# Petition — Doyle v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 446 U.S. 982

## Text

In THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBEeR TERM, 1979

No. _%9=] 315

MAJOR LEO D. DOYLE, er AL.,
Petitioners.

5

THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

Rospert Mortey Wricut,

WHITEFORD, TAYLOR, PRESTON,
TRIMBLE & JOHNSTON,
2000 First Maryland Building,
25 South Charles Street,
Baltimore, Maryland 21201,
(301) 752-0987,

KertTH A. ROSENBERG,

NewraTH, MEYER & FAtter, P.C.,

4400 Jenifer Street, N.W.,
Suite 380,

Washington, D.C., 20015,
(202) 362-1100,

Counsel for Petitioners.
February 25, 1980

ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NIE ed castes ctivscteoiions
sk ls acccuseeecons
I nnn sc coccenensecnceee
Statutory Provisions AND ReGcu.ations INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THEE CAGE .......0.0.0cccccccccssssccssscscssceeees

1. The Decision Of The United States

Court Of Claims Controls Pending
‘Cases Involving The Denial Of The
Same Statutory Rights Being Asserted
By Others Similarly Situated ...............

2. The Court’s Decision Is In Conflict With

The Concurrent Decision In Dilley, et
al. v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C.
1979) And Is In Conflict With The
Principals Of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) And Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S.C. 749 (1975) oe.

3. The Doyle Decision Frustrates Congress’

Purpose Which Is To-Prevent Discrimi-
nation In The Promotion Process Of The
I NOI 6 csscssscncceccesscrccsvecconsooes

4. The Court Of Claims Decision, Through

A Mischaracterization Of The Issue
And Incomplete And Misleading Recita-
tion Of Facts, Does Not Disclose To
Future Litigants That It Creates A New
Standard Which Must Be Met By Those
Seeking Review Of Administrative Ac-
tion, Which Standard Is Contrary To
I MN cesstuesckecscciieesntobcdidesaceietoerece

20

22

25

26

i

5. The Decision Will Lead To Lengthy

Administrative Proceedings And May

Cause Many Administrative Proceed-

ings To Be Deemed Inadequate Under

The Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of Admi-

nistrative Remedies ..........ccccceeeeerereeees

6. The Decision Encourages Administra-

tive Agencies To Issue Vague And

Imprecise Decisions And Allows Them

To Benefit From A Knowing Violation

OE RR os ak dasiieaccdpdinniamcasaaon saasioehin

7. The Decision Allows Administrative

Agencies To Violate Their Own Regula-

tions By Relying Upon A Past Pattern

Ce IR iain cssicksdnetnsrsatiastinernersnorennies

Son Et tLe aeRO ene REDE EL eae RPRan Renn ac eran

WIE oie iciinnidadincnsnianseaandtnvisenenedteestedetincescaligtins
Department of Defense Instruction 1205.4

Army Regulation 624-100, Section I, {| 1-2(a)-
ie SE BB rcrccsacetcsiertestisecctcrrees

Army Regulation 635-100, Section XVII
Change 17,7 November 1973, { 3-64(a)-(d)

Change 20, 14 January 1975, {| 3.65(a)-(d)
Army Board For Correction of Military Re-
cords Proceedings, 10 December, 1975

Secretary of the Army’s Memorandum for
Chief of Staff, 27 January, 1976 ..........
Army Board For Correction Of Military
Records Proceedings, 9 February, 1977
Opinion of the United States Court of Claims
Wie BE BIR vi citsts ears esictaecciesinssonctinnsissane
Order of United States Court of Claims
September 28, 1979 ...........resseccccssecsseees

Order of United States Court of Claims
November 30, 1979

PAGE

29

31

32
35
la
la

3a

5a
6a

8a

40a

42a

46a

88a

iil

PAGE
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
Abruzzo v. United States, 513 F.2d 608 (Ct. Cl.

RIPE adshececeeeedasickagiioccseidlascenenacunagtimataniastonss 25
Brenner v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 678 (1972) 25
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S.

BO FOR: cesicaseucscnepaeaetentiesacisacabianaiveulgunnntatie 29
Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. 1979)

18, 21, 22, 24; 25, 28
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) ........... 25, 31
Henderson v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 690

RI ares cascada clan nd snneichorssgniconteXhuannkan aaabansiivetauanoneio 25
Isbrandtson v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C.

NE I ic a calla ahnmuaneinins 30
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........ 22, 23, 24
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) ............ 25
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 937 (1974) ........... 31
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ................ 25, 31
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d

Fe Be iicbnncaeabhatiensdereincneesetieniienas 29

Stewart v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 198-
7 Decided December 12, 1979 ...............sccccecceeeeeees 25
Sunshine Publishing Company v. Summerfield,

184 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1960) ..........cceeeees 30
United States v. Newman, 478 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.

IBC SIRS Reve dN ee et EU PORE ae Ree OP 29
United States v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 |

RR RORRE ORGIES IRS aC SIR Pile ornare Onna eee 32
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) ............. 25, 31
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ........... 22, 23, 24

iv
PAGE
Statutes
1O U.S.C. § BOC) .ncccrncescecncncsssssecssessenssovovenrsensesensys 6, &, 26
10: UGC. OBFT | ccnivevecccessoneeeconsisdstennsnncsntaneneas sented 8, 11, 25, 26
1O UGC. S$ BORD cvsccciccccorcsercorcsssnsnssorscsstecnsnees 8, 10,11, 25, 26
B UG... 0 FOG nvvivcncscctisensacktticeenteesnenmeerenen 29
Regulations

Army Regulation 624-100 ...... 6, 8, 10, 13, 20, 25, 26, 32-34
Army Regulation 635-100 ..............::008 8, 13, 18, 20, 33, 34
Army Regulation 15-185 ..........c::cccesseeeeteeeeeneeeeens 8, 24, 27

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1979

No.
MAJOR LEO D. DOYLE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

Petitioners, Major Leo D. Doyle, Major Louis Gaddini,
Major John D. Gardner, Major Bobby Eugene Hill, Major
Eldon Craig Loe, Major Robert W. Mandelstam, Major Lois
Martin, Major William J. Riddel, Major James H. Robar,
Major L. D. Truitt, Major Charles M. Tryon, Jr. and Major
Kenneth P. Winchester, respectfully pray that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Claims, sitting en banc, entered in
this proceeding on May 16, 1979.*

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Claims is
reported in 220 Ct. Cl. (1979) and 599 F.2d 984 (Ct. Cl.
1979). ;

* No Petition is filed in the related case of Adams v. United

States, which was consolidated for hearing with Doyle. (Ct. Cl.
No. 275-77)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Claims was
entered on May 16, 1979. A timely motion for rehearing
and clarification was granted in part on September 28,
1979. The opinion was again modified upon timely motion
on November 30, 1979. See, 609 F.2d 990. Petitioners out
of caution requested this Court to extend the time for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari to and including
February 25, 1980, which request was granted by order of
this Court dated December 21, 1979. This Court’s jurisdic-
tion is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1255(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether Petitioners, Reserve Army officers, can be
released from active commissioned service by reason of not
being selected for promotion by two Promotion Selection
Boards pursuant to Army Regulation 635-100 where:

(a) the original Promotion Seiection Boards which
considered these officers for promotion did not have
Reserve officer membership in direct violation of 10 U.S.C.
§ 266, 10 U.S.C..§277, 10 U.S.C. §3442 and Army
Regulation 624-100, Section III, 16(b) (5); and

(b) following Petitioners administrative challenge to the
validity of the original Selection Boards and their result-
ing release, the Secretary of the Army established ex parte
“evidentiary proceedings” in the form of “reconstituted”
selection boards to reconsider Petitioners under the origi-
nal promotion criteria with Reserve membership to deter-
mine whether Petitioners had in fact been “harmed” by
the absence of Reserve officers on the original Selection
Boards; and

(c) the ex parte “evidentiary proceedings” were not in
fact conducted under the original promotion criteria
thereby diminishing Petitioners’ opportunity for selection

3

in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 277, 10 U.S.C. § 3442 and Army
Regulation 624-100, Section IV, { 23.

II. Whether the Court of Claims can sua sponte forfeit
Petitioners’ right to judicial review of the manner in which
ex parte administrative proceedings were conducted by
reason of Petitioners’ failure to complain to the Secretary
prior to the commencement of those proceedings where:

(a) Petitioners had no knowledge of the manner in
which they were being conducted until they were substan-
tially complete; and

(b) Petitioners were unaware prior to the conclusion of
those proceedings that the results would materially effect
their substantial statutory and regulatory rights; and

(c) the Secretary of the Army agreed that Petitioners
had exhausted all administrative remedies and that
Petitioners’ challenge to the validity of the defective
“evidentiary proceedings” was properly before the Court
for resolution.

III]. Whether, under the circumstances, the Court of
Claims decision amounts to a refusal to enforce the
mandates of 10 U.S.C. § 266, §277, and §3442 that
Reserve officers in the military services of the United
States will not be discriminated against in the selection of
officers for promotion and that they are entitled to be
considered for promotion on a fair and equitable basis.

IV. Whether Petitioners have been properly released
from active duty where:

(a) both the original Selection Boards and the “eviden-
tiary proceedings” granted 15% of the available promotion
vacancies to junior officers in violation of AR 624-100,
Section IV, § 23; and

, 4

(b) where virtually all of those promotions to junior
officers were granted to Regular officers; and

(c) the Secretary relies upon written policy statements
as implied changes to the regulations which were never
incorporated into the regulations by later changes.

V. Whether Petitioners have been properly released
from active commissioned service where:

(a) the original Selection Boards, and subsequent
“evidentiary proceedings” did not make factual findings
that were required by Army Regulations 624-100 and
635-100 to authorize a release from active commissioned
service; and

(b) the Secretary, after the original Selection Boards
were completed and upon complaint by affected officers,
retroactively changed the regulation to eliminate the
necessity of those factual findings to support a release
from active commissioned service so as to validate Peti-
tioners’ release from active service.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
INVOLVED

United States Code, Title 10:

§ 266(a). Boards For Appointment, Promotion, And Cer-
tain Other Purposes; Composition

Each Board convened for the appointment, promotion,
demotion, involuntary release from active duty, discharge,
or retirement of Reserves shall include an appropriate
number of Reserves, as prescribed by the Secretary
concerned under standards and policies prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense.

Aug. 10, 1956, c1041, 70A Stat. 11.

5

§ 277. Regular And Reserve Components: Discrimina-
tion Prohibited

Laws applying to both Regulars and Reserves shall be
administered without discrimination—

(1) among Regulars;

(2) among Reserves; and

(3) between Regulars and Reserves.
Aug. 10, 1956, c1041, 70A Stat. 14.

§ 3442(c) Commissioned Officers; regular and reserve
components; Appointment In Higher Grade.

Subject to subsections (a) and (b), a Regular commis-
sioned officer, or a Reserve commissioned officer who is
serving on active duty, may be appointed in a temporary
grade that is equal to or higher than his Regular or
Reserve grade, without vacating any other grade held by
him. Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary,
appointments made under this subsection shall be made on
a fair and equitable basis. Selections shall be based upon
ability and efficiency with regard being given to seniority
and age. Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat. 195.

Department of Defense Directives:

Department Directive 1205.4; Inclusion Of Reservists
On Boards Considering Members Of Reserve Compo-
nents Under § 266 Of Title 10 U.S.C. (See Appendix
la).

Army Regulations:

Army Regulation 624-100, Promotion of Officers on
Active Duty;

Section III, 4 16(b)(5)

Whenever a zone of consideration includes non-
Regular officers, selection boards will, where

6

practicable, include at least one officer of the
Reserve components.

Section I, § 1 and 2(a)-(h) (Appendix at 3a).
Section IV, { 22-23, 25 (Appendix at 4a).

Army Regulation 635-100, Section XVII, § 3-65(a)-(d),
Personnel Separations, Officer Personnel; (Appendix at
).

Army Regulation 15-185; Boards, Commissions, and
Committees, Army Board for Correction of Military Re-
cords, § 9;

Other Proceedings Not Stayed. The application to the
Board for correction of a record will not operate as a
stay of proceedings being taken with respect to the
person involved.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners are United States Army Reserve officers who
were released from active commissioned service by reason
of not being selected for promotion in 1974 and 1975 by
Department of the Army Promotion Selection Boards.’
Appendix at 47a. The Selection Boards that did not
select Petitioners failed to contain Reserve officer member-
ship as required by Title 10 U.S.C. §266 and Army
Regulation (AR) 624-100. (Appendix at 52a). Petitioners
filed applications with the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records (ABCMR) challenging the validity of the
action of the Selection Boards and Petitioners’ resulting
release from active commissicned service. The ABCMR
found that the absence of Reserve officer membership on
the Selection Boards was an “injustice” and deprived
Petitioners of consideration in the manner intended.
(Appendix at 38a).

