# Amicus Brief — Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 448 U.S. 176

## Text

> Fa IN THE

SS Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

DAWSON CHEMICAL COMPANY, CRYSTAL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION and CRYSTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Petitioners,
VU.

ROHM AND HAAS COMPANY,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK PATENT
LAW ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF THE RESPONDENT

New York Parent Law Assoctation, Inc.
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020
WiuuiaM F.. Eperze, Esea., President

By
Barry D. Rein
Of Counsel: 330 Madison Avenue

—_—. New York, New York 10017

195 Broadway and

New York, New York 10007 STANLEY H. LigBerstTEIn
Kennets E. Mapsen 260 Madison Avenue

59 Maiden Lane New York, New York 10016

New York, New York 10038 Attorneys for Amicus
Rory J. Rappine

330 ‘Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

—_——EE ee

Dawson CHEMICAL Company, CrystaL MANUFACTURING
CoRPORATION and CrystaL CHEMICAL CoMPANY,

Petitioners,

Roum anp Haas Company,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK PATENT LAW
ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF
THE RESPONDENT

The New York Patent Law Association hereby respect-
fully moves pursuant to Rule 42 for leave to file the ac-
companying brief amicus curiae herein on behalf of respond-

ent. The consent of the attorney for the respondent has
been obtained. The consent of the attorney for the peti-
tioners was sought but was refused. Copies of the letters

I!

concerning the foregoing consent and refusal have been
filed with the Clerk.

The New York Patent Law Association is an associa-
tion of over one thousand attorneys in private and corpo-
rate practice in the fields of patent, trademark and copy-
right law in the New York metropolitan area. Our Asso-
ciation is concerned with the advancement of the arts and
sciences through an effective patent system as well as
through effective application of the Antitrust Laws. This
case presents an important question requiring careful ap-
plication of both the patent laws and complimentary anti-
trust principles to effectuate the Constitutional mandate
‘‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts,’’
Article I, Section 8. The accompanying brief addresses
that issue from the point of view of the Association’s pub-
lic and professional interest in furthering that goal.

It is of particular interest to the Association that this
case presents to the Court for the first time issues with
respect to the Congressional intent and purpose underlying
enactment of Section 271 of the Patent Laws concerning
contributory infringement, because the Association was in-
strumental in drafting the first legislation seeking to define
and remedy contributory infringement. That legislation
was introduced at the Association’s request as H.R. 5988 in
the Kightieth Congress and was re-introduced as H.R. 3866
in the Highty-First Congress. Members of the Association
testified in support of it. Subsequently, in 1950, the Na-
tional Council of Patent Law Associations, composed of all
of the principal patent law associations in the United
States, together with a number of industrial associations,

IIt

formed the Coordinating Committee on Revision and
Amendment of the Patent Laws to assist Congress in
codifying the patent laws. Members of this Association
participated significantly in the work of the Coordinating
Committee and were instrumental in seeking enactment of
the present law, Title 35 U.S. Code, including Section 271.
Hence the Association has an additional interest born of
authorship in seeking to assist the Court upon this im-
portant issue.

Apart from this public and professional interest, we
have no interest in the outcome of this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Barry D. Rein
Attorney for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE \
Interest of Amicus _ . | a er 1
Question Presented . | 1
Summary of Argument 2

Argument

I. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Sec-
tion 271 expressly sanctions Rohm and Haas’
conduct .... , | 4 4

II. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the
legislative history of Section 271 confirms the
intent of Congress to sanction Rohm and
Haas’ conduct | are 9

A. Congress intended Section 271 to reverse
not only the dictum in Mercoid but its di-
rect holding as well. oe 13

B. Congress intended Section 271 to draw a
clear line between actionable contributory
infringement and application of the mis-

USO. GOCEFING ............0..505., ce eee a ae

C. Congress expressly rejected in the 1952
Patent Act the compulsory licensing
sought here by Dawson 24

Ill. The decision reached by the Court of Appeals
is fully consistent with public policy . 26

A. The result sought by amicus is consistent
with antitrust policy ........ Pantani ees 26

B. Requiring compulsory licensing of Rohm
and Haas’ patent would cut against the
public interest . 30

gtr occ 5 a rr ig er eee Rice 33

Appendix

| |

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Cases:
Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development

I, Se OF 0s WE ER Doo sn scnbvcicsnnveserersccinersivarcsiess 10
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518

+ Sele REA spoon oD sec me spe ae ae vile Raraltly Uae oer ee UeaP a Ce 3, 26
Forrest v. Capital Buildings & Loan Association, 385

F. Supp. 881 (M.D. La. 1973), aff’d 504 F.2d 891

(5th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 978 (1975) ...... 27
Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. et al.,

Be rE I oes cknacsccucgcenasivanbiccciacsdesspooinn 27
F.T.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Br. Off.,

SB ee Be Lae + et) ee 8
In re: 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigations, 1974-

2 Trade Cases [175,429] (N.D. Cal. 1974) ............ 27
KKugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissious, Inec., 337

I’. Supp. 872 (D. Minn. 1971), aff’d 460 F.2d 1214

RR oti asi eeeicaeadmninesn ieee, 27
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661

RMR estes) erick coe 3, 10, 11, 12, 18, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Reg. Co., 320

U.S. 680 (1944) ........................ 8, 10, 18, 15, 17, 19, 21, 96
Paul, et al. v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 1974-1 Trade

Cases (770,226) (ED. Mo. 1974) .............00...0.... BF
Redd y. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975),

cert. den., 452 US. 912 (1976) . Reeeaade 27
Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., et al.,

599 F.2d 685 (Sth Cir. 1979) | ieee,

PAGE
Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) 27
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) 8
Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.
1963) | | 8
Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (CC
Conn. 1871) | 15
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Eleetrie &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) 28
Statutes:
U.S. Const. art I, 68 I
Plant bons Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§2321-2583.... 31
28 U.S.C. §1498 31
Patent Act of 1952, Title 35 U.S.C. .... 1u, 7, 24, 26, 29
30 U.S.C. §271 II, 11, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 18, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29
30 U.S.C. §271(a) 4,9
30 U.S.C. §271(b) 4,9
39 U.S.C. §271(e) 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29
30 U.S.C. §271(d) 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 20, 24, 25
39 U.S.C. $271 (d)(1) 2,5, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21
30 U.S.C. §271(d) (2) :.2, 5, 6, 7, 16
35 U.S.C. S271 (a) (3) 5, 16
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq. 31
Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 3

Miscellaneous:

Hearings on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061 and H.R. 5248 Be-
fore Subcommittee on Patents, Peutieiiie &
Copyrights of House Committee on Judiciary,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) | 9, 13, 14, 15, 20

a

Vill

PAGE

Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcommittee No. 4 of
House Committee on Judiciary, 8lst Cong., 1st
SG ahead ccan retest an tarneen . 9, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23

Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of
House Committee on Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist

MR CED oesccscecssss... Pare Y Be te

Froposed Revision and Amendment of the Patent
BE retin nN EL AS SREP AN rer CFA Wht ene 24, 25
—Section 66 ........ Ree te NE Te eee:
—Section 72 MA Tad POINT ere ne et a. 20
—Additional Item D 25
H.R. 44, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) . 80
H.R. 46, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) °C
H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) | 9, 26
H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949) 1, 9
H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) . 1,9
H.R. 9133, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) 26

Remarks of the President on Innovation Initiatives,
i ge A TPL ee eS |
S.814, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975) . LAL Se
S.1283, 938d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) | |
$.2040, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) | 30
S.2176, 938d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) | 30
Section 5 of H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) | 9, 14,
16, 17, 19

Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under Some
Non-American Systenis, Study No. 19, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1959) Wanita eae

D. F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50
(1958) areeee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

I A BR

Dawson CHEMICAL Company, CrystaL MANUFACTURING
CorPoRATION and CrystaL CHEMICAL CoMPANY,
Petitioners,
v

Roum anp Haas Company,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

mE ae

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK
PATENT LAW ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT
OF THE RESPONDENT

Interest of Amicus

The interest of amicus is set forth in the foregoing
motion for leave to file this brief.

