# Petition — National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 444 U.S. 1042

## Text

K, JR., CLERR_

Iu the Supreme Court of the Huited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1979

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER
Vv.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION,
AFL-CIO AND CouNCIL OF NorTH ATLANTIC
SHIPPING ASSOCIATIONS, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530,
WILLIAM A. LUBBERS
General Counsel

JOHN E. HiGcIns, JR.
Deputy General Counsel

ROBERT E. ALLEN
Acting Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME
Deputy Associate General Counsel

LINDA SHER
Assistant General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
Washington, D.C. 20570

A NERA Sa A pete lp ni ak fon .

Ao RRR eh eee DU INO Be Rie eR at repeumenemans

Page
EE eee 1
Se EE Yaa 2
ueeeen prevented 2
TE SSE ae 2
I 3
A. The Board’s findings of fact _........ 3

1. The Port of New York (the “Dol-
3

2. The Ports of Baltimore and

Hampton Roads (the “Associated
=eeees. CON) 8
B. The Board’s decisions and orders. 12
C. The decision of the court of appeals.. 14
Reasons for granting the writ 15
oe ETS ac NTT ee 23
EESTI Se la
EASES OC 84a
I eee ht 87a
STN 90a
a SEE SS 110a

CITATIONS
Cases:

Humphrey v. International Longshore-
men’s Association, 548 F.2d 494 .._ 15, 16

Cases—Continued Page

International Longshoremen’s Association
(Consolidated Express, Inc.), 221
N.L.R.B. 956, enf’d 587 F.2d 706, cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 1041 -........ 4, 5, 6, 7, 12-14, 15
International Longshoremen’s Association

Local 1575 v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 4389...... 15
Meat and Highway Drivers, Local 710 v.

yo 'phin
Forwarding, Inc., and San Juan Freight For-
warders, Inc., are void and unenforceable.

NEW YORK SHIPPING
ASSOCIATION, INC.
(Employer)

(Representative ) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any
questions concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions may be directed to the Board’s Office,
Federal Building, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 3644, New
York, New York 10007, Telephone 212—-264-0360.

110a
APPENDIX E

Intern ‘ional Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;
Hampton Roads District Council International
iwshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1970,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 862, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association Local 846,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 970, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1784, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840,
AFL-CIO and Associated Transport, Inc.

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;
Hampton Roads District Council International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1970,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 862, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 846,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 970, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shcremen’s Association, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1784, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840,

llla

AFL-CIO; and Hampton Roads Shipping Associa-
tion and Associated Transport, Inc. and Council of
North Atlantic Shipping Associations, Party to the
Contract

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;

Atlantic Coast District Council International Long-
shoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 333, AFL-CIO;
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
921, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, Local 953, AFL-CIO; International Long-.
shoremen’s Association, Local 1855, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1429,
AFL-CIO; and Houff Transfer, Inc.

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;

Atlantic Coast District Council International Long-
shoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 333, AFL-CIO;
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
921, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, Local 953, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1855, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1429,
AFL-CIO and Houff Transfer, Inc. and Council of
North Atlantic Shipping Associations, Party to the
Contract

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;

Hampton Roads District Council International Long-
shoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1970, AFL-CIO;
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
862, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 846, AFL-CIO;

112a

International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
970, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624, AFL-CIO;
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
1784, AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; International
Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840, AFL-CIO;
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local
1736, AFL-CIO and Houff Transfer, Inc.

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;
Hampton Roads District Council International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1970,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 862, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 846,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 970, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1784, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1736, AFL-CIO and Houff Transfer,
Ine. and Council of North Atlantic Shipping Asso-
ciations, Party to the Contract

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;

Hampton Roads District Council International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1970,

113a

AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 862, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 846,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 970, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1784, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1736, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1783, AFL-CIO and
Tidewater Motor Truck Association

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO;
Hampton Roads District Council International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, Local 197 0,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 862, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1248, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 846,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 970, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1458, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1624,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1784, AFL-CIO; International Long-
shoremen’s Association, Local 1819, AFL-CIO; In-
ternational Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1840,
AFL-CIO; International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, Local 1736, AFL-CIO; International Long-

1l4a

shoremen’s Association, Local 1783, AFL-CIO;
Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations;
and Hampton Roads Shipping Association and
Tidewater Motor Truck Association. Cases 5-CC-
791, 5-CE-48, 5-CC-792, 5-CE-49, 5-CC-7938, 5-CE-
50, 5-CC-794, and 5-CE-51

August 12, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER

By CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER

On August 19, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondents Council of
North Atlantic Shipping Associations, Hampton
Roads Shipping Association, and International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, and its af-
filiated District Councils and Locals filed exceptions
and supporting briefs. The General Counsel filed an
answering brief in support of the Administrative
Law Judge’s Decision. Charging Party Houff Trans-
fer, Inc., filed cross-exceptions and supporting brief.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in the proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.

115a

Upon careful consideration and detailed analysis
of the record evidence, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that Respondents violated the Act as al-
leged. We agree. Notwithstanding our dissenting
colleague’s incorrect intimation that the Administra-
tive Law Judge decided this case solely on the au-
thority of our decision in International Longshore-
men’s Association, AFL-CIO (Consolidated Express,
Inc.), 221 NLRB 956 (1975), without giving due
consideration to the so-called critical dis*' nilarities
between that earlier case and the instant case, it is
clear that the Administrative Law Judge fully de-
veloped the facts here to support the violations which
he found. Moreover, despite his own lengthy analysis,
our dissenting colleague has ultimately failed to over-
come the criteria (noted principally at sec. B, par. 6,
of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision) that
the Administrative Law Judge correctly relied on in
finding the violations in this proceeding.

We further disagree with our dissenting colleague’s
characterization of trucking industry representatives’
testimony as “conceding” that they knew the work
they were performing was in violation of the con-
tainer rules. These officials testified only that Re-
spondents and certain shipping personnel deemed
these actions to be violations, not that they actually
were violations, or that the trucking industry ac-
knowledged them to be such.

We also reject our colleague’s reliance on the
Dublin agreement as support for his conclusion that
Respondents’ object here was a work-preservation

116a

object. The 1978 Dublin agreement, in relevant part,
contained provisions dealing with Respondents’ juris-
diction over the unloading of full shippers’ loads
destined for warehouse storage within 50 miles of
port. Respondents’ members had been doing that
work since 1969, but it is not the work at issue here.
Rather, as our dissenting colleague himself notes,
“the actions of the [Respondents] and shipping com-
panies which we must adjudge [in this proceeding ]
involve only shippers’ loads destined for a beneficial
owner more than 50 miles from port, but which were
picked up by motor transport carriers and stripped
at trucking stations within 50 miles of port.” To
that end, the Dublin agreement does not aid our col-
league’s position in any way.

Our dissenting colleague also finds some signifi-
cance in the fact that in the Consolidated Express
case, noted above, the charging parties were com-
panies historically engaged in the primary function
of loading and unloading, whereas the Charging Par-
ties here are primarily engaged in the transportation
of cargo and not its loading or unloading. We view
this fact as a distinction without a difference because
it is not important what type of enterprise was doing
the work; rather, what is important is that Respond-
ents’ members here, as in Consolidated Express, had
not historically done the work.

Finally, our colleague makes passing reference to
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Northeast
Marine Terminal Company, Ince. v. Caputo, Docket
76-444 (June 17, 1977). We agree with his state-

ii i iN i ti

117a

ment that the context of that case is ‘“concededly dif-
ferent” from that present here. And to the extent
our colleague extracts certain language from that
decision which he indicates supports his position, we
note that the Supreme Court there expressly adopted
certain language from the Second Circuit’s decision
in Consolidated Express, 587 F.2d 706 (1976). It
was also the Second Cireuit which enforced our de-
cision in Consolidated Express with the words “it
is clear that the on-pier stripping and stuffing work
performed by longshoremen as an incident of loading
and unloading ships does not embrace the work [of
stuffing and stripping containers] traditionally per-
formed by Consolidated and Twin at their own off-
pier premises.” (537 F.2d at 712.) Thus, reference
to the Northeast Marine case when read in conjunc-
tion with the Consolidated Express decision proves
only one thing, that it is the facts of each case in
the area which are paramount.

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondents International Longshore-
men’s Association, AFL-CIO; Hampton Roads Dis-
trict Council International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO; ILA Locals 846, 862, 970, 1248,
1458, 1624, 1736, 1738, 1784, 1819, 1840, and 1970,
AFL-CIO; Atlantic Coast District Council Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; and

118a

ILA Locals 333, 921, 953, 1855, and 1429, AFL-CIO,
their respective officers, agents, and representatives,
and Respondents Council of North Atlantic Ship-
ping Associations (CONASA), and Hampton Roads
Shipping Association (HRSA), their respective of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.

CHAIRMAN FANNING, dissenting:

In concluding that Respondents violated Section
8(e) and Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, the
Administrative Law Judge placed considerable reli-
ance on the Board’s determination in International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (Consolidated
Express, Inc.) ,* involving the knotty problem of some
facets of containerization in the New York port area.
Here, the problem involves another facet of contain-
erization as it developed some 10 years later in the
ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads. While the
Administrative Law Judge cites additional factors
which I address below, it is his failure to perceive
distinctions between the work practices and bargain-
ing agreements negotiated by the ILA and the ship-
ping companies in New York and those involving
the ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads which
results in his erroneous legal conclusion. My col-
leagues, I fear, by affirming the Administrative Law
Judge, fail to heed the Supreme Court’s warning that

1221 NLRB 956 (1975), enfd. 587 F.2d 706 (C.A. 2, 1976),
cert. denied 97 S.Ct. 740 (1977) (hereinafter Consolidated
Express).

119a

assessing whether a contractual provision has a valid
work-preservation objective “will not always be a
simple test to apply.” * In my view, a more searching
inquiry reveals critical dissimilarities between this
case and Consolidated Express.

At issue here is the limited question of whether
rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2) of the 1974-77 Rules on
Containers (hereinafter 1974 Rules),* which entitle
International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) la-

2 National Woodwork Manufacturers Association Vv.
N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967).

3 The rules’ pertinent provisions are as follows:

Rule 1—Containers to be Loaded or Discharged by
Deepsea ILA Labor.

(a) Cargo in containers referred to below shall be loaded
into or discharged out of containers only at a waterfront
facility by deepsea ILA labor.

(1) Containers owned, leased or used by carriers .. .
which contain consolidated container loads, which come
from or go to any point within a geographic area of any
CONASA port described by a 50-mile circle with its
radius extending out from the center of each port, (here-
inafter geographic area) or

* * * * *

(3) Containers designated for a single consignee from
which the cargo is discharged (deconsolidated) by other
than its own employee within the “geographic area” and
which is not warehoused in accordance with Rule 2(B).

Rule 2—Containers Not to be Loaded or Discharged by
I.L.A. Labor.
B. Import Cargo:

* * + * *

(2) Containers discharged at a qualified consignee’s fa-
cility by its own employees.