' Petitioners were non-selected by Promotion Boards which
convened on or about March 26, 1974 and April 8, 1975.

7

Upon recommendation from the ABCMR, the Secretary
of the Army convened “Reconstituted” Selection Boards to
reconsider Petitioners for promotion and to report their
findings to the ABCMR for such administrative action as
the ABCMR might deem appropriate. (Appendix at
40a). After the 1974 Reconstituted Selection Boards
were substantially complete, Petitioners discovered that
the manner in which those boards were conducted was not
in accordance with law and regulation.

After the Reconstituted Selection Boards’ results were
provided to the ABCMR, the ABCMR determined that
since Petitioners had not been favorably considered that
the absence of Reserve officers on the original Selection
Boards was “harmless error” and, therefore, Petitioners’
original non-selections were neither erroneous nor unjust.
(Appendix at 45a).

Petitioners filed suit in the Court of Claims challenging
Petitioners’ original non-selections and the action taken by
the ABCMR.

Administrative Proceedings

In the Fall of 1975, Petitioners filed applications for
correction of their military records with the ABCMR,’
requesting, inter alia, voiding of their failure of selection
for promotion to the next higher grade, appropriate
correction of their records and reinstatement to active
service. Petitioners challenged the validity of the actions
of the 1974 and 1975 Selection Boards and their resu:ting

? Over 1,300 applications were filed before the ABCMR by
officers similarly situated as Petitioners.

Three “lead” applications were filed and fully briefed which
controlled the ABCMR’s decisions on any later applications filed
raising the same issues. As a result of being denied relief,
officers similarly situated filed various suits. There are present-
ly at least 38 pending cases in the United States Court of Claims

involving in excess of 100 Reserve officers which have been
suspended pending this Court’s determination in this case.

8

release from active commissioned service because (1) there
was no Reserve membership on the 1974 and 1975
Selection Boards contrary to 10 U.S.C. §§ 266, 277 and
3442, Department of Defense Directive at 1205.4 and
Army Regulation 624-100; (2) that the percentage of
selections from the secondary zone was unlawful and in
violation of Army Regulation 624-100 and finally; (3) that
the Selection Boards in question failed to make the proper
factual findings as required by Army Regulations 624-100
and 635-100 in that Petitioners were not found to be not
fully qualified to assume the responsibilities expected of
the next higher grade.‘

The ABCMR granted Petitioners a hearing on December
10, 1975 where applicants were allowed to present testi-
mony and other evidence.’ Subsequent to the hearing, the
ABCMR rendered its decision finding that there were no
Reserve officer members on the Selection Boards in
question and that it was practicable to have Reserve
officer membership on those boards. In light of these

> AR 624-100, { 22-23 as published at the time of Petitioners’
original non-selections authorized only a 7.5% secondary zone
selection. The original Selection Boards granted 15% of the
available promotion vacancies to the members of the secondary
zone. Each secondary zone selection effectively deletes a vacancy
from a member of the primary zone. Petitioners were members
of the primary zone. Appendix at 49-50a, 67-68a.

‘ If an officer is found “fully qualified” for promotion but not
selected, such a determination is not a passover for separation
under the two passover rule. (Appendix at 3a, 6a, 73a).

5 In spite of the Secretary’s knowledge of the defect in the
composition of the Selection Boards (and the other defects
alleged by Petitioners), he refused to retain the Petitioners, and
others similarly situated, on active duty until the ABCMR
decided the controversy. On October 29, 1975 the Secretary
ordered all Army units to continue discharge processing of
affected officers. The ABCMR’s hearing was at that time
scheduled for December 10, 1975. The Secretary grounded his
decision on the fact that AR 15-185, {9 states that ABCMR
action does not operate to “stay other personnel actions’.
Attachment D, Plaintiffs’ Stipulation of Fact. Accordingly,
Petitioners were released from active duty.

9

findings, the ABCMR found that Petitioners might have
been deprived of consideration in the manner intended in
that:

ee

. . although the [Petitioners] have not shown that
they have been harmed because there was no Reserve
officer on the Boards, the failure to have a Reserve
officer as a member of the Selection Board raises some
doubt as to whether the [Petitioners] were accorded
proper consideration for promotion under the 1974
and 1975 promotion criterion.” (See Appendix at 38a).

The ABCMR then recommended to the Secretary that
“Reconstituted” Selection Boards be convened to reconsid-
er all officers who were originally eligible in the primary
zone and that:

“. . the letter orders of instruction and guidance
pertaining to the primary zone previously furnished
the original 1974 and 1975 Selection Boards be
utilized as the criterion for consideration and selec-
tion.” See Appendix at 39a.

The names of officers selected and not selected by these
Reconstituted Selection Boards were to be reported back to
the ABCMR for further administrative action in connec-
tion with those who had filed applications. (Appendix
at 39-40a).

On January 27, 1976 the Secretary approved the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of the ABCMR
and issued a directive to the Chief of Staff to convene
Reconstituted Selection Boards in accordance with the
recommendations of the ABCMR and stating:

ee

. . that the letter orders of instruction and guid-
ance pertaining to the primary zone previously fur-—
nished the original 1974 and 1975 Selection Boards be
utilized as the criterion for consideration and selec-
tion.” (Appendix at 40-41a).

Consistent with the findings of the ABCMR, the Secret-
ary’s directive indicated merely that the names of those

10

selected and non-selected by the Reconstituted Selection
Boards would be reported to the ABCMR for appropriate
administrative action, but did not otherwise indicate the
effect of a selection or non-selection by these Reconstituted
boards. The Secretary’s implementing memorandum was
silent on Petitioners’ request to have their records cor-
rected to eliminate their original non-selections and for
reinstatement to active duty. Petitioners were not recalled
to active duty. (Appendix at 40a).

The Secretary did not convene the Reconstituted Selec-
tion Boards as duly constituted statutory selection boards
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §3442 and Army Regulation
624-100 with power to non-select an officer for purposes of
discharge from active duty.° The Secretary viewed the
Reconstituted Selection Boards as “merely an evidentiary
proceeding into the question of harmless error” to assist
the ABCMR and the Secretary in a final disposition of the
case. Appendix at 66a; Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6, 16; Defen-
dants Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing.

The “letter orders of instruction and guidance” used in
operating the 1974 and 1975 Reconstituted Selection
Boards established the “ground rules” for the operation of
the boards governing, inter alia, the selection method to be
used; numbers to be selected; the number that can be
selected in the primary zone and the authorized number
which the Selection Boards in their discretion can select.
The original letter to the Lieutenant Colonels Board
provided that a maximum of 3,266 primary zone officers
could be selected for promotion. The letter of instruction
that was given to the Reconstituted Selection Boards
deleted secondary zone vanacies from the total promotion

* The Reconstituted Selection Boards were not viewed as

substituted boards in place of the original boards since all
officers previously promoted were to keep their promotions.

11

slots available and allowed only 2,806 promotions.’ The
original 1974 and 1975 Selection Boards had selected a full
15% of secondary zone officers® for promotion. Virtually all
of these officers selected in the secondary zone by the
original Selection Boards which contained no Reserve
officer membership were Regular officers.’ The Reconsti-
tute i Selection Boards deprived Petitioners of the oppor-
tunity to compete for 460 promotion vacancies before
selection boards with Reserve membership contrary to 10
U.S.C. § 277 and 10 U.S.C. § 3442.

The Reconstituted Selection Boards proceedings were ex
parte. Petitioners were not provided with a copy of the
letter of instruction and guidance prior to the convening of
those boards. Nor were they specifically advised as to
when the Reconstituted Selection Boards would convene.
Upon learning that the Reconstituted Selection Boards
had convened, Petitioners on April 9, 1976 requested
copies of the letters of instruction and the names of the
members sitting on each Reconstituted Seiection Board.
By reply dated May 3, 1976, the Department of the Army
provided Petitioners with copies of the instructions that
had been provided to the 1974 Reconstituted Selection
Boards. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing and Clarification
of Opinion, Attachment B. At the time of receipt of the

7 Attachments I and N, Plaintiffs’ Statement of Fact. Letters
of instructions to the other Reconstituted Boards contained the
same percentage deletion of secondary zone vacancies. Attach-
ment I and N to Plaintiff's statement of facts in Adams.

* The maximum number authorized by the Secretary’s origin-
al letter oi instruction.

° 98.6% of the secondary zone selections before the 1974
Lieutenant Colonels Boards and 87.4% of the secondary zone
selections before the 1974 Majors Boards went to Regular
officers. In 1975, the Lieutenant Colonels Boards gave 100% of
their secondary zone selections to Regular officers and the
Majors Boards gave 81% of their secondary zone selections to
Regular officers. See, Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, {{21 and
22.

12

letters of instruction, the 1974 Temporary Majors and
Warrant Officers Reconstituted Selection Boards had
already been completed and the 1974 Lieutenant Colonels
Board was in progress."

It was only after the ABCMR met following the
completion of all of the Reconstituted Selection Boards in
the Fall of 1976, that any statement was given to
Petitioners that a non-selected officer would be given no
relief. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing, p. 10, fn. 11. The
ABCMR denied Petitioners’ applications for correction of
their records and found:

“That the {Petitioners’] records having been reconsti-
tuted in a manner prescribed by the Secretary having
been reviewed by properly reconstituted . . . Promo-
tion Boards under the primary zone of the 1974 and
1975 criteria, it is reasonable to presume that had
they been considered by properly constituted boards,
they would not have been selected for promotion at
the time concerned under the ‘best qualified’ method.

* * * * * *

In consideration of the foregoing findings and conclu-
sions, the [Petitioners’] non-selections for promotion

. under the 1974 and 1975. . . selection criteria
are neither erroneous nor unjust.” Appendix at 45-
46a.

'° The Court of Claims opinion erroneously states tha
Reconstituted 1974 and 1975 Selection ann convened Pan
May, 1976 through August, 1976. (Appendix at 54a). The
Reconstituted Selection Boards schedule actually was as follows:
1974 Majors Boards for AMEDD and APL convened on March
30, 1976 and April 13, 1976, respectively; the Chief Warrant
Officers W-3 and W-4 Boards convened on April 6, 1976 and the
Lieutenant Colonels Boards convened on May 4, 1976. The 1975
Boards convened as to Chief Warrant Officers W-3_and W-4 on
June 8, 1976; as #6 Majors on July 13, 1976 and as to Lieutenant
Colonels AMEDD and APL on September 14, 1976 and August
24, 1976, respectively. See letters of instructions,Attachment B
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing and Attachment N, Plaintiffs’
Statement of Facts in Adams and Doyle.

13

The absence of Reserve officers on the original Selection
Boards was therefore viewed as “harmless error” and
Petitioners’ release from active duty in the Fall of 1975
was retroactively validated.

The ABCMR also found that the establishment of
secondary zone selection rates in a larger number than
that established by AR 624-100, {22-23 was justified by
the existence since 1972 of written policy allowing the
higher rates. With respect to the May, 1975 retroactive
change to AR 635-100, the ABCMR found that the May,
1975 amendment did not serve to operate retroactively
since:

“ such messages merely clarified and confirmed
the longstanding Departmental approved policy, that
an officer who was not selected (recommended) for
temporary promotion to the next higher grade would
have such non-selection counted towards separation,
elimination or removal from active duty as appropri-
ate... .” Appendix at 36a.

Proceedings Before United States
Court of Claims

Following the denial of their applications for correction
of military records, Petitioners filed suit in the United
States Court of Claims seeking backpay and allowances
from their date of release and other relief on grounds that,
inter alia, the requirement imposed upon Petitioners by
the ABCMR to prove that they were harmed by the
defective composition of the original Selection Boards and
the attempted retroactive validation of the original Selec-
tion Boards was contrary to Jaw.'' Respondent conceded

i’ Included in this argument was Petitioners’ contention that:
the Reconstituted Selection Boards did not accurately reflect
what would have happened before the original Selection Boards
because Petitioners were not given the opportunity to compete
for those vacancies previously given to members of the second-
ary zone. Respondent did not plead or otherwise raise any
defense based upon Petitioners’ failure to notify the secretary of
the defect in the “evidentiary proceedings”.

