# Petition — Burns v. Sullivan > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0120%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1980 - **Citation:** 449 U.S. 893 ## Text No. , In the oe so ie Supreme Court of the United States. Ocroser TFRM, 1980 FRANCIS J. BURNS, PETITIONER, v. JAMES LEO SULLIVAN er AL., RESPONDENTS. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. RICHARD L, ZISSON, Joun A. Moos, ZISSON AND VEARA, 18 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108. (617) 523-1105 BATEMAN & SLADE, INC. BOSTON , MASSACHUSETTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether a six month statute of limitations is consistent with federal policy in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. 881983, 1985(3) claiming a denial of equal protection in the form of reverse racial discrimination by a public entity? 2. Whether a retroactive application of a six month statute of limitations in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. 881983, 1985(3) claiming a denial of equal protec- tion in the form of reverse racial discrim- ination by a public entity is equitable and consistent with the rule enunciated by this Court in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)? 3. Whether Chapter 31 827 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as interpreted by the ii Courts of the Commonwealth of Massachu- setts, confers a property interest cognizable in conjunction with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution? 4, Whether a public entity's non- conformance with state mandated promotion procedures due to considerations of petitioner's race is consistent with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution? 5. Whether summary disposition was legally and constitutionally appropriate in petitioner's claim arising under 42 U.S.C. 8381983, 1985(3)? iii PARTIES TO PROCEEDING IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT Parties to the proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit include: Petitioner Francis J. Burns; Respondents James Leo Sullivan, City Manager of Cambridge, Walter J. Sullivan, Cambridge City Councilor, and David Marchand, Personnel Administrator of the Division of Civil Service of the Commonwealth of Massachu- setts. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS. Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Statement of the case Basis for federal jurisdiction in District Court Reasons for granting the writ I. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals as to the proper appli- cation of the most appropriate statute of limitations in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. $81983, 1985(3) 14 15 15 Il. Iil. Iv. Vv A retroactive application of a short administrative statute of limitations presents a conflict between the decision below and decisions of the United States Supreme Court The decision below erred as to the status of state law holding that Petitioner does not have a property interest in the promotion procedures mandated by Chapter 31 827 of the General Laws of the Common- wealth of Massachusetts A denial of Petitioner's due process claim predi- cated on a public entity's nonconformance with state 27 34 vi mandated procedures due to considerations of Petitioner's race presents a conflict between the decision below and decisions of the United States Supreme Court 39 V. Summary disposition of Petitioner's Civil Rights claim was inappropriate and presents a conflict between the decision below and decisions of the United States Supreme Court 43 Conclusion 47 Appendix follows page 47 Order of United States District Court, District of Massachu- setts la Memorandum of United States District Court, District of Massachusetts 2a vii Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - Entered April 25, 1980 Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV 28 U.S.C. 81343 28 U.S.C. 82201 28 U.S.C. 82202 42 U.S.C. 81983 42 U.S.C. 81985(3) Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 31 827 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 151B 85 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 260 S82A 23a 39a 40a 4a 45a 46a 48a 49a 50a 5la 53a 55a 58a vill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED. - CASES. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S.544 (1969) Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) 41, Aveo v. Aero Lodge, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) Beard v. Robinson, 5€3 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) Board of Curators, University of ‘Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952) Budreck v. Crocker National Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976) Burns v. Sullivan, 473 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd, No. 79-1424 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1980), reh. denied, No. 79-1424 (April 25, 1980) Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) 4, 45 ix Chambers v. Omaha Public School District, 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976) 16, 21 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) 27, 29, 33 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) 28 Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) 33 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) Wy Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) 44 DeLuca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1977) iG, if, 3 DeMalherbe v. Intern. Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. - 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978) 24, 25, 31, 32 England v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) 33 Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1972) 20 Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687 (lst Cir. 1977) 29 Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1978) aha ae Guam Scottish Rite Bodies v. Flores, 486 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1973) 32 x Hahn v. gh cor, 523 F.2d 461 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) 24 Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) 28 Holden v. Boston Housing Authority, 400 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1975)417, 30 Jarosz v. City of Chicopee, Mass. Sup. Ct. No. 78-1336 (1978) 35, 36 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) 15, 19 Kantor, et al v. Sullivan, et al, C.A. No. 74-2662-T (D. Mass.) 4, 5, 7; 10,. 44 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) 28 Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975) 20 McKenna v. White, 287 Mass. 495, 192 N.E. 84(1934) 35, 36 Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942) 18, 32 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) 23 Northeastern National Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967) 26 Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) 16 xi. Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 171 F.2d 653 (lst Cir. 1948) 44 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) 37 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 368 U.S. 464 (1962) 43 Porter v. California, 592 F. ed 770 (5th Cir. 1979) 46 Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1978) 29 Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (lst Cir. 1973) 35 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 45 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) 16 Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977) aa, 22 Smith v. Perkins-Elmer Corp., 373 F. Supp. 930 (D. Conn. 1973) 23, 24 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) 45 Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Mass. 1978) 17, 29 xii Warren v. Norman Kealty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) 16 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2u 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) 20, 23 Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978) 21 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS United States Constitution, Seventh Amendment 2 United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 2 28 U.S.C. 81254(1) 1 28 U.S.C. 81343 2, 14 28 U.S.C. 82201 2, 14 28 U.S.C. 82202 2, 14 42 U.S.C. 81983 2. 3. 1%, 38. Ws 20, 2i, 22, 24, 27; 31, 44 42 U.S.C. 81985(3) > > 24 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31 815(c) (West) 8n xiii Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31 827 (West) oe Po Pee 355 36, ST» 38, 45 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B 85 (West) 2, 18 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260 B82A (West) Su Bt MISCELLANEOUS Developments, Statute of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950) 22 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1980. No. d FRANCIS J. BURNS, Petitioner, Vv. JAMES LEO SULLIVAN, ET AL, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. The petitioner, Francis J. Burns, respectfully prays that a writ of cer- tiorari issue to review the judgement and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered in this proceeding on March 31, 1980. 1 OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Court of Appeels, which appears in the appendix hereto, (23a-38a)? infra, is not yet reported. The opinion of the United States District Court, which appears in the appendix hereto, (la-22a) infra, is reported at 473 F. Supp. 626 (1979). JURTSDICTION The judgement of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was entered on March 31, 1980. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on April 25, 1980, and this petition for certiorari was filed within 90 days of that date. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 81254(1). 1. This form of citation refers to pages of the appendix. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ee PROVISIONS INVOLVED This case involves the following constitutional and statutory provisions: United States Constitution, Amend- ments 7 and 14; United States Code, Title 28, sections 1343, 2201 and 2202; United States Code, Title 42, sections 1983 and 1985(3); Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 31, section 27; Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 151B section 53 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 260, section 2A. The above constitutional and statutory provisions appear in the appendix hereto, (4hua, 55a) infra. 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a suit seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief arising under 42 U.S.C. 881983, 1985(3). The main thrust of petitioner's action alleges a denial of equal protection and due process of law as a result of invidious racial discrimination by a public entity. The petitioner, Francis J. Burns, a white male, has been employed as a patrolman in the Police Department of the City of Cambridge since November, 1967. Peti- tioner claims he was’ subjected to racial discrimination in his attempt to be promoted to the position of sergeant. On October 22, 1973, a competitive examination was conducted by the Division of Civil Service of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to the authority conferred on it by Chapter 31 of the Gen- eral Laws of the Commonwealth for 4 promotion to the rank of sergeant in the Cambridge Police Department. Based on the results of said examination, Francis J. Burns was ranked ninth highest on the Eligible List out of one hundred and ten applicants. Subsequent to the establishment of said list, a suit was instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Kantor, et al, v. Sullivan, et al, C.A. No. 74-2662-T (D. Mass) seeking, inter alia, promotion of minority group members whose names may or may not have appeared on the eligibil- ity list without regard to their respec- tive grade scores, numerical rank on the list, or whether on not said plain- tiffs took the eligibility exam. During the month of June, 1975, after the establishment of the Eligible List, but prior to the start of the oral 5 interviews, a conference at the United States District Courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts was held relative to a possible settlement of the Kantor matter. All counsel were present, including counsel for the white patrolmen who were on the Eligible List. At this meeting, counsel for the City of Cambridge assured the counsel for certain white patrolmen that their clients would be promoted to the rank of sergeant. Only after such assurances were made by the counsel for the City of Cambridge, did counsel for certain white patrolmen allow their clients to execute the consent decree. Prior to this conference, counsel for the black patroimen in the Kantor case had knowledge that three of his clients on the Eligible List were assured by City officials that they would be promoted to the rank of sergeant. Such promotions would be made without consideration of position on the Eligible List or the results of the oral interviews. On June 16, 1975, a consent decree was executed between the plaintiffs in that action and, among others, the respon- dent James Leo Sullivan in the instant case. Under the terms of said consent decree, the Eligible List was confirmed and approved and the respondent City Manager was ordered to submit forthwith to the defendant City Council an appro- priate request to fund the cost of promo- ting not less than twenty-eight (28) patrolmen to the grade of sergeant from the names of the patrolmen appearing on the Eligible List. Pursuant to the consent decree, the petitioner received notice from the Director of Civil Service that he was certified as eligible for appointment to the grade of sergeant. He then reported to the then Acting