# Petition — J. B. K., Inc. v. Caron

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 444 U.S. 1016

## Text

a Bu; j i 3 %
; ~ Y

FILED t

4} oct 22 y979

WOM SGDAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

J.B.K., INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

VS.

NORMAN CARON, ET AL.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JAMES R. WYRSCH

1050 Home Savings Building
1006 Grand Avenue
Kansas City, Missouri 64106

Attorney for Petitioners

E. L. MENDENHALL, INc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opptendamns TRIO ........c.cccesssesseses.s. © SSS OEE ae 2
Jurisdiction — ............... a a sc ccastseeuasstncce 2
a _cswsiuasandaccanscescnenccee 2
The Constitutional Provisions and Statutes ................... 3
I I nr SoS csccechcneccascecocessoscaacecenccene 10
Reasons for Granting the Wit ..................c..sc.cccccsscesssssesee 15
i. ansnouncccncccccsees 15
1(a). Equal Protection Violations ............0...0....... 15

1(b). Fundamental Rights of Petitioners Were
Infringed Upon by Chapter 567, R.S.Mo. 20

Discussion of Question Presented ..................:sccscceseeeeeees 24
a ssnsccnssecsctccoccecaces 32
Appendix A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals .............. Al
Appendix B—Opinion of the District Court .......0..00........ A7
Appendix C—Motion for Rehearing Denied .................... A29
Table of Authorities
CASES
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) 2. eee 22

Buchanan v. Batcheler, 308 F.Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex.
1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 401

I a. sc eeasnataszeccnsccnces 23
Caesar’s Club v. St. Louis County, 565 S.W.2d 783
os sacccssacsctcsoncascocccccccnsacs 23

Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 180 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1968) 16
Cianciola v. Members of City Council, Knoxville, Tenn.,
376 F.Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) 0.0... cceeccsesceseeseee 21
City and County of Denver v. Wilson, 572 P.2d 484
Naess cisssiscccsncnccnecsnescccansscaccsencecececcees 21

il

Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass.

| LAER RA AE Rae A cD eer ele ar ELE enemy ween Ae 23
Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F.Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex.
DN Ssccsadeviaiteestacsscs coeds asec iaamsdaaietieniaauidsAaaaeagaaneniens 21, 24
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
Get Bie TI, BET CRI) ivrcsscsseccscnsevnsiincecssscasecssinnice 23
Fagden v. Linker, 365 A.2d 1947? (Pa. 1976) .............00. 22
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 3 L.Ed.2d 1877 (1959) 20
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ....00.... 22
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971) .......ccccceeeeeeeeees 21
Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116
Ti ge RBA ARERR RI ited Denes FR eR oeeee Pr naDL A oon 16
Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978) 26
Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F.Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1975) ........ 16
In re P., 400 N.Y.Supp.2d 455 (Fam. Ct. 1977) ....16, 19, 22
Jensen v. Salt Lake, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974) ~...00000200.... 21
JSK Enterprises v. Lacey, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1972) 21
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) ......... 22
Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) ............ 22
Mason v. Claytor, 459 F.Supp. 174 (D. D.C. 1978) ........ 20
Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.
1975), app. dism., 419 U.S. 891 (1976) 0... 20
OPT. ©. GPE, TW Te BT CITI) vecinsecsncenssccnnsthessésecinnee 32
Parham v. Hughes, 99 S.Ct. 1742 (1979) 2... 32
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) nce cccccesceeseees 20
People of the State of New York v. Johnson, 355
Sa SEE a 17
People of the State of New York v. Rice, 363 N.Y.S.2d
eet AEAID. 90 Rin ORONO Oe REED See EO 17

People v. Williams, 286 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1967)

Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
S| FRIAR ORR RRM cerca kena Oe RAR RI EO 2

II
Sax v. Breier, 384 F.Supp. 36 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ......0......... 21
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) oe 23
State of Iowa v. Pilcher, 249 N.W.2d 348 (Ia. 1976) .... 23
State of N.J. v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748 (N.J. 1973) ............ 23
State of Ohio v. Faulk, No. C-77486, First Appellate
EIUMETICE OE GIRO (UTOIOTOIE) nccccccccccecccessecesccsccscnnseseesese 16
State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) ........cccceeeee 17
oc Wee We COPUOR, GED UW, Be CRG) ciscciscecrettacestcsttaceacceees 23
Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939 (1979) 2... ecceeeeee 32
Valley Health Systems, Inc. v. City of Racine, 369
PCIE. BT CRD. Wi0C. TOTB) .ncccecevccsescccssescnesencesecvsxeonss 16
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 00.00.0000... 22
Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71 (1976) .........ceccceceseeeeees 22

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

United States Constitution—

I a cahdneaamecanbbens 3, 22
MI I giccctccdistceetcnen tnsasdramecnaisetinead casccneahaisiees 22
III UII ics cscs cacatacsncuravnsesustuntiaduciecsantiaseed 20, 22
INI II | ca... crsx. cas scssshaieanastnunoaseasdamaninaunks 22
Amendment Fourteen ...................cccccccecsee 3, 15, 20, 22, 24
MII HI 55.25 sasinsty scacssncsanonasdaqsnomonceastetsnmnbioudboiasantin bit 3, 21
I ts 3, 21
NIN IIE RIES, 5hcchpcsenatulesiismnscasannndaabsiicesemacessppinesooniin 16
SII cab sstiicssasicshcasaamcoiachanssccasebiemeenilaseepe psalms 16
Chapter 567, R.S.Mo. ......... sista ntdatcemagsine 4, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21
BY SIN Ip isdccrsarvemcctdanartrnraapnensinhatetsoncihiies 4,15, 17, 21
Sie an a aa eengnasacmiamaeieeneeemmammmants 6
I arash scala steeds chest cheats eoccecsdcantoetiooedionssh tantetovaien 6
NER “RAL RO PR eee ee ae IST 7

IV
foe tere bloke ee SS 7
567.060 ............ ~visuioeasetinciiganinbcia pis catalase haa 8
Ne oe caliper PA AERIS ee 8
TR BD oavsaccaceansinincestasan ecahacsietiacniaeuatiiensnken ane 8
CIE I ST AR 9
EI © scnnccscsessaéesadelneeene PPE es eS ONL ES 10
TREATISES

Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection (1972), 86

FEO U Nae, 2 ccnsnrecsvensscsisseenensatanaaa ee 26
“The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,” 83
Flory dadeey. OB6 CRG) | ncccceccetie seen 22

Richardson, “Sexual Offenses Under the Proposed Mis-
souri Criminal Code”, 38 Mo.L.Rev. 371 (1973) ........ 16, 19

“The Constitutional Right of Sexual Privacy,” 12 Suf-
eR NB ee re 17

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

J.B.K., INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

VS.

NORMAN CARON, ET AL.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners, J.B.K., Inc., d/b/a Magic Touch, Kingsmen
II, d/b/a King’s Harem, S.L.S., Inc., d/b/a Relaxation Sta-
tion, C-Sun, Inc., d/b/a Garden of Eden Health Spa, T.D.C.,
Inc., d/b/a Your Way Health Spa, L.T.D. Enterprises,
d/b/a Classy Lady Health Spa, T.R.I. Company, d/b/a
Afternoon Delight Health Spa, Lone-Star Enterprises, d/b/a
Wild West Pleasure Palace, and Diamond Enterprises,
d/b/a Fantastic Fantasy Health Spa,* petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case.

*Other appellants below, namely Marilyn Schaefer, a/k/a
Ann Watson, d/b/a Foxy Lady Health Spa and d/b/a Hideaway
Health Club Spa; Club 107, Inc., d/b/a Club 107 and d/b/a
Grandview Fitness Center; G & G Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Unique
Health Spa; E & H Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Beaver Lodge; Franko
Therapeutics, Inc., d/b/a Aristocrat House Health Spa, and
Shirley Edwards, do not join in this Petition.

~

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App. A, infra,
pp. Al-A6) is reported at 600 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1979).
The opinion of the District Court (App. B, pp. A7-A28)
is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
June 24, 1979. Petitioner’s timely motion for rehearing
or alternatively, for rehearing en banc, was denied on
July 23, 1979 (App. C, infra, p. A29). This Honorable
Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 USC 1254 (1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Whether the Appellate and Trial Courts decision
to deny preliminary relief in this case was bottomed upon
the proper test to be employed when the facts present
an issue under the Equal Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

(A) Has an important question of Federal law been
decided by the Court of Appeals which has not been, but
should be, finally settled by this Court, to-wit: should the
traditional “two-tier” analysical framework for review-
ing legislative classifications under the equal protection
clause be used or should Justice Marshall’s test (as ex-
pressed in e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) be used, i.e., whether there is an
appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by
the differential treatment.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES

U. S. Constitution, Amendment One.

Amendment One

Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the free-
dom of speech....

U.S. Constitution, Amendment Fourteen.
Amendment Fourteen

Sec. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State where-
in they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Art. I, §9, Cl. 3, U. S. Constitution.
Art. I, §9
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.
Art. I, $10, U. S. Constitution.
Art. I, §10

No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. * * *

Chapter 567, R.S.Mo.

Sec.

567.010.
567.020.
567.030.
567.040.

567.050.
567.060.
567.070.
567.080.
567.090.
567.100.

567.010.

Chapter 567
PROSTITUTION

Chapter definitions.
Prostitution.
Patronizing prostitution.

Prostitution and patronizing prostitution—
sex of parties no defense, when.

Promoting prostitution in the first degree.
Promoting prostitution in the second degree.
Promoting prostitution in the third degree.
Prostitution houses deemed public nuisances.
Preemption and standardization.

Responsibilities of prosecuting attorneys and
attorney general.

