# Amicus Brief — Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 504

## Text

Nos. 79-1943, 80-193
(Consolidated)

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

No. 79-1943
JOSEPH ALESSI, RAYMOND BUISSON, STEPHEN

MICHALSKI, CHARLES REPKA and
T. EDWARD WHITE,

Appellants,

vs.
RA BESTOS-MANHATTAN „INC. and RAYBESTOS-
MANHATTAN, INC. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
PLAN, jointly, severally or in the alternative,
Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 80-193

HENRY BUCZYNSKI, ALEX BORUSOVIC and
OTHER RETIREES SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Petitioners,

vs.
THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

MOTION OF NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS
CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE:

Of Counsel — R. VoLRk
WILLIAM W. Scorr, Jr. HORP, REED & ARMSTRONG
Car H. — Jr. 2900 Grant Building
JEFFREY S, BLUM Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG (412) 288-7771
2900 Grant Building

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

SMITH BROS., Law PRINTERS, 620 SECOND AVENUE, PITTSBURGH, Pa. 18216

1

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AS AMICUS CURIAE

NOW comes National Steel Corporation hereinafter
(“National”) and respectfully moves the Court for leave
to file a brief Amicus Curiae in support of the position
of Appellees Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., Employees Retirement Plan and Re-
spondent The General Motors Corporation.

The question before the Court which N ational
wishes to address is whether the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 prohibits a monthly pen-
sion benefit provided under a negotiated, non-contribu-
tory pension plan from being based, in part, on the
workmen’s compensation benefit that may be received
by a retired plan participant. Such provisions are com-
monly known as workmen’s compensation offsets,

National, the nation’s fourth largest steel company,
has entered into collective bargaining agreements with
the United Steelworkers of America which provide for
such workmen’s compensation offsets. In entering into
these agreements and determining their anticipated
costs National took into account the savings that would
result from such offsets. Accordingly National has a
direct interest in the issue to be decided by the Court
and in the continuing validity of such offsets.

Additionally National is a defendant in a class ac-
tion Tolbert v. National Steel Corporation (S.D. Illinois,
No. 81-3003) in which the plaintiffs are challenging the
validity under ERISA of the workmen’s compensation
offset contained in the Granite City Steel Division of
National Steel Corporation—United Steelworkers of
America Pension Plan.

WHEREFORE National moves this Court to allow the
filing of the Brief of Amicus Curiae National Steel Cor-

ii
Motion for Amicus Curiae.

poration in support of the position of Appellees and Re-
spondent which is submitted herein with the requisite
number of printed copies.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. VOLK

THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG
2900 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
(412) 288-7771

WILLIAM W. Scort, Jr.

CARL H. HELLERSTEDT, JR.
JEFFREY S. BLUM

THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG
2900 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

Motion For Leave To File Brief As Amicus Curiae 1
Interest of Amicus Curiae National Steel Corpora-

ag ARN SEF ̃—— RR RON tea 1
„„ oi.scsc\.... ccvccsccacsercoscbicccesczchalinsvcnes, 1
nn OT FIG IEEE ENE 3
r A pn 3

II. Workmen's Compensation Offsets Are Integral
Factors In The Computation And Determina-
tion Of A Pension Plan's Benefits And Thus
Are Not A Prohibited Forfei ture. 5

III. The Nature Of Workmen’s Compensation And
Retirement Benefits Does Not Preclude Off-
setting Pension Benefits Since Those Benefits
„ e 11

IV. Disailowing The Workmen’s Compensation Off.
sets Will Provide An Unexpected Windfall For
Employees And A Costly And Unanticipated

Burden For Employers . q 16
C ̃ KKK 0000000 18
CASES CITED: PAGE
Amory v. Boyden Associates, 434 F. Supp. 671 (S. D.
. ̃ TAT ae gk a tke 9
Fielder v. Travelers Insurance Company, 79 Mich.
App. 449, 263 N. W. 24 9 (1977) 14
Fisher v. Consolidated Freight Wrap, Inc., 12 Ore.
App. 417, 507 P. ad 53 (1978) . . . . 13
Gasparick v. H. C. Price Construction Co., 399 Mich.
483, 490, 247 N. W. 2d 824 (1976) 14
Heidler v. Industrial Commission, 482 P. 2d 889
— ——— ͤ cist 12
Keller v. Graphic Systems of Akron, Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1005 (N. D. Ohio, 19760) 9

iv

Table of Contents.
PAGE
Lewis v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 431
e eeebeeseeesee 9

Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 114 (C. A. 6, 1971) 5
Los Angeles Department of Power and Water v.

r e e 17
Mazor v. State of Maryland, 279 MD. 355, 369 A. 2d

„ ee eee 15
Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 546 P. 2d 481 Colo.

