# Petition — Sharpe v. Florida

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 449 U.S. 821

## Text

Bupreing Court, a
FILED |

APR 11 1989 }

IN THE “

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1979
no. €9- 1595 ;

WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE,
Petitioner,

V.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Epwarp T. M. GarLANpD
Mark J. Kapisu
Ruonpa A. BROFMAN
Tuomas 8. CLEGG

GARLAND, NUCKOLLS, KADISH,
MARTIN & CATTS, P.C.

1012 Candler Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 577-2225

TABLE OF CONTENTS |

Page
IU. Saks ok eda circe vuln ate BE es 1
IN ia SES ok ie be nd ce 2
Questions Presented for Review................... 2
Constitutional Provision Involved................. 3
Pe en et a BS ae 3
kt) a San Serer aD 3
Reason for Granting the Writ..................... 7

THIS CASE PRESENTS NOVEL ISSUES
DEALING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL TO
SEARCH AND SEIZE VEHICLES FOR
PURPOSES OF AGRICULTURAL INSPEC-
TION, ABSENT ANY REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT THE VEHICLE WAS
CARRYING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
AND THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO EFFECT
AN ARREST, ABSENT ANY KNOWLEDGE
OR SUSPICION THAT ANY ILLEGALITY
HAS TAKEN PLACE. REVIEW IS
NECESSARY TO BRING TO THIS COURT’S
ATTENTION A PRECEDENT SETTING
ERROR OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, CONCERNING THE CRITICAL
QUESTION OF THE ALLOWABLE SCOPE
AND DEGREES OF DETENTION AND
INTRUSION PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES OF VEHICLES. REVIEW IS
FURTHER NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE
CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER kK

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page

PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO JUSTIFY
AN ARREST, ABSENT ANY INFORMATION
TO SUGGEST THAT ANY ILLEGALITY
HAS OCCURRED. THESE ISSUES ARE OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE SINCE
THEY DEAL WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED DETENTIONS AND SINCE
THE ISSUES INVOLVED HEREIN HAVE
NEVER BEEN DIRECTLY ADDRESSED
BY THIS COURT.

I A aes ay Side wails sae od ara vas was 27
Ey a Sn ee 28
EE RE See ce a ae A-1
SN SE la Sn rare bar B-1

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page

Cases
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,

ae rene 8
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). ......... 0. cece ee 21
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948)....... 21
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). ........... 22, 23
Brown v. Texas, ___. U.S. ____ 61 L.Ed. 2d

Re tess ede Se eh a 11, 12
Bumper v. State of North Carolina,

ae PN I he Oak tn ho én Ve ewe 19
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). .......... 8
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)... .9, 16
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)......... 26
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). ..15, 26
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)... ......8, 9, 13
Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62

ce ERE Re re ee ee 25
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307

po. RPS Dis Se ale eet 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). ........ 8, 15, 16
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). ...18, 19
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).............. 9, 12, 13
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).............. 11, 12, 15
United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726

IR oe te i 25
United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174

Ss WU MEN aot ee eel 2 os kes, pathuus 24

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued)

ey Page
Cases (Continued)
United States Ex Rel Richardson v. Rundle,

Po Bho 2k RS | > ie cr 22
United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380

(Ses I Stn rs ale re Obl ea bs 22
United States v. Manning. 440 F.2d 1105,

Ce Ne ee phe bees 24
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, ;

Ee se Cs hho ie cs es cece cae 8, 10
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)............. 15
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471

ld. ds4 oc ERS es Rekne es ra Xa. 10, 19, 21, 22
Statutes
NN SUNNY MUNIN ince ood Su bo nik so ween tks was 9, 16
Oe ein at a es 2

iv

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1979

FE chine

WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE,
Petitioner,

V.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

The Petitioner, WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE, re-
spectfully asks that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
the judgment and opinion of the First District Court of
Appeals for the State of Florida.

OPINIONS BELOW

On April 17, 1979, the First District Court of Appeals
for the State of Florida affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County. See Appendix A.
On or about April 26, 1979, the Petitioner filed a Petition
for Rehearing in the Florida District Court which was
denied on May 21, 1979. See Appendix B. On or about
May 24, 1979, Petitioner filed his Motion to Certify

1

2

Questions to the Florida Supreme Court with the First
District Court of Appeals for the State of Florida which
granted the Motion on June 6, 1979, certifying two ques-
tions to be of great public interest. Petitioner timely filed
his Petition for Certiorari in the Florida Supreme Court,
which was denied on January 14, 1980. See Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this appeal is grounded in an April 17,
1979 decision of the First District Court of Appeals for
the State of Florida and the denial of the Petition for
Certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court on January 14,
1980. The statutory provision conferring jurisdiction for
this appeal is 28 U.S.C. 1257.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from an unreasonable search and seizure was violated
when he was detained for an extended period of time by
administrative officials despite the lack of any articulable
suspicion that the vehicle which Petitioner was driving
was being used to transport agricultural products.

2. Whether Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right to
be free from an unreasonable search and seizure was vio-
lated when his truck and its contents were searched by
administrative officials without a search warrant when
there was no articulable suspicion that the vehicle con-
tained or was used to transport agricultural products;
where Petitioner gave no consent to allow the search of
his vehicle; and where no abandonment occurred prior to
the search.

3. Whether Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when he was arrested without probable cause

3

and when his truck was searched subsequent to this illegal
arrest by local police authorities.

