# Opposition — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1981
- **Citation:** 451 U.S. 304

## Text

-

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OCT 42 197

IN THE
MIP tare,

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-408

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION
OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, AnD THE METROPOLI-
TAN SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF
MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,
VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS anp PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN OPPOSITION TO
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,
Attorney General of the State
of Illinois,
JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS,
SANFORD R. GAIL,
Special Assistant Attorneys
General,
KARAGANIS & GAIL LTD.,
150 North Wacker Drive,
Chicago, Illinois 60606,
(312) 782-1905.

October 11, 1979.

Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago e Financial 6-6565

INDEX.

PAGE
SCENE I os 6's vibe DM Rs po dev o's 8 hs bP ee Vv
Co Pee Tere er ee ee eee 1
hi: EE oo x36: 404.9 VS £5 ORS Sale CORRES ORS 1
B. Defendants’ Sewage Collection System........ 2
C. The Health Hazards of Untreated Sewage..... 5
D. The Transport of Those Disease-Causing Organ-
eg Pees Teer ee ree 7
E. The Procedural History of This Case.......... 8
F. The Remedy Ordered by the District Court.... 10
G. The Decision by the Court of Appeals........ 12
menos Tor EPOMPIR GS WI... ns ccc ice ese ccee's 16
I. The District Court’s Collection Order Is Not Incon-
sistent with the Clean Water Act................ 16
A. Congress Did Not Preempt the Imposition of
More Stringent Requirements Than Those Im-
posed Under the Clean Water Act........... 16
B. The Statutory Procedure Under the Act Itself
Contradicts Milwaukee’s Arguments......... 20
II. Miiwaukee’s Evidentiary Claims Are Spurious...... 23
III. The District Court Had in Personam Jurisdiction and
Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the Claim
ON ii e888 Ak KOR TAR eke es 24
A. The District Court had in Personam Jurisdiction 24
B. Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the
EN SUNS. oo 0 5 0 CAA 8k ae be 3 8 Oe 27
RS, oC ha aU aa hes aA 5s shee see ae OO RS 29

CITATIONS.

Cases.

Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia v. U. S.,

406 F. Supp. 556 (E. D. Va. 1976)... 0. ccccccces 20
California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings,
SPO TH. BE 161 CHUNG. BPTE) vices chess cvwsccccess 20

Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976)... .18, 20

Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co.,

SSS FP. 26 TST CF Ce, BDGT) ow iv cews conancccccce 26
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 Mh. &. 26 761 (ISG1) 20. oc cece ccccccces 25
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F. 2d 1137
ya. | RR etre Oar ee eer 26
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N. D. IIl.
| PES re ey oa Ona) ee ee eee ee 18

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ...8, 27, 28

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
GUE ney hae Ose Cacik canes seabede ak eWuee nes 25

Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Steel Corp.,
30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 323 N. E. 2d 426 (1st Dist. 1975),

Cit.. GOm. SIA UE. FTG CID TE) 0 oc cc ccveccacccess 18
Mianus River Preservation Committee v. EPA, 541 F. 2d

ee PINs poche tiae ad eV ieuke eee bs owes 17
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)........... 23, 24
McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.

SE irae a oh aes Skewes daw bein web rie ee 26

Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N. E. 2d 673 (1957) 25
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921)....... 23, 24

ili
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493 (1971)
PF EO ee Fr PaCS eS PIE ee ee Poe pe 9, 25, 26, 27
Pennoyer v. Nell, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)... seve ees cess 25

People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 IIl.
App. 3d 607, 352 N. E. 2d 255 (1st Dist. 1976)....18, 19

Shaffer v. Harris, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)..........000% 25
State Water Control Board v. Train, 554 F.2d 921 (4th
a Ui oe heer fad ie oes URS 21

Stream Pollution Control Board of the State of Indiana
v. U. S. Steel Corp., 512 F. 2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975) 19, 28

Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp.
Bye 8. : Ree a an oreo gees 20

U.S. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Vt. 1973), aff'd 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

es AEF TI; SIO GAs Geis CaN eed ess 20
U. S. v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784 (E. D.N. Y. 1973)... 20
U. S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., ........... F. Supp... re

ge OD ) ee eee ee Peer eer 20
U. S. ex rel. Scott v. U.S. Steel, 356 F. Supp. 556 (N. D.

i A cakes Jdbcee bea e sd eae eee were 20

Village of Glencoe v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 23°
Ill. App. 3d 868, 320 N. E. 2d 524 (1st Dist. 1974)... 18

Statutes.
Judicial Code 28 U.S.C.
NR nina y uae CNY Gale bh td bee a ae 27, 28
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
RE SECE SOAS Faas VA 6 A Od ee ee eRe 21-22
DPR SGMPC RPE? <6 4 snses ceo se ween beeen 15, 20, 21

Bi tli liek) Seer ee peewee 15, 18, 20, 21, 23

Ebi. 5 a re, Se eee eee 21
oko hs ey as ba Me eee wa eae 11
atk Fn hw ahs ks pe ee win a eee ee 18-19, 27, 28
MN 2 isa Abs ele bie a LA DRO ee hoes 18
OMe iklka 6a ee Ka ie aa Oo ess 16-17, 21
Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 110
So ckrsrerae kk Wied SO RE ed eee aks 24-25
ie Rane eds EEN CA ETERS 24-25

Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch.
111%, pars. 1001 et seq.
SS ae cule mae ee rae RC WA OEE 8-9
Eh 48 cen o A AIR ee hE eNOS a wa 8-9

Administrative Regulations.
40 C. F.R. Part 35, Subpart E, Appendix A.......... 21
fh ON SS’: SURO as gg len ee oh a 15

ey a My ok 2 ae ne em ibce aeD 24
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52

Other Authorities.

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, A
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
MeO OE BF io 6K. on he SRA Ss a 17, 18, 19, 22

Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377... 0... ecb ccccces 27

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

I. Were the district court’s findings that viral and bacterial

II.

III.

pathogens discharged by defendants contaminated Illinois
waters and that defendants’ discharges made a significant
contribution to the eutrophication of Lake Michigan
“clearly erroneous”?