120a

bor to strip and stuff shippers’ loads* whenever the
work is to be done within 50 miles of port by other
than the consignee’s employees, are valid work-
preservation provisions. In making this determina-
tion, careful scrutiny must be given to that history of
containerization which is unique to the ports of Bal-
timore, Maryland, and Hampton Roads, Virginia.
The record discloses that container traffic first ap-
peared in Baltimore harbor and in the Hampton
Roads port area in 1965. For decades prior to this
time, ILA employees unloaded bulk cargo from steam-
ships on a piece-by-piece basis, sorted it out, and
transported the cargo to the end of the pier for
loading by them onto the back of a truck. Their work
therefore covered all movement of ocean cargo from
a delivery truck’s tailgate to the ship’s hold for export
cargo, and the converse for import cargo. Between
1965 and 1968, ILA’s collective-bargaining agree-
ments covering longshoremen in the ports of Balti-
more and Hampton Roads did not contain any rules
regarding the extent to which longshoremen were to
be used in the handling of containers or their con-
tents. It appears that, during this period, ILA-
represented employees stripped (unloaded) import
containers which held less-than-trailer-load cargo
(LTL) and also consolidated full container loads.°

4The term “shipper’s load” refers to a full-container of
goods from one shipper to a single beneficial owner-consignee.

5 An LTL load refers to a container which is not full and
which contains the cargo of two or more shippers. Consoli-
dated loads contain the goods of two or more shippers and are
usually destined for more than one consignee or beneficial
owner.

12la

Full shippers’ loads, however, were placed by ILA
labor on the pier, unless unloading was requested by
the consignee’s agent or the stevedore. A motor trans-
port carrier generally would then drive to the pier
and pick up the shipper’s load container intact.

With the advent of containerization, the work op-
portunities associated with bulk cargo on the piers
diminished substantially. The adaptation to bur-
geoning containerization led to a 56-day strike by the
ILA in 1963. Following the strike settlement, the
ILA entered into a 1968-71 collective-bargaining
agreement with Hampton Roads Maritime Associa-
tion’ and Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore
(STA), setting forth “Rules and Conditions Covering
Handling of Containers.” It is apparent therefore
that these initial rules on containers were adopted
in Baltimore and Hampton Roads when containeriza-
tion in those ports was still in its infancy.*®

Since the introduction of container traffic to the
ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads, the shipping

*An ILA official testified that, before containerization, 5
gangs of 22 men loaded or unloaded an average of 30 tons per
hour. With the new method of loading and unloading ships, a
20-man gang and 1 crane could load 600 tons per hour.

7 The Hampton Roads Maritime Association was the prede-
cessor to the Hampton Roads Shipping Association (HRSA),
a Respondent in this case.

8 From its inception in 1965, the amount of container traffic
increased every year. Although only numbering a handful in
1965, by 1969 1 shipping company was handling 4,000 con-
tainers per year in Baltimore and by 1973 the number had
grown to 25,000.

122a

companies and ILA have contractually agreed that
ILA-represented employees must load and unload
LTL and consolidated full container loads if destined
for a point within a 50-mile radius from the center of
port. Two subsequent agreements negotiated by the
ILA and representatives of the steamship carriers for
1971-74 and 1974-77 have also included provisions
authorizing ILA members to perform this work.’
These contractual provisions and the work practices
relative to LTL and consolidated loads, however, are
not at issue here.

Our sole concern is with the provisions in the 1974
Rules, which entitle ILA labor to strip shippers’ loads
whenever such work is to be done less than 50 miles
from port. Specifically, the actions of the ILA and
shipping companies which we must adjudge involve
only shippers’ loads destined for a beneficial owner
more than 50 miles from port, but which were picked
up by motor transport carriers and stripped at truck-
ing stations within 50 miles of port. This practice
is referred to as shortstopping.

In support of their contention that stripping of
shippers’ loads was never work traditionally per-
formed by ILA labor, the General Counsel and the
motor carriers maintain that the ILA abandoned any
claim it might have had to such work in the 1968 and
1971 rules on containers applicable to the area bhe-

® The 1971 and 1974 contracts were negotiated by the Coun-
cil of North Atlantic Shipping Associations (CONASA), an
association of employer shipping associations, including STA
and HRSA, which has been authorized to enter into collective-
bargaining agreements on behalf of its members since 1971.

123a

cause they omitted any specific provision regarding
the handling of shippers’ loads. This assertion that
shippers’ loads were thereby unrestricted by the ILA
is belied by the work history involving shippers’ loads
going to warehouses after the 1968 contract.

As recognized by the Administrative Law J udge
and conceded by the General Counsel, following ex-
ecution of the 1968 agreement, ILA longshoremen
stripped shippers’ loads destined for a warehouse for
storage within 50 miles of port. Until the January
1973 Dublin agreement ** in which the ILA recog-
nized an exception for bona fide storage and agreed
not to claim the right to handle import cargo to be
“warehoused in the normal course of business for at
least 30 days,” the ILA retained jurisdiction to un-
load shippers’ loads destined for warehouses.”

10 The Dublin agreement was not unique to Baltimore and
Hampton Roads but applied also to New York.

11The Dublin agreement therefore took effect during the
1971 contract and thus prior to the 1974 Rules which made
the first explicit reference to shippers’ loads. If there was no
consensus entitling ILA labor to strip shippers’ loads destined
for warehouses prior to 1974, then the Dublin agreement
would have been a superfluous exemption under the 1971
Rules. My colleagues, while not disputing this, do overlook
its significance. Though not encompassing the precise work
at issue, the Dublin agreement demonstrates that, notwith-
standing the absence of specific contractual provisions re-
garding the handling of shippers’ loads prior to 1974, it was
understood that not all shippers’ loads could pass through port
unrestricted by ILA labor. This evidence strengthens the
ILA’s claims concerning skippers’ loads and undermines the
Administrative Law Judge’s reliance on the plain language
of the 1968 and 1971 Rules in casing doubt on respondents’
claim that the shortstopping of shippers’ loads violated the
and 1971 Rules.

124a

Since the inception of containerization in both
Hampton Roads and Baltimore, the ILA has insisted,
with the acquiescence of the shipping companies, that
shippers’ loads go directly to their destination intact.
The only exemption from this practice was that a
shipper, manufacturer, or consignee could choose to
strip or stuff shippers’ loads or manufacturers’ loads
using their own employees.’* This agreement to allow
shippers’ loads to pass through port unrestricted by
ILA labor, however, was never intended or inter-
preted to allow motor carriers or warehousemen to
load or unload shippers’ loads at their off-pier fa-
cilities. The traditional exemption for shippers’ loads
was premised on the understanding that such loads
are “through” containers, much larger in size but
properly analogous to a single item of bulk cargo.
When taken to a trucker’s warehouse to be stripped
and repacked, they lose that identity. The overwhelm-
ing testimony indicates that this shortstopping of
shippers’ loads was never approved by the ILA or
the shipping companies as a permissible encroach-
ment upon the ILA’s traditional work jurisdiction.”

12 The term “manufacturer’s load” is essentially synony-
mous with that of shipper’s load. A “manufacturer’s label’
is a single shipment transported directly, without stopping en
route, from one consignee or manufacturer to another.

18 For example, George Maier, port manager for U.S. Lines
in Baltimore and president of STA, testified that it “had al-
ways been a rule that prevailed in Baltimore” that truckers
were not to strip any container that was a full shipper’s load
going to a single consignee. Maier further explained: “In

¢

125a

This situation with respect to the handling of ship-
pers’ loads in the ports of Baltimore and Hampton
Roads is in marked contrast to the agreements and
practices relative to LTL and consolidated container
loads in the port of New York, which were at issue
in Consolidated Express. Containerization first ap-
peared in New York in the late 1950’s, much earlier
than its advent in Baltimore and Hampton Roads.
In 1959, the ILA and the New York Shipping As-
sociation (NYSA) reached an agreement in which the
ILA agreed that “any employer shall have the right
to use any and all type containers without restriction
or stripping by the Union.” “* For years thereafter,
work on any type container was done by other than
ILA labor in accordance with the contractual agree-
ment. The Board concluded therefore that the ILA

cases where it came to our attention, prior to the delivery of
such a shipment to a truckman and it came to our knowledge
that the intent of the truckman was to deconsolidate this con-
tainer and restuff it into his own equipment at his platform,
we refused delivery of that cargo to the truckman.”

The situation was similar in Hampton Roads. Jack Mace,
executive secretary of HRSA, testified that, if a member of
HRSA was informed that the pier by a motor carrier that it
was going to strip a shipper’s load at a trucking station, the
shipping company would instruct the ILA to perform the
work. Mace also testified that motor carriers in his area were
aware of the enforcement of the practice relative to shippers’
loads “certainly as far back as 1969.”

14 This provisions was contained in sec. 8(a) of the 1959
memorandum of settlement entitled “Containers—Dravo Size
or Larger.”

15 The Board indicated that, “with few exceptions,” the ILA
allowed all containers to cross the New York docks without
rehandling.

126a

had bargained away its claim to the stuffing and
stripping of LCL and LTL loads in question here.

There is no such restrictive contract clause in the
bargaining history of the instant case.’* Rather, as
already indicated, the shipping companies have im-
plicitly agreed with the ILA’s demand, since the in-
ception of containerization in Baltimore and Hamp-
ton Roads, that shippers’ loads go directly to their
destination intact. And, from execution of the 1968
Rules until the Dublin agreement of 1973, ILA labor,
in fact, stripped shippers’ loads that were instead
warehoused for storage within 50 miles of port.
Thus, unlike Consolidated Express, where the union
sought to extend its jurisdiction to cover work it had
bargained away, here the specificity of the 1974
Rules merely codified what had been the practice
and agreement of the ILA and the shipping com-
panies relative to shippers’ loads.

In Consolidated Express, moreover, maritime cargo
in New York was sorted and consolidated for many
years by companies whose primary function was
consolidation; that is, the loading and unloading of
LCL and LTL loads. The Board there recognized
that these consolidators “generate such work them-
selves, performing it not on behalf of the employer-
members of NYSA but for their own customers who

16The court of appeals did not agree with the Board’s
abandonment theory in Consolidated. Nevertheless, the ab-
sence of a similar clause in the instant matter, considering
the experience gained by the ILA as a result of a decade of
bargaining on this issue relative to New York, acquires par-
ticular significance in my view.

127a

have goods to ship.” It was further determined by
the Board that the consolidator-charging parties in
that case were traditionally engaged in the work of
stuffing and stripping containers. In context, the
ILA’s claim “to strip and stuff cargo merely because
that cargo was originally containerized by nonunit
personnel” was construed as a claim “to engage in
make-work measures.”

That situation is not present here. The Charging
Parties are primarily engaged in the transportation
of cargo and not its loading and unloading.” Con-
trary to my colleagues’ superficial assessment, this is
hardly a distinction without a difference. In Consoli-
dated Express, the Board stressed the record’s clarity
that the charging parties had “engaged in the work of
stuffing and stripping containers” for many years.
Especially when viewed in the context that the ILA
had contractually bargained away its claim to the
stuffing and stripping of the container in question
there, the persuasiveness of the ILA’s claim to a
lawful work-preservation objective was considerably
diminished. Here, however, the ILA has never re-
linquished its claim to stuff and strip shippers’ loads

17 For example, Houff Transfer, Inc., first handled the con-
tainers of U.S. Lines in March 1970. In the course of its
business, Houff moves a few hundred containers per year. Its
president, Cletus Houff, testified, however, that Houff has more
domestic business (other than container business) than steam-
ship company container business. With respect to the opera-
tions of Associated Transport, Inc., the record discloses that
approximately 10 percent of its business is in the drayage of
containers in foreign commerce.

