# Reply Brief — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 304

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
No. 79-408 NOV 14 1980
IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR.. CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OctosEer TERM, 1979

City or MitwavukerE, THe SEweraGe ComMMISSION OF
THE City or MILWAUKEE, AND THE METROPOLITAN
SEWERAGE CoMMISSION OF THE County oF MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,
v.

PEOPLE OF THE State oF ILLINOIS AND
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS IN REPLY TO BRIEFS
AMICI CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES,
STATE OF NEW YORK AND
NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION

RicHarp W. CuTLER
ELWIN J. ZARWELL
(Attorney of Record)
SAMUEL J. RECHT
JAMEs H. Baxter III
ANDREW M. BaRNES
780 North Water Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
(414) 277-5000
Attorneys for Petitioners
the Sewerage Commission of

Of Counsel:

QuaRLEs & BRaDY
780 North Water Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

and

MicwakE. J. McCase
735 North Water Street
Milwaukee, Wiseonsin 53202

November 13, 1980

the City of Milwaukee and
the Metropolitan Sewerage
Commission of the County
of Milwaukee

JAMES B. BRENNAN
Room 800, City Hall
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
(414) 278-2601

Attorney for Petitioner
City of Milwaukee

Press or Braon S. ApbAmMs PaintTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

INDEX

Page
a Rar arg eae gr RAReG Gaetny= ay Die aeRO ar Pee 2
I. The Solicitor General’s Brief is Misleading .... 2

II. The Solicitor General Agrees with Milwaukee in
Selee: RIES CRO RS ec e's cee eas anes ewes 8

III. Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,
This Case Should Have Been Referred to the
Expert Agencies Having FWPCA Authority .. 9

IV. New York Argues a Case not Before the Court 11

EES GSES SEARLE EEE Ce ae aN Pee Beat 12

CITATIONS
CasEs:

Environmental Protection Agency, et al. v. National
Sea Clammers Association, et al., Supreme Court

No. 80-12, cert. granted Oct. 20, 1980 ............ 8,9
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) . .9, 10
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (1975) ..... 3

United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
et al., Civil Action Nos. 79-987, 79-988, 79-989 and

SL PR AMGEGED Soiree ka uo osdi ei birds bekee uns 11
STATUTES:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended
secon Ber (20 UB, VIZRL) . occ cece seen 8
Section 402 (33 U.S.C. § 1342) ........ oes eae 5
mecuom B00 (33 U.S.C. 4 1565)... 6 ook cece cn cses 2,8
Wisconsin Administrative Code
TRESS Rade. ENE i ba big < wi ada ¥b kee dee éas 7, 8
SP iret ales hainks wit wes «kbd bad cod bes abe eas 7, 8
ete ie eel takes bow bbe Cae Bele c 7

ii Citations (Continued)

Page
MISCELLANEOUS:
Ill. Pollution Control Bd. R. and Regs. ch. 3
PEE suk b dsr Sin ick Ra owen aad wees 8
PUG eras bah SGd das daa nk oh Oem bean 8
PG PN beh sch Swen hee eee 8

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (Environmental Policy Divi-
sion of the Congressional Research Service of the
Library of Congress, Committee Print 1973) ....4, 5,6

No. 79-408

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBER Term, 1979

City or Mitwavukege, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF
THE City or MILWAUKEE, AND THE METROPOLITAN
SEWERAGE CoMMISSION OF THE County oF MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,
Vv.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF ILLINOIS AND
PEoPLE OF THE StaTE OF MICHIGAN,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS IN REPLY TO BRIEFS
AMICI CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES,
STATE OF NEW YORK AND
NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION

This brief of the petitioners (collectively “Milwaukee”)
replies to the briefs of the respondents’ supporting amici,
namely, the New England Legal Foundation’, the Solicitor

‘To the extent that the amicus brief of New England Legal
Foundation deals with FWPCA, as distinguished from problems
it is litigating under the Clean Air Act, its arguments are met in
the various sections of this brief and Milwaukee’s reply to re-
spondents’ brief which deal with FWPCA. The short answer to
the Foundation is that where FWPCA and federal administrative
determinations made thereunder establish permitted conduct in a
proceeding in which all interested parties have an opportunity to
be heard, it would be anomalous and unwise to afford those same
parties the opportunity to proceed in the federal courts under the
guise of a ‘‘federal common law’”’ to secure relief they chose not to
seek in the federal statutory proceedings.

