# Petitioners Brief — Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 453 U.S. 1

## Text

Nos. 79-1711; 79-1754; 79-1760; 80-12 (Cons

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

$< -—-

CITY OF NEW YORK AND ABRAHAM BEAME,
Petitioners (79-1760,

—Y —

NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION
AND GOSTA LOVGREN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

RRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
CITY OF NEW YORK AND BEAME

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel

of the City of New York
Attorney for Petitioners

City of New York and Beame
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007
(212) 566-2091

LEONARD KOERNER,
STEPHEN P. KRAMER,

of Counsel.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED*

1. Whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. (& Supp. I) §§ 1251 et seq., and the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 32 U.S.C. (& Supp. I)
§§ 1401 et seq., imply a private right of action independent of
the rights explicitly created by the citizen suit provisions of
those Acts, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365 and 1415(g).

2. Whether a private citizen has standing to maintain a
federal common law nuisance action for alleged damages re-
sulting from ocean pollution as a general federal question
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3. Whether any federal common law nuisance action for
alleged damages resulting from ocean pollution, if available to
a private citizen, is not preempted by the present regulatory
scheme governing ocean pollution established by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act.

° The other parties not appearing in the caption named as appellees in

the court below were the United States Environmental Protection
Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency; United States Army
Corps of Engineers; Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary
of the United States Department of the Army; Bergen County Sewer
Authority; The Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; Passaic
Valley Sewerage Commissioners; Middlesex County Sewerage Author-
ity; The Linden Roselle Sewerage Authority; Middletown Sewerage
Authority; the City of Glen Cove; and the City of Long Beach. Others
named as parties in the District Court were the New York Department
of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as
Commissioner of the New York Department of Environmental Conser-
vation; New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; David J.
Bardin, individually and as Commissioner of New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection; County of Westchester Department of
Environmental Facilities; and the West Long Beach Sewer District.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: ois ccc cdcvebecddnclenun i
TABLE OF AUTHORITICS 0ocvicscckilslnn LS Vv
CAPE RAW a 6 coda ood ch akehacibee Lee |
PUP ne as RIES is kd bose doeahede ince 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......... 1, la-15a
SIATEMENT OF THE CAGE ooo cca ocicnkave cS ]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................... 2)
RPE ES icc nedvvaddsuwben cianeeeel eee
The Water Pollution Control Statutes Here In
Issue Contain Explicit Statutory Remedies Which
Define Citizen Rights. No Other Remedies Can Be
SN ov pks kd taccecudencdl eee 1]
POPREOS Wek vie sccinns 4h cuee cnackcne eee
Congress Has Determined That State Common
Law, Not Federal, Is To Provide The Rule Of
Decision For Torts Occurring In The Territorial
Waters Of The United States And That The
United States Would Not Assert General Jurisdic-
tion Over Ocean Waters Adjacent To Territorial
Waters. No Basis Exists For The Creation Of A
Federal Common Law Nuisance Claim For Ocean
Pollution Assertable By Private Parties ......... 15

ot |: eer per wom rE cern Fle See |
The Clean Water And The Marine Protection Acts
Present A Comprehensive Scheme For The
Achievement Of Levels Of Water Quality Which
Protect State Sovereign Interests And The Public
Health And Welfare. The Statutory Scheme
Leaves No Room For The Development Of Com-

- PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |

iv

PAGE
mon Law Standards Of Acceptable Levels Of
Pollution Or Water Quality.................... 30

ec te Pie 35
Appendix of Relevant Statutory Provisions
1) Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,
ae U.0.C. (Supp. Il) 1401 ef g0g. . 0.0... oc ccc ccwccs la
2) The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
(Supp. II) sections 1332, 1333, and 1339............ 8a
3) The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
(1976) (superseded) sections 1332 and 1333.......... l4a

4) The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 33 U.S.C.
ESOi(e) and 1311(a) and (d) .......... ccc c cece cece 1Sa

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE
Aqua Slide ’N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety

Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831 (Sth Cir. 1978).............. 33
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)............ 31
Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411

She MY ag week wa Whee Soa Oil ad hae ke 22, 29
CETA Workers’ Organizing Committee v. City of New

Yore, G17 F.20 926 (2nd Cir. 1900)... ccc cc cccees 12
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441

Re a 7, Sipe ener gai Gir ah treo an a> Pane sea neem 12
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542

SR ee Bs CAP enn ee ai ay ar meen es ee 28
City of Evansville, Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling

Corp., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) ............... 12
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

ARCS La Ad ewe BEER eee a CA au wands ies 8a 22
Committee for Jones Falls Falls Sewage System v. Train,

See dee ee ee is STON ios 6 a vs bce e ss ob ao) 34
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d

Rr I he as a ae 29
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931)..... ae
Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.,

Gat Wome ee GO Paik dice ib does deena. 18
Core VM, Se SI, Bate hiv tk kok Cah vec dowkanews 14
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 48 U.S.L.W. 4243,

PO, FeSO ra Ste Tt, TW 6s wks sv oecserivvane. 5

Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) . 27

vi

PAGE

Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).17, 20,

33
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit & Insur-

oer Game. 515 U.S; OCF IGE)... oo. Sree bcc ck 22
Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel.

State Water Resources Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976)... 4
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)........ 18, 21
Ethyl Corp. v. E.PRA., 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),

CONT. a. SOD UB. BOE AIO ivk os ove kk eb da cae, 34
Forrester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 559

Ree POOR ME ROPER erga ee i 33
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) .19, 20
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713 (1865)... 17
Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140

re MN ave Ak ado vk bac deeb Sr 19
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ...11, 19-21,

29-31
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) ............. 21
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) .............. 20
Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930)............. 20
Miree v. DeKalb Co., 433 U.S. 25 (1977) ............. 18
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) .............. 20
Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Comm’n, 557 F.2d

Pe A PPR es coe cle ki, ret ue 33
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883)...... 20
New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953)......... 20
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)... 29
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) ......... 33

North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923)...... 21

Vii

PAGE
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493
I hie ceca. Been wu blew ae hae Oe eee ae 22
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976)....... 20
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ............. 18
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. i151 (1978)..... 31
Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. v. Dept. of
Transportation of New Jersey, 423 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir.
RG. bis uke 046i haben de decduee dene 18
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352
RRR Pes SR rari pre te Rogar trees ep he SH. 24
Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918) .......... 27
Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940) ....... 28
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
0 PO Perry ee grt rem Na? 14, 22

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) . 14

Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569

oe Fe ae pe ee eee 26
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)... 20
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)........ 23
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965)....... 27

United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 415 (1816) 17
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 32 (1812). 17

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) ........ 26, 27
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Ce: EE Rc Gee Caran 6d vce bbaNicwnseceunesea 18
United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (Sth Cir.
SNK Gad vv ckvahke cabs lowen beienwbk skeen 27

Viii

PAGE
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
SN ds Fen! foo eon ya OCOD bok ke 18
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332
en SUR ose di ben ok ove sabtuesudon. ik. 23
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
Wass ka ry ei ge ar ey te 5
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63
SEY 650 NGS VAM Nae ake eo aks cake Eee a cd ia, 18
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591; (1634) «... 6.5. 17, 18
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 CU a bckien sued 23

Willamette Iron Bridge Co. vy. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1880) 16-19
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) .... 20

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389
WN edn Se er ee So 34

Statutes, Proclamations and International Conventions

Act of August 11, 1888, c. 860, § 9 (25 Stat. 424)...... 18
Clean Air Act, Section 304(e), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II)
PM Rit a Peti en did $ 00d vos sides oo, 12, 13

Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.

Ree fae Se} Re nn cia passim
Pe Pie ges o a eo ee 14
Bae MAEMO 55 f0.d ae vids koe bach ceri onc, 3, 34
Me I hae oS ela ee oy 6
oi Lo: EO 34
i et ee 3, 4,3

ix

PAGE
De PEs RERUN 560-06 6.6.06 he vuchw baeinune wees 3
EEE e CLES sy Nn abd heehee ed cab kee cae 3
i a as Cie eke Lat ane pee ate ee Dua ees 3
i PEC b bce. ia kihee ahs s 4 Ke s.cma cama ws 4
MOMs Ask caboas hs ck soak eb ccene coeaes 4
Ss SED So isd anc pedinasbebasaeuna Wan’ 4
SE, SP as has bask A kw ea ee ayers so eke Ne 5, 14, 30,
31
EE er Terre for eee rere re 3
i cigs ees le tho ce ace aks 6 owen 4
i Ch Sok aus Cas Gos we CK Ok MK Me Oar weeek 6 4
Pr RE ik os 6 SF ihe Cada banecuedeanwe sens 5
Se srg Es Si ae 84 0 wa 'e-p re 4's 60 Se Ne 8A .
A ge ORE en Seen 5, 31
Be Biudytrs COMMUCAPHOMSD 65 bs oda buco obs wad dee weeie 5, 6, 31
ey ns SEED 66's hiens bd eckson es aap eens 6
ME Stas is Sie nah Rada dee oe bbe Rew 5
eh EI 6 oats borane wake ea kha Cheese aS 6, 30
eS aos 6 44g b 9594598 BAKE Ree e ene hs eRe 4, 6, 30
EE dis ehh ates ewae b bh Gea aK a Ao a owe 3
Pe eas RUGS vk wa ace v6 Pabewas peda ede ee ks 12
Pe as Sai aa pv dN Veoh ees RAK Le SOS Re Ka yee 4
Lag Dy. SIRRRERS TR Snare Mr oan Pr aor ee PIR CIR 3
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29
Sins Se: MERE UE a coe s bw iva cbiea ees us 12
Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 2313,
NE aU ins 5. sob whee eo0-0u Cece Ca Meee es 26

PAGE

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
Beh Aigis POG EN EROS «slick 0's 0b Se ov 6a eb ae 8

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 15 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (1964) 26

Exec. Proc. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 59 Stat. 884........ 23
Sh UA... TR lee aa webcast 12
Interstate Sanitation Commission, 49 Stat. 932 ........ 5

Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 1052, as amended
by Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 and Pub. L. No.
95-153, 91 Stat. 1255, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401-

DOF cb cs NCb anes seve ts-0s0619 eee passim
SO OS... LAGI oso vn ius veeenc dean eae eee 7
Po Sirs PORE va uv iveg biweecekeeaeouelane eeu 7
Bo Gahan WOM s vo e's Sched) 4545 Ned ek ee 7
DF Cites SORE 0 ck kus bh as vy ean es ecu cen cae 7, 30, 31
39 OA. Ge PIRI svi ves chct eae tee 9
nA, ARB seek ccneasivedhbioieaeen ee 7
Pe Wins MERA nhs swsknke sy ¥ seen eaeeeeaens 12

