# Petition — American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 449 U.S. 950

## Text

80-213

No.

IN THE

Supreme Cmert of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.
Petitioner,
Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Of Counsel: JAMES A. MCKENNA, JR.
THOMAS N. FROHOCK
EVERETT H. ERLICK

RoBEerT J. KAUFMAN CARL R. RAMEY

; : DENNIS P. CORBETT
American Broadcasting McKENNA, WILKINSON &
Companies, Inc. ‘

1330 Avenue of the BITTNER

p Revere 1150 Seventeenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for American
August 13, 1980 Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

The decision in this case establishes significantly new
legal standards governing the use of broadcast time by
political candidates under Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act of 1984, as amended. The question
presented is whether the construction placed on Section
312 (a) (7) by the court of appeals is contrary to the pur-
poses of the Communications Act, usurps the previously
recognized discretion of broadcast licensees in the area
of political programming, and violates fundamental First
Amendment principles.

PARTIES BELOW

Petitioner ABC was a petitioner in the proceedings be-
fore the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the court whose judgment is sought
to be reviewed. Other petitioners in the court of appeals
were CBS Inc. and National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
The Federal Communications Commission and the United
States of America were the respondents below. Carter/
Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. and National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters were intervenors below.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..0.0.0n.n2...2.....-c.c.ccccscsceceeseoee
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
SERRE RISES SYS ce OT eS Oe

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
AN IMPORTANT STATUTORY QUESTION
WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS
ea ia i clean age digscnnsoudsbucjeossenssenen

II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALSO GRANT RE-
VIEW BECAUSE THE COURT OF AP-
PEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE ..W0W02000 0...

ERNIE ee

(iii)

17

23

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|

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

American Security Council Education Foundation
v. FCC, 607 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 100 S.Ct. 662, —— U.S. (1980) .... 13
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) —...000000000002.... 6
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democra-

tic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1978)...... 8, 9,

18, 21, 23
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 454
oe | Ei eae SE 5 ) RR Ccematyener Nap mee 20

Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 460 F.2d
891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848

LSPA SRN OO Tee ae RD OY 2 LOO 13
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) .........022000..... 19
FCC Vv. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).. 20
Green V. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971)........ 13
Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974)...... 19
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
I ce a a 20
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
6, SS eis ak Mae ame BaD pyc ay Le GORE SOT Rep Noes ter BN 22

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS:

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend-
RSE PRICE RRS Waar ocd OPEV eR Na ae passim

Communications Act of 1934, as amended:

Section 312(a) (7), 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) ....passim
Section 315(a), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) .....8, 9, 11, 14, 19

Section 315(b), 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) 0000... 8
Section 402(a), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) ...0... 5

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) .............................. 6, 15
I Ml rm a 2
Bees Te I iia eich ceniaiacisdccnseaiorcccedlanddnas nents cals 5

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

117 Cona. Rec. 20028 (1971) .................................. 16

SS. 1, BE Cait, BO BOOR: CUITE) nnencccccncccccccsececosee 16

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE Conc. & AD.
ny ee RONEN IES BA RE ee ard ie ee 9-10

S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CopE Conc. & AD.
DT IY eae re ae eee On. a. 16

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND REPORTS:

Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.2d 968, ap-
plication for review denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33
(1977), reconsideration denied, 67 F.C.C.2d

Ms NE ae age Ra 12-13, 15
Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) 2... 13
Hon. Dan Walker, 57 F.C.C.2d 799 (B’cast Bur.

ig | Ape OF RRB LO RANA CG Dy TE co i NR, 13
Hon. Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976).. 12
Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974).......... 12
Humphrey for President Campaign, 34 F.C.C.2d

SE. + SRS REUNION aaah, St nase a ONC ec 11

Notice of Inquiry: Commission Policy in Enforc-
ing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications
Act, FCC 78-204, released March 22, 1978 (BC

PRIS Bs RD A ses cgtts e a ea” 8
Paul A. Talmey, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (B’cast Bur.
GE ToC Serck MERY = ELA SA pe ON AT RUBLE 12

Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforc-

ing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications

Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079 (1978) 0. 8, 10-11, 12
Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission

En Bane Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303

Ea AT GANS ree ra? ACERS ly CRAIN BNE V8 i 9
Rockefeller for Governor Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d

er aren Te OR cc 11,13
Rosenbush Advertising Agency, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d

WI MI pt ee re a a itt 9
Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602 (1978) ............... 11-12

Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Can-
didates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510
NUIIEE? scdietasbatidcnidicieesoataiibdden ei eae Za ll

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No.