128a

which do not go to their destination intact. Nor does
the record support the conclusion that the motor car-
riers have “traditionally” been engaged in the stuf-
fing and stripping of such containers. With respect
to the record evidence that motor carriers have short-
stopped some shippers’ loads at their off-pier facilities
and used their own employees to strip the loads from
the containers and stuff them into the motor carriers’
containers for transportation to the consignee, it ap-
pears that the work was done without the knowledge
of either the ILA or the shipping companies.”
Whether predicated upon considerations of safety,
state highway or bridge regulations, or economy,”
it is apparent that the work involved could just as
satisfactorily have been done at the piers by ILA
labor.” Viewed in this context, the Administrative

18 Unlike Consolidated Express, in which the shipping docu-
ments involved showed when the LTL or LCL containers
originated from or were destined to a consolidator, here, when
a container is released to a motor carrier, the delivery order
specifies that the cargo is to be transported to the consignee.
Intent to shortstop is thereby difficult to ascertain, though the
early return of the shipping company’s container may demon-
strate that shortstopping has, in fact, occurred. Effective en-
forcement of the rules is thus difficult.

19 Inasmuch as the trucking companies pay a per diem for
each day they have a shipper’s container, by immediately
opening the containers and reloading them in motor transport
equipment, the trucking companies can save money.

20 ILA President Thomas Gleason explained the ILA’s posi-
tion as follows:
We are not telling Associated, or Pilot, or U.S. Lines not
to do business with each other. All we are saying to them
is, “look we have a contract which spells out what the

129a

Law Judge’s conclusion that the ILA did not have
a lawful work preservation objective incorrectly foc-
uses on motor carrier work “traditions.”

The incidents alleged here as unlawful secondary
activity all involve shippers’ loads destined for a
beneficial owner more than 50 miles from port, but
shortstopped by a motor carrier and stripped within
50 miles of port. Upon learning of these actions, the
ILA complained to the appropriate joint ILA-Ship-
ping Company Container Committee * that the motor
carriers had violated the 1974 container rules. In
every case, fines were exacted against the shipping
companies which had released the containers to the
motor carriers. The shipping companies, in turn,
requested indemnification from the trucking compa-
nies.” When the motor carriers refused, the shipping

rules are.” U.S. Lines has no right to make an agree-
ment to bypass our contract. If Associated wants to
handle these containers and they want to take it and
deliver it in their truck, then come down to the pier with
your truck, let the longshoremen, as they have done it
for 50 or 75 years, take that cargo and put it on the truck
and take it wherever you want. We have no objection to
that. Otherwise, take the container and bring it to the
man’s place of business.

21 Pursuant to the ILA’s 1968 contract, joint container com-
mittees, representative equally of the ILA and the respective
shipping associations in the ports of Baltimore and Hampton
Roads, were established to resolve ILA complaints alleging
violations of the container rules.

*2'The record demonstrates that, for several years prior to
adoption of the 1974 contract, the trucking industry was
aware that shortstopping was a violation of the container
rules. Allie McNeil, vice president of D. D. Jones Transfer

130a

companies canceled their respective equipment inter-
change agreements, thereby precluding the affected
motor carriers from handling future container
cargo.”

and Warehouse Company, Inc., a member of the Tidewater
Motor Truck Association, admitted that, since 1969, he knew
of the rules and of their application to containers destined
for discharge within the 50-mile radius of port. Robert
McGleskey, district manager of Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., testified that, shortly after he began operations in
Norfolk, Virginia, in 1970, he became aware that it was a
violation of the rules for a trucker to strip a shipper’s load at
its facility. McGleskey further admitted his awareness that
the steamship carrier would be assessed damages for this
violation. L. Chadwick, assistant manager of Hennis Freight,
a member of the Tidewater Motor Truck Association, and a
former employee of Associated Transport, admitted similar
knowledge since 1971.

*8 A shipping company will not turn over its container to a
motor carrier unless there is an equipment interchange agree-
ment between the two carriers. In effect, this agreement is a
case which delineates the rights and obligations of the lessee-
motor carrier while it has custody of the lessor-shipping com-
pany’s containers.

The equipment interchange agreement used by the shipper
U.S. Lines contains language giving the motor carriers “com-
plete control” of the cargo once they transport it from the
pier. This “complete control” language is one basis on which
the Administrative Law Judge refutes the testimony of Re-
spondents’ witnesses that all parties understood that short-
stopping of shippers’ loads violated the container rules since
the 1968 contract. I find the Administrative Law Judge’s
reasoning unpersuasive.

The interchange agreement has nothing to do with the
handling of cargo but is primarily concerned with user re-
sponsibility and per diem charges. There is no language in

—

13la

If work preservation is actually the objective of the
1974 container rules relative to shippers’ loads, the
economic impact on the neutral motor carriers does
not thereby transform the rules and their enforce-
ment into activity with a secondary objective.”
Whether rules 1(a) (3) and 2B(2) have an improper
“cease doing business’ objective, as found by the
Administrative Law Judge, is a question of fact
which must be resolved here on the basis of the work
history regarding shippers’ loads in the ports of
Baltimore and Hampton Roads. In this vein, the
critical determinant is the record’s disclosure that,
beginning in 1968, ILA labor stripped shippers’ loads
destined for a warehouse within 50 miles of port.

the agreement relative to the right of the trucker to take
cargo out of the container after its transfer from the shipper.

Perhaps a more significant provision in the interchange
agreement is that which obligates the lessee-motor carrier to
“comply with any and all appropriate formalities and re-
quirements regarding the use, operation or transportation
of the containers or chassis.” This arguably binds the
trucker to adhere to the shipper’s obligation to the ILA as
set forth in the container rules.

24 See, e.g., Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America [J. L. Simmons Company, Inc.] V.
N.L.R.B., 444 F.2d 895, 901 (C.A.D.C., 1971), cert. denied
404 U.S. 986 (1971) ; American Boiler Manufacturers Associa-
tion V. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d 547, 552 (C.A. 8, 1968), cert. de-
nied. 398 U.S. 960° (1970), affg. 167 NLRB 602 (1967);
N.L.R.B. v. Local. Union No. 23 of Sheet Metal Workers In-
ternational Association of Greater New York [Johnson Serv-
ice Company], 380 F.2d 827, 880 (C.A. 2, 1967). See also the
Supreme Court’s discussion of its interpretation of the his-
torical counterpart to Sec. 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), in National Wood-
work Manufacturers Association v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612,
627 (1967).

132a

This practice continued until the Dublin agreement
of January 1973 which exempted any cargo ware-
housed “in the normal course of the business of the
beneficial owner” for at least 30 days. The incidents
of shortstopping of shippers’ loads by the motor ecar-
riers for which the ILA here exacted fines, however,
do not constitute permissible warehousing as defined
in the Dublin agreement. These incidents therefore
violated rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2) of the 1974 con-
tainer rules. In my view, these rules reflect the work
practices and agreements between the ILA and the
shipping companies relative to the handling of ship-
pers’ loads almost since the inception of containeri-
zation in the ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads.
Until the Dublin agreement, the ILA and shipping
companies agreed that, if shippers’ loads did not go
to their destination intact tc be stripped and stuffed
by the employees of the shipper, manufacturer, or
consignee, then the unloading and reloading of such
containerized loads should be done on the pier by
ILA longshoremen just as they had handled break
bulk cargo for decades.* The intervening contracts

*5 In Northeast Marine Terminal Company, Inc. v. Caputo,
Docket 76-444 (June 17, 1977), the Supreme Court decided
that an individual stripping a container is engaged in a
“longshoring operation” within the meaning of the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (Act). Although the context is concededly
different from that here, the Supreme Court’s discussion of
containerization, in terms of moving longshoremen’s work
shoreward, is instructive. The Court stated:

In effect, the operation of loading and unloading has been
moved shoreward, the container is a modern substitute

eat ee ee Se) ee

133a

specifically confirm this. The ILA never bargained
away its claim to the work in dispute. Nor in en-
forcing it does it seek either to expand the longshore
bargaining unit by the involuntary addition of other
emp_oyees or to achieve any labor relations objective
outside of this unit. Against this background, I
view rules 1(a) (8) and 2B(2) of the 1974 container
rules as valid work-preservation provisions, the
maintenance and enforcement of which violate neither
Section 8(e) nor Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.
To conclude otherwise would be to restructure the
work practices and agreements which the ILA and
the shippers have negotiated in response to the mo-
mentous impact which containerization brought to the
ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads. This we do
not have authority to do.

I would further find, contrary to the Administra-
tive Law Judge, that the ILA’s 30-day suspension of
the 1974 Rules on April 28, 1975, did not have an
objective proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). In
compliance with the rules’ “380 days written notice”
provisions, ILA notified CONASA, in late March
1975, of its intent to suspend the rules because of
phony warehouse practices. It had come to the ILA’s
attention that truckers were attempting to circumvent
the “permissible warehousing” provisions of the

for the hold of the vessel. As Judge Friendly observed
below, “stripping a container . . . is the functional equiva-
lent of sorting cargo discharged from a ship; stuffing a
container is part of the loading of the ship even though
it is performed on the shore and not in the ship’s cargo

holds.”

134a

Dublin agreement by simply using their warehouses
as deconsolidation stations. As ILA President Tho-
mas Gleason explained, motor carriers were bringing
the cargo “in the front door and out the back” and
construing this as justifiable warehousing. After ne-
gotiations, the ILA and CONASA executed a supple-
mental agreement which “clarified and reinstated”
the 1974 container rules.** Based on my views as
expressed above, I would similarly find that the ne-
gotiations concerning the 30-day suspension of the
rules had a valid work-preservation objective.

Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge:

These consolidated cases were heard before me in
accordance with Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 158, et seq.),
referred to herein as the Act, on October 15, 16, 17,
22, 23, and 24, 1975. The Respondents participated
in the hearing pursuant to due notice and two con-
solidated complaints issued respectively by the Re-
gional Director for Region 5 on September 25 and
October 1, 1975, which were in turn consolidated by
order of the Acting Regional Director on October 10,

26 The clarification explaineg#that trucking stations where
containers are unloaded wit 50 miles of port do not con-
stitute bona fide public warehouses within the meaning of the
Dublin 30-day warehouse exception.

135a

1975. The consolidated complaint of October 10, 1975,
alleged that all the Respondents had violated Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act and that Respondents Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Association and its Hampton
Roads and Atlantic Coast District Councils, and ILA
locals (referred to herein collectively as ILA), named
in the above caption had violated Section 8(b) (4)
(ii) (B) of the Act.