4. Whether Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when Sheriff’s officers conducted a second search
of his vehicle, without a warrant; where there was no
probable cause to search; and where there was no exigent
circumstances.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

All references to the record in this case will be preceded
by the capital letter “‘R’’; references to the transcript of
the Motion to Suppress Hearing will be preceded by the
capital letter ‘‘T’’.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was charged with violating state laws of
Florida, in that he possessed more than one hundred
pounds of cannabis and in that he attempted bribery.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information,
alleging numerous insufficiencies in the Information, and
a Motion to Suppress, alleging the warrantless search of
his truck was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
On October 24, 1977, the Motion to Dismiss and the
Motion to Suppress were denied. At trial, Petitioner was

4

acquitted of the bribery charge, but was convicted of the
possession charge. Petitioner filed a Motion for a New
Trial which was denied orally on December 5, 1977 and
by written order dated December 9, 1977. An appeal was
taken to the First District Court of Appeals for the State
of Florida, which affirmed the judgment on April 17, 1979.
On April 26, 1979, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Re-
hearing in the Florida District Court, which was denied
on May 21, 1979. On May 24, 1979, Petitioner filed his
“Motion to Certify Questions to the Florida Supreme
Court” which was granted by the First District Court of
Appeals for the State of Florida on June 6, 1979, certi-
fying two questions to the Florida Supreme Court to be
of great public interest. However, on January 14, 1980,
the Supreme Court of Florida denied Petitioner’s writ of
certiorari, and stated that no petition for a rehearing
would be entertained. On March 11, 1980, Petitioner filed
with this Court a Motion to Stay the Mandate of the
Florida District Court of Appeals and Judgment of the
Florida Circuit Court and Motion for Enlargement of
Appellant’s Bond Already In Force. This motion was
denied on March 24, 1980.

Petitioner respectfully submits the following chronology
with respect to the “search and seizure” issue presented
here.

On the evening of March 19, 1977, William Harris
Sharpe, Petitioner, was driving a Ryder Rental Truck
north on Interstate 75 in the State of Florida. (T-36)
Approximately twenty-five miles south of the Georgia
border, the Petitioner voluntarily entered an inspection
station maintained by the Florida Department of Agri-
culture (T-36). No one was traveling with him at the
time. (T-36).

5

Upon entry into the inspection station, he was ap-
proached by a uniformed inspector, (T-49) who stated
that, “I would like to take a look inside your truck if
you don’t mind.” (T-34). The purpose of this request
was to ascertain whether the truck contained agricultural
products. (T-41). Petitioner responded that he was un-
able to open the truck, since the key to the padlock, was
in the possession of his girlfriend, who was traveling
ahead of him. (T-36). Petitioner further stated that the
truck contained furniture from his girlfriend’s apartment
(T-51), which he was helping move.

The inspector refused to allow Petitioner to continue
his northward journey, because he had not had an oppor-
tunity to look inside the truck, (T-53) despite the fact
that he had no reason whatsoever to believe that Peti-
tioner had anything but furniture in the vehicle. (T-52).
Shortly thereafter, the agricultural inspector informed
Petitioner that, “we can get a hammer for you if you
wouid like to break it” (the lock) (T-53). Petitioner re-
plied that it was a brand new lock and that he did not
wish to damage it. (T-55). Another uniformed inspector
told Petitioner that, it could be a long wait and that the
truck would have to stay in the inspection station until
it was searched. (T-71).

At least ten minutes later, (R-20) the inspectors ob-
served that the back of Petitioner’s vehicle was open.
Petitioner was observed standing next to it. (7-39). The
first inspector who initially approached Petitioner looked
into the vehicle and observed furniture, an old motorcycle
and an old tire. (T-56). At no time, did he observe any
agricultural products or contraband. (T-59). After ob-
serving these items, he physically entered the truck in
order to further search it. (T-57). This was the first search

6

which uncovered no contraband or agricultural products
in the truck.

Shortly thereafter, the inspector heard another inspec-
tor call to him that the Petitioner was gone. (T-58). The
first inspector stated he did not know why the Petitioner
had left (T-59) and that during the time the truck was
being searched, he had no idea that any contraband or
agricultural products were in the truck. (T-59). The other
inspector agreed, that even after seeing Petitioner leave,
he had no reason to believe that Petitioner had done any-
thing wrong. (T-68). He further stated that from looking
at the contents of the truck, but without entering it, the
truck contained nothing that concerned the Florida De-
partment of Agriculture. (T-72).

Without further searching the vehicle, the inspector
contacted the Florida Highway Patrol and the Hamilton
County Sheriff’s Office. (T-58-60). Shortly thereafter, a
deputy sheriff took the Petitioner into custody and took
him directly to the Hamilton County Jail. (T-82). Another
deputy sheriff took possession of the truck and drove it
to the jail. (T-74). Up to this time, no one from the
Sheriff’s Office had entered the truck, (T-75) and no con-
traband had been found. The deputy sheriff who trans-
ported the truck stated that he did not know why it was
carried to the jail. (T-75).

Petitioner was at the jail when the truck arrived. (T-82).
Without conferring with Petitioner in any way, the truck
was opened, searched and a controlled substance was
seized. No search warrants had ever been obtained for
either the agricultural inspectors’ or the sheriff’s depart-
ment search. (T-78).

7

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THIS CASE PRESENTS NOVEL ISSUES DEAL-
ING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PERSONNEL TO SEARCH AND SEIZE
VEHICLES FOR PURPOSES OF AGRICULTURAL
INSPECTION, ABSENT ANY REASONABLE SUS-
PICION THAT THE VEHICLE WAS CARRYING
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO
EFFECT AN ARREST, ABSENT ANY KNOWL-
EDGE OR SUSPICION THAT ANY ILLEGALITY
HAS TAKEN PLACE. REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO
BRING TO THIS COURT’S ATTENTION A PRECE-
DENT SETTING ERROR OF THE FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF FLOR-
IDA, CONCERNING THE CRITICAL QUESTION
OF THE ALLOWABLE SCOPE AND DEGREES OF
DETENTION AND INTRUSION PERMISSIBLE
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PURSU-
ANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND SEI-
SURES OF VEHICLES. REVIEW IS FURTHER
NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE CRITICAL QUES-
TION OF WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS
TO JUSTIFY AN ARREST, ABSENT ANY INFOR-
MATION TO SUGGEST THAT ANY ILLEGALITY
HAS OCCURRED. THESE ISSUES ARE OF EX-
CEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE SINCE THEY DEAL
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED DETENTIONS AND
SINCE THE ISSUES INVOLVED HEREIN HAVE
NEVER BEEN DIRECTLY ADDRESSED: BY THIS
COURT.

