# Petitioners Brief — American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 452 U.S. 490

## Text

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No. 79-1429
. SAR «14 1981

(Consolidated with No. 79-1583)

Dee SCL aT Grete tee Eat ene oh ~ T MIGHAEL RGR AR
IN THE cis

Supreme Court of the TMnited Stairs
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,’
MILLIKEN & COMPANY, ARKWRIGHT MILLS, SPARTAN
MILLs, BLAIR MILLS, INC., HERMITAGE, INC., DAN
RIVER, INC., CONE MILLS CORPORATION, MAYFAIR
MILLS, SPRINGS MILLS, INC., RIEGEL TEXTILE COR-
PORATION, FIELDCREST MILLS, INcC., AND WEST POINT-

PEPPERELL, INC.,

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}

. Petitioners,

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, etal.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap»oeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ROBERT H. BORK NEIL J. KING

142 Huntington Street Counsel of Record

New Haven, Connecticut 06511 A. STEPHEN Hurt, JR.
ANDREW N. VOLLMER

GREGORY B. TOBIN ; Ca ld envio
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, bole oe ae
SMOAK, STEWART AND Washi “+9 3
EDWARDS ashington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-6000

First National Bank Tower

Two Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30383
Counsel for American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

{Counsel for other Petitioners are listed on inside cover]

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Milliken and
Company

JOSEPH K. MADDOX, JR.
P.O. Box 5784
Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Spartan Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

Gary S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Hermitage, Inc.

SAMUEL K. ABRAMS

BRIAN E. MORAN

BAKER & HOSTETLER

818 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

H. J. EvaM, III

NEIL W. KOONCE

Cone Mills Corporation
Greensboro, N.C. 27405

Counsel for Cone Mills
Corporation

DAN M. BYRD, JR.
J. SPRATT WHITE
P.O. Rox 70

Fort Mill, S.C. 29715

Counsel for Springs Mills,
Ine.

ROBERT H. BORK
142 Huntington Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06511

Counsel for Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc.

January 14, 1981

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &
BROWNE

P.O. Box 451

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Arkwright Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Blair Mills, Ine.

HARLAN H. HUNTLEY
RoGeR L. TUTTLE

2291 Memorial Drive
Danville, Virginia 24541

Counsel for Dan River, Ince.

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &
RROW NE

P.O. Box 451 .

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Mayfair Mills

FRED M. RICHARDSON

Lovic A. BROOKS, JR.

CHARLES A. EDWARDS
CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH
1900 Peachtree Center Building
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Counsel for Riegel Textile
Corporation

RICHARD H. MONK, JR.

C. POWERS DORSETT

West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
P.O. Box 71

West Point, Georgia 31833

Counsel for West Point- :
Pepperell, Inc. )

ibiedrpeter ae a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OSHA STILL HAS NOT ARTICULATED

ANY MEANINGFUL OR’ EFFECTIVE
COST-RELATED LIMITATIONS UPON ITS
STANDARD-SETTING AUTHORITY ....

Il. DETERMINING WHETHER A REASON-

III.

ABLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A STAND-
ARD IS BOTH CONSISTENT WITH CON-
GRESSIONAL INTENT AND WITHIN THE
AGENCY’S COMPETENCE ............

OSHA DID NOT MAKE A SUPPORTABLE
FINDING THAT THE COSTS OF THE
STANDARD BEAR A REASONABLE RELA-
TIONSHIP TO THE EXPECTED BENEFITS
OR EVEN THAT THE COSTS WOULD BE
Bech oo re, a che AE ONE NID tel SLES Se

Page

16
17
24
29

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
I ee HR ER Se inihe Scat qiadenahienieltnininnhwoniiies 7
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.
I a cele pildahettch asic ndcaciieniucnseciteeassdieiiaranintnteelicastnniieon 27
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. Connally, 387 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)...... 7
‘4 American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, Nos. 80-
ER |) Benes Sam ee ee 7
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
Bs IE sible eciclcdrcnidichshiorbibenceictangtainsapietapebmunanne 20
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971) ......... PH SEDER ART ETA RE A 7
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association, 49
U.S.L.W. 4008 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1980) .................. 12, 15, 16
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) _...0........-2-...---.2---ee0e- 6
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) ................ 17
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-
son, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ..............2....... 11

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute, 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S.

PN. PRE FE A EE passim
Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.

cites cacitl cal chen chSeedianewsaahlabenibcciecdabaibiainonanbiar nbagsistinn 7
RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (6th

ica lees 11,12
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 382 U.S. 194 (1947) .......... 17
Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Mar-

shall, 680 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1980) -................... 12
Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th

I a acrsnetececch cheat tac ea acc a 11,12
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980)...... 8

Administrative Decisions and Reports:

Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OSH Dec.
(CCH) 25250, 4 OSH Cas. (BNA) 1541 (1976).. 12

a
-

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Statutory Provisions:
Clean Air Act
§ 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. III 1979) ........
Consumer Product Safety Act
§ 9(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (1976)
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

§ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976)
§ 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976)
§ 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976)......
§ 6(b) (6) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (6) (A)

GOUT cen cesnalaiacnstntine tee ous G tans

Se USC. § 706(3) (C). (2096)
30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (83) (1976) 0
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976)

Administrative Regulations:

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (f) (2) (v) (1979)
43: Pea. Reg. S608 C1076)
43 Fed. Reg. 27850 (1978) ........................-:....
oS Fun. Ree. 6601 (100)
45 Fed. Reg. 83448 (Dec. 18, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 85772 (Dec. 20,1980) _.........

Miscellaneous:

McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Dele-
gated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119 (1977)...
SOUP UD I i
Statement of Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator Douglas M. Costle......
1 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dic-
GPE SPIE cctcisnsaccdlincdicie ete a

10, 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 79-1429
(Consolidated with No. 79-1583)

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,
MILLIKEN & COMPANY, ARKWRIGHT MILLS, SPARTAN
MILLs, BLAIR MILLS, INC., HERMITAGE, INC., DAN
RIVER, INC., CONE MILLS CORPORATION, MAYFAIR
MILLs, SPRINGS MILLS, INC., RIEGEL TEXTILE Cor-
PORATION, FIELDCREST MILLS, INC., AND WEST POINT-
PEPPERELL, INC.,

~ Petitioners,

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, e¢ al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

The Brief for the Federal Respondent is a lengthy
document that attempts to explain and justify the ap-
proach that the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (“OSHA”) has taken in setting standards for
exposure to cotton dust and other toxic substances. Peti-
tioners make three broad points by way of reply.

1The Brief for the Federal Respondent, who is the Secretary of
Labor, will be referred to as the Secretary’s Brief and cited as
“OSHA Br.”

A list naming all parent companies, subsidiaries that are not
wholly owned, and affiliates of corporate petitioners in No. 79-1429
is attached as Appendix A to this Reply Brief.

2

First, perhaps the most important aspect of the Sec-
retary’s Brief is what it leaves unsaid. Despite its great
length, the Brief fails to articulate any economically
based guidelines or criteria—short of the threatened de-
struction of an entire industry—that limit the unprece-
dented power to which OSHA lays claim.

Second, in an obvious reaction to the Benzene case,”
the Secretary now makes a number of concessions that
bring his construction of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (the “OSH Act” or “Act’”) much
closer to that of the petitioners. However, in an effort
to avoid the logic of these concessions, the Secretary
suggests that an assessment of costs and benefits in the
setting of occupational health standards is inconsistent
with congressional intent and impossible to apply in
practice. This suggestion cannot withstand analysis.