Has Congress, in Public Law 92-500 as amended by Public
Law 95-217, prohibited the states from seeking the impo-
sition of more stringent treatment than the national mini-
mum levels of treatment through the use of state statutes,
federal common law or state common law?

Did the district court have in personam jurisdiction, and

was venue proper in the district in which the injury
occurred?

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GQnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-408

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION
OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, anpD THE METROPOLI-
TAN SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF

MILWAUKEE, Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Anp PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN OPPOSITION TO
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. Introduction.

Petitioners City of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of
the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Com-
mission of the County of Milwaukee (hereinafter referred to
collectively as “Milwaukee”) have petitioned this Court to
grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the appellate
court below. Basically, Milwaukee challenges the district court’s
findings of fact and the appellate court’s affirmance that Mil-
waukee discharges enormous volumes of raw, untreated human
fecal waste into Lake Michigan and that shore parallel currents
transport these wastes containing billions of bacterial and viral
pathogens (disease-causing agents) into [linois waters, thus

2

creating a major health hazard for Illinois swimmers and for
Illinois’ public water supply. Beyond challenging its liability for
creating a common law public health nuisance, Milwaukee seeks
to challenge the basic remedy ordered by the district court and
by the appellate court—i.e. that raw human fecal waste should
be collected and transported to waste treatment facilities for
treatment instead of being discharged raw into public waters.

In its petition Milwaukee seeks to gain this Court’s attention
by seriously misrepresenting the evidence presented to the dis-
trict court, the findings and logic of the district court and appel-
late court, and the state of the law.

B. Defendants’ Sewage Collection System.

To properly appreciate the enormity of the raw sewage prob-
lem caused by Milwaukee, one must understand the collection
system Milwaukee has built to transport raw human fecal wastes
from its residential or commercial source to its treatment plants.
If the public health hazard were not so great, Milwaukee’s sewage
collection system could be admired as the ultimate invention of
Rube Goldberg. Among the system’s unique features:

1. Milwaukee has consciously followed the practice
of building large sewers which would be intentionally con-
nected into smaller sewers leading to the treatment plants.
When the large sewers fill up with raw sewage, the smaller
sewers cannot handle the hydraulic load. Rather than build
larger “downstream” sewers adequately sized to carry the
hydraulic load of the large “upstream” sewers, Milwaukee
has built overflow devices to pour the raw fecal wastes
into the local rivers or into Lake Michigan.

2. Also unique to Milwaukee is their system of giant
“flushing tunnels.” The stench of the enormous volumes of
raw fecal waste discharged from these overflow devices
becomes so severe that the city maintains two giant
“flushing tunnels” to draw in clean Lake Michigan water

3

to the upyer reaches of the local rivers and to literally
“flush” the raw fecal wastes into Lake Michigan.

In Milwaukee, the basic pattern for sewage collection is by
means of a house lateral sewer connected to a municipal col-
lector sewer under the street. The municipal collector sewer then
connects to a large “interceptor” sewer system which carries
fecal waste—principally by gravity flow—to a treatment plant
for treatment (Tr. 118, Tr. 426). In Milwaukee this “inter-
ceptor’ system is called the “MIS” or Metropolitan Interceptor
System (Tr. 120, Tr. 426).

Beginning in the post-war years, Milwaukee began extending
sewer service to more and more residential and commercial
areas (Tr. 206). These new sewer extensions and the new
sewage loads from these areas were connected to the existing
interceptor system creating hydraulic overloads in the inter-
ceptor system, i.e. more sewage flow than the pipe can handle
(Tr. 139). Not the least cause of these hydraulic overloads was
defendants’ conscious practice of building larger diameter sewers
in outlying areas which were connected to smaller diameter
sewers leading to the treatment plant.’

1. On adverse examination, Mr. Weiland, Director of Engincer-
ing for the Sewerage Commission, testified:

Q. Isn’t it correct that in the development of the Metro-
politan Interceptor System, pipes of a larger capacity were
connected to pipes downstream which had a lesser capacity?

A. Yes. (Tr. 139-140.)

ok * * ue Be
Q. What size sewer does that 72-inch special section sewer
lead into?
A. I believe it is a 42-inch. (Tr. 333.)
* * ok * *

Q. And this 72-inch system in 1949 was then connected
into a 42-inch system, isn’t that right?

A. Yes. (Tr. 333-334.)

* * * a *

Q. Wasn’t the sewer built with full knowledge by the staff
that the 42-inch sewer was hydraulically undersized so that
it couldn’t handle the load of the 72-inch sewer?

(Footnote continued on next page.)

4

These hydraulic overload problems are exacerbated by rain
storms. In most of the Milwaukee metropolitan area the de-
fendants have constructed “separate” sanitary and storm sewers.
The sanitary sewers are the sewers intended to carry human fecal
wastes to the treatment plants. However, rain water from down-
spouts or storm drains is often discharged into the already hy-
draulically overloaded sanitary sewers. The result is an exacerba-
tion in both volume and duration of the raw sewage overflow.

Thus, while periods of hydraulic overload and resultant over-
flow are often associated with rainfall events, these hydraulic
overloads and resultant overflows have been known to extend
over both dry and wet periods and to result in continuous dis-
charge of raw sewage into the rivers and lake for as long as
30 days.

Also discharging into this hydraulically overloaded inter-
ceptor system are a series of collector sewers that were designed
to carry both storm and fecal (“sanitary”) wastes (“combined”
sewers). These sewers also overflow both because of hydraulic
overload in these “combined” collector sewers and because the
interceptor system into which these combined sewers discharge is
already hydraulically overloaded due to upstream hydraulic
loads.

At the present time Milwaukee maintains several hundred
overflow devices or structures throughout the metropolitan area
—both on the interceptor (MIS) system and on local collector
sewers. Overflows of raw human fecal wastes from these devices
occur approximately 50 times a year and last up to 30 days and
contain billions of gallons of fecal wastes.

As noted above, Milwaukee has developed a unique system
for ridding itself of the obnoxious odors and disease hazard

(Footnote ccntinued from preceding page.)