A. PETITIONER’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

8

TO BE FREE FROM AN UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS VIOLATED WHEN
HE WAS DETAINED FOR AN EXTENDED
PERIOD OF TIME BY ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICIALS DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY ARTIC-
ULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE VEHICLE
WHICH PETITIONER WAS DRIVING WAS BE-
ING USED TO TRANSPORT ARGICULTURAL
PRODUCTS.

Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Reasonableness is measured by balancing the intrusion
against the promotion of legitimate government functions.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). As
part of considering this equation with regard to warrant-
less searches of motor vehicles, (which does constitute a
search within a meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)), it is necessary not
only to consider the government interest at hand, but the
degree of intrusion upon the individual, Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 283 (1973), and the degree of
discretion left with the official who seeks to effect the stop.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Due to the in-
herent flexibility in the concept of reasonableness this
Court has enunciated a unique standard of measuring the
propriety of searches and seizures by administrative offi-
cials. This Court has not addressed itself, however, to the
novel issue of administrative searches and seizures of
motor vehicles, as is presented in the case at hand.

Administrative searches and seizures are subject to the
Fourth Amendment, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978) although to justify a search or seizure, “probable
cause in the criminal law sense is not required.”” Marshall

9

v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). Instead a
determination must be made as to whether the reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
administrative inspection are satisfied with respect to the
particular premises to be searched. Camara v. M unicipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

The rationale for allowing this unique standard for ad-
ministrative searches was to permit the smooth imple-
mentation of regulatory schemes. As noted however, the
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness continued
to apply, so that while searches and siezures were based
on a lesser standard of justification than probable cause,
it was necessary that they be “relatively limited inva-
sions” of privacy, Camara v. M unicipal Court, supra at
537 and “limited in scope and relative in purpose.”’ See
v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967). In determining the
justification of the intrusion, it is also proper to consider
whether the seizure interferes with the person’s freedom
of movement, and if so, how much time was consumed
and whether the person was inconvenienced by the de-
tention. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 658.

In the case at hand, Petitioner voluntarily entered an
agricultural and weight station pursuant to Florida Stat-
ute 570.15, which states that Florida agricultural officials
may have access to truck and motor vehicle trailers which
are used “in the production, manufacture, storage, sale,
or transportation within the state of any food product;
any agricultural, horticultural or livestock product; or
any article or product with respect to which any authority
is conferred by law on the department.” It is noteworthy,
that subsequent to the search and seizure in question, this
statute was amended by the Florida legislature. This new
statute now gives Florida officials the right to indefinitely

10

detain any vehicle, until a search of said vehicle has been
made.

When Petitioner entered the agricultural station, he
told the inspectors that his truck contained no agricul-
tural products but instead contained furniture. (T-51).
The agricultural officials were denied access to the cargo
area of the truck, due to the Petitioner’s lack of a readily
available key. (T-36). Thereafter, the inspectors refused
to allow the Petitioner to continue his journey, although
they had no reason whatsoever to believe that Petitioner
had anything but furniture in his truck. (T-52).

The Florida Appellate Court, in its opinion, viewed the
behavior of the agricultural inspectors as within the con-
fines of the Fourth Amendment, holding that the state
agricultural commission has the authority to detain all
trucks until they have been physically inspected. Peti-
tioner asserts that such authority granted to an adminis-
trative agency exceeds the limits of reasonableness as con-
templated by the Fourth Amendment, and as such is
illegal, so as to authorize the suppression of any evidence
obtained pursuant to that seizure. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Petitioner contends that those detentions which exceed
the limits of reasonableness can no longer be justified on
administrative grounds. Such detentions must then be
measured by the same standards which apply in criminal
cases. The case of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) is instructive. There the border patrol
had constructed a permanent checkpoint for the purpose
of detaining illegal aliens. The procedure used at the
checkpoint was found to be acceptable, but the Court
limited the extent of the seizure. Thus, the border patrol

1]

could:

1. Require a vehicle to stop at a border patrol check-
point.

2. Briefly detain the travelers juring which time all
that is required of them is a response to a brief question
or two or possibly the production of a document evi-
dencing the right to be in the United States.

3. Visually inspect the vehicle (but limiting that in-
spection to what could be seen without a warrant).

4. Refer motorists selectively to a secondary area for
questioning only if there is something suspicious about
the particular vehicle passing through the checkpoint, but
then only for a few brief questions about citizenship and
immigration status.

Applying the logic of this decision to the case at hand,
the State of Florida would have had the authority to
require the Petitioner to stop and would have been en-
titled to inquire as to the contents of the truck. However,
absent probable cause in the form of specific and artic-
—ulable facts that the truck contained agricultural prod-
ucts, they would have had no authority to detain the
Petitioner. The record is clear that no such suspicion
existed. The agricultural inspector testified that he had
no reason to believe that Petitioner’s truck carried any-
thing but furniture. (T-52).

Numerous criminal cases, have dealt with the degree of
proof necessary to justify a continuing detention. In Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), this Court stated that
“specific and articulable facts” were necessary to justify
even a short detention. In Brown v. Texas, __ U.S. ___,
61 L.Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979), this Court required that a
detention must be based on “specific, objective”’ facts,

12

concerning specific misconduct and rejected a contention
that an intrusion could be justified if a party “looked
suspicious’. It is significant that both Terry v. Ohio, supra,
and Brown v. Texas, supra, involve short detentions.

As noted, administrative searches and seizures are unique
in that they may be based on less than probable cause,
since they are presumably less intrusive. Petitioner does
not dispute the authority of the state to briefly detain
vehicles to determine if they contain agricultural prod-
ucts. Petitioner does dispute however, the authority of
administrative officials to subject all trucks to an extended
detention, absent any specific knowledge or articulable
suspicion that the vehicles’ contents are subject to ad-
ministrative regulation by the agency in question.

