# Amicus Brief — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 304

## Text

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979
No. 79-408

City of Milwaukee, The Sewerage Commission Of
The City of Milwaukee, And The Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission Of The County Of Milwaukee,
Petitioners,
US.

People Of The State Of Illinois And
People Of The State Of Michigan,
Respondents.
—=—_
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN

a

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General

DAVID J. HANSON
Deputy Attorney General

NANCY L. ARNOLD

; Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice

114 East, State Capitol LINDA H. ROCHERT
Madison, Wisconsin 53702 Assistant Attorney General
(608) 266-1221

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
May, 1980 State of Wisconsin

INDEX

Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............eceee 2
GURPEPR INU WUUTEIEED cece cccncavesccscccevcss 2
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................. 2
EE Ka on 6 Oa Reape noes ehacebtaearaed 6

I. The 1977 Wisconsin Judgment
Is A Major Commitment By The
Petitioner Sewerage Com-
missions To Abatement Of
Water Pollution And Will Ade-
quately Protect The Citizens Of
Illinois, Michigan, And Wiscon-
canbe On RNa hodnens 6

II. Congress Intended To Create A
Comprehensive Scheme Of
Regulation, And A Remedy
Developed Pursuant To This
Scheme Must Preempt Federal
Common Law Approaches ........... 7

III. Assuming That A Federal Com-
mon Law Nuisance Action Sur-

' vives, The District Court
Should Have Deferred To The
Judgment Of The Wisconsin
State Court Entered Pursuant

To State And Federal NPDES
Requirements And Refrained
From Imposing A _ Different

EA ERS Sn gc ic 21
A. Comity and Abstention. .......... 22
B. Lack of Emergency. .............. 26

CAPE. wah da wang antandendacieenckokneeeanes 27

TABLE OF CASES

Arizona v. California,

DA Sit WO CED So cescasevacees

Baker v. Carr,

ee Us. EBS (IGGR) io oscncescctee es

Butler v. Judge of U.S.
District Court, 116 F.2d

1023 (Oth Cir. 1061) ........5.2...

Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,

B18 UA. Gee (IDES) once di cee weccs.

Cochran v. Ensweiler,
372 F. Supp. 471

ere ee rrr

Committee For Jones Falls
Sewage System v. Train,
539 F.2d 1006

CRO SG SO Ken Kis ectcenversesa

E.P.A. v. Cal. ex rel
St. Water Res. Control Bd.,

ee eh errerer rr rerT

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

BOG US. GO GD occ ccscysjenvcs

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee

599 F.2d 151, (7th Cir. 1979) .....

Illinois v. Milwaukee,

GUS UB. GE CREE) ck icccescncecsss

Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co.,

391 F.2d 486 (2nd Cir. 1968) .....

er ee ry 23

10,13,14,16,17

ery 12,13,14,15

Juidice v. Vail,

Se Sie ee MOPEED Anke Ses des ceasnevest

Landis v. Northern American Co.,

eR | ere errr rere

Lauer v. Freudenthal,
96 Wash. 394, 165

eg: GR ee rere rere Coe

Missouri v. Illinois,

ge # BS Bh. er eee ee ere

Moore v. Sims,

De Ne EE CUEID a5. 6 been deeece cccueas

Reserve Min. Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agcy. 514 F.2d

Se I A NONE in ndc tse decdscwcecsass

Sartin v. Commissioner of Public
Safety of St. Of Minn.,

535 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976) ............

Sewerage Commission of the City
of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission of the
County of Milwaukee v. State
of Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, Case No. 152-342,

Cae, Co ee Sg. occu paadeawnccis

Texas v. Pankey,

441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) ...........

Textile Workers Union uv.
Lincoln Mills,

Se Be SU MAMIOFD 4nd ap sweaeccereedicas

lv

Page
United States v. Carson,
SiS F.2d 420 Gt Cir. 1967) nw. ccccccccccce 12,17
Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
ne I ed elbuss eos 12
White v. Husky Oil Co.,
266 F. Supp. 239
i Ci ME 65 sch wa sakeedeelendaeekyecacdan a 22
WISCONSIN STATUTES
RE BME iho 40h cub eet badewe che oenes ence 3
SO na cu wads aden ewites whew eus bodes 20
EIA SL weed otenscdscewkh ea beucke locksveineene 20
BN 54.65 a Ss eine Shiricen io bnkeis<bckanee 20
SOT sbiaewan th eskescdeweaecaldebseeesee 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

40 C.F.R., Part 35
eS es a ck oie Sha bc nue eadehaees 18

Clean Water Act of 1977
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376 . 4

Handbook on Environmental Law
Fe <2 Cs EE ot id inie cdc nweaseeebes bias 15

Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
Se Sr: OE, TEP a dikccvcccdancuecases cs 2

ee Ses es ee ED eb okkobda edad dees akeeen 13

Page
Rules of the Supreme Court of the
SFE. aE | 2
[1972] U.S. Code Con. & Ad.
EASES RE SA oe 7,8,9,10,11

Wisconsin Administrative Code,
re re bi wana ¢anseanas 18-19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979
No. 79-408

City of Milwaukee, The Sewerage Commission Of
The City of Milwaukee, And The Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission Of The County Of Milwaukee,
Petitioners,
US.

