# Appellees Brief — Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellees Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 453 U.S. 609

## Text

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No. 20-581
In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1961

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, CENTRAL ILLINOIS
LIGHT COMPANY, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE, DE-
TROIT EDISON COMPANY, INTERSTATE POWER COMPANY,
LAKE SUPERIOR DISTRICT POWER COMPANY, LOWER COLO-
RADO RIVER AUTHORITY/CITY OF AUSTIN, MINNESOTA
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, NORTHERN STATES POWER
COMPANY, UPPER PENINSULA GENERATING COMPANY, WIS-
CONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, DECKER COAL
COMPANY, PEABODY COAL COMPANY, AND WESTMORE-
LAND RESOURES, INC. and WESTERN ENERGY COMPANY,
Appellants,

— against —

STATE OF MONTANA, TED SCHWINDEN, GOVERNOR OF
MONTANA, ELLEN J. FEAVER, DIRECTOR OF THE STATE DE-
PARTMENT OF REVENUE, MORRIS L. BRUSETT, DIRECTOR
OF ADMINISTRATION AND STATE TREASURER,

Appellees.

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BRIEF OF APPELLEES

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APPEARANCES:

MIKE GREELY

Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MIKE McGRATH

Assistant Attorney General
MIKE McCARTER
Assistant Attornev General
State Capitol

Helena, Montana 59601

OF COUNSEL:

A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH, JR.
Sharp, Randolph & Green

Suite 501

1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Appellees

COCKLE PRINTING CO., 2311 Douglas St., Omaha 68102

i
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in dis-
missing the appellants’ claims in light of the provision
of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act affirmatively endors-
ing the right of the states to levy severance taxes and
determine the rate of those taxes.

2. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-
cluding that Montana’s coal severance tax did not impose
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in light
of the unbroken line of precedents in this and other courts
sustaining such taxes over Commerce Clause challenges?

3. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-
cluding that Montana’s coal severance tax satisfied the
Commerce Clause requirement that a tax be fairly re-
lated to services provided by the state in light of the fact
that Montana has provided the taxpayers with “services
that inelude not only police and fire protection, but the
benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of
a civilized society [Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 484, 445 (1979)]?

4. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-
eluding that Montana’s severance tax, which is “imposed

bb

on each ton of coal produced in the state,” does not dis-

eriminate against interstate commerce?

5. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in dis-
missing appellants’ federal preemption claims where those
claims were not based on any specifie statutory provision
but rather on an assertion that a general national aspira-

tion may preempt a state tax?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages
See cena e Narn 1
tg Oe ty (| a 5)
I 5c ecsncicnhnlsacniapcentsieihaeleseimeniilaheniiaguanaatantinians 8

I. In Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920, Congress granted the states permission
to set severance tax rates as they saw fit. ................ 10

II. Settled Commerce Clause principles and sound
institutional considerations fully support the
Montana Supreme Court’s .dismissal of appel-
lants’ attack on the rate of Montana’s coal sever-
I ich ate ieetionessilsniicnslnetaneeestetesescmisnnanenlespiaadinan 15

IIJ. The state court properly dismissed appellants’
claims that the rate of Montana’s coal severance
tax frustrates broad national coal policies and
SRR are EER NDS Ne Ls Nana ND ASE ons aE 35

i ene Pee aa Peas at ERY ENP ee Be LC tM ED 46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alaska v. Arctie Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961) wu 000.19, 21
American Commuters, Ass’n. v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d

Se ee YO 0) fees ceildlinaneedaienaae . =
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., — U. S. —, 100 S. Ct. 1932

(1980) Nis Nie td «a ote [EOD EE ION So ke ee

Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 1137 So. 2d
308, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 2 (1962) occ cccccssemseen 15

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.
ey: Re REE iaecbitcdciictatigintidetneiaddaiaaie ae 24
Caskey Banking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117,
Spee MPUUIT. +: cstccialhatsnnpciciteceiasnianicaissasdiaciactaiatinaaedaededaaiad canara 19
Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584
2 | ER enee con eran DME Par eaeES WET EvER YON Gn sin Peary Pik a) 20
City of Pittsburgh v. Aleo Parking Corporation,
Re ik We tt CRD vec cee ecciccnies cade 6, 9, 31
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triagle, 421 U. S. 100,
IPN Ucincediedicssocicniuchinesemsplediciniusctaneiadcaa tale rcarie eteacans 25
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, — Mont. —,
GAD WP; De RT, DO CD cesses CMESAL en 5
Complete Auto Transit, Ine. v. Brady, 430 U. S.
E.R ER SERRE ANS OME Fr iA Meh I Br Ryn ne PPAF. 21, 22
Conley v. Gibson, 355 1. S. 41 (1957) once 5

Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Ine. v. Alabama, 393
A | , SMe ce

Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Ine., 405
Saf OE MRRIPWUOE wcsiicoenatceeesdeciicathuane isan anaGneenanaets 28

Department of Revenue v. Association of Washing-
ton Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51 (1978) ...... 25

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Ine., 431 U. S. 265,
FR ak , 5 RRO CAEN Ache IS hy

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S.
yg | ) gee PE ey ALI ame A rR Ne OFTEN! SST 8, 40, 43

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
EB . | ) r 23, 26
Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean,
I as hascneeingammnnebiicin 20
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) ...... 44
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8. 245
NE a ncaaenieenennienmtensstnioni 15, 16, 17, 18
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) nn nescsssenssessesneene 41,42
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941) eee 41
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927) ..... 15
Tin we Beasbarrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1GGL) nanan cineca en sseesee 14
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U. S. 434, 445 (1979) ...... HELTER eT 7, 23, 26, 46
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 480 U. 8S. 519 (1977) 0... 41
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40 (1934) .............. 32
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
IT Sg 45
McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940) ....45, 46
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F. 2d 537
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 8S. Ct.
OE Ea RC 16
Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U. S. 45, 48-
aE AE SR SR et 11

Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 8 (1933) ce A a

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pag 's
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
i ee Mc SE: SED ides chtintccdadapacdcndteaecenicntecaicedenieacunl 44
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S.
eo, Reeeamnnanes meen 5 eae lichliatie ratios 34
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U. 8.
I ac ee 41, 42
New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin
W. poe; Ge U. BS. SG, 120-51 (i876) .......................... 41
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Schauffler, 308 U.S. 54, 57 (1938) 43
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. 8. 416
1 REE I et rts i ee broke neat Rehr nthe Pr Pon Det et newts 18, 19, 30

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
I a ci ee a 17

Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. 8. 172 (1928)... 15

Penn Dairies, Ine. v. Milk Control Commission of
Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (19438) nnn cessaeeee 44

Pike v. Bruce Church, Ine., 397 U. S. 137 (1970) oo... 19

Post Oak Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 575 P.
en See ee a ee ne 16

Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
rn IY oe es . 14

Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120
Ros See Ie, UIIUIOUD ccc ciisinncsaltegeaehdenbeeicdnaaaioaaadadeeninnes « WW

Southern Pacofie Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,
769 (1945) seers ol Meroe aha aes ee re Se . 14

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages
St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U. 8S. 157,
| AC. GRAIG a rene, woes menos keen oer 25
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 280 (1898) .nnccccccmocnveneen 25
Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. 8. 5,
a ceiarnrenbesnaneninns 9, 44, 45
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466
I ici hice tsensbasceesileeblebeteonteniseapianitaasstanantalion 9
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
Or, ek a id eieemntaninaoeny 30
Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U. S.
i go shaladenniiiiintieinioniihiontemsean 9
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100
Hee SB St ene 45
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ences 17,18
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444
Ee EAE ae er ERR cso Sete em ee 25
STATUTES :
I SPC a SII <cscpreisseccisnnssipnicinenetiniitsiannensinnannenticios 1
I CR I ah cectsexscnnnsnpesnsnsnnlasecnicciiarneiebeiianoin 1
RI. URI TSI acciisalansiostcnmapenentingioieiennensialilenaniaiionnia 1, 29
a es I itscicectissiccennnctpeieeniisineneneenininn rota 21, 22

Section 32 of the Minerals Lands Leasing Act of
SEE Reomwme k R

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages
Ne ee TN
PUPPIES TR ei ic i Ss 6, 10, 36
Se a I ci ical cerestanseesnleunbeetattaiaia 37
Se re ri UR —
Ra a La 37
42 U.S.C. $6211 EVEN CEN EOE OTR, PAO NEN sith 37
42 U.S.C. $6212 cli tiglatasiilins siconsinhideet eile 37
42 U.8.C. $ G231 ot seq... utiisetdueeaed: aa
Re IE il siicinsrenssascsonemmebatbitibiitandamensls a
I, ——
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Montana Constitution, Article TX, 45 va at
U.S. Constitution, Article T, § 9 ........ te

U. S. Constitution, Article VI .......... a

D. Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal Indus-
try and Surface-mined Lands (Inform, Ine..
oo SS Reaper oy Peis | 27

Hogan and Shelton, Interstate Tax Exportation
and State Fiscal Structures, 26 Nat. Tax J. 553
RUE RS Tie 00nd CO Nar eee A ART ee 32

K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land. 7
(1957) , EE LA ER

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 391-400 (1977) 45

villi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

M. Gillis, Severance Taxes On Energy Resources

in the U. S. Growth and Change (Jan., 1979) ...........

McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Lo-
cal Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 Nat. Tax

Fi Fe CR ecenicressicseenesniaseocsineictsaetiniitinnietniniitnsagntiionngniieti

MeLure, The Interstate Exportation of State and
Loca: Taxes: Estimates of 1962, 20 Nat. Tax. J.

De CI i icttintcecitnicinmeecpdneeerntierientneeneiiniartnndaenidniint

Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain 110-133

PIII = SiceipntcnLsecsiseacsacsecpsetneaehenhasientscaeinnaiaaiatnsabanialsshsiialaoninie

P. Hariman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-

Ey Re | aC eee

Shelton and Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Ex-
portation and Regional Energy Policies, 17 Nat.

a i | eae eee ee

Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-

sources, 9th Cong., 2d Sess., 506 (1980) 0000000...

Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 6625
and H. R. 7163 before the Subcommittee on En-
ergy and Power of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d
Serene

President’s Commission on Coal, Coal Data Book,

62, 63, 66 (1978) eecucomoomnn Ciaran

President’s Commission on Coal, Report to the
IN i ih ad su sicstadicnreeenieestsaaplansdcccilibin

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A Se-
lective Legislative Analysis, 13 Land & Water
L. Rev. 747, 800-12 (1978) 38
Montana Legislative Council, Fossil Fuel Taxation
INN NEE ON" aacisstecinceiticteiensouedecrhesablighcnmsbepcniciesiocneen 2
1977 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1245, 1510,
BENE. sidieninissnnens aibdiaicceelooisiatabuianteisipousieann aka 38
Montana Legislative Council, Statement To Accom-
pany The Report Of The Free Joint Conference
Committee On Coal Taxation (April 16, 1975) ........... 3
The Federalist No. 32 (A. Hamilton) 4-4
House Resolutions 45 and 93 and Senate Resolu-
tion 83, Laws of Montana (1974) pp. 1419, 1453
mE ee ca TsO, Fo caamanienpemaianieeisiehl 2
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-
Bi I PR EE shaccickccetdatenstetsheshccebioabcideinerahtsaane . of
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
fe OR | es | Same nee ne 37
Comptroller of Publie Accounts, State of Texas,
State and Local Taxes On Oil and Gas Produc-
tion: A Comparison of Texas, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and New Merrco (1979) rreeecccsnrssssrccsesnscssssnnesessnseseeensees 4

Gates, History of Public Land Law Development
vip Be _ | Re a 11

NNN. SO, RS CRORE ticinicerecpehceereerenicreteaiccneiniotienerts 13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Montana imposes a severance tax on “each ton of coal
produced in the state” based on the value and energy con-
tent of the coal and the method of extraction. Section 15-
35-103, MCA. The effective rate of tax is less than the
statutory rate because other taxes paid on production to
federal, state, and local governments are excluded in com-
puting the value of coal.' The tax applies equally to coal
consumed in Montana and coal destined for shipment out
of state.

Nature has graciously endowed the State of Montana
with a wealth of natural resources, including large de-
posits of low sulphur coal.? Throughout its history, Mon-
tana’s economy has depended upon the development of
those resources. In the words of one historian, “Nature,
not the evil designs of men, decreed that Montana be a
place with a colonial economy.” K. Ross Toole, Montana:
An Uncommon Land 7 (1957). As a result, Montana has
long suffered economic dislocations of boom and bust cy-
cles of mineral production, along with the scars left from

1 Section 15-35-103, MCA, provides that the value of the coal
is the contract sales price. Section 15-35-102 (1), MCA, de-
fines contract sales price as “the price of coal extracted and
prepared for shipment f.o.b. mine, excluding the amount
charged by the seller to pay taxes paid on production. . .”
a paid on production are defined in 4 15-35-102 (6),

CA.

2 The entire United States is rich in coal, with approximately
31% of the known recoverable coal in the world, represent-
ing a several hundred years supply. President’s Commission
on Coal, Report to the President (1980). Coal deposits are
found in 31 states and mined in 26. President’s Commission
On Coal, Coal Data Book, 62-63, 66 (1978). In 1977 Montana
Coal Production was 20 million tons, or 3% of the entire U. S.
production. Id. at 66-67, 89.

l

mining operations. Montana’s history with mining was

aptly described in the opinion of the court below:
Montana’s experience has shown that its mineral
wealth could be exhausted and exported with little left
in Montana to make up the loss of its irreplaceable re-
sources. Montana has been painfully educated about
the extreme economic jolts that follow when the mine
runs out, the oil depletes, or the timber saws come
still. We have a good many examples that teach us
what happens to our hills when the riches of our Treas-
ure State are spent. (J.S. 7a.)

Historically, Montana’s mining has principally involved

gold, silver, copper, and other metalliferous ores. Then

the 1970’s brought the prospect of a substantial expansion

of coal strip mining.

In 1974 the Montana Legislature adopted resolutions
seeking an interim study of taxation on coal production.‘
The interim study proposed several tax alternatives,’
and in 1975 the Montana legislature enacted the present
coal severance tax (Laws of Montana (1975), Ch. 525).
The actual rate of the tax was settled by conference com-
mittee. In its report to the legislature that committee
stated :

3 Montana historian K. Ross Toole gives a similar description in
Montana: An Uncommon Land 7 (1957): ‘““Montana’s growth
in one sense, has been a series of traumas. There has been
a strikingly consistent pattern which, appropriately enough,
conforms to the pattern of the land itself, For every pinnacle
there is an equally impressive declivity. For every sudden
rise, a sudden fall. Optimism has alternated almost monot-
onously with despair.”

4 House Resolutions 45 and 93 and Senate Resolution 83, Laws
of Montana (1974) pp. 1419, 1453, & 1683.

5 Montana Legislative Council, Fossil Fuel Taxation (December,
1974).

3

In setting the level of the tax, the conference commit-
tee looked at the needs to be met. The objectives were
to (a) preserve or modestly increase revenues going to
the general fund, (b) to respond to current social im-
pacts attributable to coal development, and (c) to in-
vest in the future, when new energy technologies re-
duce our dependence on coal and mining activity may
decline.”
Montana Legislative Council, Statement To Accompany
The Report Of The Free Joint Conference Committee On
Coal Taxation (April 16, 1975) [A copy has been filed
with the clerk of this Court]. Thus in enacting the tax,
the legislature carefully considered the legitimate needs
of the State of Montana, including the need for revenue for
the general support of government.

In 1976 the voters of Montana revealed their deter-
mination to reverse historical trends by overwhelmingly
adopting a referendum to amend the Montana Constitu-
tion to provide that fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds
from the tax be dedicated to a permanent trust fund. Mon-
tana Constitution, Art. IX, 45. The trust fund represents
a self-imposed savings account to pay for future costs of
unforeseen social and environmental impacts caused by
strip mining, as well as to assist in stabilizing the State’s
economic base when its resources are depleted or the min-
ing activity ceases.

Many states have severance taxes. The first such tax
was imposed by the State of Michigan in 1846,° and by
1979 thirty-three states had adopted some type of sever-
ance tax.’ Severance taxes are levied on oil, gas, coal,

6 United States Department of Agriculture, State Taxation of
Mineral Deposits and Production (1978).

7 Bureau of Census, State Government Tax Collections in 1979,
Table 3 (1980).

ET Ne ee

4

copper, potash, uranium, molybdenum, vermiculite, sulfur,
dolomite, sand, gravel, limestone, forest products, iron,
taconite and even salt. In terms of total state revenues,
severance taxes in 1979 represented 25.5% of total tax
collections for Wyoming; 22% for Louisiana; 21.1% for
Alaska; 18.5% for Oklahoma; 18% for Texas; and 13.5%
for Montana.®

When viewed as a tax on energy, Montana’s coal tax
rate compares favorably with the tax rates imposed on
oil and gas by Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and New Mex-
ico. A recent study undertaken by the State of Texas
for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 determined that the Texas
severance tax was 6.36 cents per million BTU’s of oil and
gas. The rates for a million BTU’s in Louisiana, Okla-
homa and New Mexico were 10.26, 8.13 and 7.76 cents re-
spectively.2 Montana’s tax per million BTU’s of coal was
approximately 7.11 cents.!°

The appellants—four (4) coal companies and several)
of their utility customers—have brought the present ac-

8 Id. Collections by the top ten states for 1979 were as follows:

1. Texas $1,025,550,000
2. Louisiana 511,589,000
3. Oklahoma 280,982,000
4. Alaska 173,685,000
5. New Mexico 159,431,000
6. Kentucky 154,017,000
7. Florida 91,901,000
8. Wyoming 87,419,000
9. Minnesota 71,263,000
10. Montana 53,919,000

9 Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of Texas, State and
Local Taxes On Oil and Gas Production: A Comparison of
Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico (1979)

10 See Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H. R. 6625 and H. R.
7163 before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1980).

5

tion seeking a declaration that the Montana coal severance
tax is excessive and unreasonable. They also seek a re-
fund of severance taxes paid under protest since the sec-
ond quarter of 1978. The real parties in interest are the
appellant coal companies, which conduct extensive strip
mining operations in Montana. These coal companies are
Montana taxpayers, and the tax is imposed on their local
activities. The various utilities join as plaintiffs based
upon appellants’ assertion that the coal companies pass
Montana’s tax through to their utility customers rather
than absorbing the tax."