Chief- of-Police, Francis Pisani, now deceased, on or about June 26, 1975, for an inter- view for promotion. The interview lasted approximately five minutes. During said interview, plaintiff expressed his will- ingness to accept a promotion to the rank of sergeant. On or about July 3, 1975, the peti- tioner received notice that he had been skipped over by twenty-two (22) indivi- duals who had received examination scores inferior to the score he had achiéved. These individuals included three black patrolmen, Calvin J. Kantor, Thomas H. Benson and Herbert H. Halliday of the Cambridge Police Department, who were plaintiffs in the Kantor case and who were in the 20th, 27th and 30th positions on the Eligible List, respectively. Petitioner, 8 Francis J. Burns, a white patrolman, was skipped over for promotion to the rank of sergeant during the series cf promo- tions although he placed ninth on the Eligible List. On or about July 9, 1975, respondent, James Leo Sullivan, acting as sole appoint- ing authority for the City of Cambridge, filed with the Division of Civil Service for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts authorization of employment promoting twenty-eight (28) individuals to the rank of sergeant. Under the provisions of the General Laws of Massachusetts (ter. Ed.), Chap- ter 31, Section 15(c)1, the respondent 2.- The provisions of 815(c) have been substantially duplicated in the present Mass. General Laws Chapter 31 827, as amended by 811 and 845, Chapter 393 of the Acts of 1978. 9 City Manager and Acting Chief-of-Police Pisani, acting as the collective-appoint- ing authority, were required, upon skipping over the petitioner and promoting indivi- duals who scored lower on the eligibility examination, to provide a written state- ment of their reasons for so skipping over an applicant who placed higher on the list. The petitioner was, in fact, skipped over twenty-two (22) times, and in each instance, the statement given pursuant to law was "better qualified". Such a conclusion is not based on fact or any reasonable, objective standard of com- parison, but is arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by records of the plain- tiff's performance as a patrolman and by records of the applicants who skipped over plaintiff in the promotion process. 10 The District Court granted summary judgement against petitioner holding that he was not entitled to bring his claim of constitutional deprivations be- fore a jury (13a). Summary judgement was granted in spite of the fact that the District Court had evidence that: | 1. The attorney for the black plain- tiffs in Kantor v. Sullivan, C.A. No. 74- 2662-T (D. Mass.) testified at a deposition - in the case of Deluca V. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass, 1977) that he was party to a secret deal with the promoting authority whereby three black patrolmen would be promoted to the rank of sergeant regardless of their written and oral examination scores and to the exclusion of three white patrolmen (12a-l3a). 2. The written and oral scores, tak- en in any mathematical combination, do not support the contention asserted in the 11 statement of reasons that the 22 indi- viduals who passed over petitioner were "better qualified" .3 In spite of the evidence before the Court, the inescapable inference that had petitioner been black he would have been promoted to the position of sergeant was ignored. The District Court also held that the petitioner had no property right to the position of sergeant (20a) and, consequently, no due process rights were violated. Moreover, the District Court held that even if James Leo Sulli- van participated in a secret deal whereby three black patrolmen would be promoted at the expense of three white patrolmen "such evidence would not be enough to 3. This evidence was not mentioned by the District Court, however it was discussed by the Court of Appeals (26a). 12 support plaintiff's allegation that he was a victim of racial discrimination" (13a). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of summary judgement. However, petitioner's equal protection claim was deemed time barred by the statute of limitations in that petitioner failed to file his 881983, 1985(3) claims within the short admini- strative statute of limitations (six- month period) applicable to administra- tive complaints filed with the Massachu- setts Commission Against Discrimination (37a). The Court of Appeals was silent as to the appropriateness of the District Court's summary disposition of petition- er's equal protection claim and applied the six-month statute of limitations retroactively. The Court of Appeals also 13 affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgement finding that the peti- tioner was not deprived of due process of law by the promotion procedures (3la) utilized by’ the respondent City Manager, mua 2ithough the Court of Appeals conceded that race may have been a dispositive factor in the promotion process and that procedures mandated by state law may have been disregarded (n.5, 26a). Petitioner filed a petition for re- hearing, relying on evidence demonstrating that he did not obtain facts supporting his claim of racial discrimination until May, 1978 and thus, his action was timely. Petitoner's request for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals (40a-43a). 14 BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code, Sections 1343, 2201, 2202 and Title 42 of the United States Code, Sections 1983 and 1985(3) provide the basis for federal jurisdiction in the above-mentioned court of first instance. 15 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE MOST APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITA- TIONS IN AN ACTION ARISING UNDER 42 U.S.C. 881983, 1985(3). Congress has not adopted a statute of limitations for actions arising under 42 U.S.C. 81983. When Congress fails to create a statute of limitations for federal causes of action, courts must apply the statute of limitations of the most analogous causes of action under the law of the state in which the federal cause of action arises. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). The application of state law must be consistent with the policies underlying the federal cause of action. 16 Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976). State statute of limitations, however, should not be automatically applied in civil rights actions if it would discrim- inatorily single out federal causes of action by imposing an unduly brief period in which to commence the action. Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976). Courts need not search for a state statute which would apply only in a remotely analogous manner if a state statute of limitations is found which clearly governs and is directly related to the federal civil rights claim. Chambers, id. at 228; Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975). Petitioner filed his civil rights action prior to the expiration of the 17 statute of limitations previously adhered to in District of Massachusetts. Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1193, (D. Mass 1978); Deluca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass 1977); Holden v. Boston Housing Authority, 400 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass 1975). While the Court below recognized that decisions in the District of Massachusetts have uniformly held that actions arising under the Civil Rights Acts sound in tort and therefore, the Massachusetts general tort statute of limitations applies (3 years, see, M.G.L. c. 260 82A), .it held that a uni-. form approach to all civil rights cases would not be utilized (34a-35a). The Court below foreclosed the possi- bility of petitioner obtaining relief.in an action predicated upon an allegation of racial discrimination in public employment, irrespective of petitioner's reasonable 18 reliance on previous interpretation of the applicable federal and state statutes of {iat cacton. State courts may not fore- close relief for litigants relying on federal statutes. Miles v. Illinois R.R.; 315 U.S. 698 (1942). Petitioner is entitled to similar protection. The Court below held that the most analogous statute of limitations was the six month statute utilized by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrim- ination, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 151B 85 (37a). Petitioner asserts that the short administrative statute of limi- tations is not "most analogous" in a case arising under the Civil Rights Acts. Actions filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination are not necessarily predicated upon allega- tions of state action, unlike actions arising under 42 U.S.C. 81983. Addition- ally, the structure of M.G.L. Ch. 151B is 19 designed to foster mediation and concil- fation of civil rights actions. Admini- strative informality is utilized in the gathering of evidence and attempts to resolve the matter in dispute. The administrative statute of limitations is only analogous in that actions claiming racial discrimination by a public employ- er may be filed under that statute. Petitioner asserts that utilization of a six month statute of limitations for his civil rights action is inappropriate under federal law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, at 454. Strong federal policy considerations dictate against reliance on a short administrative statute of limitations in cases arising under the Civil Rights Acts. A survey of decisions in other Cir- cuit Courts of Appeals reveals that no 20 other court has applied a short admini- strative statute of limitations in determining the "most analogous" state statute of limitations for an action arising under 42 U.S.C. 81983. Other Circuit Courts have decided with uni- formity that limitations periods for the filing of an administrative claim are inapplicable to civil rights actions in courts of law. Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (six- month period for filing complaint with Ohio Civil Rights Commission); Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1972) (90-day period for filing complaint with Kentucky Civil Rights Commission); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (120-day period for filing complaint of a discrimination claim under Illinois Fair Employment Act); 21 Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1978) (180-day period for filing complaint under Missouri Discriminatory Housing Practices Law); Chambers v. Omaha Public School District, supra, at 225-27 (180-day period under Nebraska Fair Employment Act); Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977) (30-day period for challenging action by Board of Commissioners of a utility district); Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978) (six-month limitations period for filing civil rights complaints under the Colorado Anti-Dis- crimination Act). The Eighth Circuit in the Green case specifically rejected the trial court's assertion that a six-month limitations period was the most analogous state statute of limitations for a plaintiff's claim arising under 81983 since state 22 action is an essential element of the cause of action, unlike a state admini- strative action. Green v. Ten Eyck, supra, at 1288. The Court below, in imposing a six- month limitations period for.a civil rights claim under 81983, not only has taken a position in a square and irreconcilable conflict with the view of other circuits, but has done so in a fashion which under- mines strong federal policy considerations. The United States has an interest in a time period that is "sufficiently generous...to preserve the remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions". Shouse v. Pierce County, supra, at 1146. Some causes of action have relatively long limitations periods because the law favors the individuals who prosecute them. See Developments, Statute of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185-1186 (1950). 23 Clearly, victims of constitutional torts fall into said category. See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978), quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 194 (1961). The United States' interest in main- taining "sufficiently generous" time periods is a response to the special needs of plaintiffs who bring their con- stitutional claims to federal courts. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, supra, at 476. Suits brought in federal courts of law are generally more complex than complaints filed with administrative agencies and present a greater need for assistance of counsel. Smith v. Perkins- Elmer Corp., 373 F. Supp. 930, 936 (D. Conn. 1973). After a charge is filed with the administrative agency, it is the "agency's responsibility to shoulder the 24 burden and initiative of investigation". Smith v. Perkins-Elmer Corp., id. at 936. In judicial proceedings, the plaintiff must build his own case, a particularly demanding burden in 81983 cases filed in the District of Massachusetts. As the Court declared in Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 467 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976), "While we believe that the plaintiff is entitled to all favorable inferences,he is not enti- tled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsey, speculation and con- jecture". Judicial proceedings require more expansive limitation periods than those utilized in administrative pro- ceedings in order to allow plaintiffs more time for investigation before filing. DeMalherbe v. Intern. Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (N. D. Cal. 1978). Longer statute of limi- tations periods are particularly 25 appropr. ate for judicial proceedings so as to foster negotiation between the parties before adversary positions have become inflexible. "[T]Jhe filing of a law suit aiters in a very significant way the posture of the parties and their ability to reach an informal settlement". Budreck v. Crocker National Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635, 644 (N.D. Cal. 1976). "Whereas the filing of a lawsuit reflects the failure of negotiation and makes settlement less likely, an administrative proceeding represents, at least in theory, the continuation of negotiation with the help of a professional mediator". DeMalherbe v. Intem. Union of Elevator Constructors, supra, at 1335. The Court of Appeals' decision to impose a six-month statute of limitations in the case at bar presents an important federal jurisdictional issue that should 26 be decided by this Honorable Court. Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952). Additionally, the decision by the Court below presents a square and irreconcilable conflict with relevant decisions from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits for the United States Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 75, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); Northeastern National Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 217 (1967). These conflicts justify the grant of certiorari to review the judgement below. 27 II. A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF A SHORT ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PRESENTS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION BELOW AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Assuming for purposes of argument that it was proper for the Court below to hold that a six-month statute of limi- tations applies in a case arising under 42 U.S.C. 81983 claiming a denial of equal protection in the form of racial discrimination by a public entity, a retroactive application of said statute of limitations conflicts with decisions of this Honorable Court. This Court, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971), specified the factors to be considered in determining whether "nonretroactivity" is appropriate in new decisions altering a 28 statute of limitations. In order for a decision to be applied nonretroactively, a new principle of law must be created: ...-either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti- gants may have relied, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 451 (1968), or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Second, it has been stressed that "we must...weigh the merits and the demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation" Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 615 (1965). Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application for "{w]here a decision of the Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity" Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 29 The Court of Appeals retroactively applied a short administrative statute of limitations (six months) in lieu of a longer judicial statute of limitations (3 years) to petitioner's civil rights action alleging a denial of equal pro- tection in the form of racial discrimi- nation by a public entity (3la-37a). This retroactive application of the shorter limitation period is in direct conflict with the guidelines established in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra. Clearly, the Court below established a new principle of law by overruling past precedent that litigants in the District of Massachusetts have utilized. Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 218 (lst Cir. 1978); Graffals Gonzales v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687 (lst Cir. 1977); Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1193 30 (D. Mass 1978); Deluca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass 1977); Holden v. Boston Housing Authority, 400 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass 1975). In fact, the Court that heard petitioner's claim held in the related case of Deluca v. Sullivan that the tort statute of limitations applied so that the plaintiffs might "have a reasonable period of time in which to have access to the federal courts" (34a). The Deluca case and petitioner's claim arise from the same series of promotions within the Cambridge Police Department in 1975. The Court of Appeals suggests that whether a general statute of limita- tions is automatically to be used in civil rights actions is a question of first impression. Assuming the legitimacy of such a slain, it is clear, in light of the uniform approach in determining applicable limitations periods in the 31 District of Massachusetts, that the resolution of the question could not have been "clearly foreshadowed". Imposition of a six-month statute of limitations in petitioner's civil rights claim would frustrate the"prior history and purpose of the rule in question". State law must be utilized in order to determine the applicable limitations period in 81983 cases only to the extent that federal policy will be observed. Congressional intent to protect civil rights of individuals will be undermined if a six month statute remains the rule in the First Circuit. "If a Circuit must choose between two state statutes for causes of action, each roughly analogous to a civil rights action, the Court should always choose the longer statute in order to best effectuate that federal policy." DeMalherbe v. Intern, 32 Union of Elevator Constructors, supra, at 1341. See, Guam Scottish Rite Bodies v. Flores, 486 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1973). 1963) (Marshall, J.). The ‘‘most analogous”’ state law will be applied unless it is ‘‘inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under con- sideration.’’ Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975). Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (Louisiana survivorship statute applied to Section 1983 suit, resulting in abatement of action be- cause of death of plaintiff). See also Johnson vy. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978) (one year Virginia statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions discriminates unreasonably against federal rights where similar state rights protected by longer statutes of limitations). Determination of the applicable state statute of limita- tions requires consideration of four questions: (1) the nature of the federal cause of action, see Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 1978): (2) the analogous state causes of action; (3) the state statutes of limitations for those causes of action; and (4) which of the state statutes of limitations is tne most appropriate under federal law, see Johnson v, Railway OPINION OF THE COURT. 