Chapter definitions

As used in this chapter, the following terms mean:

(1)

“Promoting prostitution”, a person “promotes

prostitution” if, acting other than as a prostitute, or
a patron of a prostitute, he knowingly

(a) Causes or aids a person to commit or engage
in prostitution; or

(b) Procures or solicits patrons for prostitution;

or

(c) Provides persons or premises for prostitution
purposes; or

4)

(d) Operates or assists in the operation of a
house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise; or

(e) Accepts or receives or agrees to accept or
receive something of value pursuant to an agreement
or understanding with any person whereby he par-
ticipates or is to participate in proceeds of prostitution
activities; or

(f) Engages in any conduct designed to institute,
aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution;

(2) “Prostitution”, a person commits “prostitu-
tion” if he engages or offers or agrees to engage in
sexual conduct with another person in return for some-
thing of value to be received by the person or by a
third person;

(3) “Patronizing prostitution”, a person “patron-
izes prostitution” if

(a) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he gives
something of value to another person as compensation
for that person or a third person having engaged in
sexual conduct with him or with another; or

(b) He gives or agrees to give something of value
to another person on an understanding that in return
therefor that person or a third person will engage in
sexual conduct with him or with another; or

(c) He solicits or requests another person to en-
gage in sexual conduct with him or with another, or
to secure a third person to engage in sexual conduct
with him or with another, in return for something of
value;

6
(4) “Sexual conduct’ occurs when there is

(a) “Sexual intercourse” which means any pene-
tration, however slight, of the female sex organ by the
male sex organ, whether or not an emission results; or

(b) “Deviate sexual intercourse” which means
any sexual act involving the genitals of one person
and the mouth, tongue or anus of another person; or

(c) “Sexual contact” which means any touching,
manual or otherwise, of the anus or genitals of one
person by another, done for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire of either party;

(5) “Something of value” means any mioney or
property, or any token, object or article exchangeable
for money or property.

L.1977, p. ........, S.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.020. Prostitution

1. A person commits the crime of prostitution if
he performs an act of prostitution.

2. Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor.

Aalee ty Bs -.--- , ».B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.030. Patronizing prostitution

1. A person commits the crime of patronizing
prostitution if he patronizes prostitution.

2. Patronizing prostitution is a class B misde-
meanor.

BREE ts BR ences. , S.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

7

567.040. Prostitution and patronizing prostitution—
sex of parties no defense, when

In any prosecution for prostitution or patronizing
a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective
parties to the sexual conduct engaged in, contemplated
or solicited is immaterial, and it is no defense that

(1) Both persons were of the same sex; or

(2) The person who received, agreed to receive
or solicited something of value was a male and the
person who gave or agreed or offered to give some-
thing of value was a female.

Balert, M , 5.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.050. Promoting prostitution in the first degree

1. A person commits the crime of promoting pros-
titution in the first degree if he knowingly

(1) Promotes prostitution by compelling a person
to enter into, engage in, or remain in prostitution;
or

(2) Promotes prostitution of a person less than
sixteen years old.

2. The term “compelling” includes
(1) The use of forcible compulsion;

(2) The use of a drug or intoxicating substance
to render a person incapable of controlling his con-
duct or appreciating its nature;

(3) Withholding or threatening to withhold dan-
gerous drugs or a narcotic from a drug dependent
person.

8

3. Promoting prostitution in the first degree is
a class B felony.

A See , 5.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.060. Promoting prostitution in the second degree

1. A person commits the crime of promoting pros-
titution in the second degree if he knowingly promotes
prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or
owning, either alone or in association with others,
a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or
enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or
more prostitutes.

2. Promoting prostitution in the second degree
is a class C felony.

ey a , 5.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.070. Promoting prostitution in the third degree

1, A person commits the crime of promoting pros-
titution in the third degree if he knowingly promotes
prostitution.

2. Promoting prostitution in the third degree is
a class D felony.

yy aan - Speen , 5.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.080. Prostitution houses deemed public nuisances

1. Any room, building or other structure reg-
ularly used for sexual contact for pay as defined in
section 567.010 or any unlawful prostitution activity
prohibited by this chapter is a public nuisance.

2. The attorney general, circuit attorney or prose-
cuting attorney may, in addition to all criminal sanc-
tions, prosecute a suit in equity to enjoin the nuisance.

9

If the court finds that the owner of the room, build-
ing or structure knew or had reason to believe that
the premises were being used regularly for sexual
contact for pay or unlawful prostitution activity, the
court may order that the premises shall not be occu-
pied or used for such period as the court may deter-
mine, not to exceed one year.

3. All persons, including owners, lessees, officers,
agents, inmates or employees, aiding or facilitating
such a nuisance may be made defendants in any suit
to enjoin the nuisance, and they may be enjoined
from engaging in any sexual contact for pay or unlaw-
ful prostitution activity anywhere within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.

4. Appeals shall be allowed from the judgment
of the court as in other civil actions.

Pe 5 a See , 9.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.090. Preemption and standardization

The general assembly by enacting this chapter
intends to preempt any other regulation of the area
covered by felony sections 567.050 through 567.070,
to promote statewide control of prostitution, and to
standardize laws that governmental subdivisions may
adopt in other areas covered by this chapter. No
governmental subdivision may enact or enforce a law
that makes any conduct in the area covered by sec-
tions 567.050 through 567.070 subject to a criminal
or civil penalty or sanction of any kind. Cities and
towns may enact and enforce laws prohibiting and
penalizing conduct subject to criminal or civil penalties
or sanctions under other provisions of this chapter,
but the provisions of such laws shall be the same

10

and the authorized penalties or sanctions under such
laws shall not be greater than those of this chapter.
Cities and towns may also enact and enforce laws
prohibiting and penalizing public solicitation of sexual
conduct, whether or not the offer to engage in sexual
conduct is in return for something of value, and health
laws to prevent the spread of venereal diseases.

Oy a: re , 5.B.No.60, $ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

567.100 Responsibilities of prosecuting attorneys and
attorney general

In addition to the responsibility of circuit attor-
neys and prosecuting attorneys in their respective ju-
risdictions to enforce the criminal provisions of this
chapter, they shall have the duty to enforce the pro-
visions of section 567.080; and the attorney general
shall have a concurrent duty to enforce the civil provi-
sions of section 567.080.

PS a Sapore , S.B.No.60, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 14, 1978, Plaintiffs, all of whom are
individuals and/or corporations engaged in the business
of operating massage parlors in the State of Missouri,
filed a verified complaint in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. Plaintiffs si-
multaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining
order with supporting suggestions and a motion for pre-
liminary injunction, together with suggestions in support
thereof.

A temporary restraining order was issued, and there-
after a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction
was held on January 3, 1979.

11

Prior to the hearing, the Defendants, all of whom
were either state, county or local law enforcement or prose-
cutorial officials in the State of Missouri, responded to
the complaint, some pursuant to a formal answer, others
pursuant to a motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b) (1), (6), F.R.
Cw. F.

A transcript of all proceedings in the lower court
was made and will be filed with this Court.’ After the
hearing on the motion for a temporary injunction, on Janu-
ary 3, 1979, the cause was continued; and on January
9, 1979, the Court below denied the relief sought (<e.,
issuance of a temporary injunction). Thereafter, on Jan-
uary 12, 1979, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion
which constituted findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Although the Trial Court found that Petitioners demon-
strated “irreparable injury’, it found Petitioners had not
convinced the Court that they would succeed on the merits
or that they demonstrated sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits or that the balance of hardship tipped
in their favor. Thereafter, pursuant to 28 USC 1292(a) (1)
and Rules 3 and 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Petitioners took an interlocutory appeal to the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which affirmed the lower
court’s denial of injunctive relief.

Petitioners invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction pur-
suant to 42 USC 1983, 28 USC 1331, 1343(3), 28 USC
2201-2202, Petitioners being licensed and taxed massage

1. The official court reporter’s transcript of proceedings of
January 3, 1979 consisting of 6i pages will be referred to as
“Tr. 1/3/79, p. ....”.. Throughout this Petition, reference will
be made to various portions of the Record by stating the name
of the document referred to, followed by the date of filing (i.e.,
“COMPLAINT, 12/14/78” or “ORDER, 1/9/79’). Petitioners
elected pursuant to Rule 30jh), F.R. App. P. and Rule 11, Local
Rules, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to proceed on
the original designated record below.

12

parlor operators in the State of Missouri who, as of Janu-
ary 1, 1979, would be criminally and otherwise liable under
the provisions of Sections 567.010-567.100, R.S.Mo., and
particularly directed their attack upon those provisions
prohibiting “sexual contact,” defined -as the “touching,
manual or otherwise, of the anus or genitals of one person
by another, done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire of either party.” Other provisions of the
Statutes were also attacked as unconstitutional.

The evidence showed that Petitioners were all legiti-
mate, licensed and taxed operators of massage parlors,
each and every one of whom had invested in excess of
$10,000.00 in their respective businesses, and were engaged
in offering the services of masseuses who were women
to male customers to furnish massages to take place in
private and not in public. The services to be provided
were in the nature of ‘“‘sexual contact”’ which was declared
to be “prostitution” under the new Missouri law (COM-
PLAINT, 12/14/78, and supporting affidavits).

The evidence showed that the newly-enacted statutes,
Sections 567.010, et seq., R.S.Mo., could and would be ap-
plicable to the Plaintiffs and permit and require their
prosecution under said provisions. Additionally, the com-
plainants’ businesses were such that they could be declared
“public nuisances” and shut down for as long as one year
at a time, under the provisions of Section 567.080, R.S.Mo.
These statutes superceded and preempted local ordi-
nances, Section 567.090, R.S.Mo., and enforcement of these
statutes was declared to be the responsibility of both state
and county prosecutors. Section 567.100, R.S.Mo. (COM-
PLAINT, 12/14/78).

Included in the statutory proscriptions was that of
“sexual conduct”, specifically to include “sexual contact”,
Section 567.010(4) (c), R.S.Mo., which was criminally con-

13

demned where such conduct took place for money or any-
thing else of value. Section 567.010(5), R.S.Mo.

It was further established as a matter of undisputed
fact that the complainants’ conduct would bring prosecu-
tion under the above statutes because the massage admin-
istered by the female employees to male customers
involved the touching and/or massaging of the male gen-
italia (COMPLAINT, 12/14/78).

At the hearing on motion for temporary injunction
held on January 3, 1979, the following facts were adduced:.

Introduced into evidence was the affidavit of Professor
Edwin Hunvald, Professor of Law, University of Missouri
at Columbia, as to the purpose of newly-enacted legislation,
including Sections 567.010, et seq., R.S.Mo. (Tr. 1/3/79,
pp. 7-8, Exhibit 1) and detailing the legislative history
of these statutes. Professor Hunvald’s testimony related
that the sole justification for the enactment of these stat-
utes, at least as they applied or might apply to the Plain-
tiffs, was to control the spread of venereal disease (Tr.
1/3/79, p. 11; HUNVALD AFFIDAVIT). Professor Hun-
vald’s testimony showed, by way of the comments made
by the drafters of the proposed Missouri code, which were
attached to Professor Hunvald’s Affidavit, that there were
valid arguments for making prostitution legal. Hunvald’s
testimony also showed that sexual conduct not for hire
was not prohibited under the new Missouri Statutes, and
that sexual conduct for hire involving certain sexual fet-
ishes was similarly not prohibited.