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.
Petitioner,
v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”)
hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to review that court’s judgment of March 14,
1980, in CBS Ine. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Nos. 79-2408, 79-2406, and 79-2407.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, not yet officially
reported, appears as Appendix A.! The opinions of the

1 Appendices A-G are contained in a separately bound
volume, submitted jointly by ABC and two other petitioners
—CBS Inc. (Docket No. 80-207, filed Aug. 11, 1980) and Na-
tional Broadcasting Company, Inc.

2

Federal Communications Commission are reported at 74
F.C.C.2d 631 (1979) and 74 F.C.C.2d 657 (1979) and
appear as Appendices B and C, respectively.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
March 14, 1980. Timely petitions for rehearing were de-
nied by the court of appeals on May 15, 1980 by an or-
der which appears as Appendix D. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
AND STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and Sections 312(a) (7)
and 315(a) and (b) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a) (7), 315(a) and
(b). These constitutional and statutory provisions are
set forth in Appendix G.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The focal point of this proceeding is Section 312 (a) (7)
of the Communications Act which authorizes the Com-
mission to revoke the license of a broadcast station for
“willful” or “repeated” failure to provide “reasonable
access” to federal candidates seeking to purchase broad-
cast time. The fundamental statutory and constitutional
issues flowing from the application of this important
statutory provision directly impact the activities of na-
tional broadcast networks, local stations (both commer-
cial and non-commercial), and political candidates at all
levels of the federal election process.

On October 11, 1979, President Carter’s media ad-
viser, Gerald Rafshoon, requested that ABC and the

3

other two major television networks offer the Carter/
Mondale Presidential Committee (the “Committee”’) a
30-minute paid program period between 8:00 p.m. and
10:30 p.m. EST during the period December 4 to 7,
1979." In response, ABC advised Mr. Rafshoon that it
could not comply with his request for one of the requested
early December air dates but that it expected to make
time available in early 1980.* Subsequently, ABC advised
the Committee and the Commission that it had deter-
mined to make time available, responsive to such can-
didate requests, commencing the first week in January.‘

On October 29, 1979 the Committee filed a complaint
with the Commission, alleging that the ABC, CBS and
NBC Television Networks had denied the Committee rea-
sonable access as required by Section 312(a) (7). ABC
and the other networks responded to the complaint, each
explaining the basis for its decision not to sell the Com-
mittee precisely what had been requested.

In two separate orders, a deeply divided Commission®
held that all three television networks had violated Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) by refusing to make available the time
requested by the Committee. The Commission also made
a number of far-reaching policy determinations appli-

2 App. A at Ba.

* App. A at 8a n.6. CBS responded by stating that it was
prepared to sell the Committee two five-minute segments
rather than the half-hour requested. App. A at 6a n.5. NBC
responded by declining the request in light of the early dates
requested and the number of candidates who might seek
“equal time.” App. A at 8a n.8.

* App. A at Ba.

® Both orders were by identical 4-8 votes, with the majority
consisting of the four Commissioners affiliated with the
Democratic Party.

4

cable to future “access” requests. Particularly influenc-
ing the Commission’s judgment was a belief that in pass-
ing upon the Committee’s request, the networks should
have given consideration to “the nature of the candidate’s
request” —i.e., President Carter’s “desire to set forth at
the outset of a national campaign a comprehensive state-
ment of views and to establish a framework for the or-
ganization and issues in the campaign.” °®

Chairman Ferris and Commissioners Fogarty, Brown
and Quello comprised the majority. Commissioners Lee,
Washburn and Jones dissented. In a separate statement,
Chairman Ferris and Commissioner Fogarty expressed
their view that “[flinding the moment in time when a
candidate for federal office becomes entitled to ‘reasonable
access’... is especially difficult.” 7

In dissent, Commissioner Lee stressed the far-reaching
nature of the decision, representing a major and unwise
change in the law.* Commissioner Washburn noted that
what the Commission was doing, in ruling that ABC’s
January offer was unreasonable, was finding that a 30-
day delay for the Committee’s program was sufficient
ground for the Commission to substitute its judgment
for a network judgment.* And Commissioner Jones said
that the facts of this case did not provide “a clear show-
ing that the networks [had] acted in an unreasonable
manner.” '°

On petitions for reconsideration by each of the three
networks, the Commission on November 28, 1979 again

674 F.C.C.2d at 650 n.33, App. B at 100a.
7 Id. at 651, App. B at 102a.

8 Jd, at 652-54, App. B at 108a-05a.

® 7d. at 653-54, App. B at 105a-07a.

10 Id, at 654, App. B at 107a.

5

ruled in favor of the Carter/Mondale Committee.”
Thereafter, all three networks petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit for review pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).