When considering the state’s interest in regulating the
transfer of agricultural products inside the State of Flor-
ida, it is necessary to consider the unique factual setting
in which the seizure in question took place. Virtually all
of the leading administrative search and seizure cases con-
sidered by this Court have involved situations in which
the administrative officials knew that the premises which
they sought to search contained something within, which
was subject to the regulatory authority. In Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., supra, the inspector was aware that the
inside of the premises was subject to the provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. Likewise, in See v.
Seattle, supra, there was no doubt that the premises sought
to be inspected were subject to the fire regulations of the
City of Seattle. The case at hand, however, is different
in that the agricultural inspectors had no reason to believe
that the truck in question centained agricultural products.
This lack of knowledge, then makes this case ripe for
review by this Court, as here the administrative agency

13

in question, had no reason to believe that they would find
those items for which they were authorized to conduct an
inspection.

Delaware v. Prouse, supra, concerned the administrative
detention of motor vehicles. There a policeman stopped
a vehicle for purposes of a spot license registration check.
This court found such a practice to be illegal, as there
existed no, “appropriate factual basis for suspicion direct-
ed at a particular vehicle” at 660. Such a standard, more
stringent than the standard enunciated in other adminis-
trative search cases, was necessary because of the extent
of the intrusion and because it left too much discretion in
the hands of the arresting authority. As the court noted
at 660, ‘‘the grave danger of abusive discretion, does not
disappear simply because the automobile was subject to
the State regulation resulting in numerous instances of
police citizen contact.”’

The intrusion in the case at hand, was “inconvenient”,
“consumed time’’, and significantly interfered with the
Petitioner’s “freedom of movement’. Furthermore, the
seizure was not “limited in scope and relevant in purpose,”
See v. Seattle, supra, since the administrative officials here
saw fit to detain a vehicle, absent any information what-
soever to suggest that the vehicle detained was subject
to the administrative regulation which formed the basis
of the detention. Finally, in suggesting that the agricul-
tural commission is entitled to a physical search of all
trucks, the state asserts that they are able to subject all
trucks to an extended detention, a clear contradiction of
the Fourth Amendment requirement that administrative
seizures be relatively limited invasions of privacy.

Under the rule propounded by the Florida Appellate
Court, the state should be allowed to physically inspect

14

all vehicles for the purposes of administrative efficiency
and refusal of a citizen to permit that extensive intrusion
should give them authority to detain a vehicle and the
citizen indefinitely. Such a rule of course would give the
state agricultural commission not only the right to make
seizures on less than probable cause “in the criminal
sense’, but allow them to make seizures more intrusive
than those necessary to accomplish their administrative
function. In such circumstances, the anticipated tradeoff
between the lesser justification needed to conduct an ad-
ministrative search and the lesser degree of intrusiveness
of an administrative search and seizure would become non-
existent. The practical result would be that all seizures
and subsequent searches would become reasonable. Such
a result is contrary to the Fourth Amendment and ac-
cordingly the evidence seized as a result of the illegal
detention should have been suppressed.

B. PETITIONER’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO BE FREE FROM AN UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS VIOLATED WHEN
HIS TRUCK AND ITS GONTENTS WERE
SEARCHED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT WHEN THERE
WAS NO ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE
VEHICLE CONTAINED OR WAS USED TO
TRANSPORT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS;
WHERE PETITIONER GAVE NO CONSENT TO
ALLOW THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE; AND
WHERE NO ABANDONMENT OCCURRED
PRIOR TO THE SEARCH.

Permissible searches under the Fourth Amendment are
limited to those which are reasonable. In criminal cases,
probable cause must exist before a search can be reason-

15

able. Absent exigent circumstances, a search warrant is
necessary to effectuate a search and seizure, as absent a
warrant all searches are presumed to be unreasonable.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). One
function of a warrant, which seeks to insure “reasonable-
ness’, is the requirement limiting the allowable scope of
a search, so that it remains “strictly tied to and justified
by the circumstances which rendered its initiation per-
missible.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 19 (1968), citing
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Mr. Justice
Fortas, concurring).

Administrative searches are subject to the authority of
the Fourth Amendment, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978) and thus normally require a search warrant absent
consent. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Accordingly, they are limited in scope by the prescrip-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. While it is well recog-
nized, that such seizures can be based on a lesser standard
than those necessary to justify a criminal search, Marshall
v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, the Fourth Amendment require-
ment of reasonableness remains, .0 that the legitimacy of
each search must be reviewed on a case by case basis.
Thus in each case, there must be a balancing of the spe-
cific enforcement needs of each statute justifying an ad-
ministrative intrusion and the individual’s privacy guar-
antees infringed upon. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra.

Accordingly, the scope of searches made by administra-
tive personnel is limited by the purposes of the search in
question. This is implicit in the concept allowing a search
based on “less than probable cause in a criminal sense,”’
because such searches involve a relatively limited inva-
sion of the citizen’s privacy, since, “the inspections are
neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of

16

evidence of crime.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 527 (1967). Thus the standard needed to legitimize
an administrative search is lessened, since such a search
involves a lesser degree of intrusion.

Because a lesser degree of intrusion is justified under
the administrative search guidelines, a search warrant is
invariably preferred absent consent. As the Court in
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978), noted, “when
the inspector demands entry (without a warrant), the
occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of
the . . . code requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to
search and no way of knowing whether the inspector him-
self is acting under proper authorization.” Implicit in this
preference for a warrant is the fear that administrative
officials in the field would possess almost unbridled discre-
tion to exceed the permissible limits of an administrative
search. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra at page 324.

In the case at hand, a search of the contents of the
Petitioner’s truck was conducted after the Petitioner had
been involuntarily detained and absent a warrant. The
search was conducted by Florida agricultural officials,
(T-56) for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vehicle
in question contained any agricultural products. (T-41).
Under the Florida Statute 570.15, the officials in question
were entitled to search vehicles used in the agricultural
business, and thus the intrusions were to be confined to
searching for agricultural products.