The verified complaint was introduced into evidence
(Tr. 1/3/79, p. 12, Exhibit 2).,

Mr. Thomas I. Cylar, Assistant Director of the Venereal
Disease Control Clinic covering several Western Missouri
counties, testified as an expert witness for the Plaintiffs

14

that massage parlor operations and sexual activity therein
had never been a cause for the spread of venereal disease
(Tr. 1/3/79, pp. 13-16).

One of the Plaintiffs, Schaeffer, testified as to her
knowledge and experiences, both as a massage parlor oper-
ator for a five-year period of time, and as Secretary of
the Missouri Massage Association (Tr. 1/3/79, pp. 17-
23). It was established from Ms. Schaeffer’s testimony
that, in all such businesses, the masseuses were females,
the customers males.

The affidavits of two physicians, Dr. Elliott and Dr.
Colom, were admitted into evidence (Tr. 1/3/79, pp.
23-25, Exhibits 3 and 4). In their testimony, these two
physicians stated that there were no detrimental effects,
and in fact, innumerable benefits, to massage, including
the masturbatory function, in their professional opinions.
Dr. Elliott testified that venereal disease would not likely
be contracted through sexual touching. Dr. Colom’s affi-
davit also established that the conduct of masturbation
was widespread amongst American males, and that it was
a medically-accepted treatment practiced by such medical
practitioners as Masters and Johnson.

The testimony of State Representative O’Toole was
admitted into evidence (Tr. 1/3/79, pp. 26-32). His testi-
mony, like that of State Senator Caskey (Tr. 1/3/79,
pp. 30-33), established Professor Hunvald’s connection with
the then-proposed and ultimately enacted legislation herein
involved, and showed that the only possible reason for
the enactment of this legislation was the prevention of
venereal disease, and showed that the legislators intended
that this legislation, in part, was directed against massage
parlor operators (Tr. 1/3/79, p. 29).

15

Counsel thereupon sought leave to file supplemental
briefs addressing the issues, which the trial court allowed
(Tr. 1/3/79, p. 35), and the initially granted temporary
restraining order was ordered to continue in effect until
January 9, 1979 and pending the court’s decision on the
motion for an injunction (Tr. 1/3/79, p. 59).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Introduction.

Petitioners are in this Petition attacking those pro-
visions of the Missouri Statutes which prohibit ‘sexual
contact” for something of value, i7.e., §§567.010(4)(b) and
(5) and related provisions of these Statutes punishing and
making criminal such acts. They are not asking that
Chapter 567 as it relates to ‘“‘sexual intercourse” and
“deviate sexual intercourse” for “something of value” be
declared unconstitutional. §§567.010(4) (a), (b) and (5).

l(a). Equal Protection Violations.

The provisions of Chapter 567, R.S.Mo., relating to
“sexual contact” for hire do in fact violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as fol-
lows: (1) the Statute permits sexual touching for those
who do not pay, but does provide criminal penalties for
those who pay; (2) the Statute provides for unequal pun-
ishment for those who “patronize prostitution” or for
those committing crimes of prostitution, as opposed to
those who “promote prostitution”; (3) the Statute pro-
vides for the same penalties for those engaged in ‘sexual
intercourse” and “deviate sexual intercourse’’, as for those
who engage in “sexual contact”; (4) the Statute prohibits
the touching of the “genitals” (defined in Webster’s Dic-
tionary as meaning the “reproductive organs”), i.e., the

16

touching of the penis and vaginal areas; this leaves as no
violation of the law such activities as sado-masochism,
bondage, sexual acts with animals or corpses, adultery,
fornication, peeping, touching of the female breast, of the
thighs, and the like; See Richardson, “Sexual Offenses
Under the Proposed Missouri Criminal Code’, 38 Mo.L.Rev.
371 (1973), at p. 378; (It is to be noted further that under
Section 566.110 of the Missouri Statutes, sexual ccntact
between consenting persons is not a violation of the law,
except ‘“‘when the other person is incapacitated or 12 or
13 years old’’; it is also interesting to note that Chapter 566
prohibits the touching of the breast of any female person
whereas under Chapter 567, same is not prohibited.); (5)
the Statute unconstitutionally distinguishes between ac-
tivities undertaken for money or property of value and
those which may be undertaken in exchange for other ser-
vices which are also of value; and (6) the Statute arbi-
trarily distinguishes between operations involving one
prostitute and operations involving more than one prosti-
tute. In Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F.Supp. 91 (E.D.Va. 1975),
the court there held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
preliminary injunction against a sexual touching ordinance
under an equal protection analysis because “the touching
or exposing of specific body parts, may indeed be under-
inclusive in character and without a rational basis.” See
also, for an equal protection analysis, In re P., 400 N.Y.
Supp.2d 455 (Fam. Ct. 1977); Cheek v. City of Charlotte,
180 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1968); Valley Health Systems, Inc. v.
City of Racine, 369 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Wisc. 1973); Hart
Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah
1978); People v. Williams, 286 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1967),
which held that a New York statute defining solicitation
for prostitution was void on equal protection grounds, and
to like effect is State of Ohio v. Faulk, No. C-77486, First
Appellate District of Ohio (unreported), a copy of which

17

was attached to Petitioners’ Brief in the Eighth Circuit
as Exhibit C; People of the State of New York v. Johnson,
355 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267-268 (1974); People of the State of
New York v. Rice, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484, 487-48 (1975) (strik-
ing down state sodomy law on equal protection grounds
for discriminating between married and unmarried per-
sons). Compare State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (NJ.
1977) commented upon: ‘The Constitutional Right of
Sexual Privacy,” 12 Suffolk, Va.L.Rev. at pp. 1312-1328.

Petitioners showed that there was no rational basis,
compelling state interest, or an appropriate governmental
interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment
set out above.”

Thus Petitioners conclusively showed that the drafters
of the Statute, as well as the Missouri Legislature, only
had one purpose in mind in enacting Chapter 567.010(c)
prohibiting sexual contact, namely the purpose of pre-
venting venereal disease (See Professor Hunvald’s affidavit,
with Comments of the drafters of the Code attached thereto,
Tr. pp. 7-8; Exhibit 1). Also attached to Professor Hun-
vald’s affidavit were arguments in favor of legalization of
prostitution, contained in the Comments to the Modern
Penal Code, at pp. 171-173. The arguments in favor of
prostitution were summarized as follows (citing many
authorities): (1) prostitution cannot be eliminated by
law; (2) sumptuary laws that cannot be generally enforced
lend themselves to extortion and arbitrary and episodic
prosecution; (3) failure to provide a professional outlet for
male sexuality results in more rape and other sexual crimes;
(4) registration and periodic health inspection are the best
means for controlling venereal disease; disease is much more
likely to be spread by the promiscuous amateur than by

2. See discussion, infra.

18

professional prostitutes concerned and instructed to avoid
infection; (5) legalized prostitution offers less opportunity
for official corruption and an unrealistic effort of total
repression; (6) by confining prostitution, particularly in
neighborhoods, police surveillance is facilitated and the
safety of the general community is promoted (Tr. pp. 7-8;
Exhibit 1). The affidavit of Kenneth Elliott, as acknowl-
edged by the court below, certainly casts doubt on any find-
ing that sexual touching involved the spread of venereal
disease (Tr. pp. 23-25; Exhibit 3). The testimony of Mr.
Cylar, a Public Health official, certainly put to rest the
notion that venereal disease by sexual touching presented
any health problem (Tr. pp. 13-16). Both Dr. Elliott’s and
Dr. Colom’s affidavits showed that masturbation has bene-
ficial effects, was widespread amongst American males, had
no deterimental effects, and was in certain circumstances
used by medical practitioners (Tr. pp. 23-25; Exhibits 2,
3&4). The testimony of the State Legislature showed that
the only possible reason advanced to the legislature for en-
actment of the law was the prevention of venereal disease.
The lower court, in its Memorandum Opinion, acknowledged
that Petitioners had made a substantial showing in this re-
gard (See Appendix B, pp. A21-A23).

However, the trial court stated that there might have
been other reasons that the Missouri Legislature enacted
Chapter 567 (which reasons and facts, it is respectfully
suggested, were never presented to the Missouri Legisla-
ture). According to the lower court in its Memorandum
Opinion, the Legislature might have enacted the Statute
for the following reasons: ‘“(1) the strain public market-
ing of sex may place on the institution of marriage, (2) the
possibility that innocent citizens may be confronted by un-
wanted solicitation, and (3) the State’s concern over regu-
lating the criminal manipulation that may surround the ac-

19

tivity of prostitution.” (Appendix B, pp. A22-A23). In this
respect, the Petitioners made available to the court the case
of In rei ., the finding of which the lower court chose to dis-
regard (See Appendix B, p. A22). In In re P., citing nu-
merous authorities, the ws Nate that the prevailing evi-
dence shows that prostitution does not harm the family or
marriage (at p. 468), does not serve any objective such as
deterring organized crime (at p. 467), and does not present
any offense to public sensitivities (at pp. 468-469). In re
P., 400 N.Y.Supp.2d 455 (1977). (This case was presented
to the court by way of attachment to Petitioners’ Sugges-
ticns in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion.) Thus, the Petitioners made a showing that there
was a possibility that they would succeed on their merits
concerning the propriety of Chapter 567, and also showed
that there were sufficiently serious questions going to *he
merits to make them a fair ground of litigation with respect
to the propriety of Chapter 567. It is also to be noted that
the State may not “rely upon the bare assertion of im-
morality to justify a criminal prohibition.” In re P., at p.
467, citing many authorities. This view was echoed by one
of the drafters of the Code, Judge Orville Richardson. See
“Sexual Offenses” under the proposed Missouri Criminal
Code, 38 Mo.L.Rev. 371 (1973), at pp. 373-4, and particu-
larly footnote 6, wherein the author states (in footnote 6
at p. 374): “All arguments seem to weigh most heavily
against the legal enforcement of morality.”