The appellants have made numerous factual asser-
tions in their brief. Many of these factual statements are
irrelevant to the constitutional arguments presented here.
In any event Montana does not concede that appellants’
factual assertions are true, but rather asserts that the ap-
pellants can prove no set of facts in support of their claims
which would entitle them to relief, Commonwealth Edison
v. Montana, — Mont. —, 615 P. 2d 847, 849 (1980); Con-
ley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957).

,,
Vw

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants’ claims in this case are based entirely upon
assertions that the rate of Mcntana’s tax is too high and
that a Court is an appropriate and capable institution to

11 Recent studies prepared for the State of Montana show (as-
suming 100% Montana's tax is passed on to the consumer)
that the severance tax would account for only !/, of 1% to
2% of the residential consumer’s final utility bill. Coal

Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 448,
506 (1980).

6

determine just how much tax the state of Montana may
appropriately levy. These assertions run counter to this
Court’s repeated pronouncements that where the power to
tax exists, it is accompanied by the right to set the rate
of the tax. See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Cor-
poration, 417 U. S. 379 (1974). The very nature of deter-
mining an appropriate rate of taxation is a legislative
function, and neither settled principles of Commerce Clause
adjudication nor Supremacy Clause analysis support ap-
pellants’ contention that the courts must review Montana’s
tax rate to determine whether it is “reasonable.”

A. Appellants’ contentions are initially foreclosed by
the terms of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which ex-
plicitly reserves to the states “the right to levy and collect
taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights,
property or assets of any lessee of the United States.” 30
U.S.C. §189. Through this section, Congress affirma-
tively endorsed the right of the states to determine ap-
propriate rates of taxation free from federal interference.

B. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed appel-
lants’ Commerce Clause claim on two independent grounds,
either of which is sufficient to sustain its decision.

First, the court followed the unbroken lines of prece-
dent in this and other courts dismissing Commerce Clause
attacks on state severance taxes. The sound principle un-
derlying these decisions is this: Not every state tax that
allegedly affects interstate commerce burdens it within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause. Under this principle,
non-discriminatory state severance taxes have never been
viewed as imposing a burden on interstate commerce. The
principle was right when it was first articulated; it is right
today; and it is not undermined by decisions relied upon

7

by appellants which expansively construe the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

Second, considering appellants’ Commerce Clause
claims on the assumption that this Court’s severance tax
decisions were not dispositive, the state court properly re-
jected appellants’ contentions that the levy is not fairly
related to benefits provided by the state and discriminates
against interstate commerce. In providing the taxpayers
with “services that include not only police and fire pro-
tection, but the benefits of a trained work force and the
advantages of a civilized society,” Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 445 (1979), Mon-
tana has satisfied the “fair relation” requirement enunci-
ated by this Court in its recent Commerce Clause opinions.
The tax similarly satisfies the requirement that it not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce; the tax, both on
its face and in practical effect, falls equally on coal con-
sumed in Montana and coal destined out of state.

C. The gravamen of appellants’ general preemption
claim, like the substance of their other claims, is that the
rate of Montana’s severance tax is too high. Appellants
concede that no federal statute or national policy pre-
cludes Montana from levying a severance tax on coal, but
allege that the rate frustrates “the basie thrust” of fed-
eral coal policy App. Br. 16.

Appellants fail to identify any federal statute or regu-
lation that conflicts with Montana’s tax. Congress has
never expressed an intention to limit the rate of coal sev-
erance taxes. Nor has it attempted to regulate the price
of coal or the many variables which increase coal costs.
The purported burden any tax may put on the achieve-

8

ment of a general policy which may have motivated Con-
egress in adopting specific legislation is too fragile a basis
to invalidate the sovereign power of a state to design its
tax structure. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U. S. 117 (1978).

D. Finally, institutional considerations strongly re-
inforce the state court’s judgment dismissing appellants’
Commerce and Supremacy Clause claims. As already noted
above, appellants’ case ultimately rests on their objection
to the rate of the Montana tax. Appellants are therefore
asking this Court to do what no court has ever done,
namely, to undertake its own investigation of social, eco-
nomic, aesthetic and regulatory values and establish an
appropriate rate of a state general excise tax. Such judg-
ments are plainly beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. If
they are to be made at all, they must be made by state
legislatures and Congress, the only bodies with both the
institutional resources and constitutional authority to make
them.

Ly
Vv

ARGUMENT

Appellants recognize, as they must, that states may
properly impose severance taxes on coal and that noth-
ing in the Constitution or any federal law prohibits such
tax measures.’? Appellants objection—and the basis for
each of their arguments in this court—is that the par-
ticular severance tax rate adopted by Montana is too high.
The extent to which Montana has overtaxed appellants

12 See App. Br. 20 n. *; J. S. 15; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants in
the Court below 46-47; 52 n. 29; 79.

9

is a subject they do not address. Although we therefore
do not know whether appellants would find a rate of 25%,
20% or some other amount acceptable, their counsel has
informed both the Montana Supreme Court and Congress
that 15% would pose no problem.’ Appellants assert the
proper percentage should be determined by the judiciary.

The State of Montana disagrees. Appellants are ef-
fectively asking this court to reverse its consistent hold-
ing that the right to tax encompasses the right to deter-
mine the rate of the tax, see, e. g., Weston v. City Council
of Charleston, 27 U.S. 171, 174 (1829); City of Pittsburgh
v. Alco Parking Corporation, 417 U.S. 369 (1974); and
break with precedents which have rejected arguments sim-
ilar to those made here—that a non-discriminatory state
tax is nevertheless unconstitutional because it indirectly
falls on some constitutionally immune or protected sub-
ject or activity, see, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit,
355 U.S. 466 (1958); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Peniston,
85 U.S. 5, 30-31 (1873). It is the State’s position that
precedents rejecting similar challenges to state tax rates
should be followed; the “correct” rate of the severance
tax on coal is a subject for legislative, not judicial regu-
lation. Neither the Constitution nor any federal law re-
quires otherwise.

13 In oral argument to the Montana Supreme Court, counsel
for appellants conceded that a 15% rate would be accept-
able. This same concession was made to Congress. Coal
Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Sen. Comm.
On Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Congress, 2d Sess.
262 (1980) (testimony of William P. Rogers); Coal Severance
Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 94 (1980) (tes-
timony of William P. Rogers).

10

Finally, respondents are aware of no state tax case
decided by this Court in which the Court’s decision was
based upon a factual inquiry into the amount or indirect
incidence of a tax or into the benefits furnished by the
State to the specific taxpayers. This Court should affirm
the decision of the Montana Supreme Court, which prop-
erly rejected Appellants’ invitation to undertake the con-
stitutionally unwarranted and judicially unmanageable
task of establishing the appropriate rate of a state tax
levied for the general support of government.

I. In Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920, Congress granted the states permission
to set severance tax rates as they saw fit.

It is rather ironic that in attacking the rate of Mon-
tana’s coal severance tax, appellants invoke the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920,'* 30 U.S.C. $181, et seq., a
statute that thoroughly undercuts each of their various
arguments in this Court. The Act confirms in the clear-
est possible terms that a state may impose severance
taxes on coal mined from federal land; that the appro-
priate severance tax rate is a matter for the state to de-
cide; and that the exercise of these state powers is en-
tirely consistent with federal law.

The Act contains a proviso that constitutes nothing
less than congressional permission for the states to enact
the type of taxing measures at issue in this case. Thus,
section 32 of the Act, 30 U.S.C. $189, provides:

14 Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437. Some of the Act's history is recounted
in the Court’s opinion in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., — U.S. —,
100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).

11

That nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to
affect the rights of the States or the local authority
to exercise any rights they may have, including the
right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements,
output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets
of any lessee of the United States. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
As the Court held more than fifty years ago, Congress in-
tended section 32 “to remove altogether from the field of
controversy, among other questions, ... the authority of
the states to impose taxes upon lessees in respect of their
property” regardless of the interest of the United States
in the leased land. Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268
U. S. 45, 48-49 (1925).

That Congress imposed no limits on the rates of state
severance taxes does not render section 32 “irrelevant,”
as appellants contend (App. Br. 48). The absence of any
such limitation is highly significant. As the history of this
section reveals, Congress ratified the power of the states
to impose severance taxes and deliberately used language
that would allow the states to do so at the rate they saw
fit. :

The withdrawal of most areas of federal coal and oil
lands by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William H.
Taft prompted efforts to adopt a comprehensive federal
leasing act for oil, gas and coal.'’ During the House de-
bate on an early version of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act

15 See generally, Gates, History of Public Land Law Develop-
ment 725-736 (1968); Peffer, The Closing of the Public Do-
main 110-133 (1951). After the first withdrawals, President
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress suggesting ‘that there
should be some provision for leasing coal, oil and gas rights.
...” 41 Cong. Rec. 450 (1906); 41 Cong. Rec. 2077 (1907).

12

(H.R. 16136, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914)), western Con-
gressmen expressed concern that under the bill the States
might be unable to tax the production of federal lessees.
Representative Lenroot of Wisconsin took the lead in an-
swering western fears by pointing out that a “State can
tax the product of that mine [leased under the bill] just
such sum as it [the State] chooses.” 51 Cong. Ree. 15058
(1914). Later, referring to a Colorado company mining
coal on lands it owned, Rep. Lenroot and Rep. Mondell of
Wyoming engaged in the following colloquy:

Mr. Lenroot: * * *

* ** [M]uch has been said concerning the matter
of taxation and the denial of these States of taxes to
which they are entitled. Again, referring to the Colo-
rado Iron and Fuel Co., they do pay some taxes, it is
true, to the State of Colorado upon their lands; but
if those lands were under lease, the State of Colo-
rado would receive under this bill one half of the pro-
ceeds of these [federal] royalties, and in addition the

. state of Colorado could tax the output—every ton
of coal mined by the Colorado Iron and Fuel Co.—in
such sums as its legislature in its wisdom might choose
to impose.