In summary, Cases 5-CE-48, 5-CE-50, and 5-CE-
1,’ allege that Respondents ILA, Hampton Roads
District Council and their affiliated locals in the
Hampton Roads Shipping Association (referred to
herein as HRSA) and CONASA violated Section
8(e) of the Act by entering into, maintaining, and
giving effect to provisions of their current collective-
bargaining agreement whereby employer-members of
HRSA have agreed to cease doing business with As-
sociated Transport, Inc. (referred to herein as Asso-
ciated), Houff Transfer, Inc. (referred to herein as
Houff), and other employer-members of Tidewater
Motor Truck Association (referred to herein as
TMTA). Cases 5-CC-791, 5-CC-793, and 5-CC-794
alleged that ILA, its Hampton Roads District Coun-

1 At the hearing, I granted the motion of the Council of
North America Shipping Associations (referred to herein as
CONASA), one of the Respondents named in Case 5-CE-51, to
intervene as a party to the contract in Cases 5-CE-48, 5-CE-
49, 5-CE-50, and 5-CE-51. However, in making that ruling,
I overlooked CONASA’s status as a named Respondent in
Case 5-CE-51. Accordingly, I now amend my ruling to cor-
rect that inadvertence. The captions of Cases 5-CE-48, 5-CE-
49, and 5-CE-50 appear as amended at the hearing. I have
restored the caption in Case 5-CE-51 to its correct form.

136a

cil and their affiliated locals in the Hampton Roads,
Virginia, port area violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)
of the Act by imposing fines upon employer-members
of HRSA, including United States Lines, Inc. (re-
ferred to herein as U.S. Lines), by suspending a por-
tion of the 1974-77 collective-bargaining agreement
with HRSA, and by entering into, maintaining, and
seeking to enforce portions of the same agreement
regarding cargo containers, all with an object of
compelling such employer-members of HRSA to cease
doing business with Associated, Houff, and other
members of TMTA.

In Case 5-CE-49, the complaint alleges that Re-
spondents ILA, its Atlantic Coast District Council,
and their affiliated locals in the Baltimore, Maryland,
port areas violated Section 8(e) of the Act by enter-
ing into, maintaining, and giving effect to provisions
of their 1974-77 collective-bargaining agreement with
Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. (re-
ferred to herein as STA), including U.S. Lines and
Lavino Shipping Company (referred to herein as
Lavino), whereby STA and its employer-members
have agreed to cease doing business with Houff. Fi-
nally, Case 5-CC-792 alleges that Respondents ILA,
its Atlantic Coast District Council and their affiliated
locals in the Baltimore port area violated Section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act by engaging in conduct
similar to that alleged in Cases 5-CC-791, 5-CC-793,
and 5-CC-794 for the purposes of compelling U.S.
Lines and Lavino to cease doing business with Houff.

Upon the entire record in this case, including the

187a

transcript of the hearing before me, the transcript of
testimony in a proceeding ancillary to the instant
case, 1.e., William C. Humphrey, etc. v. International
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CI O, et al. and
Hampton Roads Shipping Association, Civil Action
10-441-N in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, a proceeding
in which the Regional Director of Region 5 sought
an injunction under Section 10(1) of the Act,? and

the parties’ briefs, as corrected and supplemented, I
make the following: oe

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED

Houff, a Virginia corporation, operates freight ter-
minals at Baltimore, Maryland, and Norfolk, Vir-
ginia. Associated, a New York corporation, operates
a freight terminal at Virginia Beach, Virginia. Both
Houff and Associated are engaged in the interstate
transportation of freight by motor truck under li-
censes issued by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
&

? Following the adjournment of the hearing i i
g in the instant
case on October 24, the parties had opportunity to determine

if the hearing should resume for purposes of cross-examination

of witnesses who had testified in the injunction oceedi

Thereafter, on December 9, 1975, as danioicisas of “a
parties, I issued an order in which I received the transcript
in the injunction proceeding as part of the record herein
_— Jt. Exh. 1, and closed the hearing as of that same

138a

sion. During the preceding 12 months, Houff and
Associated, respectively, received revenues exceeding
$50,000 from their interstate freight operations.

STA is an organization composed of various steam-
ship lines and steamship agencies doing business in
the Baltimore, Maryland, port area including U.S.
Lines and Lavino. It exists for the purpose, among
others, of bargaining collectively on behalf of its em-
ployer-members with labor organizations, including
ILA, concerning wages, hours, and conditions of em-
ployment of the employese of the Associations em-
ployer-members. U.S. Lines, a New Jersey corpora-
tion, and Lavino, a Pennsylvania corporation, are
engaged in the transportation of cargo by oceangoing
vessels in interstate and foreign commerce. During
the past 12 months, STA’s employer-members re-
ceived in excess of $1 million from the transportation
of cargo in interstate and foreign commerce.

CONASA is, and at all times since 1971 has been,
an association of employer shipping associations, in-
cluding STA and HRSA, the members of which are
engaged in the business of conducting collective-bar-
gaining negotiations on behalf of their respective
employer-members and entering into collective-
bargaining agreements covering the employees of their
employer-members of HRSA, including U.S. Lines,
received in excess of $1 million from the transporta-
tion of cargo in interstate and foreign commerce.

TMTA is an employer association composed of 28
employer-members including Associated, which are
engaged in interstate transportation and delivery of

139a

general freight and commodities in and around the
Hampton Roads, Virginia, area. During the past 12
months, the employer-members of Tidewater received
in excess of $50,000 from the interstate transporta-
tion and delivery of freight and commodities.

At all times material herein, U.S. Lines, Lavino,
Associated, Houff, the employer-members of TMTA,
STA, HRSA, and CONASA, are, and each has been,
an employer as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act,
engaged in commerce and in operations affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act, respectively.

I further find that ILA, Hampton Roads District
Council, Atlantic Coast District Council, and ILA
Locals 333, 846, 862, 921, 953, 970, 1248, 1355, 1429,
1458, 1624, 1736, 1783, 1784, 1819, 1840, and 1970
are labor organizations within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.

I conclude and find that it is proper to assert
jurisdiction in these proceedings.

Il. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. The Facts

1. The evolution of the ILA-CONASA
Container Rules

Prior to the mid-1960’s, when the first container-
ships appeared in Baltimore harbor and in the Hamp-
ton Roads port area, the ILA longshoremen unloaded
bulk cargo from steamships, sorted it out on a piece

140a

basis, and transported the cargo to the end of the
pier for loading onto the back of a truck. There, I
find from the testimony of ILA President Thomas W.
Gleason, Sr., that the longshoremen’s work ended
with respect to import cargo. At that point, in Bal-
timore and in Hampton Roads, where truck transpor-
tation was involved, a freight handler would load
the cargo onto the back of a truck sent by the con-
signee. Although the ILA has represented the freight
handlers, I find from Mr. Gleason, Sr.’s, testimony
that they were not longshoremen. However, after
the mid-1960’s with the increasing use of large con-
tainers, the work opportunities associated with bulk
cargo on the piers diminished.

Notwithstanding this development, ILA’s collective-
bargaining agreements covering longshoremen in the
ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads for the years
prior to 1968 did not contain any rules regarding
the extent to which longshoremen were to be utilized
in the handling of containers or their contents. Dur-
ing those years, ILA longshoremen stripped (un-
loaded) import containers which held _less-than-
trailer-load cargo (LTL).* However, they did not
strip full shipper’s loads (import containers loaded
with goods belonging to a single consignee, who was
also beneficial owner of the cargo) unless requested
to do so by the consignee’s agent or the stevedore.
Thus, as a rule, ILA labor simply removed the ship-

3 LTL cargo refers to individual shipments destined to two
or more consignees which have been shipped in a single
container.

l4la

per’s load container from the ship to the pier, where
it was picked up by a motor transport carrier.

In their 1968-71 collective-bargaining agreement,
ILA and HRSA’s precedessor, Hampton Roads Mari-
time Association, for the first time, dealt with con-
tainerization in the bargaining unit. In this context,
the provisions pertinent to this case were as follows:

II. RULES ON CONTAINERS

The following provisions are intended to pro-
tect and preserve the work jurisdiction of long-
shoremen and all other ILA crafts at deepsea
piers or terminals. To assure compliance with
the collective-bargaining provisions the following
rules and regulations shall be applied.

A. Definitions and Rule as to Containers Cov-
ered.

Stuffing—means the act of placing cargo into a
container.

Stripping—means the act of removing cargo
from a container.

Loading—means the act of placing containers
aboard a vessel.

Discharging—means the act of removing con-
tainers from a vessel.

These provisions relate solely to containers meet-

ing each and all of the following criteria:

1. Containers owned or leased by employer-
signatory members (including containers on
wheels) which contain LTL loads or consolidated
full container loads.

2. Such containers which come from or go to
any person (including a consolidator who stuffs
containers of outbound cargo or a distributor

142a

who strips containers of inbound cargo and in-
cluding a forwarder, who is either a consolidator
of outbound cargo or a distributor of inbound
cargo) who is not the beneficial owner of the
cargo.

3. Such containers which come from or go to
any point within a geographical area of any
port in the North Atlantic District described by
a 50-mile circle within its radius extending out
from the center of each port. It is understood
that the center of Hampton Roads will be de-
fined as Middle Ground Light.

B. Rule of Stripping and Stuffing Applied to
Such Containers

A container which comes within each and all
~ = the criteria set forth in “A” above shall be
stuffed and stripped by ILA longshore labor.
Such {LA labor shall be paid and employed at
longshore rates under the terms and conditions
of the General Cargo Agreement. Such stuffing
and stripping shall be performed on a water-
front facility, pier or dock. No contaner of cargo
shall be stuffed or stripped by ILA longshore
labor more than once. N otwithstanding the above
provisions, LTL loads or consolidated container
loads of mail, of household goods with no other
type of cargo in the container, and of personal
effects of military personnel shall be exempt from
the rule of stripping and stuffing.

C. Rules on No Avoidance or Evasion

* * * * *

5. Failure to stuff or strip a container as re-
quired under these rules will be considered a

148a

violation of the contract betwen the parties. Use
of improper, fictitious or incorrect documentation
to evade the provisions of “B” shall also be con-
sidered a violation of the contract. If for any
reason a container is no longer at the waterfront
facility at which it should have been stuffed or
stripped under the rules then the steamship car-
rier found guilty of intent to cause improper,
fictitious, or incorrect documentation to evade
the provisions of “B” above shall pay to the joint
Welfare Fund $150.00 per container which
should have been stuffed or stripped.

Under the foregoing rules, ILA longshoremen work-
ing on the piers were to strip and stuff LTL or con-
solidate full container loads arriving on piers in con-
tainers owned or leased by Hampton Roads Maritime
Association members, which were destined for or
came from any person, not the beneficial owner of the
cargo, and which came from or was destined to any
point within a 50-mile radius from the center of the
port. The contract also provided that ILA was to
receive a royalty for each loaded container which
passed over the piers free of stripping or stuffing by
“ILA longshore labor.”

The 1968-71 ILA-STA collective-bargaining agree-
ment covering the port of Baltimore contained pre-
cisely the same container rules as were agreed to at
Hampton Roads, except that the liquidated damage
provision called for payment of $250 per violation
instead of the $150 required under the Hampton
Roads contracts.

144a

Since 1970, HRSA and STA have authorized
CONANA to bargain collectively with ILA on their
behalf regarding container rules. Thus, the container
rules for both ports have been uniform in their re-
spective subsequent contracts with ILA.