People Of The State Of Illinois And
People Of The State Of Michigan,
Respondents.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

We respectfully request the Court to refer to the
Citation of Opinions Below, the Statement of Jurisdic-
tion, the Citation of Statutory Provisions Involved,
and the Statement of the Case presented in the brief of
the City of Milwaukee, et al., filed with the Court in
this proceeding.

The State of Wisconsin, by its Attorney General,
respectfully submits this brief amicus curiae, in
support of the appeal of the City of Milwaukee, et al.,
pursuant to Rule 42 (4) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Has the federal common law of nuisance
survived the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972 (hereinafter FWPCA)?

2. If it has, what degree of deference should a
federal court exercising that jurisdiction pay to the
national regulatory scheme established by the FWPCA
and to state action under that Act to enforce its
requirements?

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The United States Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376, to provide a
comprehensive, uniform, and national solution to the
problem of pollution of the waters of the United States.
Pursuant to sec. 402(b), 33 U.S.C. sec. 1342(b), of the
Act, the enforcement obligations of the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System in the State
of Wisconsin were delegated to the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Natural Resources and the Attorney General

of the State of Wisconsin. In order to fulfill those
obligations, ch. 147 of the Wisconsin Statutes was
enacted in 1974. The Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (WPDES) created by ch. 147, Wis.
Stats., is consistent with the requirements of the
federal act.

Pursuant to the requirements of these state and
federal laws, the Sewerage Commission of the City of
Milwaukee and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commis-
sion of the County of Milwaukee (hereinafter “the
Commissions”) applied for and obtained WPDES
permits from the State of Wisconsin (hereinafter “the
State”) for the operation of their sewage collection and
treatment facilities. When the Commissions violated
the requirements of those permits, issued under ch.
147, Wis. Stats., the State of Wisconsin brought suit to
enforce the requirements of the law and to secure
abatement of water pollution in the area served by the
Commissions.

On May 25, 1977, the State of Wisconsin concluded
its enforcement action in State Circuit Court against
the two Commissions with a judgment which complies
with fec ral and state water pollution laws and
standards, whch comprehensively addresses the
attainment of effluent limitations and abatement of
combined sewer overflows, and which adequately
protects the interests of residents of Illinois, Michigan,
and Wisconsin in limiting discharges of pollutants to
Lake Michigan.

On November 15, 1977, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded a
suit brought by the State of Illinois against the City of
Milwaukee, et al., under the federal common law of
nuisance, by entering a judgment requiring the
Commissions to treat all sewage to meet certain
effluent limitations six times more stringent than
those required under the FWPCA and to construct a

system to eliminate all overflows of raw sewage from
combined sanitary and storm sewers. On April 26,
1979, the Court of Appeais for the Seventh Circuit
\eversed the order of the District Court insofar as it
imposed effluent limitations stricter than those re-
quired under the FWPCA. It affirmed that part of the
order requiring the elimination of all sewage overflows
outside the combined sewer system by July 1, 1986,
and further requiring the construction of a collection
and conveyance system for the combined sewer system
that will eliminate overflows in the combined sewer
system by December 31, 1989.

The suit in the United States District Court was
brought to address the same problems and to protect
interests identical to those resolved in the suit in state
court. While the exercise of jurisdiction by a United
States District Court in these circumstances may
appear compatible with that of Wisconsin, this is not
in fact the case. Although attempting to reach similar
goals, the remedies of the two courts may conflict in
such a fashion as to frustrate the efforts of the State of
Wisconsin and to usurp its enforcement authority.

This fact has far-reaching implications for the
State of Wisconsin and all other states with delegated
authority under the FWPCA or the Clean Water Act of
1977 (hereinafter CWA), Pub. L. No. 95-217, 33 U.S.C.
secs. 1251-1376. If other jurisdictions may rely on the
federal common law of nuisance as Illinois did here,
while choosing to ignore the opportunities provided for
participation in and enforcement through the NPDES
process, conflicting results, multiplicity of suits, and
frustration of the national goal of clean water will be
the result. Such disruption of the NPDES state
administrative and enforcement process undermines
its integrity.

Accordingly, the State of Wisconsin urges this
Court to determine what, if any, vitality the federal
common law of nuisance maintains with respect to
water pollution control suits in light of the FWPCA
and the CWA. We do not dispute that a common law
cause of action for nuisance may lie in an appropriate
case. This is not such a case. Specific standards of
pollution control have been set under comprehensive
congressional legislation. Such standards must
supersede the setting of others based on a federal
common law. Moreover, even in areas of pollution
control not specifically addressed in otherwise com-
prehensive legislation, the federal court is obliged to
fashion a remedy consistent with the congressional
program’s demands, especially where a decision is
likely to have a substantial effect on that program.
Finally, we urge this Court to declare for the benefit of
local, state, and federal government that, even where a
federal court might properly exercise federal common
law jurisdiction in the water pollution area, when the
responsible state authorities are clearly fulfilling their
enforcement obligations under the national regulatory
scheme, the federal court must defer to the State’s
expertise in establishing the remedy.