Third, both the Secretary and the Union Respondents
pretend that the record below was what they wish it had
been. The reality of the case is different, however, and
cannot be changed by respondents’ wishful thinking.

I. OSHA STILL HAS NOT ARTICULATED ANY
MEANINGFUL OR EFFECTIVE COST-RELATED
LIMITATIONS UPON ITS STANDARD-SETTING
AUTHORITY.

In the Secretary’s Brief, the agency’s lawyers have
spared no effort to explain OSHA’s approach to setting
occupational health standards and to demonstrate that
this approach reflects the application of “an adequate
and intelligible [congressional] standard to guide [OSHA]
in fulfilling [its] responsibilities’ under the Act. OSHA
Br. at 63. When all is said and done, however, OSHA’s
lawyers have been no more successful than the agency it-
self in explaining what this “adequate and intelligible

2 Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S. July 2, 1980).

Standard” is that OSHA allegedly is applying. Nor have
they been able to show how this alleged standard re-
sponds to the provisions of the legislation from which all
of OSHA’s authority is derived.

The Secretary’s Brief makes clear that OSHA con-
tinues to lay claim to what the agency characterizes as
“admittedly far reaching” authority over American in-
dustry. OSHA Br. at 63. And, despite an effort to ob-
scure the point, it seems quite evident that the only cost-
related limitation that OSHA acknowledges is the ability
of the industry as a whole to bear the costs of any one
standard without being ruined financially.

The Secretary appears to recognize that Congress did
not intend to confer upon OSHA Sweeping and unprece-
dented authority “to order changes in the way that busi-
ness is conducted” free of any meaningful and effective
economically based constraint. OSHA Br. at 63. Thus,
he acknowledges that Section 6(b) (5) of the Act contains
qualifying language (such as the term “feasible”) that
“mandates consideration of practical concerns, including
costs, in the setting of standards.” Jd. at 45. And he
concedes that this qualifying language—mirroring Con-
gress’ practical concerns—“unquestionably limits the Sec-
retary’s standard-setting authority.” Jd. However, a
careful reading of the Secretary’s Brief shows it to be
an extended exercise in question begging: Nowhere does
it explain how the Secretary construes the term “feasible”
in a manner that places an effective cost-related limita-
tion upon OSHA’s standard-setting activities,

In various places, the Brief asserts that the term
“feasible” must be construed in its most extreme sense
as meaning “capable of being done” or “capable of
achievement.” Jd. at 39, 40, 48.° Taken at face value,

*The Secretary cites Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary for this meaning, but neglects to point out that the
dictionary also defines “feasible” as meaning “suitable,” “reason-
able,” or “practicable.” See id. at 831 (1971); 1 The Compact
Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 978 (1971).

4

this construction implies the absence of any cost-related
limitation whatsoever on OSHA’s authority, for maxi-
mum protection against a toxic substance for which
no absolutely safe level of exposure exists logically would
be “capable of achievement” by requiring that the em-
ployer cease operations altogether. Recognizing that
Congress did not intend the term “feasible” to be given
such an extreme reading, OSHA demurs and interpre’s
economic feasibility to mean that the costs must be “af-
fordable.” See, e.g., id. at 41, 49, 57. But OSHA has
never explained what it means by “affordable,” and
even after reading the Secretary’s Brief, one still does
not know how this test of “affordability” is to be applied
or how it reflects the language of the Act or the under-
lying congressional intent.*

4 The Secretary’s Brief points to a hodgepodge of miscellaneous
statutory provisions, administrative policies, and judicially-imposed
restraints that the Secretary presumably believes may, in the aggre-
gate, provide the missing cost-related restraint on OSHA’s wide-
ranging power. OSHA Br. at 55-58. But the Secretary does not
explain how one can discern in the factors he enumerates an ade-
quate and intelligible criterion to limit the delegation of congres-
sional authority to the agency. Indeed, the Secretary’s efforts
demonstrate the haphazard nature of any economic limitations short
of industry ruination that OSHA is prepared to recognize. Thus,
the Secretary observes that

limitations of technological feasibility will often limit expendi-
tures of financial resources because . . . it will often be [tech-
nologically] impossible to achieve the degree of stringency
[i.e., maximum protection] that is actually warranted by the
health data.

Id. at 57. This limitation on OSHA’s authority may be para-
phrased as follows: “When there is no additional technology on
which to spend more money, OSHA will not mandate further ex-
penditures.” Such constraint-by-default is hardly the kind of mean-
ingful and effective cost-related limit that will avoid an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority.

Moreover, this litany of factors to which the Secretary’s Brief
points as protection against irresponsible and unwise regulation is
undercut by the agency’s own statements. For example, the Secre-
tary’s Brief states that OSHA considers industry’s need to address

5

In the end, the only cost-related limit that the Secre-
tary appears to acknowledge is the possibility that a
standard might not be “economically feasible” if its im-
pact upon the “long-term profitability and competitive.
ness” of an industry would be so severely adverse that
the continued viability of the industry as a whole would
be threatened. Id. at 38, 49. When this point might
be reached and how the agency would assess the im-
pact that its standard is expected to have on produc-
tion, employment, competition, prices and trade are mat-
ters that are left entirely to speculation. Indeed, it may
well be that the agency considers any such impacts to be
largely irrelevant: In this very proceeding, OSHA’s
spokesman stated that the “most recently stated policy
of the agency is that . . . the substantive provisions of
the standard, that is those which are included to provide
protection against the hazard will not be diluted due to
considerations of economic or inflationary impact.” ®

The Secretary insists, however, that this Court need
not be troubled by the prospect that OSHA, with its open-
ended concept of “affordability,” will arbitrarily push
industries to the brink of financial ruin; nor should the
Court be concerned that OSHA will misallocate society’s
limited industrial hygiene resources, thereby providing
employees with a lower overall level of protection against

other serious health hazards in the workplace in determining
whether a particular standard is “financially affordable” and sug-
gests that, in the Cotton Dust proceeding, OSHA took account of its
“proposal for more stringent controls on workplace noise levels as a
patentially competing need for capital.” Jd. at 57 n.62. The rec-
ord indicates that this is not so. Thus, Grover Wrenn, then
OSHA’s Deputy Director for Health Standards, testified explicitly
that OSHA considered the “economic impact upon this industry ...
of the dust standard, combined with the noise standard [to be]
irrelevant to [the Cotton Dust] proceeding.” Transcript of OSHA
Hearing (“Tr.”) at 75 (emphasis added). References to exhibits
introduced during the OSHA hearing are cited as “Ex.”

5 Tr. at 73 (Grover Wrenn).

6

the host of differing health and safety risks that may
exist in the workplace. According to the Secretary, if
such misfortunes do result, they would simply reflect the
“policy judgments of Congress.” Id. at 56.

However, as demonstrated at pages 31-35 of petitioners’
opening Brief, such policy objectives cannot be attributed
to Congress, and even the Secretary appears to be some-
what uncomfortable with this argument. Consequently,
his Brief advances a second justification that appears to
be more seriously maintained. According to the Secretary,
the fact that OSHA might regulate in an unreasonable
and irresponsible manner (presumably even in a man-
ner that is at odds with the intent of Congress) is ir-
relevant, since, in the Secretary’s view, OSHA’s exer-
cise of authority under the Act has been “responsible and
practical.” OSHA Br. at 37. By regulating in this “rea-
sonable and practical fashion,” the Secretary contends,
OSHA itself “provides a meaningful brake on regulation.”
Id. at 48.