Question Presented

Whether the owner of a patent for a new use of a known
non-staple chemical compound having no other commercial
use who sells the compound to users with instructions for
applying it to that use, is required to license all competi-
tors to manufacture and sell the identical compound in
order to render his patent enforceable.

Summary of Argument

The plain language of 35 U.S.C. Section 271 defines
Rohm and Haas’ conduct as not consiituting patent misuse.
The construction sought by the Government and Dawson
would impose a gloss on the statute subjecting the pat-
entee’s expressly recited rights to license and sell (Section
271(d)(1) and (2)) to an implied requirement of com-
pulsory licensing.

It would also emasculate completely Section 271(d)(1),
for a patentee’s mere sales of a component, less than all, of
his patented invention have never constituted misuse; the
sole effective purpose of that provision is to except from the
misuse doctrine sales of a component where the implied
license attendant the sale is the only license granted.

The legislative history of Section 271 establishes the
intent of the drafters and of Congress to place beyond the
scope of the misuse doctrine a patentee’s sales of material,
non-staple components of a patented process where the
implied license attendant the sales are the only licenses
granted. The clear line drawn by Congress was between
that conduct, which is permissible within the scope of
Section 271(c), and attempts to control staple articles
of commerce beyond the scope of Section 271(c), which
would constitute misuse. Congress in 1951 considered the
enactment of both restrictions upon licensing and com-
pulsory licensing that would bear on Rohm and Haas’
conduct. It rejected them. That rejection and the legisla-
tive history of Section 271 in its entirety overwhelmingly
provides the ‘‘clear signal’’ of Congress required by this

3

Court to change the pre-existing law as it had been estab-
lished in Mercoid, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518 (1972).

The public policy of the Antitrust Laws against tying
does not require compulsory licensing here because the
patented process and the product propanil are so inextric-
ably interrelated in logic and in the marketplace as to con-
stitute but a single product. Tying, on the other hand,
requires that there be separate tying and tied products.
The rights granted under the patent laws have a direct
bearing on the issue of product definition.

Section 271 constitutes a legislative determination, as
applied to this case, that propanil for use in the patented
method is within the patent grant. The result is the same
as if the patent in issue contained a separate claim to
propanil per se for use in the claimed method, assertible
against sellers of the compound for use in that method.
Propanil is not ‘‘unpatented’’ in that sense; it is within
the legitimate scope of the patent grant. Hence no exten-
sion of the grant is involved here that would warrant the
result by Dawson and the Government.

The construction of Section 271 sought here by the
Govrenment and Dawson would not benefit rice farmers or
the public generally. It may, on the contrary, tend to
deprive them of the benefits of innovation and increase
rather than decrease the cost of agricultural products. It
would additionally burden the equrts with a wholly new
class of litigation to determine a reasonably royalty in each
specific instance.

ARGUMENT
I e
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Section

271 expressly sanctions Rohm and Haas’ conduct.

Section 271 is the section of the patent law defining a
patent owner’s remedy for infringement. Entitled ‘‘In-
fringement of Patent,’’ it contains four paragraphs (a)
through (d). Paragraph (a), not in issue here, simply
codified preexisting law as to so-called ‘‘direct’’ infringe-
ment. Paragraph (b) further includes as an infringer any-
one who ‘‘actively induces infringement of a patent.’’

Paragraph (c) recites that ‘‘whoever sells
a component

of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition
or
a material or apparatus

for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention,

knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and

not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for

substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a con-
tributory infringer.’’

Paragraph (d), which complements paragraph (c),* pro-
vides that ‘‘[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief

* The Court of Appeals correctly noted that paragraph (d) is
“ancillary to” paragraphs (b) and (c), 599 F.2d 685, 703, n.24,
quoting from the official Revisory Notes to Section 271.

5

for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
one or more of the following:

(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by
another without his consent would constitute con-
tributory infringement of the patent;

(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the pat-
ent; or

(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against in-
fringement or contributory infringement."

It is undisputed here that propanil, the herbicidal use
of which is the subject of Rohm and Haas’ patent, is a
‘‘material,’’ ‘‘for use in practicing a patented process,’’
‘‘constituting a material part of the invention,’’ and ‘‘not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for sub-
stantial non-infringing use,’’ 35 U.S.C. §271(¢), and thus
directly within the carefully circumscribed scope of ‘‘con-
tributory infringement’’ as that term is incorporated in
each of (1), (2) and (3) of Section 271(d). Rohm and
Haas’ conduct therefore falls squarely within the express
authority of Section 271(d): it derives revenue from the
sale of propanil, an act which, if performed by another,
would constitute contributory infringement as authorized
by (1); and it has sought to enforce its patent rights
against contributory infringement as authorized by (3).**

* All emphasis herein is added unless expressly noted.

** A purchaser may resell propanil purchased from Rohm and
Haas because the sale, conveying by implication the right to use the
thing purchased in the patented process, exhausts Rohm and Haas’

(footnote continued on next page)

6

The statutory language on its face authorizes Rohm and
Haas to do any one, or two, or all of the foregoing acts
without being ‘‘denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent... .’’? Yet it is the
crux of Dawson’s and the United States’ position that
merely by doing those acts, Rohm and Haas is guilty of
misuse.

The United States argues thus that Rohm and Haas,
although it has not committed any acts other than those
enumerated, has done more—it has ‘‘license[ed] the use of
its process on condition that the licensees buy unpatented
propanil from Rohm and Haas,’’ and that Section 271 is
‘‘silent’’ as to the legality of that behavior (GB-13).*

Perceiving on one hand this ‘‘silence,’’ Dawson and
the United States find on the other hand a statutory re-
quirement that if Rohm and Haas chooses to sell propanil,
it must license all of its competitors to do so at a reason-
able royalty. But then it must also be true that if Rohm
and Haas did not sell propanil but instead licensed an-
other to do so, it would equally be subject to compulsory
licensing. In each case purchase of the seller’s propanil
would be ‘‘tied,’’ in the Government’s and Dawson’s view,
to the right to practice the patented method. In each case
the public’s choice among propanil suppliers is equally
limited and the foreclosure of manufacturing competitors

rights in it. It may also be said, therefore, that Rohm and Haas has
authorized others (vendees) to perform acts which, without its con-
sent, would constitute contributory infringement, as sanctioned in Sec-
tion 271(d) (2).

* “GB” refers to the brief of the United States as amicus curiae
and “DB” refers to the brief of Dawson et al.