%%% ͤ M ³·˙ AA ss 12
Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406 (C. A.

ee een 9
Scott v. C. E. Powell Coal Co., 402 P. 73, 166 A. 2d

/ ̃ ̃ͤͤUanm VA... ee ubaihaee 12

Utility Workers Union of America v. Consumers
Power Company, (C. A. 6, No. 78-1402, January

enen 4
Winer v. Edison Brothers Stores Pension Plan, 447
SOG, Gt (ELD. BEO., TOTS) ici icbiSiiciiccceicccccccseccssees 9

STATUTES CITED:

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001

%%% ͤ doaugSediced 1. 3
, ..... 6
, ͤ .. aS Bae 8 ee ALORA a 7
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. Section
%% e 6
REGULATIONS CITED:
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Regulations,
e on 6

Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, 26 C.F.R.
„„ 4, 6, 17

1

v
Table of Contents.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: PAGE
H. Rep. No. 533, 93 Cong., 1974 U.S. Code Cong., &
Admin. News, p. 4639, 5655-5656 3
S. Rep. No. 383, 93 Cong., 1974 U.S. Code Cong., &
Admin. News p. 4890-49330 7
REVENUE RULINGS CITED:
Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 C. B. 16//2ꝛ7 17
TREATISES CITED:
1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§1.00,
ß d Neda Ske. eicsincese. 13
4 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, 5897.10,
N. A 13

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION

The interest of Amicus Curiae National Steel Cor-
poration is described in the preceeding motion for leave
to file brief as Amicus Curiae.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress’ concern in enacting the anti-forfeiture
provisions of ERISA was to ensure that after an em-
ployee completed a certain number of years of service
with an employer he would have a vested right to receive
a promised benefit. A workmen’s compensation offset
contained in a pension plan is an integral factor in the
plan’s computation and determination of benefits to
which a retired employee is entitled. It does not result
in a complete denial of all pension benefits and obliga-
tions determined under the terms of the plan. Rather
the net effect of the offset is to provide retired employees
with a total monthly benefit that is equal to the entire
benefit provided under the plan. Accordingly it is not a
“forfeiture” of a retirement benefit as that term is de-
fined under ERISA.

Workmen’s compensation benefits and retirement
benefits paid under a pension plan serve the same pur-
pose—to recompense an employee for his loss of earning
power. If a retired employee were to receive concurrently
workmen’s compensation benefits and retirement ben-
efits under a pension plan, he would be receiving dupli-
cate benefits while only suffering one wage loss. Since
workmen’s compensation benefits arise from a loss of
earning power and are not a means of quasi-tort recov-
ery, the commentators and the pre-ERISA cases recog-
nize that it would be contrary to public policy and
inconsistent with the nature of workmen’s compensation
to prohibit workmen’s compensation offsets.

Summary of Argument.

Workmen’s compensation offsets do not deprive
retired employees of deferred wages which they have
earned. Rather an employer must take into account the
cost of providing pension benefits. If a pension plan
contains a workmen’s compensation offset the antici-
pated cost of providing pension benefits is less than if
the plan did not provide such benefits. The savings re-
sulting from the presence of a workmen’s compensation
offset in a pension plan permits an employer to provide
to all employees a greater pension benefit or a different
benefit that would not have been available absent the
offset. If workmen’s compensation offsets are not per-
mitted employees will receive greater than bargained for
total benefits and employers will be saddled with un-
anticipated, burdensome costs.

Argument.

ARGUMENT

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
does not prohibit the Monthly Retirement Pension
Benefit provided under a negotiated, non-contribu-
tory pension plan to be based in part on the amount
of the Monthly Workmen’s Compensation Benefit
received by a retired employee.