Mr. Mondell:

Is the gentlemen sure—quite sure—as a legal
proposition that the State can tax the output of these
leased mines?

Mr. Lenroot:
T am absolutely certain. * * *
Mr. Mondell:

I am glad to have the gentleman’s opinion and
I hope he is right because this is our only hope under
this legislation.

51 Cong. Ree. 15064-65 (1914) (emphasis supplied).

13

Later in the debate, Representative Ferris, sponsor of the
bill and Chairman of the Public Lands Committee which
favorably reported the bill to the floor of the House, lent
his support to Representative Lenroot’s assurances, stat-
ing “[t]here is no doubt but that your legislature has the
authority to impose an excise tax that will catch every
pound of coal and every gallon of oil produced,” and that
this taxing authority was in addition to any royalty shar-
ing. 51 Cong. Rec. 15558 (1914).

Although the bill under consideration in the debate
recited above contained no express recognition of state
taxing power, this was remedied in the next Congress
when the House Committee on Public Lands offered an
amendment to the pending leasing bill. After minor
changes in the Committee’s proposal, the House adopted
the amendment, which contained language nearlv identical
to that ultimately enacted as section 32 of the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920.'*

In the House debate immediately preceding passage of
the 1920 Act, Representative Mondell again stressed that
the proviso affirmed state power to tax leasehold improve-
ments and mine output of federal lessees. 58 Cong. Rec.
7646 (1919). Despite protests that under the proviso the

16 The amendment adopted by the 64th Congress read:
Provided that nothing in this act shall be construed or
held to affect the rights of the States or other local au-
thority to exercise any rights which they may have to
levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of
mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessees.

53 Cong. Rec. 1122-1123 (1916). Representative Mann of
Illinois characterized the proposition that the states could
tax the property of lessees as one on which “we are all
agreed,” 53 Cong. Rec. 1122 (1912); the adoption of the
amendment reflected that view.

14

states would have the power to levy “burdensome taxes”
and thereby ruin lessees and render the leases of no value
(58 Cong. Rec. 7647 (1919) (remarks of Rep. McLaugh-
lin)), Congress passed section 32 without further changes.

Congress thus intended by section 32 to grant the
states permission to impose severance taxes on coal and
other minerals at the rate the states themselves deemed
appropriate.” Both proponents and opponents of section
32 agreed that the proviso had that purpose and effect.

The significance of section 32 to appellants’ argu-
ments’® in this Court is apparent. Since Congress has
granted express permission to the states to do precisely
what appellants protest—namely, exercise the plenary
power to set their own severance tax rates—it cannot be
said that the rate of a state severance tax may render the
tax unconstitutional.’®

For similar reasons, appellants’ Supremacy Clause
arguments must be rejected in light of section 32. Mon-
tana’s tax cannot be considered inconsistent with federal
law when Congress itself has ratified the state’s power

17 While section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act applies
only to taxation of federal lessees, it is inconceivable that
Congress intended to permit states greater authority to tax
federal lessees than other taxpayers.

18 The appellants continue to assert that the coal taxed by
Montana is federal coal, and thus belongs to the people of
the United States as a whole. What they ignore is that
through leases the federal government has sold its interests
in the coal and the people of the United States, through
royalties, will receive their fair rate of return. [See Opinion
below J. S. 27 (a).] |

19 See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 434-
36 (1946); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); see Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).

15

and authority to impose the tax and set the rate. While
appellants may believe that contemporary conditions war-
rant restrictions on the states’ authority, that is a matter
for Congress to decide. Until and unless Congress acts,’°
Montana is free to exercise the authority confirmed in
section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.

We therefore submit that section 32 is a sufficient
basis for rejecting each of appellants’ contentions regard-
ing Montana’s tax. In the discussion that follows we ad-
dress each of appellants’ Commerce and Supremacy Clause
arguments and discuss why, even aside from section 32,
those arguments must be rejected.

II. Settled Commerce Clause principles and sound in-
stitutional considerations fully support the Mon-
tana Supreme Court’s dismissal of appellants’ at-
tack on the rate of Montana’s coal severance tax.

A. The Decisions of This and Other Courts Repudi-
ating Commerce Clause Challenges to State Sev-
erance Taxes Reflect Wise and Established Prin-
ciples of Commerce Clause Adjudication and
Should Not Be Disturbed.

The arguments appellants raise are not new. For
nearly sixty years this Court and other courts have con-
sistently rejected Commerce Clause attacks on state sever-
ance taxes. See, e. g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260
U.S. 245 (1922) ; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284
(1927); Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 1137 So. 2d

20 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425,
448-449 (1980); cf. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466,
474 (1958).

16

308, appeal dismissed, 371 U. S. 2 (1962); Post Oak Oil
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 575 P. 2d 965 (Okla. 1978) ;
ef. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F. 2d 537 (10th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980). Con-
tending that a severance tax upon coal destined for ship-
ment to other states burdened interstate commerce, the
taxpayers i: Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra, ar.
gued, as appellants argue here, that:

Pennsylvania has a natural monopoly of anthracite
eoal in this country. That coal is a prime necessity
of life, especially in the northeastern States. Wighty
percent of such coal is shipped out of Pennsylvania
... [and the] intention at the time this act was passed
was so to use the natural monopoly which Pennsyl-
vania possesses as to compel the inhabitants of the
United States to pay a tax to Pennsylvania. (260
U. S. at 251-52.)
Despite these allegations the Court held that Pennsy]l-
vania’s tax on the local activity of severing natural re-
sources from the earth did not constitute a burden on
interstate commerce within the meaning of the Commerce

Clause.

Appellants make no effort to distinguish the present
ease from Heisler and its progeny. Instead, they argue
that times have changed, that the country now has a
pressing need to develop its energy resources, and that
Heisler rests on an outmoded analysis of the Commerce
Clause.

Appellant’s prediction of “grave practical conse-
quences to this nation” unless the rate of each state’s
severance tax is subject to judicial examination at a trial
completely ignores both inherent market limitations in
fixing tax rates and the role of Congress under the Com-

17

merce Clause. Appellants argue that the scope of con-
gressional power to regulate interstate commerce has ex-
panded considerably since the Court decided Heisler, how-
ever, they fail to recognize that as a result Congress has
ample authority to deal with severance tax rates on coal
if it should deem this necessary or appropriate.”!_ Rather
than a reason for overruling Heisler, the expansion of
congressional power is a reason for adhering to that de-
cision.

Citing cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), appellants argue that because Congress
could determine the appropriate limits of such tax rates,
the courts should do so. Appellants, however, have con-
fused the Commerce Clause’s affirmative grant of power
to Congress “to regulate Commerce. . . . among the sev-
eral States,” U.S. Const., Art. I, 49, cl. 3, with the nega-
tive implications of the Clause. This Court has consis-
tently recognized the substantial differences between Com-
merce Clause considerations bearing on the scope of
congressional power and those bearing on the limitations
on state power. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S.
1, 8 (1933).

Thus while appellants cite Wickard for the proposi-
tion that the Commerce Clause’s negative restraints have
been broadened by decisions expanding the scope of con-
gressional power (App. Br. 18, 21), the Court in Wickard

21 Congress, unlike the Court, has numerous options available.
It could, for example, prohibit the pass through of the tax
by coal companies; provide federal tax deductions to offset
the tax; or pass legislation giving the states an incentive to
reduce their taxes.

18

made exactly the opposite point. The Court observed
that the scope of congressional authority depended on an
inquiry into “what was ‘necessary and proper’ to the ex-
ercise by Congress of its granted power,” 317 U.S. at
121, whereas the point of reference for limitations on
state authority was the “concept of sovereignty .. . im-
plicit in the status of statehood.” Jd. Hence in deter-
mining whether Congress had the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate activities affecting inter-
state commerce, the Court in Wickard was not confined
by the holdings in cases such as Heisler, that state taxes
on those activities imposed no burden on interstate com-
merce. This was not because these cases were no longer
authoritative but rather because the considerations under-
lying the seope of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause are of little aid in determining whether
state action burdens interstate commerce.” As the Court
recently observed:
[S]tatements . . . made in upholding the richts of
States to tax what was argued to be interstate com-
merece . .. are not used interchangeably as state-
ments of law where the issue is the power of Con-
gress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The
restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause stand-
ing alone may well be less than the preemptive reach
of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the
power. (Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265, 282 n. 17 (1977).)
Appellants also contend that the Montana Supreme
Court’s adherence to Heisler contravenes Nippert v. City

22 To take the facts of Wickard itself, it can hardly be con-
tended that the existence of congressional power to regulate
the production of wheat grown for “home” consumption
warrants the inference that a state tax upon such consump-
tion imposes a burden on interstate commerce.

