# Amicus Brief — American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 452 U.S. 490

## Text

IN THE
Supreme Court af the United States

OcroBER TERM, 1980

a a a OED Sites ey

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INc.,
Mrurken & Company, ARKwrIGHT MILLS,
Spartan Miuys, Biark Mits, Inc., HERMITAGE, INC.,
Dan River, Inc., Cone Mitts CoRPORATION,
Mayra Miixs, Serine Miixs, Inc., RieGEL TEXTILE
CorporATION, Fretpcrest Mii1s, INC., and
West Pornt-PEPPERELL, INC.,

Petitioners,
v.

Ray MarsHALL, SECRETARY OF LaBoR,
Unrrep States DEPARTMENT OF LaBor,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL |

INSTITUTE FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS |
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

and

BRIEF OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS —

:
JEROME POWELL :
Counsel of Record
W. Scorr RaILton i
Reep Sura SHaw & McCuay |
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 i
(202) 457-6131 \
Of Counsel: Barton C. GREEN
Davip FERBER General Counsel ’ i
Reep Smita Spraw & McCay American Iron and Steel Institute
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 1000 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-6117 (202) 452-7143 F

November 20, 1980
a

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

No. 1429

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS InstituTE, INc.,
MILLIKEN & Company, ARKwricHt Mis,
Spartan Mis, Buair Mitts, Inc., Hermrrace, INc.,
Dan River, Inc., Cone Mitts Corporation,
Mayrarr Mitts, Sprine Miizs, Inc., Rrecen Texte
CoRPORATION, Frevpcrest Mitts, Inc., and
West Pornt-PEpPERELL, INc.,

Petitioners,
¥.

Ray MarsHa.t, SECRETARY oF Lazor,
Untrep States DEPARTMENT OF LaBoR,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

—_—

INSTITUTE FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS

; MOTION OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL
| CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

The American Iron and Steel Institute, a nonprofit
trade association with a membership which includes
63 domestic iron and steel producing companies, moves
for leave to file a brief, amicus curiae, in support of

li

the petitioners. This motion is accompanied by the
written consent of the Solicitor General for the respon-
dents and by the written consents of some of the peti-
tioners. While counsel for each of the petitioners have
orally consented to the filing of this brief, written con-
sents have not been received from all of the petitioners.

As set forth more fully in the attached brief, the
American Iron and Steel Institute’s interest arises
from the fact that the American steel industry, unlike
the petitioners in this case, is substantially affected
by numerous OSHA health and safety regulations pur-
suant to §6(b) of the OSH Act. In the light of the
economic problems now facing the basic steel industry,
this Court’s application and interpretation of the
terms “‘to the extent feasible” and ‘‘the feasibility of
the standards”’ in § 6(b) (5) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
655(b) (5), and ‘‘reasonably necessary or appropriate’”’
in § 3(8) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8), are crucial to
the industry. The parties are unlikely to present to
this Court the effect its interpretation of these statu-
tory terms will have on an industry subject to numer-
ous OSHA regulations.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip FERBER
November 20, 1980

lii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF INTEREST ...............00..00.5.,.. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................00.... 7
vininsiicasceentec ee EL TOT URES ea 8
WE err iid ree ee 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CasEs:

Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute, 48 USLW 5022 (July 2, 1980). .3, 9, 12

Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, Nos.
78-2663, ete. (5th Cir. Nov. eae 6, 9

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Mar-
shall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980) ....6, 7, 8,
10,1

Statutes anp Rutss:
Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seg... 4
Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. 4

Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (1970), §$ 6(a), $6(b)(5) ..2,3,4
6

29 U.S.C. 652(8) (1970), DOE ov bavbia cus ocx 2,3
ye mailece teapot CEO Te FE Cee 3, 4
43 Fed. Reg. 54480-82 SOMME Shi eetecanrca. ce 10
43 Fed. Reg. 54494 ig SE ee ae 8
45 Fed. Reg. 36962 ( MN SS vn leeidyfabsaecas gcc ose 4
45 Fed. Reg. 36971 ec, EEN eee eae 3
45 Fed. Reg. 37648 ( one RE ci one 3, 4

45 Fed. Reg. 37649 WOE hh cOkacase soca oho acs 3

iv

Table of Authorities Continued
Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel at the Cross-
roads: The American Steel Industry in the 1980s.