I. Introduction

In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, P.L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829,
29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., (““ERTSA’’)—a complex
panoply of labor and tax laws governing this country’s
private pension system. Congress’ purpose in enacting
ERISA was (1) to establish minimum standards of
fiduciary conduct for those dealing with retirement plans
and (2) to improve the equitable character and sound-
ness of private pension plans by requiring them (a) to
vest the accrued benefits of employees who had signifi-
cant periods of service with an employer, (b) to meet
minimum standards of funding and (c) to guarantee
the adequacy of the plans’ assets. H.Rep. No. 533, 93
Cong., 1974 U.S. Code Cong., & Admin. News, p. 4639,
5655-5656.

The only question before the Court which will be
addressed by Amicus National Steel Corporation is
whether ERISA permits a monthly pension benefit pro-
vided under a negotiated, non-contributory pension plan
to be based, in part, on the workmen’s compensation
benefit that may be received by a retired plan partici-

pant.

In the companion cases of Buczynski v. The General
Motors Corporation and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Argument.

Circuit held that such workmen’s compensation offsets
were not prohibited by ERISA. The holding of that court
was based on the validity of Treasury Regulation 1.411
(a)-4(a) (1979) which expressly authorizes workmen’s
compensation offsets and on the court’s view that Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit such offsets.

On November 3, 1980, the Court noted probable
jurisdiction in the appeal of Alessi et al., and granted
the petition for writ of certiorari of Buczynski et al.,
and consolidated the cases.

On January 6, 1981, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Utility Workers
Union of America v. Consumers Power Company (No.
78-1402, January 6, 1981). In that case the Sixth Circuit
held that workmen’s compensation offsets were a for-
feiture prohibited by ERISA. The basis for the Sixth
Circuit’s holding was that pension benefits and social
security benefits (which may be used to offset p asion
benefits) have the same “source of entitlement.” On
the other hand the Sixth Circuit reasoned that work-
men’s compensation benefits are paid solely because an
employee has sustained an occupational injury within
the course of his employment. Thus, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that workmen’s compensation benefits were
not part of “an integrated and correlated retirement
system” that could be used to offset pension benefits
under ERISA.1

1. Interestingly in reaching that conclusion the
Sixth Circuit failed to note its prior decision in Lofty v.
Richardson, 440 F.2d 114 (C.A. 6, 1971) in which it up-
held the constitutionality of reducing social security dis-
ability benefits by the amount of workmen’s compensa-
tion benefits received where the total received under the
two programs exceeds 80 percent of previous average
monthly wages.

Argument.

In this brief we will attempt not to restate the
presentation of Appellants Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. Employee Retirement
Plan and of Respondent The General Motors Corpora-
tion. We will address ourselves to certain arguments
of the Appellants and Petitioners and to the opinion of
the Sixth Circuit in Utility Workers concerning Con-
gress’ intent in adopting an anti-forfeiture provision;
the nature of workmen’s compensation benefits vis-a-vis
retirement benefits; and the role of collective bargaining
with respect to such benefits.

II. Workmen’s Compensation Offsets Are Integral Fac-
tors In The Computation And Determination Of A
Pension Plan’s Benefits And Thus Are Not A Pro-
hibited Forfeiture.

The pension plans which are the subject of this case
provide, in effect, that the retirement benefit which a
retired employee is entitled to receive will be reduced
or offset by the amount of the workmen’s compensa-
tion benefit, if any, that he receives from his former
employer or on his former employer’s behalf. There is
no provision in ERISA which expressly prohibits such
a provision. Indeed, the pertinent Treasury Regulations
specifically permit such an offset as do those of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See Treasury
Regulations on Income Tax, 26 C.F.R. Section 1.411(a)
—4(a); 29 C. F. R. Section 2605.2. Nevertheless the Ap-
pellants, Petitioners and United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit contend that such a provision con-
stitutes a forfeiture prohibited by ERISA since a com-
pany could legitimize any forfeiture of vested pension
benefits simply by including the forfeiture into the pen-
sion plan’s computation procedures. We submit, how-

Argument.

ever, that this reasoning misconstrues the meaning of
the term “forfeiture” and fails to recognize Congress’
intent in enacting the anti-forfeiture provisions of
ERISA.

Section 203(a) of ERISA and Section 411(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code each require that “an employee’s
right to his ‘normal retirement benefit’ [be] nonfor-
feitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age.“
(Emphasis supplied.) Each section also provides that
a plan must meet certain vesting requirements under
which an employee- participant must be entitled to a
certain specified percentage of his “accrued benefit“
after a specified number of years of service.