In short, there was no evidence showing that there was
any “public interest” requiring the prohibition of “sexual
touching”, nor any showing that masturbatory conduct by
a person injuriously affects others, nor any showing that
the “means (were) reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive.”

20

Finally, there was no showing that the least restrictive
means necessary were used to accomplish the purpose. All
of the evidence, in fact, was to the contrary.

1(b). Fundamental Rights of Petitioners Were
Infringed Upon by Chapter 567, R.S.Mo.

(1) The Petitioners’ rights to employment, to do busi-
ness, and to obtain income both from the ownership of
property and from conducting business are fundamental
rights.

As the lower court correctly held, “the Supreme Court
has recognized: ‘the right to hold specific private em-
ployment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the
“liberty” and “property” concepts of the Fifth Amend-
ment.’” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377
(1959). See also Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d
1342 (8th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1976).
The Fifth Amendment mandate applies with equal force
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause, and there is no difference in the depth of the
protection afforded to persons as between the Fifth Amend-
ment’s application federally, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s application to and against the State. Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 702 (F.N. 3) (1976); Mason v. Claytor, 459
F.Supp. 174, 179 (D. D.C. 1978).

Each Petitioner in this matter established by way of

————-veritied petition that they had a going business requiring

a substantial investment. Their businesses were, as noted
above, certainly legal prior to January 1, 1979 when Chap-
ter 567 took effect. Petitioners established they were
taxed, inspected and otherwise examined by the Defen-
dants, their officers, agents and employees. It was estab-
lished by Professor Hunvald in his affidavit that at least

21

one amendment to Chapter 567 was specifically directed
against massage parlors (Tr. pp. 7-8, Exhibit 1).

Given Petitioners’ fundamental right to property and
to enjoy the fruits thereof,’ the Respondents failed to
show any “compelling state interest’, rational basis, or
an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered
by the differential treatment so as to justify the provisions
of Chapter 567, R.S.Mo. 1969, as it relates to “sexual touch-
ing”. Petitioners therefore were entitled to a preliminary
injunction in this regard. See Corey v. City of Dallas,
352 F.Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Sax v. Breier, 384
F.Supp. 36 (E.D. Wis. 1974); City and County of Denver
v. Wilson, 572 P.2d 484 (Col. Banc 1977); JSK Enterprises
v. Lacey, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1972); Cianciola v. Mem-
bers of City Council, Knoxville, Tenn., 376 F.Supp. 719
(E.D. Tenn. 1974); Jensen v. Salt Lake, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah
1974).

(2) Petitioners’ Rights to Freedom of Speech to Freely
Associate, and to Privacy, Are Fundamental Rights Af-
fected by Chapter 567 of the Missouri Statutes.

(a) The Right of Free Speech. Section 567.010(3) (c)
and Section 567.010(1)(d) prohibit solicitation to engage
in sexual conduct. It is respectfully suggested that these
provisions violate Petitioners’ right to free speech. The
Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held
that, regardless of taste, tradition, or common acceptance,
free speech is protected unless it falls into the category
of “fighting words”. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1971). And, free speech does not lose its First Amend-

3. It is also clear that Chapter 567, R.S.Mo., constitutes a
violation of Petitioners’ Freedom to Contract (see Article I, Sec-
tion 10, U. S. Constitution) and, further, is an ex post facto law
aimed at Petitioners’ businesses (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3,
U. S. Constitution).

99
ment protection because of its commercial aspects. See
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-821 (1975). This Court has
made it abundantly clear that a criminal statute capable
of punishing spoken words could not stand constitutional
muster unless it has been authoritatively construed by
state courts to be inapplicable to speech which is protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lewis
v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). The statute in this
case which sweeps as broadly as it does is on its face
therefore plainly unconstitutional. See Note, “The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,’ 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844
(1970).

(b) The Right of Privacy. This Court has held that
there is a constitutional right to “privacy”. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold made clear
that the right of privacy was implicit within the First
Amendment Freedom of Association, within the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, within the Fourth Amend-
ment restraint on search and seizure, within the Ninth
Amendment’s unenumerated rights, within the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection guarantee, within the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Guarantee, and with-
in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. It is suggested
that such right of privacy also resides within the First
Amendment Freedom of Religion and within the Fifth
Amendment restraint on self-incrimination. It has been
held that the right of “‘privacy” includes the right of sexual
privacy. See In re P., cited supra, citing many authorities;
State v. Saunders, cited supra. See also Fagden v. Linker,
365 A.2d 1947 (Pa. 1976); Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d
71 (1976) (acts with non-spousal partners); Lovisi v.
Slayton. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (acts of oral-sexual

23

expression ketween heterosexuals); and the right to pos-
sess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home, Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also State of Iowa
v. Pilcher, 249 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Ia. 1976); Commonwealth
v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 480-481 (Mass. 1974); State
of N.J. v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 753 (N.J. 1973); Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 847 (1968); Buchanan v. Batcheler, 308 F.Supp. 729
(N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
401 U.S. 989 (1971). These cases all hold that sexual
relations which are private and consensual in nature are
within the constitutional right of privacy. It is to be
noted that, in the instant case, the sexual act of touching
was, according to Petitioners’ Complaint, to take place
in the privacy of a room in an area of Petitioners’ busi-
nesses. Thus, the privacy of the home is also involved
in this matter. See U. S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973),
wherein the court held that the “Constitution extends spe-
cial safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it
protects other special privacy rights such as those...
procreation ... .” Contra, Caesar’s Club v. St. Louis
County, 565 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.App. 1978). See also Discus-
sion at pp. Al8-A19 of the Trial Court’s “Opinion” in this
cause.

Thus, since Petitioners have the protected rights as
enumerated above, and since there was no showing of
a compelling state interest, or rational basis or appropriate
governmental interest suitably furthered by the differen-
tial treatment‘ in this case, Petitioners were entitled to
their preliminary injunction.

4. See discussion, infra.

24

DISCUSSION OF QUESTION PRESENTED

Traditionally, the courts have applied a two-tiered
analysis to decide questions under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Consti-
tution. The court in Corey v. City of Dallas, cited supra,
reversed on other grounds, 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974),
stated:

“The Equal Protection Clause does not deny to a state
or local government the power to treat different classes
of persons in different ways in the area of public
health, safety and morality. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). However,
governmental bodies are denied the power to legislate
persons into different classifications when the classi-
fications are unrelated to the objective of the legisla-
tion. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 394
U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1968); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct.
463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).

“Where a challenge based upon classification is made
to a state or local law under the Equal Protection
Clause a court is required to consider ‘the facts and
circumstances behind the law, the interests which the
State claims to be protecting, and the interest of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification.’ Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626, 89 S.Ct.
1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).

“There are two standards which are applicable in eval-
uating a classification by law which is challenged un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.

25

“A. Rational Basis Standard

“Tf a classification does not affect a ‘fundamental right,’
its constitutionality is to be judged on the basis of
whether the distinction drawn by the law has some
rational basis to a legitimate governmental interest.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101,
6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). In McGowan the Supreme Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause ‘is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrele-
vant to the achievement of the State’s objective’ and
that ‘a statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify, it” 366 U.S. at 425, 426, 81 S.Ct. at 1105.
Further, the Court held that there is a presumption
of constitutionality of the law where a rational basis
for classification conceivably exists even though there
is a resulting inequality.

“B. Compelling State Interest Standard

“On the other hand, if a classification does affect a
‘fundamental right,’ its constitutionality is to be judged
on the basis of whether the classification is necessary
to promote a compelling state interest. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886,
23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct.
1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).

»* * *

“In order for legislation affecting a fundamental right
to withstand a challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause, it is incumbent on the governmental authori-
ties to show that there was no other practical matter

26

in which the objective of the legislation could be ac-
complished and that the interest of the governmental
authority is superior to the rights of the persons who
may be adversely affected by the legislation.” At
pp. 979-980.

This two-tiered analysis has been criticized. The first
part of the test - whether there is a “rational basis” for
the legislation in question - has proved in practice to be
“minimal scrutiny in theory and none in fact.” Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection (1972), 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8.
The second part of the test - the “strict scrutiny” standard,
or “compelling state interest” test, has been characterized
as “strict in theory and fatal in fact.” Gunther, op. cit.,
at p. 8.

The learned Justice of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Stanley Mock, has brilliantly summarized the exist-
ing state of affairs in Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586
P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978), at pp. 924-926:

“The two-tier system of reviewing equal protec-
tion claims has been criticized by many thoughtful ob-
servers as a rigid and artificial analytical structure.
Leading the assault has been Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, who has characterized the two-tier mode of an-
alysis as ‘outdated and intellectually disingenuous.’
(Beal v. Doe (1977) 432 U.S. 438, 457, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 53
L.Ed.2d 464 (dis. opn.).) Justice Marshall summarized
his consistently expressed views in a dissent to the
court’s opinion in San Antonio School District v. Rod-
riguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 98-99, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1330, 36
L.Ed.2d 16: ‘I must once more voice my disagreement
with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal prctec-

27

tion analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
519-521, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (dissent-
ing opinion); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90, 92
S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that
equal protection cases fall into one of two neat cate-
gories which dictate the appropriate standard of re-
view—strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this
Court’s decisions in the field of equal protection
defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of
what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a
spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.’ (See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia (1976) 427 U.S. 307, 318-321, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49
L.Ed.2d 520 (dis. opn. by Marshall, J.).) And Justice
Marshall set forth his perception of the proper inquiry
in his majority opinion, signed by six other justices, in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408
U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212: ‘As in
all equal protection cases . . . the crucial question is
whether there is an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment.’
(Italics added.)

Other judges and commentators have endorsed
the view that the traditional framework for equal pro-
tection analysis is deficient in concept and frequently
ignored in practice. Justice White did so explicitly in
Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 458-459, 93 S.Ct.

28

2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (conc. opn.), and Justice Powell
implicitly with his conspicuous avoidance of two-tier
rhetoric in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
(1972) 406 U.S. 164, 172-173, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d
768. (See also Gunther, supra; Bennett, Liberty,
Equality, and Welfare Reform (1973) 68 Nw.L.Rev.
74, 96; Gellhorn & Hornby, op. cit. supra, 60 Va.L.Rev.
at pp. 986-988; Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term
—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment (1977) 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 3; Francis v. Cle-
land (D.S.D.1977) 433 F.Supp. 605, 618-619; Hoover v.
Meiklejohn (D.Colo.1977) 430 F.Supp. 164, 167-168;
Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Assn.,
Inc. (D.Kan.1974) 377 F.Supp. 1233, 1238-1239; Mc-
Ilvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police (1973), 454 Pa.
129, 309 A.2d 801, 807-811 (dis. opn.); Schwartz v.
Talmo (1973), 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318, 324-325
(dis. opn.).)