.

7

equally complete. Equally, then, the statute would com-
pel extending licenses on reasonable terms to all comers
upon any attempt to license one.*

This reading of the statute is inconsistent with its
plain meaning, for it would engraft upon it (1) a limitation
in Section 271(d)(2) precluding grant of an exclusive li-
cense, although nothing in the language suggests such a lim-
itation, and (2) a proviso that the rights to derive revenue
and to license in (d)(1) and (d)(2) are conditioned upon
granting compulsory licenses to all at a reasonable royalty.
Absolutely nothing in the 1952 patent act or its legislative
history suggests an intention by Congress to require com-
pulsory licensing of any patents.** Surely if Congress had
intended two of the three rights expressly granted the
patentee by Section 271(d) to result in compulsory licens-
ing, it would have expressly so provided.

Even more compelling is the fact that to read Section
271(d)(1) as the Government and Dawson read it would
result in its complete emasculation. The right of a patentee
or anyone else for that matter to s..il goods is derived not
from the patent law but from the common law. This is
true whether or not the goods are part of a patented com-
bination or a component for use in a patented process.
No case has ever held merely that a patentee may not sell
such a part or component. All that some have held is that
such sales constitute misuse if the implied licenses attendant
the sales are the only licenses granted.

* Dawson implicitly agrees with this conclusion for its list of ways
in which Rohm and Haas could exploit the patent dce: not include

licensing any propanil manufacturers unless it licenses all of them
(DB-30).

** Tmportantly, Congress in enacting the 1952 Patent Act expressly
rejected a proposal to make compulsory licensing available as a remedy
for improper use of a patent, see pages 24 et seq., infra.

8

The only conceivable purpose and meaning of the provi-
sion is therefore to shelter that type of sale, within the
scope of Section 271(c), from application of the misuse doc-
trine.* If the provision is not read as placing such sales,
including Rohm and Haas’ sale of propanil, beyond the
ambit of the misuse doctrine, then it will be of no force
whatsoever. A statutory provision should not be construed
so as to render it a nullity. This Court has noted that ‘‘ [i]t
is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute rather than to emasculate an entire sec-
tion, as the Government’s interpretation requires,’’’ United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (citation
omitted); see also F'.7.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit Co.,
Miami Br. Off., 515 F.2d 988, 994-995 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ;
Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir.
1963).

The Government argues, in an effort to reconcile its
construction with the necessity to give meaning to each
statutory provision, that ‘‘in accordance with subsection
(d)(1) the patentee is still free to obtain revenue from his
sales of the unpatented component. He is limited only by
the condition that he cannot arrogate to himself all these
sales by tying his grant of a license to the purchase from
him of the unpatented component’’ (GB-15). The fatal
defect in this argument is that it is not subsection (d) (1)
but the common law that permits a patentee to obtain
revenue from selling so-called ‘‘unpatented’’ components.
Subsection (d)(1) is superfluous unless read to permit such
sales without requiring the patentee to grant licenses apart
from the sales.

* This is fully consistent with the goals of antitrust policy reflected
in the misuse doctrine for reasons set forth at pages 26 et seq., infra.

Il.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the legis-
lative history of Section 271 confirms the intent of
Congress to sanction Rohm and Haas’ conduct.

As set forth in amicus’ motion to file this brief,
supra, this Association drafted the legislation, first intro-
duced as H.R. 5988 in the Hightieth Congress, in 1948, which
with minor changes became Section 271. That legislation
was introduced again in the Eighty-First Congress as
H.R. 3866 and in the Eighty-Second Congress as part of
H.R. 3760, the patent law codification bill. Testimony with
respect to H.R. 5988 and successor bills was presented at
length by members of this Association.* Together with the
testimony of industry representatives and the Government,
it formed the basis for Congress’ understanding of the pro-
posed legislation.

The essence of the testimony was that as a result of
abuses of the judicially fashioned right of a patentee to
control contributory infringement, a line of decisions of this

* Contributory Infringement in Patents—Definition of Invention:
Hearings on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061 and H.R. 5248, before Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), p.16 (hereinafter
“1948 Hearings”). H.R. 5988 was the first bill drafted by this Asso-
ciation to revive a remedy for contributory infringement. The “last
section” referred to, Section 5, was essentially identical to the present
Section 271(d); the first four sections with minor changes became
paragraphs (a)-(c) of Section 271. The same bill was introduced
in 1949 as H.R. 3866, see Contributory Infringement: Hearings on
H.R. 3866 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949) (hereinafter “1949 Hear-
ings”), and again in 1951 as part of H.R. 3760 to recodify the entire
patent law, see Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on
H.R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) (hereinafter “1951 Hearings”),

10

Court beginning in Carbice and culminating in Mercoid
had unduly eroded that doctrine by an overbroad applica-
tion of the countervailing doctrine of patent misuse, and
therefore that Congress should draw a clear line between
actionabie contributory infringement and proper applica-
tion of the misuse doctrine.* The line sought to be drawn
by the proposed bill was one permitting a patentee to con-
trol a carefully circumscribed class of non-staples but pre-
serving the misuse doctrine with respect to staples. That
line was explained and defined throughout the three years
of testimony with particular reference to the Mercoid cases.
An appreciation of the holdings of those cases as they were
understood by the members of the congressional subcom-
mittees is therefore essential to an understanding of ‘the
purpose of Section 271(d).

Both Mercovd cases, decided on the same day, arose out
of efforts by Mid-Continent and its exclusive licensee Min-
neapolis-Honeywell to enforce patents covering a home
heating system against Mercoid. In each instance, the pat-
ent sought to be enforced covered a combination of ele-
ments, and in each instance Honeywell, Mid-Continent’s ex-
clusive licensee, did not sell the entire combination covered
by the patent but sold components of it having no use
other than in the infringing combination. Honeywell an-
nounced in advertising and otherwise that purchasers of the
components would automatically receive licenses to make
and use the patented combination. Mercoid, the accused

* Carbice Corp v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27 (1931). Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S.
661 (1944) (hereinafter “Mercoid I”); Mercoid Corp. v. Minne-
apolis-Honeywell Reg. Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (hereinafter
“Mercoid IT”).

11

contributory infringer, likewise merely manufactured com-
ponents, less than all of the claimed combination, having no
use other than in infringing the patent.

The result in both cases was clear; the patentee Mid-
Continent and its licensee Honeywell were precluded from
enforcing the patent, and Mercoid’s claims were granted for
relief under the antitrust laws. The several opinions, con-
curring opinions and dissents were not as clear and, as
predicted by Mr. Justice Roberts, 320 U.S. at 674, en-
gendered much confusion among members of the bar and
inconsistency in the decisions of lower courts. Thus, on the
one hand, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in
Mercoid I, stated:

‘¢ |. we assume for the purposes of this case that Mer-
coid was a contributory infringer and that respondents
could have enjoined the infringement had they not mis-
used the patent for the purpose of monopolizing un-
patented material. Inasmuch as their misuse of the
patent would have precluded them from enjoining a
direct infringement they cannot stand in any better
position with respect to a contributory infringer.
Where there is a collision between the principle of the
Carbice case and the conventional rules governing ei-
ther direct or contributory infringement, the former
prevails.’’ 320 U.S. at 668-669 (Citation omitted)

This suggests that the Court would have enforced the patent
against Mercoid but for the fact that Honeywell, the exclu-
sive licensee, was itself selling less than all of the patented
combination and attempting thereby to license only those

12

who purchased the unpatented component from it or its
manufacturing sublicensees.*

As an additional and more expansive basis for the
Court’s holding, however, making reference to the Court’s
consistent holdings ‘‘that the owner of a patent may not
employ it to secure a limited monopoly of an unpatented
material used in applying the invention,’’ 320 U.S. at 664,
Mr. Justice Douglas stated:

‘¢. , . the competition which is sought to be controlled
is not competition in the sale of the patented assembly
but merely competition in the sale of the unpatented
thermostatic controls.’’ 320 U.S. at 667.