2

General of the United States and the Attorney General of
the State of New York.

ARGUMENT
I, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S BRIEF IS MISLEADING.

The Solicitor General has shown little interest in this
ease. In his response to this Court’s initial invitation to
state the position of the United States, he suggested that
this Court deny review. When this Court granted Mil-
waukee’s petition for review, the Solicitor General assigned
the matter for briefing and argument to a junior staff
member. As a result the person principally responsible for
the brief (see the statement of the Solicitor General in
support of the motion to admit Andrew J. Levander pro
hac vice) is a staff attorney of approximately two years
standing.

This may explain why the argument that Sec. 505 of
FWPCA (§ 1365) “expressly preserves” the federal com-
mon law is based in significant measure on a purported but
incorrect quotation of Senator Muskie appearing at page
24 of the Solicitor General’s brief, vis. :

“For example, in a colloquy on the floor of the Senate,
Senator Griffin inquired whether passage of the Clean
Water Act would affect in any way the then ongoing
Reserve Mining Company litigation. 1 Leg. Hist. 191.
The Senator specifically noted that this suit, which
concerned the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake
Superior, was based in part on the federal common
law of ‘public nuisance’ (ibid.) See Reserve Mining Co.
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). Consistent
with the position taken by EPA, Senators Muskie * and
Hart replied that the Clean Water Act would not affect
or hinder ‘the suit now pending against the Reserve
Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899***[,] the
existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act or other
law.’ 1 Leg. Hist. 211 (emphasis supplied). See 1 Leg.
Hist. 191-194; Senate Hearings, Pt. 1, at 1017-1020.

3

See also 1 Leg. Hist. at 248 (similary colloquy between
Reps. Dingell and Wright).” (Emphasis in the origi-
nal.)

Footnote 32 reads:

“82 Senator Muskie was the primary author of the Clean
Water Act and his views are therefore entitled to par-
ticular weight. See, e.g., H. I. duPont deNemours & Co.
v. Train, supra, 430 U.S. at 129; Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978).”

In this fashion the Solicitor General’s brief emphasizes
the purported fact that Senator Muskie, the primary author
of the 1972 FWPCA amendments, said the suit against
Reserve Mining under “other law” would not be affected
by enactment of the amendments. In fact, the legislative
history bears out neither the argument, the quotation cited,
nor the attribution of that quotation to Senator Muskie.
Senator Muskie did not utter the phrase “or other law”;
Senator Muskie referred to “any other acts of Congress”.
The argument also attributes to Senator Griffin a refer-
ence to “the federal common law of ‘public nuisance’ ”
though Senator Griffin never mentioned federal common
law.

Senator Griffin did speak about the Reserve Mining case.’
However, his statement of concern mentioned only in pass-
ing allegations based on “violation of water quality stand-
ards and the allegation that such dumping constitutes a
public nuisance.” At no time did Senator Griffin mention
whether the water quality standards or the public nuisance
he was concerned with were federal or state in character.
His real concern was with the aspects of the suit resting

2It is significant, but not referred to by the Solicitor General’s
brief, that when the issue of the federal common law was dealt
with by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, it said:
‘*[W]e deem it unnecessary and, indeed, unwise, to also rely on
federal nuisance law.’’ Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,
532 (1975).

4

on the Refuse Act of 1899. He never inquired in respect of
common law implications, much less as to the effect on
federal, as distinguished from state, common law. He never
mentioned, and nowhere does the legislative history deal
with, “federal common law.” The significant portions of
what Senator Griffin in fact said follow.

Senator Griffin said:

“However, when these provisions [Secs. 4 and 402(k)
(§ 1342(k))] are read together, it is not altogether
clear what effect is intended with respect to pending
Federal court suits against polluters violating the
Refuse Act of 1899.

If section 402(k) were read as having retroactive effect,
then about 170 Federal suits filed against polluters
prior to the date of enactment of the bill, including
the Reserve case, could be dismissed.

It is true that the suit against Reserve Mining is also
based upon violations of water quality standards and
the allegation that such dumping constitutes a public
nuisance. However, the strongest part of the case is
based on the Refuse Act.

[I]t is inconceivable that the Senate would want to
emasculate the best available enforcement device now
available—the Refuse Act—and legislatively dismiss
suits pending under it.” Legislative History at 191.