The terms “accrued benefit” and “normal retire-
ment benefit” are defined in Section 3 of ERISA for
purposes of Section 203(a), and they are also defined
in Section 411 of the Internal Revenue Code. The term
“normal retirement benefit” is defined in ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code as “the greater of the early
retirement benefit under the plan or the benefit under
the plan commencing at normal retirement age.” “Ac-
crued benefit” is defined in ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code in the case of a defined benefit plan (as
are the plans here) as “the individual’s accrued benefit
determined under the plan . . . expressed in the form of
an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement
age.”

Finally the definition of the term nonforfeitable“
is contained in Section 3(19) of ERISA. That section
states that the term nonforfeitable, when used with
respect to a pension benefit or right—

means a claim obtained by a participant or his
beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred

Argument.

benefit under a pension plan which arises from the
participant’s service, which is unconditional, and
which is legally enforceable against the plan. (Em-
phasis supplied.)

Thus, the term “nonforfeitable” does not apply to
the manner in which benefits are to be computed. Rather
these sections provide that once an employee has com-
pleted a certain number of years of service he must be
entitled to receive some benefit and the benefit which
he is entitled to receive cannot be taken away from him.
Put simply, Congress was concerned that after several
years with an employer, an employee have a vested right
to receive a promised benefit,

Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the pertinent
legislative history (S. Rep. No. 383, 93 Cong., 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, 4890, 4930) :

Unless an employee’s rights to his accrued
pension benefits are nonforfeitable, he has no as-
surance that he will ultimately receive a pension.
Thus, pension rights which have slowly been stock-
piled over many years may suddenly be lost if the
employee leaves or loses his job prior to retirement.

Today slightly over two thirds of the private
pension plans provide some vested rights to pension
benefits before retirement. However, as a general
rule, employees do not acquire vested rights until
they have been employed for a fairly long period
with a firm or are relatively mature. Since there
is no general applicable legal requirement for pre-
retirement vesting, some plans do not offer this
type of vesting at all, and among those plans which
do, there is no uniformity in the vesting rules as

Argument.

provided. At present, only one out of every three
employees participating in employer-financed plans
has a 50 percent or greater vested right to his ac-
crued pension benefits. As a result, even employees
with substantial periods of service may lose pension
benefits on separation from employment. Extreme
cases have been noted in which employees have
lost pension rights at advanced ages as a result
of being discharged shortly before they would be
eligible to retire.

x * —

For reasons indicated above, the committee
concluded that it is necessary and desirable to pro-
vide a minimum standard of vesting for all qualified
pension plans. (Emphasis supplied.)

The pension plans in question here, like most pen-
sion plans containing workmen’s compensation offsets,
provide for a normal retirement benefit that takes into
account any workmen’s compensation benefits received
by a retired employee from the employer or on its be-
half. Accordingly, the workmen’s compensation offset
is an integral factor in the plans’ computation and deter-
mination of benefits to which a retired employee is en-
titled. Thus, it is not a forfeiture (1) of a normal retire-
ment benefit or (2) of an accrued benefit as those terms
are defined in ERISA. Rather, the workmen’s compensa-
tion offset is used to determine the amount of a partici-
pant’s normal retirement benefit to be received under
the plan. Calling the offset a forfeiture is irreconcilable
with the fact that the offset is a factor used to deter-
mine a normal retirement benefit. Thus, we submit that
the offset cannot be considered a forfeiture of that bene-
fit.

9
Argument.

The cases relied upon by Appellants (Br. 14, 15)
and Petitioners (Br. 20, 21) Winer v. Edison Brothers
Stores Pension Plan, 447 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Mo., 1978) ;
Keller v. Graphic Systems of Akron, Inc., 422 F. Supp.
1005 (N.D. Ohio, 1976) ; Lewis v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa., 1977);
Amory v. Boyden Associates, 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.
N.Y., 1976); and Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570
F. 2d 406 (C. A. 2, 1977) do not compel a different con-
clusion. These cases dealt with the validity of denying
a participant a benefit on account of his entering the
employ of a competitor rather than with the validity
of computing a participant’s normal retirement or ac-
crued benefit, That is, they involve provisions which
result in a complete denial of all pension obligations,
while the provisions in question here involve the deter-
mination of the amount of the benefit to which the par-
ticipant is entitled.