This language suggested that any attempt to enforce or
license a patent beyond the scope of its claim was imper-
missible, even though such enforcement is the essence of
contributory infringement.

It is the Government’s and Dawson’s view, as we under-
stand it, that Section 271 was intended merely to reverse
the latter dictum, and it is true that testimony was pre-
sented to Congress that Section 271(d) was necessary to
dispel the confusion resulting from Mercoid I and to rein-

* This is mirrored in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, 320 U.S. at 676:

“The court holds in effect that the owner of a patent who
exacts, as the condition of a license, that unpatented materials
used in connection with the invention shall be purchased only
from the licensor cannot obtain relief from equity against one who
supplies such unpatented materials even though the unpatented
appliance was not for common use but was designedly adapted for
the practice of the invention, but when so used did not involve an
infringement of the patent. The decision is thus merely an
appropriate application of what has come to be known as the
doctrine in the Carbice case, 283 U.S. 27. In this view I concur.”

13

state to any degree the remedy against contributory in-
fringement.

It is equally clear, however, that the members of the suc-
cessive congressional subcommittees, all lawyers, thor-
oughly understood the intention of the drafters of Section
271(d) to reverse the specific holding in Mercoid as well,
namely that a suit for contributory infringement is barred
if the patent owner is selling less than all of the claimed
invention and refuses to grant licenses independently of his
sales. It is that inescapable understanding and intent that
sanctions Rohm and Haas’ conduct in this case.

A. Congress intended Section 271 to reverse not only
the dictum in Mercoid but its direct holding as well.

Congress’ understanding of and intent to undo the
holding in Mercoid was reflected in the testimony of Theo-
dore S. Kenyon, a member of this Association:

‘““As a result of [Mercoid] and similar decisions,
great doubt has been cast upon the enforceability of
combination and so-called use ,atents where the patent
owner was engaged in manufacturing the essentials of
the combination or the special ingredient used im the
patented process, but where the claims were not liter-
ally infringed until these parts or supplies were com-
bined with others or used in a particular manner by
the ultimate purchaser.’’*

With almost clairvoyant application to the precise case

before this Court, Mr. Kenyon continued:

‘¢. .. in the chemical industry, a great many very
valuable ‘use patents’ have been granted for inven-

* 1948 Hearings, p. 17.

14

tions for the first time making useful some hitherto
known, but commercially useless, ingredient. These
inventions have given rise to new industries or the ex-
pansion of old industries in the manufacture and sale
of these special ingredients for the new and useful pur-
pose. Obviously the ingredients themselves could not
be patented per se because they had already been
known or described in textbooks. The real invention
lay in their utilization to achieve new and unexpected
results. The ‘misuse of patents’ doctrine has pre-
sented to the owners of such patents the alternatives
of either giving up the manufacture of these special
ingredients or in effect dedicating their patents to the
public. It is plain that neither of these alternatives is
in the public interest.

The bill which you have presented draws a line be-
tween the sale of staple articles having actual commer-
cial noninfringing use, on the one hand, and those spe-
cial components or ingredients which are particularly
made or adapted for use in the infringing combination
and are not suitable for actual commercial noninfring-
ing use, on the other hand; and it provides that the
sale of parts or ingredients of the latter type without
the consent of the patent owner constitutes a contribu-
tory infringement of the patent, and furthermore that
the sale of such parts or ingredients by the patent
owner himself shall not constitute a misuse of his
patent.’’*

Although the Department of Justice strongly disap-
proved of Section 5 of the proposed bill (corresponding to
the present Section 271(d)) in that it would ‘‘negate much
of the existing body of case law which has operated to

* 1948 Hearings, p. 18.

ee

ee 6 owe

—_——_—S 2 oo oe PP ee ee

15

prevent illegal extension of the patent grant... ,’’* the
Navy Department voiced its approval precisely in order
to foster the very conduct that the Justice Department
opposed, i.e., the bill

«é
.

. . would lend an incentive to the patent owner to
go into production when the field might be saturated
with only a few hundred machines, if, as a result of
producing the machines, probably at little or no profit,
he could be assured of a market for the parts or ma-
terial, peculiar to the patented structure but upon which
no separate patent may be obtained.

Inasmuch as the bill makes clear that staple articles
and commodities of commerce, not especially made or
adapted to use in a patented invention, and suitable
for actual commercial use are outside its scope, it would
appear that both the public and the Government are
amply safeguarded, if the doctrine is reestablished.’’**

The Committee’s specific awareness of the drafters’
intent to overturn the Mercoid holding with respect to a
patentee’s so-called ‘‘tie-in’’ sales was. equally clear in
1949. In a lengthy discussion of Wallace v. Holmes, 29
Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (CC Conn. 1871), holding that there
was contributory infringement of a patent on the combined
base, burner and chimney of a kerosene lamp by defendant’s
sales of all parts except the chimney, Congressman Bern-
hard stated:

‘‘Mr. Bernhard. I did not mean the defendant; I
meant the patentee. In other words, suppose that the
patentee was not interested in selling the complete
article for which he had a combination patent, but was
interested only in the sale of one of the component

* 1948 Hearings, p. 69.
** 1948 Hearings, p. 33.

16

items, the sale of the novel burner, and suppose he
sold the novel burner to the public with the condition
that those who bought his burner would be permitted
to use his combination patent by coupling it together
with these other articles which they could buy in any
store.

Mr. Rich. Well, Mr. Bernhard, you are importing
into this situation now an angle which was developed
much later on, and which has nothing whatever to do
with the problem of contributory infringement as such.
What you are thinking of is the misuse situation, and I
will come to that later.’’*

Mr. Rich then explained Section 5 of the proposed legis-
lation:

‘*Subsection (a) [271(d)(1)] above refers to cases
like the Lamp case or the Mercoid case where the paten-
tee has been in the busmess of selling less than the
entire invention claimed and has been making a profit
out of it; that is, derived revenue.

Subsection (b) [271(d)(2)] refers to this type of
situation: Suppose the patentee of the lamp had
granted a license to somebody to make the lamps with-
out chimneys or, as actually was the case, in the
Mercoid situation, the patentee licensed people to make
these switching units which had no other use except in
the case of this invention, and collected royalties.

In connection with subsection (¢) [271(d) (3) ], there
have been cases recently following the Mercoid case,
in which the courts have held that merely bringing a
suit is a misuse and that you are out of court on a
a motion to dismiss.

Mr. Bernhard. You also lose.your patent.