EC RE 62b sw Lcdanbunse paces Cheung omet 5, 6
Annual Statistical Report, American Iron anp STEEL
oe dg SEE ECT FRE Rate aM ANTES 5

Council on Wage and Price Stability, Catalog of Fed-
eral Regulations Affecting Iron and Steel Indus-
my, Dopemiben, WOVG wi EVs. icie ks Av bap cicseces 4,5

Environmental Protection Agency’s Carcinogen As-

sessment Group “List of Carcinogen,” April 22,
1980

Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
NIOSH, as contained in the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency National Institutes of Health
Chemical Information System (July 1979), re-
ferred to at 45 Fed. Reg. 53673 (1980) ......... 3

Report to the President by the Steel Tripartite Ad-
visory Committee on the U.S. Steel Industry (Sept.
24, 1980)

No. 1429

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN TEXTILE Manuracturers Institute, INc.,
MILLIKEN & CoMPANY, ARKWRIGHT M118,
Spartan MiLus, Buair Mitts, Inc., Hermritace, INc.,
Dan River, Inc., Cone Mis CORPORATION,
MAYFAIR Mii1s, SPRING Mis, Inc., Rrece. TEXTILE
CoRPORATION, FIELDCREST ’ MILLS, Inc., and
West Pornt-PEPPERELL, Ino. s

Petitioners,

v.

Ray MarsHAuL, SECRETARY OF LABor,
Unirep STates DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

2

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL
INSTITUTE AMICUS CURIAE

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) is a non-
profit trade association with a membership that in-
cludes sixty-three domestic iron and steel producing
companies. These companies employ some 449,000 per-
sons in their steel producing and fabricating opera-
tions and possess approximately 92% of the raw steel
producing capability in the United States. AISI is
participating in rulemaking and litigation concerning
the standard proposed by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) for occupational ex-
posure to lead because that standard has had and will
continue to have a direct impact on certain steel in-
dustry operations. AISI’s interest in the instant case
stems from the consonance of legal issues presented in
the cotton-dust and lead-standard litigations and the
potential precedential effect of this litigation on the
interpretation and application of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) generally.

Crucial to the American iron and steel industry will
be this Court’s application and interpretation of the
terms “‘to the extent feasible’ and ‘‘the feasibility of
the standards”’ in § 6(b) (5) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
655(b) (5), and ‘‘reasonably necessary or appropriate’”’
in § 3(8) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8). If the view of
the court below should be sustained that these terms
require no more of OSHA than a determination that
the costs of the standard will not bankrupt the regu-
lated industry, the American steel industry will be
dealt a severe blow. This is because the steel industry
is or expects to be subject to numerous OSHA health
and safety regulations promulgated pursuant to §6

3

(b),' including those dealing with coke oven emissions,”
asbestos,* noise,‘ benzene,’ lead,®° carbon monoxide
(CO),’ sulphur dioxide (SO:),° heat stress,® iron
oxide,” benzo (a)pyrene,” naphthylamine,” and trich-
loroethlene,”* all of which are expected materially to
affect the manufacture of steel or subsidiary opera-
tions. Also, of concern to the steel industry are cur-
rent OSHA standards adopted pursuant to § 6(a),
to which the ‘‘reasonably necessary or appropriate”’
language of § 3(8) seems equally applicable. These in-
clude various of the subjects as to which § 6(b) stand-

*§6(b)(5) of the OSH Act containing the ‘‘feasibility’’ lan-
guage clearly covers health standards and may also cover safety
standards. See Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. American Pe-
troleum Institute, 48 USLW 5022, 5023, n. 1 (July 2, 1980)
(Benzene).

?29 CFR 1910.1029 (1977).
*29 CFR 1910.1001 (1976), 45 Fed. Reg. 36971 (1980).
*29 CFR 1910.95 (1974), 45 Fed. Reg. 36962 (1980).

*29 CFR 1910.1026 (1978), invalidated by Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 48 USLW
5022 (July 2, 1980).

°29 CFR 1910.1025 (1979), 45 Fed. Reg. 63476 (1980).
* 29 CFR 1910.1000, Table Z-1, 45 Fed. Reg. 37648 (1980).
*45 Fed. Reg. 37649 (1980).

* Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances NIOSH, as
contained in the Environmental Protection Agency National Insti-
tutes of Health Chemical Information System (July, 1979), re-
ferred to at 45 Fed. Reg. 53673 (1980).

1° Td.

*\ Environmental Protection Agency’s Carcinogen Assessment
Group ‘‘List of Carcinogens,’’ April 22, 1980, referred to at 45
Fed. Reg. 53673 (1980).