In short, the vice of the traditional approach is
that it applies either a standard that is virtually always
met or one that is almost never satisfied. Professor
Wilkinson observed that the attempt to apply ‘two
widely variant levels of scrutiny with no gradations
for rights of intermediate importance’ must prove un-
satisfactory ‘because, as Professor Freund once re-
marked, the world does not move on a “binary princi-
ple.” ’ (Wilkinson, supra, at p. 948, fn. 15.)

The broad analytical lacuna thus remaining would
be filled if Justice Marshall’s intermediate approach
were adopted; it has not yet gained widespread ac-
ceptance, however, no doubt because of a hesitance to
develop an unstructured standard that might appear
to invite judicial intervention in policymaking pref-
erably left to political agencies. But any court that

29

is so inclined can perform simple legal legerdemain and
reach a predetermined result by maneuvering such
conclusory labels as ‘suspect’ or ‘fundamental.’ Even
the most responsible application of the traditional an-
alysis inevitably involves a certain measure of judicial
balancing, for the scope of such terms as ‘rational,’
‘legitimate,’ ‘compelling,’ or ‘necessary’ remains largely
a matter of opinion. The tendency of courts to manipu-
late words and meanings to avoid the rigidity of the
two-tier framework has prompted one commentator to
write: ‘Working with due process and equal protec-
tion opinions dealing with fundamental rights is like
playing [the croquet match in Alice in Wonderland]
..., using concepts that bend or fall limp to chase words
that move with a mind of their own into categories
which just are not there any more. We quickly learn:
this is not the game we thought we were playing.’
(Goodpaster, supra, at 479.)

In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court
has apparently developed an intermediate level of re-
view in response to ‘a perception that the all-or-nothing
choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny
ill-suits the broad range of situations arising under the
equal protection clause, many of which are best dealt
with neither through the virtual rubber-stamp of truly
minimal review nor through the virtual death-blow of
truly strict scrutiny, but through methods more sensi-
tive to risks of injustice than the former and yet less
blind to the needs of governmental flexibility than the
latter.’ (Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978)
p. 1089 (hereinafter Tribe).) That equal protection
standards are in a state of flux—and that a third stan-
dard of review is emerging—has been widely recog-
nized. (See, e. g., Acha v. Beame (S.D.N.Y.1977) 438
F.Supp. 70, 78; Gay Students Org. of U. of New Hamp-

30

shire v. Bonner (D.N.H.1974) 367 F.Supp. 1088, 1096-
1097, affd. and mod. (1st Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 652; Tribe,
supra, at pp. 1082-1092; Simson, A Method for Analyz-
ing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection
Clause (1977) 29 Stan.L.Rev. 663, 665-666; Wilkinson,
supra, at pp. 951-953; Goodpaster, supra, at pp. 501-
504; Ackerman, op. cit. supra, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev, at pp.
774-775; Karst, op. cit. supra, 91 Harv.L.Rev. at p. 23,
fn. 122; Note, A Question of Balance, Statutory Classi-
fications Under the Equal Protection Clause (1973) 26
Stan.L.Rev. 155, 157-160; Note, The Supreme Court of
California, 1972-1973 (1974) 62 Cal.L.Rev. 408, 462.)

The new standard, thus far most closely associated
with discrimination based on classifications by gender
or the status of illegitimacy, was clearly articulated in
Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451,
457, 50 L.Ed.2d 397: ‘To withstand constitutional chal-
lenge .. . classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives.’ The vitality
of ‘middle-level scrutiny’ was subsequently confirmed
when this language was quoted and the new standard
applied in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977) 430 U.S. 199,
210-211, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270, and Califano v.
Webster (1977) 430 U.S. 313, 316-3171 97 S.Ct. 1192,
51 L.Ed.2d 360.

Justice Marshall’s opinion for the court in Za-
blocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673,
54 L.Ed.2d 618, indicates the new intermediate mode
of review may be more generally applied. The equal

1. Several lower federal courts have also quoted and
applied this test in cases involving gender-based discrim-
ination. (E.E.0.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (3d Cir. 1977)
556 F.2d 167, 179; Blake v. City of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal.
1977) 435 F.Supp. 55, 60; Hoover v. Meikeljohn (D.Colo.
1977) supra, 430 F.Supp. 164, 168; In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974 (C.D.Cal.1977) 427 F.Supp. 701, 708.)

31

protection analysis there presented carefully avoided
the two tiers of traditional review and focused instead
on such factors as the importance of the rights involved,
the extent to which the classification at issue inter-
fered with their exercise, and the significance of the
state interests advanced in support of the classifica-
tion. The court concluded that the statutory classifi-
cation could not ‘be justified by the interests advanced
in support of it.’ (Id. 434 U.S. 451, at p. 391, 98 S.Ct.
at p. 683.) Several other Supreme Court justices have
accorded explicit recognition to the development of
an intermediate level of review. In his dissenting
opinion in Craig v. Boren (1976) supra, 429 U.S. 190,
218, 97 S.Ct. 451, Justice Rehnquist observed that the
court was applying an ‘elevated or “intermediate”
level scrutiny.’ Concurring in Craig, Justice Powell
remark that the court subjects gender-based classi-
fications to ‘a more critical examination than is nor-
mally applied when ‘fundamental” constitutional
rights and “‘suspect classes” are not present.’ (Id. at p.
210, 97 S.Ct. at p. 464; see also id. at pp. 211-214, 97
S.Ct. 451 (cone. opn. by Stevens, J.).) Dissenting in
Moore v. East Cleveland (1977) 431 U.S. 494, 551, 97
S.Ct. 1932, 1962, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, Justice White cata-
logued the three levels of review: strict scrutiny, ‘the
somewhat less strict standard of Craig v. Boren,’ and
‘the generally applicable standard’ (the rational basis
test) .°

2. Many lower courts have also recognized explicitly
that equal protection anaivsis now entails three levels of re-
view. For instance, in Hoover v. Meiklejohn (D.Colo.1977)
supra, 430 F.Supp. 164, 168, the court understood the stan-
dard enunciated in Craig to constitute ‘a “middle-tier ap-
proach,” requiring something between “legitimate” and
“compelling,” viz., “important,” and something more than
a “rational” relationship but less perhaps than “strict
scrutiny,” viz., “substantially” related.’ (See Meloon v.

(Continued on Following Page)

32

As the foregoing discussion indicates, this Court has
never explicitly stated when courts should employ the so-
called ‘“‘medium-level” of review, e.g., when fundamental
rights are involved or when they are not, only when
racial or gender based classifications are involved, Orr v.
Orr, 99 S.Ct. 1102 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 99 S.Ct.
1742 (1979), or in all cases, Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.Ct. 939
(1979) (age discrimination). This Court should grant
certiorari to decide this important question.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should be granted,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated with in-
structions to grant Petitioners’ preliminary injunction or
to reconsider its opinion in light of the proper test for
resolving Equal Protection questions, and for such other
and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in
the premises.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES R. WyRSCH
Attorney for Petitioners

Footnote Continued—

Helgemoe (D.N.H.1977) 436 F.Supp. 528, 530-532; Meloon
v. Helgemoe (lst Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 602, 604-605; Vance v.
United States (N.D.Tex.1977) supra, 434 F.Supp. 826, 833-
834, affd. per curiam (5th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 1214; Lewis v.
Cohen (E.D.Pa.1976) 417 F.Supp. 1047, 1053; Gilpin v. Kan-
sas State High School Activities Assn., Inc. (D.Kan.1974)
supra, 377 F.Supp. 1233, 1238-1239; see also Note, The Su-
preme Court, 1976 Term (1977) 91 Harv.L.Rev. 70, 177-182;
Note, Gender-Based Legislative Classifications (1978) 57
Nev.L.Rev. 555, 559.) In Francis v. Cleland (D.S.D.1977)
supra, 433 F.Supp. 605, 618-620, the court noted that the
new ‘medium level of review’ has been applied in cases in-
volving classifications which, though not suspect, came close
to being suspect; the court concluded that such a middle-tier
approach is likewise appropriate when a case involves a
right not fundamental but which is close to being funda-
mental.”

Al

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-1079

J.B.K., Inc., etc., et al.,
Appellants,

V.

Norman Caron, et al.,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri

Submitted: April 24, 1979
Filed: June 14, 1979

Before LAY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, massage parlor operators in Missouri,
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent state and local
law enforcement personnel from enforcing Chapter 567,
Revised Statutes of Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 567.010-
567.100, which became effective January 1, 1979. Chapter

A2

567 prohibits prostitution, which MO. REV. STAT. § 567.010
(2) defines as follows:

“Prostitution”, a person commits “prostitution” if
he engages or offers or agrees to engage in sexual
conduct with another person in return for something
of value to be received by the person or by a third
person.

Terms such as “sexual conduct” and “something of value”
are subsequently defined.

Appellants’ business activities include genital massage
for payment which would come within the statutory defini-
tion of prostitution. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 567.010(2)
and (4)(c). They contend that the prohibition of this
activity violates their rights to freedom of speech, freedom
of association, privacy, due process, equal protection, free-
dom of contract and employment. They also allege a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

The district court! denied the requested preliminary
injunction primarily because he considered that anpellants
had not established a probability of success on the merits
of any of these claims. We hold that the denial of the
preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion,
and we affirm on the basis of the district court’s compre-
hensive opinion. In addition, we make the following obser-
vations.

Appellants’ right to privacy claim rests on their mis-
taken premise that the constitutionally protected right to
privacy encompasses all sexual acts performed by consent-
ing adults in nonpublic places. We do not agree that
the right to privacy extends to all sexual practices per-

1. The Honorable Russell G. Clark, United States District
Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

A3

formed in private including the commercialized sexual ac-
tivities regulated in this case. See Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

As stated in that case:

Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included
“only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’
or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ * * *
This privacy right encompasses and protects the per-
sonal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation, and child rearing.