Under this novel theory, Congress presumably need not
provide any meaningful or effective constraint upon the
exercise of agency authority; instead, the legislature and
the courts may simply trust the regulators to do the right
thing. Trusting the regulators, however, is not a substi-
tute for requiring them to adhere to adequate and in-
telligible congressional standards,* particularly when
the power to which an agency lays claim is as extrava-
gant and “admittedly far reaching” as it is here. Indeed,
the requirement of meaningful and intelligible statutory
criteria is intended to prevent precisely the uncanalized
agency discretion that the Secretary seeks and thereby
to preserve two fundamental elements of our govern-
mental and administrative system: (1) the constitutional

6 See Benzene, 48 U.S.L.W. at 5031-32; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (statement of Leventhal, J.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ; McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 1166 (1977).

7

Separation of powers,’ and (2) the ability of courts ef-
fectively to protect against unauthorized agency action.®

Moreover, there is solid ground for disputing the Sec-
retary’s view that OSHA has regulated in a “reasonable,”
“responsible and practical manner.” Putting aside the
present dispute, one need look no further than the Ben-
zene proceeding for a case in point. In that instance,
OSHA mandated the expenditure of more than $500
million without attempting to determine whether there
existed any significant health risk that might be re-
duced by its enormously costly standard. See Benzene,
48 U.S.L.W. at 5026, 5031, 5034 (plurality opinion). In-
stead, the agency required industry to carry the virtually
impossible burden of proving a negative—i.e., “the exist-
ence of a safe level of exposure.” Jd. at 5035. In so do
ing, OSHA, as a plurality of this Court noted, avoided
its “threshold responsibility” and “exceeded [its] power,”
id., hardly an indication of “responsible” regulation.®

In short, the actions OSHA has taken pursuant to its
own construction of its statutory authority demonstrate

‘A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
529-30 (1935).

8 See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807,
818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976). See gen-
erally Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737, 754-60 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court).

® This same unreasonable and irresponsible approach to regula-
tion is evidenced in OSHA’s generic cancer policy, 45 Fed. Reg.
5001 (1980), which would impose a host of costly requirements
(including a reduction of exposures to the lowest feasible level)
“whenever there is a certain quantum of proof ... that a sub-
stance causes cancer at any exposure level.” Benzene, 48 U.S.L.W.
at 5032 n.51 (plurality opinion). Belatedly recognizing these prob-
lems, OSHA recently indicated that it plans to “reformulat[e]”
the cancer policy. Motion [of OSHA] To Hold Proceedings in
Abeyance Pending Administrative Republication of Generic Cancer
Standard at 4, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, Nos. 80-3018,
et al. (5th Cir., filed Dec. 22, 1980).

8

why Congress must adequately delimit the power it
grants to administrative agencies rather than delegating
wide-ranging authority simply on the basis of an agency’s
assurances that it can be trusted.’®

II. DETERMINING WHETHER A REASONABLE RE-
LATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF A STANDARD IS BOTH
CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
AND WITHIN THE AGENCY’S COMPETENCE.

Despite his professed admiration for the manner in
which OSHA has exercised its authority, the Secretary
appears to recognize that the OSH Act should be con-
strued so as to avoid the constitutional questions that
would be raised by a delegation of authority on the basis
of trust. This recognition has led him to make a number
of concessions regarding the proper interpretation of the
Act and the underlying congressional intent. These con-

10 The wage guarantee provision of the Standard, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v) (1979), Pet. App. at 8-9, is a further ex-
ample of why OSHA cannot be trusted to delimit its own authority.
Conceding that wage guarantee authority is not expressly granted
in the OSH Act—as it is in other legislation such as the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (3)
(1976)—respondents suggests that such authority can be implied
from Section 6(b) (7), which authorizes OSHA, “[w]here appro-
priate, [to] prescribe suitable protective equipment and control or
technological procedures.” See Union Br. at 52. But one is hard
put to perceive how a requirement that employers guarantee the
wages of their employees can be deemed to be “suitable protective
equipment [or] control or technological procedures.” Moreover,
respondents concede that Congress did not intend for employers to
continue the regular pay of workers who absent themselves from
employment. They contend, however, that the congressional con-
cern did not extend to situations where the employee does not cease
working altogether but, instead, performs less valuable work re-
quiring a lower level of skill, effort or responsibility. The legisla-
tive history canvassed by this Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,
445 U.S. 1 (1980), indicates that Congress’ concern was not so
narrow. Rather, Congress intended that the Act not be read to

9

cessions (which are joined in by the Union Respondents)
move the Secretary and the Unions much closer to accept-
ing the construction of the Act urged by petitioners.

For one thing, the Secretary and the Unions appear to
have embraced the more balanced and pragmatic read-
ing of the statute that petitioners have urged from the
outset. Thus, after reviewing the legislative history, the
Secretary concludes that the language of the Act should
be construed “in a reasonable and practical fashion,” that
the qualified language of Section 6(b) (5) does indeed
“mandate[] consideration of practical concerns, includ-
ing costs, in the setting of standards,” and that Section
6(b) (5) “unquestionably limits the Secretary’s standard-
setting authority.” OSHA Br. at 45, 48."

Moreover, the respondents appear to have accepted
petitioners’ contention that an OSHA standard is valid
only if it (i) addresses a significant risk of material
health impairment that would exist in the absence of the
standard and (ii) is expected to achieve a significant re-
duction in that risk."2 And they acknowledge Congress’
recognition that OSHA must address a host of new and
varying health and safety risks in the workplace and is

require that employers compensate a worker for a job that the
worker is not performing. The wage guarantee provision of the
Standard imposes just such a requirement.

"The Union Respondents reach essentially the same conclusion
when they quote Senator Dominick for the proposition that Congress
intended OSHA to take steps that are “feasible and practical” in
enacting occupational health standards. Brief for Union Respond-
ents (“Union Br.”) at 34. The Union Respondents describe Senator
Dominick as “a principal participant in shaping § 6(b) (5).” Zd. at
28.

Thus, the Secretary acknowledges that an OSHA standard
must be shown to produce “benefits [that] are significant,” OSHA
Br. at 45, in the sense that it will “substantially reduce” a “sig-
nificant risk of material health impairment.” Jd. at 27. The Union
Respondents agree with this formulation, stating that an OSHA
standard should be one that “eliminates or substantially reduces”
a “significant risk of . . . health impairment.” Union Br. at 27.

A

10

not able to focus its attention and society’s resources
upon a narrow spectrum of such risks. At this point,
however, the agreement between the parties ends.

Petitioners contend that OSHA cannot protect em-
ployees “so far as possible,’ see 29 U.S.C. § 651(b),
against the multiplicity and variety of workplace health
and safety hazards if it takes no account of the economic
impact of a standard short of the point at which the
destruction of an entire industry is threatened. Peti-
tioners read the Act and the legislative history as evi-
dencing a congressional expectation that OSHA would
regulate more wisely—that it would assess the health
protection benefits of its standards in light of the costs
involved—in order to guard against serious misalloca-
tions of the finite resources that are available for the
protection of worker safety and health. If the costs of
a single standard are wholly disproportionate to the re-
duction in health risk that is expected from the standard,
that reduction in risk (and the attendant health protec-
tion benefits) cannot, in petitioners’ view, be deemed sig-
nificant. Such a standard is inconsistent both with the
“resonably necessary or appropriate” requirement of Sec-
tion 3(8) of the Act and with the “practical concerns”

_-—underlying the qualified language of Section 6(b) (5).