22 Td.
13 Id.

4

ards are anticipated, such as exposure to noise,” car-
bon monoxide,” sulphur dioxide," electrical standards,”
and standards respecting walking and working sur-
faces," as well as other possible hazards, such as ex-
posure to acid mist,”® coal dust,” and dusts (total).
The §6(b) standards, as adopted or proposed, are
almost uniformly more expensive for the industry than
the “‘consensus”’ or ‘‘established Federal”’ safety and
health standards with respect to the same subject
matters that have been previously adopted by OSHA
pursuant to §6(a) of the OSH Act, although the
latter standards have resulted in substantial compli-
ance costs.

At the same time the industry is subjected to these
heavy expenses of compliance with OSHA regulations,
it is subject to the burdensome costs of complying with
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., as well as
to numerous other Federal regulations. By reason of
such regulations, the Council on Wage and Price Sta-
bility reported:

“Steel is an industry whose production proce-
dures are to some extent prescribed for it by gov-
ernment, whose costs are substantially influenced

by government, whose market share exists at the
sufferance of government and whose profitability

129 CFR 1910.95 (1974), 45 Fed. Reg. 36962 (1980).
*° 29 CFR 1910.1000 Table Z-1.

18 Tq,

* 29 CFR 1910.308-309, 45 Fed. Reg. 37648 (1980).

8 29 CFR 1910.21.34, 45 Fed. Reg. 37648 (1980).

1° 29 CFR 1910.1000 Table Z-1.

*° Id. at Table Z-2.

21 Id. at Table Z-3. Pig

4)

has a good deal less to do with innovation and
enterprise than it does with what government
decides to let it keep.” ™

Over the past several years, the basic American steel
industry has been characterized by production far be-
low capability, by low or negative rates of return, and
by declining employment. During the most recent four
calender quarters for which data is available, the
second quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 1980,
the major integrated steel producers suffered a decline
of 63% in corporate profits, with outright losses in
steelmaking operations as a result of escalating costs
and underutilization of facilities.” From 1970 to 1979
employment by American companies in the production
and sale of steel products declined by 15%, from
531,000 to 453,000. Not coincidently, imports of steel
have increased both absolutely and proportionately
during the past three decades. In the early 1950s steel
imports represented 1.8% of domestic sales; by 1978
that figure had grown ten-fold to 18.1%.”

** Council on Wage and Price Stability, Catalog of Federal
Regulations Affecting Iron and Steel Industry, December, 1976,
at iv.

°° Report to the President by the Steel Tripartite Advisory Com-
mittee on the U.S. Steel Industry, (Sept. 24, 1980) at 1. Co-chaired
by the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce and comprised of gov-
ernment, labor, and industry leaders, the Steel Triparitite Ad-
visory Committee submitted findings on the steel industry and rec-
ommendations for its revitalization to President Carter. These
recommendations provided the basis for President Carter’s pro-
gram for tne industry, announced on Sejtember 30, 1980.

** Annual Statistical Report, AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INsTI-
TUTE 1979, p. 21.

*° American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel at the Crossroads: The
American Steel Industry in the 1980s (Jan. 1980) (hereinafter
**Steel at Crossroads’’) at 9.

6

Modernization of facilities is the key to the indus-
try’s recovery but this will require enormous capital
expenditures over the next five years. The Steel Tri-
partite Committee has examined this matter and has
concluded that when the industry’s capital needs for
modernization and for meeting environmental and
health requirements are compared to available capital
resources for the critical 1980-84 period a shortfall of
1.7 to 2 billion dollars annually results.”

It must be added that the economic problems con-
fronting the steel industry and inflation and persistent
balance of payments deficits, among other things, bear
testimony to a malaise in the American economy in
general and in basic industries in particular. It is
against this economic backdrop that OSHA’s cotton
dust standard—and specifically the agency’s treatment
of the economic feasibility issue—must be judged.

AISI’s participation in the on-going proceedings to
establish a health standard for occupational exposure
to inorganic lead has served to focus the steel indus-
try’s attention on the legal issues presented. to this
Court in the instant case. In the lead standard pro-
ceeding OSHA, with approval of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia Circuit,” has determined
among other things that it has the power under § 6
(b) (5) of the Act to force whole industries to convert
their basic manufacturing facilities from traditional
to novel and untried technologies because the latter

*° This estimate represents a consensus reached with Treasury
Department representatives on the Steel Tripartite Advisory Com-
mittee. STC Report at 8. Industry estimates of the capital shortfall
are in fact somewhat larger. See Steel at the Crossroads, supra,
at 50.

