# Petition — Grzywacz v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1662%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 446 U.S. 935

## Text

IN THE

seme Court of the United States

‘TERM 1980

No. %9=122]

RONALD GRZYWACZ, RICHARD KRIESHOK AND EDWARD GOCLAN,
Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

NorMAN S. LONDON
Attorney for Petitioner Grzywacz
LAWRENCE J. FLEMING
Attorney for Petitioner Krieshok
1600 Boatman’s Tower
100 North Broadway
St. Louis, Missouri 63102
(314) 231-8700
CARMEN S. Durso
Attorney for Petitioner Goclan
110 East Lincoln Street
Belleville, Illinois 62221

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fe rae? aR sams oe Page
Opinion Below ........ cece eee cece e cece eeeees |
cg bbb aber tvcweeces se = l
Questions Presented ..........0 eee eee eee eee eeees 2
SSI SEEN OO OP Eee ER EEE 2
Reasons for Granting the Writ ....... 6.6.0.0 eee seers 6

I. Further direction is needed to resolve a conflict

among the United States Courts of Appeals

regarding the scope and meaning of “‘enter-

prise’? as the term is used in 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(c) and 1961(4) (1976). .........-- eee 6

Il. Further direction is needed to resolve a decisive

split among the United States Courts of Ap-

peals regarding the criteria for admissibility of

‘‘other crime evidence’’ pursuant to
PE IS Gives cc vcwscscceces 13
ca Gisdee wear sence soncs 21
Appendix A ........cccccccceee rec ccceccccccsenns A-1
Appendix B....... 2. e cece cece cece eect e eee eeccees A-23
ps en mrs ee A-24

Table of Cases

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) ........... 10
United States v. Back, 588 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).... 15,16
United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1965) .... 20

ii

United States v. Dennis, 458 F.Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo.
MP ENUM ev eume eee ou” 12

United States v. Frumento, 405 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa.
1975) aff'd 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) cert.
denied sub nom Millhouse v. United States, 434
i RET en ene ea 7,11

United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979) 1,10,11

United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 119} (3rd_ Cir.
cig, Ee PLE UG GT Pics Sena aL 14,16,17,19

United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81 (2nd Cir.
esa eae ee gy pes ss Et, 14,16

United States v. Mandel, 415 F .Supp. 997 (D.Md. 1976) 7,10
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) . 7,12
United States v. Moeller, 402 F.Supp. 49 (D.Conn.

6 iad EE ES re re 8
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977)
cert. denied 435 U.S. 951 GPE Sica eek 12
United States v. O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38 (Sth Cir.
ME oda e eee a ee secenes 14,15,17,19

United States v. Ostrowskv’, 501 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1974) 15
United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1975) .. 14,15,16

United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (Sth Cir. 1977)
vacated 58 L.Ed.2d 192, aff'd in part reversed in
oot i |, 12

United States v. Seymour, et al, No. 75-27 MAC (M.D.
Ga. 1975) aff’d sub nom United States v. Brown,
555 F.2d 407 (Sth Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
sie yids TTT Pe ee ei 7

iii

United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir.
OPENS eia's 3b oan laces laoreet es 7,8,9,10,12
United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978) 16

United States v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1978)..... 16

Constitution and Statutes Cited

PA er EE hors 65s oa 0 boo ean ba bee ee aka ree 2
FO NE Pe a's « eS SleN Toe hure ene ere aks 11
STi: UE iS s Rane sh eek ee kane eee an 2,11
arses NE oka 2 4 en 5b's Pekar kS ca nee eee 2,6,7,10
Se ES Ac ck wena sSatedanetd i per@eneen 6
ie EE 9195: 8 Avs cade esa hevesewereer eee 7
Pa in SE 5 2 G's pce eeca ee Visa snes 2,6,7,8,12
IE ia s'eX atid owe dedewee bese banseey 2
ee Rk eee rere rye errr Terre 11
28 as SE Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes. such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.

This evidence is not admissible unless its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect. United States v. Weidman.
572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978).

° The total length of the trial transcript is 1040 pages. At the
end of the third day the transcript ran to 505 pages. All but
35 pages of the evidence presented by the Government during
the first three days was County evidence.

— A-20 —

evidence. More than half of the evidence .presented by
the Government was County evidence; yet, according to
the majority, all of this was necessary to show “the
planned design and modus operandi of appellant Grzy-
wacz.” Supra, at p. 10.

I do not dispute that evidence of similar acts of prior
misconduct may be used to show opportunity, prepara-
tion, plan, etc. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But evidence of this
sort is not admissible unless its probative value outweighs
its prejudicial effect. Weidman, supra, 572 F.2d at 1202-
03. Weighing the probative value of the evidence against
its prejudicial effect leads me to the conclusion that the
County evidence should not have been admitted.
Arguably its probative value is, as the majority stated,
its utility in showing design and mode of operation of
one of the three defendants.’ But there can be little
doubt about the potential prejudicial impact of the
evidence. Little demonstration is needed to conclude that
three days of County evidence would distract the jury’s
attention from the real issues in this case. Presented at
the very beginning of the trial, the County evidence
could serve only to create an aura of guilt against all
three defendants before the jury had heard any evidence
on the crime for which they actually were indicted.

