# Opposition — General Public Utilities Corporation v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 449 U.S. 1096

## Text

No. 80-382 oer 14 1980

MICHAEL RODAK, JR...

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, METROPOLITAN
EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT

COMPANY AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioners,

v.

SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY ALLIANCE, RONALD L. DAVIS,
BETTY TOMPKINS, BEVERLY M. HESS, AND

DOREEN E. SNELL,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF SUSQUEHANNA
VALLEY ALLIANCE, et al.

MICHAEL CHURCHILL ALBERT J. SLAP

Attorney of Record 1009 Black Rock Road
JUDITH A. DORSEY Gladwyne, Pennsylvania 19035
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (215) 642-5740
1315 Walnut St., 16th fl.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 JEAN ROYER KOHR
(215) 735-7200 Minney, Mecum & Kohr
150 E. Chestnut St.
Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17602
(717) 299-5649
Counsel for Respondents

Le OE EE See RO eae

Table of Contents

ene GE MABETIOOTACLOS, ... occccccce
Counter-Statement of the Case....

Reasons for Denying the Writ.....

THE OPINION OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION'S
REGULATORY SCHEME AND DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

AND OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL...

A. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Is Not
Seeking Certiorari.......

B. No Court Has Held
Contrary to the
Ruling Below...... erry

C. Petitioners Seek to
Argue Factual Matters
Contrary to the
PEM EINE o 6 bb & Ae 6 600 6 60 me

Conclusion..... Retewh 66 be Bi ae Wa as

10

18

20

ii
Table of Authorities

Cases

City of Rochester v. Bond,
+ 9 (sa aes See) cvewke

16
Frank Mashuda v. Alleghen
Co., 2560 F.2g 241 (3a Cir.
1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 185

(1959), reh. denied, 361
8 BO Cee asa ek wk eee 49

Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc.
v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588
TRUCMCRARs DOT aes ee eneseee’ peaved,

Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regu-

sagery Commission, 606
F. 61 faeG Cis. gee oe

Scientists' Institute for
Public Information, Inc.
v. Atomic Energy Commission,
481 F.2d 1079 (D.c. Cir. 1979)..18

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S.
SEF (LOTE) cece ecees oer Tere 10,

Statutes

Administrative Orders Review
Act, 28 U.8 6. Of) rors & a

POCORN Bee etGl ibs sets ce dbadeeal

14,

ll,

17

bake

17

> ei |

Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§2011 Ct. SCG... eee eeereeereevees 3
SeCtion 2239. .ccccvccccsescves 17
Section 2239 (a) ..ccccccvccves 6, 13,

16
BSOCtion 2239:(B) occ eccccscness a ll,

. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1977,

33 U.S.C. §1251 et. Seq......... 10,° 20
DOC ETOe DARE OL) bs 666s eee bans ae an
BOSCIOM LISS CD) bs on eee He 6 bee 3

National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§4321 et. SEG... eseaeee scoseveesedy, LO,

No. 80-382

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY
CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY ALLIANCE, RONALD L.
DAVIS, BETTY TOMPKINS, BEVERLY M. HESS,
AND DOREEN E. SNELL,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF SUSQUEHANNA
VALLEY ALLIANCE, et al.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 1979, the nation's most

serious commercial nuclear accident began
at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit 2 (hereinafter TMI), releasing in ex-

cess of 10 million curies of radionuclides

2

into the environment and contaminating
950,000 gallons of water on site.

In mid-April, 1979, without notice or
any opportunity for public comment or re-
view either in the form of an environmen-
tal impact statement (hereinafter EIS) or
otherwise, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (hereinafter NRC) approved a plan
proposed by the Petitioner utilities to
decontaminate the TMI reactor (Complaint,
437).

The first step in the process was to
be the partial decontamination and subse-
quent discharge into the Susquehanna River
of 245,000 gallons of intermediate-level
radioactive water. The NRC verbally ap-
proved the purchase and construction by
the utilities of a system known as EPICOR-
II for decontamination of that water.

Faced with public announcements by

Metropolitan ‘dison and the NRC that

3

imminent discharge of radioactive water
into the Susquehanna River was scheduled,
Respondents sent a 60-day notice of intent
to sue under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1977 (hereinafter the Clean
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §1365(b) on May 23,
1979, and on May 25, filed a Complaint and
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.*
Respondents alleged that operation of the
decontamination system and discharge of
treated water into the Susquehanna River
would violate the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. §2011 et. seg., andrelated regula-
tions; §301(f) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §1311(f£); and the U.S. Constitution ;
and that the authorization of such activi-
ties without an EIS violated the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (herein-

after NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.