A. Yes.

Q. And the staff for the commissions went ahead and built
the sewer without at that time providing for adequate hydraulic
capacity, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes. (Tr. 334.)

5

represented by these raw sewage overflows. The overflows dis-
charge either into Lake Michigan or into local rivers which
then flow into Lake Michigan. In storms the rivers’ flow is
sufficient to move the fecal wastes from the rivers into Lake
Michigan. To assist the rivers’ flow in dry weather defendants
maintain huge “flushing” tunnels. These tunnels draw clean
Lake Michigan water into the upper reaches of the river and use
that water to literally “flush” the fecal wastes out into Lake
Michigan.

C. The Health Hazards of Untreated Sewage.

The raw sewage discharged by Milwaukee contains enormous
numbers of pathogenic” organisms, both bacteria and viruses.
Any urban center like Milwaukee contains persons who are
infected with pathogens and who are shedding bacterial and
viral pathogens through their feces (Tr. 3101, 2174). A single
gram—1/454 pound—of human feces from an infected indi-
vidual can contain literally millions of viruses (Tr. 10278).
Depending on the level of disease within the community, raw
sewage can contain from approximately seven thousand to
several hundred thousand viruses per liter (Tr. 2180).

Bacteria and viruses are two totally different pathogenic
groups. Within the bacteria group there are hundreds, if not
thousands, of different strains of pathogenic bacteria. For ex-
ample, two common pathogenic bacteria associated with fecal
matter are Salmonella and Shigella. Salmonella has over 400
different subtypes, and Shigella has over 600 different sub-
types (Tr. 3053). Indeed, the total number of bacterial patho-
gens is not really known (Tr. 3053).

Bacterial pathogens cause diseases of severe discomfort and
sometimes serious complications. Basically, when ingested these
organisms cause intense diarrhea (Tr. 3054). Other bacteria—

2. The noun “pathogen” or the adjective “pathogenic” refers to
the disease-causing nature of these organisms (Tr. 2155).

6

known as “opportunistic” pathogens—can create serious sec-
ondary infections in injured persons or serious illness in the very
young or elderly (Tr. 3055).

The other and perhaps more serious group of pathogens
found in fecal wastes are viruses. Viruses which pass from the
body in feces are called “enteric” viruses (Tr. 2149).

A virus is an incredibly small object measuring less than one
millionth of an inch in diameter (Tr. 10171). Many people
who get infected by enteric viruses do not show any disease
symptoms. Viruses simply multiply in the lining of the gut and
are excreted with the feces without causing any disease symp-
toms (Tr. 2157). A thousand people may become infected
before one shows a clinical symptom of the disease. Yet these
asymptomatic infected carriers pass on just as many viruses as
a diseased person (Tr. 2145, 2157, 2174). Thus, thousands of
people can become infected and become carriers and multipliers
of an enteric viral disease without any indication of the disease
being present.

Actual disease symptoms only appear when a particular virus
enters the bloodstream through the lymph glands (Tr. 2143)
and attacks a “target” organ, such as the heart, lungs, brain or
central nervous system (Tr. 2157). Polio is an enteric virus that
attacks the tissue of the spinal cord (Tr. 2161, 2165). Coxsackie
virus causes pleurodynia—a disease of the covering of the lungs
which causes a great deal of inflammation and pain (Tr. 2164).
Coxsackie B virus has as its target organ the muscle tissue of the
heart causing such diseases as pericarditis (Tr. 2167) and
myocarditis. Myocarditis is a particularly severe and sometimes
fatal heart disease in young children (Tr. 2160). Coxsackie
viruses also have been found to increase the incidence of birth
defects (Tr. 2167) and are suspected of triggering diabetes in
susceptible individuals (Tr. 13211). Hepatitis A is an enteric
virus which attacks the liver (Tr. 2168).

The common denominator of all these enteric viruses is
that they leave the body of a carrier by means of the feces

7

(Tr. 2147). Thus, fecal material is a necessary link in the
transmission of the virus to the next victim. This is called
“fecal-oral transmission” (Tr. 2155).

Viruses are incredibly difficult to detect with accuracy. The
common test is to place suspected viral fluid on a bed of animal
or human embryo tissue. If the tissue on the cell becomes in-
fected, the number of infected areas are counted as plaque-
forming units (Tr. 2179). Unfortunately, this test is very
inaccurate and will not detect known viruses. For example,
Hepatitis A cannot be grown or isolated with the test (Tr.
10193). Many viruses will only grow in certain types of cell
tissue and will not show up in other virus tests at all (Tr.
12134, 12320). Moreover, because viral particles are not
distributed uniformly through a volume of liquid, it is possible
to completely miss substantial quantities of viruses under stand-
ard testing techniques (Tr. 12333).

D. The Transport of Those Disease-Causing Organisms
to Illinois Waters.

The Court of Appeals below summarized the district court’s
findings regarding transport of these disease-causing organisms
as follows:

The district court found that the defendants dump sub-
stantial quantities of pathogen-containing sewage into Lake
Michigan each year, that the lake currents carry the patho-
gens into Illinois waters, where they may infect drinking
water supplies and pose a danger to swimmers, and there-
fore that defendants’ actions pose a significant risk of in-
jury to Illinois residents. These findings are not clearly
erroneous. Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P. (Appendix A-26 to
A-27.)

The district court found that “bacteria and viruses number-
ing literally in the millions are transported live and intact
from Milwaukee to Illinois waters.” [Tr. 14217.] This
finding is not clearly erroneous. (Appendix B-10.)

8

There is no need here to extensively discuss the evidence of
transport of these pathogens. The Court of Appeals discusses
the evidence at length. (See Appendix A-29 to A-30; B-10 to
B-25.) It is sufficient to observe that even defendants’ own
experts—based on their own tests in Lake Michigan—admitted
that Milwaukee’s sewage is carried by prevailing currents into
Illinois waters several times a year (Tr. 7175; 8931).

