# Petition — Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 156

## Text

-— =

In the Supreme Court
OF THE

United States

Ocrozrer TERM, 1979

me 279-512

ScrnprA SteAM Navicatron Co., Lirp.,

Petitioner,
vs.

Lauro DE Los Santos and SeatTLe SrevevorE Co.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

Grayvon S. Sarina
Two Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, California 94111
Attorney for Petitioner
LuGnros, BucHANAN, PAUL
& MADDEN
Roserr fl, MADDEN

Lrtnick Mctlosr & CHARLES
Mpwarp M. Keecu

Of Counsel

BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH © 1045 SANSOME ST. ¢ a.F., CA @4111 © (415) 961-7664

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

BEER PION ne 0" a Cine ane A aR 2
ESE EE Pe i i Sg Raa MRS aa: 2
SCE Rn, Ser ae Le a aL a 2
IS Niger) 0 oe ag ee na te de ee ah 3
IE I oda Po ae Ne 3
weenie see eres Mie WHR... ere ek 6
Background of the question ............................. 6
PRE RR TS et RRP ht RA re Bis 8
Importance of the question )........................000. 13
3. SERSON RE i SGP) spa nama renee can 16

STS all Ot ee) ae) my Ee | hte 17

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page

Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 431 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass.
ACRE SE Rees OF 7A aM meNp eee MU Tras Cera 5, 12

Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (1st Cir.
TG eS > WA RE ei En Seen PETE Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546, F.2d 1233, 1238; Napoli v. [Trans-
pacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir., 1976, 536 F.2d 505,
508-509; Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, E.D.La., 1977, 433 F.Supp. 1020,
1022; Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975,
398 F.Supp. 1224, 1229; Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
D.Md., 1975, 394 F.Supp. 1092, 1097-98, 1100-01; Birrer v. Flota

B-13

lead of those Circuits for three reasons.

First of all, § 343(b) and § 343A place limitations on a
landowner’s liability to an invitee inconsistent with Con-
gress’ explicit direction to reject common law rules of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk in favor of
applying the admiralty concept of comparative negligence.*

Mercante Grancolombiana, D.Ore., 1974, 386 F.Supp. 1105, 1112.
Cf. Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d
798; Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 2 Cir. 1977, 559
F.2d 861; Castel v. Moller, A.P., N.D.Cal. 1977, 441 F.Supp. 851;
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, E.D.Tex., 1974, 380 F.Supp.
222, 226-27.

*The Comments explaining § 343(b) and § 343A(1) show that
these limitations on liability are based upon the substance of the
proscribed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Section 343A, comment e, for example, explains that:

In the ordinary case, an invitee who enters land is entitled to
nothing more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers
he will encounter if he comes. If he knows the actual condi-
tions, .. . and the dangers involved . . ., he is free to make an
intelligent choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is
sufficient to justify him in incurring the risk b entering or
remaining on the land. The possessor of the iad may reason-
ably assume that he will protect himself by the exercise
ordinary care, [i. e., avoid contributory negligence] or that he
will voluntarily assume the risk of harm if he does not succeed
in doing so. Reasonable care on the part of the possessor there-
fore does not ordinarily require precautions, or even warning,
against dangers which are known to the visitor, or so obvious
to him that he may be expected to discover them.

(emphasis added)

In like fashion § 343, comment b limits the possessor’s duty sim-
ply to putting the invitee in a position where the invitee “may de-
cide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation [to en-
counter the danger], or may protect himself against the danger if he
does accept it.” See also, § 343, comment d, § 343A, comment d,
and § 496C, comment d. Cf. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 61,
394 (4th Ed., 1971).

The Restatement’s standard of care incorporates the proscribed
defenses into its definition of the possessor’s duty when it allows the
possessor to count on his invitees to discover conditions, realize their
dangers, and then protect themselves against the dangers. To apply
the limitations of § 343(b) and § 343A (1) to negligence suits ae
the Amendments would violate the legislative intent behind

B-14

We also fear that these limitations on liability would un-
dercut Congress’ intention to reduce the frequency of acci-
dents by creating economic incentives to provide safer
working conditions. Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 454-55;
D. Robertson, “Negligence Actions by Longshoremen
Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,”
7 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 447, 473.°

Secondly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kermarec v.
Compagnie General T'ransatlantique, 1959, 358 U.S. 625,

§ 905(b) because it would, in substance if not in form, give defend-
ant shipowners the benefits of a partial or absolute bar to liability
having the characteristics of a defense based upon contributory
negligence or implied assumption of risk or both. Brown v. Ivarans
Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863-64, fn. 10; Hurst v. Triad
Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1250, fn. 35; Davis, supra,
440 F.Supp. at 453-55; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 494; Espi-
noza v. United States Lines, Inc., §.D.N.Y., 1978, 444 F.Supp. 405,
410; Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1977, 279 Or. 477, 494-97, 369
P.2d 1040, 1050-51 (in banc); The Injured Longshoremen, supra,
28 Hastings L.J. 780-81; cf. Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading
Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546 F.2d 1233, 1241-242.