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.
(1976 & Supp. II) 1331-1343, 67 Stat. 462-470..... 1, 24, 25

SS USC. GPE ERR 6 5 so ivckcs ducevaniekeens 24
43 UBC. GIOFED BRIO b's once Uiwsscdescawaesecanel 25
8S USL. CEPR FE vin kins scaxcacunnaadbecueeeun 24, 25
A3-U.5.C. Gam SE CORRES ov eck a cunanca beensanuen 25
43 U.S.C. Gong. EE) BIBI oy onisisinvc vineconvencebts 25

43 U.5.C, Comp. FE) ASR oon aca cediaceaee 25

xi

PAGE
Sn ME, BED ROWOERPLED ccc ccc ccececscccccens 25
a Mn, GED EPPLUME). co ccveccccccvscccceces 25
ee RE) | 25
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, 33
es as Cue e wate w 08 449 6009 0:00 0 6, 18
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315....1, 15,
24
Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 209, 33
Ec iden cb abacecebichecceeevesas 6
ous Sa swt bua Wb cb incctddessavect 10, 19, 20,
22
Regulations
nL sO. kts Ve ea an wh ewes Us ewnadesece 3
Te ect W eed ek bends seees teehee’. 3
RE I ee eee ee eee 5
ee ee 8 | | oe
NE BET 6 ns 660s. cdccacistecvavececas 7, 8, 30
40 C.F.R. Part 227, Subpart (B), Subpart (C); 227.3,
ere i Cian ckG Cah vA dhe vase do scenes’ 8,9
I NE ob eds ccccccccccsdeccccscesuse 7,8
Cee GS. i Ne ages bance cds te.c 8
i ee ee seca ccsecesesccacseseseness 5
Ne ee bi tenn seeeenn es eeesbed nn’ 3
es hs eek basins Ons i 6b-oes esau 4
Miscellaneous:

Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro, Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler,
The Federal Courts and the Federal System, (2nd ed.
eee kk onde dveca es eencaadess 17, 28

xii

W. Bishop, /nternational Law (3rd ed. See Gao oe 21, 27

Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act:
Key to a New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 2334 (1953) .. 25

Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials (2nd ed.

POPE Se eh ve Wha hve caU hoc banal cease 21
Friendly, Jn Praise of Erie—and the New Federal Com-

mon Law, 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 383 (1964). ... 22
Heinzen, The Three Mile Limit: Preserving The Freedom

of the Seas, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1959)............ 24
H.R. Rep. 92-361, 92 Cong., Ist Sess.........cccccc. 6

A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print. 1973). .12, 13

Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States

Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665 (1959) ........ 21
Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) ................. 33
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L.

igh Beach io. ORE PO eer On eee 20, 32, 33
S. Rep. No. 411, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1953) ......... 25
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. ........... 13
S. Rep. No. 92-451, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess............. =e

S. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1971) 13

Schwartzenberger, The Dynamics of International Law
GOP ah koh db eal oubh cies iis kk ive cies ian 27

Von Moschzisker, R., Common Law and Our Federal
Jurisprudence, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 270, 367 (1925) 23

Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
OF GOMRW. Ea, TRL OP CIUEIR s scead dns occ lkecn 17

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 616 F.2d
1222. The opinion and judgment of the court of appeals are
reproduced in the Middlesex Appendix at la and 37a. The
opinion of the district court is not officially reported and is
reproduced in the Middlesex Appendix at 40a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Middlesex Appendix
38a) was entered on February 5, 1980. A timely petition for
certiorari was filed by petitioners herein on May 5, 1980. An
order granting the petition for certiorari and consolidating it
with Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 was entered on October
20, 1980 (Joint Appendix 48a). The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. I) 1251 et seq. are reproduced
in the Middlesex Appendix at 72a ef seg. The pertinent provi-
sions of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,
33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401 ef seg., the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1331 ef seg., and the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 33 U.S.C. 1301 ef seq. are
reproduced in an Appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Pleadings and Proceedings Below

Respondent National Sea Clammers Association is an asso-
ciation whose members make their living harvesting fish and
shellfish from the water and ocean beds of the Atlantic Ocean
near New York and New Jersey. Respondent Lovgren is an

2

individual similarly employed. Petitioners City of New York
and Beame,' and the other parties in the District Court, are
various federal, state and local officials and governmental
departments that are charged with environmental! protection or
are responsible for sewage treatment and disposal.

Respondents allege that petitioners discharged or permitted
the discharge of certain nutrient-rich sewage and toxic wastes
into the Atlantic Ocean or its tributaries. Respondents com-
plained of discharges allegedly made both in compliance with
and in violation of federal regulatory statutes. They alleged
that in 1976 these discharges caused death and other adverse
effects on marine life, and, as a result, they sustained business
losses.

The local governments discharge treated and untreated sew-
age from pipes (“point sources”) into the territorial waters off
their respective states pursuant to federal permits. In addition,
sewage sludge, a by-product of modern sewage treatment, is
placed in vessels which transport the materials and discharge
them at various locations approximately 12 miles off the
United States coastline. This dumping is also done pursuant to
federal permits.

The complaint was dismissed by the district court on motions
for summary judgment, with prejudice, on all claims except for
two said to arise under state law which were dismissed without
prejudice. The court of appeals reversed the order of dismissal
of those claims based upon the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376, the Marine Protection, Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. 1401-1444, the federal
common law of nuisance, and the maritime tort law.

l Edward I. Koch replaced Abraham Beame as Mayor of the City of
New York on January 1, 1978. Abraham Beame was sued individually
and in his official capacity as Mayor.

3

B. Regulatory Scheme of the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act? provides for both federal and state
regulatory power over the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters, which are defined as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C.
1362(7). Federal technology-based effluent limitations for all
discrete point sources of pollution must be met by certain
specified dates. For publicly owned treatment works, with
which we are concerned here, the Act requires application of
“secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator” of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“the Ad-
ministrator”) no later than July 1, 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)
(B), 1314(d)(1)), subject to extension to July 1, 1983 in speci-
fied instances. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1311(i). The secondary
treatment requirement may be modified for publicly owned
plants that discharge into marine waters upon a showing that
state water quality standards will not be violated and that other
potential uses of the waters will be protected. 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
II) 1311(h). By July 1, 1983, all publicly owned plants must
employ the “best practicable waste treatment technology over
the life of the works,” 33 U.S.C. (and Supp. II) 1311(b)(2)(B);
1281(g)(2)(A).

Discharges of untreated sewage resulting from overflows of
combined storm and sanitary sewage systems are not consid-
ered publicly owned treatment works requiring the application
of secondary treatment technology. See 40 C.F.R. 122.3(bb), 45
Fed. Reg. 33423 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 122.3).
Hence they are regulated by conditions in discharge permits
under 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C) and 1342 (a)(2). Congress re-
cently required the Administrator to submii a report on the
problem of combined storm and sanitary sewer overflows, 33

2 The Clean Water Act refers to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566. See also Act of Dec. 28, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906;
Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2467.

a

4

U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1375(c), but did not mandate that they be
eliminated.

In addition to his power to mandate the use of specific
technology and specific discharge limitations, the Administra-
tor also has authority to control water quality. Should a
particular discharge from a point source, or the collective
impact of a group of point sources, interfere with the attain-
ment of that level of water quality necessary to protect a broad
spectrum of potential uses, including protection of fish and
other wildlife, the Administrator may impose stricter standards
than those otherwise mandated. 33 U.S.C. 1312(a). However,
stricter standards may not be imposed under this authority if a
person affected by the proposed limitation demonstrates that
there is no “reasonable relationship between the economic and
social costs and the benefits to be achieved.” 33 U.S.C.
1312(b)(2).

The Administrator has been given powers supplementary to
those given in 33 U.S.C. 1312 over discharges into the oceans.
The Administrator is authorized to promulgate guidelines for
the degradation of the waters of the territorial seas, the
contiguous zone, and the oceans. 33 U.S.C. 1343. All dis-
charges must be made in compliance with the guidelines, which
take into account a broad array of environmental factors. See
45 Fed. Reg. 65942-54 (1980).

States are allowed to impose more stringent controls than
those imposed by federal authorities by either of two means.
First, States have blanket authority under federal law to impose
stricter effluent limitations on point sources within their juris-
diction than those imposed by the federal authorities.’ 33
U.S.C. 1370. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Califor-
nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200,
218 (1976). Second, States may adopt overall water quality

3 One exception is that facilities built after 1972 in conformity with
applicable performance standards are given a grace period of up to ten
years. 33 U.S.C. 1316(d). See also 33 U.S.C. 1322(f) (marine sanitation
devices).

5

standards which may require a source to meet stricter effluent
limitations than federal technology-based limitations.‘ 33
U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C). No cost benefit analysis is required for a
State’s imposition of stricter effluent limitations.

tates are mandated to develop, subject to the
Administrator’s approval, water quality standards which cover
both intrastate and interstate waters. 33 U.S.C. 1313.° Since
these water quality standards must be reflected in any discharge
permit, 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C), including a permit for a point
source affecting the waters of a neighboring State, 33 U.S.C.
1341 (a)(2), the individual States are given a means of protect-
ing their waters from sources of out-of-state pollution. Out-of-
state discharges incompatible with another state’s water quality
standards must be controlled by the regulatory authority issu-
ing the permit to reflect the receiving state’s water quality
standards. Jd. The applicant for any discharge permit must
certify that the discharge will comply with applicable effluent
limitations and state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. 1341

(a)(1).

All interested parties, including a State whose water quality
standards may be affected by a discharge, are entitled to notice
and an opportunity for a hearing regarding the issuance of a
permit. See Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 48 U.S.L.W.
4243, No. 78-1472 (March 17, 1980); 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1),
1342(a)(1), (b)(3)-(b)(5), (j); 40 C.F.R. Parts 124-125; 45 Fed.
Reg. 3384 ef seq. (1980). An affected State may submit written
recommendations to the Administratcr or, if a State is adminis-
tering the discharge permits, to the permitting State. If the
permitting State does not accept the recommendations, it must

4 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d $22, 830 (7th Cir.
1977).