Not so, say respondents. In their view, as long as the
costs of a-standard stop just short of ruining an entire
industry, Congress’ “practical concerns” are satisfied,
even if the costs of the standard are wholly dispropor-
tionate to the resulting health benefits. To justify this ex-
treme reading of the Act, respondents claim that the in-
terpretation urged by petitioners would require OSHA to

13 Thus, the Secretary points out that Congress was aware of the
variety of health hazards in the workplace and was “concerned
that those [hazards] would be replicated geometrically due to the
rapid introduction of new and yet untested chemicals and processes.”
OSHA Br. at 41. The Union Respondents also call attention to
Congress’ awareness of the multiplicity of potential new health
risks that would have to be addressed by OSHA. See Union Br.
at 39 n.64.

11

perform a rigidly formal cost-benefit calculation that
places a dollar value on employee lives or health. OSHA
Br. at 59. See also id. at 38, 45, 59-62; Union Br. at
39-40 n.64,

There is no foundation for this claim. Employee life
and health need not be valued in monetary terms and
rigidly balanced against the costs of proposed regulatory
actions. Congress did intend, however, that OSHA would
spend society’s industrial hygiene resources wisely. To
do so, OSHA must determine whether the health pro-
tection benefits of its standards bear a reasonable re-
lationship to the level of resources that must be committed
to achieve those benefits—resources that necessarily will
be unavailable to achieve other health and safety ob-
jectives in the workplace."

14 As noted at pages 41-47 of the opening Brief for Petitioners,
the weight of relevant judicial precedent supports a construction
of the Act that requires that the health protection benefits bear a
reasonable relationship to the costs of an OSHA standard. The
Secretary’s Brief inaccurately states, OSHA Br. at 50, that the issue
of whether OSHA “must perform a cost-benefit analysis in setting
standards .. . was first considered by the District of Columbia
Circuit in connection with the asbestos standard in Industrial
-Union Department vy. Hodgson,” 499 F.2d 467 (1974). In fact, the
affected industry did not challenge the asbestos standard in court,
and the question of OSHA’s obligation to perform a cost-benefit
analysis of any sort was never raised—let alone decided—in that
case.

Moreover, the fact that the Secretary “disagree[s],” OSHA Br.
at 52 n.56, with the decisions of the Seventh Circuit in Turner Co.
v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (1977) and of the Sixth Circuit
in RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (1979), does not
mean that those cases do not support petitioners’ position in the
present case or that they are not persuasive. The Secretary also
suggests that the Turner and RMI decisions required OSHA to
show a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits only
because the hazard addressed was not seriously debilitating or
life-threatening. OSHA Br. at 52 n.56. This position is wholly
illogical: Rather than making a cost-benefit assessment inappropri-
ate, variations in the seriousness of the hazard are precisely the
type of consideration that should be taken into account in assessing

12

Determining whether the benefits of a standard bear
a reasonable relationship to its costs does not require
the establishment of some bright line test for deciding
whether any particular standard is cost-justified. Rather,
as this Court recognized in a reldted context, Congress
understands that agencies may engage in a more “ ‘limited
cost-benefit analysis’ ”’ with the objective of assuring that
the risk reduction benefits of a standard are not wholly
out of proportion to its costs. Similarly, in setting aside
the application of OSHA’s Cotton Dust Standard to the
ginning industry, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the dis-
tinction between a “formal cost-benefit analysis [which]
demands that regulatory benefits exceed their costs” and
the OSH Act’s more limited requirement “that the ex-
pected costs of OSHA regulations be reasonably related
to the expected benefits.” Texas Independent Ginners
Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 411 n.44 (5th Cir.
1980).

Indeed, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (a
federal agency that also is charged with protecting health
and safety) recently proposed a rule describing the meth-
odology that it plans to utilize in performing cost-benefit
assessments under Section 9(c) of the Consumer Product

the relationship between costs and benefits. In any event, the
purported distinction is groundless: Cotton dust has not been
shown to be life-threatening, and the reference in the Turner
opinion upon which the Secretary relies does not limit the decision
to “life-threatening” hazards. Moreover, the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission and OSHA itself consider noise
exposure—the health hazard involved in Turner—to be a “harmful
physical agent,” which, like cotton dust, is governed by Section
6(b) (5) of the Act. See Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OSH
Dec. (CCH) 25250, 25255-56, 4 OSH Cas. (BNA) 1541, 1546-47
(1976). Furthermore, the court in RMI relied on decisions involv-
ing OSHA’s Benzene Standard and other cases involving life-
threatening hazards. 594 F.2d at 571-72.

15 FPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4008, 4010
n.10 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1980) (quoting the remarks of Senator Muskie
regarding “best practicable technology” standards of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972).

13

Safety Act (“CPSA”). 45 Fed. Reg. 85772 (Dec. 20,
1980). The proposal states that “the Commission is not
required to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis prior to
issuing a consumer product safety rule” and will not do
so. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85773, col. 2.2* However, the Commis-
sion does plan to perform a cost-benefit assessment to
determine whether the “expected benefits of a rule bear a
reasonable relationship to the anticipated costs.” Id. The
proposal goes on to explain that

[t]his test . . . does not require the Commission to
find that the quantifiable costs are outweighed by
the quantifiable benefits but rather to determine that
the total benefits, in the judgment of the Commis-
sion, justify the costs.
Id. In short, Congress, the courts and other agencies all
have recognized that a responsible determination of
whether the costs of regulatory action bear a reasonable
relationship to the expected benefits is a sensible, useful
and practical exercise that need not involve either a sub-
jective valuation of life and health or a precise balanc-
ing of benefits and costs in strict monetary terms.?”

Respondents’ resistance to responsible cost-benefit as-
sessment also reflects their view of other health, safety
and environmental legislation. But consideration of such
other statutes shows that this view is unjustified.

16 Thus, contrary to the Secretary’s suggestion, the Consumer
Product Safety Act cannot be distinguished from the OSH Act on
the ground that either the language or legislative history of the
CPSA “specifically requir[es] that costs be justified by benefits.”
OSHA Br. at 54. The language of Section 9(c) of the CPSA
quoted on page 54 of the Secretary’s Brief clearly does not “spe-
cifically requir[e]” any such thing. And the Commission itself
states that the “legislative history of the CPSA indicates that the
Commission is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior
to promulgating a consumer product safety rule.” 45 Fed. Reg. at
85773, col. 2 (emphasis added).

17 See also Brief for Petitioners at 41-47.

14

For example, the Secretary concedes that “it was per-
haps appropriate for [EPA] to engage in balancing risks
against costs” to determine whether the public health
is protected against carcinogens by an “ample margin of
safety” under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. OSHA
Br. at 55 n.59. According to the Secretary, however,
a similar exercise is not appropriate under the OSH Act,
since Section 6(b) (5) of that Act “gave guidance to the
Secretary with respect to how he should weigh the eco-
nomic consequences of regulation.” Jd. Presumably, the
Secretary is referring to the qualified language of Section
6(b) (5), including the term “feasible,” which the Sec-
retary acknowledges reflects “practical concerns” and
imposes “unquestionabl[e] limits” on OSHA’s standard-
setting authority. Jd. at 45. The Secretary’s distinction
is spurious, because the language of Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act is, if anything, less reflective of such prac-
tical concerns or limits and more absolute in its focus on
health protection than Section 6(b) (5)—let alone Section
3(8)—of the OSH Act. Consequently, if it is “appropri-
ate for [EPA] to engage in balancing risks against
costs,” it must be even more appropriate for OSHA to
engage in such an exercise as part of its standard-setting
activities.'®

Furthermore, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (the “Water Act’), 33 U.S.C.
§$§ 1251 et seg. (1976), on which respondents rely, OSHA
Br. at 40 n.44; Union Br. at 1b-3b, also supports the posi-
tion of petitioners. Under the Water Act, EPA -is di-

18J—n its most recently proposed standard under Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, EPA determined not to control benzene emis-
sions from a particular vent, because it concluded that the energy-
consumption “impact [of doing so] outweighs the benefit from
controlling this vent.’ Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/
Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83448, 83451, cols. 2-3 (Dec. 18, 1980).
EPA also rejected a more stringent control option for this car-
cinogen after assessing “the relatively small health benefits that
would be gained and the costs of requiring [the] more stringent
option.” Id. at 83457, col. 2.