33a Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 462 n.7. See generally Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (D.Mass. 1978). Burns premised his suit on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The district court properly characterized his action as alleging denial of equal protection in the form of racial discrimination by a public entity. When Burns was passed over for promotion, he had available to him two analogous state causes of action. He had an automatic right of appeal within the state civil service system in which he could have alleged failure to follow state civil service law. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 2(b). This cause of action expired in thirty days. Mass Civil Service Rule 33. The second cause of action was a specific complaint of racial discrimination which had to be filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi- nation within six months of his nonpromotion. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B. We are aware that three separate district court decisions in the District of Massachusetts have held that actions under the Civil Rights Act sound in tort and, therefore, the Massachusetts general tort statute of limitations should be applied. Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1193; DeLuca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D.Mass. 1977) ; Holden v. Boston Housing Authority, 400 F. Supp. 399 (D.Mass. 1975). While we often defer to district court interpretations of state law, we find these decisions are not conclusive in this case. In Ware and Holden, the question was whether the case was controlled by the six-year statute of limitations for contracts or the two-year tort statute." No other Massa- chusetts statutes of limitations were considered. Ware in- volved a suit for racial discrimination in hiring and dis- 11 The general tort statute of limitations was increased to three years by 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 777, § 1. BURNS U. SULLIVAN 34a charge brought against a private employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The more analogous statute of limitation was found to be the one governing tort actions. In Holden, no mention was made of the more specific remedy for wrongful discharge of a public employee: a writ of manda- mus filed with the Supreme Judicial Court within six months of the discharge. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 46A.% Consequently, we think Ware and Holden must be limited to the statutes of limitations actually considered. In DeLuca v. Sullivan, the same court that heard Burns’ suit held that the action of other officers passed over in the 1975 Cambridge Police Department sergeant promotion was not barred by expiration of the thirty-day civil service statute of limitations. DeLuca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. at 738. The court’s principal rationale was not that the statute was not the ‘‘most analogous,’’ but, rather, that so short a period of time ‘‘fails to correspond to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs to have available a reasonable period of time in which to have access to the federal courts.’’ Id. The court also relied on what it perceived to be this circuit’s rule that the then two-year Massachusetts tort statute of limitations must be applied to civil rights actions.“ We consider these reasons in reverse order. Although we have consistently held that civil rights actions brought by dismissed or mistreated employees sound in tort rather than in contract, Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1978); Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1977), we have never indicated that a general tort 122 This remedy is now codified at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 42. 13 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A now provides: Except. as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions of contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues. OPINION OF THE COURT. 35a statute of limitations is automatically to be used in place of limitations contained in state statutes specifically tail- ored to deal with the plaintiff’s cause of action. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d at 318 (Puerto Rico statute regulating political discharge of employees more analogous than general tort statute, but contained no specific statute of limitations). Determi- nation of the ‘‘most analogous’’ state statute requires a careful analysis of state law. While we see merit in the DeLuca court’s reasoning that civil rights plaintiffs may need more than thirty days to file a civil rights complaint, we think a six-month limi- tation reasonable. Although it may take more than six months to properly prepare a civil rights case, a complaint meeting the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) can surely be filed in that time. And amendments to the complaint and supplemental pleadings may be sought after suit is brought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Moreover, if the plaintiff is required to exhaust his state administrative remedies, a matter of some dispute, see note 14 infra, his case will have already been prepared and with little, if any, modification can easily be filed within six months of the decision of the state agency. There are important policy reasons for using the time limitations of a state statute that protects the same rights the plaintiff seeks to vindicate by resort to the federal Civil Righs Acts. Assuming no requirement of exhaustion, a rule providing a three-year statute of limitations will allow state employees to bide their time and use the federal courts, bypassing the state administrative proceedings. Two un- fortunate results will follow. First, the general government policy, observed at both the state and federal levels, of prompt resolution of personnel disputes will be thwarted. Second, without any showing that state administrative pro- cedures will not provide the plaintiff with due process and protect against constitutional violations, see Eisen v. East- BURNS V. SULLIVAN 36a man, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970), the federal courts will become surrogate state personnel departments.