From the point of view of an injured plaintiff, to use a definition
of shipowner’s duty which incorporates assumption of risk may well
be worse than allowing the shipowner to plead assumption of risk
as an affirmative defense. If assumption of risk came into play as an
affirmative defense, the shipowner would have the burden of prov-
ing that the longshoreman assumed the risk. On the other hand, be-
cause the longshoreman has the burden of proving the shipowner’s
breach of duty, to incorporate absence of assumption of risk into
the definition of duty would force the injured plaintiff to bear the
burden of proving that he did not assume the risk. See The Injured
Longshoreman, supra, 781, fn. 90.

‘In urging us to affirm the district court’s application of Restate-
ment §§ 343(b) and 343A, Scindia relies heavily upon Judge Or-
rick’s use of the business invitee standard in Ramirez v. Toko
Kaium K.K., N.D. Cal., 1974, 385 F.Supp. 644. We note that in
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., N.D. Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 484,
and in Darwin v. United States, N.D.Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 501,
Judge Orrick explicitly modified his Ramirez approach to reject the
use of the business invitee standard. In many a our approach
follows Judge Orrick’s thoughtful analysis in Gallardo.

b-15

630-32, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, supports our selection
of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” approach.
Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., N.D.Pa., 1978,
452 F.Supp. 841, 844. In Kermarec, the plaintiff had come
on board defendant shipowner’s vessel to pay a social visit
to a crew member. As he was leaving, the plaintiff injured
himself in a fall caused by a defective stairway runner. The
plaintiff then sued the shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness
and negligence.

Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts began by
ruling out any recovery based upon unseaworthiness, just
as we must rule out an unseaworthiness recovery under
§ 905(b). The lower courts then set aside the plaintiff’s jury
verdict based upon negligence on the ground that the plain-
tiff had been a mere licensee rather than an invitee. A unan-
imous Supreme Court reversed. Refusing to incorporate
the common law of invitees into admiralty, the Court set
forth its own negligence standard:

the owner of a ship... owes to all who are on board for
purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the

, duty of exercising reasonable care under the circum-

stances of each case. 358 U.S. at 632, 79 S.Ct. at 410.
(emphasis added)

The Court saw the common law moving toward “ ‘impos-
ing... a single duty of reasonable care in all circum-
stances’ ” 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550. It then
explained that the real property tort law of invitees had
been

inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a

culture which traced many of its standards to a heri-
tage of feudalism, 358 U.S. at 630, 79 S.Ct. at 410.

be as

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and that in an effort to adopt that law to do justice in a
modern industrialized society,
common-law courts had found it necessary to... create
...asemantic morass... [of] increasingly subtle ver-
bal refinements, . . . subclassifications ... [and]...

fine gradations in the standards of care. 358 U.S. at
630-31, 79 S.Ct. at 410.

Invoking the admiralty tradition of “simplicity and prac-
ticality,” the Court decided to spare the federal courts from
having to join in the “confusion and conflict” by simply
adopting the better rule towards which the common law
was evolving, albeit “unevenly and with hesitation.”

The Kermarec reasoning applies just as fully today, Fs-
pinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 1978, 444
F.Supp. 405, 413-14, especially in light of the fact that the
trend in the law of invitees relied upon in Kermarec has
continued. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 1968, 69 Cal.2d
108, 79 Cal.Rptr. 97, 448 P.2d 561. As Judge Orrick put it
in Gallardo:

[this] Court rejects resort to terminology which pre-
vents inquiry into the reasonableness of conduct under
the circumstances of a given case. Discussions relating
to invitees, contractors, primary and second responsi-
bilities, obviousness of dangers, and relinquishment of
control all have the tendency to steer courts away from
a balance of the risk of harm against the utility of the
particular conduet in question. 435 F.Supp. at 496.

