinions by
two judges and the two separate dissenting opinions by
four judges. Even the Tax Court majority felt “constrain-
ed by the weight of legislative history” to reject its in-
clination to hold the organization tax-exempt. This case is
now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

All of the District Courts which have considered the
same issue have held that Section 501(e) is not exclu-
sive and that non-profit organizations such as HCSA
are charitable organizations within the meaning of Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt from
taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code. United Hospital
Services, Inc. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind.
1974); Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc.
v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), ap-
peal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and
No. 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); Community Hospital
Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R. 2d 79-934;
79-1 U.S.T.C. § 9301 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); Chart Inc. v. United
States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C. 1979), appeal docketed,
Nos. 80-1138 and 80-1339 (D.C. Cir. April 14, 1980);
HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of America, 473 F.
Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir.
1980) Pet. for Cert. filed September 2, 1980, 49 U.S.L.W.
3165 ( No. 80-338); HCSA v. United States, the instant case.
Similar issues are now pending in other District Courts ai.d
the Court of Claims.

Similarly, numerous state court decisions have concluded
that a non-profit corporation formed solely for the purpose

16

of providing services to its tax-exempt hospital members
is exempt from state real and personal property taxes. See,
e.g., Children’s Hospital Medical Center v. The Board
of Assessors, 353 Mass. 35, 227 N.E. 2d 908 (1967);
Hospital Purchasing Service v. City of Hastings, 11 Mich.
App. 500, 161 N.W.2d 759 (1968). HCSA was also granted
exemption from Washington state real and personal prop-
erty taxes after litigation. Aithough an exemption under
Section 501(a) of the Code does not depend upon state
law, federal courts have considered state court rulings to
determine the broad outlines of “charity”. Coeur d Alene
Country Club v. Viley, 64 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Idaho 1946).

Hospital laundry service is a sensitive matter. If not per-
formed with sufficient quality controls, it can be the means
of spreading diseases that hospitals hope to contain or cure.
Petitioner provides its member hospitals with linen and
laundry services at less cost and under more sanitary con-
ditions than other available laundries. Each non-profit
hospital could maintain its own laundry at a greater cost
and operate with tax-exempt status, Whether each hospital
washes the sheets itself or has that duty performed by a
separate organization should be of no tax significance. If
the activity is tax-exempt when conducted by the individ-
ual tax-exempt hospital, it does not become a non-exempt
activity simply because it is spun off to a central laundry
owned by the tax-exempt members. Shared laundry ser-
vices are an essential part of the cost containment efforts
favored by Congress in the area of health care services.
See Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation
v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164 (D. D.C. 1979).

17
CONCLUSION

There now exists a conflict between the Court of Claims
and the Third and Ninth Circuits. The same issues are also
pending on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit,
(two cases) and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Petitioner, and other similar entities, are chari-
table organizations within the meaning of Section 501(c)
(3) of the Code and exempt from taxation under Section
501(a). An organization exempt under Section 501(c) (3)
of the Code cannot be denied exeinption because of Section
501(e). The legislative history does not support the result
reached by the Ninth Circuit. This Court should grant
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Circuit Courts
of Appeal and the Court of Claims in order to provide for
the uniform administration of the federal tax laws.

Respectfully submitted,

THomas §, ZILLY
LANE, POWELL, Moss &
MILLER
Counsel for Petitioner
Hospital Central Services
Association

A-1
APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

HospiraAL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, Civil No.
Plaintiff, C76-779M
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, =
Defendant.

FILED IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Washington
AUG. 8, 1977
Epcar SCOFIELD, Clerk

THIS MATTER comes on for consideration before the
undersigned Judge of the above-entitled Court upon cross-
motions for summary judgment. On May 9, 1977, the
plaintiff moved for summary judgment based upon the
records and files, its brief in support of the motion, its
answers to defendant's interrogatories, and the affidavits
of Frank Metheny, John A. Dare and George Stone. On
June 27, 1977, the defendant filed its “Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment” on the grounds
that “there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect
to plaintiff's theory of recovery herein which preclude the
granting of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.” Simul-
taneously, the defendant cross-moved for summary judg-
ment in its favor, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, “on the grounds that no genuine issues
of material fact exist in respect of the defenses interposed
herein.” The defendant filed, unaccompanied by affidavits,

A-2
“Defendant's Brief In Support of Its Opposition to Plain-
tiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Its Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment,” to which plaintiff has since filed
a reply.