E. The Procedural History of This Case.

Milwaukee’s enormous discharges of raw sewage into Lake
Michigan and thence into Illinois waters led Illinois to bring
an original action before this Court in 1971. In 1972 this
Court held that Milwaukee was not a state for purposes of
mandatory original jurisdiction by the Supreme Court over
actions between the states under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
This Court did hold, however, that Illinois could bring an
original action against Milwaukee in the federal district court
under the doctrine of federal common law nuisance. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

In 1972 Illinois filed a complaint in federal District Court
seeking to abate Milwaukee’s fecal discharges.* The complaint
was in three counts. Count I charged Milwaukee with the
creation of a federal common law nuisance. Count II charged
Milwaukee with violation of statutory prohibitions against water
pollution contained in the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111% § 1001 et seq.*

3. In addition to the raw sewage discharges, Illinois also sought
relief against the discharge of improperly and inadequately treated
sewage that reached Milwaukee’s two treatment plants. The remedial
order of the district court regarding such treatment and the over-
turning of that order on the basis of extra-record factual assump-
tions is the subject of the State of Illinois’ Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, filed October 5, 1979 (No. 79-571).

4. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111%, § 1012 states in part:
No person shall:

(a) Cause or threaten or allow the discharge of any con-
taminants into the environment in any State so as to cause

(Footnote continued on next page.)

9

Count III charged Milwaukee with the creation of a common
law nuisance under Illinois law pursuant to the remedy articu-
lated in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493
(1971).

The case came to trial in January, 1977. After hearing months
of testimony and reviewing hundreds of exhibits, the district
court entered judgment finding defendants’ discharges con-
stituted:

(a) afederal common law nuisance;
(b) acommon law nuisance under Illinois state law;

(c) a violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act which prohibits any acts which may cause water
pollution in Illinois (Appendix F-2, F-24).

The basis of defendants’ liability was two-fold. First, the
district court found that Milwaukee’s enormous discharges of
raw and partially treated sewage created a serious health hazard
to the residents of the State of Illinois (Appendix F-6 to F-8;
F-15. See Court of Appeals decision and order, Appendix A-26
to A-27; B-2 to B-25).

As a second basis of liability, the district court found that
Milwaukee’s discharges contained huge amounts of phosphorus
and other nutrients which are accelerating eutrophication of
Lake Michigan and are causing taste and odor problems, un-

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

or tend to cause water pollution in Illinois, either alone
or in combination with matter from other sources, or so
as to violate regulations or standards adopted by the Pol-
lution Control Board under this Act. (Emphasis added. )

Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111%, § 1003(n), defines “water pollution” as:

[S]uch alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological
or radioactive properties of any waters of the State, or such
discharge of any contaminant into any waters of the State, as
will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters
harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or
welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational, or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild
animals, birds. fish, or other aquatic life. (Emphasis added)

10

pleasant bathing conditions and a hostile environment to aquati«
life (Appendix F-16 to F-20). :

F. The Remedy Ordered by the District Court.

The remedy ordered by the district court is rather simple in
its logic and evidentiary basis:

1. Collection. The district court ordered that all of the
raw sewage be collected for treatment instead of being
discharged raw into Lake Michigan.

2. Treatment. The district court then ordered that all
of the raw sewage—once collected—be treated to destroy
the disease-causing organisms in the sewage.°

Several important procedural observations are necessary here.
The district court did not select or dictate the method or the
time schedule for achieving collection of sewage. The evidence
had established several methods for effective collection. These
methods included:

1. Sewer separation, i.e. taking the storm drainage—
intentional or unintentional—out of the sanitary sewer
and leaving the adequately sized sanitary sewer to carry
the sewage to the plants. |

2. Collection, Storage, Treatment (CST). Rather
than separate the storm drainage from the sanitary waste,
the design here is to collect the mixture of storm water

and sewage, store it, and then gradually pump the stored
wastes for treatment.

The district court did not select or order a particular method
of collection:

5. The level of treatment ordered by the district court is not at
issue in Milwaukee’s Petition. As noted below the appellate court
reversed the district court’s treatment order on the extra-record and
erroneous factual assumption that “secondary” treatment—estab-
lished as a minimum treatment by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 et seq., would destroy viruses. The appellate court’s action
is the subject of the State of Illinois’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

1]

... 1am not going to order any particular method to be
employed at this time. I am interested in results. The
methods are a matter of design. (Decision of July 29,
1977.) (Appendix F-26.)

Milwaukee—not the district court—then proceeded to select
a collection, storage, treatment (CST) system as the basis of
collection. The Judgment Order of which Milwaukee now
complains was prepared by Milwaukee lawyers and engineers
(with plaintiffs’ participation) and submitted to the district court
for approval on November 14, 1977.

Milwaukee not only selected the method of collection; Mil-
waukee also selected the timetable for collection and elimination
of raw sewage overflows. This timetable calls for a staged
program of overflow correction which will be completed by
1989.° Indeed, having negotiated the timetable with plaintiffs,
having stipulated as to the feasibility of the timetable (Appendix
E-2), and having submitted the timetable to the district court,
Milwaukee can hardly complain about the timetable.

Moreover, there is an additional procedural aspect of the
district court’s order which deserves attention here. Throughout
its appeal before the Seventh Circuit and in its petition here,
Milwaukee continues to assert extra-record boxcar numbers
as to the hundreds of millions of additional dollars the remedy
ordered by the district court (and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals) will cost beyond the program purportedly established
by Wisconsin under the NPDES‘ permit. (See, e.g. Milwaukee
petition, p. 22.) Yet the Judgment Order specifically provides
for evidentiary hearings in the district court if Milwaukee wishes
to modify the Judgment Order to allow a lower-cost remedy.

6. Note that under the Clean Water Act, so often misquoted
by Milwaukee, the outside deadline for Publicly Owned Treatment
Plants to achieve secondary or more stringent treatment is 1983, a
far tighter deadline than that included by Milwaukee in the Order
it now challenges.

7. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 33 U. S. C.
§§ 1341-1344.

12

Should defendants develop information which establishes
in defendants’ opinion that separation of all or part of
the system is a preferred alternative, which will provide a
collection and treatment level equal to or better than that
required herein then defendants may apply to the Court
for modification of this paragraph to provide therefor.
(Judgment Order.) (Appendix D-4.)