“ See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976); DiPiro v. Taft, 584 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. demied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979). Finally, the Massachusetts general tort statute of limi- tations is clearly intended to be used in conjunction with conventional tort, contract and replevin actions for which there is no specific statute of limitations. While, in certain circumstances, such conventional actions may be the ‘‘most analogous’’ actions to civil rights actions, that is sc only when the state has not prohibited by statute the deprivation of the specific civil right at bar. Where, as here, the state has provided a specific remedy, complete with statute of limitations, for racia] discrimination in public employment and promotion, actions under the federal Civil Rights Acts alleging racial discrimination by the state must be governed by that statute of limitations. In our view, although this rule shortens considerably the time in which an aggrieved person may bring a Section 1983 action for racial discrimi- nation in public employment, it conflicts with no federal 14 Since we decide Burns’ claims on other grounds, we address his failure to exhaust state administrative remedies only to the extent necessary to note the unsettled state of the law in this area, compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973), with Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975), and to observe that the same strong reasons for recognizing state limitation of action policies in personnel matters also argue for recognition of the primacy of viable state personnel dispute resolution mechanisms. See Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1114, n.4 (1st Cir. 1974) ; Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970). Sce also Etsen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970) ; Comment, Exhaustion of State Administraiwe Remedies in Section 1983 Cases. 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). We note further that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), requires persons alleging racial discrimination in employment in a state that has administrative mechanisms which can provide relief to give that state system at least sixty days to provide such relief before pro- ceeding under Title VII. OPINION OF THE COURT. policy and enhances the wlity of the state to resolve its own personnel problems. The time period is no shorter than the six-month period available to federal and state employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for initiation of a complaint of racial discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 220 (1976). In addition, we note that the entire Massachusetts civil service system is built upon a policy of prompt initiation and resolution of public employee personnel actions. See, e.g., Report of Special Committee on Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regu- lations, 1930 House Doc. No. 1001 at 9; Brooks v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 80, 294 N.E.2d 487, 489 (1973); see generally Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, $$ 1 et seg. This rule gives a plaintiff six months from either the date of the alleged act of discrimination or final state administrative adjudication of the claim of discrimi- nation to seek relief pursuant to Section 1983. Under this statute of limitations, Burns’ equal protection claim ex- pired in January of 1976. The First Amendment Claim Burns’ final contention on appeal, that the advice he solicited from Councilor Sullivan restrained or chilled his freedom of speech, is without a scintilla of merit. He volun- tarily sought Councilor Sullivan’s advice and assistance in pressuring the City Manager. Councilor Sullivan made no threat; the advice was solicited, offered and accepted for the purpose of achieving Burns’ promotion. See generally Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), aff’d 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). While Burns rejected Councilor Sullivan’s advice not to hire an attorney, he accepted the advice of both his attorney and Councilor Sullivan not to cause a controversy over BURNS V. SULLIVAN 38a his nonpromotion.* Burns strains credulity in contending that he followed Councilor Sullivan’s advice and not that of his attorney. Finally, even if Councilor Sullivan alone had advised Burns, we know of no facts alleged in this case that would take Councilor Sullivan’s actions outside the public officials’ qualified, good faith immunity from Civil Rights Acts damage liability. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974) ; Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072 (ist Cir. 1979). Im these circumstances, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the claimed first amendment violation. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978); Matorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d at 1077. Affirmed. 157f Burns had not received similar advice from his attorney, Councilor Sullivan’s advice still would not have given substance to Burns’ first amendment claim, but it might have given Burns some assistance in overcoming the statute of limitations. See Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180 (1st Cir. 1970) (school superintendent’s active discouragement of use of employee appeal procedure by teacher and personal initiation of extra-statutory procedures held to bar superintendent’s reliance on exhaustion. ) 39a UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 79-1424, FRANCIS J. BURNS, Plaintiff, Appellant, Vv. JAMES LEO SULLIVAN, ET AL. Defendant, Appellees. JUDGMENT Entered March 31, 1980 This cause came to be heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and was argued by counsel. Upon consideration whereof, It is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the district court is affirmed. By the Court: Clerk. 40a UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FRANCIS J. BURNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 79-1424 Vv. JAMES LEO SULLIVAN, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees Before Coffin, Chief Judge, Campbell and Bownes, Circuit Judges. ORDER OF COURT Entered April 25, 1980 Appellant petitions for rehearing on the issue of expiration of the six- month statute of limitations which we found applicable to his claim of racial discrimination. In addition to contending that a six-month statute of limitations contravenes the policies underlying the federal Civil Rights Acts, a matter we decline to reconsider, Burns claims the Yla six-month period did not begin to run until on or about May 23, 1978, and that his equal protection suit was, therefore, not time-barred. While we doubt that petitioner's failure to raise this claim in response to appellee's arguments on the original hearing is adequately ex- cused, we nevertheless reject it on its merits. The substance of Burns' petition is an affidavit by Wayne A. Perkins, Esq., an attorney who represented another Cam- bridge policeman in a connected case in 1978. ‘WThe affidavit states that Perkins was told by Beryl Cohen, Esq., attorney for the black plaintiffs in Kantor v. Sullivan, that the Kantor Suit was dropped in return for a promise that the black Plaintiffs would be promoted to the rank of sergeant. Perkins