The following facts stand uncontradicted in the record.
Plaintiff Hospital Central Services Association (HCSA)
was incorporated on March 30, 1966, as a nonprofit Wash-
ington corporation by four hospitals, namely, Virginia Ma-
son Hospital Association; Sisters of Charity House of Provi-
dence; Northwest Memorial Hospital Association and West
Seattle General Hospital for the purpose of operating a
central hospital laundry facility, Shortly after the organiza-
tion of HCSA, Overlake Memorial Hospital and Children’s
Orthopedic Hospital Association joined HCSA. Effective
July 31, 1970, West Seattle General Hospital withdrew.
Subsequently, Swedish Hospital Medical Center became a
member of the Association. In addition, in 1971 Ballard
Community Hospital, and in 1974, Seattle General Hospital
became associate members of HCSA.

At all times material since January 1, 1974, therefore, the
following nonprofit charitable hospitals were members of
HCSA:

Children’s Orthopedic Hospital and Medical Center

Northwest Memoral Hospital Association

Overlake Memorial Hospital Association

Providence Medical Center

Swedish Hospital Medical Center

Virginia Mason Hospital Association
In addition, Ballard Community Hospital and Seattle Gen-
eral Hospital are associate members.

Each member hospital and each associate member hos-
pital is a nonprofit hospital exempt from federal income

A-3

taxation under Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, and exempt from paying ad valorem real and per-
sonal property taxes in the State of Washington. Attached
as Exhibit A hereto is a true and correct copy of the oral
decision of Judge Robert M. Elston in the matter of Hos-
pital Central Services Association v. King County, Cause
No. 768034, rendered March 1, 1974 in the Superior Court
of the State of Washington in and for the County of King.

The HCSA laundry facility, which was completed in
1968, now processes the laundry needs and maintains a
linen inventory for its members at the present rate of
approximately eleven million pounds a year.

The processing, of the laundry is specifically designed
and controlled to insure sanitary standards. Soiled laundry
is not transported in a truck at the same time as clean
laundry. The carts used in the pickup and delivery of
laundry are made of fiberglass and are sanitized between
each pickup and delivery. Each truck is sanitized after
each delivery of soiled laundry to HCSA. The unloading
and loading of trucks occur on separate ends of HCSA’s
plant to reduce the risk of spread of bacteria. All clean
laundry being delivered to a hospital is covered with a
plastic cover to insure maintenance of a sanitary condition,
which cover is used only once and is disposed of after its
use. A positive-negative air-flow system is used at the
laundry to prevent the spreading of bacteria and infection
from the soiled laundry, which means that air flows only
from the area servicing clean laundry to areas servicing
soiled laundry and not vice versa.

HCSA derives income from membership fees based on
the amount of service actually provided; the amount of
charge per pound is set from time to time by the Board of

A-4

Trustees—each member of which is de jure also an officer,
trustee or employee of a member hospital—and is in an
amount which will cover the actual cost of operation,
including purchases of necessary equipment, and will pro-
vide for the amortization of a long-term bank loan. HCSA
only charges per pound amounts sufficient to meet said
annual operating costs. No net earnings from HCSA inure
to the benefit of any individual, and in the event of dissolu-
tion, all the assets of HCSA are required to be distributed
to organizations which are qualified as tax exempt under
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended,’

HCSA estimates that from incorporation through the
year 1974, it saved its member hospitals $1,992,250 in in-
vestment costs and approximately 39,000 square feet of
operational space. HCSA employs approximately 110 to
128 persons. The laundry is managed by a manager and a
managerial staff consisting of approximately nine persons.

On July 9, 1975, HCSA filed an application for recogni-
tion of Exemption from Federal Income Taxation, Form
1023, the Application for Recognition of Exemption was
denied by letter from the Internal Revenue Service dated
August 3, 1976. After reconsideration, by letter dated
September 17, 1976, the Internal Revenue Service affirmed
its ruling of August 3, 1976, denying exempt status to
the plaintiff.

In the manner required by law, HCSA filed its corporate
income tax for the year ending December 31, 1974 with the
Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, Ogden,

1. The Court has considered footnote 3 at page 9 of the defendant's
brief in support of its opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment.

A-5
Utah. HCSA paid a tax for the year 1974 in the amount of
$3,862. In 1975, HCSA had a net operating loss which it
carried back and all of the 1974 tax paid was recovered
except $178. As a result of Notice dated September 1, 1975,
HCSA paid a penalty of $96.55 and interest of $89.35 for a
total of $185.90 for the year ending December 31, 1974.

On or about August 25, 1976, HCSA filed its amended
income tax return to recover a refund of $178.00 for taxes
paid for 1974, To date the defendant has not acted with
respect to said claim for refund.