This Court should be very wary of suggestions
that the remedy imposed by the State, pursuant to
congressional mandate, is not adequate. After all, the
citizens of Milwaukee, Kewaunee, Manitowoc,
Sheboygan, Racine, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, have as
much interest in clean Lake Michigan water for
drinking and recreation as do citizens of Illinois.
Indeed, being closer to the source of the alleged
pollution they and their state government have more
reason to be concerned than does Illinois.

ARGUMENT

I. The 1977 Wisconsin Judgment
Is A Major Commitment By The
Petitioner Sewerage Com-
missions To Abatement Of
Water Pollution And Will Ade-
quately Protect The Citizens Of
Illinois, Michigan, and Wiscon-
sin.

Legal action by the State to enforce federal and
state water pollution requirements culminated on May
25, 1977, in the entry of a detailed stipulation between
the State and the Commissions which is incorporated
in the Wisconsin Judgment. [The Sewerage Commis-
sion of the City of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee uv.
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources,
Case No. 152-342, Cir. Ct., Dane County.] The commit-
ment made by the Commissions extends over several
decades and represents a major undertaking in terms
of federal, state, and local dollars expended and level
of treatment achieved.

The Wisconsin Judgment is divided into sections,
each of which addresses a different aspect of the water
pollution problem in Milwaukee. In brief summary, the
Wisconsin Judgment requires the Commissions to
comply with applicable effluent limitations, to
eliminate any dry weather bypassing within the
service area, to eliminate all wet weather bypassing, to
correct all combined sewer overflows, and to restrict all
sources of additional waste flow into the system, all by
prescribed deadlines. Each deadline established is
specifically related to the others, so that constant
maximum effort based upon established priorities is
assured.

The Wisconsin Judgment is a comprehensive and
balanced approach to the sources of water pollution
within the control of the two Commissions. It requires
the Commissions to undertake long-term, complex
abatement efforts and to complete projects and
components of those projects in compliance with a
detailed and carefully developed schedule of deadlines.
The Wisconsin Judgment exemplifies the complex and
large scale nature of water pollution abatement in a
major metropolitan area. But more importantly in the
current context, it exemplifies the State of Wisconsin’s
determination to fulfill its obligations to the citizens of
Wisconsin as well as other states to secure and
maintain clean water within its jurisdiction, and to
fully and adequately enforce the requirements of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and _ the
NPDES/WPDES program.

II. Congress Intended To Create A
Comprehensive Scheme Of
Regulation, And A Remedy
Developed Pursuant To This
Scheme Must Preempt Federal
Common Law Approaches.

Wisconsin submits that the statutory pattern
created by Congress and the legislative history to the
Act shows it intended that there be a single federal
decision-maker directing a comprehensive program of
abatement of industrial and municipal discharges to
the nation’s navigable waters. Ad hoc approaches to
solving the problems of pollution of our nation’s
waters were specifically rejected:

Water pollution control in the past has all
too often been sporadic, inconsistent, and
improvised on an ad hoc basis. The major
purpose of this legislation is to establish a

8

comprehensive long-range policy for the
elimination of water pollution, making it clear
to industry and municipalities alike the pollu-
tion control performance which will be ex-
pected over the next decade. At the same time,
the bill provides a mechanism for generating
sound, detailed information on the costs which
will be associated with the later stages of the
control program, and allow subsequent Con-
gresses to evaluate the success of the policy
enunciated in this bill.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3758 (emphasis
added).

The key to accomplishing Congress’ long-range
goals lay in its charge to EPA to establish and then
apply direct discharge limitations to all polluters of the
nation’s waters. It directed EPA to develop these
limitations based on the best pollution control
technology which industry was capable of produc-
ing. The technological standards, once established in
the administrative process,'/ would provide

1/That it intended EPA, and EPA alone, to assume
the responsibility of developing the necessary
technological expertise to develop a sound program of
regulation is evident from the remarks of the Senate
Committee on Public Works (in reference to the
“citizen suit” provision of the Act):

Section 505 would not substitute a “com-
mon law” or court-developed definition of
water quality. An alleged violation of an
effluent control limitation or standard, would
not require reanalysis of technological in [sic]
other considerations at the enforcement stage.
These matters will have been settled in the
administrative procedure leading to the es-

9

“manageable and precise benchmarks for enforce-
ment,” Jd. at 3747, and courts would be relieved of the
difficult technological inquiries and determinations
required in this area.?/ Congress’ wisdom in this
regard is amply illustrated by the following remarks of
the District Court Judge:

Ordinarily, when the trier of fact weighs
evidence and attempts to come to factual
conclusions, he does so in the light of his own
experience and his own observations and his
own common sense. Not only is this proper to
do, it is something that we specifically instruct
juries to do in every jury case.