5 The Interstate Sanitation Commission, a tri-state agency created
pursuant to an agreement among New York, New Jersey and Connect-
icut to cope with pollution of New York Harbor and adjacent coastal
waters pursuant to an interstate compact, see 49 Stat. 932, has
esiablished water quality standards for coastal waters within its juris-
diction.

6

notify the affected State and the Administrator of its reasons.
33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(5). Thereafter the Administrator may refuse
to approve the permit, in which case the permit may not be
issued. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1342(d)(2).

Compliance with a permit is deemed compliance with speci-
fied sections of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1342(k). Most relevant here
is that the sections specified in section 1342(k) include 33
U.S.C. 1311 and 1343—the sections which require permits to
reflect effluent limitations necessary to protect state water
quality standards and the federal guidelines for the degradation
of the oceans. Hence compliance with a permit is deemed
compliance with both those specific statutory sections limiting
discharges of pollutants and with the water quality standards
imposed by either the discharger’s home State, any other State,
or the federal government.

C. Regulatory Scheme of the Marine Protection Act.

Prior to the enactment of the Marine Protection Act,* the
United States had no comprehensive law controlling the ocean
disposal of wastes.’ The Marine Protection Act, enacted in
response to increasing concerns regarding unregulated dump-
ing,* established a single, uniform regulatory scheme regarding

6 The Marine Protection Act refers to the Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 1052, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 and Pub. L. No. 95-153,
91 Stat. 1255, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401-1444.

7 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C. § 407,
and the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 209, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 441-451(b), authorized the Corps of Engineers to regulate dumping
within the navigable waters of the United States and beyond the
territorial seas where barges transporting materials for dumping passed
through the ports of New York, Baltimore or Hampton Roads, Vir-
ginia. Other federal statutes regulating the intentional or accidental
discharge of certain materials in ocean waters were even more limited in
scope, and unlike the 1888 and 1899 Acts did not require permits for
ocean disposal.

8 See H.R. Rep. 92-361, 92d Cong. Ist Sess.; S. Rep. No. 92-451, 92d
Cong. Ist Sess.

7

the dumping of material into ocean waters from vessels travel-
ling from the United States, or by any United States vessel, or
by any person if the dumping occurs in the territorial waters of
the United States or the contiguous zone.

The Marine Protection Act regulates the dumping of all
types of materials “to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into
ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect
human health, welfare or amenities, or the marine environ-
ment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities.” 33
U.S.C. 1401(b). Unless authorized by permit “[n]o person shall
transport from the United States . . . any material for the
purposes of dumping it into the ocean.” 33 U.S.C. 1411.
Permits for ocean dumping of dredged material are issued by
the Secretary of the Army through the Corps of Engineers and
permits for dumping of nondredged material, including sewage
sludge, are issued by the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. 1412, 1413.
In no event may dumping permits be issued except where the
Administrator or the Secretary determines that the “dumping
will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,
welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological
systems or economic potentialities.” 33 U.S.C. 1412(a),
1413(a). Nor may a permit be issued which will violate applica-
ble water quality standards 33 U.S.C. 1412(a). The Administra-
tor is required to promulgate criteria for the evaluation of
permit applications for disposal of both dredged and non-
dredged material. 33 U.S.C. 1412(a), 1413(b).

Fed. Reg. 28610. The regulations emphasized the environmen-
tal acceptability of ocean disposal of the wastes in question,
focusing primarily on their physical and chemical characteris-
tics. See 40 C.F.R. Part 227, as published at 38 Fed. Reg.
28618.

The regulations established several categories of permits.
Material that complied with the Part 227 numerical criteria
could qualify for a “special” three-year dumping permit. 40
C.F.R. 220.3(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 28614. Where the material could

8

not satisfy Part 227 limitations, but the applicant could show a
need to dump and lack of alternatives which outweighed
temporary or permanent environmental impacts, the regula-
tions authorized the Administrator to issue an “interim” permit
for a term of not more than one year. 40 C.F.R. 220.3(d), 38
Fed. Reg. 28614. Sites for dumping were designated in the
individual permits. 40 C.F.R. 223.1(d); 38 Fed. Reg. 28616.
Wastes which could present a hazard to fishing were to be
disposed of at sites precluding such an interference. 40 C.ER.
227.32; 38 Fed. Reg. 28619.

In 1977 the Administrator promulgated revisions to the
regulations. 42 Fed. Reg. 2462 (1977). These revisions were
prompted in part by ratification of the International Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.°
The revised regulations refined the criteria for determining
environmental acceptability. Instead of relying chiefly on a
simple description of the constituents of the material, the
regulations require bioassay tests to determine the actual effects
of the material on exposed marine organisms. See 40 C.ER.

9 In the fall of 1972, an intergovernmental conference held in London
adopted the Convention. At that time the United States signed the
Convention; and on August 3, 1973, the Senate gave its advice and
consent. The Convention was drafted

to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of wastes and
other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to
harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

Convention, Article I.

The Convention prohibits ocean disposal of materials containing
certain enumerated substances except under specified conditions. Con-
vention, Annex I. The Convention also requires that special care be
taken in the ocean disposal of certain other specified chemicals and
materials which are likely to pose obstacles to navigation. Convention,
Annex II.

On March 2%, 1974, Congress amended the Act to incorporate into
domestic law those features of the Convention which were not then
included in the basic statute. Public Law 93-254. 88 Stat. 50. That
amendment became effective on August 30, 1975.

9

Part 227, Subpart B. In addition, the 1977 regulations added
more specific provisions for assessing the need for the dump-
ing, 40 C.F.R. Part 227, Subpart C, and provided new require-
ments regarding the significance of the need factor. Interim
permits are available for the dumping of materials which do
not comport with certain environmental impact criteria if
specified prohibited materials are present only as trace ele-
ments, and if the need for dumping outweighs its environmen-
tal impact on potential other uses of the ocean. 40 C.F.R.
227.3.

Specific sites for the dumping of material, based on histori-
cal locations, were designated. The dumping of municipal
sewage sludge was continued at a location approximately
twelve miles from the shore. See 40 C.F.R. 228.12.

The Act was amended in 1978 to mandate the cessation of
municipal sewage sludge dumping by the end of 1981. Sewage
sludge was defined as that sludge which unreasonably degrades
the environment. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1412a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1)

The Clean Water and Marine Protection Acts each contain
an express provision authorizing any citizen or person to sue
“on his own behalf” to compel enforcement of the respective
statutes. The express remedies apply both to persons specially
injured and to those suing simply as private attorneys general;
the express remedies are the exclusive means to redress viola-
tions of the Acts.

The legislative history of the Clean Water Act, and the
legislative history of the Clean Air Act, on which the express
remedy was modeled, evidence a clear legislative intent to
preclude development of court-defined standards of reasonable
levels of water and air quality, or other court-developed reme-
dies beyond those explicitly authorized. Congress deliberately

10

chose not to create a damage remedy for violation of these
statutes. Damages, if available, may be sought only under State
law which is the traditional source of such a common law
entitlement. Creation of an implied right of action for damages
would be to create a remedy which Congress explicitly and
intentionally rejected.

(2)

There are explicit holdings by this Court that federal courts
have no jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims brought
by private parties regarding nuisances occurring in navigable
waters. While this Court has original jurisdiction under the
Constitution to adjudicate cases in which a State alleges that
the acts of another State, or acts of citizens in another State,
are interfering with its quasi-soverign interests, and the federal
district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 to
adjudicate these cases, the federal common law applied in these
disputes may not be asserted by private parties. Neither the
Constitution nor any statute authorizes actions by private
parties to seek redress of int state pollution under a federal
common law.

Analysis of the statutes and treaties governing the jurisdic-
tion and powers of the United States in the oceans adjacent to
its territorial waters demonstrates that Congress has not as-
serted sovereignty over these waters. An assertion of sov-
ereignty is a prerequisite to the development of a common law
determining competing property rights. Congress has carefully
defined those public and private rights it wishes recognized in
the ocean waters. These rights do not include a common law
available to private parties. Congress has expressed its sov-
ereign interest in the oceans adjacent to the United States in the
muititude of statutes it has passed regulating conduct in the
area; the legislative and political judgment of Congress should
not be supplemented by a court-developed common law of
legal duties and liabilities.

11
(3)

Congress has authorized the United States Environmental
Protection Agency to promulgate minimum discharge limita-
tions and water quality standards for the territorial seas of the
United States and the adjacent oceans. Congress has further
mandated that States adopt their own water quality standards
which are included by reference into federal discharge and
dumping permits. These statutory provisions—and particularly
the federally enforceable state water quality standards—have
given States a means of protecting their waters from sources of
out-of-state pollution. The need for development of a federal
common law identified in J/linois v. City of Milwaukee, 304
U.S. 64 (1972), has been satisfied by a statutory mechanism.
Moreover, state and federal discharge limitations and water
quality standards have been promulgated which in and of
themselves preempt common law standards. Should these stan-
dards be violated and damages result, state common law
affords redress.

POINT I

THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL STATUTES HERE

IN ISSUE CONTAIN EXPLICIT STATUTORY REME-

DIES WHICH DEFINE CITIZEN RIGHTS. NO OTHER
REMEDIES CAN BE IMPLIED.

The City of New York generally concurs with the arguments
submitted by the Solicitor General of the United States in the
Environmental Protection Agency’s petition for certiorari re-
garding the question as to whether the statutes in issue can be
construed to contain implied rights of action. We rely on the
position set forth in that petition, and submit only the follow-
ing additional observations:

1. The Court of Appeals concluded that the citizen suit
provisions of the two statutes, and their concomitant prerequi-
sites to suit, applied only to those plaintiffs who have no

12

personal stake in the lawsuit under traditional standing doc-
trines and not to those who allege special injury. This conclu-
sion has no basis in the statutory language. The Clean Water
Act provision provides that, subject to the notice requirement,
“any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf.”
33 U.S.C. 1365(a). The Marine Protection Act is identical
except for the use of the word “person” in place of “citizen.”
33 U.S.C. 1415(g). A person suing “on his own behalf” surely
includes a person who has been specially injured.

2. A common sense reading of the savings clause does not
support the inference that Congress intended to “preserve” an
unexpressed remedy available to private parties alleging special
injury. The savings clause preserves concurrent remedies—it
neither grants rights or remedies, nor acknowledges their exist-
ence under federal law. Compare Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (42
U.S.C. 1983 is an authorizing statute); see City of Evansville,
Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008,
1014 (7th Cir. 1979) (savings clause of Clean Water Act creates
no rights); see also CETA Workers’ Organizing Committee v.
City of New York, 617 F.2d 926 (2nd Cir. 1980) (savings clause
of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act lends no
support to inference of Congressional intent that implied right
of action existed concurrently with express right).