In an opinion by Judge Bazelon, the court of appeals
affirmed the Commission’s action—finding, as a pre-
eminent matter, that Section 312(a) (7) created an af-
firmative right of access for individual candidates for
federal elective office. In the course of so ruling, the
decision established several new standards. First, it re-
jected broadcaster efforts to treat candidates uniformly
as to when to begin the sale of political time, stressing
instead the requirement of responding to the inherently
subjective “needs” of individual candidates pressing such
requests. Policies and practices of broadcasters that do
not operate in this individual fashion were rejected
as amounting to “across-the-board” prohibitions. Second,
the decision found that the question of when access be-
gins under Section 312(a) (7) depends on a finding of
when the campaign begins. In this regard, the decision
affirmed the Commission’s judgment that a finding of
when the campaign begins for these purposes is not a
matter of licensee discretion, but a “legal” determination
to be made by the Commission. Finally, the decision con-
cluded that although Section 312(a)(7) by its terms

74 F.C.C.2d 657, App. C.

"2 The Commission’s orders directing immediate compliance
were stayed by the court of appeals pending review. App.
A at 10a-lla. Morever, referring to developments connected
with the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran,
the Carter/Mondale Committee subsequently indicated that
it no longer desired a 30-minute program availability during
the originally requested December 4-7, 1979 period. The Com-
mittee did, however, purchase a five-minute period from
CBS on December 4, 1979 and a 30-minute period from ABC
on January 6, 1980. App. A at lla.

ry

6

refers only to broadcast “stations,” the Commission was
“justified” in applying its requirements to unlicensed
networks.

Although unanimous in upholding the Commission’s
orders, the lower court was plainly troubled by the sensi-
tive nature of the issues and their potential impact.
Judge Tamm, concurring in the opinion, observed that
the Commission’s decision not only raised “grave first
amendment concerns” (App. A at 56a), but had come
“perilously close” to being unconstitutional.“ Judge
Bazelon noted that the majority “share[d] the first
amendment concerns expressed by Judge Tamm... .” ™

ABC filed a timely petition for rehearing and sug-
gestion for rehearing en bane which was subsequently de-
nied on May 15, 1980."

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision in this case represents the first judicial
interpretation of Section 312(a) (7) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.'* The construction placed on that
statutory provision by the court below gives the provision
a meaning that was unintended by Congress, that un-
duly restricts the discretionary judgment broadcasters
are permitted to exercise in allocating time to federal
candidates, and that impermissibly casts the Commission

18 App. A at 68a.
4 Td, at 47a n.117.
1’ Apps. D and E.

16 Section 312(a) (7) was enacted as part of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, approved on February 7,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. This Court has pre-
viously reviewed other provisions of the 1971 FECA. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

7

in the role of supervising political programming—i.e.,
deciding which candidates should be heard, to what ex-
tent and when. The fundamental question presented is
whether the Commission should be permitted to so deeply
intrude into this process—sitting as the ultimate arbiter
of when given political campaigns have begun and deter-
mining whether the “needs” of individual candidates have
been properly satisfied.

The statutory and constitutional questions presented
are critically important to radio and television stations
at all levels. The standards announced by the Commis-
sion and upheld by the court of appeals affect local sta-
tions and national networks with similar force. While
the facts of the instant case involve a Presidential can-
didate requesting national network time, the standards
announced necessarily apply to all broadcast stations in
all federal elections. This would involve not only na-
tional campaigns for the Presidency, but primary and
general elections in each state for all seats in the United
States Senate and House of Representatives.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN
IMPORTANT STATUTORY QUESTION WHICH
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT

The opinion below has in substance significantly al-
-tered the relationships of candidates, broadcasters and
the Federal Communications Commission in terms of how
broadcast time is to be allocated for political purposes.
In ABC’s view, Section 312(a)(7) confers on federal
candidates a certain limited right to broadcast time that
licensees are obligated to honor. This petition does not
challenge that obligation.

Rather, our petition is directed to the precise nature of
that right and that obligation, in the context of deciding
when broadcast access for political campaigning should
begin in federal elections. Even though the statute speaks

8

in qualified and general terms (i.e., “reasonable access”),
the court below has interpreted Section 312(a)(7) in
a manner that permits the Commission to effectively
mandate broadcast sales based on its own exclusive deter-
mination of when a political campaign has begun.

Set apart from the main political broadcasting provi-
sions,'’? Section 312(a)(7) is contained in a section of
the Communications Act that permits the Commission
to “revoke any station license or construction permit .. .
for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access
to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time
for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-
fied candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his
candidacy.” 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7).

By its terms, we read Section 312(a) (7) as establish-
ing a general right of broadcast access for legally quali-
fied candidates for federal elective office. It conspicuously
fails to provide the terms and conditions of such access,
incorporating, instead, only a concept of reasonableness.
As this Court observed in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. Vv. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973) [hereinafter cited as “CBS v. DNC”), the
amendment adopting Section 312(a) (7) was intended to
“essentially codif[y] the Commission’s prior interpreta-
tion of § 315(a) as requiring broadcasters to make time
available to political candidates.” 412 U.S. at 113-14 n.12
(citations omitted).