Upon looking in the rear of the truck, the inspector in
question noticed that the truck contained furniture an
old motorcycle, and possibly an old tire. (T-56). Peti-
tioner had previously informed the inspector that the
truck contained furniture. (T-52). At no time did the

17

inspector ever observe any agricultural products or contra-
band in the truck. (T-59). Another inspector, who ob-
served the contents of the truck, while standing on the
road near the tailgate of the truck, testified at the Motion
to Suppress Hearing, that the contents of the truck were
nothing that concerned the Florida Department of Agri-
culture. (T-72). Nevertheless, the first inspector proceeded
to physically enter the truck although he had no reason
to believe that the truck contained any items subject to
the authority of the Florida Department of Agriculture.
This first search was conducted, because the thought en-
tered the mind of the inspector that the Petitioner might
not be telling the truth. (T-57).

The Florida Appellate Court interpreted the relevant
statute as allowing a search of all trucks, regardless of
whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify belief that
the vehicle contained agricultural products. Such a proce-
dure for inspection, absent a warrant, violates this Court’s
decision in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, that a war-
rant be obtained. Under Marshall, a neutral magistrate
should be interjected to assure that a search, “is reason-
able under the Constitution” and is “pursuant to an ad-
ministrative plan containing specific criteria.” Absent
such a warrant, the possibility exists that the scope and
purpose of a search will be exceeded and thus become
unreasonable.

A warrant would have been appropriate in the case at
hand, for purposes of requiring the state to justify the
search, and if issued, to limit the scope of the search to
a determination as to whether agricultural products were
present. Instead, no warrant was issued and the inspec-
tors were given “unbridled discretion” to arbitrarily search
Petitioner’s vehicle, absent any reason to believe that the

18

vehicle in question contained agricultural products.

Furthermore, once having gone forward with the search
by looking inside the vehicle, they proceeded to physically
enter the truck despite the fact that no agricultural prod-
ucts were apparent and despite the fact that the visible
contents of the truck coincided with the description pro-
vided by the Petitioner. This physical entry, certainly
not for the purpose of discovery of agricultural products,
was rationalized on the ground that the inspector in ques-
tion “‘felt”’ that the Petitioner might not be telling the
truth and not on the basis of any articulable suspicion
that any Florida law or regulation was being violated. An
“inarticulable hunch” provided the basis for the physical
entry of the truck. This was clearly outside the permis-
sible scope of an administrative search, since prior to
entry into the truck the inspectors observed that the
truck contained nothing which concerned the Florida
Department of Agriculture.

The physical entry into the truck and the search of the
truck’s contents violates Petitioner’s rights, since no pos-
sible probable cause to search existed at that time. In
fact, as already stated any suspicion that agricultural
products were contained within the truck, were negated
by the “‘look inside” the truck.

The Florida Appellate Court bypassed the issue of
whether or not the initial detention of Petitioner’s vehicle
was legal and assumed legality. Thus, that Court could
not properly reach an opinion as to whether Petitioner’s
consent to search his vehicle was given.

A party may consent to waive its Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.
Such a consent, however, must be a voluntary relinquish-
ment of a known right, Schneckoloth v. Bustamonte, 412

19

U.S. 218 (1973) and must not be the product of coercion
offered by those with the cloak of authority. Bumper v.
State of North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The gov-
ernment of course may not benefit from its own illegality,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) and if
illegality is detected by the government which is directly
related to the consent in question, such illegality must be
included in a determination of the voluntariness of the
consent.

In the case at hand, the Petitioner was subject to ex-
tensive restraint and detention before apparently opening
the doors of the truck. Prior to this time, Petitioner had
denied inspection agents access to his vehicle (T-36). It
was only after the Petitioner had been restrained and
detained that the inspectors discovered that the tailgate
doors of the truck were open. The illegal detention should
have been considered in deciding the voluntariness of the
consent, since as Petitioner noted, the government may
not benefit from its own illegality. Wong Sun v. United
States, supra.

It is also significant that the State did not prove “con-
sent”’, and only showed that the doors to the truck were
open. Therefore, at best, Petitioner consented to a “view”
of the contents of the truck by opening the doors. Con-
sent was never extended to include entry into the truck.

To summarize, no consent to search was expressly given
and it was only after the Petitioner was informed that he
might need to remain for an indefinite time and until a
physical search was conducted, that officials noticed the
doors to Petitioner’s truck were open (T-71). This is cer-
tainly not an articulated and express consent as required
by law. The agents in question were uniformed and
cloaked in administrative authority (T-49). Thus, if the

20

authority to detain the truck was illegal (as Petitioner
asserts herein) then it would. prevent the Petitioner from
having made a knowing voluntary consent of his Fourth
Amendment rights.

As the consent given to the first search here was not
voluntary, it is for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
equivalent to no consent at all. Accordingly, it cannot be
argued that consent attenuated the primary illegality,
since the consent was a direct product of said illegality
and hence not voluntary.

Petitioner further asserts that the issue of abandonment
of the vehicle in regard to the first search is irrelevant,
since the Petitioner did not leave his vehicle until after
the agricultural authorities had physically entered it.
Accordingly, his standing to contest this search was intact
at the time of this search.

Administrative officials are granted a lesser standard to
justify their searches, precisely because they would be less
intrusive. To allow those who conduct administrative
searches, the degree of discretion which the Florida Appel-
late Court approved for the agricultural inspectors in this
case would be to grant administrative agencies the right
to conduct more expansive searches than those permitted
in criminal situations, in which the state has a far greater
interest. The opinion below authorizes agricultural in-
spectors to stop every truck and presumably search, with-
out @ warrant, all of its contents, whether or not they
believed they contained agricultural products. Such un-
limited discretion would allow searches of all trucks and
place no limitation on the scope of such searches in direct,
violation: of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the
state should have been required to obtain a search war-
rant to justify its intrusion and said warrant should have

21

limited the scope of any justifiable search (if any) to far
below that which was effected by the Florida officials.
Thus, the search was unreasonable and any evidence dis-
cussed pursuant to that search, including any evidence
discovered pursuant to the alleged consent should be sup-
pressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

C. THE PETITIONER’S FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS AR-
RESTED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE.

An arrest of an individual is a seizure for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment and accordingly must be rea-
sonable. The reasonableness of an arrest will depend on
whether, ‘“‘at the moment the arrest was made, the officers
had probable cause to make it.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964). Probable cause exists when there is rea-
sonably trustworthy information whith is sufficient for a
prudent man to believe that the individual in question
had committed or was committing an‘offense. Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).