The nature of the subject matter here,
however, is such that my own experience and
observations in life are of relatively little use to
me. It is well known to all of us that the
arcane subject matter of some of the expert
testimony in this case was sometimes over the

tablishment of such effluent control provision.
Therefore, an objective evidentiary standard
will have to be met by any citizen who brings
an action under this section.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3745 (emphasis
added).

2/Congress specifically noted that the courts simply do
not have the technological resources to assume the role
of developing pollution control standards:

Enforcement of pollution regulations [once
established by the EPA under the statutory
scheme] is not a technical matter beyond the
competence of the courts. The citizen suit
provision is consistent with principles underly-

10

heads of all of us to one height or another. I
would certainly be less than candid if I did not
acknowledge that grasp of some of the
testimony was less complete than I would like
it to be, but short of enrolling in a university
course directed toward a reorientation of my
entire education and spending the years that
that would involve, I know of no remedy for
the problem.

P-Ap. F-3 and 4.

The Court of Appeals noted that Congress left the
door open for states to adopt standards more stringent
than those set by EPA and concluded that precise
uniformity was not a congressional goal. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162, 164 (7th Cir.
1979). State-setting of stricter standards, however, is in
keeping with the overall congressional scheme in a
way that court-setting of standards is not. All state
standards are adopted according to federal statutory
guidelines and the state’s programs are under con-
tinuing federal regulatory guidance. State-set stricter
standards are a logical part of the uniform statutory
scheme because they promote more vigorous anti-
pollution efforts where circumstances warrant. Such
standards, however, are set under the continuing
supervision of the single federal oversight agency by a
state agency with expertise and long-term responsibili-
ty. The critical management roie assigned to the states

ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
that is the development of clear and iden-
tifiable requirements. Such requirements
should provide manageable and precise
benchmarks for enforcement.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3747.

11

is consistent with the development of a uniform,
“comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination
of water pollution.” [1972] U. S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3758.3/ The common denominator in the process
is supervision by the EPA and ultimate control by
Congress. When litigants call upon courts to establish
discharge limitations without regard to the con-
gressional program, the courts, if they proceed, do so
without the technological, expertise forged in the
administrative process, and without the guidance of
the expert regulatory body.*/

The ad hoc problem-solving urged on the court in
this case creates uncertainty and disarray and
represents just the kind of approach Congress was
seeking to avoid. It also contravenes basic interests of
federalism, which demand that independent judicial
remedies fashioned under a federal common law give
way to congressional judgment expressed in com-
prehensive legislation.

The traditional sources of federal law are the
federal constitution, treaties, and statutes. In Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), this Court

3/It is also consistent with Congress’ stated policy
to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution.” Sec. 1251 (b).

4/Ad hoc judicial creation and enforcement of
controls without regard to the FWPCA is inconsistent
with the further objective of the Act to ‘“mak[e] it clear
to industry and municipalities alike the pollution
control performance which will be expected over the
next decade.”

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3758.

12

declared that there is no general federal common law.
Although some federal common law has developed to
resolve significant federal problems not addressed by
traditional federal law sources and not appropriately
resolved by resort to the varying laws of the 50 states,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943), Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), independent judicial determination of
applicable rules of law remains the exception, not the
rule. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). A
comprehensive congressional scheme _ supersedes
regulation by way of resort to common law standards.
And even where federal statutes are silent, courts are
obliged to adhere to the policy expressed by Congress
in comprehensive legislative programs. Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972); United States v.
Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967).

Some federal common law of nuisance has emerg-
ed in the specific context of interstate pollution
controversies where needed to fill in gaps in legislation
and to provide a uniform rule of decision where the
alternative is to apply the laws of the various states.
In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), this
Court held that an interstate dispute over water rights
had to be resolved pursuant to the comprehensive
scheme of allocation created by Congress, rather than
according to common law rules of equitable apportion-
ment. On the other hand, no comprehensive con-
gressional scheme existed to resolve the interstate
pollution dispute presented in Texas v. Pankey, 441
F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) and, accordingly, the court
turned to the federal common law to ensure a uniform
basis for decision: “Federal common law and not the
varying common law of the individual States is, we
think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a
basis for dealing in uniform standard with the
environmental rights of a State against improper
impairment by sources outside its domain.” Pankey at

13

241 (emphasis added). However, just “[a]s the field of
federal common law has been given necessary expan-
sion into matters of federal concern ... (where no
applicable federal statute exists ...),” Pankey at 240, so
does the field of federal common law necessarily
contract where Congress has expressed its will in
comprehensive legislation: “Until the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or
authorized administrative standards, only a federal
common law basis can provide an adequate means for
dealing with [these problems] ...” Pankey at 241.

This Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972), declared the existence of a federal common law
right of action to abate pollution of interstate waters.
This decision, the State submits, was a direct and
necessary response to the many procedural and
substantive inadequacies of the then-existing federal
statutes in this area. The pre-1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act did not mandate minimum
effluent discharge standards; the Act simply authoriz-
ed each state to adopt “water quality criteria
applicable to interstate waters or portions thereof’
within the state, see 33 U.S.C. sec. 1160 (c) (1). This
Court has described enforcement procedures under the
Act as “cumbrous,” “long,” and “drawn out.” Illinois
v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 158, quoting E.P.A. v. Cal.
ex rel St. Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202
(1976) and Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103. Only
the federal government, through the Secretary of
Interior and the Attorney General, could seek court
enforcement of the Act. There was no mechanism by
which the states or private citizens could seek direct
enforcement. Therefore, at the time this Court decided
Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Act provided no authority for
Illinois to enforce its provisions against an entity of a
neighboring state. Moreover, as this Court noted, “[t]he
remedy sought by Illinois [was] not within the precise
scope of remedies prescribed by Congress.” Illinois v.

14

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, the Court
turned then to the common law as a “necessary
expedient” to resolve the interstate pollution controver-
sy brought before it. Committee For Jones Falls
Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir.
1976).

With the passage of the new Act, such resort to
common law theories is no longer necessary. Enforce-
ment procedures have been “greatly strengthen|ed].”
Illinois _v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 158. Now, any
“person ... having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected” has a right to sue to secure
compliance with the Act against any person alleged to
be in violation, sec. 505(g). States may invoke the
power of the EPA to abate pollution originating
outside their borders; under sec. 505(h) the EPA’s aid
in such cases is obligatory. Section 505(h) also gives
the governor of any state the right to file civil suit
against regulatory officials if they fail to enforce an
effluent standard set under the Act.

The new Act also constituted a major revision in
substantive terms. It declared unlawful all discharges
of pollutants, except as authorized under National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit. Direct discharge limitations, based on
technology, are prescribed by EPA and authorized
state agencies for all industrial and municipal dis-
chargers of pollutants into the nation’s waterways.
Opportunities are provided for other affected states to
comment on the appropriateness of the limitations to
be imposed on any discharger, secs. 402 (b) (3), (5).

This Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at
107, foresaw the time where “new federal laws and
new federal regulations may ... preempt the field of
federal common law of nuisance.” In fact that time
has arrived. The Act’s procedural and substantive

15

gaps have been filled. States now have both effective
enforcement authority under the Act and appropriate
opportunities to participate in the administrative
standard-setting process in other states. The remedy
sought by Illinois — the setting of effluent standards
and limitations — is now within “the precise scope of
remedies prescribed by Congress.” The _ current
statutory scheme nullifies both the reason and the
necessity for resort to federal common law to set
standards and limitations to control discharges of
pollutants into interstate waters.

Accordingly, “federal common law [in this area] of
course must give way to federal statutes.” Handbook
on Envirdnmental Law (West Pub. Co. 1977) at p.
154.5/

Because the Court of Appeals reasoned that the
Act did not expressly govern the matter of control of
overflow discharges, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at
170, it concluded that the Act did not limit the relief
available to correct combined sewer overflows under a

5/The author of the Handbook also concluded that
“(t]he immediate reach of Illinois v. Milwaukee was
narrowed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. Application of the federal
common law in the future requires the courts to be
alert to whether Congress has made a clear choice in
confining the range of available remedies.”

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also
expressed reluctance to fashion federal common law in
light of the comprehensiveness of the amended
FWPCA. In Reserve Min. Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agcy, 514 F.2d 492, 532 (8th Cir. 1975),
which involved an action brought by the United States
and the State of Minnesota against a_ taconite

16

common law theory. However, it acknowledged that
even where a statute does not expressly govern a
particular case, a court “should look to its policies and
principles for guidance,” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599
F.2d at 164. Wisconsin submits that congressional
policy concerning combined sewer overflows as ex-
pressed in other provisions of the Act and especially as
administered in the NPDES permit system should
have guided the court in fashioning relief here.

As recognized by the Court of Appeals, regulation
of combined sewer overflows is implicit in the
provisions of the Act prohibiting discharges for public
treatment works not meeting secondary treatment
requirements, Id. Accordingly, the discharge permits
issued to Milwaukee required it to “‘initiate’ programs
‘leading to the elimination or control of all discharge
overflow and/or bypass points.’” Jd. Moreover, the
state court suit brought to enforce the provisions of
Milwaukee’s permits imposed a comprehensive obliga-
tion on the city to correct the problem of overflows
from its combined sewer system. Jd. The plan for
correction requires the expenditure of many millions of
dollars over a period of many years, and it is
inextricably intertwined with other provisions of the
judgment requiring upgrading of Milwaukee’s sewage

processing company to prevent the company from
continuing the discharge of wastes into Lake Superior,
the court of appeals declared:

The district court also found that Reserve’s
discharge into Lake Superior constituted a
nuisance under the federal common law of
nuisance ... Because relief may appropriately
rest on provisions of the FWCPA and on a
violation of the Refuse Act, we deem it
unnecessary and, indeed, unwise to also rely
on federal nuisance law.