As the Commission itself has repeatedly acknowl-
edged,’* beyond its manifest language there is scant legis-

17See Sections 315(a) and (b) of the Communications
Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 315(a) and (b).

18 Notice of Inquiry: Commission Policy in Enforcing Seec-
tion 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, FCC 78-204,
released March 22, 1978 (BC Docket No. 78-102) ; Report and
Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)
of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087 (1978)
{hereinafter cited as 1978 Report and Order].

9

lative history surrounding the enactment of Section 312
(a) (7). The absence of any legislative history elaborat-
ing upon this aspect of the statute, and the use of a
simple “reasonableness” standard, indicate that, as this
Court found in CBS v. DNC, Congress basically sought
to codify existing practice rather than to establish sig-
nificantly new standards or conditions.

Section 312(a) (7) was, in fact, enacted against a
long history of Commission practice that encouraged
broadcasters to offer political candidates the use of their
facilities. For instance, even though by its literal terms
Section 315 (a)—the political broadcasting centerpiece of
the Communications Act—does not grant an initial right
of access, but only affords “equal opportunities” once a
licensee permits a candidate to use a broadcasting sta-
tion, the Commission’s longstanding interpretive prac-
tice has been to encourage broadcast stations to make a
reasonable amount of time available for political broad-
casting purposes. Indeed, long before Section 312(a) (7)
was added to the administrative sanctions section of the
Communications Act, Commission policy held that it
would be contrary to a broadcaster’s overall public in-
terest responsibilities not to afford time to political can-
didates.”* It is in this sense, we submit, that Section
312(a)(7) essentially codified existing practice under
Section 315 (a).

1® Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc
Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960): Rosenbush
Advertising Agency, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 782. 788 (1971)
(licensees must take into account the “public interest consid-
eration of making their facilities effectively available to
candidates”’).

*” Further supporting this conclusion, the Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce commented on the new provision in a
manner that was clearly commendatory of then-existing Com-
mission practice:

[Footnote continued on page 10]

10

In a 1978 proceeding concerning enforcement of Sec-
tion 312(a) (7), the Commission, while disagreeing with
this Court’s finding that this provision merely codified
existing policy, nevertheless stopped short of adopting
new rules or explicit policy guidelines to replace its long-
standing practice of entrusting ongoing political pro-
gramming decisions to licensee discretion. It stated:

“Since the passage of Section 312(a)(7) as part of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the
Commission’s policy has generally been to defer to
the reasonable, good faith judgment of licensees as to

20 [Continued]

“Section 101(c) was added in Committee. It amends
Section 312(a) of the Communications Act to provide
that willful or repeated failure by a broadcast licensee
to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of his station’s
facilities by a l[e]gally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds
for adverse action by the FCC.

“The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit
the use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates
for these public offices is inherent in the requirement
that licensees serve the needs and interests of the com-
m[unities] of license. The Federal Communications Com-
mission has recognized this obligation in its Report
and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc
Programming Inquiry (1960).” 3S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d
Cong., lst Sess. 34 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CopE Conc. & AD. NEWS 1773, 1787 (emphasis added).

Even if it is conceded that Congress may have intended to
accomplish some purpose other than providing a new penalty
to underscore the obligation of broadcasters to provide time
to political candidates (as the foregoing report language sug-
gests), there is certainly no evidence in the legislative history
that Congress intended to have the Commission thrust itseif
into the timing of all federal campaigns and to assess the
broadcasters’ weighing of each candidate’s individual needs.

11

what constitutes ‘reasonable access’ under all the cir-
cumstances present in a particular case.” *4

Indeed, the most significant result of the 1978 pro-
ceeding was to reaffirm Commission reliance on licensee
discretion. If the Commission believed that Section 312
(a) (7) created or required new terms and conditions for
political broadcasting, it certainly took no action to im-
plement such additional obligatio. 3.

Significantly, neither the Commission nor the court
of appeals finds any meaningfui support in either legisla-
tive history or past decisions that would warrant such
a dramatic departure from the principle of licensee dis-
cretion. On the contrary, Section 312(a)(7) was
enacted against the backdrop of a deeply engrained Com-
mission policy that consistently afforded substantial dis-
cretion to broadcast licensees in both the political broad-
casting and analogous fairness doctrine areas.“ Thus,
in a policy statement issued in the immediate wake of
Section 312(a) (7)’s passage, the Commission announced
its intention to resolve political access claims under that
new provision by its traditional “test of reasonableness.”
Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates
for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 588 (1972). One year
later, in its first ad hoc interpretation of Section 312
(a) (7), the Commission elaborated upon the standard
it intended to follow under this provision:

211978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1079.