Mr. Rich. No; you do not lose your patent because
it is a case of the application of the unclean-hands
doctrine. The courts have said that you can wash your

* 1949 Hearings, p. 6.

17

hands when you have remedied the situation and have
stopped misusing your patent and that you may then
come back to the courts which may then possibly grant
you a recovery.

Mr. Boggs. How could you do that?

Mr. Rich. By changing your method of doing busi-
ness, perhaps, if practical. In the Lamp case, for ex-
ample, the lamps were sold with chimneys on them.’’*

Opposition to the bill was again voiced in 1949 by Mr.
John C. Stedman of the Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, whose ‘‘most serious objections’? again went to
proposed Section 5. Mr. Stedman testified correctly that
the effect of that section:

‘*. .. is to permit a patentee to sell unpatented parts
for a device or composition covered by his patent or
sell unpatented materials or apparatus for use with a
process patented by him, and at the same time prohibit
his competitors, by suit for infringement, from selling
such unpatented materials in competition with him.’’**

Mr. Stedman’s testimony together with that of the bill’s
proponents thus clearly framed to the Subcommittee the
holding in Mercoid that the proponents sought to overturn;
it was not merely the dictum to the effect that there was no
residuum left of the contributory infringement doctrine,
but rather its holding prohibiting sales of a material, non-
staple component where no licenses to use were granted
apart from the implied license attendant the sales.

Lest there be any doubt that the congressmen under-
stood this distinction and the intent of the drafters, it is
dispelled by the following colloquy:

* 1949 Hearings, p. 14.
** 1949 Flearings, p. 52.

18

‘*Mr. Willis. The Supreme Court said in the Mer-
coid-Mid-Continent case:

‘Minneapolis-Honeywell in advertising its stoker
switches stated that the ‘‘right to use’’ the Cross
system patent was ‘‘only granted to the user’’ when
the stoker switches of Minneapolis-Honeywell were
purchased from it and used in the system. There was
ample evidence to sustain the findings of the district
court that respondents endeavored to use the license
agreement so as to prevent the sale or use of combus-
tion stoker switches in these heating systems unless
they were the switches made by Minneapolis-Honey-
well and purchased from it or its sublicensees.’

Do you not think that probably that influenced the
Supreme Court more than the fact that they assumed
that the switch had no other purpose than for in-
fringing uses? Suppose that element had not existed
and suppose they had not participated in those acts?

Mr. Rich. What element?

Mr. Willis. The fact that the right to use was
predicated solely upon the purchase of the element
from them.

Mr. Rich. That was the thing essentially which
they regarded as a misuse of the patent right. But, let
me ask this rhetorical question: ] f you are in the busi-
ness of supplying electric equipment for furnaces and
you are not im the furnace business, how are you going
to enforce a patent of this type which is on the heating
system? What can you do with it? What value does
it have to you unless you can go to the source of the
thing which has no other use which instigates all of
the infringements? It is the type of situation which
occurs over and over again where contributory in-
fringement is the only practical way to get any value
from your patent. I can see nothing wrong in that
method of doing business.

19

Mr. Willis. Js that one of the permissive things
granted by section 5?
Mr. Rich. Yes.’’*

Again, when Congressman Willis asked whether or not
proposed Section 5 made adequately clear the line between
what was misuse and what was permissible conduct, Mr.
Rich replied:

‘*Mr. Rich. I think that section 5 makes it perfectly
clear what is left of misuse in this way: it says that
certain things under the headings (a), (b) and (c) shall
not be deemed to be misuse or illegal extension of the
patent monopoly.

Take the first one, (a), that the patent owner has
derived revenue from acts which if performed by an-
other without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent. To determine what that
means you will have to look at the rest of the bill and
see what we say shall be considered to be contributory
infringement now and if he has derived revenue, for
example, by selling these elements with an implied li-
cense, obtaining a little extra profit because of his pro-
tection granted under his patent, then that shall not be
misuse,’’**

That was the conduct proscribed by the holding in
Mercoid, and that is the conduct in which Rohm and Haas
has engaged. It is ‘‘perfectly clear,’’ in Mr. Rich’s words
to Congressman Willis, that Section 271(d)(1) was in-
tended to permit that conduct.

* 1949 Hearings, p. 69.
** 1949 Hearings, pp. 70 and 71.

20

B. Congress intended Section 271 to draw a clear line
between actionable contributory infringement and
application of the misuse doctrine.

The line legislated by Section 271(c) and (d) between
actionable contributory infringement and misuse cut clearly
between (1) deriving revenue from, licensing or suing for
contributory infringement with respect to non-staples as
defined in 271(c), and (2) deriving revenue from, licensing
and suing for contributory infringement with respect to
staples outside the scope of 271(¢c).* It was plainly drawn
at the outset of the 1948 hearings by Giles Rich:

‘‘Now, following the Carbice case, several other
cases came to the Supreme Court in which they also
applied the doctrine, taking these cases up on cer-
tiorari, because they wished to apply it, until finally
in 1944 we come to the Mercoid cases.

Now, in the Mercoid cases, the court assumed that
the defendant was a contributory infringer. They
specifically so stated. But then they said that where
there is a collision between this doctrine of contribu-

tory infringement and the misuse doctrine, the latter
must prevail.

* * *

So our view, and we set to work to draft this bill,
was that contributory infringement as a useful doctrine
is dead and with it the enforcibility of many per-
fectly valid and very useful patents. The bill was
designed to correct this situation without giving sanc-
tion to practices such as those in the Carbice case.’’**

* We do not mean to suggest that conduct in the first categor
would be sheltered if the patentee was engaged in price Pee vA

comparable conduct violating the antitrust laws and not within the
purview of Section 271.

** 1948 Hearings, pp. 10 and 11.

21

The issue was posed throughout the testimony as it had
been framed in Mercoid, namely that ‘‘[w]here there is a
collision between the principles of the Carbice case and the
conventional rules governing either direct or contributory
infringement, the former prevails,’’ 320 U.S. at p. 669. This
recognition of a collision between the two competing doc-
trines is irreconcilable with the Government’s view because
that view refuses to recognize the line that the ‘‘collision’’
led Congress to draw was a line defined by the scope of con-
tributory infringement in 271(c), not by an implied lim-
itation on the patentee’s conduct sanctioned by 271(d) (1).

Congressional understanding of this line is reflected in
the following colloquy between Congressman Willis and
Mr. Stedman of the Department of Justice:

‘*Mr. Willis. The trouble in my mind is that the Su-
preme Court held in the Mercoid cases that in the event
of a clash between the two doctrines the contributory
infringement doctrine must yield to the misuse doc-
trine.

* * *

The final point which I would like to lead up to is
this: Do you believe that the passage of this act
would result in Congress choosing between the two
doctrines and going overboard in favor of the con-
tributory infringement doctrine too narrowly, when
you and I feel that we have use for both doctrines?

Mr. Stedman. Mr. Chairman, if we did not feel
that there was a very real danger of that, we would
not be here. That is our chief concern.*

* 1949 Hearings, p. 57.

22

The same distinction was again emphasized by Mr. Rich,
responding to Mr. Stedman:

‘‘Now as to section 5. For the most part I agree
with everything Mr. Stedman has said in his interpre-
tation of that section, but it seems to me that he ignores
the fact that that section is limited to contributory in-
fringement as defined in the preceding parts of the bill.