3. The legislative history of the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act demonstrates that it was modeled on a parallel
provision in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. A
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print 1973)
(hereafter “Leg. Hist.”) 1497. A review of the legislative
history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act
demonstrates an unequivocal intent of Congress not to save
“implied remedies” under the Clean Air Act itself or to
authorize a damage remedy for statutory violations.

In the original Senate version of the Clean Air Act amend-
ments, from which the citizen suit provision was derived, the

13

savings clause itself referred to saving rights “under other law.”
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. p. 123; see also p.
39. Although the word “other” was dropped in the House
Senate Conference, the conference report still described the
savings clause of the Clean Air Act as preserving “[o]ther rights
to seek enforcement of standards under other provision [sic] of
law.” Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 304
(1971). Hence there appears to be no significance to the
omission of the word “other” from the final bill.

The legislative history of the Clean Air Act also demon-
strates an explicit intent not to create a damage remedy which
the Court of Appeals has authorized in its decision below. The
Senate Report describes the citizen suit provision thus:

The section [304] does not, however, affect in any way
whatever remedies such citizens or class of citizens might
have under statutory or other law, nor does it provide for
damage or nuisance actions. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, supra
at 65.

This same point is reiterated in the Senate Report several times
(“Section 304 would not substitute a ‘common law’ or court
developed definition of air quality,” id. at 36; “[t]here would be
no jurisdictional amount required in section 304 nor is there
any provision for the recovery of property or personal dam-
ages,” id. at 38.

The only significant modification between the citizen provi-
sions of the Clean Water Act and those of the Clean Air Act is
that the Clean Water Act permits the courts to impose civil
penalties in citizen suits. In this regard the Senate Report on
the Clean Water Act emphasizes that the penalties are not
available as damages to the citizen plaintiff:

It should be noted that any penalties imposed would be
deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be recovered
by the complainant. 2 Leg. Hist. 1497.

I+

Hence the argument that an implied common law or other right
of action for damages to fill in the “interstices” of this statute
does not comport with the legislative history. This interstice was
intentional.

4. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), this Court
identified four factors for ascertaining whether a private right
of action may be implied in a statute. The first three factors
provide a means for ascertaining legislative intent, which we
have discussed above. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 575-576 (1979). The fourth Cort factor is whether the
- matter is one that has traditionally been relegated to State law,
and whether a federal remedy is appropriate. As is set forth
more fully in Points II and III infra, common law rights in
navigable waters are matters traditionally relegated to State
law. The interstate and international character of the oceans do
not ipso facto call for the creation of a federal common law
remedy. The federal courts have no non-statutory authority to
enforce common law rights, even in “federal territories.” See
cases cited at p. 28 infra. Congress has expressed the national
concern with ocean pollution in a complex array of statutes,
none of which authorizes, explicitly or implicitly, development
of a federal common law.

In the nation’s territorial waters, Congress has evidenced no
intent to oust the States from their traditional role as being the
primary source of legal rights and duties. The Clean Water Act
supplies a federal remedy to what is essentially a State problem.
Under the Acct it is the States which establish the water quality
standards with which all discharges of pollution must comply.
33 U.S.C. 1313; 1311(b)(1)(C). The statute states that it “is the
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibility and rights of States to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution. . . .” 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1251(b). It
cannot be argued that Congress has expressed a desire to oust
State law and apply uniform federal rights and duties. Com-
pare Textile Workers’ Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).

15

In the Marine Protection Act, Congress has either incorpo-
rated applicable State water quality standards by reference or
authorized federal officials to develop surrogate standards for
ocean waters outside the jurisdiction of the coastal States.
Implied property rights have no place in the scheme of the
statute or under the statutory and international law which
govern the high seas.

POINT II

CONGRESS HAS DETERMINED THAT STATE COM-
MON LAW, NOT FEDERAL, IS TO PROVIDE THE
RULE OF DECISION FOR TORTS OCCURRING IN
THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD
NOT ASSERT GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER
OCEAN WATERS ADJACENT TO TERRITORIAL WA-
TERS. NO BASIS EXISTS FOR THE CREATION OF A
FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE CLAIM FOR
OCEAN POLLUTION ASSERTABLE BY PRIVATE
PARTIES.

Although pollution flows freely from international waters
into territorial waters and vice-versa, federal statutes and in-
ternational law treat differently those activities occurring
within the nation’s territorial waters and those occurring out-
side them. The legal analysis set forth below follows this
distinction and the two geographical areas are treated sepa-
rately.

A. Federal Common Law In State Territorial Waters

In the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315,
Congress provided that the individual States would exercise
jurisdiction over the lands and waters lying three miles seaward
of the coastline. 43 U.S.C. 1311. Hence whatever rule is
applicable to the nation’s internal waterways applies to ocean
pollution in the three mile ocean belt. We will show below that

16

it has long been established that no federal common law
nuisance action is maintainable by private parties for pollution
occurring in the nation’s internal waters.

In Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888),
this Court held that a private citizen could not challenge a
nuisance in a navigable waterway under the “federal common
law.” In Willamette a property owner sued to prevent the
construction of a bridge which would have impeded boat access
to his property which bordered a navigable waterway. This
Court dismissed the suit, stating:

The power of Congress to pass laws for the regulation of
the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all
obstructions therein, is not questioned. But until it does
pass some such law, there is no common law of the United
States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navi-
gable rivers, unless it be the maritime law, administered by
the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. No
precedent, however, exists for the enforcement of any
such law. . . . Such obstructions and nuisances are of-
fenses against the laws of the States within which the
navigable waters lie, and may be indicated or prohibited
as such; but they are not offenses against United States
laws which do not exist; and none such exist except what
are to be found on the statute book. 125 U.S. at 8.
While Willamette concerned an intrastate bridge, the Court
made it clear that it was the private character of the parties and
the non-sovereign interests they represented which precluded
relief under federal common law or maritime law. The Court
noted (at 125 U.S. 13-14) that if this nuisance interfered with
the operations of the federal government, it would indeed have
been actionable.

Willamette Iron Bridge was one of a long series of cases
denying private parties the right to challenge under federal
common law bridges or other obstructions of navigable water-
ways. See cases cited in Willamette at 125 U.S. 8-9; see also

17

Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 542-43 (1919)
(holder of land under state tidal waters had no federal claim
relating to damages sustained to fishing business by municipal
discharge of sewage into those waters). The decision reflected
the well-settled view that in the federai system the States were
the proper entities to define primary legal obligations among
private parties asserting conflicting rights. As stated in Gilman
v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713, 729 (1865), cited in
Willamette Iron Bridge:

It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations
which belong to the subject [of determining whether
bridge traffic or river traffic shall have priority]. The
States have always exercised this power, and from the
nature and objects of the two systems of government they
must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in
all cases to the paramount authority of Congress [over
commerce].

Gilman and the other cases relied upon in Willamette are part
of a settled federal judicial tradition that, in the absence of
Congressional action, there is no federal common law to
protect the property rights of citizens either civilly (see
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591, 658 (1834) (author
who had not complied with federal copyright statute had no
federal common law right protecting his works from reproduc-
tion)) or criminally (see United States v. Hudson, 7 Crarch (11
U.S.) 32 (1812); United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.)
415 (1816) (federal courts have no jurisdiction over common
law crimes)).'° These rights are defined and protected by State
law.

The principles applied in Wheaton v. Peters, supra, are
particularly appropriate to the present action. There the plain-

10 See generally Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 73 (1923); Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro,
Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (2nd ed. 1973) 1262-65.

18

tiff sought the protection of federal common law to prevent
unfair competition from another publisher who was printing
copies of court decisions which the plaintiff had compiled. The
plaintiff in Wheaton v. Peters, like the plaintiffs in the case at
bar, had not complied with the statutory prerequisites to assert
a claim under the federal copyright statutes. Even though the
Constitution gave Congress the power to enact laws for the
protection of authors’ works, the Court refused to fashion a
federal common law remedy and instead looked to Pennsylva-
nia law to ascertain the plaintiff’s rights.

The perspective of Wheaton v. Peters and Willamette Iron
Bridge that state law is the basic source of property rights in the
federal system has not changed in spite of the increasingly
frequent use of Congressional power to determine the conduct
of persons whose activities affect commerce. Unless Congress
has otherwise acted, it is state common law, not federal, which
defines property rights and supplies the rules of conduct even
for parties engaged in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Miree v.
DeKaib County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977); Wallis v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); cf. Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972).

Congress’s response to the decision in Willamette Iron
Bridge was the enactment of the predecessor statute to section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403.'' See
generally United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663 (1973); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 488 (1960). No private rights were
created. Both in the original enactment and in the later codifi-
cations enforcement is limited by its terms to actions brought
by the United States Attorneys. 25 Stat. 425; 23 U.S.C. 413.
See Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. .. Dept. of Trans-
portation, 423 F.2d 104, 105 (3rd Cir. 1970); Connecticut

1! The original enactment was Act cf August 11, 1888, c. 860, § 9, 25
Stat. 424, and provided for the removal of obstructions at the demand
of the Secretary of War.

19

Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 90 n.16
(2nd Cir. 1972); Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.
Supp. 1140, 1147 (N.D. Ala. 1971).

Congress’s refusal to create private rights when it responded
to Willamette Iron Bridge should not be overruled by creation
of the very common law right rejected in Willamette. Certainly
such private federal rights cannot be based upon the decision in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), relied upon
by the court of appeals in the instant case. Illinois v. Milwau-
kee held that “federal common law” would be applied to
determine the rights of a plaintiff State which claimed that
citizens of another State were unreasonably polluting interstate
waters. The Court reasoned that this common law was a “law”
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1331—hence the claim “arose
under” federal law and was cognizable in the District Courts.

All of the cases relied upon in J/linois v. Milwaukee support-
ing the proposition that the federal common law was a “law”
for adjudicating disputes under 28 U.S.C. 1331 involved claims
by a State that its sovereign interests were being infringed upon
by activities of persons in another State. In J/linois this Court
quoted extensively from Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907), where the necessity behind development
of a federal common law of nuisance was enunciated—that in
the absence of statutory rules, a forum given authority to
peacefuily adjudicate disputes between formerly sovereign
states must develop rules of decision to decide the competing
claims.