14

that Petitioners had exhausted all available administra-
tive remedies. See, Petition and Answer thereto, {19 and
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts Not in Dispute, {42 and
Defendant’s Response. The parties submitted the matter to
the Court of Claims on Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment.

Throughout the litigation Respondent maintained that
the Reconstituted Selection Boards were not “new” Promo-
tion Boards that could independently support a release
from active duty, but rather mere “evidentiary proceed-
ings” into the question of “harmless error” ancillary to the
ABCMR’s consideration of Petitioners’ applications.
Appendix at 62a, 66a; Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, note 4; Defindant’s Reply
to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 5-6, 16, Defendant’s response to
Plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing. The case was briefed and
argued on that issue.”

The Court of Claims rejected the ABCMR’s finding of
“harmless error” and held that Petitioners have suffered a
serious violation of their legal rights (Appendix at 65a),
finding that the absence of Reservists on the original
Selection Boards frustrated the Congressional intent to

eliminate conscious or unconscious bias against Reserves.
The Court stated:

“We reaffirm our holding in Sanders v. United States
[594 F.2d 804 (1979)] that an officer cannot be

The case was consolidated with Adams v. United States,
Court of Claims No. 275-77. The only factual difference between
Adams and Doyle is that the plaintiffs in Adams contained
officers of all ranks, all of whom would have reached 18 years
active service prior to the completion of the Reconstituted
Selection Boards if they had been retained on active service in
the Fall of 1975. By reason of the constructive active duty
ordered by the United States Court of Claims, all of the
plaintiffs in Adams are entitled to be placed on the retirement
roles togethe: with an award of backpay and allowances.
Appendix at 78a.

15

terminated under the two passover rule unless he had
had two fair chances at promotion as required by
statute and regulation. This includes, in this case,
consideration by boards which are constituted square-
ly in accordance with statute and regulation. This we
deem to be an officer’s basic right. Where the error is
in the violation of a provision designed to protect
against a general form of prejudice, and there is no
way of determining whether actual prejudice was
involved in highly subjective and secret decisionmak-
ing, we conclude that this right was not had. Thus, we
hold that [Petitioners], separations, predicated on two
passovers by illegally constituted boards were invalid.
These [Petitioners] were entitled to their position,
rank and pay until they were terminated from active
duty under proper authority.” (Appendix at 65a)."

The Court, however, rejected the Respondent’s position
which had been consistently taken in the briefs and in oral
argument that the Reconstituted Selection Boards were
mere “evidentiary proceedings” into the question of harm-
less error:

“(Respondent] has taken the extreme position that the
reconstituted boards were merely an evidentiary
proceeding into the question of harmless error and
has failed to consider any other. We feel that this
uncompromising attitude jeopardizes the best interest
of the government. Nor do we believe the facts
support defendant’s narrow reading of them.” Appen-
dix at 66a.

Noting that the Reconstituted Selection Boards followed
the standards and procedures of the original Selection
Boards with one exception, the Court of Claims acknowl-
edged that the Reconstituted Selection Boards did not
completely redo the job of the original defective Selection’
Boards:

“Since the reconstituted boards were instructed to and

did consider only officers from the primary zone, the

is A dissenting opinion was filed by Chief Judge Friedman
wherein he expressed the view that the absence of Reservists on
the original 1974 and 1975 Selection Boards was harmless error.

16

total number of officers those Boards were to select
was reduced by the number of secondary zone officers
the original Boards had selected. Plaintiffs allege that
this change in the number of officers the reconstituted
boards would select improperly impinged upon the
discretion of Selection Boards to select less than the
maximum permissible number from the secondary
zone, and thereby improperly reduced the number of
places for which the plaintiffs were competing and
that this disparity between the original and reconsti-
tuted boards meant that they did not have a fair
opportunity to be promoted.” (Appendix at 68a).

Absent from the Court of Claims’ opinion is the fact that
virtually all of the secondary zone selections given by the
original Selection Boards without Reserve officer members
were awarded to the Regular officers. Further, the Court of
Claims opinion does not acknowledge that accurate recon-
sideration of officers in the primary zone in symmetry
with Petitioners’ original consideration would not involve
a reconsideration for promotion of officers in the secondary
zone,’* but would involve a comparison of their files to
officers in the primary zone that would otherwise have
been promoted.

The Court of Claims concluded that notwithstanding the
Secretary’s directive that Petitioners be reconsidered by
the Reconstituted Selection Boards under the “same letter
orders of instruction and guidance which pertain to the
primary zone previously furnished the original 1974 and
1975 Selection Boards” that Petitioners should have
known from that directive that they would not in fact be
considered under the same instructions and that they
would be competing for 15% less promotion vacancies. The

‘* No secondary zone officer had filed a complaint with the
ABCMR. Officers in the secondary zone who had been promoted
would not be reconsidered for promotion since the ABCMR and
Secretary concluded that officers who had been previously
promoted by the original Selection Boards would not have their
promotions affected.

17

Court of Claims assumed that the Petitioners were aware
(although they had never been advised) that the ultimate
decision of the Secretary and ABCMR after actions taken
by the Reconstituted Selection Boards would be to retroac-
tively validate their original release from active duty:

“Since only officers in the primary zone had applied
for correction, and since only these officers were in the
situation that passovers resulted in release from
active duty, it is understandable that the Correction
Board addressed its remedy only to these individuals

. what we find determinative is that plaintiffs
were aware from the Correction Board’s decision that
only officers in the primary zone would be reconsid-
ered. No objection was made to the Correction Board
or to the Court concerning the manner of reconsidera-
tion until the reconstituted Selection Boards had not
recommended the selection of these officers... . . We
are convinced that at that time plaintiffs were well
satisfied with that part of the remedy which gave
them the opportunity to be reconsidered by new
Selection Boards for promotion retroactive to the
action of the original Selection Boards. We conclude
that under these circumstances, plaintiffs have
waived any objection to the manner in which the new
boards considered only primary zone officers when
they were well aware of the fact and chose not to raise
the objection until after they found out that they were
not recommended for promotion by the Reconstituted
Boards.” (emphasis the Court).'* (Appendix at 69-70a).

'* The Court also commented upon the filing of the Adams
case on April 13, 1976 before any action was taken by the Re-
constituted Selection Boards. (Appendix at 69-70a). In fact, most
of the Reconstituted Selection Boards of 1974 had been com-
pleted by that date, but the Court found it significant that
Petitioners did not raise the deduction of 15% selection vacan-
cies in that suit. As explained to the Court on motion for
rehearing, Petitioners were not aware of the deduction of the
15% until subsequent to May 3, 1976, well after suit was filed
and moreover, all of the plaintiffs in the Adams case would
reach 18 years service and would therefore not be subject to
discharge prior to the time the Reconstituted Selection Boards
could act so that there was no purpose in challenging the

18

After commenting upon familiar law that a party cannot
raise issues on appeal to a Court when it fails to raise the
issues before an administrative agency competent to hear
it in cas.s dealing with exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the Court stated: |

“Consonant with this doctrine plaintiffs are required
to voice their objections in such a way that the
Secretary or Correction Board is aware of problems
well known to plaintiffs, and the manner a remedy is
effectuated before it is effectuated. Plaintiffs could not
stand on their objections waiting to see if they were
retroactively promoted by the new boards and only
upon the new board’s adverse recommendations con-
tend that the remedy did not achieve its intended
result. The plaintiffs cannot have their cake and eat it
too. Any other power of the agency to correct errors,
would be wasteful of the good faith effort and expense
undertaken by the Secretary in this case, and would
not accord with principles of justice.” (Appendix at
71-72a). (emphasis added).'®

The Court held that Petitioners were not entitled to
reinstatement and consideration by two duly convened
Promotion Selection Boards but were entitled only to
constructive duty time and backpay from the date they

mechanics of the Reconstituted Selection Boards even after the
defect in them became known. The only issue in that case of any
significance was whether or not there could be any retroactive
validation of the prior illegal discharges since if there could not
be, the plaintiffs in Adams would reach the 18 year sanctuary
and must be retained until retirement. See AR 635-100, § 3-65(d)
(Appendix at 7a) and Opinion, (Appendix at 78a).

'’° The Court acknowledged that its result was “slightly
different” from the result in Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 924
(D.C. 1979) which found on substantially identical facts that the
restriction of consideration by the Reconstituted Selection
Boards to only primary zone officers materially affected the
plaintiffs’ prospect for promotion and that they were entitled to
reinstatement to active duty and reconsideration for promotion
by duly convened statutory Promotion Boards. Likewise in that
case, no waiver or estoppel defense was plead or argued by the
Respondent.

19

were released frem active service to the time when they
would have been released if they had been held on active
duty during the Reconstituted Board process.

Since a waiver issue had never been raised in defense by
the Respondent nor briefed nor argued by either party
before the Court of Claims, Petitioners filed a lengthy
Motion for Rehearing and Clarification of Opinion which
focused the Court’s attention upon the fact that neither the
ABCMR decision nor the Secretary’s implementing
memorandum put Petitioners on notice of the manner in
which the Reconstituted Selection Boards were to be
operated; that a fair and equitable reconsideration of only
primary zone officers required a comparison of files of
secondary zone officers; that the Reconstituted Selection
Board proceedings were in fact ex parte; that Petitioners
were not made aware of the actual content of the letters of
instruction to the Reconstituted Selection Boards until the
entire slate of 1974 Reconstituted Boards were almost
complete; and that the Department of the Army never
advised any of the Petitioners until the Reconstituted
Selection Boards were complete as to what the effect of
Reconstituted Selection Boards’ action would be. None of
the facts asserted in Petitioners’ Motion for Rehearing and
Clarification were disputed by the Respondent. See Defend-
ant’s response to Motion for Rehearing and Clarification.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing was denied without
opinion on September 30, 1979. Since th2 September 30,
1979 order of Court measured constructive active duty
time from the date of letter notices required under AR
635-100, which were never sent, both parties filed further
motions for clarification which resulted in an order being
issued by the Court of Claims on November 30, 1979 which
set definite dates for the termination of constructive active
duty.

The Court of Claims also affirmed the ABCMR’s find-
ings that Petitioners’ rights had not been violated by

20

reason of the Secretary’s actions in establishing a 15%
promotion rate in the secondary zone and by reason of the
Secretary’s actions in retroactively changing AR 624-100
and 635-100 in May of 1975. The Court of Claims found
that the May, 1975 change merely clarified and confirmed
longstanding policy and that the ABCMR’s rejection of
Petitioners’ contentions as to the Secretary’s failure to
amend the regulations to provide for the 15% secondary
zone selection rate was not arbitrary or lacking in
substantial evidentiary support. (Appendix at 74-77a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
CONTROLS PENDING CASES INVOLVING THE DENIAL OF THE
SAME STATUTORY RIGHTS BEING ASSERTED BY OTHERS SIMI-
LARLY SITUATED.

For a period of consecutive years prior to 1976, the
Secretary of the Army convened Promotion Selection
Boards which considered Reserve Officers for promotion to
all officer ranks, but failed to contain Reserve membership
as required by statute and governing regulation. As a
result of not being selected for promotion by these
Selection Boards, several thousand Reserve officers were
released from active commissioned service. Many of these
officers have filed suit in the United States Court of
Claims which actions have been suspended pending a final
resolution of the issues presented in this litigation."

In addition, officers who were non-selected for promotion
in 1975 and 1976 have filed cases in the United States
Court of Claims. These officers contend that not only was
their 1975 non-selection invalid for purposes of supporting
a release from active service, but that their 1976 non-
selection was also defective since they were considered _as

'" “See, note 2, supra. Representative cases include Baxter, et
al. v. United States (Court of Claims No. 447-77); Billingsley, et
al. v. United States (Court of Claims No. 448-77); and Childers,
et al. v. United States (Court ot Claims No. 521-77).”