In order to properly review probable cause decisions
made by law enforcement officers in the field, it is neces-
sary to look to the totality of the circumstances as re-
vealed by the record. Beck v. Ohio, supra. In the case at
hand, Petitioner was arrested after he had left the area
where his truck and he had been illegally detained. (T-82).
At that time, no contraband had been found in the vehicle
(T-75) and there was no evidence whatsoever that any
sort of illegality had occurred. This is born out by the
testimony of an agricultural inspector who had testified
that even after having seen Petitioner leave, he had no
reason to believe that Petitioner had violated the law.
(T-68). The question to be considered then is whether the

22

arrest in question was justified by probable cause. If not,
any evidence seized subsequent to and pursuant to said
illegal arrest should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975).

Brown v. Illinois, supra, is controlling here. In Brown,
the defendant was arrested without probable cause and
without a warrant. Thereafter, while in custody, he made
two exculpatory statements. The Court held that these
statements were to be excluded as the fruit of an illegal
arrest. Reflecting on the illegality of the arrest, this Court
stated:

The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; aware-
ness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two
detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in
their testimony, that the purpose of their action was
“for investigation” or for “questioning”. The arrest,
both in design and in execution, was investigatory.
The detectives embarked upon this expedition for
evidence in the hope that something might turn up.
(at 605).
The impropriety of the arrest in the instant case is as”
obvious as it was in Brown, supra. The State contends
that the Petitioner fled from his truck and probable cause
existed for his arrest. Flight, however, while a factor to
be considered is, standing alone, insufficient to constitute
probable cause. United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380
(5th Cir. 1972). To be sufficient to constitute probable
cause, it should be “coupled with specific knowledge on
the part of the officer relating the suspect to evidence of
crime”. United States Ex Rel Richardson v. Rundle, 461
F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir. 1962).

In the case at hand, the Petitioner was subject to a
full arrest. At the time that officials began pursuit of the

23

Petitioner, there was no reason to suspect that Petitioner
was involved in any sort of illegality. This was evidenced
by the fact that once informed that the Petitioner had
fled, the search of the vehicle ceased. Thus any contra-
band subsequently discovered during the second search
at the Sheriff’s station was unrelated to the pursuit and
apprehension of the Petitioner. Accordingly, even if there
was @ vague suspicion of some illegality, it would have
been impossible to state what specific crime was suspect-
ed, if any. Thus, any basis for pursuit and subsequent
arrest could not have been sufficient for a prudent man
to believe that Petitioner had committed or was com-
mitting an offense.

Petitioner apparently was subject to a full arrest. Absent
any knowledge of criminal behavior by the State, prob-
able cause was not present to either arrest defendant or
search the truck a second time (when the contraband was
ultimately found). Thus, the evidence discovered subse-
quent to arrest should have been suppressed. Brown »v.
Illinois, supra.

D. PETITIONER’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED WHEN SHERIFF'S OFFICERS
CONDUCTED A SECOND SEARCH OF HIS
VEHICLE, WITHOUT A WARRANT; WHERE
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SEARCH; AND WHERE THERE WAS NO EXI-
GENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

Absent certain well recognized exceptions, a warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate is necessary
to justify a search or seizure. In the case at hand no
search warrant was issued to authorize the second search
of the truck, which was conducted at the Hamilton County
Jail. (T-78). Petitioner asserts that absent a warrant, no

24

probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the
search.

The Florida Appellate Court in its opinion held that an
abandonment of the truck in question had occurred, which
authorized the search. Petitioner contends however that
a valid abandonment did not occur in that (1) he was
present on the same premises as the truck, when the sec-
ond search took place and (2) any alleged abandonment
on the part of Petitioner was involuntary and therefore
did not constitute an abandonment for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.

The consideration of an “abandonment” necessitates
an examination of all relevant circumstances existing at
the time of the alleged abandonment of an item, United
States v. Manning, 440 F.2d 1105, 1111 (5th Cir. 1971),
in order to determine if the party in question retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to it. United
States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).

In the case at hand, Petitioner left his vehicle after
agricultural authorities had physically entered it. Upon
being advised that Petitioner was no longer present, the
inspectors ceased their search, and the contraband in
question was not discovered until a second search took
place at the Hamilton County Jail. (T-74). Petitioner
was present at the jail during this search having arrived
prior to the truck (T-82). Thus, he was present on the
premises, at the same time that his truck which was
allegedly abandoned, was searched. By being present on
said premises, Petitioner retained his reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his vehicle and no abandonment took
place.

Petitioner further asserts that any alleged abandonment
attributed to him here would be improper as his actions

~

25

were caused by and were the result of an illegal search
and seizure. To be proper, an abandonment, must be vol-
untary. Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1968) ;
United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726 (Sth Cir. 1979). Evi-
dence will not be regarded as abandoned for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment if the action in question was a
result of illegality on the part of law enforcement officials
since under such circumstances, said action could not be
regarded as voluntary.

If this Court should find, that either the initial deten-
tion of the Petitioner, or the initial intrusion into the
truck was illegal, then the State of Florida would have
no justification for taking the vehicle into its possession.
The taking of the vehicle into its possession would then
have been an illegal act, as would have been the second
search, during which the contraband was discovered.

Here, the Petitioner took no action to leave his truck
prior to the time that the agricultural inspector entered
the vehicle. (T-58). Once the inspector was physically
inside the truck, the Petitioner left. (T-58). Petitioner
asserts that there exists a causal relationship between the
physical entry by the inspector and the Petitioner leaving
the truck and that the alleged abandonment would not
have occurred, but for the entry into the truck. Accord-
ingly, abandonment does not provide justification for the
second search of the truck as the abandonment was in-
voluntary, being the product of law enforcement illegality.

As the abandonment here was not voluntary, it is for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, equivalent to no
abandonment at all. Accordingly, it cannot be argued
that any allowed abandonment attenuated the primary
illegality since the alleged abandonment was a direct
product of said illegality and hence not voluntary.