* * *

As I tried to make clear the last time, it is absolute-
ly necessary, to get anywhere in this direction we are
trying to go, to make some exception to the misuse doc-
trine because it is the conflict between the doctrine of
contributory infringement and the doctrine of misuse
that raises the problem. The court in Mercoid theoret-
ically did not touch contributory infringement, they
merely said where it conflicts with misuse, the misuse
must control. How are you going to put any contrib-
utory infringement, which I said no longer exists, back
into the picture?

I previously stated, and I wish to reiterate it, that
section 5 is the most important part of the bill from the
standpoint of accomplishing our purpose. The excep-
tion which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine
would reverse the result in the Mercoid case; it would
not reverse the result in the Carbice ease.

Mr. Willis. Say that again, because that is the ques-
tion that I am intrigued with.

Mr. Rich. The exception which we would make to
the misuse doctrine would reverse the result in the
Mercoid case as we read it, as logically abolishing con-
tributory infringement.

Mr. Willis. All right, what would the bill do to the
misuse doctrine? Would it preserve it and to what ex-
tent?

Mr. Rich. It would preserve it in such cases as the
Carbice case or the Barber Asphalt case; where the

23

things dealt with are staple commodities of commerce
and not especially for use in infringement of patents.’’*

Additional light is shed on the line sought to be drawn
by Congress by a specific example of conduct that would not
be permissible under the proposed legislation. In an ex-
change between Mr. Rich and Representative Rogers con-
cerning the scope of contributory infringement and the con-
tinued existence of the misuse doctrine beyond that scope,
Mr. Rich explained that if the patentee

‘*. .. tries to license somebody, for instance, to manu-
facture a staple article of commerce, to be sold in a
patented invention and collect royalties, let us say, for
the manufacturing of salt tablets to be used in a pat-
ented vending machine or dry ice to be used in a pat-
ented shipping container, that will be misuse because it
doesn’t come within the terms of [Section 271(c¢)].’’**

These testimonial excerpts coupled with the carefully
reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeals, relying on other
excerpts from the congressional testimony, 599 F.2d at 699-
703, compel the conclusion that the line drawn by Con-
gress between permissible and impermissible conduct, pre-
viously held by the Court to constitute illegal tying irre-
spective of whether or not the articles sought to be con-
trolled were staple or non-staple goods, was one limiting
application of the misuse doctrine to circumstances beyond
the scope of paragraph (c) and sheltering the patentee
from the misuse doctrine with respect to sales of goods
within the scope of that paragraph. That line runs direct-
ly athwart the boundary sought to be established here by
Dawson and the Department of Justice.

* 1949 Hearings, pp. 67 and 68.
** 1951 Hearings, p. 175.

24

C. Congress expressly rejected in the 1952 Patent Act
the compulsory licensing sought here by Dawson.

Legislative activity to revise and codify the patent laws
was initiated in 1950 by compilation of a preliminary draft
bill entitled ‘‘Proposed Revision and Amendment of the
Patent Laws.’’ This draft included the then existing code
provisions together with additional proposals derived from
a study of all relevant bills introduced in Congress since
1925." Section 66 of the proposed revision, entitled ‘‘Li-
cense Conditions in Contract,’’ provided in part:

‘“(b) Any condition of any contract for license to make,
use or sell a patented invention, or for the sale or lease
of a patented article, or relating to any such license,
sale or lease, shall be void to the extent that it... (2)
prohibits the licensee, purchaser or lessor from using
any article not supplied by ... the licensor, vendor or
restricts the right of the licensee, purchaser or lessee
to use any such article or process.

* * *

(d) A condition of a contract shall not be void by rea-
son of paragraph (b)(1) and (2) if at the time of mak-
ing the contract the licensor, vendor or lessor was will-
ing to grant the license or sell or lease the article on
reasonable terms without any such condition and the
licensee, purchaser or lessee is entitled under the con-
tract upon reasonable notice to relieve himself of his
liability to observe the condition and substitute there-
for a reasonable specified alternative condition.”’

Section 66(b) appears to proscribe Rohm and Haas’
conduct unless Rohm and Haas were to sel] propanil, as
provided in subsection (d), without the condition that the

* 1951 Hearings, p. 21.

25

purchaser not buy propanil from any other source. That
is the outcome sought here by Dawson.

An additional section of the Proposed Revision, entitled
‘Compulsory Licenses,’’ provided in part that:

‘‘Any person may apply to the Commissioner of
Patents for the grant of a license under a particular
patent at any time after the expiration of three years
from the grant of the patent, under any of the follow-
ing circumstances:

* * *

(c) If by reason of conditions attached by the
patentee to licenses under the patent, or to the pur-
chase, lease or use of the patented article or process,
the manufacture, use or sale of materials not pro-
tected by the patent is unreasonably restrained or if
the patent has been used to unreasonably restrain
trade beyond the actual rights conferred by the pat-
ent.’’

This section may well have been construed to require the
very compulsory licensing that Dawson would have this
Court enact judicially. The infringement provision of the
Proposed Revision, section 72, was consistent with the fore-
going provisions for it contained nothing along the lines of
the present Subsection 271(¢c) and (d).*

The fact is, however, that these provisions and the pol-
icy inhering in them were rejected by Congress in favor
of the policy reflected in Section 271. The preliminary
draft was widely distributed with a request for criticisms
and suggestions. Based upon the comments received, the
committee chose to reject these proposed provisions in

* A copy of the foregoing provisions is annexed hereto as Appen-
dix A.

26

favor of the present statutory structure, which was in-
corporated in H.R. 9133 and then, after distribution of
and receipt of comments with respect to that bill, in H.R.
3760, which was enacted as the present title 35 U.S.C.
(1951 Hearings, p. 21).

This conscious Congressional rejection of compulsory
licensing, even as a remedy for what the statute would have
defined as abuses of the patent grant, is irreconcilable with
any Congressional intent to sanction the compulsory licens-
ing requirement sought here by Dawson. @¢ foregoing ex-
cerpts and the entirety of the legislative history overwhelm-
ingly provides the ‘‘clear signal’’ of Congress required by

this Court to change the pre-existing law as it had been
established in Mercoid.*

The decision reached by the Court of Appeals is
fully consistent with public policy.

A. The result sought by amicus is
consistent with antitrust policy.

The result sought by amicus in this case is fully con-
sistent with the public policy of the United States as ex-
pressed in the Antitrust Laws. In this case it is the policy
of the Antitrust Laws to prohibit tying that Dawson and

* Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972). In Deepsouth,a majority of the Court failed to find any clear
signal of congressional intent to change the pre-existing rule that the
entire combination claimed as the invention must be assembled in this
country before there can be an infringement. Whatever support the
legislative history may have provided for the change in the law
sought to be established in Deepsouth, it cannot compare with the
overwhelming support for amicus’ position here.