Thus, these cases reflect Congress’ concern with
employees’ vested rights in retirement benefits not being
forfeitable, rather than with the formula used to com-
pute retirement benefits payable under a plan. Here, of
course, the worker’s right to his benefit is not disturbed
by the workmen’s compensation offset. Unlike the sit-
uation in the cases supra, where the retired employee
lost his right to receive any benefit under the plan, a
retired employee under the plans here receives the total
benefit to which he is entitied regardless whether that
benefit is paid under the plan alone or under the plan
and under workmen’s compensation.

The Sixth Circuit in Utility Workers Union (Slip.
Op. 7) stated:

10
Argument,

If this Court were to accept the reasoning of
defendants, a Company could legitimize any for-
feiture of vested pension benefits simply by includ-
ing the forfeiture into [sic] its pension plans’ com-
pensation procedures. Such result, however, would
be contrary both to the provisions and the spirit of
ERISA.

Yet our position here is not contrary to that of the
Sixth Circuit with respect to the plan provisions that
would deprive an employee of all the benefits due to him
under the terms of a plan. Rather we only contend that
an offset is not a forfeiture where, as here, it provides
that the benefits payable by a plan are reduced if the
retired employee receives benefits of a like kind from
his employer or on his employer’s behalf. Thus, where,
as here, the net effect of the offset is to provide retired
employees with a total monthly benefit from an em-
ployer that is equal to the entire benefit provided under
the pension plan, it should not be considered a for-
feiture.

11
Argument.

III. The Nature Of Workmen’s Compensation And Re-
tirement Benefits Does Not Preclude Offsetting Pen-
sion Benefits Since Those Benefits Are Duplicative.

It is almost universally recognized that workmen’s
compensation benefits and retirement benefits paid un-
der a pension plan serve the same purpose—to recom-
pense an employee for his loss of earning power. Thus,
if a retired employee were to receive concurrently work-
men’s compensation benefits and retirement benefits un-
der a pension plan, he would be receiving a duplicate
benefit while suffering only one wage loss.

Petitioners, Appellants and the Sixth Circuit fail to
recognize the similar nature and purpose of such ben-
efits. In Utility Workers Union the Sixth Circuit (Slip.
Op. 20) quoted the District Court in that case:

both the healthy and the maimed retirees
would receive the same post-retirement income even
though the burdens on the two are clearly disparate.

Even though this may be the case, we submit that
it is not inequitable and that it should make no difference
in determining the benefits that a retired worker will
receive. Those who believe the contrary are under the
mistaken belief that workmen’s compensation provides
for a quasi-tort recovery rather than a means of pro-
tecting against wage loss. Indeed, an analysis of the
nature of workmen’s compensation payments and pen-
sion retirement benefits reveals that each is designed
to compensate an employee for his loss of earning power
while a recovery in tort is intended to make whole those
who have been wronged.

Professor Arthur Larson, who is this country’s lead-
ing authority on the subject of workmen’s compensation,

12
Argument.

characterizes workmen’s compensation as a wage loss
protection system, similar to social security and private
pensions, which, of course, are also means of protecting
against wage loss. Moreover, Professor Larson rec-
ognizes that the nature and purpose of workmen’s
compensation differ fundamentally from damages re-
coverable as the result of the commission of a tort.
First, the payment of workmen’s compensation is de-
pendent only upon the occurrence of a work-connected
injury. Neither negligence nor fault of the employer or
the employee are taken into account in determining
whether an employee is entitled to payment. Second, the
social philosophy behind workmen’s compensation is
that of providing protection and support and preventing
destitution rather than righting a wrong—the concern
of tort law. Third, unlike tort recoveries, under work-
men’s compensation the only injuries for which com-
pensation will be received will be those producing a
disability with a resulting loss in edrning power. More-
over, the compensation will not restore to a claimant
what he has lost. Rather, the compensation when added
to the claimant’s remaining earning ability will pre-
sumably enable him to exist without being a burden to
others. See 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law,
§§1.00, 2.00-2.70.2