The ILA’s 1971-74 collective-bargaining agree-
ments with HRSA and STA contained the same
CONASA-ILA container rules and royalty provision
as found in the agreements for 1968-71. As in the
1968-71 contracts, there were no provisions in the
1971-74 contracts regarding the stripping or stuffing
of full shippers’ loads by ILA longshore labor. On
September 11, 12, and 13, 1972, 3 months after the
1971-74 contracts were executed, CONASA and ILA
representatives constituting the CONASA-ILA Con-
tainer Committee met at Miami Beach, Florida, re-
garding containerization. The committee discussed
this same topic from January 25 to 29, 1973, at
Dublin, Ireland. The determinations reached at these
meetings included the following which was promul-
gated in the committee’s Interpretive Bulletin No. 1:

INTERPRETATION 1.1
Containers Covered

The rules on containers relate solely to con-
tainers meeting either of the following criteria:

(a) Containers owned or leased by carriers (in-
concluding containers on wheels) which con-
tain LTL loads or consolidated full container
loads, which come from or go to any point
within a geographical area of any port in

145a

the North Atlantic District described by a
50-mile circle with its radius extending out
from the center of each port.

(b) Containers which come from or go to any
person (including a consolidator who stuffs
containers of outbound cargo or a distribu-
tor who strips containers of inbound cargo
and including a forwarder, who is either a
consolidator of outbound cargo or a distrib-
utor of inbound cargo) who is not a benefi-
cial owner of the cargo and such containers
come from or go to any point within a geo-
graphical area of any port in the North
Atlantic District described by a 50-mile
circle with its radius extending out from the
center of each port.

Prior to the 1968 ILA collective-bargaining agree-
ments with HRSA and STA, a warehouse driver as
a matter of practice took full shipper’s load from a
pier, unstripped by ILA longshore labor, and deliv-
ered it to a warehouse where warehouse employees
would strip the container of its contents and store
them. Beginning in 1969, following the execution of
the 1968 agreement, ILA longshoremen stripped full
shippers’ loads which were to be delivered to a ware-
house for storage within a 50-mile radius of the cen-
ter of the port. ILA freight handlers loaded the
freight onto trucks for delivery to the warehouse.
At Dublin, in January 1973, the CONASA-ILA Con-
tainer Committe agered to the following modification
of their rules:

. DEFINITIONS

146a 147a

The ILA-HRSA and ILA-STA contracts, effective Oc-
tober 1, 1974, until September 30, 1977, included the
Dublin 30-day warehouse provision as rule 2(B) (4).

These contracts also departed from the 1971-74
contracts with respect to the language of their con-
tainer rules. The 1974-77 CONASA-ILA rules on
containers include the following:

x Warehousing

A beneficial owner does not violate the
Rules on Containers when he warehouses
his goods in bona fide public warehouses
under the following conditions:

. The container cargo is warehoused at a bona
fide public warehouse;

. The beneficial owner pays the normal labor
charges in and out, and the normal warehouse
storage fees for a minimum period of thirty
or more days; and

. The cargo is being warehoused (a) in the
normal course of the business of the beneficial
owner, (b) title to such goods has not been
transferred from the beneficial owner to an-
other, and (c) it is contemplated- that such
transfer of title will not take place for at
least 30 days after the warehousing of the
cargo. This exception shall not apply where
cargo is warehoused for the purpose of avoid-
ance or evasion of Rule 1.

. The beneficial owner furnishes all documenta-

tion and other information which permits the
Container Committee in the port to deter-
mine whether conditions 1, 2 and 3 have been
met.

. This definition is limited to containers ware-

housed as provided in the above conditions
and any warehouse which does not conform
to such conditions shall be deemed a distri-
bution station and treated accordingly.

(g) Qualified Consignee—means the pur-
chaser or one who otherwise has a proprietary
financial interest (other than in the transporta-
tion or physical consolidation or deconsolidation)
in the import cargo being transported and who
is named in the delivery order.

(h) Consolidated Container Load—means a
container load of cargo where such cargo belongs
to more than one shipper on export cargo or one
consignee on import cargo.

Rule 1—Containers To Be Loaded or Discharged
By Deepsea ILA Labor

(a) Cargo in containers referred .o below

sshall be loaded into or discharged out of contain-

ers only at a waterfront facility by ILA deepsea
labor:

(1) Containers owned, leased or used by
carriers (including containers on wheels
and trailers), hereinafter containers, which
contain consolidated container loads, which
come from or go to any point within a geo-
graphic area of any CONASA port described
by a 50-mile circle with its radius extending
out from the center of each port, (herein-
after “geographical area”) or

148a

(2) Containers which come from a single
shipper which is not the manufacturer
(“manufacturer’s label”) into which the
cargo has been loaded (consolidated) by
other than its own employees and such con-
tainers come from any point within the
“geographic area,” or |

(3) Containers designated for a single
consignee from which the cargo is discharged
(deconsolidated) by other than its own em-
ployees within the “geographic area” and
which is not warehoused in accordance with
Rule 2(B).

* * * * «

Rule 2—Containers Not be Loaded or Discharged
by ILA Labor

Cargo containers referred to below shall not
be loaded or discharged by ILA labor:

A. Export Cargo

* * 4 * *
B. Import Cargo
* * * * *

(2) Containers discharged at a qualified con-
signee’s facility by its own employees.

Under the 1974-77 container rules, ILA labor is
entitled to strip full shippers’ loads, whenever such
work is to be done within a 50-mile radius of the
center of the port by other than the consignee’s em-
ployees. Under rule 7(c) of the 1974-77 CONASA-
ILA contract, the amount of damages for each viola-
tion of this rule or the warehouse rule is $1,000.

149a

: 2. The employment of motor carriers to trans-
port full shipers’ loads from piers to con-
signees

Since the inception of containerization at the port
of Baltimore, and in the port area of Hampton Roads,
respectively, a motor carrier, typically, has been se-
lected by a shipping agent or broker to transport a
shipper’s load to the consignee. The broker or agent
provides the carrier with a delivery order and a bill
of lading which authorizes release of the shipper’s
load. The delivery order requests that the water
carrier deliver the cargo listed on the order for trans-
portation to the consignee. The bill of iading is a
contract between the shipper or shipper’s agent and
the motor carrier which governs the movement of
the shipper’s load to the consignee. Neither the de-
livery order nor the bill of lading prohibits the motor
carrier from stripping the shipper’s load from the
container. The motor truck carriers have not been
and are not parties to the ILA’s collective-bargaining
agreements covering longshore operations in Balti-
more or Hampton Roads. Nor have they agreed to
be bound by the rules on containers set forth in those
agreements. Typically, the containers listed on the
delivery order and bill of lading are the property of
the shipping company responsible for the cargo’s
ocean transportation. Under established practice, the
water carrier will not turn over its container to a
motor carrier unless there is an equipment inter-
change agreement between the two carriers. Such an
agreement sets out the rights and obligations of the

150a

lessee-motor carrier when it has custody of the lessor-
water carrier’s containers. The equipment inter-
change agreement used by U.S. Lines in its dealings
with Houff is typical of such agreements, and con-
tains the following language which I find significant
in determining industry practices:

United States Lines, Inc.
EQUIPMENT INTERCHANGE AGREEMENT

* ok * *
FOURTH: The lessee shall:

(a) complete promptly and expditiously the
use for which the containers or chassis has been
furnished to it and return the container or chas-
sis to the terminal of the lessor from which it was
received or to “uch other point as may be shown
on the Equipment Interchange Receipt and In-
spection Report or otherwise mutually agreed in
writing;

* * * * a

(c) comply with any and appropriate formali-
ties and requirements regarding the use, opera-
tion or transportation of the containers or
chassis;

* * * * *

(e) have complete control and supervision of
such containers or chassis while in its custody
and possession; and shall control the detail of
the work of any employee or agent operating or
using said containers or chassis during such time
any person operating, transporting, in possession
of, or using any such container or chassis after
the signing of said Equipment Interchange Re-

15la

ceipt and Inspection Report and until such form
is again signed upon return of the container or
chassis to the lessor is not the agent or employee
of the lessor for any purpose whatsoever; .. .*

As a matter of practice, when the motor carriers
truck arrives at the pier, the driver presents the
delivery order and bill of lading, locates and takes
custody of the container and drives it through safety
inspection. After satisfying the inspection, the truck-
driver signs an interchange release receipt and hauls
the containers away pursuant to instructions from his
employer. Normally, the truckdriver hauls the con-
tainer to the motor carrier’s port area terminal.

Frequently, after hauling a full shipper’s load from
a pier to its port area terminal, a motor carrier will
utilize its own employees to strip the full shipper’s
load from the container and stuff it into the motor
carrier’s container for transportation to the con-
signee. The motor carrier’s decision to strip the full

*On June 28, 1978, U.S. Lines subscribed to the Uniform
Intermodal Interchange Agreement ( UIIA) which now gov-
erns the terms of all U.S. Lines interchange agreements with
other signatories of that agreement. Associated subscribed
to UIIA on September 3, 1974. Houff became a signatory on
March 25, 1974. Par. 4 of that agreement provides in rele-
vant part:

4. Use of Equipment
4.1 Responsibility of User in Possession of Equipment.

a. User shall have the right of complete control and
supervision of equipment while in its possession and shall
be responsible for returning the equipment in the same
condition as received, ordinary wear and tear expected.

EN ESS agente oat CN eee ce ee

152a

shipper’s load may rest upon consideration of econ-
omy, safety, or state highway and bridge regulations.

In 1969, U.S. Lines handled 4,000 to 5,000 import
containers through its Baltimore terminal. This num-
ber grew to 25,000 in 1974; 80 to 85 percent of these
containers were full shippers’ loads. In 1974, Balti-
more ILA labor stripped 200-300 of these containers
at the pier. Approximately 100 trucking concerns
are engaged in hauling these containers away from
U.S. Lines’ pier.

I have studied the available records of the ILA-
STA Joint Container Committee which was estab-
lished under the 1968 contract, and has been retained
to the present under subsequent contracts, to resolve
ILA complaints alleging violations of the container
rules.” It was, at the time, difficult to determine
from these records whether the ILA’s complaint in a
particular case involved a shipper’s load. However,
where there was any doubt as to the type of load in-
volved, I have assumed that such cases involved ship-
pers’ loads. From these records I have determined
that, from September 1969 until November 1974, the
ILA filed with the STA-ILA Joint Container Com-
mittee 26 complaints involving the stripping of 45
to 50 shippers’ loads by trucking firms from con-
tainers. These complaints alleged that by permitting

5 The 1968 contract provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

A committee represented equally by management and
Union shall be formed and shall have the responsibility
and power to hear and pass judgment on any violations
of these rules... .

153a

such stripping the named STA member had violated
the STA-ILA container rules. Five of the ILA com-
plaints involved a total of eight containers occurred
prior to the CONASA-ILA container committee meet-
ing on September 11-13, 1972, at Miami Beach. The
remaining ILA complaitns involving the stripping of
shippers’ loads by truckers bear dates later than
September 13, 1972.

The record does not reflect the annual volume of
import containers received in the Hampton Roads
port area. However, the Respondents submitted
HRSA-ILA Container Grievance Committee records
covering the period from October 1969 through and
including October 1974. Again, these records do not
clearly establish which cases involved ful] shippers’
loads which were stripped by truck operators. How-
ever, I have resolved all doubts in favor of the ship-
per’s load designation. In all, I found seven ILA
complaints regarding shippers’ loads allegedly
stripped by truckers in violation of the HRSA-ILA
contract. These complaints involved 30 containers.
Of these seven cases, one, involving one import con-
tainer bearing a full shipper’s load, arose prior to
the September 1972 CONASA-ILA Container Com-
mittee meeting in Miami, Florida.