“en awh

at as les ees:

27

the Government invoke to limit the application of Section
271. But there can be no tying as a matter of definition
unless there are in fact separate tying and tied products.
Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 622-23 (1953). It has been held in this regard that
there is not sufficient separateness of products to warrant
application of the tying doctrine as between the morning
and afternoon editions of a newspaper (Times-Picayune) ;
weekday and Saturday editions of a newspaper (Paul et al.
v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 1974-1 Trade Cases [75,116],
(K.D.Mo. 1974) ; the ‘‘Shell’’ trademark and gasoline sold
under it (Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 912 (1976); mortgage loans and
attendant legal services (Forrest v. Capital Buildings &
Loan Association, 385 F.Supp. 831 (M.D. La. 1973), aff’d,
504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 978 (1975)) ;
the several elements of a package provided to stores under
a franchise arrangement (In re: 7-Eleven Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 1974-2 Trade Cases [175,429] (N.D. Cal. 1974)); anda
franchise and related advertising requirements (Kugler v.
Aamco Automatic Transmissions Inc., 337 F.Supp. 872, 876
(D. Minn. 1971), aff’d, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972).*

While the standards set down for determining whether
there are separate products or a single product for pur-
poses of tying analysis are not entirely clear,** we submit

* But see Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. et al., 394
U.S. 495 (1969), holding that the sale of prefabricated buildings and
credit for the purchase of those buildings extended by a separate cor-
poration were separate products for purposes of tying analysis.

** See Mr. Justice Black’s comment in Fortner: “Whatever the
standards for determining exactly when a transaction involves only a
‘single product’, we cannot see how an arrangement such as that pres-
ent in this case could ever be said to involve only a single product.

394 U.S. at 507.

ev te

28

that this is an appropriate case to discern but a single prod-
uct. Rohm and Haas’ patent covers the only known use of
propanil and involves merely the application of that prod-
uct to certain crops. Propanil, on the other hand, has no
use whatsoever apart from its use in the process. Product
and process in this case are but two faces of the same coin,
both logically and in the marketplace. Because they are thus
inextricably interrelated, it would strain the application of
the tying concept to define them as separate for purposes of
antitrust analysis. This is consistent with the test enun-
ciated in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1951): ‘‘That there
are not dual markets strongly suggests that there are not
separate products.’’ Plainly, there is no market for pro-
panil apart from its use in the patented process, and con-
versely there is no market for the patented process without
propanil.

Indeed, a leading commentator has urged in this respect
that ‘‘one must take into account the patent laws, which
grant some minimum of substantial rights that bear on the
question of product definition.’’* This approach is also
consistent with the intent and effect of Section 271, which
was to give every patentee within the scope of Section
271(c) the right to protect his grant beyond the narrow
confines of the patent claims. Indeed, it is fundamental that
the essence of contributory infringement is an acknowledge-
ment of the scope of the patent grant beyond the confines of
the claims. The effect is no different than if each patent
susceptible of being contributorily infringed were to con-

* Turner, “The Validity of Tying Arrangement Under the Anti-
trust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50, p. 68 (1958),

Ce IS a

29

tain a separate claim having a scope defined by Section
271(c), assertible against sellers of articles or compo-
nents, the sale of which would constitute contributory in-
fringement. For that reason, the endless references in the
Government’s brief to ‘‘unpatented’’ subject matter is a
misnomer, indeed a misuse, of the term; it is a red herring
harking back to an era brought to a close by the 1952 Patent
Act.*

It is also significant that any ‘‘tie-in’’ in the context of
Section 271 could not merely be enjoined; an affirmative
decree would be necessary not only to compel licensing but
to establish the terms of each license. As one commentator
has pointed out:

‘‘In the ordinary tie-in case, where the foreclosed
competitors are producing the tied product, the re-
straint is removed simply by prohibiting the tie-in. No
compulsory-dealing provision is required, since it may
be presumed that the patentee will not sulk, but will
sell his tying produet without the tie-in, leaving com-
petitors free to compete in the sale of the formerly tied
product. But in our example the restraint can be re-
moved only by a decree compelling the patentee to sell
the component to the ‘foreclosed’ competitors. There
are at least two good reasons for stopping short of
giving them this protection. One is administrative.
Such a decree requires virtually a public-utility type

* It is not misuse for a patentee to sell a machine constituting a
complete combination as claimed in his patent, which of course carries
an implied right to use the machine, even though no use licenses are
granted except to purchasers of the combination from the patentee.
That is not a “tie-in” of the patentee’s machine sales to the right to
use the machine because the rights both to sell and use the machine
are within the scope of the patent grant. Equally, Rohm and Haas’
sales of propanil are not “‘tied” to the use of propanil in its patented
process because both are fully within the scope of the patent grant as
set forth in Section 271.

30

of regulation: There must be some limit on the price
at which the component is sold to competitors, for-
otherwise the patentee could achieve the same exclu-
sionary effect by pricing the item so high that they
could not compete in the sale of the finished product.
The almost insoluble problem of determining a ‘fair’
price need hardly be spelled out. But more important,
such a decree goes far beyond the protection of com-
petition on the merits—it compels the inventive manu-
facturer to raise the ‘merits’ of his competitors’ prod-
ucts by distributing the fruits of his own progressive-
ness to them. This is questionable policy even if a pat-
ent were not involved.’’*

B. Requiring compulsory licensing of Rohm and Haas’
patent would cut against the public interest.

Congress has time and again been presented with and re-
jected the concept of plenary compulsory licensing. First
proposed as early as 1790, it was again introduced in 1877,
in 1952 and, more recently, in several proposals during the
1970’s.** Apart from specific exceptions to Congressional
policy expressly carved out in the fields of atomic energy,
air pollution control, plant variety protection and the

* Turner, supra, 72 Harv. L. Rev. at pp. 69-70 (emphasis in orig-
inal) (footnotes omitted). The example referred to involved a manu-
facturer of radio receiving sets who had a patent on a transformer
which he sold only as part of the complete receiver, thereby driving
competing radio producers from a substantial part of the radio market.
The result is the same whether a decree forces a manufacturer to sell
a product to competitors, as in the example, or to license competitors
to make the produce, as in the case at bar.

** See, e.g., Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Compulsory Licensing of
Patents Under Some Non-American Systems, Study No. 19, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1959) ; S.1283, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ;
S.2176, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S.814, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 44 and H.R. 46, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ; and
S.2040, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

31

Government’s own entitlement to what is in effect a compul-
sory license under its eminent domain powers,* attempts
to legislate compulsory licensing generally have met with
failure for over two centuries. If imposed by this Court it
would create both a disincentive to innovation and a signifi-
cant volume of litigation to determine in each case, for each
license applicant, what a reasonable royalty would be.**

It would be inappropriate to create here a disincentive
to industrial innovation at the very time when the President
has recommended a strong program of initiatives to pro-
mote innovation.t Taking into specific account the current
severe inflation and its effect in discouraging managers in
the private sector from spending the sums needed for ad-
equate industrial innovation, the President mandated
changes in the patent system to achieve that goal, including
a uniform patent policy to grant either title or exclusive
licenses to private contractors in inventions developed un-
der government contracts.

This constitutes recognition at the highest levels of
government of an important public policy emphasizing the

* See, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.
(1959) ), Clean Air Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 7401-7642 (1970, as
amended 1974) ), Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 2321-2583
(1970) ) and 28 U.S.C. 1498.

** We note in passing that the compulsory licensing sought by
Dawson as a contributory infringer results from the impracticability
of granting licenses to farmers, whose use of Dawson's propanil con-
stitutes direct infringement of Rohm and Haas’ patent. This case
does not present a situation where it is practical to license direct in-
fringers. Licensing direct infringers would allow them to purchase
propanil from any source; in that situation, which is not before the
Court, there would be no basis for requiring licensing of contributory
infringers.