2. Professor Larson’s view of workmen’s compen-
sation is rooted in and supported by the cases. See e.g.
Heidier v. Industrial Comm’n., 482 P.2d 889 (Ariz. App.,
1971) (Only disability from accident was sexual im-
potence which did not affect earning capacity. Claimant
not entitled to benefits for disability, in the absence
of a loss of earning capacity.) ; Puffer Mercantile Co. v.
Arellano, 546 P.2d 481 (Colo., 1975) (Loss of testicle did
not result in loss of earning capacity so that claimant
not entitled to award.) ; Scott v. C. E. Powell Coal Co.,

13
Argument.

For this reason Professor Larson recognizes that
both workmen’s compensation and retirement benefits
payable under a pension plan are elements in an overall
wage-loss protection system and rejects the concept
that a worker should receive workmen’s compensation
benefits and retirement benefits as a result of that wage
loss (4 Larson §§97.10, 97.51) :

Wage-loss legislation is designed to restore to
the worker a portion, such as one-half or two-thirds,
of wages lost due to the three major causes of wage-
loss: physical disability, economic unemployment,
and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of
wage loss; the cause of the wage loss merely dic-
tates the category of legislation applicable. Now if
a workman undergoes a period of wage loss due to
all three conditions, it does not follow that he
should receive three sets of benefits simultaneously
and thereby recover more than his actual wage. He
is experiencing only one wage loss, and in any logi-
cal system, should receive only one wage-loss bene-
fit. (Emphasis supplied.)

With specific respect to pension plan offsets Professor
Larson states:

Although avoidance of duplication cannct ordinar-
ily be achieved under American statutes in these

402 Pa. 73, 166 A.2d 31 (1960) (No recovery for loss of
taste and smell.) ; Fisher v. Consolidated Freight Wrap,
Inc., 12 Ore. App. 417, 507 P.2d 53 (1973) (Pain and
suffering not compensable unless the pain is disabling. )
Thus the courts and Professor Larson have recognized
that workmen’s mye ypc ay payments are only to be
made for the loss of earning power and that they are
not the same as a recovery in tort.

14

Argument.

cases by, so to speak, trimming at the compensa-
tion end, it is frequently achieved by express lan-
guage trimming at the private plan end, that is, by
reducing the private benefits by the amount of any
compensation payments. Even when the language
of the plan is not specific, a court may give the
benefit of the doubt to a construction that will avoid
over-lapping payments . . The implication seems
to be that duplication of benefits, even between a
private pension and a compensation act, is so abhor-
rent to the court that the language of the pension
scheme does not even “make sense” if it results in
such duplication. (Emphasis supplied. )

Various courts considering the question prior to ERISA
reached this same conclusion. In Fielder v. Travelers In-
surance Company, 79 Mich. App. 449, 263 N.W. 2d 9
(1977), the Michigan Court of Appeals held valid a
workmen’s compensation offset in a pension plan because
(79 Mich. App. 452) :

The purpose of workmen’s compensation is to
recompense an employee for his loss of earning
capacity due to a work-related injury. Gasparick v.
H. C. Price Construction Co., 399 Mich. 433, 490,
247 N. W. 2d 824 (1976). Similarly, we construe
pension benefits as compensation for loss in earning
capacity occasioned by the employee’s ultimate re-
tirement. Where, as here, early retirement is pre-
cipitated by a work-related injury for which the
employee is receiving workmen’s compensation, we
find nothing offensive in a private contractual ar-
rangement in which the employer and employee
agree that the employee shall not be twice com-
pensated for the same loss of earning capacity.

15
Argument.

Similarly, Mazor v. State of Maryland, 279 Md. 355,
369 A.2d 82 (1977), involved a workmen’s compensation
offset. There, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated
(at 369 A.2d 88) :

Our holding recognizes that workmen’s compensa-
tion is one facet of an overall system of wage-loss
protection, and that the underlying principle of the
system is to restore to the workers a portion of
wages lost by physical disability, unemployment,
or old age. It follows that although two or more
causes of wage loss may coincide, the benefits need
not be cumulative, for the worker experiences but
one wage loss.