Senator Muskie replied as follows:

“Section 4 provides and I quote the relevant words
pertaining to the Refuse Act:

No suit, action, or other proceedings lawfully com-

menced by or against the Administrator or any

other officer or employee of the United States in

his official capacity . . . shall abate by reason of

* All citations to the legislative history are to ‘‘A Legislative

History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,”’

prepared by the Environmental Policy Division of the Congres-

sional Research Service of the Library of Congress (Committee
Print 1973).

4)

the taking effect of the amendment made by sec-
tion 2 of this Act.

Without any question it was the intent of the con-
ferees that this provision include enforcement actions
brought under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, and any other acts of Con-
gress.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 193.

This colloquy concluded as follows:

“Mr. Griffin. I thank the manager of the bill. Certainly
that does clarify the meaning as to the intent of the
conferees, and it would clearly indicate that the suit
now pending against the Reserve Mining Co. under the
Refuse Act would not be affected by this bill.” (Em-
phasis added.) Jd. at 194.

Simultaneously, the following statement was made by
Representative Wright in the House:

“Section 4 provides and I quote the relevant words
pertaining to the Refuse Act:

‘No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully com-
menced by or against the Administrator or any
other officer or employee of the United States in
his official capacity ... shall abate by reason of the
taking effect of the amendment made by section 2
of this Act.’

Without any question it was the intent of the iain
that this provision include enforcement actions brought
under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, and any other acts of Congress.” (Em-
phasis added.) /d. at 248.

Note that the language of Senator Muskie’s response is
identical to the response of Representative Wright. Both
were responding to a question relating to the effect of
Sec. 402(k) on pending litigation under the Refuse Act of
1899. Both limited their response to the statement that
Sec. 402(k) would not preclude continuation of pending
litigation under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollu-

6

tion Control Act or “any other acts of Congress.” Neither
mentioned the common law, much less the federal common
law.

After Senator Muskie spoke, later that day Senator Hart
paraphrased what Senator Muskie had said as follows:

“Alarm has been voiced that efforts to prevent en-
vironmental damage to Lake Superior involving the
discharge of taconite tailings by Reserve Mining Co.,
will be hindered by this legislation. It is my under-
standing, however, after the explanation of the Sena-
tor from Maine, that the suit now pending against the
Reserve Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899 will
in no way be affected nor will any of the other counts
under the existing Federal Water Pollution Control
Act or other law.” (Emphasis added.) Jd. at 211.

Thus, not only is the attribution to Senator Muskie in-
correct, but the gravity of that incorrect attribution is
multiplied significantly by both footnoting Senator Muskie’s
primary authorship of the Act and italicizing the phrase
“other law” which is Senator Hart’s phrase, not Senator
Muskie’s phrase.

Note that the Solicitor General’s brief at 23 states:

“In addition, the contemporaneous legislative debates
and hearings demonstrate that Congress specifically
focused on the federal “common law of water pollution
abatement” (1 Leg. Hist. 688) and concluded that en-
actment of the Clean Water Act would not limit or
preclude such suits.” (Emphasis added.)

Here the word “federal” has been inserted to modify the
phrase “common law of water pollution abatement.” Mil-
waukee said in its initia] brief that the entire legislative
history failed to use that modifier. Thus, the insertion of
the modifier “federal” to introduce the mischaracterization
of the legislative history at page 24 of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s brief adds an element to the mischaracterizations
which is cause for serious concern.

7

The Solicitor General’s brief presents other misleading
arguments. At page 7 it states:

“No regulations exist, however, regarding the allow-
able discharge of viral and bacterial pathogens, fecal
coliforms, or phosphorous and chlorine residuals.”

The obvious purpose of this statement is to suggest that
an interstice exists in FWPCA and the regulations there-
under which the federal common law should fill. In fact,
the discharge permits issued to Milwaukee under FWPCA
specifically address fecal coliforms, phosphorous and
chlorine residuals, as well as various other parameters
(e.g., BOD, suspended solids, pH, etc.) and thereby by
reference thereto address pathogens. P.Ex. 62, 63 and 64,
App. 371-454, Tr. 257. There is no interstice here.