21

once non-selected officers contrary to law. Proceedings in
these cases have also been suspended in the United States
Court of Claims.'* However, the validity of the 1975 and
1976 Selection Boards has been resolved favorably to
complaining officers by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Dilley, et al
vu. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. 1979) creating a conflict
in reasoning and result. See infra at 22. |

All pending cases claim, as do Petitioners, reinstatement
to active service together with active duty pay and
allowances in the grade held at the time of the officer’s
release to the date of reinstatement. In some cases,
claimants were released shortly before retirement and are
claiming retirement benefits and placement on the retire-
ment roles by reason of constructive credit for active duty.
(See Appendix at 78a).'°

In response to the adverse decision in Doyle, several
cases have recently been filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia where plaintiffs are
required to waive any backpay claims in excess of $10,000
which would not be a prerequisite to filing suit in the
Court of Claims.” See, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a); compare 28
U.S.C. § 1491.

In total, the pending litigation affected by its case
involves in excess of one hundred former active duty

'* See, McKnight ve United States, Court of Claims No.
323-79C; and Canas v. United States, Court of Claims No.
445-77.

'* Plaintiffs in Adams v. United States, which was heard
concurrently with Doyle by the United States Court of Claims
are not joined in this petition since all of those officers will
qualify for retirement under the provisions of AR 635-100,
3-65(d) in accordance with the Court of Claims decision
(Appendix at 78a).

* These cases are: Bockoven v. Alexander, Civil Action No..
80-0417; Cooper v. Alexander, Civil Action No. 80-0416; and
Bailey v. Alexander, Civil Action No. 80-0415.

22

officers. The implications of the Doyle decision go far
beyond the parties to this case.

2. THE COURT’S DECISION IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE CONUUR-
RENT DECISION IN DILLEY, ET AL V. ALEXANDER, 603 F.2d 914
(D.C. 1979) AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF
MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) AND WEINBERGER
V. SALFI, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).

In Dilley, officers non-selected in 1975 and 1976 filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia prior to their release from active duty. As in
Doyle, the Secretary took the position that the Reconsti-
tuted Boards were solely designed to determine whether
Reserve officers had been prejudiced by the admitted
violation of § 266. 603 F.2d at 924, 925. As in Doyle, the
Secretary never argued that plaintiffs were barred from
challenging the Reconstituted Selection Board proceedings
by failing to exhaust administrative remedies or to
otherwise object to the manner in which the Reconstituted
Selection Boards were conducted. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals in Dilley found that since the selection of candi-
dates from the secondary zone effectively displaced the
candidates of the primary zone, the reduction in the
number of available promotion vacancies before the Recon-
stituted Selection Boards “materially affected appellants’
prospects for promotion before the [Reconstituted Selec-
tion] Boards and deprived them of substantial rights
guaranteed them by the statute”. 603 F.2d at 925.

In contrast to the view of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Court of
Claims reviewed the reduction in available promotion
vacancies before the Reconstituted Selection Foards as an
unimportant defect stating that in their view it was
unlikely that the Reconstituted Selection Boards would
have selected less than the maximum number of secondary
zone officers in any event. (Appendix at 68-69a). Addition-
ally, the Court of Claims applied the doctrine of exhaus-

23

tion of administrative remedies to support its findings that
Petitioners had forfeited their right to judicial review of
the defect in the reconstituted boards stating:

Decision-making bodies normally have the power to
correct their own errors, Bookman v. United States,
197 Ct. Cl. 108, 453 F.2d 1263 (1972), and the
Correction Board is no exception. The doctrine that
requires that known objections be made to the agency
is to insure that administrative agencies are thereby
afforded an opportunity to make adjustments and
correct errors on the administrative level, thus per-
mitting the government to mitigate or avoid large
damage claims that might otherwise be created
(United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 239
(1946)). Blackmar v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 1035,
1045, 354 F.2d 340, 347 (1965). (Appendix at 71a).

After Doyle was decided, Respondent filed a second
Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals
alleging its opinion was in conflict with Doyle. The Court
of Appeals properly treated the Doyle opinion as being an
exhaustion of administrative remedies decision. In dismiss-
ing the Secretary’s second Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court pointed out that the Secretary had agreed that
plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedy and
exhaustion was not required under this Court’s decisions
in Matthews v. Eldridge, supra and Weinberger v. Salfi,
supra. 603 F.2d at 926.”

Regardless of the label applied by the Court of Claims,
its opinion is, in fact, an exhaustion of administrative
remedies decision. The view of the Court of Claims is
clearly in conflict with the view of this Court in Matthews
v. Eldridge, supra and Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, which |
establishes that the doctrine may not be applied when the
Secretary himself has agreed that there has been exhaus-

** The Court of Appeals also noted that it had in the past

declined to consider arguments raised for the first time on
appela. 603 F.2d at 926.

24

tion because he has therefore satisfied himself that no
further review is warranted by reason of the internal
needs of the agency. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 422 U.S. at
330. In addition, Salfi recognizes the obvious proposition
that once applicants have presented their claims at a
sufficiently high level of review to satisfy the Secretary’s
administrative needs further exhaustion would be futile
and a waste of administrative resources unsupported by
any administrative interest. 422 U.S. at 766.

Any objection by the Petitioners to challenge the
Reconstituted Selection Board process would have been
futile. Any objection would not have halted the proceed-
ings of the Reconstituted Selection Boards. Army Regula-
tion 15-185, § 9 which governs ABCMR proceedings states
that issues under consideration by the ABCMR do not
operate to stay “any proceedings” being taken with respect
to the person involved.” Any objection by Petitioners
(assuming arguendo they had adequate knowledge to
object) would have been meaningless and is, therefore, not
required since there is no clear avenue of relief.

There is a conflict in analysis and result between Doyle
and Dilley. The Doyle decision is contrary to the require-
ments of Matthews and Eldridge. Moreover, it is impossi-
ble for persons affected to reconcile the conflicts in these
two decisions and the two conflicting results create an
injustice of serious proportion. These conflicts provide
sufficient grounds for this Court to review the proceedings
and issue its writ of certiorari to the United States Court
of Claims.

2 See footnote 5, supra, for Secretary’s prior application of
this regulation.

25

3. THE DOYLE DECISION FRUSTRATES CONGRESS’ PURPOSE
WHICH IS TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE PROMOTION
PROCESS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES. |

As a general proposition, the courts will not interfere
with or review internal military management matters
including the promotion process. See, e.g. Orloff v. Wil-
loughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); Brenner v. United States, 202
Ct. Cl. 678 (1973); Abbruzzo v. United States, 513 F.2d 608
(Ct. Cl. 1975). However, the courts are not reluctant to
review military selection board or other military proceed-
ings where substantial rights quaranteed by statute. or
regulation have been violated. See e.g., Stewart v. United
States (Court of Claims No. 198-77, December 12, 1979);
Dilley, et al v. Alexander, supra; Ricker v. United States,
184 Ct. Cl. 402, 396 F.2d 454 (1968); Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579 (1958); Henderson v. United States, 175 Ct.
Cl. 690 (1966). It is a basic tenet of our legal system that a
government agency is not at liberty to ignore its own laws
and that agency action in contravention of applicable
statutes and its own regulations is unlawful. E.g., Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354, U.S.
363 (1957).

In Doyle, the Court of Claims stated that the absence of
Reserve officers could be corrected by giving Petitioners
“the opportunity to be promoted in strict compliance with
law”. Appendix at 62a. The Court of Claims also conceded
there was a difference in the manner in which Petitioners
were considered for promotion between the original Boards
and the Reconstituted Boards. Appendix at 66a. The
difference in the manner of reconsideration could only
adversely affect Petitioners. The difference in the manner
of reconsideration is obviously discriminatory in violation
of 10 U.S.C. §277 and 10 U.S.C. § 3442 as well as a
violation of Army Regulation 624-100 which requires that
primary zone officers and secondary zone officers compete
for the same promotion vacancies. Cf. Appendix at 50a; AR

26

624-100, §23(b). The decision sidesteps the lack of “strict
compliance with law” and inherent unfairness by finding
that Petitioners had waived their rights to complain.

The decision has effectively emasculated the protections
intended by Congress to the Petitioners contained in 10
U.S.C. § 3442, § 266 and § 277. The policy expressed in the
Court of Claims decision could drastically curtail effective
judicial review of administrative action in all areas of
government. “a

4. THE COURT OF CLAIMS DECISION, THROUGH A MISCHARAC.
TERIZATION OF THE ISSUE AND INCOMPLETE AND MISLEAD-
ING RECITATION OF FACTS, DOES NOT DISCLOSE TO FUTURE
LITIGANTS THAT IT CREATES A NEW STANDARD WHICH MUST
BE MET BY THOSE SEEKING REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, WHICH STANDARD IS CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW.

The opinion mischaracterizes the Petitioners’ claim as
being a complaint that the Selection Boards did not
completely redo the job of the defective boards in that they
“did not reconsider officers from the secondary zone”.
Appendix at 67a. The Court finds the determinative factor
in the case to be that Petitioners “were aware from the
Correction Board’s decision that only officers in the
primary zone would be reconsidered”. Appendix at 69a.
Petitioners’ actual complaint was that the reconsideration
of primary zone officers was conducted in an improper
manner because it did not involve a comparison of primary
zone officer records with secondary zone officer records to
determine whether any of the primary zone officers being
reconsidered would be entitled to some of the promotion
vacancies previously granted primarily to Regular officers
in the secondary zone. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rehearing
at 1-5. It is only by virtue of this mischaracterization that
the Court can find that the ABCMR’s decision put
Petitioners on notice of the restricted scope of their
promotion reconsideration.

27

The opinion is also inadequate due to an incomplete and
misleading recitation of material facts. The opinion sets
forth the following facts which are either misleading or not
disclosed:

(a) that the “Reconstituted Boards utilized the same
instructions and guidelines the Secretary had given the
original boards”. (Appendix at 67a) In fact, the instruc-
tions and guidelines were rewritten to delete secondary
zone promotions;

(b) there is no disclosure that Petitioners were not
advised of the contents of the rewritten letters of instruc-
tion until after the Reconstituted Selection Boards were
well underway and only after Petitioners request. See,

supra at 11;.

(c) that Petitioners knew exactly how the results of the
evidentiary proceedings” would be used by the ABCMR
and that Petitioners were satisfied with the opportunity to
be promoted retroactive to the action of the original
Selection Boards. Appendix at 70a. In fact, Petitioners had
no knowledge of how the results would be used when
reported to the ABCMR. See, supra at 9-10.”

(d) that if Petitioners had complained the proceedings
would have been halted (Appendix at 71-72a). The opinion
does not disclose that the Secretary’s own regulation (AR
15-185, { 9) and prior actions would indicate the proceed-
ings would not have been halted. See, supra at note 5.

*“ Certain options were open to the ABCMR, among which
would be merely to see if two boards looking at the same records
under identical instructions with only the membership of the
boards changed would report significantly different results. If
that happened, the ABCMR might determine that the error was
in fact “harmful” and order all claimants back to active service
to be considered by two new statutory Promotion Selection
Boards convened in due course. The Court of Claims’ character-
ization of the facts necessarily does not lead to a consideration of
this alternative which would have been consistent with the

power granted to the Reconstituted Selection Boards by the
Secretary as merely “evidentiary proceedings”.

28

(e) that the Secretary did not argue any form of
estoppel, waiver or exhaustion of administrative remedies
and that the Secretary did, in fact, view the issues
presented by Petitioners as properly before the court and
ripe for resolution.

(f) the opinion infers that the initial filing of the Adams
proceedings in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia on April 13, 1976 was somehow an
attempt to hide the defect in the evidentiary proceedings
from the Secretary, when the results of the Reconstituted
Selection Boards had no effect on the outcome of Adams.

See supra at note 15.

(g) that the “problems” with the evidentiary proceed-
ings were unknown to the Secretary and that the Secret-
ary undertook a “good faith effort” so that allowing
Petitioners to prevail “would not accord with principles of
justice”. (Appendix at 71-72a).

Ignored is the fact that the Secretary knows the law as
well as Petitioners, particularly since the issue of interfer-
ence with Promotion Board discretion to determine the
number of secondary zone promotions was before the
ABCMR in this case. (Appendix at 35a). It was clear from
the Secretary’s submissions in this case that he took a
calculated risk in devising the “test for prejudice” as a
means to uphold Petitioners’ release from active service
based upon non-selection given by the original boards. See,
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-6, 16. Com-
pare Dilley v. Alexander, supra at 924 (commenting that
this was a “ends-justifying-the-means procedure’).