Pursuant to the Judgment Order, Milwaukee has recently
submitted cost figures to the State of Illinois which show that
a combination of separation and CST (Collection/Storage/
Treatment) is the lowest cost alternative. The recently sub-
mitted cost figures show that defendants can achieve a higher
level of protection than the district court’s order at a cost less
than or the same as the system agreed to by defendants in their
state consent decree. The reason for this dramatic improvement
is simple—with separation the rainfall does not get into the
sanitary sewer. Thus, there will be no overflows even under
the most intense storm.

Illinois does not wish to debate these extra-record issues
before this Court. Suffice to say that defendants’ claims of
enormous cost differentials are not supported in the record and
that the Judgment Order expressly provides a fact-finding
mechanism for lower cost collection alternatives in the district
court. Factual disputes with preliminary discovery and attendant
adversarial examination are best decided by district courts and
not on extra-record pronouncements by counsel on appeal.

G. The Decision by the Court of Appeals.

On appeal of the Judgment Order by Milwaukee, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding of liability on
the federal common law nuisance count.® In reviewing the issue

8. The Appellate Court declined to consider the state statutory
common law counts (Appendix A-46 n. 53), a matter raised in
Illinois’ Petition for Certiorari.

26

exercise jurisdiction over these defendants on claims arising
under State common law nuisance, the Court said:

The courts of Ohio, under modern principles of the scope
of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, have a
claim as compelling as any that can be made out for this
Court to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant con-
troversy, and they would decide it under the same common
law of nuisance upon which our determination would have
to rest. In essence, the State has charged Dow Canada
and Wyandotte with the commissions of acts, albeit beyond
Ohio’s territorial boundaries, that have produced and, it
is said, continue to produce disastrous effects within Ohio’s
own domain. While this Court, and doubtless Canadian
courts, if called upon to assess the validity of any decree
rendered against either Dow Canada or Wyandotte, would
be alert to ascertain whether the judgment rested upon
an even-handed application of justice, it is unlikely that
we would totally deny Ohio’s competence to act if the
allegations made here are proved true. See, e.g., /nterna-
tional Shoe Co. Vv. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
401 U.S. at 500.

The second issue, whether the discharge of pathogens into
Illinois waters constitutes the commission of a tortious act in
Illinois, is also well settled. For purposes of the [linois long-
arm statute, “a tort is committed in the place where the injury
occurs.” McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26, 28
(7th Cir. 1976); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509
F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1975); Consolidated Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir.
1967).

The District Court so plainly had jurisdiction that the issue
is not worthy of certiorari.

13

of liability, the appellate court engaged in an extensive review
of the evidence and applied the “clearly erroneous” standard
of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.

On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court’s order that all sewage be collected. The ap-
pellate court gave three reasons for its affirmance:

1. Of primary significance was the repeated admission
by defendants that discharge of raw sewage was not an
acceptable long-term alternative to collection and treat-
ment:

It is doubtful whether anyone, layman or expert,
would argue that the discharge of raw sewage into
public waters is a satisfactory alternative to collection
and treatment of sewage, even though it may be
conceded that it may take time to fund and provide
collection and treatment facilities, and therefore the
raw sewage discharges may have to be endured for
the short term. Donald Weiland, Director of Engi-
neering for the Sewerage Commission of the City
of Milwaukee, flatly stated that discharging raw sew-
age into public waters as a permanent solution to
sewage overloads was not “sound sanitary engineering
practice.”

Q. As a design engineer responsible for de-
signing sewers with adequate hydraulic capacity,
do you consider it sound sanitary engineering
practice to design and install overflow devices
which are intended to permit the discharge of
raw sewage as a permanent solution to hydraulic
overloads on an interceptor system?

A. Certainly not.

[Tr. 201.] Similarly, Dale Lundy, a hydraulic and
sanitary engineering consultant called by plaintiffs,
testified that collection and treatment is “considered
preferable” to discharge of raw sewage. [Tr. 907.]
Defendants point to nothing in the record that would
even suggest that the discharge of raw sewage into
public waters is either an acceptable long range solu-

14

tion to the problem of disposing of human wastes or
a practice that can be regarded as safe. (Appendix
A-34 to A-35.)

2. The appellate court also noted the inherent illogic
in requiring municipalities to build and operate massive
treatment plants to meet specific effluent limitations if in
the same area the same municipalities could discharge raw
sewage at will from the collection system:

It would be senseless to prohibit the discharge of
effluent from publicly owned treatment works not
meeting the secondary treatment requirements of
§ 301(b)(1)(B), if raw sewage can nonetheless be
discharged at will from overflow points before it
reaches the treatment works. (Appendix A-32 to
A-33.)

3. Finally, the appellate court noted that the consent
decree signed by Milwaukee with the State of Wisconsin®
was virtually open-ended and set no specific dates by
which al! overflows would be eliminated (Appendix A-34).
In contrast the appellate court noted that defendants had
stipulated as to the feasibility of the completion date re-
quirements in the federal Judgment Order:

Defendants concede the feasibility of the completion
date requirements. (Appendix A-38.)

On the question of what treatment is necessary to destroy
viruses, the appellate court had doubts about the need for the
degree of treatment ordered by the district court. Rather than
apply the “clearly erroneous” standard to the evidentiary basis
of the district court’s treatment remedy or alternatively to re-
mand for the taking of additional evidence, the appellate court

9. Milwaukee’s NPDES permits simply allowed overflows to
occur without any treatment or collection requirements. All the
permits contained was an ill-defined obligation to “initiate programs
leading to elimination or control of overflows” (Appendix A-33).
As the federal trial was coming to a close, Milwaukee entered into
a secretly negotiated “consent” agreement with the State of Wis-
consin (DX 1311) which Milwaukee then and now claims bars
more specific federal court action.

15

adopted the “secondary” treatment limits imposed by § 301 (b)
(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act. The appellate court adopted
the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s definition
of secondary treatment (40 C.F.R. Part 133) as that level
of treatment sufficient to destroy virus, on the extra-record as-
sumption that EPA had concluded the “30/30” secondary limit
was sufficient to destroy virus.