On or about August 25, 1976, HCSA filed its claim for
refund on Form 843, relating to the taxable year ending
December 31, 1974. On October 4, 1976, the District
Director of the Internal Revenue Service denied HCSA’s
claim for refund in the amount of $185.90.

The plaintiff brings this action to recover that amount
which it alleges was erroneously assessed and collected.

The root question presented here is whether HCSA is a
charitable organization within the meaning of Section
501(c)(3) and therefore exempt from taxation under
Section 501(a). Sub-issues presented are (1) whether
HCSA’s claimed status as a charitable organization is
defeated by operation of Section 501(e), which was
adopted in 1968, and (2) whether HCSA is prohibited from
exemption by operation of Section 502 by reason of being
a for-profit “feeder organization.”

The identical issues raised here by the motions for sum-
mary judgment, save and except for the defendant's claim
that material questions of fact exist with respect to plain-
tiff's theory of recovery, were addressed and decided in
United Hospital Services v. United States, 384 F. Supp.

A-6

776 (S.D. Ind., 1974), a case in which both sides agreed
to waive trial by jury and proceed on stipulated facts. The
stipulated facts in United Hospital were in all material
respects the same as the facts now before the Court. (See
defendant's qualified acceptance of the Statement of Facts
as presented in the plaintiff's brief in support of its motion
for summary judgment (Defendant’s Brief in Support of Its
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at
page 1.) )

The defendant launches a three-fold attack in support
of its motion for judgment and to defeat the counter-motion
of the plaintiff. First, the defendant contends that no for-
profit organization can qualify for tax exemption by hiding
under the skirts of § 501(c)(3). The defendant’s problem
is that he doesn't have the facts to go with that clearly valid
proposition.

HCSA, like the hospital services organization in United
Hospital, was incorporated under state law as a non-profit
corporation, organized and operated to provide services
which are essential to the functioning of the charitable
associations which are its members. The following un-
controverted, factual representations from the affidavit of
Mr. Metheny at pages 3 and 4 illuminate the purpose of
HCSA and its manner of operations.

(a) Each of the member hospitals is represented
by its administrator or assistant administrator on the
Board of Trustees of HCSA, and each member hospital
participates in the overall policy of HCSA and col-
lectively they absolutely control the operations of
HCSA, which are a necessary part of the operations
of the member hospitals.

(b) Each of the member hospitals participates in the
actual operations of HCSA with respect to the plan-
ning, accounting and finance, quality control and

A-7

standardization. A special Linen Advisory Committee
makes recommendations concerning purchasing and
processing specifications and has developed special
procedures for linen utilization and distribution.

(c) All members directly receive the benefit of
standardization and centralization, without profit to
any third party, in that the price each member hospital
is charged for the laundry service includes only the
costs of operation, retirement of debt, and new equip-
ment purchases.

The plaintiff estimates that HCSA activities from its
incorporation through 1974 have saved its members
$1,992,250 in investment costs alone and has provided
services at cost. HCSA has never offered its services to any-
one or any business other than its members. The fact that a
nonpublic and non-tax-exempt hospital (West Seattle Gen-
eral Hospital ) was a member of HCSA from 1966 to 1970,
and was serviced by HCSA during that period is not ma-
terial to the plaintiff's claim for exemption under Section
501(c)(3) for the year 1974.

Under the foregoing facts, defendant’s attack on HCSA
as a for-profit or “feeder” organization must of necessity
fail. Furthermore, the foregoing facts compel the Court to
conclude that HCSA is a charitable organization under
Section 501(c)(3) and therefore exempt from taxation
under Section 501(a). So to find is to reject the defendant’s
second argument, to wit, that the plaintiff, as a “coopera-
tive” hospital service organization, can qualify as tax ex- ;
empt, if at all, only under Section 501(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. In rejecting that argument, the
Court adopts the reasoning of the United Hospital opinion,
which reached the same conclusion.

Finally, the defendant contends, in opposing the plain-
tiffs motion for judgment on its claim as a matter of law,

a,

A-8

that a crucial fact, stipulated to in United Hospital, and
“heavily” relied upon therein, is missing here, namely, that
“no commercial laundry in the area was able or willing to
provide specialized laundry service to the hospitals.” The
defendant takes the position that because the record is
silent in this respect, there remains a material issue for
trial with respect to the plaintiff's claim for a refund in the
case at bar. Specifically, the defendant’s argument reads as
follows at page 8 of its brief:

Plaintiff may thus well be “competing unfairly with

ordinary, taxed business entities,’ an important con-

cern of the court in United Hospitals [sic], 384 F.