The Court of Claims decision is setting forth a new
standard for litigants seeking review of administrative
remedies because none of the elements required of a
waiver are present in this case. Waiver requires acts

29

indicating an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. Curtis Publishing Company
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, (1967). Knowledge of the facts upon
which the waiver is based must be clear and without
question, particularly in cases of this nature. Waiver is not
applied where knowledge of the ultimate fact must be
assumed by implication. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v.
Leach, 583 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Newman, 478 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1973). The Court of
Claims cited no cases on the doctrine of waiver in support
of its decision, but in fact relied only on cases dealing with
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

By reason of all of the above, the Court of Claims
opinion is not in accordance with existing law. Litigants
and potential litigants before all federal agencies who are
not intimately familiar with the facts of this case are
seriously misled as to the standards which the Court of
Claims may require of those seeking judicial review.
Future litigants are not put on notice that they will be
required to be watchdogs over any administrative reme-
dial process that occurs after the close of their adversary
hearing even where they do not what the effect of the
remedial process will be on their claim.

For all of these reasons it is approp. iate for this Court to
issue its writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Claims.

5. THE DECISION WILL LEAD TO LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CAUSE MANY ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS TO BE DEEMED INADEQUATE UNDER THE DOC-
TRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

The Doyle decision requires applicants to file with the
agency concerned, Motions for Reconsideration or objec-
tions to any granted remedy if there is any conceivable
reason to suspect that the remedy does not or may not
conform to law. Contra, 5 U.S.C., § 704. See, Plaintiffs’

30

Motion for Rehearing at 14-15. Therefore, the impact of
the Doyle doctrine must necessarily lead to more pro-
tracted administrative proceedings. Numerous authorities
indicate exhaustion is not required where further appeals
to the agency would unduly delay plaintiffs’ remedy or
would be futile. Isbrandtson v. United States, 211 F.2d 51
(D.C. Cir. 1954): Sunshine Publishing Company v. Sum-
merfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.C. 1960).

In the case of military officers, delay in granting them a
remedy causes irreparable injury. The most important
single document in an officer's record is the officer
efficiency report. During a period when an officer is off
active duty he is not performing in an assignment and
receiving no efficiency reports. Therefore, a reinstatement
to active duty with constructive active service and correc-
tion of his records still leaves him with irreparable injury
because the gap in his service records may effectively
preclude any hope for further promotion. Constant objec-
tions or requests for reconsideration of curative proceed-
ings will necessarily lead to further delay which may
render the administrative proceedings inadequate to pro-
vide any realistic remedies for the officers concerned. All
of this is unnecessary and contrary to the policy of
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies since the
latter consideration is intended only to give the adminis-
trative agency concerned an opportunity to pass on
questions within its own expertise and to cure error.
Where the agency is given that opportunity and institutes
remedies which are inadequate or defective, no rational
policy should require Petitioners to resubmit themselves to
the administrative process only to be prejudiced by further
delay.

31

6. THE DECISION ENCOURAGES ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO
ISSUE VAGUE AND IMPRECISE DEuISIONS AND ALLOWS THEM
TO BENEFIT FROM A KNOWING VIO VATION OF LAW.

Since the ABCMR’s decision and Secretary’s implement-
ing memorandum cannot realistically be said to put
Petitioners on notice of the diminution of promotion
vacancies for which Petitioners were entitled to compete as
a matter of law and since the Secretary vigorously insisted
that the proceedings were evidentiary only, executive
agencies are now in a position to benefit from vague and
imprecise decisions which mislead future claimants lead-
ing those claimants to be barred from seeking judicial
review under the Doyle doctrine.“ Indeed, the opinion
accomplishes exactly what the Court of Claims said it was
not doing, which is to provide a method whereby adminis-
trative agencies can avoid meeting their statutory obliga-
tions and avoid obeying their own regulations contrary to
the clear directives of this Court. See, e.g., Viteralli v.
Seaton, supra; Harmon uv. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579; and
Service v. Dulles, supra.

* This Court cannot assume that administrative agencies will
always deal fairly with the public. In Dilley v. Alexander, supra,
the Government prevented a preliminary injunction holding
those plaintiffs on active duty until their case was decided on
the grounds that the Court could grant to them retroactive
backpay, credit for time served and other emoluments of service
if they were successful. Therefore, the Government argued under
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 937 (1974), a preliminary
injunction was not warranted. The Court accepted the Govern-
ment’s argument. After the Court of Appeals decision invalidat-
ing plaintiffs’ discharges and ordering them reinstated to active
duty, the Government now contends that those plaintiffs are
entitled to no retroactive credit for the time served, backpay and
allowances and other emoluments of service and are entitled
merely to be placed back in the military — obviously to be -
non-selected twice again due to the gaps in their military record —
and then processed out of the service.

32

7. THE DECISION ALLOWS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO
VIOLATE THEIR OWN REGULATIONS BY RELYING UPON A PAST
PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS.

The Doyle decision sanctions changes in Governmental
regulations by implication and retroactive changes in
regulations to validate an act in violation of published
Governmental regulations. Prior to the Doyle decision it
had been a fundamental principle of administrative law
that Government agencies, including the service secretar-
ies, must strictly observe regulations which they had
established. Vitarelli v. Seaton, supra, Service v. Dulles,
supra; U.S. v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). Army
Regulation 624-100 controls the promotion of commis-
sioned officers on active duty and Army Regulation
635-100 governs the release from active duty of commis-
sioned officers. These Regulations are comprehensive in
scope and applicable to both Regulars and Reserves.”
When the original Promotion Selection Boards were
conducted, the Secretary instructed the Board that it could
select a maximum of 15% from the secondary zone for the
grade of Lieutenant Colonel and Major contrary to the
then published provisions of AR 624-100, {| 23.”

The Correction Board and the Court of Claims viewed
the Secretary’s action as valid relying upon the fact that
on September 19, 1972 an all units message announced
that the Secretary had approved “policy” for modification
of the secondary zone to 15%. ABCMR Record, Vol. VII,

* The procedures to amend the regulations are set forth in
army regulations 310-1, 310-2, and 310-3. These procedures
provide that a regulation can be amended or added to only by
the publication of changes published as numbered changes to the
basic regulation and further provides that serious errors are to
be corrected immediately by published changes but that minor
changes not affecting policy or doctrine can accumulate and be
published in the next major change or revision to the regulation.
See ABCMR Record, Vol. Vi, R-1112.

* See note 3, supra.

33

R-1170.” Change no. 3 to AR 624-100 was published on
August 6, 1974 which did not incorporate the terms of the
September 19 policy modification. The facts are set forth in
the opinion at 76-77a with the exception of the publication
of change no. 3 in August of 1974.

AR 635-100, the discharge authority, at the time of the
original Selection Boards in question provided that a
Reserve officer could not be released from active duty
unless he had been twice found by Selection Boards to be
“not fully qualified” to assume the duties of the next
higher grade under AR 624-100. (Appendix at 6a). The
Correction Board found that Petitioners were in fact “fully
qualified”. (Appendix at 37, 75a). In 1968 the Secretary -
issued a message “pending revision of AR 624-100 to the
effect that Reserve officers who were twice reported as
non-selected would be relieved from active duty under
635-100.% The definition of “non-selected” was not fun-
damentally different than the “not fully qualified” defini-
tion contained in AR 624-100. The Correction Board and
Court of Claims also relied upon a 1970 message which
again changed the categorization of officers before Selec-
tion Boards but mentioned nothing about these categories
affecting release from active duty. ABCMR Record, Vol.
VII, R-1187. Appendix at 74a.

*“ The message did not indicate its duration; was not
announced as a change to the Regulation but is only a change in

policy. The message did not comply with AR 310-1, AR 310-2 or
AR 310-3 as a change to the Regulation.

* The message actually established 3 categories of officers
before Selection Boards. Selected for promotion; selected for
retention in grade (meaning performance and indicated poten-
tial warrant possible future advancement) and those non-
selected (meaning those officers whose current performance does °
not justify immediate advancement and whose indicated poten-
tial did not clearly sustain the possibility of future advance-
ment). ABCMR Record, Vol. VI, R-978.

34

Subsequent to these messages,” two changes to AR
635-100 were published which stated that Reserves could
not be discharged from active duty as a result of Selection
Board action unless they failed a second time to be
considered “fully qualified” under AR 624-100, the last of
which was published on January 14, 1975.*° Appendix at
6a.

On May 19, 1975 at 6:00 p.m., the day before the
convening of the 1975 Major Selection Board, and subse-
quent to the filing of an application with the ABCMR by
an officer non-selected in 1974 complaining that there was
no factual finding that he was “not fully qualified” the
Secretary issued an unnumbered change to AR 624-100.
This change, stated that if a Reserve was twice reported by
a Selection Board as not recommended for promotion, he
would be released from active duty. An editorial comment
at the end of the message indicated that the change was
“intended to clarify past and present Department of the
Army policy” and that the wording of the change con-
formed to the “intent behind and practice under” the
previous version. The editorial comment went on to state
that “accordingly failure to be recommended for promotion
both before and after the date of the message counts
toward removal from active duty”. ABCMR Record, Vol.
VII at 1164-1168.

The Court of Claims approved the Correction Board’s
findings that the message was not a retroactive change but
merely “clarified and confirmed a longstanding depart-
mental approved policy that an officer who was not
selected (recommended) for temporary promotion to the
next higher grade would have such non-selection counted
toward separation”.”* The ruling authorizes any depart-

*? Neither message met the requirements of AR 310-1, 310-2,
and 310-3 for changes to regulations.

*® Change 17 published November 7, 1973, 1252 and change
20, published January 14, 1975; Appendix at 5-6a.

* Appendix at 76a.

35

ment secretary to ignore his own published regulations
and justify his actions by pointing to any longstanding
policy of ignoring the regulations.

Petitioners submit that the Court’s holding is contrary
to this Court’s authority cited above and establishes a
dangerous precedent which can render published depart-
mental regulations meaningless.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the United States
Court of Claims.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT MORLEY WRIGHT,
WHITEFORD, TAYLOR, PRESTON,
TRIMBLE & JOHNSTON,
2000 First Maryland Building,
25 South Charles Street,
Baltimore, Maryland 21201,
(301) 752-0987,
KEITH A. ROSENBERG,
NEWRATH, MEYER & FALLzR, P.C.
4400 Jenifer Street, N.W.,
Suite 380,
Washington, D.C. 20015,
(202) 362-1100,
Counsel for Petitioners.

>

February 25, 1980

la

APPENDIX

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION

Subject: Inclusion of Reservists on Boards Considering
Members of Reserve Components under Section 266 of
Title 10, U.S. Code

Reference: (a) DoD directive 1205.4, relative to same
subject, November 26, 1952 (hereby cancelled)

Purpose

To provide basic guidance to the military departments in
carrying out the provision of Section 266 of Title 10, U. S.
Code, requiring inclusion of appropriate numbers of mem-
bers from the reserve components on all boards convened
for the appointment, promotion, demotion, involuntary
release from active duty, discharge, or retirement of
members of the reserve components.

Cancellation
Reference (a) is hereby superseded and cancelled.
Policy

A. All boards convened for the appointment, promotion,
demotion, involuntary release from active duty, discharge,
.or retirement of members of the reserve components shall
be constituted as prescribed by the appropriate Secretary,
and shall include appropriate numbers of members from
the reserve components.

B. The intent of the Congress in this Section is clear,
that a member of a reserve component who is the subject of
any of the indicated board actions shall be assured a fair
representation of reserve membership on the board. The
Secretaries of the military departments will, with due
regard to availability of qualified reservists, pertinent
statutory provisions, the nature of the board action, and
the categories, regular and reserve, which may be consi-

2a

dered by the board, provide in the membership of the
indicated boards, to the fullest practicable extent, a fair
and adequate representation of members from the reserve

components.

Implementing Directives
It is requested that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Personnel and Reserve) be made an informa-
tion addressee on implementing departmental directives
relating to this policy.
Signature not legible

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Personnel and
Reserve)

3a
AR 624-100
Section I. GENERAL

1. Purpose and scope. This regulation prescribes the
policies and procedures for temporary promotion in the
Army of the United States of commissioned officers and
warrant officers on active duty under the provisions of title
10, United States Code, sections 3442, 3447, and 3449 and
for the promotion of Regular Army officers in their
permanent grades. It does not apply to officers on active
duty for training or with the Selective Service System, to
promotion of Reserve officers in their permanent grades, or
to officers of separate corps holding statutory positions in
those corps.