Interestingly, this very same argument was advanced
by Illinois in its May 10, 1979 Application for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc to the Court of
Appeals. There Illinois claimed that neither federal regu-
lations nor the discharge permit limitations were designed
to protect the public health. In response to that claim, the
EPA itself came forward with an affidavit from Mr. Charles
Sutfin, now Director of EPA’s Region V Water Division,
who drafted EPA’s “secondary treatment” standards ap-
plicable to publicly owned treatment works. That affidavit
shows that the pertinent federal regulations were designed
to accomplish the removal or inactivation of pathogens in
treatment plant effluent so as to protect the public health.
See Response of Defendants-Appellants to Petition for
Rehearing with Appendix, dated May 29, 1979, at Ap. 5-6.
Similarly, the State of Wisconsin specifically addresses
pathogen removal or inactivation when _ establishing
NPDES permit limitations. Jd. at Ap. 7-8. Finally, appli-
cable Wisconsin water quality and treatment standards
promulgated pursuant to FWPCA are expressly designed
to protect the public health. Sections NR 102.02-102.03,
103.06, 110.23, 210.09, Wis. Adm. Code.

8

The Solicitor General’s brief does go on to admit at
the same page 7 that the matters which are before this
Court on this Petition for Certiorari are covered by
FWPCA. At footnote 15 on page 7, he specifically says:

“Such overflows [from combined storm and sanitary
sewers] must be covered by a permit and must comply
with Sections 301(b)(1)(A) and 301(b)(2).” *

The Solicitor General’s brief at 14-15 argues that the
EPA believes that the federal common law is an important
tool to advance the goals of FWPCA. But the Solicitor
General fails to state that the EPA, which is committed
by Sec. 201 of FWPCA (§ 1281) to fund the goals of the
Act, is resisting to the utmost paying for any court-
imposed requirements which exceed the requirements that
the EPA or qualified states impose under FWPCA. Can
the Solicitor General and the EPA have it both ways?

Il. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AGREES WITH MILWAUKEE IN
THIS COURT’S CASE 80-12.

The Solicitor General’s position in this case is contrary
to statements made in his petition for certiorari in En-
vironmental Protection Agency, et al. v. National Sea
Clammers Association, et al., No. 80-12, cert. granted
October 20, 1980. There, in responding to the Court of
Appeals’ decision establishing an implied right of action
under FWPCA, which action is not subject to the proce-
dural requirements of Sec. 505, the Solicitor General
stated at 15:

“This focus [in FWPCA] on agency enforcement is
undermined by the decision of the court of appeals... .

*The Solicitor General’s brief at 8n.16 incorrectly asserts that
Illinois has established a higher water quality standard for Lake
Michigan than has Wisconsin. In fact, both states have established
a water quality standard of ‘‘fishable, swimmable and drinkable.”’
See Sec. NR 103.06, Wis. Adm. Code (and related Sees. NR 102.02
(3), (4) and (5), Wis. Adm. Code) and Ill. Water Poll. Control
Bd. Rules and Regs. ch. 3, Part 206 (and related Parts 203 and
204, Ill. Water Poll. Control Bd. Rules and Regs.).

9

Under the court of appeals’ decision, even when EPA
is diligently pursuing a court action against an alleged
violator, a private litigant will be free to bring a sec-
ond action, which may be in a different court because
it is not subject to the venue requirements of the
statutory provisions.”

The general problem posed by the Solicitor General in
National Sea Clammers is the same problem present in
this case. Whether the authority of the “private litigant”
to pursue the second action is implied from the provisions
of FWPCA or is based upon the federal common law, the
problem is the same. Were it not for the asserted avail-
ability of a sovereign immunity defense to a federal com-
mon law action, the Solicitor General would undoubtedly
have included an objection to such an action in its petition
in National Sea Clammers. Again the Solicitor General
would have it both ways.

Ill. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION,
THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE
EXPERT AGENCIES HAVING FWPCA AUTHORITY.

The Solicitor General argues against primary jurisdic-
tion referral because (1) nuisance claims are within the
conventional experience of the federal courts, and (2) this
case does not call upon the special expertise of the EPA,
relying principally upon Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
426 U.S. 290 (1976). (Solicitor General’s Brief at 29-30
n.40.) °

However, the District Court candidly stated that it did
not understand the technical evidence. Pet. App. F-3 and 4.
This is the very problem calling for referral.

5 Michigan’s brief also addresses primary jurisdiction at 19-20.

10

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra at 303-304, is not
dispositive. There the Court stated:

“Even when common-law rights and remedies survive
. ..1t may be appropriate to refer specific issues to an
agency for initial determination where...