Accord, Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., supra,
452 F.Supp. at 844.

Finally, because the legislative history of § 905(b) never
refers to the Restatement and never used real property tort

B-17

law terms such as “invitee,” we feel confident that our adop-
tion of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” ap-
proach is not an “impingement upon legislative policy.”
Kermarec, supra, 358 U.S. at 630, fn. do, 79 S.Ct. 406. Ac-
cord, Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 492, 496; Espinoza,
supra, 444 F.Supp. at 413-14; cf. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi,
A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863.

While Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., Inc., 9
Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507, 508-09, fn. 1, left “for another day”
the defining of negligence and duty, that case and our ear-
lier decision in Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S. A. Pan-
ama, 9 Cir., 1977, 564 F.2d 875, are both consistent with
the standard that we adopt. In each, we held that, under the
circumstances, there was no evidence that the shipowner
knew or should have known of the dangers involved. It is
also possible to read those cases as holding that the negli-
gence of the longshoremen or the stevedore or both was the
sole proximate cause of the injury. We cannot conclude as
a matter of law that that is so in the ease at bar.

In adopting the “reasonable care under the circum-
stances” standard, we cannot accept the idea that an in-
jured longshoreman cannot recover because he should have
demanded that the stevedore halt further loading opera-
tions until the stevedore could arrange to improve the work-
ing conditions. We agree with those courts which recognize
that longshoremen “face trouble for delaying work.” Nap-
oli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir.,
1976, 536 F.2d 505, 509; Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 452;
Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546
F.2d 1233, 1241, fn. 17, reaffirming, Brock v. Coral Drilling,
Inc., 5 Cir., 1973, 477 F.2d 211, 215.

B-18

[5] Under the rule of comparative negligence, the con-
tributory negligence of an injured longshoreman reduces
but does not preclude recovery. And in Dodge v. Mitsui
Shintaku Ginko KK Tokyo, 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d 669, and
Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d
675, we held that “a longshoreman who has received in-
juries caused by the concurring negligence of his stevedore
and the shipowner can recover the full amount of his dam-
ages from the shipowner.” Dodge, supra, 528 F.2d at 673;
Shellman, supra, 528 F.2d 679-81. Thus, the contributory
negligence of the longshoreman’s employer or fellow long-
shoremen will not preclude or diminish recovery through
a theory of imputed contributory negligence. It is the long-
shoreman’s own negligence that will reduce his recovery
from the negligent vessel under the Amended Act.

IV. The Standard Applied.

{6] Having determined the standard of care required
of a shipowner subject to an injured longshoreman’s third
party action under §905(b), we must reverse the district
court’s summary judgment dismissing Santos’ action. The
following district court “findings” decided reasonably dis-
putable factual issues against Santos. We reverse because
these issues are material under the negligence standard
set forth above, and cannot be decided on a motion for
summary judgment.

[7] First, the district court found that the shipowner
had not been told about the malfunctioning winch, did not
know that it did not work properly, and cor!ld not reason-
ably have been expected to know that the winch was de-

B-19

fective. There was evidence, however, that the winch had
malfunctioned for two days prior to the day of the acci-
dent, that the winch failed to stop properly with almost
every load, that the shipowner’s representatives had been
back and forth in the vicinity of the loading operation dur-
ing the two days prior to the accident, and that both the
winch driver and the hatch tender had complained to su-
periors whose job it was to communicate problems to the
shipowner’s representatives in the vicinity of the loading
operations. If members of the ship’s crew knew, or should
have known, about the allegedly defective condition of the
winch, their actual or constructive knowledge is imputed
to the vessel by respondeat superior. See, e. g., Davis,
supra, 440 F.Supp. at 450-51; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp.
at 496.

[8] The standard set forth above recognizes that a
shipowner ignorant of an unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion may be negligent in not protecting longshoremen
against it, if “the exercise of reasonable care would [have]
discover[ed] the condition.” Within these bounds it is
correct to say that the “shipowner [has] a duty to use rea-
sonable care to provide a safe place to work.” Brown v. Iva-
rans Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 860, fn. 6(a) ;
House Report at 4707, Senate Report at 10; Solsvik v.
Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., W.D.Wash., 399 F.Supp.
712, 715. Cf., West v. United States, 1959, 361 U.S. 118,
123, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161; Migut v. Hyman Michaels
Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352, 356; Hess v. Upper Missis-
sippit Towing Corp., 5 Cir., 1977, 559 F.2d 1030, 1033. By
this we do not mean an absolute or non-delegable duty to

B-20

provide a safe place. That notion is gone with unseaworthi-
ness. We only mean that under the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, failure to repair dangerous equipment or
conditions may be negligent.