The power given to the district courts in J/linois v. Milwau-
kee to adjudicate controversies under the federal common law
is derivative from, and no greater than, the Supreme Court’s
power to adjudicate disputes in which a State is a party
plaintiff. That power does not extend to private parties unless
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
in which a State is a party plaintiff extends to claims brought
by private parties asserting their sovereign’s claims. But clearly
it does not. This Court has refused to allow intervention by

“

20

parties raising claims under a theory that they had cognizable
interests their sovereigns did not represent. See, e.g., New
Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953); Kentucky v.
Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 171 (1930). Compare Darling v. City of
Newport News, supra, 249 U.S. 540 (1919) with Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper, supra, 206 U.S. 230 (1907). Similarly, this
Court has not permitted its original jurisdiction to be invoked
even by a State to assert or protect the individual rights of its
citizens. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660,
665 (1976); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
The plaintiff must be a State and the dispute must involve an
allegation of infringement of the State’s sovereign interests in
order for Illinois v. Milwaukee to apply.'?

The common law applied in cases brought by a State under
28 U.S.C. 1331 reflects the entitlement the Constitution grants
States not to have their sovereignty unreasonably infringed. As
stated in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907), “through
these successive disputes and decisions the Court was practi-
cally building up what may not improperly be called interstate
common law.” This law has no counterpart in the common law
applied in the courts of the individual States to adjudicate
disputes among private parties. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 520 (1906). Hence the fact that some common law juris-
dictions grant a right of action to private parties (such as
fishermen) who allege “special injury” from torts categorized
as public nuisances'’ has no persuasive value here. The logic of

———e

12 Hence, the statement in footnote 6 in /ilinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
at 105, that “it is not only the character of the parties that requires us
to apply federal law,” did not mean that the problem of interstate
pollution atone would support federal question jurisdiction, but that
the presence of States as parties in conjunction with a claim of
interstate pollution would warrant such a suit. Footnote 6 cites, inter
alia, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1988)—a case
(and page) standing for the proposition that the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction does not extend to monetary claims brought by a
State against a citizen of another State.

13 See Prosser, Private Action For Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997,
1013-1014 (1966); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.
1974).

21

the rules of decision applied in suits between sovereign states
has a different basis from that applied in traditional common
law suits. As stated in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146
(1902):

Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a
domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and
international law as the exigencies of the case may de-
mand.

See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670
(1931); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923).
See generally, Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 680-85 (1959).'*
And principles of international law do not permit individuals
the right to assert their sovereign’s rights in a nuisance action.
W. Bishop, Jnternational Law 463 (3d ed. 1971).

Nor does the interstate nature of pollution in the territorial
seas mandate the creation of a federal common law to deter-
mine the rights of competing users of these waters. All inter-
state commerce has interstate consequences. Yet Congress has
not deemed it necessary that torts occurring in the stream of
commerce—nor even those arising from the operation of inter-
state carriers—be governed by a uniform body of federal tort
law. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra.

A lawsuit brought under state law is an available remedy to
an individual unable to persuade his State that a suit under
federal common law is necessary to protect its sovereign in-

14 _—_ Indeed to rule that federal common law authorizes individuals to
bring federal common law nuisance actions on the basis of Jilinois v.
Milwaukee would be, as Professor Currie has noted, bootstrapping:

In one respect Milwaukee goes beyond even Swift v. Tyson, for in
Swift it was possible to argue that the powers to create federal law
was implicit in the grant of diversity jurisdiction, while in Milwau-
kee the District Courts’ jurisdiction existed only if there was federal
common law.

Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials (2nd ed. 1974) 882.

22

terests in the territorial seas. State law is competent to cope
with water pollution (or indeed any other tort) originating in
another State or on the high seas affecting an individual’s
property. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upholding the validity of a Florida statute
imposing strict liability for damages resulting from an oil spill
by any ship destined for or leaving a Florida oil transfer
Station). Either federally mandated pollution limitations—
which incorporate state water quality standards (see Point III,
infra)—will govern the determination of what is reasonable
conduct, or conflicts principles will determine whether the law
of the State in which the injury occurs, or the law of the
jurisdiction in which the pollution Originates, governs the
action. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493,
498-99 n.3 (1971). And the commerce clause will prevent States
from imposing unreasonable water quality standards on their
neighbors.

While the federal courts have developed non-statutory rules
of decision in areas where adjudication of disputes in which the
sovereign interests of the States have not been implicated—-see
generally, Friendly, J., In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 383
(1964)—these holdings will not support creation of a federal
common law nuisance action for ocean pollution brought by
private parties under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The courts have applied
federal common law rules of decision either by explicit direc-
tion from Congress (see, e.g., D’Oench Dukne & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 467-75 (1942) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)), or because the federal courts had been
granted specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the particular dispute
and the subject matter was so suffused with federal policy that
only a uniform federal rule would effectuate national policy.
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S.
448 (1957). Federal jurisdiction did not exist in these cases
because federal common law supplied the rule of decision;
common law was applied because jurisdiction otherwise existed

23

and there was a necessity to fashion uniform federal rules to fill
in the interstices of a federal statutory program. One commen-
tator has stated the rule as follows:

Thus, we see that, even though there may be no common
law as a source of jurisdiction in the federal courts, there
can nevertheless exist, as a means of exercising jurisdic-
tion already conferred, a federal common law in the sense
of a body of non-statutory rules independently announced
and administered by those tribunals.

Von Moschzisker, R., Common Law and Our Federal Jurispru-
. dence, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 270, 367 at 117 (1925).

Even when federal policies are paramount, if a federal
entitlement or liability cannot fairly be said to have been clearly
implied by Congress, this Court has denied the existence of a
federal remedy. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of
California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); where the Court refused to
create a common law right in the United States for the medical
expenses it incurred in treating a soldier run over by a negli-
gently driven truck. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 USS.
647 (1965). And, as we demonstrated in Point I, supra, Con-
gress evidenced no intent to create private federal entitlements
or liabilities in the field of water pollution.

B. Federal Common Law Outside the Territerial Waters of
the United States

The first general assertion of United States jurisdiction over
the geographical area beyond the three-mile limit was President
Truman’s proclamation of September 28, 1945 (Exec. Proc
2667, 59 Stat. 884). The proclamation cited general United
States dominion and power over the mineral resources of the
outer continental shelf, and also affirmed the waters above the
shelf as high seas. The extent of federal control in the three-
mile belt of the outer continental shelf adjacent to the coasts
was delineated in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
(1947). This Court decreed that federal dominion included

oa

control over the lands and minerals underlying the ocean
waters. The Court outlined the history of federal legislative and
executive pronouncements in the area,'* 332 U.S. at 33-37, and
held that the assertion of national dominion by the executive
and legislative branches of government over any particular
territory was binding on United States courts.

In response to this decision and the need to demarcate
property rights in the outer continental shelf, Congress in 1953
passed two statutes which set forth the basic legal framework
for the governance of activities in this geographical area: The
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, supra, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315;
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.
(1976) 1331-1343, 67 Stat. 462-470, as amended by Pub. L. 95-
372, Title II, 92 Stat. 632 (1978), 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1331-
1356. These two statutes may be described as “constitutional”
in that they (and applicable treaties) provide the basic legal
framework for the scope of American jurisdiction in the outer
continental shelf and the waters over the shelf.

As noted above, the Submerged Lands Act granted the
respective coastal states jurisdiction and management of the
lands and natural resources in the waters of the three-mile belt
adjacent to their shores. 43 U.S.C. 1311(a). State law was
provided as the applicable law of these areas. In the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, however, Congress took a dif-
ferent approach, and carefully preserved the character of the
waters seaward of the States’ territorial waters as high seas.
Congress provided that the subsoil and seabed of the shelf were
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 43 U.S.C.
(1976) 1332(a), and that the civil and criminal laws of the
respective adjacent States—except as preempted by Congress—
would apply to the subsoil, seabed, and the artificia! islands
and structures built thereon. 43 U.S.C. (1976) 17} %«).'* But

15 See also Heinzen, The Three Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of
the Seas, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 613-629, esp. at notes 112-114 (1959).

16 = The state law applied is a species of “federal common law.” See
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 342 (1969).

25

Congress explicitly provided that the waters over the seabed
were outside the jurisdiction asserted. 43 U.S.C. (1976)
1332(b). This provision was included to make “abundantly
clear the unequivocal legislative intent” that the jurisdiction
asserted was “horizontal jurisdiction” and did not affect the
status of the superadjacent waters as international waters. Sen.
Rep. No. 411, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess., at 2 (1953).'’ Parallel
provisions were enacted in extensive 1978 amendments. See 43
U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1332 subd. (1) and (2); 1333(a).

The federal district courts were given jurisdiction over cases
and controversies arising from the development of natural
resources of the subsoil and seabeds. 43 U.S.C. (1976) 1333(b).
A similar provision was reenacted in the 1978 amendments to
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. ID)
1349(b)(1). In addition, the 1978 amendments contain a citizen
suit provision authorizing any person “having a valid legal
interest” to institute an action to compel compliance with the
Act. 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1349(a)(1). The amendments also
authorize “any resident of the United States who is injured in
any manner” through the failure of an offshore mineral opera-
tor to comply with any requirement of the subchapter to bring
a civil action for damages.'* 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1349(b)(2).
The 1978 amendments again reasserted the character of these
waters as high seas. 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1332(2).

These statutory provisions clearly indicate that Congress has
not asserted general jurisdiction over conduct on the high seas
contiguous to United States territorial waters. The district
courts were not even given general jurisdiction over all cases
arising in the geographical area: specific types of cases were
enumerated. These statutes do not impliedly authorize creation
of a general common law applicable to the seas. See generally

17 See Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a
New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 2334 (1953).

18 The legislative history of these amendments is set forth at 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 1450; these specific provisions are detailed
at pp. 1566-1568, 1679-80; and 1710-13.

26

Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d
330 (Sth Cir. 1978) (holding that under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act the federal government has asserted general
jurisdiction over minerals, but not general sovereignty over the
area). Congress has carefully crafted the private rights it wishes
to create and protect in this area, and has stated explicitly the
legal interests it wishes to protect. A right of action has been
given for damages arising from mineral exploration activities in
violation of federal law; state law applies to determining other
rights flowing from mineral expioration; but no general right to
be free from ocean pollution has been authorized. Expressio
unius.