15

rected to premulgate one set of effluent standards re-
flecting the “best practicable control technology” (“BPT”’)
and another set reflecting the “best available technology
economically achievable’ (“BAT”). As the Secretary
points out, OSHA Br. at 40 n.44, BPT standards (in con-
trast to BAT standards) reflect a consideration of costs
in relation to effluent reduction benefits. See EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Association, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4009-
4010.

A comparison of the OSH Act and the Water Act shows
that OSHA standards more closely resemble BPT than
BAT standards. Thus, the qualified language (including
the term “feasible”) used to describe OSHA standards
is similar to the term “practicable” that Congress used
in describing BPT.’* Moreover, economic capability is
relevant to determining whether a variance should be
granted from a BAT limitation, but is not considered by
the agency in determining whether to grant a variance
from a BPT standard under the Water Act” or from
an occupational health standard under the OSH Act.®!

Thus, OSHA standards, in significant respects, re-
semble BPT standards under the Water Act. And both
the language and the underlying statutory schemes of the
respective statutes suggest that Congress intended that

19 In a Statement on the National Crushed Stone decision, EPA
Administrator Douglas M. Costle explained that in establishing
BPT standards, EPA “determine[s] what levels of water pollution
control are both practical and affordable.” (Emphasis added.)
These are precisely the same terms that the Secretary uses to
describe what Congress meant by the term “feasible” in Section
6(b) (5) of the OSH Act. See pages 3-4, 9 supra. (Copies of Mr.
Costle’s Statement have been lodged with the Court.)

20 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. at
4010, 4013.

21 See Union Br. at 35 (discussing the temporary variance pro-
vision of Section 6(b) (6) (A) of the OSH Act).

16

OSHA standards, like the BPT standards they resemble,
would reflect an assessment of benefits in light of costs.”

III. OSHA DID NOT MAKE A SUPPORTABLE FIND-
ING THAT THE COSTS OF THE STANDARD BEAR
A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE EX-
PECTED BENEFITS OR EVEN THAT THE COSTS
WOULD BE “AFFORDABLE.”

Respondents apparently do not dispute petitioners’ con-
tention that OSHA made no attempt to determine whether
the health protection benefits that might be expected
from the Cotton Dust Standard bear a reasonable re-
lationship to the Standard’s costs. Rather, they argue
that OSHA was not required to make any such deter-
mination. Nonetheless, OSHA’s lawyers have presented
an extended factual discussion and analysis that pre-
sumably is intended to indicate that the record below
would have supported such an agency finding had one
been made.

Even if the factual analysis presented by the agency’s
lawyers were correct, however, the Cotton Dust Stand-
ard could not be sustained. For the possibility that the
record below might have supported a finding that the
agency never made is legally irrelevant. As a plurality
of this Court observed in the Benzene case: “The stand-
ard must, of course, be supported by the findings actually

22 Since the relationship of costs and benefits is not considered
in formulating BAT standards under the Water Act, economic
capability is relevant to applications for a variance from BAT
limitations. By contrast, economic capability need not be considered
by the agency in ruling on applications for a variance from BPT
limitations, since Congress expected that the relationship between
costs and benefits would have been considered when the BPT
standard was formulated in the first instance. See EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4011. The scheme of the OSH
Act reflects this same rationale—i.e., economic hardship is not a
qualification for a temporary variance, since the relationship be-
tween costs and benefits should have been considered when the
OSHA standard was initially formulated.

17

made by the Secretary, not merely by findings that we
believe he might have made.” 48 U.S.L.W. at 5035.”

In any event, the record below would not have sup-
ported a finding that the benefits of the Cotton Dust
Standard bear a reasonable relationship to its costs.
Indeed, the record in this case cannot support even the
finding of “affordability” that the agency purports to
have made.

A. The Assessment of Costs

The opening Brief for Petitioners argued that OSHA
never made a supportable determination either of how
much its Standard would cost or of the economic impact
that a standard having such costs would have on the
affected industries and the economy as a whole. Recogniz-
ing the seriousness of this claim, the Secretary devotes
many pages to refuting it but ultimately cannot explain
away the fundamental flaws in OSHA’s treatment of
costs.

A substantial part of the economic argument in the
Secretary’s Brief is designed to justify OSHA’s rejec-
tion of the cost estimate made by its own contractor,
RTI. Whatever the merits of the argument on this point,
however, the fact is that OSHA rejected the RTI analysis
of costs. Consequently, RTI’s cost estimate cannot be, and
was not, used to support OSHA’s determination of costs
in the present case.

What OSHA did use to support its cost estimate was
the Hocutt-Thomas study, which estimated the capital
costs of a standard that was much less stringent than
the one OSHA adopted. The Secretary’s Brief acknowl-
edges this point, see OSHA Br. at 19, and attempts to
justify OSHA’s action on the grounds that (i) Hocutt
and Thomas overstated the costs of the less stringent

28 This is simply a restatement of familiar doctrine. See, e.9.,
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 880, 397 (1974); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

18

standard that they had analyzed and (ii) the Secretary
was justified in presuming that this “overstated” cost of
a less stringent standard “was sufficiently reliable to
assess the economic impact of the [more stringent] stand-
ard” OSHA ultimately adopted. Jd. Neither branch of
this argument withstands analysis.

The first of the three reasons that the Secretary ad-
vances in support of the conclusion that the Hocutt-
Thomas cost estimate was overstated is that it was
based upon the cost of dust control through retrofitting.
Id. at 18. In fact, OSHA recognized “the validity of
estimating compliance costs for retrofit controls” but
suggested that “replacement of conventional machines
with newer equipment” would reduce the number of
machines that would have to be retrofitted or controlled.
43 Fed. Reg. 27350, 27372, col. 3 (1978). The record
clearly refutes this suggestion.

OSHA identified only four items of “newer equip-
ment’”—automatic opening equipment, chute-fed systems
for carding, high speed cards, and open-end spinning
frames, id. at 27364-67—that it suggested might reduce
the need for retrofitting. But the record showed that
this equipment clearly could not produce a cost saving
in comparison to the retrofitting assumed by Hocutt and
Thomas. Thus, after reviewing the comparative costs,
RTI, concluded that “no economic advantage is realized
in the area of dust control by the installation of auto-
matic opening equipment.” ** This same conclusion holds
true where automatic opening equipment is used with
chute-fed systems for low speed cards—an arrangement
that RTI found to be “not economically feasible.” Ex.
144 at 3.