221t is particularly significant in this regard that even
under the “equal opportunities” provision of Section 315 (a)
of the Communications Act—which grants opposing legally
qualified candidates a right to equivalent response time—
the Commission has recognized licensee discretion in a variety
of important circumstances. Humphrey for President Cam-
paign, 84 F.C.C.2d 471 (1972); Rockefeller for Governor
Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d 649 (B’cast Bur. 1976).

12

“TW here a licensee’s judgments or policies under the
circumstances represent a reasonable, good-faith at-
tempt to accommodate both the right of Federal
candidates to fully inform the voters of their candi-
dacies and the interest of the public in programming
other than political broadcasts, this Commission will
be disposed to affirm such judgments and policies as
reasonably fulfilling the obligations of a licensee un-
der Section 312(a) (7).” *

In subsequent decisions, although cautioning licensees
against certain extreme policies—e.g., denying federal
candidates any program time in prime audience periods
at any time during the campaign™“—the Commission
specifically refused to recognize a candidate’s right to a
particular length of program time or to particular place-
ment on a licensee’s broadcast schedule.** In fact, in a
ruling directly contrary to the Commission’s ruling in this
case, and one that the court of appeals dismisses as mere
dictum (App. A at 26a n.59), the Commission’s Broad-
cast Bureau concluded that “[a] licensee’s discretion in
providing coverage of elections extends not only to the
type and amount of time to be made available to can-
didates, but to the date on which its campaign coverage
will commence.” Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.
2d 968, 969, application for review denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33
(1977), reconsideration denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 743 (1978) .*¢

23 Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 604 (1973).
241978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1090.

25 See, e.g., Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974)
(licensee denials of a candidate’s request to program a four-
and-a-half hour telethon on a specified date in support of his
candidacy were held not unreasonable). See also Paw A.
Talmey, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (B’cast Bur. 1974); Hon. Donald
W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1814 (1976).

26In denying the reconsideration request of the senatorial
candidate in that case, the Commission itself observed that

13

In sum, heretofore the Commissicn’s predominant pol-
icy under Section 812(a) (7) has mirrored its policy in
the political broadcasting area generally, * as well as
practices strongly adhered to by both the Commission and
the court of appeals in the analogous fairness doctrine
area **—namely, a standard of reasonableness that affords
substantial deference to licensee discretion.

The decisions below depart from these principles and
the plain meaning of the statute by shifting from the
broadcaster to the Commission the central role in deter-
mining the point in all federal election campaigns when
political time sales must commence. Rather than good
faith broadcaster determinations based on particular
campaigns applied uniformly to all candidates, the court
of appeals sanctions exclusive Commission determina-
tions based on individual candidate needs. In the lower
court’s view, the determination as to when Section 312
(a) (7) obligations attach is “purely a legal judgment”
(App. A at 28a), not involving editorial discretion.

“a candidate is not entitled to purchase any amount of broad-
cast time which he desires, at whatever time he wishes.” 67
F.C.C.2d at 746.

27 Rockefeller for Governor Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d 649
(B’cast Bur. 1976); Hon. Dan Walker, 57 F.C.C.2d 799
(B’cast Bur. 1975).

*8 Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 8 (1974); Democratic
National Committee, v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d
323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; American Security Council Education
Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662, —— U.S. —— (1980).

*° The “standard” for determining when time sales must
begin is simply left to some form of initial “objective” Com-
mission analysis of campaign “indicia.” Until this official
“start of the election campaign,” it is observed that “no
request for time need be granted.” App. A at 54a. The

14

Under this scheme, broadcasters are effectively pre-
cluded from attempting to evaluate the impending cam-
paign as a whole by assessing and responding to the
needs of all candidates uniformly.” Instead, the focus
has been shifted to satisfying the individual needs of can-
didates’ pressing requests for time. In the process, the
decision below relegates to virtual obscurity such factors
as the number of potential candidates competing for air
time and the resulting degree of program disruption.

By requiring deference to an individual candidate’s
perceived “needs,” and by granting the Commission the
exclusive domain to determine when the campaign has
begun, the decision below effectively anoints the Commis-
sion as the ultimate decision-maker in all matters of po-
litical access. In this context, ABC’s good faith decision
to offer time for the 1980 Presidential campaign begin-
ing in early January, 1980, but not four weeks earlier,
is declared manifestly unreasonable—a process of second-
guessing broadcaster judgment that defies rational ex-

precise mechanism for resolving these matters in future cases
is by no means certain. Here, of course, the “standard” was
adopted after a complaint had been filed and the broadcasters
had responded. In the future, will an uncertain broadcaster,
faced with the first request for time in a given federal election
campaign, rush to the Commission for a declaratory ruling
on whether the campaign is in “full swing?” Will the Com-
mission issue such declarations based on “all relevant facts
and circumstances” (App. A at 54a) in literally hundreds of
federal congressional or senatorial elections?