2. Definitions. a. Active duty. The term “active duty”
when used in this regulation with reference to qualifying
service for promotion refers to full-time duty of 1 day or
more in the active military service of the United States (10
U.S.C. 101 (22)), and full-time duty of 1 day or more
performed under title 32, United States Code, sections
502-505. It does not include drill periods or retirment
Doints.

b. Commanders. For the purpose of this regulation
includes those commanders and heads of Army staff
agencies responsible for maintaining officers’ personnel
records.

c. Basic date. An established date assigned to each
Regular Army commissioned officer which reflect all
service creditable for permanent promotion purposes.

d. Best qualified. Selected from among the fully qual-
ified (e below) and determined by a promotion selection
board to be the best qualified to meet the needs of the
Army.

e. Fully qualified. Considered by a promotion selection
board as qualified professionally and morally, of demons-
trated integrity, and capable of performing the duties
expected of an officer of his branch in the next higher
grade.

4a

f. Not fully qualified. Considered by a promotion selec-
tion board as not qualified to perform the duties or assume
the responsibilities normally expected of the next higher
grade. No such designation is applied to nonselection to
colonel, any promotion list, or to lieutenant colonel, WAC,

ANC, or AMSC.

g. Officer. The term officer(s) includes both commis-
sioned and warrant officers.

h. Passover. The result of being considered “not fully
qualified” for promotion by a promotion selection board.

* x * * * *

Section IV. TEMPORARY PROMOTION OF
OUTSTANDING OFFICERS

22. General. Temporary promotion of outstanding com-
missioned officers from a secondary zone below the prim-
ary zone of consideration is authorized within limitations
outlined below. This policy is designed to give those
commissioned officers who have demonstrated exceptional
ability the opportunity to be considered in advance of their

normal eligibility.

23. Zones. a. Officers may be considered for promotion
under this section to colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major
providing they have completed the following service:

Minimum years
by DOR in next

lower grade (as
of 31 December of

To grade of year of consideration)
1

EES ER We enero eas AEP DD 1 a NS ee 3Y2

EE: CE ae IIR isos ies sistas ssesinnieindntavarvens 3

b. Selection boards will be instructed that the maximum
number of officers who may be selected from the secondary
zone will not exceed—

5a
Percentage of total
number who may
To grade of be selected
| ge ARORMRI PO yeaee Serpent cies PPR AINE SEN Wl EPPA, pe 10
GEL LEA LISI ATS LE Ti
nn BERT: SS ERD esate Ra ORL OF SED RR AEE TS 5

Example: A selection board selects 2,000 captains for promo-
tion to the temporary grade of major. Of these, not more than
100 may be selected from the secondary zone.

* * * * * *

25. Nonselection. Only a very small number of officers
may be selected for promotion under these provisions.
Consequently, nonselection will not count as a passover
nor reflect against officers in any way.

* 7K mK = ok Oo“
7 November 1973 C 17, AR 635-100

Section XVII. FAILURE OF SELECTION FOR
TEMPORARY PROMOTION

3-65. General. a. Except as indicated below, the follow-
ing officers will be relieved from active duty on the 90th
day after receipt of involuntary release notification unless
voluntary earlier release is requested.

(1) Reserve commissioned officers serving on active duty
as commissioned officers and AUS commissioned officers,
who fail a second time to be considered fully qualified,
under AR 624-100, for promotion to temporary AUS grade
of: captain, major, or lieutenant colonel, provided 9 months
or more elapse between adjournment dates of selection

boards.

(2) Reserve warrant officers serving on active duty as
warrant officers who fail a second time to be considered
fully qualified under AR 624-100, for promotion to tempor-
ary AUS grade of Chief Warrant Officer W-3 or W-4,
provided 9 months or more elapse between adjournment
dates of selection boards.

(3) AUS warrant officers who fail a second time to be
considered fully qualified, under AR 624-100, for promo-
tion to temporary AUS grade of Chief Warrant Officer,

6a

W-3 or W-4, provided 9 months or more elapse between
adjournment dates of selection boards.

b. Officers having 90 days or less remaining to serve on
active duty as reflected by a current service agreement due
to denial or declination of further active duty, and officers
who have been notified of their impending involuntary
release from active duty under any other provisions of law
or regulations, are not subject to this section.

c. An officer eligible for retirement under chapter 4 may
apply for retirement, to be effective not later than the first
day of the month following the month in which release is
directed.

d. Officers who will complete 18 or more years of active
Federal service on their scheduled release date will not be
processed under this section unless such action is approved
by the Secretary of the Army, but will be retained on
active duty until the last day of the month following the
month in which they complete 20 years of active Federal
service.

* * * * * *

14 January 1975 C 20, AR 635-100

Section XVII. FAILURE OF SELECTION FOR
TEMPORARY PROMOTION

3-65. General. a. Except as indicated below, the follow-
ing officers will be relieved from active duty on the 90th
day after receipt of involuntary release notification unless
voluntary earlier release is requested—

(1) Reserve commissioned officers serving on active
duty as commissioned officers and AUS commissioned
officers, who fail a second time to be considered fully
qualified, under AR 624-100, for promotion to temporary
AUS grade of: captain, major, or lieutenant colonel,
provided 9 months or more elapse between adjournment
dates of selection boards.

7a

(2) Reserve warrant officers serving on active duty as
warrant officers who fail a second time to be considered
fully qualified under AR 624-100, for promotion to tempo-
rary AUS grade of Chief Warrant Officer W-3 or W-4,
provided 9 months or more elapse between adjournment
dates of selection boards.

(3) AUS warrant officers who fail a second time to be
considered fully qualified, under AR 624-100, for promo-
tion to temporary AUS grade of Chief Warrant Officer,
W-3 or W-4, provided 9 months or more elapse between
adjournment dates of selection boards.

* (4) Reserve commissioned and warrant officers serv-
ing on active duty in the grade of second lieutenant or
warrant officer, W-1, who fail to be selected for temporary
promotion to first lieutenant or chief warrant officer, W-2,
in the AUS will be released from active duty.

b. Officers having 90 days or less remaining to serve on
active duty as reflected by a current service agreement due
to denial or declination of further active duty, and officers
who have been notified of their impending involuntary
release from active duty under any other provisions of law
or regulations, are not subject to this section.

c. An officer eligible for retirement under chapter 1 may
apply for retirement, to be effective not later than the first
day of the month following the month in which release is
directed.

d. Officers who will complete 18 or more years of active
Federal service on their scheduled release date will not be
processed under this section, unless such action is
approved by the Secretary of the Army, but will be
retained on active duty until the last day of the month
following the month in which they complete 20 years of -
active Federal service.

* * * * * *

8a
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Army Boarp FOR CoRRECTION OF MiLitary Recorps
Proceedings

IN THE CASE OF: 10 December 1975
LOUIS D. GADDINI, 342-22-2633, et al.*

THEODORE J. KMIECIAK, JR., 202-30-5433, et al
JACOB A. HOPKINS, 188-32-6456, et al

I certify that hereinafter is recorded the true and
complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-
named individuals. A quorum was present during the
hearing and deliberation. The following findings, conclu-
sions and recommendations were adopted by the Board.

Applicants request correction of military records as
stated in applications to the Board and restated herein.

The Board convened at the call of the Chairman on the
above date and, following consideration of the case and
having made its determination thereof, proceeded to other
business.

Present:

Mr. Gordon M. Hobbs, Chairman; Mr. Oliver Kennedy,
Member, Mr. Charles R. Woodside, Member, Mr. James C.
Hise, Member, Mr. James L. Stroud, Member, Mr.
Raymond J. Williams, Executive Secretary, Mr. E. E.
Wilmeth, Examiner.

One applicant, Theodore J. Kmieciak, Jr., appeared
before the Board. Applicants Louis D. Gaddini and Jacob
A. Hopkins were unable to appear before the Board. All
applicants were represented by counsel.

The Board considered the following evidence:

Exhibit A — Applications for Correction of military
records with counsel’s brief.
* These applications were designated as lead applications

with the opinion applying to other applications raising the same
issues.

9a

Exhibit B — Military Personnel Records.

Exhibit C — Case Summaries with RED TABS A
through G. .

Exhibit D — Transcript of Hearing.

Exhibit E — Exhibits A through J submitted by
counsel at Hearing.

Exhibit F — Additional Exhibits K through M
submitted by Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Exhibit G — Counsel’s additional Exhibit N.

Exhibit H — Depositions of 12 Selection Board
members.

The Board Finds:

1. That the applicants have exhausted all administra-
tive remedies afforded by existing law or regulations.

2. That it incorporates in these proceedings and adopts
by reference thereto so much of the Exhibits above, as
pertains to the factual showing of the Department of the
Army records which generally reflect:

a. that the applicants request in substance correction of
their military records to show them;

(1) either promoted to the next higher temporary
grade or entitled to reconsideration for promotion to
the next higher temporary grade;

(2) restored to active duty, as applicable, without
loss of active duty commissioned service and basic pay
and allowances;

(3) such other relief as may be deemed necessary
and appropriate; and that at the hearing counsel for
the applicants modified their requests to the effect
that the applicants either be reconsidered for promo--
tion through additional specially convened boards or
call them back to active duty, negate their termina-
tion orders on the grounds that the passovers were
invalidly issued, and place them in the normal cycle
for promotion consideration by the next regularly
scheduled selection boards;

10a

b. that the military records of the applicants reflect in
general and in pertinent part that they were born during
the period 1921 and 1943; that they were either appointed
as commissioned officers or warrant officers of the United
States Army Reserve (USAR) for an indefinite term; that
they either were voluntarily ordered to and entered on
their current tours of active duty for an indefinite period of
time, or that they were initially ordered to and entered on
active duty voluntarily under a two or three year obligated
tours of duty after which their tours of active duty were
voluntarily extended for an indefinite period; and that
they understood that they may be released from active
duty for any one of the following reasons:

(1) Voluntary requested in accordance with applic-
able regulations;

(2) Forced reduction in Army strength;

(3) Promotion passover as prescribed in applicable
regulations;

(4) Failure to meet acceptable standards of efficien-
cy or conduct;

(5) Completion of the maximum Reserve commis-
sioned service or attainment of the maximum age,
whichever occurs first, as prescribed in applicable
regulations;

_ (6) Completion of a specified period of active Feder-
al service (20 years) or attainment of the maximum
age in the cases of warrant officers.

c. that through temporary promotions in the Army of
the United States (AUS) they attained the temporary
grades of Major, Captain, or Chief Warrant Officer (W-2)
and (W-3);

d. that in the class group of Kmieciak-et al, the
applicants military records along with those of other
eligible captains were referred to Army Selection Boards
which convened on 30 January 1974 and 19 February 1974
for consideration for promotion to the grade of Major, AUS,
under approved Letters of Instructions; that at some point
in February 1974 the then Secretary of the Army (Howard

lla

H. Callaway) directed that a new board be convened since
in his judgement the January 1974 Selection Board did not
comply with the intent of his original guidance, even
though the board complied with the literal language of the
guidance; that consequently under new Letters of Instruc-
tions the applicants were referred for consideration for
promotion to the temporary grade of major, AUS, by
Department of the Army-(DA) Promotion Selection Boards
which convened on 2 April 1974 and 15 April 1974 under
the “best qualified” method of selection within the primary
zone of selection; and that they were not recommended for
promotion by these selection boards;

e. that in the class group cases of Gaddini-et al and
Hopkins-et al, the applicants were considered and not
recommended for promotion to the temporary grades of
Lieutenant Colonel and Chief Warrant Officer (W-3) or
(W-4), as appropriate, under the “best qualified” method of
selection by DA Promotion Selection Boards which con-
vened in January and March 1974; and that the selection
boards concerned operated under approved Letters of
Instructions and guidance furnished;

f. that all of the applicants were again considered for
temporary promotion to the next higher grade under the
“best qualified” method of selection within the primary
zone of selection by appropriate DA Promotion Selection
Boards which convened in January, March, April, and
May 1975 under approved Letters of Instructions and
guidance furnished; and that they were not recommended
for promotion by these selection boards;

g. that in 1974 all of the applicants were notified in
pertinent part that as a result of the 1974 DA Promotion
Selection Boards they were among those officers con-
sidered but not selected, and that their nonselections
constituted a passover for promotion as defined in Army
Regulation (AR) 624-100; that in 1975 they were notified
in pertinent part that as a result of the DA Promotion
Selection Boards of 1975 they were not best qualified for
promotion to the next higher grade; that since this

12a

determination constituted their second nonselection for
promotion, DA policy as specified in Section XVII, Chapter
3, AR 635-100 required their release from active duty on
the 90th day after receipt of the notification; and that all
applicants except three were scheduled for release from
active duty during the months of October through Decem-
ber 1975 and January 1976 after having completed
between over 6 years and 10 months and 17 years and 11
months active Federal service. The three excepted appli-
cants had completed over 18 years active Federal service
and since they were within two years of becoming eligible
for retirement under law, they were not scheduled for
release from active duty;

h. that on 24 September 1975 and 28 October 1975
counsel for the applicants submitted applications in behalf
of the applicants along with his Brief and raised the
following points of issue:

(1) that the Secretary of the Army’s action in voiding
the selection boards action in the first 1974 Captain to
Major, AUS, selections was unlawful;

(2) that the percentage of selections directed from
the secondary zone by the Secretary of the Army was
unlawful;

(3) that the Secretary’s action in directing the reser-
vation of a designated number of promotions from the
secondary zone was unlawful;

(4) that the Secretary’s instructions to the selection
boards constituted a directive to the boards to consid-
er youth as a primary asset in the primary zone as
well as the secondary zone;

(5) that the 19 May 1975 messages amending AR
624-100 and AR 635-100 are not applicable to the
applicants; and

(6) that the apparent lack of any Reserve member-
ship on any of the selection boards involved was
contrary to 10 U.S.C. 266 and DOD Instruction
#1205.4, dated 23 June 1959.