19

of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). See App. Br. 22.
Nippert is one of a long line of cases involving fixed-fee
license taxes imposed on solicitation of orders for inter-
state sales.7 From the beginning, the Court has held
that solicitation of interstate sales is an integral part of
interstate commerce and that a tax upon such activity
imposes a burden on commerce. Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The Court, how-
ever, has been careful not to obliterate the distinction be-
tween taxes that do and taxes that do not burden inter-
state commerce. See, e.g., Caskey Banking Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119 (1941).

Countless other decisions of this Court reflect the
settled principle on which the severance tax decisions are
based: Not every state tax that allegedly affects inter-
state commerce burdens it within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc.
v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969); Alaska v. Arctic Maid,
366 U.S. 199 (1961); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia,
supra. The continued existence of this threshold re-
quirement—that a state tax must burden interstate com-
merce to justify an inquiry into the substantive criteria
for adjudicating Commerce Clause controversies—is dem-
onstrated by the Court’s opinion in Pike v. Bruce ¢ ‘hurch,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Court in Pike explicitly
addressed this “threshold contention” in the context of

23 Nippert itself involved a license tax upon “persons . . . en-
gaged in business as solicitors” measured by a fixed fee and
a percentage of gross receipts.

20

a challenged state regulation, Jd. at 140.24 Moreover, it
carefully distinguished two state tax cases that had re-
lied in part on previous severance tax decisions in con-
cluding that the levies at issue did not burden interstate
commerce. See Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) and Chassanoil v. City of
Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934), discussed at 397 U.S.
at 141.

The court below thus correctly held that before under-
taking an inquiry into the tax’s validity under substan-
tive Commerce Clause criteria, a court must find that the
tax burdens interstate commerce within the meaning of
the Clause. Otherwise every allegation that a tax affects
interstate commerce would require an elaborate inquiry
under the Commerce Clause; no state tax would be free
from Commerce Clause attack; and any state taxpayer
could generate a substantial lawsuit merely by asserting
that the levy affects interstate commerce. This Court
has therefore recognized the necessity of drawing a line
between challenges to taxes that burden interstate com-
merce, which justify a further inquiry into whether the
burden is defensible, and challenges to taxes that do not
burden interstate commerce, which may be dismissed.

State severance taxes have never been viewed as im-
posing a burden on interstate commerce. The essentially
local nature of the activity taxed—the extraction of nat-
ural resources from the earth—and the remoteness of the

24 The Court’s holding on this point—that an order expressly
forbidding interstate bulk shipment burdens interstate com-
merce—was unexceptional. A more onerous burden on
interstate commerce is difficult to imagine.

21

activity from the stream of commerce,’’ have consistently
led this and other courts to conclude that Commerce
Clause attacks on such levies may be disposed of sum-
marily. Recent decisions of this Court continue to adhere
to this view. Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama,
supra; Alaska v. Arctic Maid, supra. Furthermore, this
Court’s repeated approval of its severance tax decisions
reflects the wise judgment that abandonment of them
could create judicial and administrative chaos and that
Congress, not the Judiciary, is the only body with con-
stitutional authority and institutional competence to de-
termine what limits, if any, should be imposed on the
rate of state severance taxes (see p. 34, infra).

B. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Satisfies This
Court’s Requirements That A Tax Be Fairly Re-
lated to Benefits Provided by the State and That
It Not Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce.

Although we submit that the Court’s severance tax
cases are dispositive of appellants’ Commerce Clause
claims, Montana’s coal severance tax also passes muster
under the substantive criteria the Court has articulated

25 Compare with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U. S. 274 (1979).

26 Appellants seek to minimize the significance of the Court's
contemporary opinions that embrace the rule of the sever-
ance tax cases by arguing that the severance tax cases are
cited only for the proposition that taxpayers engaged in cer-
tain activities are not immune from taxation. App. Br. 20.
n.*. As a fair reading of Dunbar-Stanley and Arctic Maid
demonstrates, however, the severance tax cases were in-
voked for the broad proposition that they still support: A
tax on the extraction of natural resources does not burden
interstate commerce.

22

in recent opinions involving state tax controversies. The
Court has stated that it will sustain a tax against Com-
merce Clause challenge

[w]hen the tax is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-
tioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the services provided
by the State. (Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
supra, 274, 279 (1977).)
Applying these standards, the Montana Supreme Court
properly concluded that Montana’s coal severance tax was
fairly related to benefits provided by the state and did
not discriminate against interstate commerce.”’ J.S. 19a-

27a.

1. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Is Fairly Related
to the Benefits Provided Appellants by the State.

The state court’s determination that Montana’s coal
severance tax is fairly related to benefits provided by the
state is unassailable. Montana has provided the appel-
lants with unquantifiable benefits. It has provided them
with the benefits of fire and police protection; of an edu-
cated work force; of roads and waterways; an organized
government; an orderly system of laws and an economic
infrastructure and social machinery that are essential
preconditions to the conduct of modern business activity.
These benefits are of incalculable value and plainly satisfy
the consideration that a tax be fairly related to benefits

27 Appellants conceded below that the activities taxed have a
substantial nexus to the State and that the tax is fairly ap-
portioned to activities carried on there. Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants 52.

23

provided by the state. The Court’s statement in regard
to a California levy is dispositive here:

The tax... is “fairly related to the services pro-
vided by” California, services that include not only
police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained
work force and the advantages of a civilized society.
(Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 445 (1979).)

See also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Reven-

ue, 100 8. Ct. 2109, 2122 (1980).

Appellants’ contend, however, that before consider-
ing the “fair relation” criterion a court must undertake
a detailed factual inquiry into the question whether the
market value of the benefits provided the taxpayers is
substantially equivalent to the amount of the tax im-
posed. They argue that a trial is necessary to determine
“whether a reasonable relationship exists” between the
amount of the tax and the “costs or benefits involved,”
including “the legitimate needs of Montana.” App. Br.
30-31. Appellants’ contention finds no support in the
relevant decisions of this Court or in sound principles of
constitutional adjudication.

The Court has never suggested that the “fair rela-
tion” criterion contemplates a detailed factual investiga-
tion into the value of particular state-provided benefits
or taxpayer-imposed costs to determine what particular
quantitative relationship they bear to the amount of a
general excise tax like Montana’s.”* Nor has the court

28 As indicated above (see p.3, supra) and as the Montana
Supreme Court explicitly held (J. S. 22a), the coal severance

(Continued on next page)

24

suggested that based upon a potentially monumental in-
quiry, the courts must then decide what is “fair.” This
Court knows what is apparent not only to every state
legislature, but to Congress itself.

[A] tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as
we have said, a means of distributing the burden of
the cost of government. The only benefit to which
the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that de-
rived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living
in an organized society, established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. ... Any
other view would preclude the levying of taxes except
as they are used to compensate for the burden on
those who pay them, and would involve the abandon-
ment of the most fundamental principles of govern-
ment—that it exists primarily to provide for the
publie good. A corporation cannot object to the use
of taxes which it pays for the maintenance of schools
because it has no children. ... This Court has re-
pudiated the suggestion, whenever made, that the
Constitution requires the benefits derived from the
expenditure of public moneys to be apportioned to
the burdens of the taxpayer, or that he can resist
the payment of the tax because it is not expended
for purposes which are not peculiarly beneficial to
him. (Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U.S. 495, 522-23 (1937).)

(Continued from previous page)

tax was “imposed for the general support of the govern-
ment.” Appellants originally took no issue with this con-
clusion (J. S. ii), although now they suggest that the levy is
not imposed for the general support of government because
some of the tax revenues will not be immediately expended.
App. Br. 30. While this contention is a non-sequitur, the
critical p oom for present purposes, which appellants do not
and indeed, cannot dispute, is that Montana’s tax is a levy
imposed for broad governmental needs such as environ-
mental protection and public education, 4 15-35-108, MCA,
as distinguished from a levy imposed as a charge for a spe-
cific state-provided service. See pp. 31-32, infra.

25

Accord, St. Louis € S.W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157,
159 (1928); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 280 (1898) ;
American Commuters, Ass’n. v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d 1148,
1152-53 (1969). Thus, in rejecting a Commerce Clause
challenge to the application of Louisiana’s business priv-
ilege tax on an interstate pipeline company, the Court,
after adverting to the “fair relation” criterion, declared
that “[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return.”
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triagle, 421 U.S. 100, 109 (1975)
(quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,
444 (1940)). It concluded that the “powers, privileges,
and benefits” Louisiana had bestowed upon the pipeline
—namely, the benefits and privileges associated with its
ability to carry on business in corporate form—were suf-
ficient to justify the tax. 421 U.S. at 109. The Court
made no effort to ascertain the precise value of these
benefits to the taxpayer.

Similarly, in dismissing Commerce Clause objections
to the application of Washington’s business privilege tax
on gross receipts from stevedoring activities, the Court
summarily disposed of the taxpayer’s “fair relation” con-
tention with the remark that “[n]othing in the record sug-
gests that the tax is not fairly related to services and
protection provided by the State.” Department of Revenue
v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S.
734, 750-51 (1978). There is nothing to suggest that the
Court based its conclusion on a considered judgment that
the value of specific benefits provided by the state had
some particular quantitative relationship to the amount of
the tax. Indeed, as Justice Powell’s concurring opinion
observed, the Court’s conclusion that the “fair relation”

26

test was satisfied “cannot be questioned” since the taxpay-
ers “undoubtedly avail themselves of police and fire pro-
tection, as well as other benefits Washington offers its
local businesses.” Id. at 764.