17

treatment facilities and requiring the city to coordinate
a district-wide eifort to correct overflow problems in
the separate sewer systems of nearby municipalities.®/

Correction of combined sewer overflows is an
integral part of the comprehensive remedial program
ordered by the State to implement congressional
policy as expressed in comprehensive legislation. In
contrast, the remedy ordered by the district court and
sustained on appeal, which disregards the judgment of
the state as to both the substantive relief measures
required and the carefully-planned schedule by which
they must be completed, can only disrupt the NPDES
state enforcement process. Wisconsin believes that
such undermining of its efforts should not be lightly
approved, for “[w]here a decision is likely to have a
substantial effect on the implementation of a federal
program, then a federal court should declare a rule
consistent with the program’s demands.” United
States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967).

The remedy ordered by the district court also
undermines the comprehensive administrative process
of regulation created by Congress to resolve issues of
interstate pollution. That process requires states to

6/It is important to understand how the Wisconsin
Judgment requirement that Milwaukee correct all
combined sewer overflows differs from the requirement
of the Illinois district court to eliminate all combined
sewer overflows. The regulations established by EPA
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 require preparation of a detailed
Facilities Plan, an overall analysis of the pollution
abatement problems to be addressed with an analysis
of the technological alternatives available as remedies.
The purpose of the Facilities Plan preparation is to
determine the most “cost-effective” means of providing
the abatement necessary. “Cost-effective” has been

18

notify other states when permits which may affect
their interests are proposed, issued, or modified.
Congress has also required that such affected state, on
request, be afforded a hearing on any permit applica-
tion or the terms and conditions incorporated into any
issued permit or permit modification.’/

The State of Illinois receives notice of all permit
actions affecting Lake Michigan. It received notice of
the original permits proposed for the Milwaukee
treatment plants in 1974, and notice again when those
permits were issued in late 1974 and early in 1975.
Similarly, the State of Illinois received notice of the
Department’s intention to reissue permits to South
Shore and Jones Island in 1978, and notice of the
actual reissuance of those permits in 1978.

One of the terms and conditions of the permits
issued to Milwaukee was an obligation to initiate
measures to control combined sewer overflows. Illinois

defined in 40 C.F.R. Part 35, Appendix A (1979), to
mean:

b. Cost-effectiveness analysis. An
analysis performed to determine which waste
treatment management system or component
part will result in the minimum total resources
costs over time to meet Federal, State, or local
requirements.

The State of Wisconsin’s definition of “cost-
effectiveness” is in accord with the federal. Section NR
110.03 (3), Wis. Adm. Code, defines the concept as
follows:

“Cost-effective analysis” means a syste-
matic comparison of alternative means of
meeting state water quality standards, effluent
limitations or other treatment standards in

19

clearly had many opportunities to comment on the
remedial steps required to resolve the combined sewer
overflow problem, yet it never took any of these
opportunities to “make its case” against Milwaukee in
the administrative forum. At no time did Illinois
submit comments to the Department of Natural
Resources on the Milwaukee permits, participate in
permit hearings, or seek a hearing on its own motion.
The State of Illinois has totally refused to utilize that
administrative forum, with its technical expertise,
which remains available to it for purposes of making
its case. It chose instead to present its case in the
judicial forum, where the expertise does not exist, and
in so doing ignored the forum for resolution of these
issues which Congress clearly intended. It seems
reasonable that the congressional purpose of develop-
ing effective pollution control programs through
application of sound technology forged in the ad-
ministrative process should not be defeated by
remedies created outside that process. The regulatory

order to identify the alternative which will
minimize the total resources costs over the
planning period. These resources costs include
monetary costs and environmental as well as
other non-monetary costs.

At the completion of the Facilities Planning
process the precise remedy to the combined sewer
overflows will be determined by the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Natural Resources and Department of Justice
as required by the Wisconsin Judgment based on the
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the problem
and the available remedies. In contrast, the order of
the Illinois court was based on limited information as
to both the nature of the problem as well as the
technological alternatives available and the remedial
benefit of each such alternative.

20

process created by Congress to resolve these issues
must govern as to the remedial measures to be
imposed. See Iuy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 491 2nd Cir. (1968).

Moreover, in this case, not only has Congress
provided a comprehensive statutory program of regula-
tion inconsistent with a common law patchwork, but
also the specific problem presented to the federal court
for decision had been addressed and resolved in the
state court. The case for congressional preemption
must be even stronger where, as here, congressional
policy has already been applied at the time the federal
judiciary is called upon to act.

The remedy imposed by the State represents
application of the highest scientific expertise, conforms
to the long-range goals set by Congress, and is
consistent with uniform, orderly administration and
enforcement of our nation’s water pollution control
program. The judgment of the federal court leads to
regulatory chaos. Progress toward consistent, uniform
improvement in water quality demands that solutions
to problems of water pollution flowing directly from
the congressional mandate preempt. conflicting
procedures.