3. The incidents involving Houff, Associated,
and other truck carriers

On February’19, 1974, Houff sent one of its trac-
tors to the U.S. Lines’ Dundalk Marine Terminal,
in the port of Baltimore, to pick up two U.S. Lines

154a

20-fcot containers, each a full shipper’s load, with
a total cargo weight of 78,810 pounds. ILA long-
shoremen had off-loaded the containers from a ship
onto the pier. The delivery order and bill of lading
issued to Houff for the U.S. Lines containers showed
the cargo was destined to Union Carbide Corpora-
tion, Alloy, West Virginia. The Houff driver also
picked up a third 20-foot container, a shipper’s load
from Lavino consigned to Merck & Co., Elkton, Vir-
ginia. ILA longshoremen had previously off-loaded
this container from a ship into the pier. Upon de-
termining that the three containers were overloaded,
that they were unsafe, and that their rental was a
needless expense, Houff stripped them and reloaded
the cargo into Houff trailers.

On February 19, 1974, the ILA learned that Houff
had stripped the three containers. On the following
day, ILA complained to the STA-ILA Container Com-
mittee that Houff had violated “the container agree-
ment,” and that therefore liquidated damages of
$1,000 and $2,000 were due the ILA from Lavino
and U.S. Lines, respectively. On March 21, the STA-
ILA Container Committee determined that U.S. Lines
had violated the contract as alleged by ILA and
assessed a fine of $2,000 against U.S. Lines. Sim-
ilarly, on May 10, the committee found that Lavino
was guilty of violating the container agreement, and
assessed a fine of $1,000 against that firm. There-
after, U.S. Lines and Lavino paid the fines to the
STA-ILA Container royalty fund, and requested in-
demnitication from Houff. U.S. Lines threatened to

155a

terminate Houff’s interchange agreement if Houft did
not comply; Lavino threatened to have Houff entirely
banned from the port. Houff did not respond to
either requests. Effective July 22, 1974, U.S. Lines
terminated its equipment interchange agreement with
Houff. Lavino also terminated its equipment inter-
change agreement with Houff, 6 months later.

Following cancellation of their equipment inter-
change agreement with Houff, U.S. Lines and Lavino
have refused to release containers to Houff. Thus,
for example, in January 1975, U.S. Lines denied a
consignee’s request that two U.S. Lines containers
containing shippers’ loads of twine be released to
Houff for movement from Norfolk to Staunton, Vir-
ginia. U.S. Lines advised the consignee that it would
not release containers because Houff was not party to
a U.S. Lines interchange agreement.

On September 24, 1974, after being selected by a
broker and receiving delivery orders and bills of lad-
ing, Associated sent two tractors to the Marine Ter-
minal, Norfolk, Virginia. There, in accordance with
their documents, the Associated drivers picked up
eight shippers’ loads in containers either owned or
leased to U.S. Lines, which had been off-loaded from
a U.S. Lines ship by ILA longshoremen. When the
eight containers arrived at Associated’s Virginia
Beach terminal, 7 or 8 miles from the Merine Ter-
minal, the manager decided to strip all eight con-
tainers and reload the shippers’ loads into Associated

containers for shipment to consignees in Tennessee
and North Carolina.

156a

On October 5, 1974, a U.S. Lines representative
and an ILA representative discovered that the eight
U.S. Lines containers had been stripped at Asso-
ciated’s Virginia Beach terminal. Thereafter, the
ILA complained to the HRSA-ILA Container Com-
mitte which met on October 31 and fined U.S. Lines
$8,000. In its leter notifying U.S. Lines of the fine,
HRSA explained:

The prime reason for imposing a violation of
these containers was due to the fact that Asso-
ciated Transport, Inc., representatives at the
meeting would not clarify as to whether the con-
tainers were stripped within the 50 miles radius
or delivered to their respective destinations, but
only stated that they supported the contents of
the letter from the Tidewater Motor Carriers
Association dated June 7, 1974.°

By letter of January 3, 1975, U.S. Lines demanded
payment of $8,000 from Associated to cover the fines
imposed by the HRSA-ILA Container Committee. As-
sociated did not comply. On February 15, U.S. Lines

* The letter referred to by HRSA was addressed to Jack W.
Mace, HRSA’s executive secretary, and set forth the Tide-
water Motor Truck Association’s position as to HRSA’s con-
tainer rule, as follows:

1. Carriers would not allow the ILA to inspect the rec-
ords or facilities verifying movements of containers.

2. That carriers reject payment of any penalty passed
on to them by steamship lines.

8. That carriers not be required to move containers to
destination under a house-to-house basis unless ex-
clusive use of vehicle was authorized.

157a

discontinued interchanging equipment with Associ-
ated. On March 20, 1975, U.S. Lines formally ter-
minated its interchange agreement with Associated.

In circumstances similar to those found in the As-
sociated and the Houff incidents, involving shippers’
loads, the HRSA-ILA Container Committee levied two
additional $1,000 fines on U.S. Lines. One of these
ILA complaints involved one stripped container at
Pilot Freight Carriers’ Portsmouth, Virginia, ter-
minal. A second complaint described a stripped con-
tainer at Thurston Motor Lines’ Chesapeake, Vir-
ginia, terminal. Both truck terminals are within 50
miles of the center of Hampton Roads. Pilot did not
respond to U.S. Lines’ February 5 demand for reim-
bursement. By letter of February 14, 1975, U.S.
Lines referred to its demand and warned Pilot that
“after today the interchange of equipment with you”
would be discontinued “until the situation involved
is settled.”

The record does not reflect whether U.S. Lines sent
a similar letter to Thurston. However, by letter dated
February 5, 1975, U.S. Lines warned that Thurston
would be held liable for stripping a full shipper’s
load destined for a consignee located more than 50
miles from Hampton Roads. The record does not
disclose whether Thurston suffered a loss of its US.
Lines interchange agreement.

158a

4, Thesuspension of the 1974 CONASA-ILA
Container Rules

In late March 1975, ILA notified CONASA of its
intent to exercise its right’ to suspend the rules on
containers in their collective-bargaining agreements
covering Baltimore, Hampton Roads, and all other
CONASA ports, because of “phony warehouse prac-
tices.” On April 28, the rules on containers were
suspended. Thereafter, deepsea ILA labor at the
affected piers stripped all import containers of cargo
consigned to warehouses within 50 miles of the center
of the port.* Freight handlers stripped the cargo into

7 Rule 8 of the CONASA-ILA rules on containers provides:

These Rules shall be in effect for the term of the
CONASA-ILA Agreement, provided, however, that either
party shall have the right to cancel the Rules on Contain-
ers at any time on or after December 1, 1974, on thirty
(30) days written notice of a desire to renegotiate the
provisions of these Rules.

§ Rule 2B (4) of the 1974 CONASA-ILA rules on containers
provides as follows with regard to warehousing:

Cargo in containers referred to below shall not be...

discharged by ILA labor:

a & * om a
B. Import Cargo:

x x * oe *

(4) Containers of a qualified consignee discharged at a
bona fide public warehouse within the “geographic area”
which comply with all of the following conditions:

1. The container cargo is warehoused at a bona fide
public warehouse.
[Footnote continued on page 159a]

159a

motor transport carriers’ containers for delivery to
the warehouse. The ILA’s action caused daleys of 5
to 8 days in the movement of container cargo from
the piers to warehouses. The suspension also resulted
in the diversion of import container shipments from
the Hampton Roads port area.

On May 30, 1975, following negotiations, CONASA
and ILA executed a supplemental agreement which,
they announced, “clarified and reinstated” the 1974
CONASA-ILA container rules. Rule 2B(4) in the
supplement provided:

Cargo in containers referred to below shall not
be... discharged by ILA labor:

* * * * *
B. Import Cargo
* * * * *

§ [Continued]

2. The qualified consignee pays the normal labor
charges in and out; and the normal warehouse storage
fees for a minimum period of thirty or more days, and;

3. The cargo being warehoused (a) in the normal
course of the business of the qualified consignee; (b) title
to such goods has not been transferred from the qualified
consignee to another. The carrier on request will furnish
all documentation and other information which permits
the Container Committee in the port to determine whether
conditions 1, 2, and 3 have been met. This exception
shall not apply where cargo is warehoused for the pur-
pose of avoidance or evasion of Rule 1. It is limited to
containers warehoused as provided in the above condi-
tions and any warehouse which does not conform to such
conditions shall be deemed a consolidator or de-
consolidated.

160a

(4) Containers of a qualified consignee dis-
charged at a bona fide public warehouse within
the ‘geographic area’ which comply with all of
the following conditions:

1. The container cargo is warehoused at a
bona fide public warehouse

2. The qualified consignee pays the normal
labor charges in and out; and the normal
warehouse storage fees for a minimum
period of thirty or more days; and stores
the cargo for a minimum period of 3C days;
and

3. The cargo being warehoused (a) in the
normal course of the business of the quali-
fied consignee; (b) title to such goods has
not been transferred from the qualified con-
signee to another.

The carrier on request will furnish all docu-
mentation and other information which permits
the Container Committee in the port to determine
whether conditions 1, 2, and 3 have have been
met. This exception shall not apply where cargo
is warehoused for the purpose of avoidance or
evasion of Rule 1. It is limited to containers
warehoused as provided in the above conditions
and any warehouse which does not conform to
such conditions shall be deemed a consolidator or
de-consolidator.

[Clarification: In keeping with prior CONASA-
ILA decisions trucking stations where containers are
unloaded within the geographic area do not constitute
bona fide public warehouses even where cargo is des-
tined for delivery outside the geographic area. ]

l6la

Since May 30, 1975, these warehouse rules and the
“Clarification” have been in effect in Baltimore,
Hampton Roads, and all other CONASA ports.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

The General Counsel and the Charging Parties con-
tend that Respondents violated Section 8(e) of the
Act by maintaining, giving effect to, and enforcing
rule 1(a)(3) and rule 2B(2) of the CONASA-ILA
rules on containers in their 1974-77 contracts. The
General Counsel also contends that, by imposing fines
upon U.S. Lines and Lavino, ILA violated Section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) og the Act. According to the Gen-
eral Counsel! and Charging Parties, these portions of
the CONASA-ILA container rules and the attempts
to enforce them by fines constituted an attempt by
ILA to acquire work traditionally done by employees
of motor carriers.