Similarly, no significant saving could be expected from
the use of high speed cards, since high speed cards al-
ready process eighty percent of the cotton consumed in
the textile industry, id. at 2, and certain yarns cannot

24 Ex. 144 at 5. See also id. at 3, 8. OSHA did not reject RTI’s
conclusion on this point.

> |

19

be processed on high speed cards. Id.; Tr. 2458 (Hovan
Hocutt). In any event, it is undisputed that the cost of
dust control for high speed cards is virtually the same
as for low speed cards. Ex. 144 at 4; Tr. 2376-77, 2436,
2463-65 (Hovan Hocutt) .*

The final item of “newer equipment” identified by
OSHA was open-end spinning frames. But OSHA itself
rejected any suggestion that open-end spinning should be
considered as a possible cost saving under the Standard.
The agency concluded that, because of “the uncertainty
involved in awaiting the development of a long staple
open end spinning frame, . . . control strategies must
be implemented which rely upon what can be done with
existing [ring spinning] equipment.” 43 Fed. Reg. at
27367, col. 1.26

26 Even if some cost saving might otherwise be possible, it would
remain theoretical rather than real in light of the excess capacity
that currently exists in the textile industry. For there is no incen-
tive to install new production equipment in these early operations
unless overall capacity is increased in subsequent operations as
well. Tr. 2975-81 (Dr. Parker Reist). But there is no incentive
to increase overall capacity in an industry that already has excess
capacity. Moreover, the only evidence in the record of a company
that actually purchased and installed the new equipment that
OSHA identified for opening and carding showed that overall
costs increased. Tr. 2591 (James Chapman).

76 Even if the “new” production equipment identified by OSHA
were both (i) likely to be installed within the four-year compliance
period and (ii) likely to result in less expensive dust control if
installed (neither of which assumptions is correct), it could not
be viewed as a ground for concluding that the Hocutt-Thomas
estimate of $550 million was an overstatement. For if such equip-
ment is installed to achieve compliance with the Standard, the cost
of the equipment would have to be included as a cost of compliance.
And, quite apart fren the cost of controlling the dust generated by
these new machines, the cost of the equipment itself would be ap-
proximately four times the total capital cost estimated by Hocutt
and Thomas. Thus, the estimated capital cost of automatic opening
equipment and chute-fed high speed cards is $818 million. J.A. at
263-65 (L.K. Fitzgerald). An additional $1.3 billion would be

20

Thus, OSHA has not identified any new production
equipment that might replace existing equipment at’ a
cost saving that Hocutt and Thomas ignored. Nor does
the record present any basis for concluding that control
costs will be reduced by unspecified “improvements in
technology that are likely to continue during the period
for compliance.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372, col. 3. To the
contrary, the only testimony on this point, that of Hovan
Hocutt (who OSHA recognized as an expert in dust con-
trol technology), was that for the next seven years little
new technology could be expected that would make com-
pliance less expensive in spinning through weaving. 43
Fed. Reg. at 27860, col. 2; J.A. at 459-63; Tr. 2431.

The Secretary’s second ground for characterizing the
Hocutt-Thomas estimate as an overstatement is that
it “did not account for the already low levels in many
operations or the fact that more stringent controls in
earlier operations would, without additional cost, result
in less dust in later operations.” OSHA Br. at 18.
Although OSHA’s lawyers make this claim in the Sec-
retary’s Brief, the fact is that OSHA itself did not
include any such rationale in its enumeration of reasons
for believing that the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was an
overstatement. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372-73. Conse-
quently, this post hoc rationalization of counsel must be
rejected.”

The findings that OSHA did make demonstrate why
this belated suggestion of the agency’s lawyers is un-
founded. For example, OSHA recognized that it would be
difficult to implement the standard in

required to replace just thirty percent of the 15 million ring
spindles in the industry, Ex. 1438, App. D, since one open-end spindle
would replace four ring spindles at an average cost of $1,200 per
spindle. Tr. 2697 (L. K. Fitzgerald).

27 See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.

21

certain operations, such as spinning, where the ap-
plication of ventilation controls may involve unusual
difficulties, significant innovation or indeed neces-
sitate more than improvement in existing technology.

Id, at 27363, col. 1. OSHA’s view that these difficulties
could be surmounted rested on its belief that “a major
effort to solve the dust control problem in spinning” could
be made, because a modification of the exposure limit in
weaving would permit the industry to “focus more re-
Sources on spinning operations.” Jd. at 27367, col. 2.
Clearly, this “major effort” involving the “focus [of]
more resources on spinning” indicates an expectation
that, if the required exposure level in spinning could be
achieved at all, it would certainly not be “without addi-
tional cost.” OSHA Br. at 18.28

28 There is also absolutely no support in the record for the sug-
gestion that reducing dust levels in the operations of opening
through roving would permit industry to achieve the new exposure
limit in spinning or subsequent operations. To the contrary, the
record showed that it is “uncommon” for spinning operations to
be located in the same room with (or to have the same ventilation
system as) the operations that occur before spinning. Ex. 6-17 at
429 (Dr. Merchant); Ex. 6-109 (NIOSH) ; Tr. 1023-24 (Dr. Mer-
chant) ; Tr. 2013 (Dr. John Neefus) ; Tr. 2330 (Dr. John Hatcher).
Consequently, the reduction of dust levels in such earlier operations
would not be expected to have a favorable impact on dust levels in
spinning.

Moreover, the existence of “low levels” of cotton dust, OSHA Br.
at 18, in various operations that were sampled does not justify
an expectation that such levels could be maintained in the future
without further dust control equipment. The record clearly demon-
strates that cotton dust levels are a direct function of (1) the
quality and coarseness of the cotton being processed, (2) the con-
figuration of the production machinery, and (3) the nature of the
textile product being produced. Tr. 2454-55, 2478-79 (Hovan Ho-
cutt); Tr. 2702-04 (L. K. Fitzgerald). Consequently, unless OSHA
intends to freeze the sampled workplaces into precisely the same raw
material usage and production configuration that obtained at the
time of the sampling (a result that would be drastically inconsistent
with industry practice), the existence of “low levels” in a particular
workplace at a particular time does not indicate that the exposure
limits prescribed by the Standard can be met in that workplace—let

22

The final ground that the Secretary advances for be-
lieving that the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was an over-
statement is that their “calculations may also have in-
cluded costs for machines processing synthetic material.”
OSHA Br. at 18-19 ‘emphasis added). But the fact is
that Hocutt and Thomas did not assign compliance costs
to any equipment that was used exclusively for synthetics
and was located in an area where cotton was not also
processed. See J.A. at 236-37. There is no reason for
OSHA or the Secretary to speculate otherwise.”

In sum, none of the three reasons advanced by the
Secretary supports the conclusion that the Hocutt-Thomas
cost estimate was overstated.*! But even if it were over-
stated, neither the agency nor its lawyers have been able
to explain what basis there was for OSHA to believe that
the Hocutt-Thomas estimate of the capital costs of a
much less stringent standard “was sufficiently reliable to

alone others—without the need for additional controls. For the
“low level” of dust that may exist when one quality of cotton or
cotton-synthetic blend is processed can be drastically increased
when another quality of cotton is processed (or a different final
product is produced) on the same equipment.

29 Since the Standard defines “cotton dust” as any “dust present
in the air during the handling or processing of cotton,” Pet. App.
at 2, dust produced by a machine processing synthetics must be
controlled if it is located in an area where cotton also is handled
or processed even though on a separate machine. And, of course,
dust produced by a machine processing cotton-synthetic blends is
covered by the Standard.

30 The agency earlier protested that ATMI had failed to produce
the data that would permit OSHA to form a judgment on this
question. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372, col. 3. The Secretary now
acknowledges, however, that ATMI did in fact supply the survey
data, OSHA Br. at 64 n.70, and the questionnaires comprising that
data clearly segregate cotton from synthetic processing machinery.
See J.A. at 391-92.