*Very shortly before the case at bar was filed,
the City of Lancaster, Pa. also filed suit, in Dis-
trict Court in the District of Columbia, to pro-
hibit the same discharge,

-*

On that same day, the NRC issued a
statement (a) ordering preparation of an
environmental assessment on use of EPICOR-
II; (b) forbidding the licensee to operate
EPICOR-II pending completion of the en-
vironmental assessment; (c) prohibiting
discharge of wastewater into the Susque-
hanna River pending completion of a sep-
arate environmental assessment concerning
such discharges; and (d) ordering a third
environmental assessment on decontamina-
tion and disposal of "high-level" waste-
water. Thus, although the NRC prohibited
the discharge of wastewater into the
river, it agreed only to undertake en-
vironmental assessments of alternatives
for certain isolated portions of the clean-
up. It refused to undertake a full EIS
that would include alternatives for long-
term disposal of highly radioactive resins

produced by EPICOR-II, alternatives for

disposal of damaged core material and dis-
posal of radioactive gases trapped in the
containment building on site.

On August 20, 1979, the NRC issued for.

comment its assessment, Use of EPICOR-II

at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, NUREG-0591l,

and confirmed its intention not to do a

comprehensive EIS.

On October 12, 1979, Judge Rambo of
the Middle District of Pennsylvania dis-
missed Respondents' complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Re-
spondents immediately appealed the dismis-
sal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

On October 16, 1979, four days after
the District Court's dismissal, the NRC

issued an order to proceed with operation

of EPICOR-II.* The Commission stated
within the order that it was not an order
subject to §189(a) of the Atomic Energy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §2239(a). Petitioners'
Appendix (hereinafter Pet.App.), 55a-
56a.

On October 18, 1979, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals refused Respondents '
request that use of EPICOR-II be stayed
pending appeal, after the NRC stated that
storage space for untreated radioactive
water being generated was almost exhausted
and that no treated water would be dis-

chargec into the Susquehanna River.

*Upon issuance of NRC's order to proceed with
EPICOR-II, Respondents filed a Petition for Review,
No. 79-2800, in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
as a protective measure, pending the outcome in
that court of the case at bar. Respondents’

Motion to Hold Petition for Review in Abeyance
Pending Disposition of Related Appeal was granted
on February 14, 1980.

On November 9, 1979, four days before
Oral argument in the Third Circuit on Respon-
dents' appeal, the NRC informed the Third
Circuit of its intention to prepare a pro-
grammatic EIS on the decontamination and
disposal of the radioactive wastes at TMI.

Though the NRC has moved forward on
preparation of an EIS, clean-up operations
have continued simultaneously; and Peti-
tioner utilities are now in the process
of constructing a system for decontamina-
tion of the remaining high-level radioac-
tive water generated by the accident.
They are also storing on Three Mile Is-
land highly radioactive resins, produced
from operation of EPICOR-II, because the
ultimate disposal of such resins_was_not
considered at the time approval for con-
struction and operation were given, and
because the NRC has not yet approved any

plan for such disposal.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Opinion Of The Court Of Appeals Does
Not Interfere With The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Regulatory Scheme And Does
Not Conflict With The Decisions Of This
Court And Other Courts Of Appeal

A. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Is Not Seeking Certiorari

The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit undertook in this case a careful
analysis of the proper functioning of
courts of appeal and district courts vis-
a-vis the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The fact that it is the utility company
responsible for the Three Mile Island ac-
cident petitioning herein, and not the

Agency charged with regulating the

utility, is a significant

commentary on whether the opinion unduly
disrupts the normal pattern of administra-
tive regulation. Evidently, the NRC was
not concerned enough about the "emascula-
tions," "floods," and "erosions" lamented
by the utility company to join in its pe-
tition.

Petitioners claim that the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion violates the judge-made
rule of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies (this is not a case involving a
statutory exhaustion requirement) and that
the Court of Appeals has sidestepped the
exclusive review provision of the Atomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2239(b), and the Ad-
ministrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C.
§2342(4), for certain "final orders."

Petitioners conveniently overlook the
fact that the Third Circuit upheld the ex-
clusive review provision for claims aris-

ing under the Atomic Energy Act where it

10

applied and that the issues at stake here
involve claims of activities illegal under
the National Environmental Policy Act,

the Clean Water Act, and the Con-
stitution.