Any doubt as to the intent of Congress in not asserting
territorial powers over these areas is resolved by the provisions
of two treaties'® to which the United States is a signatory. The
first of the treaties to become effective was the Convention on
the High Seas (T.1.A.S. 5200, [1962] 13 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 2313),
which became effective on September 30, 1962. It provides
(Article 2) that no nation may assert sovereignty outside its
territorial waters except in limited instances not relevant here.”°
See generally United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 n.26
(1969).

The second convention to become effective was the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (T.1.A.S.
No. 5639, [1964] 15 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1607). This Convention
provides for national sovereignty over the “territorial seas”
(Article 1) (without defining territorial seas), and provides for a
“contiguous zone” of limited national sovereignty (Article 24),
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from
the landward edge of the nation’s territorial waters. The coasta’
nation may exercise that control of activities in the contiguoux

19 A third treaty which regulates ocean dumping is described at p. 8,
supra.

20 Article 22 (piracy); Article 23 (hot pursuit of ships believed to have
violated laws in nation’s territorial waters).

27

zone necessary for preventing infringement of “customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or
territorial sea.” Jd.

Although these conventions do not impair Congressional
authority to regulate pollution emanating from American
sources on the high seas, and although they do not impair
Congressional authority to regulate pollution-related activities
of foreign nationals in the contiguous zone which affect this
country’s interests, any general expression of national sov-
ereignty in the contiguous zone is inconsistent with them. An
assertion by the courts of one nation to regulate conduct in any
particular geographical area has traditionally been viewed as an
expression of sovereignty. Cf. United States v. Louisiana,
supra, 394 U.S. 25-27; United States vy. California, 381 U.S.
139, 174-175 (1965).

Moreover, the creation of a United States common law
would have consequences on international law itself, for in-
ternational law is a reflection of the generalized practices of
individual nations. Bishop, Jnternational Law, supra, 30-33;
Schwarzenberger, The Dynamics of International Law 6-7
(1976). Congress should make the ultimate decision as to how
to shape international law in this area.?'

Even apart from the statutes and conventions, we also note
that United States domestic law has traditionally not veen
applied to activities outside the three-mile limit. For example,
in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923),
this Court refused to extend the eighteenth amendment to
domestic merchant ships outside the territorial waters of the
United States. The scope of legislation is “presumptively terri-
torial,” Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918);
United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (Sth Cir.
1980). So ought to be the federal common law. And even in

21 If federal common law rights assertable by private parties are
authorized, quaere whether Canadian interests could challenge activi-
ties allegedly creating “acid rain.”

28

federal territories a general federal common law has not been
applied. Private rights in areas over which the government has
acquired exclusive federal jurisdiction have been determined
under the principle that, upon cession of territory, the laws
existing at the time of cession remain in force until changed by
the new sovereign. See Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S.
94, 100 (1940); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.
542, 547 (1885); Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and
the Federal System, supra, p. 17 n.10, at 1268.

Congress has expressed the limited extent of United States
sovereignty over the oceans seaward of the three mile limit in
the numerous regulatory statutes it has passed. These statutes
are listed in the margin.”? The complex interplay among these

22 _In addition to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which provides
for damages arising from oil spills arising from drilling, the Federal
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. (1970) 1161
authorized the federal government to clean up oil spills from tankers
and imposed strict liability on dischargers within certain limits. These
limits were raised in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act. The
Port and Water Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. (1976) 1221-27, as
amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
II) 1221-27 regulates the navigational devices and rules of ships in and
adjacent to United States waters; the Intervention on the High Seas Act
of 1974, 33 U.S.C. (1976) 1471-87 authorizes federal intervention in
marine catastrophes on the high seas which threaten United States
coastlines or the natural resources of the seas. The Marine Protection
Act, directly involved in this lawsuit, governs the dumping of virtually
any pollutant by a United States vessel under a permit system carefully
weighing all environmental impacts; similariy the Clean Water Act
governs the discharge of all pollutants from all points sources into the
navigable waters. Federal jurisdiction over most living creatures exist-
ing in the fishery conservation zone (a 197 mile belt of water seaward
of the territorial sea) was established in 1976 by the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. 1811-1813. Marine
mammals and endangered species within the fishery conservation zone
were subjected to federal jurisdiction by the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1362(15), 1372(a), and the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a). The Secretary of Commerce is
authorized by this Act to preempt regulation of fisheries within the
territorial seas, 16 U.S.C. 1856(6), and, to designate marine sanctuaries
for preserving or restoring ocean waters overlying the outer continental
shelf and the Great Lakes. 16 U.S.C. 1432(a). Such a designation

29

statutes is set forth in some detail in Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (Ist Cir. 1979). To
provide an overlay of federal common law in this heavily
regulated area would allow parties asserting particular interests
to bypass the political process and the regulatory mechanisms
Congress has set forth. Oil leasing, mineral exploration, dredg-
ing activities et al. could all be enjoined on the grounds that the
federal regulator provided insufficient protection to the
plaintiff’s interests. The City of New York’s sewerage activities
affecting the ocean are all regulated by federal law and re-
spondents may participate in the formulation of regulations
governing them. But Congress has not provided for common
law jurisprudence in this area.

We do not imply that pollution in the high seas affecting a
State’s sovereign interests is beyond the scope of a common law
nuisance action brought by a State, J/linois v. City of Milwau-
kee, supra (unless that common law has been preempted; see
Point III, infra). In addition, pollution reaching state territorial
waters may be subject to the inherent police power of the States
and to the water quality standards they promulgate under the
Clean Water Act. See Askew v. American Waterways Opera-
tors, supra, 411 U.S. 325. Similarly, ocean pollution affecting
the sovereign interests of the United States government may
perhaps be actionable by the government, either pursuant to its
inherent authority to regulate maritime affairs, and interstate
and foreign commerce (see generally New Jersey v. New York
City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)).But as we noted above, the existence
of this right of action in the sovereign does not imply that it is
maintainable by private parties.

severely limits the jurisdiction of either States or other federal agencies.
See generally Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d
872 (ist Cir. 1979). The Secretary has not exercised his authority in the
areas which are the subject of this lawsuit. In the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. II 1978) 1451-1464,
Congress required the Secretary of Commerce to approve state “coastal
zone management programs” that meet certain requirements. 16
U.S.C. (1976) 1454, 1455. Once a program has been approved, federal
agencies must determine that their activities affecting the state’s coastal
zone are consistent with the program. 16 U.S.C. 1456(1)(1)-(2).

30

POINT III

THE CLEAN WATER AND THE MARINE PROTEC-
TION ACTS PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME
FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF LEVELS OF WATER
QUALITY WHICH PROTECT STATE SOVEREIGN IN-
TERESTS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
WELFARE. THE STATUTORY SCHEME LEAVES NO
ROOM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW
STANDARDS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF POLLU-
TION OR WATER QUALITY.

Under the Clean Water Act, discharges of pollution into
navigable waters are permitted if they comply with federal and
state effluent limitations and if they do not result in a violation
of either state or federal water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.
1311(b)(1)(C); 1342(k). States have broad discretion in estab-
lishing their water quality standards, and, hence, in determin-
ing what levels of effluent reduction, beyond minimum federal
technology-based limitations, must be employed. 33 U.S.C.
1313. The federal government also has powers over the quality
of marine waters. 33 U.S.C. 1343. See pp. 4-6, supra

The Marine Protection Act authorizes dumping from vessels
only if the Administrator determines that the resulting pollu-
tion will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,
welfare or the marine environment or violate applicable water
quality standards. 33 U.S.C. 1412(a). Under current regula-
tions EPA will not even issue a permit if the applicant fails to
show a need for the dumping and lack of alternative means of
disposal. 40 C.F.R. 227.2(a).

Under this regulatory scheme, there is no room for a federal
common law of nuisance. The gaps and inadequacies of inter-
state pollution law identified in J/linois v. City of Milwaukee,
supra, 406 U.S. 91, as requiring development of federal com-
mon law to adjudicate disputes impinging upon State sov-
ereignty have been dealt with by federal statutes and reguia-
tions. The traditional standards applied in common law public

31

nuisance actions have been transferred from the Courts to
federal and state officials for determination. In saving common
law remedies, Congress did not preclude federal judges from
deferring to agency expertise disputes concerning the proper
method of pollution and control and sewage technology, and
proper standards of water quality.

The Clean Water and Marine Protection Acts provide an
explicit remedy for States to protect themselves from extra-
territorial pollution. A State can determine for itself what level
of water quality it wishes maintained. The Clean Water Act
provides that water quality standards

be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter.
Such standards shall be established taking into considera-
tion their use and value for public water supplies, propa-
gation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and
agricultural, industrial and other purposes, and also tak-
ing into account their use and value for navigation. 33
U.S.C. 1313(c)(2).

By delegating this broad authority to the States; by mandating
that all discharges and dumping from vessels be such as to
comply with state and federal water quality standards, 33
U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C) and 1412(a); by mandating that a permit-
tee certify compliance with State standards, 33 U.S.C.
1341(a)(2); and by authorizing State intervention into the
permit issuance process of another State when a receiving
State’s water quality standards may be affected, 32 U.S.C.
1342(b)(3) and (b)(5), Congress has provided a statutory mech-
anism to protect the unprotected sovereign interests identified
in Illinois v. Milwaukee.

The logic to be applied in determining statutory preemption
of federal common law does not differ substantially from the
logic of federal preemption of state police powers. Compare
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) with Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164-165 (1978). The Congressional

32

mandate in both instances represents the supreme sovereign’s
determination of the manner in which members of the public
shall conduct their activities. The legislative standards of con-
duct and water quality incorporated into the federal permits
represent the sovereign police power which is the heart of
public nuisance law. See Prosser, supra, 52 Va. L. Rev. at 997.
The federal permitting procedures implement substantive fed-
eral and state rules developed to achieve the objects of the
federal common law of nuisance. Non-statutory standards are
superseded.

The district courts should not be available, at the behest of
private parties or State legal officers, to grant de novo review
of the judgment of federal and State officials as to the proper
levels of water quality and methods of control in federal
common law nuisance actions. Once federal and State officials
have determined acceptable levels of water quality, once federal
officials have determined that alternatives not be employed
after considering the broad array of Congressionally mandated
criteria, the legislative and political judgments of the responsi-
ble officials should be respected.