As emphasized in Illinois’ petition, the appellate court had
no record support for this assumption. Indeed, all the evidence
in the record was to the contrary—i.e. that a 30/30 limit would
allow billions of viruses to be discharged daily from defendants’
plants. Moreover, by unquestioningly accepting “secondary”
treatment (i.e. 30/30) as the basis for applying its “common
law of the statute” theory (A-21, A-23, A-46), the appellate
court ignored the entire statutory mechanism under Sections
303, 302 and 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act’? for
imposing more stringent effluent limitations on public and pri-
vate point sources to protect valuable water quality resources,
such as Lake Michigan. This question of treatment levels is
discussed extensively in Illinois’ petition and need not be dis-
cussed further here.

10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313; 1312; 1311(b)(1)(C).

16

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S COLLECTION ORDER [S NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT.

In a rather disjointed argument unsupported by citations to
legal authority, Milwaukee attempts to characterize the district
court’s order that raw sewage be collected as contradictory to
the Congressional policy set forth in the Clean Water Act.
Milwaukee submits a melange of arguments—all of which are
erroneous.

A. Congress Did Not Preempt the Imposition of More
Stringent Requirements Than Those Imposed Under the
Clean Water Act.

A careful reading of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 et seq. clearly establishes Congress’ intent to allow the
imposition of requirements more stringent than those required
by the Act and to preserve all remedies—both statutory and
common law—which existed prior to the statute.

Defendants have ignored Section 510 of the 1972 Amend-
ments, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, which expressly allows a state or
political subdivision to impose more stringent requirements:

1370. State authority. Except as expressly provided in
this Act, nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude or deny
the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution;
except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance is in effect under this Act, such
State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not

17

adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance which is less stringent than the
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-
formance under this act; or (2) be construed as impairing
or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States.

The House Public Works Committee stated:

The Committee considers section 510 to be of extreme im-
portance in assuring the States of the right to adopt or
enforce provisions at least as strict as those established in
this legislation. Thus, the Committee rejected in most in-
stances suggestions for preemption by the Federal Govern-
ment and preempted the States only where the situation
warranted it based upon the urgent need for uniformity
such as in section 312(f) relating to marine sanitation
devices. Vol. 1 Congressional Research Service, A Legisla-
tive History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 823. (Hereinafter cited as “Legislative
History”; emphasis added.)

Since the passage of the 1972 Amendments, the courts have
uniformly recognized the rights of states or local subdivisions
to require more stringent requirements than the national mini-
mum.

By contemplation of minimum federal standards, however,
Congress did not intend to relegate the States to the status
of enforcement agents for the executive branch of the
federal government. To the contrary, it is indisputable that
Congress specifically declined to attempt a preemption of
the field in the area of water pollution legislation, and as
much as invited the States to enact requirements more strin-
gent than the federal standards. Mianus River Preservation
Comm. Vv. E.P.A , 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976).

Such tougher state requirements can be imposed by state statu-
tory requirements or as the result of state common law nuisance

18

actions." See, Committee for Jones Falls v. Train, 539 F. 2d
1006, 1009 n. 9 (4th Cir. 1976); see also, Metropolitan Sani-
tary District v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 360,
323 N. E. 2d 426, 434 (1st Dist. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S.
976 (1976); People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp.,
40 Ill. App. 3d 607, 352 N. E. 2d 225, 229 (1st Dist. 1976);
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F.Supp. 298 (N. D. IIl.
1973); Cf., Village of Glencoe v. Metropolitan Sanitary District,
23 Ill. App. 3d 868, 320 N. E. 2d 524 (1st Dist. 1974).

Nor did Congress in any way seek to restrict this right to
more stringent standards in the 1977 Amendments. In the
Senate Report on the 1977 Amendments, the Senate Public
Works Committee states:

There is nothing in these new provisions which in any
way preempts the rights of States to have more stringent
water quality standards or associated effluent limitations;
...S. Rep. No. 95-370, p. 43, 4 Legislative History, 676.

Just as states and their political subdivisions were entitled to
require more stringent discharge requirements under the Act,
so also were their various pre-existing common law and statu-
tory remedies preserved. Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,
creates a specific statutory cause of action for any citizen—
regardless of standard—to enforce any effluent limits imposed
by the Act. By its express terms the cause of action created
by Section 505 is limited to enforcing the specific limits set
under the FWPCA. Section 505 does not create any right to
enforce obligations not in the Act.

Milwaukee seeks to characterize a common law nuisance
action as an action brought under § 505 and therefore subject
to the permit defenses of § 402(k). However, common law

11. Indeed, under the Clean Water Act, the EPA Administrator
must take cognizance of these more stringent standards and incor-
porate them into the EPA permit. Under § 301 of the FWPCA,
a publicly-owned treatment works must meet “any more stringent
limitation” beyond secondary treatment established pursuant to any
state or other federal law. § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311

(b)(1)(C).

19

nuisance actions are not statutory actions brought under § 505.
Stream Pollution Control Board v. United States Steel Corp.,
512 F.2d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1975).

Congress wanted to make clear that Section 505 did not bar
any other action which might exist—as here—under common
law or statute. Section 505(e) of the 1972 Amendments states:

(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including
relief against the Administrator or a State agency). 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e).

The House Report on the 1972 Amendments states:

Subsection (e) provides that the right of persons (or class
of persons) to seek enforcement or other relief under
any statute or common law is not affected. 1 Legislative
History 821.

Likewise, the Senate Report says:

It should be noted, however, that the section would speci-
fically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law.
Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would
remain available. Compliance with requirements under this
Act would not be a defense to a common law action for
damages. 2 Legislative History 1499.