* * *

Finally, petitioners argue that conduct which di-
rectly involves “consenting adults” only has, for that
sole reason, a special claim to constitutional protection.
Our Constitution establishes a broad range of condi-
tions on the exercise of power by the States, but
for us to say that our Constitution incorporates the
proposition that conduct involving consenting adults
only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we
are unable to take.

e £ e

The state statute books are replete with constitu-
tionally unchallenged laws against prostitution, sui-
cide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing “bare fist’
prize fights, and duels, although these crimes may
only directly involve “consenting adults.” Statutes
making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s
freedom te associate, but few today seriously claim
such statutes violate the First Amendment or any
other constitutional provision.

A4

Id. at 65, 68 and 68 n.15 (citations omitted, emphasis
added).

With regard to plaintiff's freedom of speech claim,
see Davis v. Norman, 555 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1977). When,
as in this case, a state or local law primarily regulates
conduct, any incidental impact on speech is to be judged
in the following light:

The Supreme Court has held that:

[W]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms. ... [A] government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Id. at 190-91 quoting from United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See also Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. at 67:

Where communication of ideas, protected by the First
Amendment, is not involved, or the particular privacy
of the home protected by Stanley, or any of the other
“areas or zones” of constitutionally protected privacy,
the mere fact that, as a consequence, some human

2. See also Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F.Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) in which
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three-judge court de-
cision upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia sodomy stat-
ute against a right to privacy challenge. The statute prohibited
sodomy even when practiced by consenting adults in private.

A5

“utterances” or “thoughts” may be incidentally af-
fected does not bar the State from acting to protect
legitimate state interests.

We do not agree with appellants’ contention that Chap-
ter 567 is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is void for
vagueness if it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute” or if it “encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.” Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). We find that the statute
is precisely worded, that its terms are sufficiently defined
and that it gives “fair notice of the offending conduct.”
Id.

We note that the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Caesar’s Health Club v. St. Louis County,
565 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3317
(U.S. Nov. 7, 1978), in which the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals upheld a county ordinance virtually identical to
Chapter 567. The Missouri court found that no funda-
mental rights were infringed by the ordinance, that the
law was a reasonable and legitimate exercise of police
power and that it was not overbroad.

Challenges to other laws regulating or prohibiting mas-
sage parlor practices have met a similar fate. See, e.g.,
Tomlinson v. Mayor and Aldermen of The City of Sa-
vannah, 543 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1976);3 Brown v. Brannon,

3. In Tomlinson v. Mayor and Aldermen of The City of
Savannah, 543 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit refused
to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance ‘that prohibits hetero-
sexual massages, imposes strict training and certification require-
ments on massagists, and puts rather onerous place and manner
restrictions on the giving of massages” against challenges to the
law as “an arbitrary restriction of a supposedly due process-
protected right to operate a legitimate business, and as a violation
of equal protection * * *.” Id. at 571. The court stated:

(Continued on Followin7 Fage)

A6
399 F.Supp. 113 (M.D. N.C. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1249
(4th Cir. 1976).

We have considered appellants’ remaining equal pro-
tection, right to employment and Title VII issues and find
that they do not warrant preliminary injunctive relief.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH
CIRCUIT.

Footnote Continued—

In Smith v. Keater, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 42
L.Ed.2d 636 (1974), dismissing for want of a substantial
federal question, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203; Rubenstein v.
Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963, 94 S.Ct. 3165, 41 L.Ed.2d 1136
(1974), dismissing for want of a substantial federal question,
No. 10,027 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1974); and Kisley v. City
of Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed.2d 169
(1972), dismissing for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972), the Supreme Court
dismissed appeals from state court decisions upholding the
constitutionality of ordinances prohibiting heterosexual mas-
sages. Appellants in those three cases contended in the
Supreme Court that the ordinances established invidiously
discriminatory sex-based classifications in violation of the
equal protection clause, worked an unreasonable abridge-
ment of the right to pursue a legitimate livelihood; and cre-
ated an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that all
massages lead to illicit sexual behavior. The Supreme Court
ruled that these challenges did not raise a substantial con-
stitutional question.

Id. See also Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978),
upholding a San Antonio, Texas massage parlor ordinance as a
valid exercise of police power against charges that due process,
equal protection and employment interests were unconstitutionally
invaded.

AT

APPENDIX B ™~.

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

No. 78-1007-CV-W-3

J.B.K., INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

VS.

NORMAN CARON, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Filed January 12, 1979)

Several threshold jurisdictional questions have been
raised by the defendants concerning the propriety of this
Court considering the federal constitutional issues involved
in ruling on plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendants from enforcing particular
provisions of Chapter 567 R.S. Mo. (1979).

CASE OR CONTROVERSY ISSUE

Defendants deny the existence of a case or controversy
as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution and
the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201. The
case or controversy requirement is jurisdictional and if
this requirement is not met the federal court may not
entertain the complaint. A case or controversy arises with-

A8&

in the meaning of the constitution when a question respect-
ing the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
have assumed such a form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on it. In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 89 L.Ed.
1795, 1800 (1945). While the case or controversy require-
ment can also involve the question of standing, i.e. does
a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of the
case; this aspect of the case or controversy requirement
is not at issue in the above action. The issue before
the Court is whether plaintiffs have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury. That
injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate
and not hypothetical nor conjectural. Abstract injury
clearly is not sufficient to meet the Article III require-
ment. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38
L.Ed.2d 674, 682 (1974).

In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209,
39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), the Supreme Court found that where
threats of prosecution against petitioner existed that could
not be characterized as imaginary or speculative, it was
not necessary:

that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or
prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that
he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional
rights. Steffel, supra at 514.

In Blaknik Co. v. Ketola, et al., No. 78-1151 (8th Cir., Nov.
13, 1978) plaintiffs were seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against enforcement of a city ordinance regulating
certain conduct on premises holding a liquor license. The
Eighth Circuit in evaluating whether the case or contro-
versy requirement had been satisfied determined that
because the ordinance clearly applied to plaintiffs’ business
and because a challenger to a statute need not expose him-

A9

self to actual arrest, the case or controversy requirement
was Satisfied.

In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that various of-
ficials threatened to institute action against them on Jan-
vary 1, 1979 when Chapter 567 R.S. Mo. became effective.
From the brief legislative history before the Court, it ap-
pears that partiéular provisions of Chapter 567 were aimed
at making illegal certain massage parlor practices. (Rep.
O’Toole and Sen. Cassky’s testimony as stipulated to and
presented to the Court.)

The Court finds that particular provisions of the new
act seem clearly directed towards prohibiting particular
conduct that the massage parlors in their pleadings have
admitted is a routine part of their business. This coupled
with allegations concerning threats by law enforcement of-
ficers made at least to some of the St. Louis plaintiffs is
sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement.
Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the case or controversy requirement must be denied.

ABSTENTION ISSUE

The defendants also argue that this Court should ab-
stain from considering the issues involved in this case on
either of the following two abstention theories:

(1) the case presents unresolved issues of state
law which should be decided in the state tribunals; or,

(2) the federal court should not interfere with
state criminal prosecutions as dictated by Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669
(1971).

The Supreme Court has recognized that the proper ex-

ercise of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies
involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in

Al0

state tribunals. City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., 358 U.S. 639, 79 S.Ct. 455, 3
L.Ed.2d 562 (1959); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pull-
man, 312 U.S. 496, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Abstention on this
ground is not indicated if the state law is clear on its face
or if its meaning has been authoritatively decided by the
state court. Wright, Miller and Cooper, 17 Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, 54242 (1978).

After careful review of the sections of Chapter 567
R.S. Mo. challenged by plaintiff, the Court finds that the
language of the act is not so unclear as to require the state
courts to initially interpret its meaning nor does it involve
unsettled questions of state law whose resolution may
obviate the need for deciding federal constitutional issues.'

While there has been no state court decision on this
particular statute, the St. Louis Court of Appeals pre-
viously considered state and federal constitutional chal-
lenges to a St. Louis ordinance containing provisions nearly
identical to the provisions of §567.010(2), (4) (a), (b) and
(c), and (5). Caesars Health Club v. St. Louis County,
565 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. App. 1978). In that case the court
refused to declare the statute vague or overbroad declar-
ing:

the alleged overbreadth of the ordinance is neither real

nor substantial. Moreover, because possible invalid

applications of the ordinance are highly speculative

and not presently before this court, we believe the
ordinance should stand ‘until an actual case corrobo-

1. Abstention may be appropriate where there is a fair
possibility that the statute may violate the state constitution if
the interpretation of some specialized state constitutional provision
is required. However, absention is not appropriate where the
statute may be subject to a state constitutional challenge under
a state provision substantially similar to the federal provision
that is the basis of the federal challenge. Wright, Miller & Cooper,
supra, §4242.

All

rates and justifies [appellants] claim of anticipated
harm and unconstitutional application’... The ordi-
nance should not be declared overbroad on the basis
of frivolous and speculative invalid applications where
a limiting instruction can reasonably be placed on it.
Caesar’s Health Club, supra at 789.

While the Court recognizes this is not a binding decision
nor a decision dealing with the precise statute in question
here, that opinion further supports this Court’s belief that
the language of this state statute is not so unclear that a
state interpretation of that statute is necessary before this
Court can reach the federal constitutional issues presented
by plaintiffs’ complaint.

The defendants also suggest that the doctrine enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, supra,
dictates that this Court abstain in this case. In Younger,
the Court ruled that in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances creating a threat of irreparable injury both im-
mediate and great and amounting almost to bad faith har-
rassment, a federal court should not enjoin an ongoing
state criminal prosecution. While the Court in Younger
examined considerations of equity and comity that pre-
vented federal interference with state criminal prosecu-
tions, in later decisions the Supreme Court determined
that these considerations were inapplicable where state
criminal proceedings were merely threatened but not pend-
ing. In Steffel v. Thompson, supra, the Court determined
that a declaratory judgment was not precluded where state
criminal prosecutions were only threatened. The rationale
of Steffel was extended in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) where the
court upheld the granting of a preliminary injunction
where a state criminal statute was challenged and plain-

Al2

tiffs were not subject to criminal prosecutions in the state
court at the time the injunction was issued.

The Steffel and Doran decisions indicate that absten-
tion on the basis of Younger v. Harris would be inappro-
priate in this case since no state prosecution is presently
pending.