This distracting evidence was prejudicial in its volume
alone. The trial court should have “limit[ed] the evidence

7 The elements of a conspiracy offense are: (1) an agreement
by two or more persons to combine efforts for an illegal

urpose and (2) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.

elson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1060 (1970). The Government concedes that
the County evidence is not related to the conspiracy and was
in no way connected to two of the three defendants; it is not
evidence of an agreement nor does it constitute an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It is evidence of actions by one
of the defendants which is only indirectly relevant in proving
the overt act. Thus its probative value is minimal and when
probative value is weighed agninst prejudicial effect as
required by Weidman, supra, 572 F.2d at 1202-03: the limited
relevancy of the County evidence could hardly tip the scales in
favor of admitting the evidence.

eee

— A-21 —

to the quantity that [was] necessary to the purpose for
which it [was] admitted.” United States v. Ostrowsky,
501 F.2d 318, 373 (7th Cir. 1974). Three days of evidence
were not necessary to demonstrate Grzywacz’ mode of
operation and plan, especially where the evidence was
unrelated to the indictment and was likely to create a
bias against the defendants in the minds of the jurors.
Further “{iJt is generally recognized that there can be
no complete assurance that the jury ever under the best
of instructions will strictly confine the use of this kind of
evidence to the issue of [planned design and modus
operandi] and wholly put out of their minds the implica-
tion that the accused, having committed the prior
similar criminal act, probably committed the one with
which. he is actually charged.” United States v. Byrd,
352 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1965).

The strongest reason for excluding the evidence,
however, was its potential prejudicial effect on Goclan
and Krieshok. Although the jury was admonished not to
consider the evidence against them, it is unlikely that
this instruction was effective in removing the prejudice
since the City of Madison evidence, in conjunction with
the joint trial of all three defendants, tended to establish
a link between Grzywacz and Goclan and Krieshok. The
power of guilt by association is not easy to dispel: the
jury may well have credited Goclan and Krieshok with
the acts of Grzywacz. I fail to see how this dangerous
risk is outweighed by the need for showing one defen-
dant’s modus operandi.

The County evidence also was introduced improperly;
no contemporaneous limiting instructions were given by
the court. See generally Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953). The majority determined that this argu-
ment was meritless because the appellants did not re-
quest such an instruction. This brief dismissal of
appellants’ contention hardly seems fair given that the
Government introduced the County evidence under a
rationale entirely distinct from the theory upon which
its admissibility finally was weighed. When the County
evidence initially was presented, the Government in-
sisted that it pertained to an overall substantive con-

— A-22 —

spiracy. Only after all the evidence had been presented
did the Government confess that the County evidence
was not related to the conspiracy. Faced with a motion
for mistrial, the Government tendered for the first time
its theory that the evidence was admissible to show plan,
design, etc.

It appears as if the procedure employed by the Govern-
ment was a pretext designed to gain the admission of
the County evidence; the prosecution must have known
there was insufficient evidence to connect the County
evidence to the City conspiracy. In conference the
Government stated that “there was at least an inference
that could be drawn that (the County evidence] was part
of the conspiracy.” (Tr. p. 890.) Without any fact tying
the County evidence to the conspiracy this inference is
not permissible. Unfortunately, it is not unlikely that
this inference took shape behind the closed doors of the
jury room.

Because of the manner in which the County evidence
was introduced, the volume in which it was received and
the fact that it was hardly probative and highly prej-
udicial, I believe that the admission of the evidence was
erroneous, and separately warrants reversal.

A true Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

— A-23 —

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 10, 1979

Before
Hon. Luther M. Swygert, Circuit Judge
Hon. Walter P. Gewin, Senior Circuit Judge *
Hon. Robert A. Sprecher, Circuit Judge

~

ae
United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee, Appeal from the United
Nos. 78-2301, 78-2302, ve. States District Court for
78-2303 the Southern District of

- Illinois, Alton Division
Ronald Grzywacz, Edward

Goclan, and Richard No. 78-Cr-50003
Krieshok, Judge J. Waldo Ackerman

Defendants-Appellees. |

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing in banc filed in the above-entitled cause by counsel
for the defendants-appellants, no judge in active service has re-
quested a vote thereon, and a majority of the judges on the
original panel** has voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing be,
and the same is hereby, DENIED.

* Honorable Walter P. Gewin, Senior Circuit Judge for the Fifth
Circuit United States Court of Appeals is sitting by designation.

** Judge Swygert voted to grant the petition.

— = oe

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-544

Ronald Grzywacz,
Et Al.,

Petitioners,
Vv.
United States

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for
petitioner(s).

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby,
extended to and including February 8, i980.

/s/ John Paul Stevens
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States

Dated this 26th
day of December, 1979

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1662%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