7/Wisconsin statutory sections securing these
rights include secs. 147.09, 147.11, 147.13, and 147.20,
Wis. Stats.

21

III. Assuming That A Federal Com-
mon Law Nuisance Action Sur-
vives, The District Court
Should Have Deferred To The
Judgment Of The Wisconsin
State Court Entered Pursuant
To State And Federal NPDES
Requirements And Refrained
From Imposing A _ Different
Remedy.

The Seventh Circuit specifically considered and
rejected the argument that the enactment of the
FWPCA had preempted the federal common law of
nuisance in the area of water pollution. Should this
Court sustain that determination, a question of equal if
not greater importance remains: how are the two
authorities to operate effectively in the same arena?

Municipalities across the nation will suffer much
confusion and unnecessary expense if guidelines on
the use of federal common law are not developed by
this Court. Similarly, those states such as Wisconsin
which are charged with fulfilling their obligations
under the national NPDES scheme will find their
efforts frustrated, subject to collateral attack, and
possibly countermanded by federal courts which
choose to fashion remedies completely independent of
those imposed by the state.°/

8/It is the State’s position that compliance with
state law is required regardless of whether federal
financial assistance can be made available. However,
the State agrees that in a situation such as that faced
by Milwaukee, where the pollution abatement program
necessary to comply with the law will extend over
several decades and cost hundreds of millions of
dollars, cost to the taxpayers can and should be

22

The abatement program developed by the State of
Wisconsin pursuant to the comprehensive NPDES
regulatory scheme must preempt the ad hoc problem
solving engaged in by the federal court. Basic
principles of abstention and comity demand that
independent judicial approaches to problem-solving in
this area give way to programs developed under
congressional authorization.

A. Comity and Abstention.

Had the State of Wisconsin initiated its action
against the Milwaukee Commissions prior to the filing
of the federal action, we would emphatically assert
that the doctrine of abstention required the federal
court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.

Abstention is proper for reasons of judicial
economy so that one lawsuit will suffice to dispose of
the problem, rather than permitting two with the
possibility of conflicting results as well as multiple
costs. White v. Husky Oil Co., 266 F. Supp. 239 (D.
Mont. 1967). Equitable restraint should be exercised by
a federal court where granting of relief would adverse-
ly affect the results of a state court action. Sartin v.
Commissioner of Public Safety of St. Of Minn., 535
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976). Further, it is the duty of a
federal court to avoid unseemly conflict with a state
court. Landis v. Northern American Co., 299 U.S. 248
(1936). Implicit in these pronouncements is the notion

recognized in the timetable established for compliance.
The Wisconsin Judgment specifically treats the issues
of compliance with the requirements and means of
financing separately and in this fashion by es-
tablishing priorities and interrelated deadlines for the
projects. The federal court’s disregard for cost and
priorities imposed by Wisconsin threatens the State’s
carefully laid plans for abatement.

23

that an action involving substantially the same
question is pending in another forum which can
provide an adequate remedy. Butler v. Judge of U.S.
District Court, 116 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1941). Neither
the parties in the state court nor the issues need be
identical. Landis.

Abstention is an equitable doctrine founded on the
court’s exercise of judicial discretion, to be exercised
when the federal district court believes that some asset
peculiar to the state court’s jurisdiction will most likely
aid in adjudicating the merits of the litigation.
Cochran v. Ensweiler, 372 F. Supp. 471, 473 (D.C. Ind.
1974). Although it is clear that the doctrine of
abstention is not normally invoked when, as here, the
federal action was initiated first, the guiding principles
of that doctrine and the doctrine of comity strongly
support the State’s position that substantial deference
to the state court and the NPDES requirements was
required when the federal court reached the point of
establishing the proper remedy. The “asset peculiar to
the state court’s jurisdiction” in this case is that it had
already imposed a remedy consistent with tne re-
quirements of the federal and state NPDES programs
to solve the identical problem the federal court action
sought to resolve. Federal court invocation of the
comity principle at the point of establishing the
remedy would have had substantial value here in
securing uniformity of decision and remedy. Lauer v.
Freudenthal, 96 Wash. 394, 165 P. 98 (1917).

Our constitutional system recognizes the principle
of deference by one branch of government to another
within each branch’s sphere of influence. Congress, a
coordinate’ political department, has constitutional
authority to regulate and protect interstate waterways.
The specialized nature of the _ subject requires
deference. The correction of overflows from combined
sanitary and storm sewers, for example, involves

24

technical determinations to which the courts bring
little expertise. The district court admitted it found the
data presented incomprehensible. Congress gave the
EPA the primary task of administering the program,
and gave it authority, in turn, to delegate this
responsibility to the various states. The expertise
employed by the State of Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources in designing a remedy for the water
pollution problem here was employed pursuant to the
delegation of authority from the EPA and ultimately
the Congress. The remedy imposed on Milwaukee
derived, then, from the congressional mandate. The
state court judgment was entered pursuant to the
comprehensive federal scheme embodied in federal
statutes.