31 In addition, for two operations (twisting and warping) Hocutt
and Thomas assigned no cost whatsoever to complying with an
exposure limit of 0.56 mg/m*. Pet. App. at 152-56. This zero cost
estimate for such operations can hardly be deemed an “overstate-

23

assess the economic impact of the standard” that OSHA
ultimately adopted. OSHA Br. at 19. The Secretary
asserts, without reference to the record, that the alleged
Hocutt-Thomas

overstatements tended to offset any differences in
cost attributable to the fact that the Hocutt-Thomas
estimates were premised in part upon higher dust
levels.

Id. But even if this were so, the fact is that OSHA made
no attempt to quantify these “differences in cost,” and
the record contains no basis whatsoever for concluding
that these “differences” (whatever they might be) would
be offset by any overstatements that Hocutt and Thomas
may have made. When all is said and done, the agency’s
estimate of costs is nothing but bald speculation.”

Having failed to develop a responsible or supportable
estimate of what its Standard would cost, OSHA was
not in a position to analyze the impact that the Standard
it actually adopted would have on the affected industries
or the economy as a whole. Moreover, as the Secretary
concedes, the analysis of economic consequences that
OSHA did perform was based upon the assumption that
compliance costs would be passed through fully in the
form of price increases—an assumption that OSHA’s
contractor, RTI, characterized as “extreme.” Pet. App.
at 44; OSHA Br. at 21.** Because OSHA had no sup-

ment” of compliance costs for the even lower exposure limit ulti-
mately adopted.

82 The suggestion that OSHA could do nothing more than specu-
late because “industry refused to disclose much of its supporting
data and methodology,” OSHA Br. at 19, is frivolous. As the
Secretary now acknowledges, see note 30 supra, ATMI did supply
the survey data. The only information that was deleted from the
approximately 2,000 pages that were provided to OSHA, J.A. at
388-93; Exs. 171 & 176, was confidential data which, by agree-
ment with OSHA, the industry withheld in order to prevent identi-
fication of specific plants.

83 As noted in petitioners’ opening Brief, this extreme assumption
was unjustified. See Brief for Petitioners at 29. Even if one were

24

portable estimate of what the Standard would cost and
pursued an analysis based on an extreme assumption,
it could not rationally conclude that the Standard would
be “affordable’—whatever the agency might mean by
that term—much less that the expected health benefits of
the Standard would be reasonably related to its costs.

B. The Assessment of Health Benefits

Although respondents devote many pages of their Briefs
to an analysis of health issues, they cannot disguise the
fact that OSHA made no determination that the health
benefits of its Standard would bear a reasonable re-
lationship to its costs. Instead, echoing the approach
it followed in the Benzene Standard proceeding, OSHA
simply announced “that the benefits of the proposed stand-
ard are likely to be appreciable” and declined “to carry
out further exercises toward more precise calculations of
benefit.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 27379, col. 3.

Respondents’ lawyers now attempt to supply the “more
precise calculations of benefit” that OSHA, believing
such calculations to be irrelevant, declined to make. Their
Briefs are replete with mathematical assessments of what
the respondents claim the Standard would produce in the
way of health benefits. See, e.g., Union Br. at 11, 42;
OSHA Br. at 32. But they do not refer to any instance
in which OSHA itself made such findings. And with
good reason: Such findings never were made by the
agency. Consequently, whatever one might say about the
validity of the benefit calculations presented by the

to assume that the then-existing textile trade agreements would
continue indefinitely—a speculative assumption at best—textile
imports would grow at a rate that exceeds the growth rate of the
domestic industry. Pet. App. at 199-201 (John P. Figh). This
would result in “greater penetration from the imports” and “de-
cided pressure on the ability to raise prices.” Jd. at 199, 201. More-
over, as pointed out by the American Farm Bureau Federation,
interfiber competition has continued to increase, with man-made
fibers taking a growing share of the market from cotton. See
Amicus Curiae Brief of American Farm Bureau Federation in
Support of Petitioners at 9-10 & n.6.

25

lawyers for the Secretary and Union Respondents, those
benefit calculations have no relevance here, since the
Standard must rest upon findings made by the agency,
not those made by its lawyers after the fact.™

Moreover, even if they were relevant, the benefit calcu-
lations made by respondents’ lawyers are simply not
supportable. What respondents have done is to suggest
that the benefits of the Standard can be determined simply
by applying the prevalence rates reported in the studies
of Dr. Merchant to populations of workers who respond-
ents claim might be exposed to cotton dust in the textile
industry. See, eg., OSHA Br. at 32; Union Br. at 11.
While this may be an interesting exercise, it has little
relevance to determining the benefits that might be ex-
pected from OSHA’s Standard.*

For one thing, Dr. Merchant’s study reports prevalence
rates and does not show the probability that workers ex-
posed to specified levels of cotton dust will develop bys-
sinosis. See Brief for Petitioners at 9. And even in
terms of prevalence, Dr. Merchant’s findings cannot prop-
erly be applied to the industry as a whole. As Dr. Mer-
chant himself stated: “Clearly no inference... . can be
drawn as to the prevalence of byssinosis in the entire U.S.
textile industry ....” J.A. at 435. The Secretary ac-

4 See pages 16-17 & n.23 supra.

35 Respondents’ Briefs also make repeated references to an
estimate by Dr. Arend Bouhuys that 35,000 individuals may have
disabling lung function related to their employment in the cotton
textile industry. See, e.g., OSHA Br. at 4, 31 n.86; Union Br. at 2.
This figure cannot be credited. As Dr. Bouhuys admitted, it is “an
extrapolation from limited data and should not be considered as
anything but a crude estimate.” J.A. at 155. Even a casual reading
of his statement reveals how “crude” and unjustified Dr. Bouhuys’
extrapolation and estimate really is. Thus, his analysis assumes
that 200,000 workers are employed in “dusty jobs” (a term he
does not define) in the cotton textile industry and that all of these
are 45 years of age or older. Id. at 154. It also extrapolates charac-
teristics of an admittedly “limited” study population (645 active and
retired workers) to a putative population at risk of 425,000 active
and retired workers. Jd.

26

knowledges Dr. Merchant’s statement but claims that
it is “irrelevant.” OSHA Br. at 33 n.39. But it clearly
is not irrelevant: There was good reason for Dr. Mer-
chant to caution against inferring that the prevalence
rates found in his study could be applied to the entire
textile industry.”

Thus, even if Merchant’s predicted prevalence rates are
accepted at face value (and petitioners contend that they
cannot be*’), they could not be used as respondents’

36 Thus, Dr. Merchant’s study was concluded by the time that the
cotton dust exposure limits that the new Standard supersedes took
effect for the industry as a whole at the end of May 1971. See
OSHA Br. at 2. Consequently, it does not reflect the effect of
the exposure limits that have prevailed since that time. More-
over, Dr. Merchant studied workers at three cotton and two
cotton-synthetic blend plants, whereas the more typical ratio of
plants in the industry is the reverse-—with cotton-synthetic blend
plants predominating over plants that process only cotton. For
example, the 1971 study of Burlington Industries’ plants revealed
that thirteen of the plants processed cotton-synthetic blends, while
only six processed all cotton. Ex. 71, Part IV, Report III, Table 1. A
similar ratio prevailed when West Point-Pepperell commenced its
general medical surveillance program in 1973. Tr. 1648-49 (Dr.
Jack Whitworth). Since byssinosis prevalence rates are generally
found to be substantially lower in ¢otton-synthetic blend plants
than in all-cotton plants, see id. at 1696-97, the results of a study
in which all-cotton plants were overrepresented would give a skewed
picture of prevalence rates in the industry as a whole.