As the Illinois Appellate Court held in rejecting an argument
by United States Steel Corporation identical to that made by
defendants here:

The clear intent of Congress to allow the states or their
political subdivisions the primary responsibility for en-
forcing their own, more stringent standards by common
law nuisance actions [citations omitted] or the equally clear
intent of our legislature to confer that responsibility on the
Attorney General [citations omitted] would be thwarted
by a stay of these proceedings. People ex rel. Scott v. United
States Steel Corp., 352 N.E.2d at 228-229. (Emphasis
added. )

20

All federal courts which have considered the question uni-
formly refused to strike common law nuisance claims on the
grounds that they had been pre-empted by the Clean Water
Act. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Vv. Jennings,
594 F. 2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979); Township of Long Beach
v. City of New York, 445 F.Supp. 1203, 1214-15 (D.N. J.
1978); U. S. v. Outboard Marine Corp.., ............ F. Supp. ........ ,
12 ERC 1346, 1348 (N. D. Ill. 1978); Board of Supervisors of
Fairfax County, Virginia v. U. S., 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E. D.
Va. 1976); U. S. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp.
110, 120 (D. Vt. 1973); U. S. v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784,
794 (E. D.N. Y. 1973); U.S. ex rel. Scott v. U. S. Steel, 356
F. Supp. 556, 559 (N. D. Ill. 1973); U.S. v. Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd 487 F. 2d
1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U. S. 976 (1974). Cf.,
Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).

Milwaukee cites Jones Falls, supra, as supporting the principle
of preemption. However, that court held that a federal common
law nuisance claim is barred where the alleged pollution was
wholly intrastate. 539 F.2d at 1010. Moreover, Jones Falls
did recognize that the Clean Water Act did not preempt state
common law nuisance actions, even if state common law
nuisance actions imposed stricter standards. Jd. at 1009 and n. 9.

B. The Statutory Procedure Under the Act Itself Contradicts
Milwaukee’s Arguments.

Apart from the express provisions of the Clean Water Act
preserving the rights of states to impose more stringent require-
ments than those imposed by the Act, the statutory scheme of
the Act itself contradicts Milwaukee’s arguments:

1. While Congress has authorized the EPA Administra-
tor to extend the deadline for publicly-owned treatment
plants to meet secondary [§ 301(b) (1) (B)] or more strin-

21

gent limits imposed pursuant to § 301 (b) (1) (C)**—where
federal funds have not been available—this deadline can
only be extended to “no later than July 1, 1983.” 33 U. S.C.
§ 1311(i)(1). Congress did not authorize extensions be-
yond 1983. Here, by contrast, the district court’s order is
much more lenient, calling for completion by 1989.

2. Apart from the express statutory extension to no
later than 1983, the absence of federal funding is not a
defense to a discharger’s failure to meet pollution limits.
State Water Control Board v. Train, 554 F. 2d 921, 924-
927 (4th Cir. 1977). Availability of federal funding under
Title II of the Clean Water Act is not and cannot be a
defense to compliance with Title [l—either as to the
secondary limits of § 301(b)(1)(B) or the more stringent
limits of § 301(b)(1)(C).

3. The “cost-effective” analysis which Milwaukee cites
so blithely does not relate to exemptions from the require-
ments of Title III. The “cost-effective” analysis require-
ment is simply that if federal funds are requested, federal
funds granted under Title II be used for the least cost
alternative which achieves the limitations imposed by
Title II]. Under Title II the results must be the same—
achievement of the effluent limits of § 301(b)(1)(B) or
§ 301(b)(1)(C). Cost-effective analysis simply requires
that those limits be achieved in the least cost way if federal
grants are used to fund the achievement of these limits.
See 40 C. F. R. Part 35, Subpart E, Appendix A.

Indeed, § 217 of the Clean Water Act—cited by Mil-
waukee—is directly related to selection of the least cost
alternative to meet the Title III requirements. The legisla-
tive history of that section discloses Congress’ concern
that the pre-1977 cost-effectiveness guidelines had a strong
bias toward funding conventional treatment in meeting the

12. Water quality related effluent limits imposed pursuant to
the procedures of § 303 or § 302 or more stringent limits imposed
under state law are preserved under § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.

22

requirements of the Act. The basic purpose of § 217 was
to require identification of innovative alternatives such as
recycling of waste and beneficial uses of sewage as least-
cost alternative means of meeting Title III limits. See
S. Rep. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 40; H. Rep. 280, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess., 73 (1977).

Neither Illinois nor the district court had any quarrel
with the principle that Milwaukee should be allowed to
pursue the least cost alternative in collecting its raw sew-
age. Indeed, as discussed above, the Judgment Order—
drafted in concert by Milwaukee and Illinois—provides for
modification to allow lower cost methods of collection to
be installed if Milwaukee can establish that such methods
are feasible. Moreover, Milwaukee has recently informed
Illinois that it has developed such lower cost alternatives
and wishes to submit these lower cost alternatives to the
district court pursuant to the modification provisions of
the Judgment Order. The preliminary cost information
provided by Milwaukee indicates that separation of the
sewers provides the least cost alternative to accomplishing
the district court’s collection order and that such costs are
less than or approximately the same as the costs of meeting
the open-ended consent decree with Wisconsin.’*

4. Apart from the minimum requirements of the Act,
the Act provides special procedures for protecting pure
bodies of water such as Lake Michigan. Under the Act,
each body of water is given individualized analysis to de-
termine its desired uses and water quality needs. From this
assessment of the desired uses and water quality needs,
effluent limits tailored to the specific water quality needs
of the receiving body of water can be fashioned. These
limits are called “water quality related effluent limitations”

13. Again, these cost questions are properly placed before the
district court under the Judgment Order rather than placed as bare
allegations in a petition for certiorari.

23

and are mandated by § 303 and § 302 of the Act and
by § 301(b)(1)(C).

Thus, contrary to Milwaukee’s assertions—all municipalities
are not to be treated alike. For example, dischargers into marine
waters may have different effluent limits than dischargers into
pure bodies of fresh water such as Lake Michigan. Each lake
or river and its water quality needs are assessed on their own
individualized merits."*

II.

MILWAUKEE’S EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS ARE SPURIOUS.

Milwaukee has taken snatches of the district court’s findings
and concocted a series of evidentiary claims that have little
relationship to reality. It is sufficient to note that each of the
defendants’ evidentiary arguments was exhaustively examined
by the appellate court and rejected. Both the district court and
the appellate court found clear and convincing evidence of
Milwaukee’s liability (Appendix F-15; F-23; A-27). The ap-
pellate court’s exhaustive analysis of the evidence is contained
at pages B-2 through B-27 of the Appendix.