states further that he informed counsel for Burns of Cohen's 42a statement on or about May 23, 1978. Burns argues that his cause of action did not accrue until he received this infor- mation. We disagree. Even assuming, as Burns urges, that the statute of limita- tions on his claim of racial discrimina- tion did not begin to run until the time he knew or should have known his cause of action had accrued. see Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975), that would be of no help to Burns here. Burns knew on July 3, 1975, that he had been passed over for promotion, and he should have known shortly thereafter that four persons, including the three black plain- tiffs in Kantor, had been promoted over him, although ranked below him on every known merit list prepared by the City of Cambridge. See Burns v. Sullivan, slip op. at 4n.5. This information should have been sufficient to alert Burns that bs 43a several persons may have been promoted over him solely because of their race. If Burns had initiated his suit, or at least an investigation, at that time, he might have gained Perkins' information from Attorney Cohen himself. We see no leeway in the law for an aggrieved party to wait an indeterminate period for his cause of action to become more meritor- ious, due to the discovery of important facts, such as evidence of discriminatory intent. Petition for rehearing denied. By the Court: Clerk. 4a CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT VII. Civil trials In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord- ing to the rules of the common law. 45a CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT XIV. 81. Citizenship rights not to be abridged by states Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 46a 28 U.S.C. 81343. The district courts shall have origi- nal jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: » To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 [42 USCS 81985]; To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge 47a were about to occur and power to prevent; To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, Statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons with- in the jurisdiction of the United States; To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. 48a 28 U.S.C. 82201 Creation of :remedy In a case of actual controversy with- in its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Intern- al Revenue Code of 1954 [26 U.S.C. 87428] any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal rela- tions of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgement or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 49a 28 U.S.C. 82202 Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgement of decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such Judgement. 50a 82 U.S.C. 82963: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi- leges, or immunities secured by the Con- stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 5la 42 U.S.C. 81985(3) TITLE 42 CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of an- other, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protec- tion of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to 52a vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice-President, or as a member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such con- spiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privi- lege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of dam- ages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 53a MASS. GEN. LAWS C.31 827 Appointment or promotion; manner of selection Except as provided otherwise by section fifteen, if the administrator certifies from an eligible list the names of three persons who are eligible for and willing to accept appointment, the appointing authority, pursuant to the civil service law and rules, may appoint only from among such persons. If such eligible list contains the names of less than three persons who are willing to accept appointment, the appointing authority may appoint from among those persons or may request authorization to make a provisional appointment pursuant to sections twelve, thirteen and fourteen. If an appointing authority makes an original or promotional appointment from 54a a certification of any person other than the person whose name appears highest, and the person whose name is highest is willing to accept such appointment, the appointing authority shall immediately file with the administrator a written statement of his reasons for appointing the person whose name was not highest. Such an appointment of a person whose name was not highest shall be effective only when such statement of reasons has been received by the administrator. The administrator shall make such statement available for public inspection at the office of the division. 55a MASS. GEN. LAWS C.151B, 85. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice or alleged violation of clause (e) of section thirty-two of chapter one hundred and twenty-one B or sections ninety-two A and ninety-eight of chapter two hundred and seventy-two may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organi za- tion or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful practice complained of or the violation of said clause (e) of said section thirty-two or said sections ninety-two A and ninety-eight and which Shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be required by the commission. The 56a attorney general may, in like manner, make, sign and file such complaint. The commission, whenever it has reason to believe that any person has been or is engaging in an unlawful practice or violation of said clause (e) of said section thirty-two or said sections ninety-two A and ninety-eight, may issue such a complaint. Any employer whose employees, or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to co-operate with the provisions of this chapter, may file with the commission a verified complaint asking for assistance by con- ciliation or other remedial action...Any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed within six months after the alleged act of discrimination. The institution of proceedings under this section, or an order thereunder, shall not be a bar to proceedings under said 57a sections ninety-two A and ninety-eight, nor shall the institution of proceedings under said sections ninety-two A and ninety-eight, or a judgement thereunder, be a bar to proceedings under this sec- tion. 58a MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 260 B2A Three years; actions of tort, contract to recover for personal injuries and replevin Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions of contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385007_0120%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.