[9] A “shipowner’s duties to the longshoremen .. .
{do not] end when it turn[s] the vessel over to the steve-
dore in a safe condition.” Bess v. Agromar Line, 4 Cir.,
1975, 518 F.2d 738, 741-42, fn. 8. On the trial of this action,
it may develop that the malfunctioning of the braking
mechanism began only after the stevedore commenced
loading operations. In this connection we note that while
a less rigorous duty to inspect may apply where full in-
spection would interfere with the work of the stevedore,
the duty to inspect does not automatically cease once steve-
dores have come aboard for the first time. Slaughter v.
Ronde, S.D.Ga., 1974, 390 F.Supp. 637, aff'd per curiam,
5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 973. Compare Gallardo, supra, 435
F.Supp. at 496; Espinoza, supra, 444 F.Supp. at 412-13. In
Congress’ example of the longshoreman slipping on the
oily deck, Congress did not limit the phrase

substance had been on the deck for such a period of
time that it should have been discovered and removed

by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care by the
vessel under the circumstances

to oil spilled before the first longshoreman came aboard.
Second, the district court found that the stevedore had
exclusive control of the gear and the premises during the

relevant time period. Under the standard we have adopted,
control would be relevant to the extent that it might limit

B-21

the shipowner’s opportunities to inspect for dangerous
conditions or to remedy such conditions. We agree that in
some cases, control may play a critical role in determining
the appropriate standard of care. Nevertheless, we do not
follow those cases which have focused exclusively or pri-
marily on whether the shipowner relinquished control of
the stevedoring to the employer of the injured longshore-
man. Instead, we focus on the reasonableness of the ship-
owner’s conduct in the light of his practical opportunities
to discover defective conditions and remedy them.’

Showing that the stevedore or Santos’ fellow longshore-
men had control to show their concurrent negligence would
not be relevant after Dodge, supra, and Shellman, supra,
unless that control could fairly be said to help prove a sole
or superseding cause.

While the admitted facts portion of the pretrial order
states that the stevedore was in “control of the loading,”
that stipulation would not require a jury to conclude that
the stevedore had exclusive control of the gear and prem-

7Cases focusing on relinquishment of control include Cox v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 798; Briley
v. Charente S.S. Co., Ltd., 5 Cir., 1978, 572 F.2d 498, 500; Hickman
v. Jugoslavenska Linijska, Etc., 2 Cir., 1978, 570 F.2d 449, 451-52;
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1249-253;
Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1977, 553
F.2d 837, 840-41. See also, Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 409,
414 (1965); Talliercio v. A/S D/S Svenborg & D/S of 1912 A/S,
S.D.N.Y., 1978, 451 F.Supp. 949, 951-52; Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.,
§.D.Ga., 1978, 449 F.Supp. 1016, 1020-021; Valle v. Jugoslavenska
Linejska Provibda, $.D.N.Y., 1977, 434 F.Supp. 608, 611-12; Cro-
shaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975, 398
F.Supp. 1224, 1229-231. Cf. Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., O/Y, 4. Cir.,
1978, 576 F.2d 1072, 1079-080, quoting Riddle v. Exxon Transporta-
tion Company, 4 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-112; Teoflovich
v. Amico Mediterranean Pacific Lines, C.D.Cal., 1976, 415 F.Supp.
732,739.

B-22

ises. From the record before us, it is not at all clear that
the shipowner did not maintain ultimate control over the
ship and its gear during the loading. Far from concluding
that only the stevedore could have had the defective winch
repaired, we cannot be certain from the record that the
stevedore had any authority to repair it.

Third, the district court held that the initial spillage was
“caused by the pallet striking the pallet jack.” Santos ar-
gued the broader view that the defective braking mecha-
nism caused the initial spillage by failing to stop the pallet
before it struck the pallet jack. Since the winch driver’s
deposition testimony supports this broader view, the im-
portance of the braking mechanism as a “cause” of the
initidi spillage should have been left for the jury.