The Respondents’ defense is that rule 1 (a) (8) and
rule 2(B) and their enforcement represented an ef-
fort to preserve work traditionally performed by ILA —
labor and that therefore such efforts were authorized
by principles set forth in National Woodwork Manu-
facturers Association et al. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612
(1967), and American Boiler Manufacturers Asso-
ciation v. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d 547 (C.A. 8, 1968),
cert. denied 398 U.S. 960 (1970). Under those prin-
ciples, if ILA’s conduct and contractual agreements
with CONASA, HRSA, and STA, of which the Gen-
eral Counsel complains, were designed to preserve
work to which ILA represented-employees of HRSA’s

162a

and STA’s employer-members were entitled, then both
the conduct and the agreements would be primary in
purpose and would not run afoul of the Act. How-
ever, if ILA’s real object was to reach out for work
traditionally done by employees not represented by
ILA, or work to which ILA had waived all claims,
the challenged container rules and the pressures on
HRSA and STA would have had a secondary object
violative of Section 8(e) and Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)
of the Act, respectively. Here, “[t]he touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addresesd
to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-
a-vis his own employees.” National Woodwork Manu-
facturers Association, supra, 386 U.S. at 645. Apply-
ing the National Woodwork test as did the Board in
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO
(Consolidated Express, Inc., and Twin Express, I ne.),
221 NLRB 956 (1975), enfd. 587 F.2d 706 (1976),”
I find merit in the General Counsel’s and the Charg-
ing Parties’ contentions.

In International Longshoremen’s Association, AF L-
CIO (Consolidated Express, Inc. and Twin Express,
Inc.), supra, the Board found that the ILA was at-
tempting to obtain the work of stuffing and stripping
less-than-container load cargo or less-than-trailer load
cargo, which consolidators traditionally performed at

°On July 9, 1976, International Longshoremen’s Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO, and New York Shipping Association, Inc., filed
a petition for rehearing in Docket No. 75-4266 which the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied on
August 6, 1976.

163a

their own off-pier facilities with their own employees,
who were not in the unit represented by the ILA.
The Board observed that “[t]he traditional work of
the longshoremen represented by ILA has been to
load and unload ships. When necessary to perform
their loading and unloading work, longshoremen have
been required to stuff and strip containers on the
piers.” (221 NLRB at 959.) The Board then found
(Id. at 960) that:

the on-pier stripping and stuffing work performed
by longshoremen as an incident of loading and
unJvading ships does not embrace the work tra-
ditionally performed by Consolidated and Twin
at their off-pier premises .. .. Yet, ILA’s de-
mands here could only be met if the work tradi-
tionally performed off the pier by employees out-
side the longshoremen unit were taken over and
performed at the pier by longshoremen repre-
sented by ILA.

On these facts, the Board held that the 1971 con-
tainer rules negotiated between ILA and the New
York Shipping Association (these same rules appeared
in the 1971 ILA contracts covering the Baltimore
and Hampton Roads port areas, respectively) cover-
ing LTL or consolidated full container loads did not
have “a lawful primary object” (Consolidated Ex-
press, supra, 221 NLRB at 961), and therefore vio-
lated Section 8(e) of the Act. The Board also held
that fines imposed by ILA upon shipping companies
who were members of the New York Shipping As-
sociation also violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the
Act.

164a

Here, as in Consolidated Express, the facts show
that ILA’s demands can only be satisfied “if the work
traditionally performed off the pier by employees out-
side the longshoremen unit were taken over and per-
formed at the pier by longshoremen represented by
ILA.” Thus, the history of the longshoremen’s work
tradition in Baltimore and Hampton Roads shows
that their role in handling break-bulk import cargo
ended at the head of the pier, where an ILA freight
handler picked up the cargo and loaded it onto a
truck. Thereafter, the fate of that cargo was the
responsibility of the motor carrier, as set forth in
the bill of lading.

The advent of containerization in the ports of Bal-
timore and Hampton Roads did not change the tra-
ditional role of the ILA longshoremen. The motor
carriers have treated import shippers’ loads destined
for consignees located more than 50 miles from the
center of the port of entry much as they did break-
bulk cargo. For, with very rare exceptions, motor
carriers have freely picked up the steamship com-
pany’s containers mounted on wheeled trailers and
hauled them to the consignee in accordance with the
bills of lading. The motor carriers have also tradi-
tionally hauled such containers to their own truck
terminals and have stripped the shippers’ loads from
them and are loaded into their own trailers, using
truck terminal employees, whenever considerations of
safe regulation, safety, or economy persuaded a motor
carrier to take that precaution.

165a

To counter the General Counsel’s showing, Respond-
ents presented evidence to show that ILA, CONASA,
HRSA, STA, and various steamship and motor truck
employers in the Baltimore and Hampton Roads port
areas understood that such shortstopping of shippers’
loads violated the container rules in the 1968 and
1971 contracts. However, the plain language of the
1968 and 1971 rules limited to “LTL loads or con-
solidated full container loads” the “complete control”
language of the full equipment interchange agree-
ments used by U.S. Lines in dealing with motor car-
riers, and the paucity of grievances involving ship-
pers’ loads in the ports of Baltimore and Hampton
Roads prior to the September 1972 CONASA-ILA
meeting at which ILA first sought adoption of rule”
1(a)(3) and 2B(2) cast doubt on the Respondents’
claim. The fatal weakness in Respondents’ defense
is its failure to rebut the General Counsel’s showing
that, in the performance of contracts to haul cargo
from a pier to the consignee, motor carriers have
traditionally utilized their own employees whenever
economy, safety, or government regulations required
the stripping of a shipper’s load destined to a con-
signee outside the 50-mile zone.

From the foregoing and the record as a whole, I
find that the traditional on-pier work of longshore-
men has not included the work performed by the
employees of motor carriers, as Associated and Houff,
at their off-pier facilities. Thus if ILA’s demand is to
be satisfied here, motor carriers seeking to do busi-
ness with employer-members ~f HRSA and STA

166a

would be obliged to assign this work to ILA labor
at the pier. Indeed, in order to avoid the sanctions
revealed in this case, motor carriers who might other-
wise exercise their discretion to transfer cargo after
leaving a CONASA-ILA pier would permit ILA labor
to routinely strip all shippers’ destined outside the
50-mile zone, and thus transform containers into
cargo nets.

Here, I find as the Board found in Consolidated
Express, supra, 221 NLRB at 960, “the National
Woodwork, supra, and American Boiler Manufactur-
ing Association v. N.L.R.B. cases are distinguishable
from the instant case since, in those cases, the very
work claimed had once been performed, exclusively,
by employees in the units represented by the respond-
ent organizations therein.” Thus, here, as in Con-
solidated Express, supra, rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2)
of the 1974-77 CONASA-ILA rules on containers have
no valid work-preservation purpose. Their purpose
is to cause U.S. Lines, Lavino, and other employer-
members of HRSA‘and STA to cease doing business
with motor carriers who refuse to surrender to ILA’s
attempt to acquire work now done by the motor car-
riers’ employees. I find therefore that by maintain-
ing, giving effect to, and enforcing the contracts and
agreements known as the rules on containers, as set
forth in the 1974-77 collective-bargaining agreements
and as reaffirmed in their supplemental agreement
of May 30, 1975, Respondents CONASA, HRSA, and
ILA violated Section 8(e) of the Act. I also find that
by threatening to assess and by assessing liquidated

167a

damages as provided in those agreements, thereby
threatening, restraining, and coercing CONASA,
HRSA, STA, U.S. Lines, and Lavino, with an object
being to force those persons engaged in commerce
to cease doing business with Associated, Houff, Pilot,
and Thursten, Respondent ILA violated Section 8(b)
(4) (ii) (B) of the Act.

I also find that an objective of the suspension of
the rules on containers on April 28, 1975, was to
pressure CONASA, HRSA, STA, and their employer-
members to cease doing business with motor carriers
who refused to adhere to rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2).
In making this finding, I have looked in large part
at the timing of ILA’s notice of suspension in late
March. For it was in March and February 1975 that
U.S. Lines suspended its equipment interchange agree-
ments with Associated, Thurston, and Pilot because
they stripped shippers’ loads destined beyond the 50- :
mile zone and demonstrated the apparent refusal of /
the motor carriers to surrender to ILA pressure.
Further evidence of ILA’s unlawful intent is con-
tained in the declaration in the CONASA-ILA sup-
plemental agreement of May 30, 1975, that “truck-
ing stations where containers are unloaded within
the geographic area [50 miles of the center of each
port] do not constitute bona fide public warehouses
even where cargo is destined for delivery outside the
geographic area.” Having found that ILA’s sus-
pension of the 1974-77 CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers was motivated at least in part by the same
cease-doing-business object which provoked the fines

168a

against U.S. Lines and Lavino, I further find that,
by that conduct, ILA again violated Section 8(b) (4)
(ii) (B) of the Act.

THE REMEDY

Having found Respondent ILA and Respondents
HRSA and CONASA engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act, and Re-
spondent ILA engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(b) (4) (ii)(B) of the Act, I
shall recommend that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action which I find
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and co::-
clusions and the entire record in this case, and pur-
suant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the follow-
ing recommended:

ORDER ”

A. Respondents International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, AFL-CIO, Hampton Roads District Council,
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO,
ILA Locals 846, 862, 970, 1248, 1458, 1624, 1736,
1783, 1784, 1819, 1840, and 1970, AFL-CIO, their
officers, agents, and successors shall:

10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec.
102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor
Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and
Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings,
conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be

deemed waived for all purposes.

169a

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Maintaining, giving effect to, and enforcing
the contracts and agreements known as the CONASA-
ILA rules on containers to the extent and in the
manner said contracts and agreements have been
found to be unlawful herein, or any other contract
or agreement, express or implied, whereby CONASA
and HRSA, on behalf of its employer-members, agree
to cease or refrain from doing business with any
other person in violation of Section 8(e). of the Act.

(b) Continuing to seek or impose fines against
employer-members of HRSA, including U.S. Lines,
or any other person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof
is to force or require such persons to cease doing
business with Associated Transport, Inc., Houff
Transfer Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc., or any other employer-members of
Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

(c) In any other manner, including the suspension
of the CONASA-ILA rules on containers, coercing or
restraining CONASA, HRSA, or any of HRSA’s em-
ployer-members, or any other person engaged in com-
merce in an industry affecting commerce, where an
object thereof is to force or require such persons to
cease doing business with Associated Transport, Inc.,
Houff Transfer, Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., or any other employer-
members of Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

170a

2. Take the following affirmative action which is
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Notify all of their members who are employed
by employer-members of HRSA that any and all of
the provisions known as the CONASA-ILA rules on
containers which have been negotiated between ILA
and CONASA on behalf of HRSA which restrain,
restrict, limit, fine, or prohibit handling in the cus-
tomary manner, containers bearing shippers’ loads,
have been found to be void and unenforceable with
respect to Associated Transport, Inc., Houff Trans-
fer, Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurston Mo-
tor Lines, Inc., or any other employer-member of
Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

(b) Post at all of their respective business offices,
meeting halls, and dispatch halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix A.” "* Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 5, after being duly signed by a representa-
tive of each Respondent labor organization named in
this section of the Order, shall be posted by each of
the said labor organizations immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by each of them for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to members are

11Tn the event that the Board’s Order is enforced by a
Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the Nationa! Labor Relations Board.”

17la

customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by said labor organizations to insure that these no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.

(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps each of the said labor organizations has
taken to comply herewith.