‘the limited functions of review by the judiciary
[would be] more rationally exercised, by prelimi-
nary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specializa-
tion, by insight gained through experience, and by
more flexible procedure.’ Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. at 574-575, 96 L.Ed 576,
72 S.Ct. 492.

See also United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra,
at 64, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 77 S.Ct. 161, 426 U.S. at 303-304.”

The Court went on to point out that in the Nader case
(contrary to the situation here) the expertise of the
agency involved would not be helpful in resolving the issues
before the Court. 426 U.S. at 305-306.

As pointed out in Milwaukee’s initial brief at 11, here
Illinois had actual notice of, and could have participated
in, the NPDES permit proceedings (including a public
hearing) where all of the technical matters could have been
heard and determined by the qualified expert administra-
tive agencies specifically created for that purpose.

Even if those proceedings were not dispositive of the
issues presented, the agencies’ expert input, based upon
an extensive record on the precise issues now before the
Court (including whether the discharges did in fact affect
Illinois, how serious any potential risk actually was, and
whether the benefits of potential remedies justified the cost
thereof) would have provided the specific expertise the Dis-
trict Court admittedly lacked on the issues it decided.

11

IV. NEW YORK ARGUES A CASE NOT BEFORE THE COURT.

The brief amicus curiae of the Attorney General of the
State of New York is directed to an issue not before this
Court. In its “Statement of Interest” New York exposes its
true concern: “In certain circumstances, a federal common
law public nuisance action may be the only path open to a
state government which seeks to resolve an apparent inter-
state conflict.” (Emphasis supplied.) N.Y. Brief at 1. The
brief then offers a “hypothetical” fact situation involving
toxic waste disposal. Jd. at 1-2. The burden of the brief is
to establish that the states retain the option of going to
federal court to seek a remedy for an injury which an
administrative agency acting under federal statutes does
not address. Jd. at 20. Thus, the New York brief is really
addressed to the so-called “Love Canal” case. See the cita-
tions to United States v. Hooker Chemicals € Plastics
Corp., et al., Civil Action Nos. 79-987, 79-988, 79-989 and
79-990 (W.D.N.Y.) at page 9 of New York’s brief.

“Love Canal” does not entail the discharge of “conven-
tional pollutants” (BOD, suspended solids, fecal coliform
and pH) by a publicly owned treatment works or other
publicly maintained point source pursuant to and in accord-
ance with a discharge permit issued in compliance with
the provisions of the FWPCA. It is not, and should not be,
incumbent upon Milwaukee to brief, argue and prevail in
every imaginable hypothetical fact situation, regardless
of the presence or absence of regulation or statute in the
premises, in order to prevail in the present certiorari pro-
ceeding pending before this Court on a narrow issue under
a specific statutory scheme.

A decision favorable to Milwaukee, limited as it should
be to the issues before this Court, will in no way decide
the so-called “hypothetical” fact situation argued by New
York. In contrast to the “Love Canal” situation, we here
deal with permittees under an all pervasive federal statute

12

and federal regulatory scheme directed to the precise mat-
ters before the Court. New York’s case is not before the
Court.

CONCLUSION

The briefs of the respondents’ supporting amici add little
if any illumination to the issues before the Court. In each
instance they are calculated to advance a position of the
writer in an area of the law or under a statute not pre-
sented here and not controlled by a decision directed to
the relatively narrow issues that are presented. On this
basis Milwaukee respectfully suggests that those briefs
should be used only as guideposts to mark the outer pe-
rimeters of the issues before the Court and the limits of
the decision rendered.

Respectfully submitted,

Ricuarp W. CuTLER
ELWIN J. ZARWELL
(Attorney of Record)
SAMUEL J. RECHT
JaMeEs H. Baxter III
ANDREW M. BaRNES
780 North Water Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
(414) 277-5000

Attorneys for Petitioners
the Sewerage Commission of

Of Counsel: the City of Milwaukee and
Quantas & Baapy the Metropolitan Sewerage
780 North Water Street Commission of the County

; . : of Milwaukee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

and JAMES B. BRENNAN

MicnHakEt J. McCaBEe Room 800, City Hall
735 North Water Street Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

November 13, 1980

(414) 278-2601

Attorney for Petitioner
City of Milwaukee

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2154%3A20. Public record. Not legal advice.