Supp., at page 780.
That representation based on a silent record falls entirely
short of the response which is required of an adverse party
when a motion for summary judgment is made and sup-
ported as provided in Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e)
requires that the adverse party, by affidavits or as other-
wise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

The fact that the plaintiff does not compete with com-
mercial laundries is not disputed in the present record.

It being the opinion of the Court that for the reasons
discussed above the plaintiff is entitled to the summary
judgment prayed for, NOW, THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED and DECREED that the motion of the
defendant for summary judgment be and ihe same is hereby
DENIED, and

IT IS ORDERED and DECREED that the motion of
the plaintiff for summary judgment be and the same is
hereby GRANTED, and

A-9
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
judgment be entered against the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff for the recovery of interest and penalty taxes in the

amount of $185.90 which was erroneously assessed and
collected for the year ending December 31, 1974.

Counsel for the plaintiff shall present to the Court an
appropriate judgment in accordance with this Order.

DATED this 8th day of August 1977.

s/s WALTER T. MCGovERN
Chief United States District Judge

Exhibit A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

HospiTAL CENTRAL SERVICES
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 768034
Kinc County, a legal subdivision of
the State of Washington,
Defendant.

ORAL OPINION

Hon. Rospert M. Eston
March 1, 1974

THE COURT: I appreciate the materials that have
been presented, the helpful briefs, the affidavit of Mr.
Carney, the exhibits that have been attached. This is the
kind of case that it comes as no surprise to hear a sugges-

A-10
tion that no matter what the ruling is, it will be appealed.
That seems almost inherent in the nature of it.

Because of that, I want to say I have considered both
briefs, the affidavit of Mr. Carney, the exhibits that have
been attached to the plaintiff's brief, and the documents
contained in the clerk’s file, and would ask that when an
order is prepared on the decision, that the order on sum-
mary judgment specify those documents I have relied upon
in reaching my decision.

The Barlow case makes it very clear that the statute is
not to be enlarged by judicial construction. The statute,
RCW 84.36.040, grants an exemption from taxation for
hospitals, and this exemption is in derogation of the gen-
eral public interest to have property remain on the tax
rolls, so that this exemption must be strictly construed.
Judicial interpretation cannot enlarge the exemption and
that it the basic consideration when there is a claim for
exemption.

In this case one of the arguments made is that because
the Hospital Central Services Association is a separate
corporation and in law having a separate entity because of
that, that this means that it does not qualify for an exemp-
tion because the exemption is limited to hospitals and not
to some separate corporations which might perform services
or supply materials for hospitals.

My conclusion is that the nature of the association is not
something that would extend the exemption statute by
applying it to the association, The association is owned by
the member hospitals. All member hospitals are charitable
organizations. No aspect of the Association’s activities is
devoted to anything other than servicing and furnishing

A-11
supplies for the member hospitals. No aspect of the Associa-
tion’s activities is directly or indirectly for the benefit of any
other than a charitable hospital.

It is, I think, clear in 84.36.040 that the last paragraph
of that statute does cover this situation in a general way
when it provides that a hospital within the meaning of
this section includes any portion of the hospital building
or other buildings in connection therewith used as a neces-
sary home or as a residence for persons engaged or em-
ployed in the operation of the hospital or operated as a
portion of the hospital unit.

The laundry involved here that is operated by the As-
sociation is operated as a portion of the hospital unit and
I do not think it violates that concept to have that associa-
tion operate as a portion of six hospital units as distin-
guished from one hospital unit. I do not think the fact that
it serves multiple hospitals makes it any less a hospital op-
eration than if it served simply one individual hospital.

Its scope of operation is larger and the effect of serving
six hospitals and having sometimes to make independent
decisions with respect to some incidental differences that
might arise I do not think is fatal to its operation, the con-
cept of its operation as a part of the hospital unit. It has
been set up to comply as completely with the requirements
of charitable institutions as it can be, both with respect to
the property that it has and the distribution of that prop-
erty upon its ceasing to exist. There is apparently sub-
stantial reliance by the State Board of Tax Appeals on the
fact that 96 per cent of the garments and linens laundered
by the Association are owned by the Association and the
Association then makes a charge to the member hospitals

A-12
in the form of rent as the State Board of Tax Appeals has
indicated.

I frankly do not appreciate the significance of that fact
as derogating in any way from the fact that the Association
operates as a part of a hospital unit in furnishing exclusive-
ly laundry or laundry-type services or supples.

The Association owns the garments and linens that are
laundered. The Association is owned by the member hos-
pitals. And so the member hospitals, in effect, own the
garments and linens if there were to be a cessation of ac-
tivities, for example, by the Association. It almost sounds
like a paraphrase of Gertrude Stein, “A rose is a rose is a
rose.” The garments are garments of the Association which
is owned by the hospitals and so forth.