Because the Court can find no theory under which
abstention would be appropriate given the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, defendants’ motion requesting the
Court to invoke the abstention doctrine is denied.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUE

A preliminary injunction may be issued only if the
moving party can satisfy either of the following require-
ments:

(1) probable success on the merits and possible
irreparable injury; or,

(2) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and
a balance of hardship tipping decidedly toward the
party requesting injunctive relief. Fennell v. Butler,
570 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1978).

After considering the evidence presented on January 3,
1979 by plaintiffs, the Court concludes that they have failed
to satisfy either of the above standards for the following
reasons:

Possible Irreparable Injury and Probable Success
On the Merits

It is clear that the type of irreparable injury suffi-
cient for obtaining a preliminary injunction must be more
than the cost, anxiety and inconvenience of having to
defend against a single criminal prosecution. Independent

Al3

Tape Merchant’s Assoc. v. Creamer, 346 F.Supp. 456, 459-
60 (M.D. Penn. 1972).

Plaintiffs, however, claim that they each have invested
more than $10,000 in their business and property and that
this investment and substantial profits therefrom would
be lost if the statute is enforced against them. (See,
Paragraph 8 of plaintiffs’ complaint.) If the challenged
statute merely prohibited the practices of massage parlors
which involved “sexual contact”, the Court would have
serious doubts as to whether plaintiffs had made a suffi-
cient showing of irreparable harm since they would be
free to continue operating their massage parlors for any
other legitimate purpose. However, §567.080 provides
that a building used for “sexual contact” for pay is a
public nuisance which the Attorney General, Circuit Attor-
ney, or Prosecuting Attorney may seek to enjoin. The
section further allows the Court to order that the premises
not be occupied for a period not to exceed one year. The
Court concludes that since a violation of the statute may
result in a closing of plaintiffs’ massage parlors for up
to one year, plaintiffs have satisfactorily demonstrated ir-
reparable injury.

To satisfy one standard for granting a preliminary
injunction, plaintiffs must also demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits of their constitutional challenges
to the statute. While the following analysis is not meant
to be a binding decision on the merits of the case, the
Court at the present time is not convinced that plaintiffs
could succeed on the merits of any of their constitutional
challenges to the statute.

Plaintiffs allege that §567.010(3) (c), $567.010(1) (b)
and $567.010(4) violate their rights to First Amendment
freedom of speech, freedom of association and their right
to privacy under the Ninth, First, Fourth, Fifth and Four-

Al4

teenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also allege that these par-
ticular sections violate the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they
are too vague, overbroad, not related to legitimate govern-
ment interests and that plaintiffs are thereby denied the
right to employment and to earn a living.

$567.010 provides as follows:

567.010. Chapter definitions
As used in this chapter, the following terms mean:

(1) “Promoting prostitution”, a person “pro-
motes prostitution” if, acting other than as a prosti-
tute or a patron of a prostitute, he knowingly

(a) Causes or aids a person to commit or
engage in prostitution; or

(b) Procures or solicits patrons for prostitu-
tion; or

(c) Provides persons or premises for prosti-
tution purposes; or

(d) Operates or assists in the operation of
a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise;
or

(e) Accepts or receives or agrees to accept
or receive something of value pursuant to an
agreement or understanding with any person
whereby he participates or is to participate in
proceeds of prostitution activity; or

(f) Engages in any conduct designed to insti-
tute, aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of pros-
titution;

Ald

(2) “Prostitution”, a person commits “prostitu-
tion” if he engages or offers or agrees to engage in
sexual conduct with another person in return for some-
thing of value to be received by the person or by
a third person;

(3) “Patronizing prostitution’, a person “pa-
tronizes prostitution” if

(a) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he
gives something of value to another person as
compensation for that person or a third person
having engaged in sexual conduct with him or
with another; or

(b) He gives or agrees to give something
of value to another person on an understanding
that in return therefor that person or a third person
will engage in sexual conduct with him or with
another; or

(c) He solicits or requests another person
to engage in sexual conduct with him or with
another, or to secure a third person to engage
in sexual conduct with him or with another, in
return for something of value;

(4) “Sezual conduct” occurs when there is

(a) “Sexual intercourse” which means any
penetration, however slight, of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ, whether or not
an emission results; or

(b) “Deviate sexual intercourse” which
means any sexual act involving the genitals of
one person and the mouth, tongue or anus of
another person; or

Al6

(c) “Sexual contact” which means any
touching, manual or otherwise, of the anus or
genitals of one person by another, done for the
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire
of either party;

(5) “Something of value” means any money or
property, or any token, object or article exchangeable
for money or property.

First Amendment Issue

In United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46 (D.C. Ct. App.
1975), c.d. 49 L.Ed.2d 373, appellees, charged with soliciting
for prostitution in violation of the District of Columbia
Code, challenged the constitutionality of the solicitation
provision. The trial court held that the appellees’ offer
to engage in commercial sex was protected speech. In
reversing this ruling, the court of appeals explained:

[w]hat we are dealing with is a straightforward
business proposal which may be regulated under the
standards applicable to purely commercial advertis-
ing... Having determined the character of the speech
at issue, we next consider whether it is protected
by the First Amendment and, if so, to what extent.
We conclude that solicitation for prostitution is not
entitled to immunity under the First Amendment.
U.S. v. Moses, supra at 52-53.

Further, the Court of Appeals in Moses, supra, deter-
mined that as a classic example of commercial speech
this activity was subject to reasonable regulation like the
provision in question. On the basis of this reasoning which
the Court feels is applicable to the solicitation provisions
of this statute, the Court does not believe §567.010(1)
(b) and §567.010(3)(c) are in violation of the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights.

Al7

Additionally, the Court does not believe that
$567.010(4) (c) violates any of plaintiffs’ rights to freedom
of association or to express their own lifestyle.

Other courts in considering massage ordinances have
ruled that the associational activities of owners of commer-
cial massage parlors are purely commercial and do not
come within the core protection of the right to association.
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D.
Fla. 1978). In Bayside, operators of adult entertain-
ments sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging
the unconstitutionality of the city ordinance that regulated -
adult entertainment and services. While certain zoning
restrictions were found not to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, the Court upheld particular provisions regulating
adult massage parlors. The portion of the statute regulat-
ing massage parlors established recordkeeping require-
ments and prohibited massages of persons by individuals
of the opposite sex. While the Court recognizes signifi-
cant differences exist between those regulations and the
statute in question here, the Court believes that the court’s
evaluation of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims are
relevant. The Florida District Court found:

Furthermore to the extent that the plaintiff’s attack
on the Code’s massage-related provisions is grounded
upon any alleged infringement of First Amendment
rights of expression, that attack is frivolous. In this
context the Court can perceive no communicative char-
acteristics of any substance which would bring massage
parlors within the ambit of the First Amendment’s
free speecn clause. Bayside, supra at 710.

See also Brown v. Haner, 410 F. Supp. 399, 400 (W.D.
Va. 1976). Further, it should be noted the regulation
challenged does not prohibit plaintiffs from associating

Al8

but only prevent them from performing particular acts
of commercial sex for hire.

The Court does not believe that plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims are wel! taken and has not been made
aware of any theory on which plaintiffs might succeed
on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

Right to Privacy

Supreme Court decisions have recognized a constitu-
tional right of privacy derived from certain ‘‘penumbras”
of the Bill of Rights and applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment for:

personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’. . . This
privacy encompasses and protects the personal inti-
macies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child rearing [citations omitted]
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66, 93
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973).

Appellants in Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260 (S.Ct. Del.
1975) were challenging Delaware’s prostitution statute
which imposed a criminal penalty for individuals who
engaged or offered to engage in sexual conduct for a fee.
In support of the proposition that the prostitution statute
impinged on their rights to privacy the parties cited Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973),
reh. denied, 410 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1409, 35 L.Ed.2d 694;
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.
2d 542 (1969); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).

The Superior Court of Delaware pointed out that in
those cases the rights involved were so personal that they
were clearly fundamental, but concluded:

Alg

This court would be constrained by logic and common
sense from saying that those personal rights implicit
in those cases are the same or can be of the same
order as the public sale of sex and the human body.
Blake, supra, at 262.

The context in which the proscribed activity takes
place is important in determining the extent to which
the activity may be prohibited. “The more public the
context, the more permissible the control.” State v. Hicks,
360 A.2d 150, 152 (S.Ct. Del. 1976). This conclusion was
supported by the Supreme Court of Iowa in rejecting
a contention that Iowa’s prostitution law violated the right
to privacy as set forth in Griswold, supra. State v. Price,
237 N.W.2d 813 (S.Ct. Iowa 1976). In Price the Court
concluded that the right to privacy was not unqualified,
and that prostitution was not a constitutionally protected
activity. Because of the effect commercial sex may have
on other members of the community, the Court determined
that it may be regulated in situations where such regula-
tion would be subject to constitutional challenges if im-
posed on consenting adults engaging in sexual conduct
in the privacy of their home.

This Court does not believe that the sale of commercial
sex is a fundamentai right nor a right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Additionally, the context in
which the activity regulated by $567.010(4)(c) occurs
is a public place of business and not the privacy of one’s
home. The Court has grave doubts as to whether plaintiffs
could ever be successful in challenging the statute on the
grounds that they have a protectible privacy interest.

Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs argue that the solicitation provisions of the
statute violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment on the following grounds:

A20

(1) the provisions are too vague;
(2) the provisions are overbroad; and,

(3) the provisions are not reasonably related to
the achievement of any legitimate government interest
and are an unreasonable exercise of the police power.

$567.010(4)(c) is alleged to violate the due process
clause in all of the above respects and additionally for
the reason that it denies plaintiffs the right to employment
and to obtain income from the ownership of property.
This section is also alleged to deny plaintiffs the equal
protection of the laws by prohibiting conduct which if
done for nothing would not be illegal. Additionally, plain-
tiffs urge that the law will be selectively enforced and
that it is unconstitutional in that it provides unequal
punishment for those who “patronize prostitution” and
those who “promote prostitution”.

Vagueness Issue

A person may not constitutionally be held “criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). Before a statute
can be found to be unconstitutionally vague within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must
find that the statute fails to inform a person of ordinary
intelligence of the conduct which is forbidden. Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d
222, 227 (1972).

After reading the language of Chapter 567 R.S. Mo.,
the Court finds that this statute clearly sets forth the
conduct which is prohibited. The fact that plaintiffs claim
that particular provisions of this statute will apply to
certain practices of massage parlors, further indicates that

A21

the language is sufficiently clear to enable the average
individual to understand what conduct is illegal under
this statute—even prior to the time of its initial enforce-
ment.