Petitioners' analysis of these issues
lumps all types of cases, fact situations,
and orders together and attempts to invoke
the mantle of nuclear power [Petitioners'
Brief for Certiorari (hereinafter Pet .Br.)
at 8] as a way to prevent the arsenal of
remedies available to a district judge
from being brought to bear upon such ac-
tivities.

B. No Court Has Held Contrary to the
Ruling Below

Petitioners' brief asserts that the
Third Circuit's opinion is contrary to

‘Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

435 U.S. 519, 526-27(1978), Grand Canyon

11

Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588

(10th Cir. 1974), and City of Rochester v.

Bond, 603 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Pet.
Br. at id.

Nothing in Vermont Yankee stands for

the proposition that “review of the ade-
quacy of NRC compliance with NEPA in li-
censing actions lies solely in the courts
of appeals pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2239(b)
and 28 U.S.C. §2342." Pet. Br. at 10.
Indeed there was no discussion in the

opinion of that issue. Vermont Yankee was

fundamentally concerned with courts impos-
ing procedures on rulemaking proceedings.
Furthermore, the two cases are poles
apart factually. This case involved pro-
tecting citizens from a threatened dis-
charge of radioactive waste ito their
drinking water supply, in the absence of
any formal administrative action, licen-

sing proceeding, any other hearing, or

7%

*?

12
pursuant to an EIS. In contrast, Vermont

Yankee involved a remand by the Circuit
Court after a licensing process that had
been going on since 1969 and "an incred-
ibly extensive review" that had involved
Over two weeks of hearings and books of

transcripts. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at

aT

Because Vermont Yankee was not con-

cerned with the role of district courts
in reviewing NEPA violations, it cannot
possibly be at odds with the Third Cir-
cuit opinion.

The suggested conflict with opinions
by the circuit courts is no more real.

Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500

F.2d 588, (10th Cir. 1974), involved a
rather abstract disagreement over admin-
istrative policy regarding the operation
of the Glen Canyon Dam, i.e., (1) whether
intermittent flows from the dam

violated an implied contract

13

with the tour operators; and (2) whether
the National Environmental Policy Act,

42 U.S.C.§4321 et seq., required prepara-
tion of an EIS for continued operation of
the dam.

Glen Canyon Dam had been constructed
prior to the passage of NEPA,and therefore
the federal agencies which had been sued
had not even considered NEPA in their
decision-making. As Judge Seth stated,
he and the plaintiffs in the case could
only speculate on the position the Depart-
ment of Interior might take on the re-
quirement for an EIS. Thus he character-
ized the problem before him as "one of
ripeness." Id. at 590.

In the present case, there was no need
to speculate as to the NRC's position on
the requirements of NEPA. That statute,
passed ten years prior to the accident at

TI, was totally ignored by the NRC until

i

14
its announcement of May 25, 1979. Even
then it stated its intention to do a se-
ries of environmental assessments on three
aspects of the clean-up, rather than a
comprehensive EIS. Not until four days
before oral argument in the Third Circuit
and after commitment to significant clean-
up activities did the agency commit itself
to doing a full EIS to evaluate those very
commitments. See Opinion below, Pet.App.
at 18a.

In City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d

927 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the Court was again
faced with a facility (a 600-foot radio
antenna tower) that was already built. A
formal administrative hearing and two in-
formal public hearings provided an ade-
quate administrative record for the Ap-
peals Court to review. In rejecting the
City of Rochester's belated efforts to re-

open a Federal Aviation Administration and

LS

Federal Communications Commission "no haz-
ard" determination, the Court relied pri-
marily on the fact that the determination
was a reviewable order. As Judge Wilkey
points out: "[I]f ... there exists a spe-
cial statutory review procedure, it is or-
dinarily supposed that Congress intended
that procedure to be the exclusive means

of obtaining judicial review in those

cases to which it applies. City of Roch-

ester, 603 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added).

The case at bar differs from City of

Rochester in both respects. First, there

was no administrative record for the
Appeals Court to review in this case.
Secondly, as the NRC itself admits, its
October 1979 order to Metropolitan Edison
regarding operation of the decontamination
equipment was not a final order covered by
§189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§2239(a). Pet.App., 55a-56a. It was

16

therefore not covered by the exclusive re-
view provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§2239(b).* It is within Congress' purview
to create an exclusive statutory review
provision for certain types of administra-
tive orders and not for others. This is
precisely what Congress has done in the
Atomic Energy Act. Unlike the Court in

City of Rochester, Petitioners would have

this Court sweep into the exclusive re-
view provision every NRC action, inaction,
and order, no matter under which section
of the Act it issues.