80 Weighing individual candidate needs is, in fact, the very
antithesis of treating candidates in the same election uni-
formly or as a group. It is also directly contrary to the
political broadcasting tradition embodied in Section 315 (a) re-
quiring that all candidates be treated on an equivalent or uni-
form basis once broadcast facilities have been used for politi-
cal appearances (i.e., the “equal opportunities” concept).

15

planation and conflicts with deeply embedded past
precedent.**

While the legislative history of Section 312(a) (7)
is admittedly sparse, it is nevertheless clear that in en-
acting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Con-
gress sought to reduce campaign costs, and that one
means it envisioned as achieving that end involved
shorter media campaigns. Thus, in commenting on the
creation of the 60- and 45-day periods prior to general
and primary elections, respectively, for the applicability
of the “lowest unit rate provision,” Senators Prouty,
Cooper and Scott noted that “[e]veryone agrees that

81 In a rather remarkable “defense” of licensee discretion
in these circumstances, the lower court remarked that “a
counter-offer of 15 minutes as opposed to a half-hour” might
have been acceptable or reasonable. App. A at 37a. Putting
aside the separate difficulties and uncertainties a broadcaster
would face in attempting to maintain a legal position (under
the standards of this case) that a candidate’s expressed needs
could be satisfied by a lesser amount than the candidate con-
tinued to request, the court’s suggestion merely highlights
the artificial and inherently subjective nature of the required
decisional process under the Commission’s new standards. It
also shows the real absence of licensee discretion when the
ultimate determination is left to agency or judicial resolution
of what is or is not reasonable based on only slight factual
differences. Would 15 minutes indeed have been reasonable
here and 30 minutes not if the Committee had continued to
press for 30 minutes before the Commission? Was the first
week of January unreasonable, but the first week of De-
cember perfectly reasonable? Was ABC, therefore, only un-
reasonable by a matter of three or four weeks? Would the
result have been different (as in the Martin-Trigona case,
supra) if the candidate were someone other than an incum-
bent President or a major party candidate? The mind boggles
at the fine lines the Commission and the courts will be re-
quired to draw in the future.

16

political campaigns tend to be too long. We are hopeful
that the 45- and 60-day provisions will encourage shorter
campaigns.” * In failing to address these purposes, the
court of appeals decision not only contributes to the
frustration of such legislative goals, it highlights the dis-
torted different course the Commission’s actions actually
sanction. In other words, not only have clear legislative
goals been thwarted, Section 312(a) (7) has been inter-
preted in a manner that is conspicuously inconsistent
with the legislative scheme generally and past practice
and analogous rulings in the political broadcasting area
specifically.*

Finally, by interpreting Section 312(a) (7) in the man-
ner indicated, the court of appeals greatly accentuates a
host of constitutional problems, a subject matter we turn
to in the next section.

82S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE CONG. AND Ap. NEws 1821,
1855. See also 117 CONG. REc. 29028 (1971), where Senator
Pastore remarked that Section 312(a) (7) required the sale
of a “reasonable amount of time” but did not permit candi-
dates to “inundate . . . broadcasting.”

38 It should also be noted that Section 312(a)(7) was
adopted after Congress had also considered but rejected
proposals that would have set aside specific broadcast time
periods for political campaigning. For instance, S. 1, con-
sidered by Congress contemporaneously with the bill which
became the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, would have re-
quired each broadcast station and each network to make free
prime time available to Presidential and Vice Presidential
candidates. The bill specified the amounts of time, limited
the program periods to half-hour segments, and specified
the days prior to an election that the program time could be
used. The bill would have required broadcasters to begin
providing time approximately eight weeks before the Presi-
dential election. S. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1971).

27

II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALSO GRANT REVIEW
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DE-
CIDED AN IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL IS-
SUE

The interpretation given Section 312(a)(7) by the
court of appeals indisputably intrudes upon licensee dis-
cretion and broadcaster First Amendment rights (a re-
quirement to schedule a program against a broadcaster’s
will is an intrusion—even if regarded as a permissible
one). Similarly, the standards specifically sanctioned un-
der the construction adopted by the lower court involve
highly sensitive political considerations—a point em-
phasized by Judge Tamm:

“The Commission, through its implementation of sec-
tion 312(a) (7), has come perilously close to falling
into the chasm of impermissible government action.”
App. A at 68a.