37 See Brief for Petitioners at 10-11. The Secretary’s criticisms
of various studies that were inconsistent with Dr. Merchant’s re-
sults is unfounded. For example, the Secretary states that, in two
of these other studies (those of Dr. Weill and Dr. Morgan), dust
levels “were generally much lower than” 0.5 mg/m*. OSHA Br. at
10 n.16. But the fact is that 40 percent of the employees in the
yarn preparation areas studied by Drs. Weill and Morgan were ex-
posed to dust levels above 0.5 mg/m*. See J.A. at 162 (Dr. Hans
Weill) ; Ex. 39, Tables 1 & 2 (Dr. Morgan) ; Ex. 48a (Dr. Morgan).
(Employees working with “synthetic” materials as shown in Ex. 43a
were excluded from Dr. Morgan’s study.) By contrast, less than
25 percent of the workers in the yarn preparation areas studied by
Dr. Merchant were exposed to dust levels above 0.5 mg/m*. J.A.
at 38, Group 3. By the same token, the fact that there was a large

27

lawyers use them here—a point that the agency itself may
have recognized implicitly when it failed to make the cal-
culations in which its lawyers now engage. Moreover,
even this unjustified use of the Merchant study by re-
spondents’ lawyers does not show that the Standard is
likely to produce any substantial health benefits beyond
those that could be realized at far lower cost through
implementation of medical surveillance programs with
more moderate exposure limits. For respondents’ math-
ematical manipulations take no account of the impact that
a medical surveillance program would have on reduc
ing the incidence of byssinosis (particularly the serious
grades) at the permissible exposure levels that were
proposed by the industry.**

None of the workers studied by Dr. Merchant had par-
ticipated in a medical surveillance program; consequently,
the results reported by Dr. Merchant do not indicate how
the prevalence of byssinosis would vary from one exposure
level to another if the employees involved participated

range of dust levels in the Weill study is not a ground for rejecting
it. If it were, the Merchant study might have to be rejected as well,
since Dr. Merchant selected his plants for study on the basis of
“extremes of exposure.” Id. at 27.

38 Respondents persist in suggesting that even the mild, re-
versible and nondisabling symptoms of byssinosis constitute a
“material impairment of health” within the meaning of the OSH
Act. See OSHA Br. at 31 (acute form of byssinosis constitutes
“material impairment of health”); Union Br. at 5, 44. Since the
court below did not find that these symptoms constitute “material
impairment of health” within the meaning of the Act, Pet. App.
at 50-51 n.83, 617 F.2d at 654 n.83, the Standard cannot be sup-
ported on the basis of respondents’ characterization of these re-
versible and nondisabling symptoms. We would also note that in its
recent policy statement allowing partial-shift wearing of respira-
tors under the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA distinguished between
the hazards presented by exposure to carcinogens and the less
serious hazard presented by cotton dust even at a level that exceeds
the “ ‘lowest feasible level’ of exposure.” (Copies of the OSHA
News Release describing the new respirator policy have been
lodged with the Court.)

28

in a medical surveillance program, supplemented by res-
pirator use and employee transfer in appropriate cases,
This is a crucial point, since even OSHA acknowledged
that such a program of medical surveillance is likely to re-
duce the incidence of byssinosis significantly.”

In sum, respondents’ lawyers have attempted to supply
health benefit findings that the agency itself failed to
make. And in making these findings for the agency,
respondents’ lawyers manipulate the record in ways that
are simply unjustified. The simple fact is that OSHA
itself did not perform the kind of health benefit assess-
ment that respondents’ lawyers would have wished, and
the record below cannot be altered by the mathematical
sleight of hand performed by the agency’s lawyers after
the proceeding has been long closed.

- 89 See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27359, col. 3; Brief for Petitioners at 15,
49. Indeed, the Secretary in part attributes the disparity in the
prevalence rates found in the Weill and Morgan studies on the
one hand, and in the Merchant study on the other, to the fact that
the employees studied by Weill and Morgan “had been part of an
on-going worker surveillance program,” while the employees studied
by Merchant had not. OSHA Br. at 10 n.16. And OSHA agreed
that pulmonary function testing utilized as part of a medical
surveillance program would diminish the likelihood that pulmonary
impairment would occur. As stated by OSHA: “These tests will
ensure that any significant change from the baseline determination
will become apparent before material impairment occurs.” 41 Fed.
Reg. 56498, 56502, col. 1 (1976).

29

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the Brief for
Petitioners, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to
grant the petitions for review and vacate the Standard.

ROBERT H. BorK
142 Huntington Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06511

GREGORY B. TOBIN

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK, STEWART AND
EDWARDS

First National Bank Tower

Two Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30388

Respectfully submitted,

NEIL J. KING
Counsel of Record

A. STEPHEN Hut, Jr.

ANDREW N. VOLLMER
WILMER & PICKERING
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-6000

Counsel for American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GARY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Milliken and
Company

JOSEPH K. MAppox, Jr.
P.O. Box 5784
Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Spartan Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Hermitage, Inc.

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &
BROWNE

P.O. Box 451

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Arkwright Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarRY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON
The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Blair Mills, Inc.
HARLAN H. HUNTLEY
ROGER L. TUTTLE

2291 Memorial Drive
Danville, Virginia 24541

Counsel for Dan River, Inc.

30

SAMUEL K. ABRAMS THOMAS A. EVINS
BRIAN E. MORAN CLYDE H. HAMILTON
BAKER & HOSTETLER BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &
818 Connecticut Ave., N.W. BROWNE
Washington, D.C. 20006 P.O. Box 451
E 1 Spartanburg, S.C. 29304
ar a nese Counsel for Mayfair Mills
Cone Mills Corporation
Greensboro, N.C. 27405 poe ee prema
Counsel for Cone Mills CHARLES A. EDWARDS
Corporation CONSTANGY, BRooKsS & SMITH
1900 Peachtree Center Building
DAN M. BYRD, JR. 230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
J. SPRATT WHITE Atlanta, Georgia 30303
P.O. Box 70 ‘ P
Fort Mill, S.C. 29715 Counsel for Riegel Textile
Corporation
Counsel for Springs Mills,
Inc. RICHARD H. MONK, JR.
C. POWERS DORSETT
ROBERT H. BORK West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
142 Huntington Street P.O. Box 71
* New Haven, Connecticut (6511 West Point, Georgia 31833
Counsel for Fieldcrest Counsel for West Point-
Mills, Inc. Pepperell, Inc.

January 14, 1981

la
APPENDIX A

Catawba-Charlab, Inc.

Cliffside Railroad Company

Schaeffer Engineering

Societe Francaise des Fabrications-RIBY
Establissements Schaeffer & CIE

Societe des Impressions Sur

La Societe Cotonniere Ivoirenne

Societe Beninoise des Textiles

Blue Bell Cote d’Ivoire

Impressions de Textiles de la Republique
Popularie de Congo

Sonitextil (Societe N igerienne des Textiles)
Amoskeag Company

Crossley Karastan Carpet Mills, Ltd.
Fieldcrest Ireland, Ltd.

Lantor International Limited

Lantor of Australia Pty. Limited

Wool Filters International

Firet, B.V.

CODI International, B.V.

CODI GmbH

Lantor Nonwoven of South Africa (Proprietary) Limited
Lantor Hong Kong Limited

Lantor (U.K.) Limited

Owners of over 50% of Springs Millis, Inc.’s common
stock also own large interests in the Bank of Lancaster
and the L & C Railroad. Springs Mills disclaims these
companies are affiliated.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2223%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.