B. Respondents International Longshoremen’s As-
sociation, AFL-CIO; Atlantic Coast District Council,
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO,
ILA Locals 333, 921, 953, 1355, and 1429, AFL-CIO,
their officers, agents, and representatives, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Maintaining, giving effect to, invoke, or en-
forcing the contracts and agreements known as the
CONASA-ILA rules on containers to the extent and
in the manner said contracts and agreements have
been found to be unlawful herein, or any other con-
tract or agreement, expressed or implied, whereby
CONASA and STA, on behalf of its employer-mem-
bers, agree to cease and refrain from doing business
with any other person in violation of Section 8(e)
of the Act. |

(b) Continuing to seek or impose fines against
employer-members of STA, including U.S. Lines and
Lavino, or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where an ob-
ject thereof is to force or require such persons to
cease doing business with Houff Transfer, Inc.

(c) In any other manner, including the suspen-

172a

sion of the CONASA-ILA rules on containers, coerc-
ing or restraining CONASA, STA, or any STA’s
employer-members, or any other person engaged in
commerce in an industry affecting commerce, where

an object thereof is to force or require such persons

to cease doing business with Houff Transfer, Inc.
(2) Take the following affirmative action which is
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Notify ali of their members who are employed
by employer-members of STA that any and all of the
provisions known as the CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers which have been negotiated between ILA and
CONASA, on behalf of STA, which restrain, restrict,
limit, fine, or prohibit handling in the customary
manner, containers bearing shippers’ loads, have
been found to be void with respect to Houff Transfer,
Ine.

(b) Post at all of their respective business offices,
meeting halls, and dispatch halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix B.”' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 5, after being duly signed by a rep-
resentative of each Respondent labor organization
named in this section of the Order, shall be posted
by each of the said labor organizations immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by each of
them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to mem-
bers are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by said labor organizations to insure that

12 See fn. 11, supra.

173a

these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.

(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps each of the said labor organizations has
taken to comply herewith.

C. Respondents Council of North Atlantic Ship-
ping Associations, (CONASA), and Hampton Roads
Shipping Association ( HRSA), their respective offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from maintaining giving >ect
to, and enforcing the contracts and agreements kiown
as the CONASA-ILA rules on containers to the ex-
tent and in the manner said contracts and agree-
ments have been found to be unlawful herein, or any
other contract or agreement, expressed or implied,
whereby Respondent CONASA, on behalf of its mem-
ber, HRSA, and on behalf of its employer-members,
including U.S. Lines, agree to cease or refrain from
doing business with any other person in violation of
Section 8(e) of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action which is
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) HRSA shall notify U.S. Lines and all other
employer-members of HRSA that any and all provi-
sions of the contracts and agreements known as the
CONASA-ILA rules and containers, which have been
negotiated between ILA and CONASA on behalf of
HRSA, and which restrain, restrict, limit, fine, or
prohibit handling in the customary manner, contain-

174a

ers bearing shippers’ loads, have been found to be
void and unenforceable with respect to Associated
Transport, Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurs-
ton Motor Lines, Inc., or any other employer-member
of Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

(b) CONASA shall notify U.S. Lines and all other
members of HRSA that any and all of the provisions
known as the CONASA-ILA rules on containers which
have been negotiated between ILA and CONASA on
behalf of HRSA which restrain, restrict, limit, fine,
or prohibit handling in the customary manner, con-
tainers bearing shipper’s loads, have been found to
be void and unenforceable with respect to Associated
Transport, Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurs-
ton Motor Lines, Inc., or other employer-member of
Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

(c) HRSA shall mail to U.S. Lines and each of
HRSA’s other employer-members, and post at its
Norfolk, Virginia, office copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix C.”** Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
5, after being duly signed by Respondent HRSA’s
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employer-members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by R&pondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

18 See fn. 11, supra.

~

175a

(d) CONASA shall mail to HRSA, U.S. Lines, and
each of the other employer-members of HRSA, and
post. at CONASA’s main office in New York, New
York, copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix D.”* Copies of said notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being
duly signed by Respondent CONASA’s representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained by it for 50 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to member associations are customar-
ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.

(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in
writing, with 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondents CONASA and HRSA have
taken to comply herewith.

14 See fn. 11, supra.

176a

APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

After a hearing in which all sides had the oppor-,

tunity to present their evidence, it has been found
that we violated the law. Accordingly, we post this
notice and we will keep the promises we make in

this notice.

WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain in effect,
give effect to, invoke, or in any other manner or
by any means enforce the contract and agree-
ments known as the CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers, rules 1(a) (3) and 2B(2) as set forth
in the HRSA-ILA collective-bargaining agreement
effective from October 30, 1974, to September 30,
1977, and as restated by the ILA-CONASA Memo-
randum of Agreement effective May 30, 1975, or
any other contract or agreement express or im-
plied whereby the Council of North Atlantic
Shipping Associations, and the Hampton Roads
Shipping Association, on behalf of its employer-
members, agree to cease or refraiii from doing
business with any other person in violation of
Section 8(e) of the Act.

WE WILL NOT seek or impose fines against em-
ployer-members of the Hampton Roads Shipping
Association, including United States Lines, Inc.,
or any other person engaged in commerce or in

177a

an industry affecting commerce, where an object
thereof is to force or require such persons to
cease doing business with Associated Transport,
Inc., Houff Transfer, Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., or any other
member of Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner, including
the suspension of the CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers, coerce, or restrain the Council of North
Atlantic Shipping Associations, Hampton Roads
Shipping Association, or any of Hampton Roads
Shipping Association’s employer-members, or any
other person engaged in commerce in an industry
affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to
force or require such person to cease doing busi-
ness with Associated Transport, Inc., Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurston Motor Lines,
Inc., and any other employer-member of Tide-
water Motor Truck Association.

WE WILL and do hereby notify our members,
and other individuals employed by Hampton
Roads Shipping Association, or any of its em- |
ployer-members, that any and all of the provi-
sions of the contracts and agreements known as
the CONASA-ILA rules on containers which have
been negotiated between ILA and CONASA on be-
hal fof Hampton Roads Shipping Association,
which restrain, restrict, limit, fine, or prohibit
handling, in the customary manner, containers
bearing shippers’ loads have been found void and

178a

unenforceable with respect to Associated Trans-
port, Inc.

INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
LOCALS 846, 862, 970,
1248, 1458, 1624, 1736,
1783, 1784, 1819, 1840, &
1970

HAMPTON ROADS DISTRICT
COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO

179a

APPENDIX B

NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

After a hearing in which all sides had the oppor-
tunity to present their evidence, it has been found
that we violated the law by committing unfair labor
practices. Accordingly, we post this notice and we
will keep the promises we make in this notice.

WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain in effect,
give effect to, invoke, or in any other manner
or by any means enforce the contract and agree-
ments known as the CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers, rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2) as set forth
in the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore,
Inc. ILA collective-bargaining agreement effective
from October 30, 1974, to September 30, 1977,
and as restated by the ILA-CONASA memorandum
of agreement effective May 30, 1975, or any
other contract or agreement express or implied
whereby the Council of North Atlantic Shipping
Associations, and the Steamship Trade Associa-
tion of Baltimore, Inc., on behalf of its employer-
members, agree to cease or refrain from doing
business with any other person in violation of
Section 8(e) of the Act.

WE WILL NOT seek or impose fines against
employer-members of the Steamship Trade As-
sociation of Baltimore, Inc., including United
States Lines, Inc., and Lavino Shipping Com-
pany, or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where an

-180a

object thereof is to force or require such per-
sons to cease doing business with Houff Transfer,

Inc.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner, including
the suspension of the CONASA-ILA rules on con-
tainers, coerce or restrain the Council of North
Atlantic Shipping Associations, Steamship Trade
Association of Baltimore, Inc., or any of Steam-
ship Trade Association’s employer-members, or
any other person engaged in commerce in an in-
dustry affecting commerce, where an object
thereof is to force or require such person to cease
doing business with Houff Transfer, Inc.

WE WILL and do hereby notify our members,
and other individuals employed by Steamship
Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., or any of
its employer-members, that any and all of the
provisions of the contracts and agreements known
as the CONASA-ILA rules on containers which have
been negotiated between ILA and CONASA on be-
half of Steamship Trade Association of Balti-
more, Inc., which restrain, restrict, limit, fine,
or prohibit handling in the customary manner,
containers bearing shippers’ loads have been
found void and unenforceable with respect to
Houff Transfer, Inc.

INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
LOCALS 333, 921, 953,
1355, & 1429

ATLANTIC COAST DISTRICT
COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO

18la
APPENDIX C

NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES AND
ALL EMPLOYER-MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

After a hearing in which all sides had the oppor-
tunity to present their evidence, it has been found
that we violated the law by committing unfair labor
practices. Accordingly, we post this notice and we
Shall keep the promises we make in this notice.

_WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain in effect,
give effect to, invoke or in any manner or by
any means enforce the contracts and agreements
known as the CONASA-ILA rules on containers,
rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2), as set forth in the
HRSA-ILA collective-bargaining agreement effec-
tive from October 1, 1974, to September 30, 1977,
and as restated by the CONASA-ILA Memorandum
of Agreement effective May 30, 1975, or any
other contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby CONASA, on behalf of HRSA, Or HRSA on
behalf of employer-members, agrees to cease or
refrain from doing business with any other per-
son in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.

WE WILL and do hereby notify United States
Lines, Inc., and all other employer-members of
HRSA that any and all of the provisions of the
contracts and agreements known as the CONASA-
ILA rules on containers which have been nego-
tiated between ILA and CONASA on behalf of

182a

Hampton Roads Shipping Association, which re-
strain, restrict, limit, fine, or prohibit handling,
in the customary. manner, containers bearing
shippers’ loads have been found void and unen-
forceable with respect to Associated Transport,
Inc., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., Thurston Mo-
tor Lines, Inc., and any other employer-members
of Tidewater Motor Truck Association.

HAMPTON ROADS SHIPPING
ASSOCIATION

183a
APPENDIX D

NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES AND
ASSOCIATION- MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

After a hearing in which all sides had the oppor-
tunity to present their evidence, it has been found
that we violated the law by committing unfair labor
practices. Accordingly, we post this notice and we
shall keep the promises we make in this notice.

WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain in effect,
give effect to, invoke, or in any manner or by
any means enforce the contracts and agreements
known as the CONASA-ILA rules on containers,
rules 1(a)(3) and 2B(2), as set forth in the
HRSA-ILA collective-bargaining agreement effec-
tive from October 30, 1974, to September 30,
1977, and as restated by the CONASA-ILA Memo-
randum of Agreement effective May 30, 1975, or
any other contract or agreement, express or im-
plied, whereby CONASA, on behalf of HRSA, or
HRSA on behalf of its employer-members, agrees
to cease or refrain from doing business with any
other person in violation of Section 8(e) of the
Act.

WE WILL and do hereby notify United States
Lines, Inc., and all other employer-members of
HRSA that any and all of the provisions of the
contracts and agreements known as the CONASA-
ILA rules on containers which have been negoti-

184a

ated between ILA and CONASA on behalf of Hamp-
ton Roads Shipping Association, which restrain,
restrict, limit, fine, prohibit handling, in the cus-
tomary manner, containers bearing shipper’s
loads have been found void and unenforceable
with respect to Associated Transport, Inc.

COUNCIL OF NORTH
ATLANTIC SHIPPING
ASSOCIATIONS

W ov. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFics; 1980 308108 183

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1534%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.
