# Reply Brief — Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 452 U.S. 264

## Text

Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596

Iu the Supreme Court of the Uuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

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DONALD PAUL HODEL,
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, APPELLANT
Vv.
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
; VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS
hy v.

DONALD PAUL HODEL,
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

PRET TA ROY OA
y

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
SRDS ZONE, ANU leis WOOP Sasi nccoesnncigasactncsbeneskudouains 6
Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,
In re, 14 E.R.C. 1088, appeals pending, Nos. 80-

1810 et seg. (D.D.C., filed Aug. 26, 1980) .......... 5
United States v. Polino, 181 F. Supp. 772 ................ 6
Constitution and statutes:
United States Constitution:
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (Commerce
Cf Rel BP igi Sa aap oo SMT Ls IS 2,8
a a cadence biobene 4
SE rte eae 2
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 7401 et seq..... 4
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
PU i 4

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C.
(Supp. I) 1201 et seq.:

Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265(c).. 3
Section 515(e), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265 (e).. 3
Section 521, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271 .............. 7
Section 521 (a) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271
SSRI Sear of erent IY RAED) Be Sr TI 7,8
Section 521 (a) (3), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271
OD RR eR SENTERO REY PPE 7,8,9
Section 522(e), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(e).. 5,6
Section 525 (a), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1275 (a).. 9
Section 525(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1275(c).. 9
Miscellaneous:
OR WOU. Team. TARO CERT) occcnnc x nccciccic ccc cctncsciccees 6
380 C.F.R. 761.5(a) (2) (i), 44 Fed. Reg. 15342
9 sp ROR CIT gS NOS AANA oe BON ODN WIN Soe ROR TTe 5
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1072, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).. 4
H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
UPI pects ieccaadpnabiaceatseisaeeeicialensadi aap ccabisliethacididaden 6

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 79-1538

DONALD PAUL HODEL,
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,* APPELLANT

Vv.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

No. 79-1596

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS

Vv.

DONALD PAUL HODEL,
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.*

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

In large measure, plaintiffs’ brief fails to address
the arguments advanced by the Secretary of the
Interior in support of the Surface Mining Act. We
therefore continue to rely primarily on the views ex-

* The Secretary of the Interior has disqualified himself in
this case.
(1)

2

pressed in the principal brief for the Secretary. We
respond briefly to several of plaintiffs’ contentions
that in our view misdirect the judicial focus in this
litigation or inject an element of factual confusion‘
into the controversy.

1. In the first place, plaintiffs repeatedly attempt
to treat this case as if it were an essentially factual
dispute in which the Secretary’s success on appeal
depends on his ability to demonstrate that the dis-
trict court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous
(see, e.g., Va. Br. 2-8, 5-6, 87-40). This is inac-
curate. Plaintiffs are the parties challenging the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress, and they
therefore bear the heavy burden of establishing that
the explicit and implicit legislative findings on which
the statute is based are irrational. When the validity
of a federal statute is at stake, a district court does
not sit to try facts as it would in a criminal prosecu-
tion or a negligence suit. The court’s inquiry is of
a different character altogether. And, on appellate
review, the question is not whether the district court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous but whether
the district court properly resolved the legal dispute
regarding the existence vel non of a rational basis
for the challenged legislative action.

2. The other main prong of plaintiffs’ attack on
the Surface Mining Act is the argument that the
Act affects “land use” and that it therefore im-
permissibly exceeds congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and invades the area reserved
to the states under the Tenth Amendment. But there
is no constitutional magic associated with the phrase
“land use.” The Constitution does not prohibit Con-
gress from passing laws affecting land use, and it
does not provide that states and local governments
may exercise exclusive control over land use regula-

3

tion. The cases on which plaintiffs rely (Va. Br. 30)
merely establish that state and local governments
enjoy broad authority to regulate land use; they do
not hold that Congress lacks power to enact meas-
ures affecting iand use, even when those measures
are rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose within the powers delegated to Congress by
Article I of the Constitution. In short, this case does
not turn on whether the Surface Mining Act can or
cannot be characterized as a “land use” measure.
The question is rather whether Congress may prop-
erly regulate surface mining methods in the exercise
of its Article I powers. If it can, any incidental ef-
fects on land use are irrelevant to the constitutional
dispute.