13a

i. that on 6 November 1975 The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel (DCSPER) submitted a detailed report with
nine inclosures to this Board, as requested, relative to the
first five points of issue and stated pertinently:

(1) that the requests of the applicants are without
justification;

(2) that the actions taken by the Department of the
Army, in all respects, were according to regulations
and established procedure;

(3) that withdrawal of their notifications of release
from active duty would be without basis. The fact that
the applicants are Reserve officers twice “not recom-
mended for promotion” by duly constituted promotion
boards required their release by regulation, accepted
procedure, announced policies, common knowledge,
and based on the lony established principle of align-
ing the temporary promotion system and involuntary
separation/retirement policies with the statutory pro-
visions of the permanent (RA) promotion system;

(4) that removal from their records that they were
“twice not recommended” for promotion would belie the
fact that they were so categorized by two duly
constituted promotion boards and would be unfair to
other officers similarly categorized for many decades;

(5) that applicants have not been selected for promo-
tion by a promotion board; therefore their promotions
are not justified or warranted and would be grossly
unfair to others similarly situated over many years.
Since the board did not determined that they were
amongst the “best qualified”, their promotions to the
higher grade would not be in the best interest of the
United States Army or the United States Govern-
ment;

(6) that prior board proceedings were not defective;
therefore, reconsideration by the next Selection
Board, with that Board being instructed as applicants
request is not justified;

(7) that based on approved regulations and adherence
to long standing established policies and procedures,

l4a

the DA Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel is of the opinion and takes the firm position
that the applicants have been afforded all rights to
which entitled and all actions taken concerning their
consideration for promotion and involuntary separa-
tion were in accordance with decisions made by the
Secretary of the Army or delegated to his subordin-
ates; hence, in accordance with regulations; and

(8) that further details and amplification regarding
the Army Staff position and its rationale in the
matter were contained in Inclosures Number 1
through 9 of their report.

j. that on 6 November 1975 The Assistant Judge
Advocate General for Civil Law concurrently submitted
the Army Brief in Opposition to the Applications as
Inclosure Number 10 to the detailed report referred to
above relative to the common issues of law and fact raised
by the applicants and counsel on the first five points of
issue. It was concluded:

(1) that the Secretary of the Army is not bound to
accept the recommendations of a promotion selection
board;

(2) that the Secretary of the Army personally deter-
mined that acceptance of the recommendations of the
January 1974 promotion selection board (Captain to
Major) would not be in the best interest of the Army;

(3) that Section IV, AR 624-100 pertaining to second-
ary zone selection rates was effectively changed in
1972 by electrical message and has been followed;

(4) that the Secretary of the Army did not direct the
reservation of a designated number of promotions to
secondary zone officers;

(5) that the temporary (AUS) promotion system im-
plemented by the Secretary gave due regard to
seniority and age;

(6) that promotion selection boards were not directed
to reserve a designated percentage of promotion
recommendations to secondary zone officers;

15a

(7) that instructions and guidance given the selection
boards in question were fair and equitable;

(8) that promotion selection boards were not directed
to consider youth as a primary asset for selection in
the primary zone;

(9) that the 19 May 1975 amendments to AR 624-100
and AR 635-100 do not deprive the applicants of
property without due process of law;

(10) that the applicants have neither a property nor a
liberty interest affected by the 19 May 1975 amend-
ments;

(11) that the May 1975 amendments do not operate
retroactively and were intended to clarify past and
present Army policy and practice; and

(12) that there has been no legal error and the
applicants have suffered no injustice.

k. that on 18 November 1975 counsel for the applicants
submitted his response to the Army’s staff and legal
positions relative to first five points of issue raised by him
and the applicants. In essence it was contended pertinently
that the Secretary is bound to accept the selection board’s
recommendation under the circumstances in the matter;
that AR 624-100 was not changed by any of the referenced
policy messages; that the May 1975 Department of the
Army message amendments do not clarify basic policy and
practice; that the Secretary did in fact direct the reserva-
tion of a designated number of promotions to secondary
zone officers; that with respect to the retroactivity of the
May 1975 Department of the Army message amendments,
the applicants point out that for a substantial period of
time officers had been led to believe that they would be
retained in service as long as their performance was such
as to indicate that they were qualified to assume the
duties of the next higher grade; that the radical change
attempted by the Secretary cannot be explained away by
arguments contending that the May 1975 Department of
the Army messages simply drew on antecedent facts and
therefore was not retroactive; and that there is nothing

l6a

within the context of cited statutes to suggest that the
Secretary was authorized to issue anything except prospec-
tive regulations insofar as those regulations relate to
promotion actions.

1. that cn 26 November 1975 The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel (DCSPER) submitted its response to Coun-
sel’s rebuttal to the Army staff and legal positions. In
essence, DCSPER sustained the Army staff's position as
presented on 6 November 1975, notwithstanding counsel’s
rebuttal thereto;

m. that on 2 December 1975 the DCSPER responded to
the issue raised by the applicants and counsel relative to
the apparent lack of any Reserve member on any of the
Selection Boards involved. In essence, DCSPER agreed
and emphasized that 10 U.S.C. 266 prescribed an appropri-
ate number of Reserves, as prescribed by the Secretary
concerned; that DOD Instruction 1205.4 established the
policy that ... boards ... shall be constituted as
prescribed by the appropriate Secretary and shall include
appropriate number of members from the Reserve compo-
nents; and that AR 624-100 prescribed . . . boards will,
where practicable, include at least one officer of the
Reserve components. However, it was stated pertinently
that DA personnel staff officers considered the foregoing
adequately permissive to allow for appropriate and practic-
al flexibility in the process of selecting potential nominees
and nominating them as board members;

n. that at the hearing counsel for the applicants called
three witnesses who testified before the Board and pre-
sented certain statistical data, charts, and other informa-
tion pertaining to the Reserve membership requirements
of 10 U.S.C. 266, the availability of Reservists to sit as
members of AUS Promotion Boards, and the correlation
between age and selection/nonselection, among RA officers
and Reserve officers; that he restated the points of issue as
‘setforth in his original brief and covered in subparagraph
2h above, giving particular emphasis to the last issue to
which Major General James Milnor Roberts, Jr., testified

17a

relating to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 266 wherein
“each board convened for the appointment, promotion,
demotion, involuntary release from active duty, etc., of
Reserves shall include an appropriate number of Reserves
as prescribed by the Secretary concerned under standards
and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense”.
Counsel felt that the intention behind that statute clearly
was that the number that shall be included on the boards
was a matter of Secretarial discretion; that the statute did
not state that a board had to have a majority of Reserves;
that the law did not say that 10 percent of the membership
had to be Reserves; that it just stated that an appropriate
number shall be include on each board with discretionary
power being left to the Secretaries of the services to decide
what an appropriate number is; and that the position of
the applicants and himself was that “zero” could not be an
appropriate number because the statute would have no
meaning whatsoever. With respect to the first issue
regarding the Secretary’s action in voiding the first 1974
captain to major Selection Board’s action, Counsel stated
pertinently that once the Secretary makes regulations, he
must follow them scrupulously as the Courts have said;
that AR 624-100 specifies the circumstances under which
officers can be taken off of a board recommended list and
that the board action is administratively final; and that he
submitted that when AR 624-100 was written and prom-
ulgated, the Secretary had stripped himself of discretion in
the matter and no longer had discretionary authority after
promulgation of AR 624-100 to not accept a promotion
board’s entire recommended list. In this connection, coun-
sel submitted an exhibit relative to the correspondence
between Secretary Callaway and Senator Thurmond to the
effect that it was recalled that Captain Norris N. Lowe
was one of four officers who have been selected by the first
1974 captain to majors’ AUS Selection Board. Subsequent-
ly, Captain Lowe was not selected by the new 1974 captain
to majors’ AUS Selection Board which the Secretary
convened.

| a RMT EE ee eT

18a

At this point of the hearing former Secretary of the
Army (Howard H. Callaway) appeared before the Board as
a witness and referred to his affidavit of 24 October 1975.
He stated to the effect that in the wind-down of the
Vietnam war, Secretary Froehlke who preceded him made
the announcement that 15 percent of the list for promotion
from captain to major was to go below the primary zone;
that it was to give those officers who were particularly
outstanding some kind of opportunity to advance more
rapidly; that he publicly endorsed that statement in-
asmuch as it was well understood and well accepted; that
when the captain to majors’ promction board was in the
planning, the DCSPER went over the whole situation with
him and brought up the question of the 15 percent because
there had not been a promotion board to major for five
years; that there were a great many well-qualified cap-
tains, who in the opinion of the DCSPER were entitled to
promotion to major and that if 15 percent were allowed to
be taken away from the captains who were entitled to
promotion to majors, such action would take away promo-
tions from good captains; that however he saw just as
clearly that there were a lot of officers in the secondary
zone, outstanding officers who had under a promise of the
then Secretary of the Army to which he was also
committed and with whom he did not want to break faith;
that after working with the problem for a good bit of time
in coordination with his staff, he decided to go to a
13-month promotion list before the next promotion board;
that by doing this the Department was able to hold to the
60 percent which was all that was ever recommended,
while at the same time they were also able to hold to the
15 percent for below the primary zone; that therefore he
issued instructions to the promotion board and was
assured his instructions were clear as to his intent; that
subsequently it was brought to his attention that the
promotion board was about ready to come up with
recommendations, but was not quite there in so far as
coming up with 15 percent; that to the best of his

19a

recollection the promotion board had come up with approx-
imately 8 percent; that shortly thereafter he talked at
length with the President of the board about the procedure
utilized and was not pleased because it was very mechani-
cal; that as result he caused to be brought in to him
roughly eight officer files at the bottom of the primary
zone and 8 files of officers nonselected in the secondary
zone; that after personally looking at all the files, the
officers’ files below the primary zone were clearly superior
to the other files; that to confirm his opinion, he mixed the
files up without regard to primary zone and secondary
zone and had them evaluated independently by three
officers who had much experience and were superior
officers in the Army; that they came back with their
individual evaluations and in every case every below-the-
zone officer was selected over the primary zone officers;
that the gap in quality between the two groups was
enormous; that prior to acting he checked with General
Abrams who conducted his own independent investigation;
that three days later General Abrams returned incensed
and stated that the Secretary’s intent which was well
known had not been acted upon and was violated; that
while he did not believe that the board members had any
conspiracy to violate his intent, General Abrams suggested
that a new board be convened; that accordingly a new
board was called back and instructions were changed to
make it crystal clear what his intent was; that no
recommended list was formally submitted by the first
captain to majors selection board of 1974; that no other
files were personally reviewed by him other than the 16
files mentioned earlier; that he was never advised until
recently of any requirement to have at least one Reserve
officer sitting on a promotion board panel; and that had he
been aware of this fact and the provisions of Title 10
U.S.C. requiring the inclusion of appropriate number of
reserve officers, he would have contacted his Judge
Advocate General and General Counsel for an interpreta-
tion, and if in their interpretation the law required that,
he would have done it.