Defendants repeatedly cite New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921), and Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906), as if the facts in those situations were identical to those
in the instant case. But in each of those cases the plaintiff state
was allowing its own dischargers to discharge equal or greater

14. Without getting into a name-calling match with EPA—
which is just the kind of feud Milwaukee seeks to engender—neither
EPA nor Wisconsin has done a water quality needs analysis of Lake
Michigan from the standpoint of virus or bacteria as required by
§ 303 of the Clean Water Act. The only forum which has ever re-
lated Lake Michigan water quality needs regarding virus and bac-
teria and which has worked back to impose water quality based
effluent limits was the district court in this case. It should be noted
that the principal witnesses before the district court urging collection
of raw wastes and effective treatment were EPA’s top experts on
virus and bacteria.

24

amounts of sewage into the same watercourse, contaminating

the same water:
Where as here, the plaintiff has sovereign powers and de-
liberately permits discharges similar to those of which it
complains, it not only offers a standard to which the de-
fendant has the right to appeal, but as some of those dis-
charges are above the intake of St. Louis, it warrants the
defendant in demanding the strictest proof that the plain-
tiffs own conduct does not produce the result, or at least
so conduce to it that courts should not be curious to
apportion the blame. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496,
522 (1906). (Emphasis added.)

In New York v. New Jersey, the complaining state allowed
New York City to dump into the same waters seven times the
volume of sewage (all untreated) as the proposed New Jersey
discharge which was treated. 256 U.S. at 303.

Here, by contrast, Illinois has either completed or has under
construction programs which have already eliminated or will
eliminate all uncollected and untreated sewage discharges to
Lake Michigan.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION,
AND VENUE WAS PROPER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH
THE CLAIM AROSE.

As a final matter, Milwaukee has suggested that the case
should have been dismissed because the District Court was
without in personam jurisdiction over the defendants and further
because venue was improper. These are disposed of easily.

A. The District Court Had in Personam Jurisdiction.

A district court’s jurisdiction over the person of a non-
resident defendant is dependent upon the extra-territorial service
statute of the forum State. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In this case
the Illinois “long arm” statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, 94 16

25

and 17, control. Section 17, which lists the actions of a de-
fendant by which it submits to the jurisdiction of an Illinois
court, includes “[t]he commission of a tortious act within”
Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court has construed this provision
to include acts done in other states which result in injury in
Illinois, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ml.
2d 432, 176 N. E.2d 761 (1961), and has stated that the
long arm statute authorizes “the extension of jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due
process clause.” Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp.,
supra, 176 N.E. 2d at 763; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,
143 N. E. 2d 673, 679 (1957).

Confronted with this authoritative construction of the Illinois
statute, Milwaukee is reduced to arguing (1) that its discharge
of raw sewage and disease-causing organisms into Illinois waters
does not constitute a sufficient “minimal contact” with Illinois
to support in personam jurisdiction; and (2) that in any event
this does not constitute commission of a tortious act in Illinois.

Milwaukee’s first argument comes 100 years too late. In
the era of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), attempts by
states to exercise jurisdiction over persons outside of their
territorial limits were invalid. This archaic doctrine, as well
as the entire conceptual framework which supported it, have
of course been rejected. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U. S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v. Harris, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
The relevant inquiry is whether the actions of the defendant
establish “certain minimum contacts with [the forum State]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” [citation omitted]
International Shoe, supra 326 U.S. at 316.

This Court has addressed this question in the context of
interstate and international water pollution in Ohio v. Wyan-
dotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971). Ohio had
charged Michigan and Canadian corporate defendants with pollu-
tion of Lake Erie. Deciding that Ohio State courts could

27

B. Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the
Claim Arose.

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which permits
suit in either the “judicial district where all defendants reside,
or in which the claim arose . . .”. The Court’s 1972 opinion in
this case noted that this provision gives some “flexibility” to
venue in this case. Jllinois v. Milwaukee, supra, 406 U.S. at
108 n. 10.

Milwaukee contends that venue was improper in the Northern
District of Illinois, and advances three reasons: (1) that the
nuisance “arose” in Wisconsin; (2) that § 505 of the Clean
Water Act places venue exclusively in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin; and (3) that a municipality may only be sued in
the District in which it is located. Each of these arguments is
wholly specious.

1. Under the federal common law of nuisance an action
“arises” in the place where the injury occurs. Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108 n. 10; Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., supra, 401 U.S. at 500. This general
principle is consistent with the traditional view of tort law,
which holds that “[t]he place of the wrong is in the state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place.” Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, § 377 (1934). This claim arose in Illinois.

2. Section 505(c)(1) is inapplicable to this action by
its very terms:

Any action respecting a violation by a discharge
source of an effluent standard or limitation or an
order respecting such standard or limitation may be
brought under this section only in the judicial district
in which such source is located. 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(c)(1).

This action was neither (a) respecting an effluent standard
or limitation, nor (b) brought under the citizen suit pro-

28

visions of § 505. See Stream Pollution Control Board v.
United States Steel, supra, 512 F.2d at 1041. The venue
limitations of § 505(c) are simply irrelevant.

3. Venue of an action against a municipality, based
on the federal common law, is governed by § 1391(b),
which allows it to be brought where the claim arose.
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108 n. 10. Milwaukee’s
arguments to the contrary are based upon either pre-
1966 cases, which construed a different statute, or on
a single case involving suit against actions by Congress,
in which special consideration limited venue to the Dis-
trict of Columbia.

Venue in this case was properly in the Northern District
of Illinois.

15. The language “or in which the claim arose,” which provides
flexibility and a choice of venue, was added by P.L. 89-714, § 1
(1966).

29

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
filed by the City of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of
the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Com-
mission of the County of Milwaukee, should be denied.

October 11, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,
Attorney General of the State
of Illinois,
JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS,
SANFORD R. GAIL,
Special Assistant Attorneys
General,
KARAGANIS & GAIL LTD.,
150 North Wacker Drive,
Chicago, Illinois 60606,
(312) 782-1905.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_2154%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