26

Even if the Court should find that no illegality existed
in the search and seizure of the Petitioner’s truck by the
administrative officials in question and that the arrest of
Petitioner is legal, the Court should still suppress the
items seized pursuant to the second search.

No probable cause existed at the time of said search.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) as the State
lacked independent “specific and articulable facts” on
which to base probable cause. Instead, at the time of the
second search, there was no information to suggest that
any illegality occurred.

Additionally, no exigent circumstances existed to jus-
tify the search. At the time of the search, the Petitioner
was in custody and was traveling alone and the possibility
of movement of the vehicle was non-existent as it was
under the control of the Sheriff of Hamilton County.
Furthermore, the vehicle could have been readily locked
so as to safeguard its contents. In addition, the State had
ample opportunity to seek a warrant, and as such should
not be permitted to decide probable cause, instead of leav-
ing that decision to a neutral magistrate. In this regard,
it must be remembered that, ‘the word ‘automobile’ is not
a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades
away and disappears.”’ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
Accordingly, a search warrant should have issued as ab-
sent such warrant no probable cause and no exigent cir-
cumstances existed. Thus any evidence seized pursuant
to the second search should have been suppressed as the
“fruits” of the primary illegalities which occured or al-
ternatively as items seized during a warrantless search
where no probable cause existed.

27

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner contends
that the First District Court of Appeals for the State of
Florida erred in its decision concerning the novel issue
presented to it and misapplied controlling authority to the
circumstances involved in Petitioner’s situation. There-
after, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the
judgment of the First District Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

GARLAND, NUCKOLLS, KADISH,
MARTIN & CATTS, P.C.

f mye? . Kabisu
1012 Candler Building

127 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404/577-2225

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have this day served, the Attor-
ney General, Tallahassee, Florida with a copy of this
pleading by depositing in the United States Mail a copy
of same in a properly addressed envelope with adequate

postage t#Jereon. ‘
This day of , 1980.

ww Lhd. (). edad

i Max J. KHapisH

1012 Candler Building
127 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404/577-2225

Appendices

APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE, ) NOT FINAL
UNTIL TIME
Appellant, EXPIRES TO
FILE REHEAR-
VS | ING PETITION
AND DISPOSI-
STATE OF FLORIDA, TION THEREOF
IF FILED.

CASE NO. II-183

Appellee.

4

Opinion filed April 17, 1979.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County.
Royce Agner, Judge.

Virlyn B. Willis, Jr., for Appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General and Michael H.
Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

BOOTH, J.

This cause is before the Court on appeal from the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court, Hamilton County, entered on
a jury verdict finding Sharpe guilty of possession of more
than 100 pounds of cannabis, and sentencing him to five
years imprisonment and a ten thousand dollar ($10,000)
fine. He urges as error the trial court’s failure to suppress
evidence taken in a search of his truck.

The facts are that Sharpe stopped his rental truck at
an agricultural inspection station on an interstate high-
way, but when told by a uniformed inspector that he
wished to inspect the vehicle, Sharpe advised that his

A-1

A-2

girlfriend had the key to the lock securing the rear door
of the truck and she was driving another vehicle ahead
of him on the highway. The inspector asked Sharve what
was in the truck and Sharpe answered that he had some
furniture from his girlfriend’s apartment. The inspector
then requested Sharpe to pull his truck over to the dock
and wait. At one point, the inspector suggested that if
Sharpe couldn’t get the truck open, and if his girlfriend
didn’t come back, that he could get a hammer for Sharpe
to break the lock. Sharpe stated it was a new lock that
he didn’t want to break. He indicated his girlfriend would
come back. At no time did Sharpe refuse to allow the
truck to be searched.

Some minutes later the inspectors noticed that the back
of the truck was open and Sharpe was standing next to
it. One of the inspectors went over and looked inside the
truck and observed furniture and an old motorcycle.
Shortly after he entered the back of the truck to look
further, he heard another inspector call that Sharpe was
gone. Sharpe was seen running across an open field. At
that point all inspection of the vehicle was stopped. The
inspectors contacted the highway patrol and the sheriff’s
office. Shortly thereafter, Sharpe was taken into custody.
A deputy drove the truck from the inspection station to
the jail, where the truck was searched and the cannabis
discovered.

Sharpe contends that despite the requirement of Florida
Statute section 570.15(1)(a) that specified vehicles stop
at agricultural inspection stations, the inspectors must
allow such vehicles to pass uninspected absent a reason-
able suspicion that agricultural products are being trans-
ported. It is his position that when he told the inspector
that his vehicle contained furniture, and the inspector

A-3

had no reason to suspect otherwise, the inspector should
have let his vehicle pass. Finally, he contends that he did
not abandon his truck and therefore the search carried
out by the sheriff’s officers was illegal because it was done
without a search warrant and without his valid consent.
We must disagree with Sharpe’s reasoning.

Florida Statute 570.15 provides in pertinent part as
follows:

““(1)(a) +The commissioner, assistant commissioner,

irectors, counsel, experts, chemists, agents, inspec-
tors, road-guard inspection special officers, and other
employees and officers of the department shall have
full access at all reasonable hours to all:

* * *

6. Trucks;

7. Motor vehicles, other than private passenger auto-
mobiles with no trailer in tow or any vehicles bearing
an RV license tag;

8. Truck and motor vehicle trailers;

* * *

used in the production, manufacture, storage, sale,
or transportation within the state of any food prod-
uct; any agricultural, horticultural, or livestock prod-
uct; or any article or product with respect to which
any authority is conferred by law on the department.

(b) If such access be refused by the owner, agent, or
manager of such premises or by ‘the driver of such
aforesaid vehicle, the inspector or road-guard inspec-
tion special officer may apply for a search warrant
which shall be obtained as provided by law for the
obtaining of search warrants in other cases, or may
conduct a search of any of the aforesaid vehicles with-
out a warrant pursuant to s. 933.19.