We are not arguing here that compliance with federal tech-
nology-based effluent limitations acts in itself as a shield from
damages that state common law imposes upon a polluter.
Rather, we are arguing that compliance with a permit under
these statutes precludes a finding by a federal court under
federal common law that a State’s sovereign interests are being
unreasonably infringed, or that the acts of pollution involved
unreasonably degrade water quality or unreasonably infringe
on public rights. In the Clean Water Act Congress has man-
dated that the States define what level of water quality protects
the public welfare; citizens of those States and citizens of other
States should be bound by the sovereign’s determination. If a
polluter’s actions impose costs on others, the injured party may
seek redress under state common law if it imposes such a
liability, or from his legislature to reduce the amount of
pollution that its officials have deemed acceptable. In the
Marine Protection Act, federal officials have been given

33

authority to define acceptable levels of water quality in the
oceans, and to weigh the need for the dumping in light of its
environmental impact and the availability of alternatives. Pre-
cluding private parties from challenging the official judgment
that, in light of these criteria, a given amount of pollution is
not unreasonable would do no harm to the statutory scheme.

The critical question to be employed in a common law public
nuisance action is determining what conduct constitutes an
“unreasonable” interference with the public’s rights.?? The
discharges involved in the case at hand cannot be deemed
unreasonable either in and of themselves or in light of their
impact. Under the common law no one user of the public’s
rights has priority over others. Pollution from municipal sew-
age treatment operations is not in and of itself unreasonable
because it interferes with fishing. Sewage must be disposed of
in some manner, and if the only known way is to use the
oceans, there is no prima facie tort. See Darling v. City of
Newport News, supra, 249 U.S. 540 (1919); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); and see cases collected in Moore v.
Hampton Roads Sanitation Commission, 557 F.2d 1030, 1033
(4th Cir. 1977). The question is whether the means chosen are
unreasonable or have an unreasonable impact. But in granting
the city a permit to engage in the challenged conduct, federal
and state officials have determined that the pollution in issue
here is not unreasonable. Their balancing of competing needs
and their judgment as to what are acceptable levels of water
quality are virtually identical to that which would be employed
in the common law tort action. Cf. Forrester v. Consumer
Product Safety Comm’n, 559 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Aqua Slide ’N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831, 839 (Sth Cir. 1978).

We do not question the power of Congress to create a
regulatory scheme which delegates to state and federal officials
the authority to determine what levels of water quality would

23 See Prosser, supra p. 20, n.13, 52 Va. L. Rev. at 1003; see also W.
Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), 576-577. .

34

be deemed reasonable and allow, at the same time, for parties
to attempt to persuade federal judges in common law actions
that the officially sanctioned levels of pollution were unreason-
able. But such an approach would be wasteful, duplicative, and
in conflict with traditional notions of deference to the officials
upon whom Congress has placed the responsibility of carrying
oui its will. The regulations which govern ocean pollution
implement a highly complex and technical statute. Every dis-
charge from every point source must have a permit reflecting
applicable regulations. The Administrator is given discretion to
make legislative, policy-type judgments. See Ethyl Corp. v.
E.PA., 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. den. 426 U.S.
941 (1976). If the Administrator determines that elimination of
a given pollutant is not necessary to meet water quality stan-
dards applicable under 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1), or that elimina-
tion of a pollutant is not practicable under 33 U.S.C.
1281(g)(2)(a), his determination reflects the legislative judg-
ment. The absence of a particular control methodology does
not mean an absence of Congressional policy. Traditional
standards of review should not be circumvented by common
law actions that amount to collateral attacks on discretionary
agency decisions.

When Congress protected common law remedies by enacting
a savings clause in the citizen suit provisions of these statutes, it
did not have before it a developed body of federal common law
governing pollution of interstate waters. See Wyandotte Trans-
_ portation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 196, n.5 (1967).
It is not unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to
Save state common law remedies, and not an inchoate body of
federal common law. See Committee for Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976). See
also pp. 12-13, supra.

35

CONCLUSION

Petitioners City of New York and Beame respectfully request
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed and that
the case be remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint
herein.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ
Corporation Counsel
of the City of New York
Attorney for Petitioners
City of New York and Beame
December 4, 1980

LEONARD KOERNER,
STEPHEN P. KRAMER,

of Counsel.

APPENDIX

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Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,
33 U.S.C. 1401-1412a:

§ 1401. Congressional finding, policy, and declaration of pur-
pose

(a) Unregulated dumping of material into ocean waters en-
dangers human health, welfare, and amenities, and the marine
environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities.

(b) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials into
ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into
ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect
human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environ-
ment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities.

(c) It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate (1) the
transportation by any person of material from the United
States and, in the case of United States vessels, aircraft, or
agencies, the transportation of material from a location outside
the United States, when in either case the transportation is for
the purpose of dumping the material into ocean waters, and (2)
the dumping of material transported by any person from a
location outside the United States, if the dumping occurs in the
territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the United States.

§ 1402. Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter the term—

(a) “Administrator” means the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency.

(b) “Ocean waters” means those waters of the open seas
lying seaward of the base line from which the territorial sea is
measured, as provided for in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone (15 UST 1606; TIAS 5639).

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(c) “Material” means matter of any kind or description,
including, but not limited to, dredged material, solid waste,
incinerator residue, garbage, sewage, sewage sludge, muni-
tions, radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents,
radioactive materials, chemicals, biological and laboratory
waste, wreck or discarded equipment, rock, sand, excavation
debris, and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and other waste;
but such term does not mean sewage from vessels within the
meaning of section 1322 of this title. Oil within the meaning of
section 1321 of this title shall be included only to the extent
that such oil is taken on board a vessel or aircraft for the
purpose of dumping.

(d) “United States” includes the several States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Canal
Zone, the territories and possessions of the United States, and
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(e) “Person” means any private person or entity, or any
officer, employee, agent, department, agency, or instrumental-
ity of the Federal Government, of any State or local unit of
government, or of any foreign government.

(f) “Dumping” means a disposition of material: Provided,
That it does not mean a disposition of any effluent from any
outfall structure to the extent that such disposition is regulated
under the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, as amended under the provisions of section 407 of this
title, or under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, nor does it mean a routine discharge of
effluent incidental to the propulsion of, or operation of motor-
driven equipment on, vessels: Provided further, That it does
not mean the construction of any fixed structure or artificial
island nor the intentional placement of any device in ocean
waters or on or in the submerged land beneath such waters, for
a purpose other than disposal, when such construction or such
placement is otherwise regulated by Federal or State law or
occurs pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program:
And provided further, That it does not include the deposit of

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oyster shells, or other materials when such deposit is made for
the purpose of developing, maintaining, or harvesting fisheries
resources and is otherwise regulated by Federal or State law or
occurs pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program.

(g) “District court of the United States” includes the District
Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the
District Court of Puerto Rico, the District Court of the Canal
Zone, and in the case of American Samoa and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the District Court of the
United States for the District of Hawaii, which court shall have
jurisdiction over actions arising therein.

(h) “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Army.

(i) “Dredged material” means any material excavated or
dredged from the navigable waters of the United States.

(j) “High-level radioactive waste” means the aqueous waste
resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction
system, or equivalent, and the concentrated waste from subse-
quent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reproc-
essing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradiated fuel from nuclear
power reactors.

(k) “Transport” or “transportation” refers to the carriage
and related handling of any material by a vessel, or by any
other vehicle, including aircraft.

(1) “Convention” means the Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.

SUBCHAPTER I—REGULATION

§ 1411. Prohibited acts

(a) Except as may be authorized by a permit issued pursuant
to section 1412 or section 1413 of this title, and subject to
regulations issued pursuant to section 1418 of this title,

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(1) no person shall transport from the United States,
and

(2) in the case of a vessel or aircraft registered in the
United States or flying the United States flag or in the case
of a United States department, agency, or instrumentality,
no person shall transport from any location

any material for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters.

(b) Except as may be authorized by a permit issued pursuant
to section 1412 of this title, and subject to regulations issued
pursuant to section 1418 of this title, no person shall dump any
material transported from a location outside the United States
(1) into the territorial sea of the United States, or (2) into a
zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States,
extending to a line twelve nautical miles seaward from the base
line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
to the extent that it may affect the territorial sea or the territory
of the United States.

§ 1412. Dumping permit program

Environmental Protection Agency permits

(a) Except in relation to dredged material, as provided for in
section 1413 of this title, and in relation to radiological,
chemical, and biological warfare agents and high-level radioac-
tive waste, for which no permit may be issued, the Administra-
tor may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings, for the transportation from the United States or, in
the case of an agency or instrumentality of the United States,
Or in the case of a vessel or aircraft registered in the United
States or flying the United States flag, for the transportation
from a location outside the United States, of material for the
purpose of dumping it into ocean waters, or for the dumping
of material into the waters described in section 141 1(b) of this
title, where the Administrator determines that such dumping
will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,

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welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological
systems, Or economic potentialities. The Administrator shall
establish and apply criteria for reviewing and evaluating such
permit applications, and, in establishing or revising such crite-
ria, shall consider, but not be limited in his consideration to,
the following:

(A) The need for the proposed dumping.

(B) The effect of such dumping on human health and
welfare, including economic, esthetic, and recreational
values.

(C) The effect of such dumping on fis*eries resources,
plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shore lines and beaches.

(D) The effect of such dumping on marine ecosystems,
particularly with respect to—

(i) the transfer, concentration, and dispersion of
such material and its byproducts through biological,
physical, and chemical processes,

(ii) potential changes in marine ecosystem diver-
sity, productivity, and stability, and

(ili) species and community population dynamics.
(E) The persistence and permanence of the effects of
the dumping.
(F) The effect of dumping particular volumes and con-
centrations of such materials.

(G) Appropriate locations and methods of disposal or
recycling, including land-based alternatives and the proba-
ble impact of requiring use of such alternate locations or
methods upon considerations affecting the public interest.

(H) The effect on alternate uses of oceans, such as
scientific study, fishing, and other living resource exploita-
tion, and nonliving resource exploitation.

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(I) In designating recommended sites, the Administra-
tor shall utilize wherever feasible locations beyond the
edge of the Continental Shelf.

In establishing or revising such criteria, the Administrator shall
consult with Federal, State, and local officials, and interested
members of the general public, as may appear appropriate to
the Administrator. With respect to such criteria as may affect
the civil works program of the Department of the Army, the
Administrator shall also consult with the Secretary. In re-
viewing applications for permits, the Administrator shall make
such provision for consultation with interested Federal and
State agencies as he deems useful or necessary. No permit shall
be issued for a dumping of material which will violate applica-
ble water quality standards. To the extent that he may do so
without relaxing the requirements of this subchapter, the Ad-
ministrator, in establishing or revising such criteria, shall apply
the standards and criteria binding upon the United States under
the Convention, including its Annexes.