3. Plaintiffs’ criticism (Va. Br. 31-33) of the
“Steep-slope” variance procedure in Section 515(e) of
the Act is unavailing. Plaintiffs complain that Section
515(e) does not offer a meaningful opportunity for
divergence from the “approximate original contour”
requirement because the statute in any event requires
that the highwalls of reclaimed mining cuts be com-
pletely covered. This objection is both premature and
incorrect. Plaintiffs have not identified a single in-
stance in which the statutory obligation to cover the
highwall has prevented a mine operator from making
profitable use of a variance. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe, as an a priori matter, that, after
the highwall has been completely covered, flat bench
land will not remain in sufficient quantities to per-
mit commercial or residential development. In addi-
tion, plaintiffs’ argument ignores the availability of
variances under Section 515(c) of the Act, the pro-
vision governing variances when the mountaintop
removal mining method is used. Finally, and perhaps
most important, plaintiffs simply refuse to acknowl-

4

edge that, once statutorily required reclamation has
been released, the mined lands may be used for any
purpose whatever. If flat bench land is truly as
valuable as plaintiffs contend, there should be no
financial impediment to the reestablishment of flat
areas on the sites of old mining cuts, once those areas
have been restored and stabilized in the manner de-
scribed by Congress.

4. Plaintiffs further contend (Va. Br. 33-35) that
the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional because
“less intrusive means” could have been used by Con-
gress to control the adverse effects of surface mining.
Indeed, plaintiffs suggest that, even before enactment
of the Surface Mining Act, the salutary aims of the
statute were adequately served by the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 7401 et seg., and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
The short answer to this argument is that Congress
rejected it. The effectiveness of existing laws in deal-
ing with a problem identified by Congress is ordi-
narily a matter committed to legislative judgment.
At least in situations where no racial, ethnic, or
otherwise suspect classifications are involved and no
First Amendment interests are implicated, Congress
is not obliged to proceed by adopting the minimal form
of regulation that arguat-y could suffice to produce
the desired result. And, in any event, here Congress
expressly considered the effectiveness of existing legis-
lation and concluded that additional measures were
necessary to deal with the adverse effects of surface
mining operations. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 93-1072,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 123-124 (1974). Plaintiffs’ argu-
ment therefore is neither factually nor legally ade-
quate to justify invalidation of the Surface Mining
Act.

5

5. Plaintiffs’ discussion (Va. Br. 48) of the “valid
existing rights” provision in Section 522(e) of the
Act is misleading. Under Section 522(e), the re-
strictions on surface mining operations near roads,
schools, churches, parks, public buildings, and ceme-
teries are expressly made “subject to valid existing
rights.” Plaintiffs assert (Va. Br. 48) that this ex-
ception “applies only to specific surface mining opera-
tions for which all required permits were issued prior
to August 3, 1977, the effective date of the Act * * *.”
The language of Section 522(e) does not say that
“valid existing rights” may be recognized only where
all required permits were obtained before August 3,
1977. Plaintiffs cite no authority for their interpreta-
tion, but it is apparently based on 30 C.F.R. 761.5
(a) (2) (i), 44 Fed. Reg. 15342 (1979), a regulation
promulgated to implement Section 522(e) during the
Act’s permanent phase. That regulation, however, has
been remanded to the Secretary by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, the court
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to review the reg-
ulations promulgated under the Surface Mining Act.
See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Liti-
gation, 14 E.R.C. 1083, 1091 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980),
appeals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seg. (D.C. Cir., filed
Aug. 26, 1980). The Secretary did not appeal this
aspect of the district court’s decision, and the regula-
tion is not now effective. (Even before the decision,
the Secretary did not interpret the regulation to make
pre-enactment issuance of all necessary permits a sine
qua non for recognition of “valid existing rights”
under Section 522(e). The regulation was intended
to provide only that one way in which a mine opera-
tor could conclusively establish his “valid existing
rights” was to show that all necessary permits had

6

been obtained before passage of the Act. 44 Fed.
Reg. 14993 (1979).) The Secretary is now consider-
ing the appropriate content of a revised regulation on
the subject. The limited legislative history of Section
522(e) makes it reasonably clear that Congress used
the phrase “valid existing rights” to include more
than those surface mining operations that had ac-
tually received permits before the date of the statute.
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 95
(1977), citing United States y. Polino, 131 F. Supp.
772 (N.D. W. Va. 1955).