The Court’s most recent observations that the “fair
relation” criterion will be satisfied if the state provides
the taxpayer with “the benefit of a trained work force,
and ‘the advantages of a civilized society,’” Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, supra, 100 S. Ct. at
2122; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supra,
441 U.S. at 445, further demonstrate that a trial with an
elaborate factual investigation is unnecessary to resolve
the “fair relation” issue.”? Appellants’ contrary position
is an invitation to transform the courts into legislative
committees to hold hearings into whether a certain tax
rate is “fair” and allow taxpayers to attempt to quantify
what benefits they receive from the State. But appel-
lants do not suggest how a court is to value the benefits
of police and fire protection, the elaborate network of
roads and waterways, or the orderly system of laws that
Montana provides them. We are not told how a court is
to measure in dollar terms the value of a trained work
force or the economic infrastructure and social machinery
that are essential preconditions to the conduct of modern
business activity. One can only guess by what standard
a court should assess costs imposed on Montana as a re-
sult of the loss of aesthetic values, the increases in crime,
alcoholism, and divorce, and the exhaustion of a nonrenew-

29 Montana’s position is even stronger if one compares the
nature of the contacts with the State in those cases with the
strip mining activity conducted in this case.

27

able resource that constitutes the state’s economic base.
How can a court measure in dollar terms the costs of en-
vironmental degradation that are presently unknown and,
indeed, unknowable? If appellants’ coal-mining activities
destroy Montana’s underground aquifers, in which much
of the state’s scarce water supply flows, it will literally
destroy the lifeblood of Montana society. The impact ap-
pellants’ activities will have is not something that can
presently be determined° The only certainty is that
after the last ton of coal is mined and the last dollar of
severance tax is paid, Montana will have to deal with these
and a host of other problems that the coal companies leave
in their wake.*!

The State vigorously disputes appellants’ self-serving
assertion that there is “unlikely” to be a “serious dis-
pute” over the “fair relation” issue should the matter be
remanded for trial (App. Br. 31). But to require the
State of Montana to demonstrate the present and future
benefits it furnishes appellants would surely precipitate
attacks on the “fairness” of the various revenue measures
of other states. According to appellants’ Commerce Clause
theory, an allegation by a taxpayer that © state is “ex-
porting” its tax burden entitles the taxpay. to a trial on
whether the tax is “fairly related” to benefits provided
by the state App. Br. 29-31. Since every state in the

30 See generally, D. Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal
Industry and Surface-mined Lands (\Inform, Inc., N. Y., N. Y.
1980).

31 Montana is wisely setting aside in trust a part of its sever-
ance taxes so that future generations will not have to bear
the cost of these burdens without the possibility of assist-
ance from the very activity which created them.

28

country “exports” its tax burden to some extent,*? there
would be no end to “fair relation” challenges to state
revenue measures. No doubt Texas, which appears here
as an amicus, will soon be defending the fairness of its
own severance taxes on oil and gas, which are substan-
tially equivalent to Montana’s tax on coal when the levies
are compared on equivalent units of energy, see pp. 4-5,
supra.

Nor will taxpayers by any means be confined to sever-
ance taxes in mounting “fairness” challenges to state rev-
enue measures. New York’s tax on stock transfers which
falls heavily on out-of-staters, Florida’s tax on hotel and
motel receipts*’ which falls largely on tourists, and Michi-
gan’s taxes on the automobile industry** which are passed
on to consumers nationwide, are all vulnerable to the
charge that the state is attempting to tailor its taxes to
fall largely on non-resident consumers. Indeed, even gen-
eral income and sales taxes would be subject to such an
attack.’’

Finally, appellants rely on several cases in which the
Court has allegedly undertaken a detailed factual inquiry
into the “fair relation” question in adjudicating the valid-
ity of a state tax. See App. Br. 32 citing, e. g., Evans-

32 See McLure, The Interstate Exportation of State and Local
Taxes: Estimates of 1962, 20 Nat. Tax J. 49 (1967).

33 N. Y. Tax Law § 270 et seq. (McKinney 1966, Supp. 1980-81).

34 See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 424 U.S.
318 (1977).

35 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.03 (1980).
36 E. g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 208.1 et seq. (Supp. 1980-81).
37 See McLure, supra, note 22.

29

ville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972).
Every one of these cases, however, involved a fee that
was designed and defended as a specific charge imposed
by the state for the use of state-owned or state-provided
transportation facilities or services. These “user charges”
are assessed as reimbursement for specific quantifiable
services furnished by the government to the user, not for
general revenue purposes. Highway use taxes and similar
levies “are not true revenue measures and... the con-
siderations applicable to ordinary tax measures do not
apply.” P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce, 20 n. 72 (1953). They are “rather of the nature of
a rent charged by the State, based upon its proprietary
interest in its public property ...” 7d. at 122. It may well
be appropriate in cases involving such fees to inquire into
the relationship between the amount of the fee and the
specific service or benefit for which the fee is charged.
The holdings of those cases, however, have no bearing on
the validity of a general excise tax, such as the coal sever-
ance tax, which is neither designed nor defended as a
quid pro quo for a particular service or benefit rendered
by the state.

2. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Does Not Discrimi-
nate Against Interstate Commerce and Is Not
‘‘Tailored’’ to Fall on Residents of Other States.

Montana’s coal severance tax is “imposed on each ton
of coal produced in the state.” Section 15-35-1038, MCA.
The levy is nondiscriminatory on its face. It applies to
all coal extracted in the state; it applies without regard to
the ultimate destination of the coal—whether inside or out-
side the state; and it applies without regard to the nature

30

of the enterprise extracting the coal—whether local or inter-
state. No claim is or can be made that the coal severance
tax explicitly discriminates against interstate commerce.

It is true, of course, that the Commerce Clause forbids
taxes which, though nondiscriminatory on their face, by
their practical operation discriminate against interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra.
Montana’s coal severance tax cannot reasonably be charac-
terized as such a levy, however. The degree to which either
local or interstate business shoulders the burden of the tax
is determined according to the amount or value of the coal
extracted and not according to any distinction—in prin-
ciple or in practice—between local and interstate com-
merce. Coal consumed in Montana is not treated differ-
ently than coal destined out-of-state. Appellants have
never contended otherwise, and appellants’ concession that
Montana may properly tax coal at some lower rate con-
tradicts their assertion that the tax is discriminatory.

To the extent that appellants’ claim of discrimination
is predicated on the fact that the coal in question is trans-
ported out-of-state so that the tax burden allegedly falls on
out-of-state consumers, it fails to state a claim under the
Commerce Clause. The states do not discriminate against
interstate commerce—nor do they improperly “tailor” their
taxes to fall on residents of other states—when they de-
mand from those consuming local resources payment for
the costs imposed on and benefits provided by the state
with respect to the extraction of these resources. Inter-
state commerce, this Court has frequently held, must pay
its way. See e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev-
enue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).

ee

31

By conceding that Montana has power to impose a coal
severance tax on their activities (App. Br.6), appellants
have conceded that the tax is not by its nature illicitly dis-
criminatory or “tailored.” Their theory is that it becomes
so only when the rate gets too high. Appellants’ discrimin-
ation and “tailored tax” claims are rooted in their con-
tention that the tax is “excessive” (J.S. i) and that inter-
state commerce is therefore being made to pay more than
its way, which merely restates their argument that the coal
severance tax is not fairly related to benefits provided by
the state. Because the “fair relation” criterion is met in
this case (see pp. 24-32, supra), it cannot plausibly be
argued that interstate commerce is paying more than its
way.

C. Sound Institutional Considerations Reinforce the
Conclusion That Appellants’ Commerce Clause
Claims Were Properly Dismissed.

As we have indicated, the heart of appellants’ case is
“that the tax is excessive in amount and thereby violates
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitu-
tion.” (J.S. i, App. Br.6). By appellants’ reasoning there
must be some rate at which the tax would pass constitu-
tional muster, and it is the task of the courts to ascertain
that rate.

The judiciary, however, has never undertaken the task
that appellants would thrust upon it—the determination
of the appropriate rate of a general excise tax. Indeed,
whenever taxpayers have invited this Court to become
embroiled in controversies over the amount of a general
excise tax, it has steadfastly declined to do so. See, e.g.,
City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369

32

(1974) and cases cited therein; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
292 U.S. 40 (1934). While many of the cases repudiating
challenges to taxes on the basis of their amount involved
the Due Process Clause, their reasoning is applicable to
Commerce Clause challenges as well.** The Court’s deci-
sions are predicated on the fundamental consideration—
ignored by appellants here—that the determination of the
proper rate of a tax is quintessentially a legislative judg-
ment beyond the pale of judicial competence.