Thus, the authorities and courts have recognized
that it would be contrary to public policy and incon-
sistent with the nature of pension benefits and work-
men’s compensation to prohibit workmen’s compensation
offsets. Indeed, if such offsets were not allowed, a retired
employee might well receive combined payments from a
pension plan and from workmen’s compensation that
exceed his pre-retirement income.3

Finally, in Utility Worker’s Union the Sixth Cireuit
questioned (Slip. Op. 19) why a worker should seek
workmen’s compensation benefits if those benefits would
result in an offset of his pension benefits. The question
fails to recognize that often a worker will seek and
receive workmen’s compensation benefits before he re-

3. See e.g. Utility Workers Union, Appellant’s
Brief p. 7, where it is stated that if the workmen’s com-
pensation offset was invalidated certain plaintiffs would
receive workmen’s compensation benefits and on
benefits totaling 119 percent of their pre-re ent
wages.

16
Argument.

tires. If he is partially disabled, he may continue to
receive those benefits after he returns to work and after
his retirement. Thus, a worker would elect to apply for
workmen’s compensation benefits, notwithstanding the
offset, because of the immediate benefit he would receive.

Thus, we submit that the nature of workmen’s
compensation benefits is such that they may be properly
offset against pension benefits. Whether an employee’s
income is reduced because of retirement or because of
injury he has suffered only one wage loss and he may
be compensated for that wage loss by receiving benefits
from a pension plan, social security or workmen’s com-
pensation. Regardless of the source of those benefits he
should be compensated only once.

IV. Disallowing The Workmen’s Compensation Offsets
Will Provide An Unexpected Windfall For Em-
ployees And A Costly And Unanticipated Burden
For Employers.

Petitioners (Br. 32-35) and Appellants (Br. 18) go
to great pains to argue that retirement benefits are
wages earned during the course of employment but
payable after the completion of the work career. The
implication of their argument is that the workmen’s
compensation offset would deprive them of the deferred
wages which they have earned. This argument mis-
conceives the role that collective bargaining plays in
determining the pension benefits that a retired em-
ployee is entitled to receive.

When an employer and a union enter into collective
bargaining, they ultimately agree to the division of an

17
Argument.

economic package of a certain value. The form of ben-
efits provided to employees in such a package includes
wages and such fringe benefits as retirement benefits
paid under a pension plan. Thus, when an employer, such
as Amicus National Steel or the employers here, agrees
to provide pension benefits to its workers, it must take
into account the cost of providing those benefits. The
anticipated cost of providing those benefits under a plan
which contains a workmen’s compensation offset re-
flects any savings represented by the offset which could
be achieved either by way of a decreased pension lia-
bility or a decreased workmen’s compensation liability.
This anticipated savings results in a greater pension
benefit or the provision of a different benefit that would
not have been available absent the offset.5 This fact was
implicitly recognized by the Court in Los Angeles Dept.
of Power and Water v. Manhart 435 U.S. 702. In dis-
cussing the effect that the allowance of a retroactive
recovery would have on pension plans, the Court stated:

4. Although this argument is addressed to the
economic effect that prohibiting workmen’s compensa-
tion offsets would have on employers like National Steel
Corporation who adopt pension plans pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement, the economic effect
would also be the same on employers who adopt pension
plans outside of a collective bargaining situation.

5. Prior to the institution of the cases challenging
the validity of workmen’s compensation offsets, em-
ployers and unions se nag | employees would have
had no reason to doubt the validity of such offsets. As
noted, supra, Treasury Regulation 411(a)-4(a) specific-
ally permits such offsets. Furthermore, in Rev. Rul. 68-
243, 1968-1 C.B. 167, the Internal Revenue Service held
that benefits payable under a state workmen’s compen-
sation law or an occupational disease law could be an
eT offset against benefits payable under a quali-

plan.

18
Argument.

These plans, like other forms of insurance, depend
on the accumulation of large sums to cover con-
tingencies. The amounts set aside are determined
by a painstaking assessment of the insurer’s likely
liability. (Emphasis supplied. )

Thus, if workmen’s compensation offsets are not per-
mitted employees will receive greater than bargained for
total benefits and employers will be saddled with un-
anticipated and burdensome costs. Moreover, in future
years, other economic benefits provided to employees
will necessarily be reduced by the added cost of dis-
allowing workmen’s compensation offsets.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. VOLK

THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG
2900 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
(412) 288-7771

WILLIAM W. SCOTT, JR.

CARL H. HELLERSTEDT, I x.
JEFFREY S. BLUM

THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG
2900 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2514%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