20a

With regard to the issue concerning the May 1975
message amendments to AR 624-100 and AR 635-100,
counsel presented as Exhibit J a written outline of
historical circumstances concerning changes, revisions,
and messages to AR 624-100. It was pointed out in essence
that there were three numbered changes to AR 624-100
which failed to incorporate numerous message revisions to
the regulation which had been issued prior to the num-
bered changes; that the messages contained in part
changes in promotion policy and on certain occasions such
changes were buried at the end of the messages; that in
addition certain message announcements contained policy
statements concerning elimination of promotion categories
pertaining to promotion of a particular group of officers,
but apparently the Army applied such changes to other
groups of officers and warrant officers without appropriate
change in the regulation; that as an example the 1975
message amendments to AR 624-100 and AR 635-100
contained provisions at the end indicating retroactive
provisions regarding nonselection by prior selection
boards; that such action amounted to changing the rules of
the game; that while the Army feels that the 1975
amendments were not retroactive, it seemed clear to the
applicants and counsel that these particular amendments
were not a retroactive regulation at all because of the
existence of prior messages; and that however, the amend-
ments did, in fact, change the rules which were in effect
prior to May 1975, whether or not credence was given to
these messages as being validly in effect after the actual
changes to the regulation were issued.

With respect to the feelings of the applicants relative to
the age discrimination problem, the depositions rendered
by a fair number of selection board members reveal that
all of the officers who testified denied that chronological
age or Reserve component made any difference in their
deliberations; that however, he believed that the testi-
mony of Mr. Callaway was such that it could be fairly
assumed that relative to the 15 percent secondary zone,
there was very little discretion left, if any, for the selection

2la

boards to come back with anything less than a full 15
percent; and that it was a very odd situation as to how the
statistics came out on the selection boards and how they
seem to be influenced to some extent by actions outside of
the boards.

In Conclusion, counsel stated in substance that discrimi-
nation is always an insideous sort of thing; that it arises
also relative to the problem of wrestling with 10 U.S.C.
266; that from Mr. Callaway’s testimony it is obvious that
nobody ever thought of the requirement of Reserve officers
on the board; and that he submitted that after all this
controversy was over and done with, there will be Reserve
officers sitting on future selection boards.

Inasmuch as the Judge Advocate General’s Office had
not presented the Army’s staff legal brief on the 10 U.S.C.
266 issue, permission with counsel’s concurrence was
granted The Judge Advocate General’s Office to present an
oral brief at the hearing, provided a written brief was
submitted to the Board as soon as possible after the
hearing and provided counsel was afforded an opportunity
to submit any comments thereto for consideration of this
particular matter. Counsel stated that otherwise, he was
satisfied that the record was full and complete. During the
hearing counsel submitted to the Board Exhibits “A”
through “J” in further support of applicants contentions
relative to the issues raised in this entire matter.

o. that on 11 December and 16 December 1975 in
response to the Board’s request at the conclusion of the
hearing in the matter, The Judge Advocate General’s
Office submitted a legal opinion and a brief in opposition
to the applications for relief on the grounds of 10 U.S.C.
266. It was opined that Section 266 provides that the
boards convened for the purposes indicated therein shall.
include “appropriate numbers” from the Reserve compo-
nents; that the legislative history of this provision dis-
closes that the term “appropriate numbers,” rather than a
minimum number or fixed ratio, was employed by the
Congress to cover situations where the same board was

22a

used to consider both Regular and Reserve personnel; that
in such cases, it was believed that the proportion of
Reserve members on the board should be roughly equal to
the proportion of Reserves being considered, but Congress
also recognized that Reserve participation would not be
possible in all instances, such as where no Reserve officer
was senior in rank to the Reserve officers being consi-
dered; that in an effort to provide reasonable flexibility,
the provision was written so as to allow Reserve represen-
tation on boards to be established by regulation of “the
appropriate Secretary in accordance with standards and
policies established by the Secretary of Defense,” that
subsection III.B, Department of Defense Instruction
1205.4, 23 June 1959, prescribes that “[t]he Secretaries of
the military departments will, with due regard to availa-
bility of qualified reservists, pertinent statutory provi-
sions, the nature of the board action, and the categories,
regular and reserve which may be considered by the board,
provide in the membership of the indicated boards, to the
fullest practicable extent, a fair and adequate representa-
tion of members from the reserve components;” that
paragraph 166(5), Army Regulation 624-100, 29 July 1966,
as changed, currently implements the foregoing statutory
and regulatory authorities and provides that “[w]henever
a zone of consideration includes nonregular officers, selec-
tion boards will, where practicable, include at least one
officer of the Reserve components;” that these regulatory
provisions, being in implementation of statute, are manda-
tory and may not be waived; that therefore, where
selection boards of the type noted above have been, or are
conducted without Reserve component representation, it is
the opinion that the Army bears the burden of establishing
either that (1) no Reserve officer was qualified for service,
or (2) no qualified Reserve officer was reasonably available
for service; that implicit in the first determination is the
additional requirement that the Army demonstrate that
the criteria establishing qualifications for service on a
selection board are reasonable and do not operate inten-
tionally and systematically to exclude Reserve officers
from qualifying for service; and that should the Army be

23a

able to establish either (1) or (2), i.e., no Reserve officers
qualified or no qualified Reserve officer reasonably avail-
able, it is the further opinion that such a selection board
would be lawfully constituted.

In furtherance to the foregoing legal opinion The Judge
Advocate General’s Office stated pertinently that the
Secretary of Defense has set forth his policies and
standards in DOD Instruction 1205.4 and Army Regula-
tion 624-100 provides for the inclusion of at least one
reserve member on the concerned promotion boards where
practicable. The boards under consideration by the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records in this matter did
not have Reserve membership. In late 1967 two decisions
were made by Headquarters Department of the Army,
which may have affected Reserve membership on promo-
tion selection boards. One decision was that, due to a
critical shortage of funds, temporary duty (TDY) funds
would not be available for brining officers to Washington,
D.C., to sit on promotion boards. Previously board mem-
bers were selected from throughout the Army in order to
get wide representation. Restricting board membership to
residents of the Washington, D.C., area would have
effectively put a geographical/quantitative limitation on
those officers eligible for board membership. The decision
was also made to upgrade substantially the qualitative
standards for board membership. Such a combination of
qualitative and quantitative restrictions would have sub-
stantially reduced the pool of eligible and available
reservists. Because of this reduced eligibility, few, if any,
would have ever been identified for nomination. It should
be made clear that nothing in the Army staff's investiga-
tion has revealed any decision or other action to leave
Reserve officers off promotion boards with a malicious
intent. Even if there had been a recognition of a statutory
or regulatory preference for such membership which was
overborne by fiscal consideration in 1967, as there appears
there may have been, nothing has come to light which in
any fashion shows that the decision was in any way meant
to harm the promotion chances of Reserve personnel.

24a

Viewing the situation in light most favorable to appli-
cants, the facts do not justify relief. Even assuming that
there was a conscious decision to leave Reserves off the
boards due to fiscal constraints and further assuming that
such decision resulted in a failure to specifically seek out
Washington Area Reserves for promotion board duty, no
Reserve officer can show specific prejudice to his opportun-
ity for promotion. Indeed, the facts clearly militate strong-
ly to the contrary. The depositions of a number of members
of the promotion boards shows that the officers who sat on
the boards did not favor Regulars over Reserves and, being
aware that nonselected reservists would be required to
leave active duty, often gave reservists the benefit of the
doubt. It is also plain that each board has a reservoir of
Reserve experience due to the careers of the officers
making up the boards. Thus, it could hardly be argued
that the boards were incapable of accurately judging the
file of any particular reserve officer. Accordingly, it is
apparent that even if error existed in the composition of
the promotion boards, it was harmless error upon which no
relief should be predicted; and

p. That on 19 December 1975 counsel submitted appli-
cants memorandum in opposition to the Army staff
submission and legal brief on Title 10, U.S.C. Section 266
which is marked as Exhibit “N” to these proceedings. In
essence counsel cited the pertinent provisions of 10 U.S.C.
266 and DOD Directive 1205.4 implementing the statute,
and contended that the statute and the DOD Directive
required a fair and adequate Reserve representation on
temporary Selection Boards convened pursuant to 10
U.S.C. 3442 and AR 624-100; that the defect in the
composition of the 1974-1975 Selection Boards was juris-
dictional and therefore their action is void; and that the
“harmless error” theory is not applicable to the applicant’s
case. Numerous Federal court decisions were cited as
references in support of the applicants contentions.

3. That Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States provides that the temporary
appointments of commissioned officers in the RA shall be

25a

made by the President alone in grades below Lieutenant
Colonel and by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, in grades of Lieutenant Colonel and
above.

4. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3012, provides, in
pertinent part, that the Secretary of the Army, who is
head of the DA, is responsible for and has the authority
necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the
Army; that he shall perform such other duties relating to
Army affairs, and conduct the business of the Department
in such manner, as the President or the Secretary of
Defense may prescribe; and that he may prescribe regula-
tions to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under
this title.

5. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3442(c), provides, in
pertinent part, that under regulations to be prescribed by
the Secretary, appointments made under this subsection
shall be made on a fair and equitable basis; and that
selections shall be based upon ability and efficiency with
regard being given to seniority and age.

6. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3297(d) provides that
except as otherwise provided by law, promotion list officers
and brigadier generals of the RA may be promoted to the
regular grades of captain through major general only
when recommended by a selection board; that a recommen-
dation for promotion must be made by the majority of the
total membership of the board; and that notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a board that is to recommend
officers for promotion whom it considers to be best
qualified may recommend only those officers whom it also
considers to be fully qualified.

7. That Title 10, U.S.C., Sections 3300 (a)(b)(c) provides
pertinently that when promotion-list officers in the regu-
lar grade of first lieutenant, captain, or major are to be
considered, under section 3299 of this title, by a selection
board for promotion to the next higher regular grade to fill
existing or anticipated vacancies, the Secretary of the
Army may direct the board to consider officers in the

26a

specified grade in the order of their seniority on the
promotion list concerned, recommend those who are fully
qualified for promotion, pass over those not so qualified,
and continue this procedure until the number of officers
specified by him is recommended; that when a promotion-
list officer in the regular grade of first lieutenant, captain,
or major must be considered under section 3299 of this
title for promotion because of length of service, or because
he is on a promotion list above an officer who must be
considered for that reason, the Secretary m#y furnish the
board a list of officers to be considered for promotion to the
grade concerned, and direct the board to recommend the
officers on that list whom it considers fully qualified for
promotion; that instead of the procedures set forth in
subsection (a) or (b), the Secretary may furnish to the
board a list of promotion-list officers to be considered and
may direct it to recommend a number specified by him for
promotion; that the board shall recommend those officers
whom it considers to be best qualified; and that however
the number prescribed by the Secretary for the recommen-
dation must be at least 80 percent of those listed for
consideration for the first time.

8. That title 10, U.S.C., Section 3362, provides, in
pertinent part, that the Secretary of the Army, or such
authority as he directs, shall convene selection boards to
consider reserve commissioned officers under this chapter;
that each board shall be composed of at least five members
who are senior in regular or reserve grade to, and who
outrank, any officer considered by the board; that so far as
practicable, at least one-half of the members of the board
must be reserve officers; that a recommendation for
promotion must be made by the majority of the total
membership of the board; and that the Secretary of the
Army shall prescribe regulations to carry out this chapter.

9. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3447, provides that the
appointment of a person under sections 3442, 3444, and
3445 of this title shall be made without reference to any:
other appointment that he may hold in the Army; that
temporary appointments of commissioned officers in the

27a

Army shall be made by the President alone in grades
below brigadier general, and by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, in general officer
grades; and that the President may vacate at any time a
temporary appointment in a commissioned grade.

10. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3449, provides that
temporary promotions in warrant officer grades shall be
governed by such regulations as the Secretary of the Army
may prescribe.

11. That Title 10, U.S.C., Section 266 (a) provides that
each board convened for the appointment, promotion,
demotion, involuntary release from active duty, discharge,
or retirement of Reserves shall include an appropriate
number of Reserves, as prescribed by the Secretary
concerned under standards and policies prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense. (Examiner’s Note: Under Index to
Notes to this Section, Note Number 3 provides that all
boards convened for appointment, promotion, release from
duty, etc., shall incl

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1748%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