The trial court should have deferred to the
legislative judgment and accepted as its guide the
decision of the Congress regarding what is necessary
to protect interstate waters. At the very least it was
incumbent upon the federal court to inform itself of the
requirements of the Wisconsin Judgment and to reach
a determination as to that remedy’s ability to meet the
needs of the plaintiffs, Illinois and Michigan. Absent
such an evidentiary determination regarding the
state’s remedy, the federal court was unable to
determine the need for it to act. Had such an inquiry
been made and had the court been satisfied, as we
submit it would, that the state remedy was sufficient,
it should then have deferred to that expertise in
establishing the remedy. Failing to do so, a federal
court risks interruption and frustration of the national
pollution abatement process which Congress intended
to establish.

This principle of deference is akin to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine and is best explained in terms
of its similarity to the political question doctrine under

’

25

which courts decline to decide issues more properly
resolved by another branch of government.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable ‘constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards of resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decison already made; or the poten-
tiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on
one question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). |

This Court has declared “in the abstention
context,” that “the federal court should not exert
jurisdiction if the plaintiffs had an opportunity to
present their federal claims in the state proceedings.”
Moore v. Sims, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2378 (1979), quoting
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (emphasis in
original). Under similar principles, Wisconsin submits,
Illinois should have utilized the opportunities available
to participate in the state permit-issuing process. The
NPDES/WPDES program provided an adequate ad-
ministrative forum for consideration of the water
pollution and public health related issues raised by
Illinois. Illinois chose to ignore this process and
instead go to the federal court.

26

B. Lack of Emergency.

Under well-settled principles of equity
jurisprudence, injunctive relief should be granted only
when the right to relief is clear. Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901). Moreover, ‘{t]he Younger
doctrine, which counsels federal court abstention when
there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong
policy against federal intervention in state judicial
processes in the absence of great and immediate
irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.” Moore v.
Sims, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2377 (1979). Plainly, there was no
compelling need for the court to impose the remedy it
did. There was no sudden, dramatic increase in the
rate or amount of effluents discharged into the lake, no
sudden decrease in water quality near Chicago
attributable to Milwaukee, and no evidence of a water-
borne outbreak of disease among Chicago residents.
Furthermore, the remedy, involving tremendous add-
tional costs to Milwaukee area residents, was imposed
without evidence that commensurate additional
benefits would accrue to Illinois.

Similarly, we suggest that under established
principles of abstention, comity and judicial deference
to legislative judgment a court is obliged to act, if at
all, with great restraint. We respectfully suggest that if
this Court finds that the federal common law of
nuisance survives the federal Act, the Court must
fashion and require strict adherence to a rule limiting
exercise of jurisdiction in these cases to genuine
emergency cases, imposing liability only on a clear
and convincing showing of a clear and present (not
potential) danger, and fashioning a remedy only where
the link between the remedy and the harm to be
alleviated is beyond dispute and the responsible state
government has clearly failed to act. No such showing
was made in this case. These circumstances dictate
that the District Court should have _ permitted

27

Milwaukee to proceed to implement the remedy
imposed by the state court according to the schedule
approved by that court.

CONCLUSION

The federal common law remedy fashioned by the
District Court below was unwarranted in light of the
comprehensiveness of the 1972 Amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Pursuant to the
Act, EPA has prescribed technologically-based direct
discharge limitations for all point sources of pollution,
and these controls are more than adequate to protect
the nation’s interstate waters. Moreover, the Act now
provides mechanisms whereby both State governments
and private citizens can seek direct enforcement of
these standards. There is, therefore, no need for a
District Court to fashion a common law remedy. It is a
well accepted principle of law that federal common law
remedies must give way to those prescribed by
Congress in comprehensive legislation.

Even if the 1972 Amendments have not preempted
the federal common law of nuisance regarding control
of pollutants in the circumstances of this case, the
District Court should, nevertheless, have deferred to
the judgment of the Wisconsin State Court entered
pursuant to the State and Federal NPDES re-
quirements. The remedy imposed by the State Court
comprised a thorough solution to the identical problem
before the District Court. Since this remedy was
derived from the federally prescribed standards for
water pollution control and imposed to implement
congressional policy, basic principles of comity and the
federal interest in securing uniformity of decision
should have prompted the District Court to defer to the
State Court’s judgment.

28

The Court of Appeals’ ruling should be reversed
insofar as it affirms the District Court’s order relating
to combined sewage overflows.

Respectfully submitted,

KB. OL Lied

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General

DAVID J. HANSON
Deputy Attorney General

NANCY L. ARNOLD
Assistant Attorney General

LINDA H. BOCHERT
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
State of Wisconsin

Department of Justice

114 East, State Capitol

Madison, Wisconsin 53702
: (608) 266-1221

May, 1980

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2154%3A29. Public record. Not legal advice.