** United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No.
79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980) (Lead).

7

may, in OSHA’s view, achieve some health gains for
employees. OSHA further concluded, again with the
approval of the Court of Appeals, that the unknown
but unquestionably vast dollar expenditures required
to eifect these changes in fundamental technology and
manufacturing processes did not render the standard
economically infeasible because, as here, it did not
appear that the costs imposed by the standard would
bankrupt the affected industries.

While Certiorari will be sought in Lead, this Court’s
disposition of this case may establish precedents
which both will affect the disposition of some of the
issues in Lead and will resolve critical questions con-
cerning the meaning and application of the OSH Act
generally. For the reasons already indicated and de-
veloped further herein, the proper resolution of these
questions here is a matter of the gravest concern to
the American steel industry.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The criteria applied by OSHA and the court below
to determine that the cotton dust standard is econom-
ically feasible are clearly inadequate. They confer on
OSHA an unfettered power to impose costs on affected
industries and to direct the allocation of their capital
resources without regard to the realities of today’s
economy. In so doing, they inescapably raise grave
questions of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The constitutional questions can be avoided and
the American economy can be spared the imposition of
unnecessary costs by a reading of the OSH Act which
compels OSHA to justify the costs of its standards.

8

ARGUMENT

In the language of the Court of Appeals, OSHA’s
determination that the cotton dust standard was eco-
nomically feasible rested on the agency’s ‘conclusion
that the standard will not put the industry out of
business.’’ “* (Pet. App. 69). In Lead, supra, the Court
of Appeals further explicated its understanding of the
term ‘‘economic feasibility.”” The Court said (per
Chief Judge Wright) :

‘“‘A standard is feasible if it does not threaten
‘massive dislocation’ to, AFL-CIO v. Brennan,
supra, 530 F.2d at 123, or imperil the existence
of, American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,
supra, 577 F.2d at 836, the industry .... More
specifically, Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, supra, teaches us that the practical
question is whether the standard threatens the
competitive stability of an industry, 499 F.2d at
478, or whether any inter-industry discrimination
in the standard might wreck such stability or lead
wea concentration ... .’’ Slip Opinion at
143-44,

We submit that this reading of feasibility is both
practically and legally deficient. Practically it fails

**OSHA does recognize that the costs of a given standard are
not to be viewed in complete isolation. In its preamble to the lead
standard the agency stated its position as follows:

‘‘Costs from other sources, including other OSHA standards,
have been considered in the same manner as any other known
costs facing an industry. As such they become part of the
economics of the industry from which the likely impact of
the “en standard is measured.’’ 43 Fed. Reg. 54494 (Nov.
21, 1978).

As indicated from the quotation from the lead standard case in the
text, supra, however, the ‘‘likely impact’’ of a proposed OSHA
standard sufficient to restrain OSHA is the virtual bankruptcy of
the affected industry.

9

because at a time when American industry cannot tol-
erate unnecessary additions to its costs, it imposes on
OSHA no real obligation to justify the costs of its
regulations. Legally it fails because, bankruptcy of the
affected industry aside, it furnishes no guidelines for
the exercise of OSHA’s regulatory discretion.

Of course, it is implicit in the adoption of the OSH
Act that the American economy will bear the costs of
upgrading the safety and health of the industrial
workplace. However, as this Court noted in Benzene,
supra, 48 USLW at 5033, 34, both the language of the
OSH Act and its legislative history make plain that
Congress did not wish to confer on OSHA a limitless
authority over the American economy.

Just such a limitless delegation of authority is
achieved, however, by the construction given to the
term ‘‘feasible’’ by OSHA with the approval of the
court below.” So long as industry bankruptcy is
avoided, OSHA is left free to decree whatever changes
in the domestic economy it feels may contribute to an
improvement in the health or safety of the industrial
workplace,

OSHA’s lead standard discloses the extent to which
such an unbridled discretion can be carried. Com-
pliance with that standard among other things will
require the primary lead industry to convert its basic
manufacturing processes from a pyrometallurgical
technology to a new and unproven hydrometallurgical

* But ef. Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, Nos.
78-2663, ete., (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980) Slip Opinion 1208, 1225
n. 50:

‘The economic feasibility aspect of the statutory limitation

requires that OSHA regulations must be affordable and also
must be of practical cost.’’