Fourth, the district court emphasized that after the
lengshoremen raised the partially spilled pallet they left
it to-swing back and forth overhead. The amount of swing-
ing, if any, matters a great deal because Santos claims
that the remaining sacks of wheat did not loosen because
the pallet swung back and forth but because the winch’s
defective braking mechanism let the pallet keep creeping

_ down, thus requiring the winch driver to keep jerking the

pallet back up to the desired height. Since some of the
deposition testimony suggested little if any swinging, the
amount of swinging as compared with the amount of ver-
tical movement caused by the allegedly defective winch
should have been left for the jury.

Finally, the district court applied Restatement (Second)
§ 343 and § 343A which, as we have seen, incorporate the
substance of the defenses of contributory negligence and

B-23

assumption of risk. In applying those sections, the court
concluded that the “jumpiness” of the winch was open and
obvious, and that both because the plaintiff’s activities
were dangerous, and because the plaintiff recognized some
of the dangers, he could not recover as a matter of law.
These findings also require reversal. They demonstrate
that the district court actually relied upon the limiting pro-
visos, §§ 343(b) and 343A, in deciding to grant summary
judgment. Thus, its mistaken view of the law cannot be
said to have been harmless error.®

As an alternate ground of decision, the district court
concluded that the “defective condition of the winch had
only a remote cause-in-fact relationship to plaintiff’s acci-
dent and could not have been the proximate cause thereof
as a matter of law.” Because the district court based this
conclusion in part on factual findings which we have just
indicated should have been left for trial, we cannot sustain
the district court’s dismissal on this alternate ground. We
thus do not consider whether, if we had sustained the fac-
tual findings, we would have agreed that the defective con-
dition could not have been found a proximate cause of the
accident as a matter of law.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

‘We note that the standard we adopt today is very similar to the
standard set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 and
§ 343A, minus the limitations placed on recovery under those pro-
visions by § 343(b) and § 343A(1). Had the district court not relied
on the limiting provisions of the Restatement invitee rule, the error
of law may ‘have been harmless. However, as we have noted, the
district court did rely on the limiting provisos.

Appendix C

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

Lauro de los Santos, ‘
Appellant,
sb No. 76-3225
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.,
OPINION
Appellee,
Seattle Stevedore Co.,
Intervenor.

[June 28, 1979]

On Petition for Rehearing

Before: DUNIWAY and CHOY, Circuit J udges,
and Grant,* District Judge

Per Curiam:

In its petition for a rehearing and suggestion of a rehear-
ing in bance, appellee Scindia calls our attention to the fact
that Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., D. Mass., 1977,
431 F'. Supp. 869, was reversed by the First Circuit, 1978,
585 F.2d 1142. However, the First Circuit expressly declined
to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343 and 343A
as the standard of care, because the injury occurred on the
dock, not on the ship. The court looked to § 414A of the

*The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

= os

= C-2

Restatement, which deals with a landowner’s liability for
activities dangerous to those outside the land. In comment-
ing on Restatement ${§ 343 and 343A the court said that
they incorporate “the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.” (p. 1147) That is precisely the
reason why we do not adopt them as the appropriate stand-
ard in this case.

In our opinion, we said that the Second, Fourth and
Fifth Circuits “have defined ‘negligence’ in terms of a land-
lord’s duty to invitees under Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 343 and § 343A.” Scindia says that we should add
the First, Third, Seventh and probably the Sixth Circuits
to the list. Scindia is right about the Seventh, Clemons v.
Mitsu O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 7 Cir., 1979, ...... | aaa
(No. 78-1812, April 16, 1979). Scindia is wrong about the
others.

As to the First Circuit, it cites Anderson v. Iceland
Steamship Co., supra, which expressly does not adopt
§§ 343 and 343A. As to the Third, Scindia cites Marant v.
Farrell Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1977, 550 F.2d 142, and Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237. Neither
case is in point. Marant does not mention §§ 343 and 343A
at all. Hurst expressly declines to rely on §¢ 343 and 343A.
See fn. 35, 554 F.2d at 1248. It uses §¢ 409-29, which deal
with an employer’s duty to control the activities of an
independent contractor. As to the Sixth, Scindia cites
Migut v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352,
356. It is obviously not in point. There, the shipowner’s
liability to the longshoreman had been settled, and the

—

C-3

question was whether the shipowner or the charterer should
bear the cost. The opinion in the case does not mention
$$ 343 and 343A.

The petition for a rehearing is denied.

The suggestion of a rehearing in banc has been trans-
mitted to the judges who are in regular active service,
and no judge in regular active service, or judge who was
a member of the panel, has requested a vote on the
suggestion.

The suggestion of a rehearing in banc is rejected.

---

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