+ Remarks of the President on Innovation Initiatives, October 31,

1979,

32

exclusivity of rights granted innovators by the patent sys-
tem. That public policy is worthy of recognition by this
Court. Antitrust policy should be construed to complement
rather than to undermine it. To render those rights non-
exclusive in a significant class of developments, as sought
here by Dawson and the Government, would necessarily
undermine that policy. It would also reduce competition by
encouraging a class of non-innovators who would await the
development by others of new uses for existing materials
and would then demand entree to the market created there-
by. This rewards the non-contributor at the expense of
the contributor and ultimately discourages development of
new products and processes, resulting in reduced competi-
tion, fewer products and fewer jobs.

To the extent that companies like Dawson and Crystal
may develop more efficient methods to produce propanil,
they may elect to license those methods to Rohm and Haas,
thereby benefiting both petitioners and the public. More-
over, the disclosure through the patent system of Rohm
and Haas’ use for propanil ought to stimulate others to-
wards finding additional uses for propanil, for their own
economic reward and to the public’s benefit.

If Rohm and Haas chose to confine its use of propanil
to itself rather than face compulsory licensing, that would
certainly not benefit the public. Nor would the administra-
tion of justice generally be benefited by subjecting the
courts to a new category of litigation to adjudicate what
is a reasonable royalty in each instance.

33

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court

of Appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Barry D. Rei
and
Stranutey M. Lieserstein

Attorneys for Amicus
Of Counsel:

Pau M. Entow
195 Broadway
New York, New York 10007

Kenneta BE. Mapsen
59 Maiden Lane
New York, New York 10038

Rory J. Rappine
330 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017

March 22, 1980

APPENDIX

PROPOSED REVISION AND AMENDMENT
OF THE

PATENT LAWS

PRELIMINARY DRAFT
WITH NOTES

COMMITTEE PRINT

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1950

Conn on kf W to

Ch. 9 OWNERSHIP, ASSIGNMENTS, AND LICENSES § 67

§ 66. Licenses, conditions in contracts

(a) A patentee may grant licenses permitting making, using or
selling the patented invention, in so far as his exclusive right is con-
cerned, to the extent and subject to such conditions relating to such
making, using or selling of the patented invention or to the patent
as he may choose, subject to the provisions of this title.

(b) Any condition of any contract for license to make, use or sell
a patented invention, or for the sale or lease of a patented articlé,
or relating to any such license, sale or lease, shall be void to the ex-
tent that it (1) requires the licensee, purchaser, or lessee to acquire
from the licensor, vendor or lessor or his nominees any articles other
than the patented article, or (2) prohibits the licensee, purchaser or
lessee from using any article not supplied by, or any process not
belonging to, the licensor, vendor or lessor, or restricts the right of
the licensee, purchaser or lessee to use any such article or process or
(3) requires the licensee, purchaser or lessee to assign or otherwise
give control of any invention made by or owned by him to the licensor,
vendor or lessor.

(c) In any action for infringement of a patent it shall be a defense
to prove that at the time of the infringement there was in force a
contract, containing a condition declared void by this section, made
by or with the consent of the plaintiff.

(d) A condition of a contract shall not be void by reason of para-
graph (b) (1) and.(2) if at the time of making the contract the licensor,
vendor or lessor was willing to grant the license or sell or lease the
article on reasonable terms without any such condition and the licen-
see, purchaser or lessee is entitled under the contract upon reasonable
notice to relieve himself of his liability to observe the condition and
substitute therefor a reasonable specified alternative condition.

(e) This section shall not render void any contract or condition
with respect to sales agency or exclusive Sales agency, or for the supply
of parts, which would be valid without this section.

; Note

This section brings up the subject of valid and invalid conditions in license
agreements. The first paragraph is declaratory of a broad right to grant
licenses. The second paragraph (except clause 3 which is new) is an expansion
of section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S. C. 14) to apply the licenses as well as
to sales or leases and follows decisions of the courts in holding such conditions
invalid. The third paragraph states the penalty which has been applied by the
eourts. The fourth and fifth paragraphs qualify part of the second paragraph.

53

CON OOP WN

§72. Infringement of patent

Any person who makes, uses or sells any patented machine, manu-
facture, composition of matter or improvement, or uses any patented
process or improvement, within the territory of the United States
and its Territories during the term of the patent therefor without
authority, and any person who intentionally aids and abets any such
unauthorized making, using or selling, infringes the patent and shall
be liable to a civil action for infringement, except as otherwise
provided in this title.

Note

The first part of this section is declaratory only, defining infringement.
The second part defines contributory infringement in broad terms, recent legis-
lative proposals on contributory infringement are: 80th Congress, H. R. 5988,

hearings May 1948; 8lst Congress, S. 2518, H. R. 3866, hearings May, June
1949, H. R. 6436.

59

ee

Conn kf Wilde

ADDITIONAL ITEMS

2. Compulsory Licenses

1. Grounds for compulsory license

Any person may apply to the Commissioner of Patents for the
grant of a license under a particular patent at any time after the
expiration of three years from the grant of the patent, under any of
the following circumstances: eae |

(a} If the patented invention is not being worked in the United
States on a commercial scale without reasonable justification.

(b) If the demand for the patented invention in the United States
is not being met to an adequate extent without reasonable justification
or is being met to a substantial extent by importation.

(c) If by reason of conditions attached by the patentee to licenses
under the patent, or to the purchase, lease or use of the patented
article or process, the manufacture, use or sale of materials not
protected by the patent is unreasonably restrained or if the patent
has been used to unreasonably restrain trade beyond the actual rights
conferred by the patent.

(d) If the decree of a court in an action by the United States under
the anti-trust laws has declared that the patent shall be available for
licensing to any applicant on reasonable terms.

(ce) If the use of the patented invention is necessary for public
health or public safety.

(f) That the applicant for license is the patentee of an invention
of an improvement on the patented invention which cannot be
worked without utiliziug the patented invention, provided that the
improvement is a substantial and important contribution to the art
and the applicant for license is willing and able to grant to the patentee
and his licensees a lieeuse to use his improvement on reasonable terms.
» In determining the existence of reasonable justifiestion under para-
graphs (a) and (b) there shall be considered, among other factors,
the efforts of, and measures taken by, the patentee and whether
sufficient time has elapsed since the date of the patent to work the
invention or supply the market, coustdertng the nature of the inven-
tion and the resources of the patentee.

Notes

This item brings up the controversial subject of compulsory licensing of patents.

Paragraph (a) of section | recites the customary ground for erant of a com pulsury
license and both (a) and (b) would apply in the case of foreign owned United
States patents when the invention was not being manufactured in the United
States. Paragraph (c) is a possible remedy in the case of abuse of patents.
Paragraph (d) relates to the existing power exercised by the courts in civil anti-
trust actions. Paragraph (ec) follows a recomn endation of the National Patent
Planning Commission (1943). Paragraph (f) is commonly found in laws of other

countries. There have been numerous legislative proposals for compulsory

licenses in this country.
4

91

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1147%3A21. Public record. Not legal advice.