The District of Columbia Circuit's

decision in Natural Resources Defense

Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979) was

*Presumably, therefore, the oral approval given
in April of 1979 to construct EPICOR-II was also
not a reviewable order under §189(a).

17

Similarly premised on the fact that there
was a "final order" with an administra-
tive record ripe for review. "[T]here is
no dispute that NRC's decision consti-
tutes a 'final order' under 28 U.S.C.
§2342 and 42 U.S.C.§2239." Id. at 1265.
In the Three Mile Island case, the re-

spondents and NRC both dispute the. exis-

tence of a final order under 42 U.S.C.
§2239.

There is no conflict between a rule
which states that NEPA and other issues
may be raised in agency proceedings and,
if made part of a statutorily reviewable
order, must be raised in the appeals
court, with the ruling below that affords
Respondents the opportunity to correct
illegal agency action in district court
prior to the existence of a statutorily
reviewable order and record and where it

is unlikely that such a reviewable order

i

18

will be forthcoming. Opinion below, Pet.

App., 14a-20a; See, Scientists' Institute

for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic

Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.c.

Cary BSF 2)

C. Petitioners Seek to Argue Factual
Matters Contrary to the Complaint

Courts have traditionally recognized
exceptions to the judicially-created ex-
haustion doctrine. Exceptions include
circumstances where "the challenged
agency action presents a clear and unam-
biguous violation of statutory or consti-
tutional rights, ... when resort to ad-
ministrative procedures is 'clearly shown
to be inadequate to prevent irreparable
injury,' ... or when exhaustion is fu-
tile." Pet. App., p. 26a-27a. (Citations
omitted. )

In this case, the factual conditions

necessary for all three exceptions were

19

pleaded in the Complaint. Where, as here,
the District Court dismissed the action
without a hearing, the reviewing court
must take the allegations in Respondents'
Complaint as true for the purposes of ap-

peal. Frank Mashuda v. Allegheny Co.,

256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360
U.S. 185 (1959), reh. denied, 361 U.S.

855 (1959).

Respondents' Complaint asserts clear
and unambiguous violations of statutes
and the Constitution (Complaint, {'s 79,
99, 112, 113), that resort to the NRC pro-
cedure would have been futile (Complaint,
44), and that Respondents were imminently
threatened with irreparable injury (Com-
plaint, q's 22, 84, 106). Contrary as-
sertions in Petitioners' brief are appro-

priate for hearing by the District Court,

r%

i

20
and not for argument in this Court.*

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit is not in conflict with any

decision of this Court nor “35 2c in

*The Clean Water Act count provides a blatant
example of Petitioners' attempt to have the bene-
fit of their own version of the facts. After
first suggesting that it should not be the Court
but the NRC which must necessarily ascertain whe-
ther the water to be disposed of after processing
will in fact be "high-level radioactive waste
within the meaning of Section 301(f) of the Clean
Water Act..." (Pet. Br. at 12), they then assert
on page 13:

Since, as indicated above, the waste-
water to be discharged here is of a type
subject to the exclusive regulatory jur-
isdiction of the NRC under the Atomic
Energy Act, it is, as this Court stated
in Train, ‘beyond the reach' of the Clean
Water Act...,

21

conflict with the other Circuits and,
therefore, the Court should deny the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER
OF PHILADELPHIA

By

MICHAEL CHURCHILL
Attorney of Record

JUDITH A. DORSEY

1315 Walnut St, 16th Fl.

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 735-7200

ALBERT J. SLAP

1009 Black Rock Road
Gladwyne, PA 19035
(215) 642-5740

JEAN ROYER KOHR
Minney, Mecum & Kohr
150 E. Chestnut St.
Lancaster, PA 17602
(717) 299-5649

Counsel for Respondents

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the llth day
of October, 1980, three copies of the
foregoing Brief in Opposition of Susque-
hanna Valley Alliance, et al., were served
by deposit in the United States mail,
first class, postage prepaid, upon the
following:

Mark Augenblick, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 "M" Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Solicitor General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Stephen F. Eilperin, Esq.
Solicitor

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 "H" Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555

William M. Cohen, Esq.

Land and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Carlon M. O'Malley, Jr.

U.S. Attorney

Middle District of Pennsylvania
U.S. Post Office Building
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501

MICHAEL CHURCHILL

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0401%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