6. Plaintiffs’ comments regarding the Tucker Act
and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 488 U.S. 59 (1978), misinterpret
the Court’s opinion in that case. Appellees in Duke
Power objected to the Price-Anderson Act on two
theories. They contended that the statute violated
both the Due Process Clause and the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 438 U.S. at
69. The Court ruled that th potential availability
of a Tucker Act remedy in the Court of Claims for
any uncompensated taking of property effected by the
challenged statute did not deprive the district court
of jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. 1331, to consider ap-
pellees’ constitutional claims. 4388 U.S. at 71 n.15.
But, because of the Tucker Act option, the Court
found it unnecessary to address the merits of appel-
lees’ Just Compensation Clause argument or the pro-
priety of granting equitable relief to remedy an un-
compensated taking. Jd. at 94 n.39. The Court’s
approach in Duke Power thus supports the view
expressed in the Secretary’s principal brief (Br. 58-
60) that any taking of a particular parcel of prop-
erty allegedly effected by the Surface Mining Act is
not unconstitutional unless just compensation is un-
available and that therefore declaratory and injunc-
tive relief should not be awarded unless and until

7

the plaintiff or plaintiffs allegedly injured by a par-
ticular taking have established that their legal reme-
dies are inadequate. The Secretary did not assert
that the possibility of a monetary recovery under the
Tucker Act defeats the jurisdiction of this Court or
the district court; he suggested only that, where the
Tucker Act option has not been explored, it may be
premature for this Court to resolve the merits of the
taking question.

7. Plaintiffs contest (Va. Br. 52) the accuracy of
the Secretary’s statement (Br. 62) that “[p]laintiffs
did not allege that they, or any one of them, received
a summary cessation order under Section 521(a) (2)
or suffered loss as a result. Nor was any such show-
ing of harm made at trial.” In challenging this as-
sertion, plaintiffs rely solely on three cessation orders
issued to plaintiff Paramont Mining Corporation.
See J.S. App. 65a-66a. But no allegations regarding
those cessation orders are contained in plaintiffs’
complaint, and the record is silent on the question
whether the orders were summary cessation orders
issued under Section 521(a)(2) or ordinary cessa-
tion orders issued after a notice of violation and
expiration of an abatement period under Section 521
(a) (3). See the general explanation of the cessation
order procedures at pages 60-62 of the Secretary’s
principal brief. The district court’s amended order
enjoins Section 521 of the Act “only insofar as [it]
relate[s] to summary issuance of cessation orders”
(J.S. App. 2a; emphasis in original). Plaintiffs
did not attempt to introduce the Paramont cessation
orders into evidence, and the trial testimony does
not disclose the nature of the orders. See Pr. Tr.
131-137; Tr. 683-686."

1“Py, Tr.” refers to the transcript of the preliminary
hearing in February 1979.

8

In fact, an examination of the three cessation or-
ders issued to Paramont reveals that only one of the
three orders was issued under Section 521(a) (2);
the remaining two orders were issued under Section
521(a) (3). The one summary cessation order (No.
78-I-15-1, issued Aug. 16, 1978) was issued because
Paramont allegedly was conducting surface mining
operations in an area for which it had not obtained
a permit. No evidence in the record shows that Para-
mont suffered any significant financial loss as a re-
sult of the issuance of that cessation order.®

The district court’s mistaken conclusion that Para-
mont had suffered a great financial loss as the result
of the issuance of a summary cessation order was
based on an order issued on January 4, 1979 (No.
79-I-19-1). See Tr. 684-685. An examination of that
cessation order reveals, however, that it was issued
under Section 521(a)(3) and not under Section 521
(a)(2). It was not, in other words, a summary
cessation order. The order was issued for the failure
to abate a violation concerning which a notice of
violation had been issued on November 27, 1978.*
The notice stated that abatement should be completed

2Copies of the three orders have been lodged with the
Clerk of this Court.

8 An administrative law judge ruled that the summary
cessation order was improper because the lack of a permit
did not necessarily establish the “imminent danger” to health
and safety or the reasonable expectation of “significant,
imminent environmental harm” required by Section 521
(a) (2) as a precondition for summary administrative action.
A copy of the administrative law judge’s decision and order
has been lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

* A copy of that notice of violation (No. 78-I-19-7) has also
been lodged with the Clerk of this Court.

9

by December 27, 1978. At any time after November
27, 1978, Paramont was entitled to request a public
hearing under Section 525(a) of the Act and to re-
quest temporary relief from the Secretary under
Section 525(c). It did not do so. Whatever harm
Paramont may have suffered after issuance of the
Section 521(a)(3) cessation order on January 4,
1979, it was not attributable to the summary cessa-
tion order procedure attacked in this litigation and
invalidated by the district court. The Paramont
cessation orders therefore provide no support for
plaintiffs’ challenge to the accuracy of the statements
made in the Secretary’s opening brief.

For these reasons, and the reasons stated in the
principal brief for the Secretary, the judgment of the
district court should be reversed as to all questions
before the Court, except the Commerce Clause ques-
tion raised by plaintiffs’ appeal in No. 79-1596. In
that respect, the judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.
WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

FEBRUARY 1981

WV. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1981 338091 257

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2241%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