The Court’s recognition that determining the proper
rate or amount of a state tax is not a judicial function,
reflects sound institutional considerations. If courts were
saddled with the responsibility of determining the ap-
propriate amount of a tax, based on an inquiry into the
quantitative relationship between the tax burden and the
costs and benefits involved, they would become entangled
in issues which they are institutionally ill-equipped to re-
solve. Given the inherent limitations of a court’s own re-
sources and the judicial process, a court is simply incap-
able of putting a dollar value on ecological damage, social
disruption, and the loss of am economic base. Courts would
also be required to struggle with the elusive question of
the economic incidence of the tax to determine whether a
taxpayer who alleges that he is paying an “excessive” tax
is actually bearing the tax burden.*®

—

38 See P. Hartman, State Taxation of interstate Commerce 19
(1953).

39 See, e.g., Hogan and Shelton, Interstate Tax Exportation
and State Fiscal Structures, 26 Nat. Tax J. 553 (1973); McLure,

(Continued on next page)

33

This Court’s consistent position that such issues are
not judicially cognizable does not mean that there are no
restraints on Montana’s power to set its own tax rates or
that taxpayers aggrieved by the rate of a state tax affect-
ing interstate commerce have no avenue for relief. While
a court is an inappropriate forum for determining the rate
of a tax, a legislative body is fully capable of making such
a determination. And in the context of the present con-
troversy, it is Congress that has the ultimate responsibility
to contend with Montana’s coal severance tax rates, if it
sees fit to do so.

Congress, in fact, has been focusing abundant atten-
tion on national energy policy in general and on the very
issues that divide the parties here. Legislation directed
specifically at the problem appellants seek to have this
Court resolve was introduced in the Ninety-Sixth Con-
gress; hearings at which appellants fully presented their
views were held on the proposed legislation; and the
legislation was approved by the House Subcommittee on

(Continued from previous page)

Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy
Resources, 31 Nat. Tax J. 257 (1978); McLure, supra note 32;
Shelton and Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation
and Regional Energy Policies, 17 Nat. Res. J. 261 (1977).

40 S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 7163, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.
6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

41 Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980); Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 6625,
H. R. 6654 and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

34

Energy and Power.” Similar legislation has already been
introduced this session. S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

It is therefore apparent that Congress is fully aware
of and involved in the conflict that only the legislative
branch is capable of resolving. In recent years, Congress
has shown itself willing to legislate in the state tax field
when, in its judgment, state tax legislation threatened to
impose a burden on interstate commerce. Armed with
the extensive information provided by its hearings and by
staff research, Congress can make an informed political
judgment as to whether a rate limitation or other action to
offset state severance taxes is warranted. As this Court
has frequently recognized, the resolution of such issues
has been committed by the Constitution to the legislative
branch. See, e.g., Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267, 280 (1975).

42 Report Bulletin No. 12, Prentice Hall State and Local Taxes
(All States Unit) (Sept. 16, 1980).

43 See 15 U.S.C. § 381 et seq. (1976) (limiting states’ power
to tax income from interstate commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 391
(1976) (prohibiting states from imposing electrical energy
taxes discriminating against out-of-state purchasers); 15
U. S. C. § 78bb (d) (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing
stock transfer taxes when the only nexus between the state
and the transaction is the presence of the transfer agent);
49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing
user charges in connection with the carriage of persons in
air commerce). 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1978) (pronibiting
states from taxing railroad property more heavily than other
industrial and commercial property); Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. 96-296 § 31, 94 Stat. 793 (to be conified at 49
U.S. C. § 11503a) (prohibiting states from taxing, motor car-
rier property more heavily than other industrial and com-
mercial property.)

35

III. The state court properly dismissed appellants’
claims that the rate of Montana’s coal severance
tax frustrates broad national coal policies and
goals.

Appellants’ Supremacy Clause claims, like their Com-
merce Clause claims, are in substance an attack on the
rate of Montana’s coal severance tax. Appellants concede
that no federal law or policy prevents Montana from levy-
ing some kind of coal severance tax (App. Br. 6), but assert
that Montana’s tax is preempted on the ground that the
rate of the tax is purportedly repugnant to “the basic
thrust of federal policy,” App. Br. 16, 46-47.

Appellant’s preemption claims are subject to the same
fundamental objections that have already been raised:
Congress has affirmatively approved the authority of the
States to determine severance tax rates and, in any event,
the determination of the proper rate or amount of a tax
is a state prerogative and a legislative not a judicial func-
tion. Even if Congress had not adopted affirmative legis-
lation endorsing the state’s right to set severance tax rates,
see pp. 11-16, swpra, it is inappropriate for a court to in-
validate a state tax solely on the ground that the rate is
too high. No court has ever held a tax preempted on that
basis.

Moreover, appellants have seriously misconstrued the
nature and effect of national policies concerning coal.
Their assertion that the rate of a state tax may be pre-
empted because it increases the cost of some federally
favored activity finds no support in settled principles of
preemption analysis.

36

A. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Does Not Frustrate
the Purposes and Policies Embodied in the Fed-
eral Legislation Cited by Appellants.

Appellants’ Count II preemption claim is based on a
selective reading of national energy legislation, through
which they have attempted to carve out an alleged policy
regarding western coal. Although appellants have cited
numerous federal statutes dealing with coal and energy
in general (App. Br.5, note*) nowhere do they contend
that the Montana Coal Severance Tax is preempted by
any specific provision of any of these acts. In fact, con-
gressional action in the area of coal policy has been spe-
cific and limited, and there is nothing in existing legisla-
tion to suggest that Congress either intended to limit state
taxes on coal or to elevate any policy encouraging coal
use to preeminence over other policies which may reduce
its use or increase its cost. To the contrary, congres-
sional action reflects a continued solicitude for state tax
powers and for other state and national policies that may
compete with coal policy.

Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,
30 U.S. C. § 189, supra, expressly endorses the authority
of states to impose mineral severance taxes. A similar
acknowledgment appears in section 601, Title VI, Power
Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-
620, 92 Stat. 3289), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8401, which
provides for federal financial assistance in areas suffer-
ing adverse economic consequences from coal development.
In determining an impact area’s need for federal assist-
ance, the section requires that other state and local re-
sources shall be taken into consideration, “including sev-
erance tax revenue ... to the state and local governments

37

which are associated with the increase in coal . . . develop-
ment activities ...” Jd. (emphasis supplied).

Congress has adopted very specific and limited means
for encouraging coal development and use. The Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-163, 89
Stat. 871) adopts incentives for development of under-
ground coal mines, 42 U.S.C. §6211; makes provision
for export restrictions, 42 U.S.C. § 6212; and provides
for the creation of strategic coal and other fossil fuel re-
serves, 42 U.S.C. § 6231 et seq.

Congressional action in other areas recognizes the
eontinued importance of competing national policies de-
spite their potentially adverse impact upon the produc-
tion, cost and use of coal. Miners of coal, low sulfur and
high sulfur alike, are neither exempt from costly environ-
mental and strip mining regulations, see 30 U.S.C. § 1251
et seq., nor from health and safety requirements under
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq., even though these requirements may increase
the cost of coal. The Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., reflects a
congressional preference for underground coal mining be-
cause of its limited environmental impact and demon-
strates that Congress is perfectly willing to countenance
an increase in the costs of coal production, in Montana
and elsewhere.

Furthermore, regional economic concerns continue to
predominate over any broad, unitary coal policy. For
example, in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub.
L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685), Congress required “application of
the best technological system of continuous emission re-

38

duction” for all new stationary sources, including those
burning low sulfur coal. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. The legis-
lative history of this requirement reveals congressional
dissatisfaction with the use of low sulfur western coal to
meet air emission standards and reflects a congressional
intention to (1) reduce reliance upon western coal, and
(2) promote expanded use of high sulfur eastern and mid-
western coal. By requiring the best technologically feas-
ible reduction of sulfur emission with respect to low sulfur
coal, Congress abolished the then prevalent practice of
burning untreated low sulfur coal to meet air emission
standards and thereby increased the cost of burning low
sulfur coal in the hope of making eastern high sulfur coal
more competitive in the market place, spurring the eastern
coal economy, and reducing national reliance upon low
sulfur western coal. 1977 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1245, 1510, 1575.

With a similar purpose, Congress granted state gov-
ernors, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
President authority to prohibit a major fuel burning sta-
tionary source “from using fuels other than locally or re-
gionally available coal or coal derivatives to comply with
implementation plan requirements” upon a finding that
such action “is necessary to prevent or minimize signifi-
eant or regional economic disruption or unemployment.
...’ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
95, § 122, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7425.4

44 See generally The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A
Selective Legislative Analysis, 13 Land & Water L. Rev. 747,
800-12 (1978).

39

In sum, the specific provisions of federal coal legisla-
tion define the contours of national policy in this domain.
These provisions belie the existence of “a national intent
to maximize the production and use of western low sul-
phur coal” (App. Br. 38) at the expense of other consid-
erations. They contain no provision that even remotely
reflects an intent to limit the amount of a state severance
tax. Instead, as the court below properly concluded, the
“basic thrust” of federal policy is to accommodate the
diverse concerns of the nation, the regions, and states,
even though the resulting costs including those which might
be attributable to state severance taxes, may increase the
price of coal. See J. S. 33a-34a.

B. Under Settled Principles of Preemption Analysis,
the Asserted National Policies on Which Appel-
lants Rely Cannot, as a Matter of Law, Invalidate
a State Tax.

45 There is no certainty that the Montana tax is or need be
passed on in whole or even in part to consumers. See M.
Gillis, Severance Taxes On Energy Resources in the U.S.,
Growth and Change (Jan., 1979). Moreover, even if Con-
gress were to limit state severance tax rates, the limitation
would have little impact on the cost of coal. The tax is only
a small fraction of the ultimate cost of coal generated energy.
The cost of transporting coal far exceeds the amount of the
tax; that cost recently drew criticism from the President's
Commission on Coal, which found that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had established rate guidelines allow-
ing railroads a “7%” premium for coal traffic, a premium
which is intended to ‘subsidize other traffic moving at less
than full costs. * * *,’”” Staff Findings 20 (1980). Capital costs
for coal fired generators are three to five times the cost of

- oil and gas fired generators. President’s Commission on
Coal, Coal Data Book 54-55 (1980). Operating costs, a fair
profit for the utility company, and the taxes of the consum-
ing state must also be added.