The Barlow case, my reading of it—and I do not suggest
that there might not be different interpretations of this
case; it probably presents a good opportunity for an appel-
late court to make whatever clarification it wishes with re-
spect to it—but my reading of the Barlow case is that the
emphasis is upon the use rather than the formality of struc-
ture or format of the entity.

The use here is strictly a hospital use. There is the matter
of performing hospital laundry services, period, and as I
have indicated before, I do not think that the fact that this
is being done for more than one hospital changes that as-

pect.

I do not think, therefore, that it is an extension of an
exemption to say that an association that has been set up
for the sole purpose of performing only hospital laundry
functions, limited strictly to doing this for charitable hos-
pitals, is extending that exemption in any way. It is simply

A-13
recognizing that the Association is doing a hospital func-
tion and doing it for a number of hospitals, presumably but
not determinatively on a more efficient basis for the hospi-

tals.

Therefore, my conclusion is that the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment must be granted. The defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment must be denied. In view of that
ruling I do not think it is necessary to determine the ques-
tion of equitable estoppel.

If counsel will prepare an order, then, based on the rul-
ing. Thank you again for your presentations.

(End of proceedings. )

B-1
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HospiraL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, No. 77-3701
Appellee, D.C. No.
V. C76-779M
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OPINION
Appellant.
FILED
July 21, 1980

RicHARD H. Deane, Clerk
U.S. Court of Appeals

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Walter T. McGovern, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and submitted April 8, 1980

Before: GOODWIN and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges,
and WILLIAMS,” District Judge

PER CURIAM

Hospital Central Services Association, a nonprofit Wash-
ington Corporation which operated a laundry, paid income
taxes for 1974 and, after exhausting its administrative reme-
dies, sued under § 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code
for a refund. The district court held the association to be
a tax-exempt charity and granted the refund, The govern-
ment appeals, contending that § 501(c)(3) does not ex-
tend to hospital laundry services like those involved here.

*The Honorable Spencer Williains, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

B-2

The identical issues were recently before the Third Cir-
cuit in HCSC-Laundry v. United States of America, No.
79-2286 (3rd Cir. June 6, 1980). There, as here, a group of
charitable hospitals had formed a nonprofit corporation in
order to effect economies of scale that could not be realized
if each hospital were to install and staff its own laundry.
There, as here, the laundry services were performed for
the tax-exempt hospitals that had created the corporation.’
There, as here, the district court held that because a chari-
table hospital could operate its own laundry without im-
pairing its exemption under § 501(c) (3), it should be able
to pool its laundry facilities (and its exemptions ) with other
hospitals and thus confer tax exemption upon the new
entity.

A group of charitable § 501(c) (3) hospitals may jointly
create and own a tax-exempt entity under § 501(e)(1)(A)
to perform certain functions: e.g., computer service, pur-
chasing, warehousing, laboratory, printing, billing and col-
lecting, and other services listed in § 501(e)(1)(A) of the
Code. The issue is whether, under § 501(c)(3), the hos-
pitals may create tax-exempt entities to perform services
not listed in § 501(e)(1)(A).

After a careful examination of the legislative history of
§ 501(e)(1)(A) and of established legal principles which
we need not repeat here, the Third Circuit held that Con-
gress had intentionally omitted laundry services from the
list of commercial services for which charitable hospitals
could form jointly-owned entities that would be tax-exempt.

1. The taxpayer in the case at bar may not strictly qualify under
§ 501(e) (1) (B) because, at the time it was organized, it served a hospital
that did not then qualify for exemption under § 501(c) (3). We need not
reach this question, however, as the case tums on the meaning of

§ 501(e) (1) (A).

B-3
Whether the legislative decision to favor the commercial
laundry industry by removing a tax advantage from com-
petitors was a wise or equitable decision is obviously not
a judicial question. On the only judicial question—the
meaning of the tax law—we agree with the Third Circuit
for the reasons stated in its opinion.

heversed.

C-1
APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HospiTaL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, No. 77-3701
Appellee, \ DC CV 76-779
V. WTM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JUDGMENT
Appellant.
FILED IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Western District of Washington
July 21, 1980
Jor R. Romans, Clerk

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington (Seattle).

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript of
the Record from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington (Seattle), and was duly
submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment
of the said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is
reversed,

Costs in this court in favor of the appellant and against

the appellee.
Costs:
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT $227.45
TOTAL $227.45

Filed and entered July 21, 1980.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0644%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