While the other members of the panel stated that “[t]he
majority shares the first amendment concerns expressed
by Judge Tamm, and welcomes the admonition regarding
agency conduct that is embodied in his concurring opin-
ion” (App. A at 47a n.117), the fact remains that a
clearly political matter was decided by an agency split
along party lines in favor of an incumbent President
of the same party as the majority Commissioners. It
is difficult to perceive a more dangerous example of, as
Judge Tamm remarked, “nonneutral government deci-
sionmaking”™ aggravating already significant First
Amendment tensions.

Despite an attempt by the court of appeals to place
this case within the mainstream of past political broad-

% App. A at 56a.

18

casting rulings,® the newly diminished licensee role and
the heightened Commission involvement required by the
decision greatly exacerbate constitutional concerns. As
we have demonstrated (pp. 11-15 supra), the substantial
discretion afforded broadcasters under all preexisting
standards [including those specifically applying 312 (a)
(7)] has been virtually eviscerated here. Of equal sig-
nificance, the discretion previously resting with licensees
has been transformed into a new dictatorial role for the
Commission in the partisan political process. This role
is fundamentally at odds with the concept of a free press
and the principle of licensee discretion embedded in the
Cominunications Act.

In CBS v. DNC, this Court emphasized that although
the singular character of broadcasting provides a condi-
tion in which some limited governmental regulation is at
times constitutionally proper, the need for such regula-
tion must always be balanced against the importance of
permitting broadcasters to make their editorial choices
freely:

“The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927,
the model for our present statutory scheme, [cita-
tion omitted], reveals that in the area of discussion
of public issues Congress chose to leave broad jour-
nalistic discretion with the licensee.” *

The same statutory scheme that awards broadcasters
editorial discretion and prohibits government censorship

85 For instance, at one point the lower court dismissed the
constitutional contentions of the networks by, inter alia, sug-
gesting that “[t]he interference with editorial discretion
seems no more or less” here than under the longstanding
Commission interpretation of the obligation of broadcasters
to provide time to political candidates as a group under the
general public interest standard. App. A at 42a-43a n.102.

86 412 U.S. at 106.

19

of program content also—in the special area of political
broadeasting—recognizes that a political candidate’s use
of broadcast facilities should be undertaken without li-
censee interference. Thus, in a unique and limited re-
versal of the general statutory pattern, Section 315 (a)
of the Communications Act prohibits any censorship of
broadcast material in which a legally qualified candidate
appears. On its face, this provision is intended to sep-
arate broadcasters and the regulatory agency from the
partisan political process; and to permit political can-
didates to convey the political message they wish to con-
vey without interference.*’

The decision below seriously threatens the neutral role
that broadcasters and the government should maintain in
candidate decisions regarding how broadcast facilities
are used for political purposes. It does so by delegating
to the Commission the “editorial” judgment of when a
certain kind of political program must commence; and
by premising that decision on a standard—the needs and
political objectives of individual candidates—that places
broadcasters (to the extent any discretion is left) and
the government (in exercising an ultimate oversight
function) in the prohibitive role of deciding to inau-
gurate broadcast campaigning based on an examination

** See Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959) where this Court ex-
plained that the no-censorship clause in Section 815(a) re-
flected a “deep hostility to censorship either by the Commis-
sion or by a licensee” over political discussion by legally
qualified candidates. See also Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887,
890 (9th Cir. 1974), where, in a different but analogous con-
text, the Commission and a different court of appeals recog-
nized the need to restrict the Commission’s role in such mat-
ters in order to avoid “highly subjective judgments [by the
agency] concerning the content, context, and potential politi-
cal impact of a candidate’s appearance.”

20

of the motivations, needs, interests and purposes of in-
dividual candidates.

By focusing on the needs of individual candidates, as
opposed to the needs of candidates in general in an over-
all campaign, the lower court decision distorts the process
and places both the Commission and broadcast licensees
in the dangerous position of effectively favoring one can-
didate over another. The prospect of a politically-
appointed government agency judging the active status
of a given campaign aud deciding the precise point at
which campaign appearances must begin raises issues
that go to the heart of the First Amendment.** As Judge
Tamm emphasized in his concurring opinion, the inherent
political sensitivity of requests for access under Section
812(a) (7) “raises the serious danger of nonneutral gov-
ernment action favoring one speaker or viewpoint over
another.” ** The highly charged circumstances of this
case, involving a complaint by an incumbent President
seeking reelection, highlight this danger of favoritism.”
As Judge Tamm further observes, “members of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission may well have more
than a passing interest in the outcome of federal elec-

88 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978) where Mr. Justice Stevens emphasized that “it is a
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” See also
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

8° App. A at 67a.

#0 In failing to act upon Judge Tamm’s concerns, the court
below also ignored its own teachings in Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
There, the same court observed that an FCC decision favoring
an incumbent President and disregarding an earlier agency
precedent “raise[d] serious questions concerning the require-
ment of governmental neutrality in the area of the First
Ainendment.” Jd. at 1034.