A-4

(c) Such departmental officers, employees, and road-
guard inspection special officers may examine and
open any package or container of any kind contain-
ing or believed to contain any article or product which
may be transported, manufactured, sold, or exposed
for sale in violation of the provisions of this chapter,
the rules of the department, or the laws which the
department enforces and may inspect the contents
thereof and take therefrom samples for analysis.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any truck or any truck
or motor vehicle trailer to pass any official road-guard
inspection station without first stopping for inspec-
tion. A violation of this subsection shall constitute a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as pro-
vided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.”

Section 570.151 provides as follows:

“The department may appoint road-guard inspec-
tion special officers of sufficient number to carry out
the duties of the department relating to road-guard
inspection as prescribed in this section. Said offi-
cers shall be known as road-guard inspection special
officers...

* * xX

All such special officers shall have power and au-
thority to make arrests, with or without warrants
as provided in s. 570.15, for violations of law com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of s. 570.15 to the
same extent and under the same limitations and
duties as do peace officers under the provisions of
chapter 901, and all such special officers shall have
the right and authority to carry arms while on duty,
provided such officers shall meet the requirements
of the Police Standards and Training Commission
established under s. 943.11...”

The State in the reasonable exercise of its police power
has required agricultural inspections of specified vehicle ;

A-5

operated on the highways of the State. In Stephenson v.
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 329
So.2d 373 (Fla Ist DCA 1976), affirmed 342 So.2d 60
(Fla 1976), this Court so held and ruled further:

‘‘The inspections are necessary in order that appellee
[Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services]
may carry out its responsibilities relating to disease
control, fruit and vegetable grading and other simi-
lar matters required by law, appellee’s regulations
and federal marketing orders. Under subsection (2)
of section 570.15 above, all trucks and motor vehicle
trailers [not limited to those mentioned in subsection
(1)] are required to stop at appellee’s road-guard in-
spection stations for inspection. Unless such a vehicle
stops at the station, it cannot be determined by the
inspectors whether or not it is being used for trans-
portation of ‘any food product, any agricultural, hor-
ticultural, or livestock product; or any article or
product with respect to which any authority is con-
ferred by law on the department.’ Upon stopping,
the majority of operators of such vehicles will prob-
ably have no objection to such an inspection and
will consent to same; but as provided in the statute,
if access is refused, the vehicle may not be searched
without the inspector obtaining a search warrant or
without a legal basis for search without a warrant
pursuant to established law. Such in no way impairs
appellants’ right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure, their right to due process of law, or their
right to equal protection of the law. We do not find
that it violates any constitution right of appellant.”
(329 So.2d at page 376)

The Supreme Court affirmed the Stephenson decision,
quoting an earlier decision,’ holding (342 So.2d 60, 61):

“The protection of a large industry constituting one
of the great sources of the state’s wealth and there-

1 Johnson v. State, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So.2d 853 (Fla 1930).

A-6

fore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of
so great a portion of the population of the state is
affected to such an extent by public interest as to
be within the police power of the sovereign.”

Sharpe’s contention that the agricultural inspectors
should have limited their inspection of his truck to a few
questions and a plain view search is devoid of merit. He
was driving a two-ton rental truck with a large fully en-
closed cargo area of the type customarily used as testi-
fied to by the inspectors, to haul fruit and tomatoes. The
nature of the truck precluded any plain view inspection
and, therefore, it was necessary for the inspector to look
inside the truck’s cargo area in order to perform his duty
of inspecting for agricultural products. Therefore, we find
that Sharpe’s detention at the road-guard station was
reasonable.

We find that Sharpe consented to the inspection of his
truck and opened the truck of his own volition, State v.
Drake, 343 So.2d 1336 (Fla 1st DCA 1977), and that his
arrest was lawful following his having fled the scene after
an inspection of the truck began. City of Miami v. Nelson,
186 So.2d 535 (Fla 3d DCA 1966); Florida Statute sec-
tions 570.151, 901.15.

Finally, we agree with the trial court that defendant
abandoned his truck at the road-guard station. The sub-
sequent impoundment of the abandoned truck was also
reasonable, Mattson v. State, 328 So.2d 246 (Fla 1st DCA
1976), and the seizure of the evidence contained therein
not improper. State v. Jackson, 240 So.2d 88 (Fla 3d DCA
1973); State v. Nittolo, 317 So.2d 748 (Fla 1975).

A-7

We have considered Sharpe’s remaining points and
find them without merit. Accordingly, the judgment and
sentence appealed are AFFIRMED.

SMITH, Acting Chief Judge and MASON, ERNEST E.,
Associate Judge, CONCUR.

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE, )
Appellant,

—vs— > CASE NO. II-183

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. |

ORDER

Petition for Rehearing and Response thereto having
been considered,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition is hereby denied.

By Order of the Court dated this 21st day of May,
A. D. 1979. Unless otherwise ordered, the Court’s man-
date will issue fifteen (15) days after this date. Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 9.340; General Order en-
tered April 14, 1978. Acting Chief Judge Robert P. Smith,
Jr., Judge Anne C. Booth, and Associate J udge Ernest E.
Mason.

A TRUE COPY
ATTEST:
RAYMOND E. RHODES, CLERK

/s/ Raymonp E. Ruopss ©

District Court of Appeal, First District
Tallahassee, Florida

APPENDIX C
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 1980

) CASE NO. 57,012
WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE, District Court
Petitioner, of Appeal,
STATE OF FLORIDA, “First: District
Respondent. DCA brn NO.
I-183

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the
Court on jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record
deemed necessary to reflect jurisdiction under Fla. R.
App. P. 9.120, and it appearing to the Court that it is
without jurisdiction, it is ordered that certiorari is denied.

No Motion for Rehearing will be entertained by the
Court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d).

Petitioner’s amended notice is hereby denied.

ADKINS, ACTING C.J., BOYD, OVERTON, SUND-
BERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., Concur

A True Copy ner
CC: Hon. Raymond E. Rhodes,
TEST: Clerk
Hon. Charles Ralph Carlton,
Clerk
Sid J. White Hon. Royce Agner, Judge
Clerk Supreme Court.

Virlyn B. Willis, Jr., Esquire
Charles A. Stampelos, Esquire
By: /s/ Nancy E. Ryats
Deputy Clerk

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2258%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.