40

Even assuming that it were possible to extract from
the welter of statutes’ cited by appellants a broad na-
tional policy to encourage the use of western coal and
federal coal, such a policy provides no basis under estab-
lished preemption doctrine for invalidating state legis-
lation. Contrary to appellants’ contention, state laws are
not preempted by the “basic thrust” of a “national pur-
pose” or “overall federal policy,” App. Br. 16, 36, 39, 46-
47. The Court made that point clear in Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), by sum-
marily rejecting a contention similar to that made here,
namely, that a broad, general national policy favoring
“free competition” can preempt a state regulatory scheme.
The claim advanced by appellants in Exxon was that a
state statute prohibiting producers or refiners of petro-
leum products from operating retail service stations in
the state was invalid because it interferred with a na-
tional policy favoring “free competition.” Because the
contention was strikingly similar to the one advanced by
appellants herein, this Court’s response hears quotation:

Appellants point out ... the . . . basic national pol-
icy favoring free competition, and argue that the
Maryland statute “undermines” the competitive bal-
ance that Congress struck between the Robinson-

46 Appellants also rely on “official pronouncements by the
President and members of his Cabinet,” App. Br. 36. What-
ever the import of these pronouncements, they are of scant
relevance to this case. It is federal legislation, not speeches
1 the President or his appointees, that preempts state law.
The various “official’” and often irreconcilable pronounce-
ments that emanate daily from Executive Branch personnel
and shift dramatically from administration to administration,
do not constitute “Laws of the United States,’’ U.S. Const.
Art. VI, cl. 2, and cannot be the basis for judicial invalida-
tion of a state statute under the Supremacy Clause.

41

Patman and Sherman Acts. This is merely another
way of stating that the Maryland statute will have
an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a
conflict between the statute and the central policy
of the Sherman Act—our “charter of economic lib-
erty.” . .. Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot
itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating
the Maryland statute. For if any adverse effect on
competition were, in and of itself, enough to render
a state statute invalid, the States’ power to engage
in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.
(437 U.S. at 133-134.)

Accord, New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin

W. Fox, 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978).

While the Court’s preemption decisions do not lend
themselves to easy generalizations, Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), they reveal that no state law,
much less a state tax law has been struck down on the
basis of general national policies of the sort that under-
lie appellants’ claim here. Findings of preemption have
uniformly been predicated upon specific rights, require-
ments, and regulatory schemes enacted into law by Con-
gress, or by specific administrative regulations adopted
pursuant to such laws.

The cases appellants invoke for the proposition that
a broad national policy may itself be the predicate for
preempting a state law do not support their contention.
Sce Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977);
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235
(1967) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), cited at App.
Br. 39-40. Two of the cases, Nash and Hill, involved con-
flicts between state legislation and the National Labor
Relations Act, “a comprehensive code passed by Congress

42

to regulate labor relations in activities affecting inter-
state and foreign commerce.” Nash, 389 U.S. at 238. In
each case, the state law was preempted because it inter-
ferred with a specific right conferred by Congress under
this “comprehensive code.’*?7 No case has held that a
broad national policy or aspiration may be the basis for
preempting a state statute. The reference in many of
this Court’s preemption opinions to the “policies,” “pur-
poses,” and “objectives” underlying particular statutes
has never been a substitute for a determination that the
enactments themselves. -the “Laws of the United States,”
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2—would be substantially frus-
trated by the state legislation at issue. Interpretation of
those “laws” may, of course, be influenced by the policy
underlying them, but the policy itself is not a law.

The preemption issue raised by appellants was prop-
erly disposed of without a trial. Whether or not there
are “Laws of the United States” with preemptive impli-
cations for coal severance taxes is a question that a court
can and should resolve. The Court does not need the
“testimony of regulators, administrators, and expert wit-
nesses” (App. Br. 40-41) to resolve that issue. Indeed,
appellants’ claim that such testimony is necessary merely

47 In Nash, it was the right of an employee to file an unfair
labor practice complaint that was infringed by a state statute
which denied unemployment benefits to persons exercis-
ing such right. In Hill, it was the right of employees to
select their own collective —e agents which was cur-
tailed by the state statute requiring licensure of union busi-

ness agents and prohibiting new citizens and convicted
felons from acting as collective bargaining agents. In Jones,
federal standardized product labeling requirements were
held to preempt state labeling requirements based upon
different standards.

43

reflects their mistaken belief that such matters as a for-
mer Energy Secretary’s remarks before a trade associa-
tion bears on whether Montana’s coal severance tax is
contrary to “the Supreme Law of the Land.” See App.
Br. 36, n.** Nor does the question of whether a broad
national policy can be used as the basis for preempting
a state law require a trial. This is clearly an issue of
law which a Court may properly dispose of upon a mo-
tion to dismiss, see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54, 57 (1938) and was
treated as such by the Court in Eaaxon, supra.®

C. A Proper Appreciation of the Central Role of State
Tax Power in the Federal System Precludes Pre-
emption of a State Tax Solely on the Ground that
the Increased Costs Associated with the Tax In-
directly Affect Implementation of Federal Poli-
cies.

Assuming that the existence of a broad national pol-
icy to encourage the production of western coal or of
some unarticulated compromise in the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act (App. Br. 46) could form the predicate for
a preemption claim, appellants’ case boils down to the
proposition that a state tax may be preempted because
of the indirect economic impact that the amount of the
tax may have upon some federally favored activity. No
state tax has ever been invalidated on this basis, and an

-

48 The State would agree with appellants that a trial would be
necessary to resolve the issue whether Montana’s tax frus-
trates a national policy to encourage the use of western coal
if the Court determines as a matter of law that there is such
a policy and that such a policy can form the basis of a pre-
emption claim.

At

appreciation of the central role of state tax power in
the federal system suggests that no state tax should be.

As this Court has always recognized, the states’
“power of taxation is indispensable to their existence,”
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824), and
thus to the federal scheme that the framers created, see
e.g., The Federalist No. 32 (A. Hamilton). Moreover, the
exercise of state tax power has traditionally been re-
garded as compatible with the exercise of federal power.
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199. Just last term
the Court observed that “concurrent federal and state
taxation of income, or course, is a well-established norm.”
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
448 (1980). Furthermore, while a state tax may increase
the costs of engaging in particular activity, unlike a state
regulation, it prescribes no mode of conduct in an area
in which Congress may have adopted rules of its own.

For these reasons, the economie burden imposed by
a state tax should not, in and of itself, be a basis for
federal preemption of state tax legislation. Every tax,
after all, imposes increased costs on the person, prop-
erty, or activity subject to the levy. Union Pacific R.R.
Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 30-31 (1873) and see Penn
Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania,
318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943). Elementary economics teaches
that such costs may reduce the demand for the goods or
services taxed, and to that extent any state tax arguably
threatens to “frustrate” federal law. Yet to allow such
“frustration” to be a basis for preemption of a state
tax is wholly inconsistent with the Court’s recognition

that state tax power is critical to the states’ independent

45

existence and is generally compatible with concurrent ex-
ercises of federal power.

The Court’s preemption decisions involving state tax-
ation have never recognized the contention which appel-
lants advance here, and indeed have consistently rejected
it when presented. L.g., Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Pen-
iston, supra. Moreover, with one exception, this Court
has invalidated a state tax on preemption grounds only
where the tax was directed at the federal government it-
self, its instrumentalities, or its special wards, the Indian
Tribes. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) and other cases cited by appellants
at App. Br. 41. These cases involve considerations dis-
tinct from those encountered in the usual preemption con-
troversy and provide little guidance for preemption analy-
sis generally. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
100 8. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1980) ;*° L. Tribe, American Consti-
tutional Law 391-400 (i977). The single case in which
the Court invalidated a state tax on general preemption
grounds was McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414
(1940), where the Court struck down a state tax upon
sales of imported fuel which had been delivered as ships’
stores to vessels engaged in foreign commerce. Two crit-
ical factors readily distinguish the controversy there from
the instant case. First, Congress itself had withdrawn
the fuel in question from federal taxation, 309 U.S. at
423, and second, the case involved foreign commerce, an

49 The Court in White Mountain observed: “The unique his-
torical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally un-
helpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian
tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged
in other areas of the law.” 100 S. Ct. at 2583.

46

area in which the primacy of federal interests warrants
special consideration that may override state legislation
that is otherwise unobjectionable. Japan Lines, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 4384, 444-51 (1979).
McGoldrick does, however, share one characteristic with
other preemption cases involving state taxes which serves
to distinguish it from the instant controversy: There was
no suggestion that the rate of the tax figured in the
Court’s determination that it was inconsistent with fed-
eral legislation.

a ,
-_~O——

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the
Montana Supreme Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

MIKE GREELY
Attorney General
Counsel of Record

MIKE McGRATH
Assistant Attorney General

MIKE MceCARTER
Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General
State of Montana

State Capitol

Helena, Montana 59601

OF COUNSEL:

A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH, JR.
Sharp, Randolph & Green

Suite 501
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Appellees
February, 1981

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0596%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