10

technology.” OSHA does allow the industry ten years
in which to achieve the conversion, but this regulatory
magnanimity serves only to underscore the scope of
the power asserted. OSHA’s justification for the ten-
year compliance period is its recognition that the
technology to meet the standard exists today in em-
bryonic form only." Thus, the standard requires the
industry to invest its capital resources in the pursuit
of an unproven technology which OSHA has selected
for it and this without any real assurance that the
health objective of the standard can be achieved
through the new technology.”

OSHA’s authority to preempt core managerial de-
cisions regarding changing to different manufactur-
ing technologies is directly at issue in the Lead case
but is not present, as such, in the instant case. OSHA’s
assertion in Lead, on the other hand, of the power to
direct the allocation of corporate resources to the pur-
suit of specific new technologies does bear directly on
the cotton dust standard. Indeed, the lead standard
takes OSHA’s assertion of authority one step farther
than the instant case. Here, the expenditures which
the standard would require of the industry are, by
and large, hygenic in nature (improved ventilation,
enclosure of equipment, ete.). In Lead the agency
claims the power to direct the expenditure of cor-

*° 43 Fed. Reg. 54480-82 (Nov. 21, 1978).

** Id. The Court of Appeals found the ten-year compliance pe-
riod consoling. It said :

“OSHA’s technology-forcing strategy, and its reliance on
embryonic schemes for compliance, are particularly reasonable
in the light of such a generous phase-in period.’’ Lead, supra,
Slip Opinion at 172.

*? See the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the new technology,
td, at 174.

11

porate funds in areas—selection of manufacturing
technologies for example—that lie wholly outside the
agency’s statutory competence solely because the
agency believes that there may be some beneficial side
effects from the expenditures,

This is limitless discretion. It is discretion exercised
without reference to meaningful guidelines and with-
out the possibility of effective judicial oversight. This
is not regulation; it is legislation.

To avoid the constitutional consequences of such a
Sweeping delegation of power, the Act must be con-
strued to impose realistic limitations on OSHA’s feas-
ibility determinations. We believe that this objective
is achieved if the agency is required to demonstrate
that its standards impose on industry no greater costs
than are necessary for the responsible discharge of
the agency’s regulatory function. This would include
a showing that the benefits to be derived from the
standard will bear some reasonable relationship to
their anticipated costs and that the standard repre-
sents a cost-efficient mode of achieving those. benefits,
The court below explicitly rejected this construction
of the Act here (Pet. App. 69-77) and in Lead, supra,
Slip Opinion at 140, n. 102.

The parties will address the statutory bases for the
construction of the Act which they advocate. It suffices
to repeat here that the construction placed on the
term ‘‘feasible’’ by OSHA and the court below serves
neither to restrain OSHA in the selection of health-
improvement alternatives nor to provide meaningful
guidelines for the exercise of the agency’s discretion,
Short of industry bankruptcy, OSHA is left free to
direct the application of massive corporate resources

12

to achieve minimal or speculative health gains. Such a
construction of the Act raises inescapably those ques-
tions of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power foreseen in Benzene, supra, 48 USLW at 5082.

CONCLUSION

The unfettered discretion which OSHA has fash-
ioned for itself, with the approval of the court below,
to direct the restructuring of whole industries in the
name of safety and health raises inescapably the most
serious constitutional questions. However, there is
nothing in either the terms of the Act or its legislative
history or its overall purpose to suggest that Congress
intended to confer any such far-reaching authority on
OSHA. To the contrary, as this Court observed in
Benzene, supra, 48 USLW at 5033, 34, there is clear
evidence of a Congressional purpose to circumscribe
OSHA within reasonable bounds. This goal can be
achieved and difficult constitutional questions can be
avoided if the Act is read to impose practical and ob-
jective limitations on OSHA’s economic feasibility
determinations,

At a minimum these limits should include obliga-
tions to perform cost-benefit and cost-efficiency analy-
ses. Nothing less will suffice to confine OSHA to a
regulatory as opposed to a legislative role and to
insure that the costs to the American economy of the
OSH Act are not wholly disproportionate to the safety
and health benefits to be derived from it,

13

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME. POWELL

Counsel of Record

W. Scorr Ratton

Reep Smitn SHaw & McCuay
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-6131

Of Counsel: Barton C. GREEN

Davip FEerBEeR General Counsel

Reep Smitx SHaw & McCuay American Iron and Steel Institute
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 1000 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C, 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-6117 (202) 452-7143

November 20, 1980

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2223%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.