21

tions, particularly presidential contests.” ** Moreover,
“there is some evidence that the Commission has, on oc-
casion, been subjected to direct political pressure,” #

The principle of neutral decisionmaking emphasized
by Judge Tamm and articulated by decisions of this
Court * is seriously threatened by the new standards laid
down in this case—standards that stress the individual
needs of candidates and make the determination as to
when federal election campaigns begin for purposes of
broadcast time sales a “legal” judgment of the Commis-
sion. As Judge Tamm notes, unlike the regulatory ap-
proaches under the fairness doctrine that were upheld
by this Court in Red Lion,“ the form of Commission

*! App. A at 63a (footnote omitted).

#2 Td. at 64a n.16. While ABC advances no suggestion that
such pressure was exerted in this case, a framework never-
theless exists that would seem to call for extreme caution
and agency insulation, rather than loose standards that
actually depend on agency value judgments of essentially
subjective factors. As Judge Tamm further observed:

“As the present case suggests, the campaign for the
Presidency itself is likely to be the most important
occasion for the application of section 812(a)(7). The
President and his party obviously have a strong interest
in the outcome of a presidential election, particularly if
the President himself is a candidate for reelection, and,
by the time the campaign begins, the incumbent Presi-
dent will have appointed several (if a first-term Presi-
dent) or perhaps all (if a second-term President) of the
sitting Commissioners. Even if a Commissioner makes
every effort to remain impeccably neutral, it is nonethe-
less possible, especially in presidential campaigns, that
his partisan and politica) affiliations might subconsciously
influence his decisionmaking.” App. A at 64a.

48 See cases cited in note 88 supra. See also CBS v. DNC,
412 U.S. at 117 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).

“* Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367 ( 1969).

r%

22

review sanctioned under Section 312(a)(7) permits
agency review and implementing orders even though the
broadcaster has made no initial choice in the presenta-
tion of particular program material. In contrast, here:

“The danger of government nonneutrality under
section 312(a)(7) is exacerbated by the Commis-
sion’s emphasis, in its standards governing the right
of access, on the ‘individual needs’ of the candidate.
Whether and to what extent a candidate is entitled
to broadcast access depends on a weighing of his
‘individual needs’ against the other relevant consid-
erations detailed by the Commission. This evaluation
may lead to a determination, for example, that a
candidate requesting a half hour for a particular
purpose may instead be entitled to only fifteen min-
utes, see [App. A at 37a]; another candidate, on
the other hand, may be found entitled to the full
half hour that he seeks.

“Thus, without regard to any prior broadcast
coverage of opposing candidates, an agency of the
federal government is authorized to decide, based in
significant part on the candidate’s ‘individual needs,’
whether and to what extent a given political can-
didate is entitled to be heard on the nation’s
airwaves.” *

45 App. A at 62a-63a. Judge Tamm’s own solution to
avoiding these profound difficulties was to approach the
analysis of the “individual needs” factor by “focus[ing]
solely on the candidate’s needs as stated by the candidate”
—“both at the broadcaster level and before the Commission
on review.” App. A at 67a-68a (emphasis in original). How-
ever, if broadcasters are not required to evaluate or weigh
each candidate’s needs, the standard would appear to be
meaningless, since any candidate requesting broadcast time
obviously regards such a request as necessary to his “needs.”
At the same time, if broadcasters and the Commission in re-
viewing such requests are, in fact, required to perform a
political weighing process, maintaining a neutral role in the
political process becomes virtually impossible.

23

In sum, in failing to recognize the dangers of inter-
jecting the Commission too deeply into the editorial proc-
ess when political candidates request broadcast time, the
decision in this case violates important constitutional
principles. A scheme that so completely transfers deci-
sions as to “whether and to what extent a given political
candidate is entitled to be heard on the nation’s airwaves”
also conflicts with this Court’s concerns in CBS v. DNC
that the Commission should avoid being drawn “into a
continuing case-by-case determination of who should be
heard and when.” 412 U.S. at 127.

Accordingly, the myriad of important constitutional
principles endangered by the decision in this case provide
further support for review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for certiorari
should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel: JAMES A. MCKENNA, JR.
THOMAS N. FROHOCK
EVERETT H. ERLICK CARL R. RAMEY

ROBERT J. KAUFMAN

American Broadcasting DENNIS P. CORBETT

MCKENNA, WILKINSON &

Companies, Inc. KITTNER
“—. a of the 1150 Seventeenth St., N.W.
x Washington, D.C. 20036
New York, NY 10019 (202) 861-2600

Counsel for American
August 13, 1980 B-oadcasting Companies, Inc.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0234%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