Permit categories

(b) The Administrator may establish and issue various cate-
gories of permits, including the general permits described in
section 1414(c) of this title.

Sites and times for dumping

(c) The Administrator may, considering the criteria es-
tablished pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, designate
recommended sites or times for dumping and, when he finds it
necessary to protect critical areas, shall, after consultation with
the Secretary, also designate sites or times within which certain
materials may not be dumped.

Fish wastes

(d) No permit is required under this subchapter for the
transportation for dumping or the dumping of fish wastes,
except when deposited in harbors or other protected or en-

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closed coastal waters, or where the Administrator finds that
such deposits could endanger health, the environment, or
ecological systems in a specific location. Where the Administra-
tor makes such a finding, such material may be deposited only
as authorized by a permit issued by the Administrator under
this section.

Foreign State permits; acceptance

(e) In the case of transportation of material, by a vessel or
aircraft registered in the United States or flying the United
States flag, from a location in a foreign State Party to the
Convention, a permit issued pursuant to the authority of that
foreign State Party, in accordance with Convention require-
ments, and which otherwise could have been issued pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, shall be accepted, for the pur-
poses of this subchapter, as if it were issued by the Administra-
tor under the authority of this section.

§ 1412a. Cessation of sewage sludge ocean dumping; “sewage
sludge” defined

(a) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter referred to in this section as the “Adminis-
trator”) shall end the dumping of sewage sludge into ocean
waters, or into waters described in section 1411(b) of this title,
as soon as possible after November 4, 1977, but in no case may
the Administrator issue any permit, or any renewal thereof
(under Title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
tuaries Act of 1972) which authorizes any such dumping after
December 31, 1981.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term “sewage sludge”
means any solid, semisolid, or liquid waste generated by a
municipal waste-water treatment plant the ocean dumping of
which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,
welfare, amenities, or the marine environment, ecological sys-
tems, 9r economic potentialities.

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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp.
II) 1332, 1333, and 1349:

§ 1332. Congressional declaration of policy

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that—

(1) the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided
in this subchapter;

(2) this subchapter shall be construed in such a manner
that the character of the waters above the outer Continen-
tal Shelf as high seas and the right to navigation and
fishing therein shall not be affected;

(3) the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national re-
source reserve held by the Federal Government for the
public, which should be made available for expeditious
and orderly development, subject to environmental safe-
guards, in a manner which is consistent with the main-
tenance of competition and other national needs;

(4) since exploration, development, and production of
the minerals of the outer Continental Shelf will have
significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of the
coastal States, and on other affected States, and, in
recognition of the national interest in the effective
management of the marine, coastal, and human environ-
ments—

(A) such States and their affected local govern-
ments may require assistance in protecting their
coastal zones and other affected areas from any
temporary or permanent adverse effects of such
impacts; and

(B) such States, and through such States, affected
local governments, are entitled to an opportunity to
participate, to the extent consistent with the national

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interest, in the policy and planning decisions made
by the Federal Government relating to exploration
for, and development and production of, minerals of
the outer Continental Shelf;

(5) the rights and responsibilities of all States and,
where appropriate, local governments, to preserve and
protect their marine, human, and coastal environments
through such means as regulation of land, air, and water
uses, of safety, and of related development and activity
should be considered and recognized; and

(6) operations in the outer Continental Shelf should be
conducted in a safe manner by well-trained personnel
using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient
to prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of
well control, fires, spillages, physical obstruction to other
users of the water or subsoil and seabed, or other occur-
rences which may cause damage to the environment or to
property, or endanger life or health.

§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands—Constitution
and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; publication of
projected State lines; international boundary disputes; restric-
tion on State taxation and jurisdiction

(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ane to all artificial
islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected
thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or pro-
ducing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other
device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of trans-
porting such resources, to the same extent as if the outer
Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases
on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued
only under the provisions of this subchapter.

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(2)(A) To the extent that they are applicable and not incon-
sistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and
regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted,
the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect
or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are declared to be
the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and
fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the
area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the
outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President
shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such pro-
jected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All
of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by
the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State
taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.

(B) Within one year after September 18, 1978, the President
shall establish procedures for settling any outstanding interna-
tional boundary dispute respecting the outer Continental Shelf.

(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law
as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a
basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of
any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the
outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources
thereof or the revenues therefrom.

§ 1349. Citizens suits, jurisdiction and judicial review—Persons
who may bring action; persons against whom action may be
brought; time of action; intervention by Attorney General;
costs and fees; security

(a)(1) Except as provided in this section, any person having a
valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected may
commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel com-
pliance with this subchapter against any person, including the
United States, and any other government instrumentality or
agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to

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the Constitution) for any alleged violation of any provision of
this subchapter or any regulation promulgated under this
subchapter, or of the terms of any permit or lease issued by the
Secretary under this subchapter.

(2) Except as provided in par*graph (3) of this subsection,
no action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1) of this
section—

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given
notice of the alleged violation, in writing under oath, to
the Secretary and any other appropriate Federal official,
to the State in which the violation allegedly occurred or is
occurring, and to any alleged violator; or

(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the
United States or a State with respect to such matter, but in
any such action in a court of the United States any person
having a legal interest which is or may be adversely
affected may intervene as a matter of right.

(3) An action may be brought under this subsection immedi-
ately after notification of the alleged violation in any case in
which the alleged violation constitutes an imminent threat to
the public health or safety or would immediately affect a legal
interest of the plaintiff.

(4) In any action commenced pursuant to this section, the
Attorney General, upon the request of the Secretary or any
other appropriate Federal official, may intervene as a matter of
right.

(5) A court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or subsection (c) of this section,
may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees, to any party, whenever such court
determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is
sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in a

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sufficient amount to compensate for any loss or damage
suffered, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.

(6) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, all
suits challenging actions or decisions allegedly in violation of,
or seeking enforcement of, the provisions of this subchapter, or
any regulation promulgated under this subchapter, or the terms
of any permit or lease issued by the Secretary under this
subchapter, shall be undertaken in accordance with the proce-
dures described in this subsection. Nothing in this section shall
restrict any right which any person or class of persons may
have under any other Act or common law to seek appropriate
relief.

Jurisdiction and venue of actions

(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with
(A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf
which involves exploration, development, or production of the
minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals, or (B) the
cancellation, suspension, or termination of a lease or permit
under this subchapter. Proceedings with respect to any such
case or controversy may be instituted in the judicial district in
which any defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial
district of the State nearest the place the cause of action arose.

(2) Any resident of the United States who is injured in any
manner through the failure of any operator to comply with any
rule, regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to this sub-
chapter may bring an action for damages (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) only in the judicial district
having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

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Review of Secretary’s approval of leasing program; review of
approval, modification or disapproval of exploration or
production plan; persons who may seek review; scope of

review; certiorari to Supreme Court

(c)(1) Any action of the Secretary to approve a leasing
program pursuant to section 1344 of this title shall be subject
to judicial review only in the United States Court of Appeal for
the District of Columbia.

(2) Any action of the Secretary to approve, require
modification of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any
development and production plan under this subchapter shall
be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of
appeals for a circuit in which an affected State is located.

(3) The judicial review specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
this subsection shall be available only to a person who (A)
participated in the administrative proceedings related to the
actions specified in such paragraphs, (B) is adversely affected
or aggrieved by such action, (C) files a petition for review of
the Secretary’s action within sixty days after the date of such
action, and (D) promptly transmits copies of the petition to the
Secretary and to the Attorney General.

(4) Any action of the Secretary specified in paragraph (1) or
(2) shall only be subject to review pursuant to the provisions of
this subsection, and shall be specifically excluded from citizen
suits which are permitted pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section.

(5) The Secretary shall file in the appropriate court the
record of any public hearings required by this subchapter and
any additional information upon which the Secretary based his
decision, as required by section 2112 of Title 28. Specific
objections to the action of the Secretary shall be considered by
the court only if the issues upon which such objections are
based have been submitted to the Secretary during the
adrninistrative proceedings related to the actions involved.

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(6) The court of appeals conducting a proceeding pursuant
to this subsection shall consider the matter under review solely
on the record made before the Secretary. The findings of the
Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. The court may
affirm, vacate, or modify any order or decision or may demand
the proceedings to the Secretary for such further action as it
may direct.

(7) Upon the filing of the record with the court, pursuant to
paragraph (5), the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive
and its judgment shall be final, except that such judgment shall
be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States
upon writ of certiorari.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (1976)
(superceded) 1332 and 1333:

§ 1332. Congressional declaration of policy; jurisdiction;
construction

(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain
to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control,
and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.

(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that
the character as high seas of the waters above the outer
Continental ‘Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing
therein shall not be affected.

‘

§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands—Constitution
and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; publication of
projected State lines; restriction on State taxation and jurisdic-
tion

(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and

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seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial
islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and trans-
porting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer
Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases
on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued
only under the provisions of this subchapter.

(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsis-
tent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and
regulations of the Secretary now in effect or thereafter
adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as
of August 7, 1953, are declared to be the law of the United
States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if
its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of
the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine
and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extend-
ing seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable
laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate
officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws
shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.

(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law
as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a
basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of
any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the
outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources
thereof or the revenues therefrom.

The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. Sections
1301(e), 1311(a), 1311(d).

43 U.S.C. 1301(e) (Definitions):

(e) The term “natural resources” includes, without limiting
the generality thereof, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish,

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shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and
other marine animal and plant life but does not include water
power, or the use of water for the production of power;

§ 1311. Rights of the States—Confirmation and establishment
of title and ownership of !ands and resources; management,
administration, leasing, development, and use

(a) It is determined and declared to be in the public interest
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the
natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the
right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use
the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with
applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions
hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and
assigned to the respective States or the persons who were on
June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law of the respective
States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees,
lessees, or successors in interest thereof;

* * * * *

(d) Nothing in this chapter shall affect the use, development,
improvement, or control by or under the constitutional author-
ity of the United States of said lands and waters for the
purposes of navigation or flood control or the production of
power, or be construed as the release or relinquishment of any
rights of the United States arising under the constitutional
authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to
provide for flood control, or the production of power;

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2305%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