Plaintiffs have been unable to demonstrate satisfacto-
rily to the Court any theory under which the statute might
be declared impermissibly broad at a trial on the merits.

Police Power Regulation

Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the challenged sec-
tions of the new statute are not reasonably related to
any legitimate government objective and are an unreason-
able exercise of the police power. Plaintiffs suggest that
the only purpose behind the prostitution statute was to
prohibit the spread of venereal disease. Defendants contend
that it is not possible for venereal disease to be spread
by the type of sexual contact defined by §$567.010(4) (c).
In support of this proposition, affidavits from Drs. Elliott
and Colom were offered into evidence at the hearing on
January 3, 1979 (Exhibits 3 and 4).

In examining the validity of the exercise of state’s
police power in enacting this statute, it is important to
determine what standard of review is to be applied. Where
a statute does not regulate nor affect fundamental rights
its constitutionality is judged on the basis of whether the
law has some rational relation with a legitimate govern-
mental interest. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). Only where a chal-
lenged statute affects fundamental rights must the statute
be reviewed under the “compelling state interest’ test.
McGowan, supra; see Cory v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp.
977, 979 (N.D. Tx. 1972); and Caesar’s Health Club v.
St. Louis Co., supra, at 786. In applying the rational
basis test the exercise of the police power is presumed

A22

to be constitutionally valid. Bibb. v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959). The
Court does not believe that the sale of commercial sex
is a fundamental right the regulation of which must be
considered according to the compelling circumstances test.

It has long been recognized that it is a valid exercise
of the state’s police powers to regulate massage parlors
on the basis of the public health, safety and morality.
Cory, supra at 981. The same rationale has been utilized
to uphold state’s regulations of prostitution. See State
v. Blake, supra and State v. Hicks, supra. Plaintiffs have
placed considerable reliance on a December, 1977 decision
by the Family Court of New York, In Re P, 400 N.Y.S.2d
455 (1977) declaring the New York prostitution laws un-
constitutional. However, the trial courts of that state had
previously upheld the statute finding unequivocally that
the state has a legitimate interest in regulating the com-
mercialization of sex, and that there is a sufficient nexus
between prostitution statutes and legitimate legislative con-
cerns of public health, safety, commerce and morality to
preclude a court’s interference with such enactments.
People v. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141-142 (S.Ct. Trial
Term June 1, 1977). There are no cases indicating that
the trial or appellate courts of New York have ever fol-
lowed the reasoning of the family court in In Re P.

In rejecting a challenge that the Delaware prostitution
statute was without a rational basis, the Court in State
v. Hicks, offered numerous suggestions as to why a state
might choose to regulate the activity. The factors enu-
merated included the following:

(1) the strain public marketing of sex may place
on the institution of marriage, (2) the possibility that
innocent citizens may be affronted by unwanted so-
licitation, and (3) the state’s concern over regulating

A23

the criminal manipulation that may surround the ac-
tivity of prostitution. State v. Hicks, supra at 152-
153.

In Caesar’s Health Club, supra at 787 the St. Louis Court
of Appeals concluded:

We believe the ordinance here in question discloses
on its face a purpose to protect and further the health,
morality, and general welfare of the citizenry, and
that it furthers its purpose in a reasonable way.

The mere fact that the regulation of venereal disease
may not be the reason for prohibiting the conduct set
forth in §567.010(1)(b), $567.010(3) (c) and §567.010(4)
(c) does not mean the state does not have other legitimate
reasons for enacting the law. Therefore, the Court con-
cludes that it is unlikely that plaintiff could successfully
demonstrate that the statute in question was an unlawful
exercise of the state’s police power.

Constitutional Right to Employment

Plaintiffs argue that the statute denied them the right
to employment, to do business, to obtain income from
the ownership of property and from conducting business.
As plaintiffs point out, the Supreme Court has recognized:

the right to hold specific private employment and
to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable
governmental interference comes within the ‘liberty’
and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959).

This concept has been applied to state regulation through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, it is also clear that the states may regulate
and control businesses which the legislation determines
may threaten the public safety, welfare, and morals. An

A24

Illinois ordinance prohibiting massage parlors from provid-
ing customers with sexual massages was challenged as
infringing the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to work. The
Appellate Court of Illinois rejected this challenge on the
basis that the ordinance tended to preserve the health,
morals and safety of the citizens; and therefore determined:

massage establishments and those who give massages
may be licensed and regulated under the police power
of the State of Illinois and its municipalities without
contravening the due process rights of those who prac-
tice massage. Wes Ward Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews,
355 N.E.2d 131, 136 (App. Ct. Ill. 1976).

The Court does not believe that plaintiffs could success-
fully demonstrate the regulations challenged violate their
right to employment free of unreasonable government in-
terference.

Equal Protection

The remainder of plaintiffs’ challenges to this section
are based on claimed violations of the Equal Protection
clauses. Unreasonable classifications are alleged to have
resulted from the classifications which (1) prohibit conduct
if done for something of value which would be legal if
done for free, (2) will result in selective enforcement
of the laws, and (3) provide for different penalties between
promoters and patronizers of prostitution.

The Court can find nothing in the language of the
statute that would appear to promote selective enforcement
by law enforcement officials. It would be purely specula-
tive for the Court prior to the time any arrests or prosecu-
tions have taken place under the law to consider the ques-
tion of selective enforcement. This question has been
raised prematurely and would not appear to be an issue

A25

on which the Court could make any finding concerning
the likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits at the
present time.

In the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims must be evaluated according to the stan-
dards set forth in McGowan v. Maryland:

Although no precise formula has been developed, the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the states a wide
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The con-
stitutional safeguard is offended only if the classifica-
tion rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the State’s objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it. McGowan, supra at
399.

In Blake v. State appellants had levied a number
of similar equal protection challenges against the state’s
prostitution statute including a contention that the penal-
ties levied against the seller were greater than the punish-
ment provided for other participants in the activity, and
thus were unconstitutional. The court concluded that this
was not unreasonable for:

The ‘seller’ is more strictly controlled and more se-
verely punished in any number of criminal statutes.
More importantly, however, there is a legitimate and
reasonable basis to conclude that curtailment of the
seller’s activities will reduce the incidence of criminal
activity in a multi-party sequentially related crime
situation. Blake, supra at 262.

A26

In this case plaintiffs challenge the penalty differential
between promoting and patronizing prostitution. This is
in effect a penalty difference between the buyer and
seller of the proscribed activity as in Blake. Like the
Delaware court, this Court believes that the state may
have legitimate reasons for imposing a greater penalty
against the promoter of proscribed services than the buyer.
Given the many legitimate reasons which might justify
such a differential, the Court does not believe that plain-
tiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.

Finally, plaintiffs allege a denial of equal protection
because conduct that is not prohibited becomes illegal if
done for money or something of value. Where funda-
mental rights are not involved, as in this case, the equal
protection clause does not deny government the power
to treat different classes in different ways, but only denies
government the power to accord different treatment to
persons placed into different classes on the basis of criteria
wholly unrelated to legitimate government objectives.
Conn. State Federation of Teachers v. Bd. of Ed. Members,
538 F.2d 471, 483 (2nd Cir. 1976). As previously pointed
out, significant distinctions can be drawn between regula-
tions directed at commercial sexual activity and regula-
tions directed towards individuals in the privacy of their
homes. The Court feels that there is a rational basis
for treating these two categories of individuals differently
and therefore, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be able
to successfully argue that this statute violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A27

Title VII Claim

Plaintiffs’ complaint contains an allegation that the
statute prohibits bi-sexual massages in violation of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e). Nothing in the language of
the statute would appear to prohibit bi-sexual massages.
In contrast, the cases cited by plaintiffs on this point
involved interpretations of state statutes that clearly and
explicitly forbid bi-sexual massages. Even though the
Court can find no basis for accepting this interpretation
of the statute, assuming plaintiffs’ contention to be true,
the issue of whether that type of statute violates Title
VII has been decided by the Supreme Court. In Ruben-
stein v. Township of Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963, 94 S.Ct.
3165, 41 L.Ed.2d (1974), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ruled that a municipal massage parlor licensing ordinance
barring operators from massaging persons of the opposite
sex constituted a reasonable exercise of the police power
and did not violate Title VII of the 1974 Civil Rights
Act nor the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the issues of whether the ordinance
violated Title VII or the equal protection and due process
clauses were raised. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question. See
42 L.W. 3637. Because the Court in Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), has
determined that this type of a dismissal is a binding adjudi-
cation on the merits, this Court would be foreclosed from
ruling in plaintiffs’ favor on the Title VII claim if it
were in fact an issue in this case.

For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that
plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits of their constitutional challenge. However, the
Court must also consider the alternative test for granting
a preliminary injunction.

A28

SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS QUESTION GOING TO
THE MERITS AND BALANCING OF THE
HARDSHIPS

The Court may also grant a preliminary injunction
if the plaintiffs can show a sufficiently serious question
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litiga-
tion and a balance of the hardship tipping toward the
party requesting preliminary relief. For the detailed rea-
sons set forth above, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ con-
stitutional allegations do not contain sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them fair ground
for litigation. Research by the Court has indicated that
the majority of the case law is clearly contrary to plain-
tiffs’ positions.

Even if it could be said that plaintiffs had made this
showing, the Court would have to find that the balance
of the hardships does not tip toward plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
did not demonstrate the extent to which their business
involved the type of sexual massage prohibited by
§567.010(4)(c). In the absence of any such showing, it
would not appear an unreasonable hardship for plaintiffs
to continue operating their massage parlors but temporarily
discontinue the practices forbidden by Chapter 567, R.S.
Mo. until a decision on the merits can be reached.

For all of the reasons outlined above, the Court finds
that plaintiffs did not successfully demonstrate their en-
titlement to a preliminary injunction under either of the
tests established by the Eighth Circuit in Fennell v. Butler,
supra. Consequently, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied on January 9, 1979.

/s/ Russell G. Clark
Russell G. Clark, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: January 12, 1979

A29

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 79-1079.
September Term, 1978

J.B.K., Inc., etc., et al,
Appellants,

vs.

Norman Caron, et al,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.

The Court having considered petition for rehearing
en banc filed by counsel for appellants and, being fully
advised in the premises, it is ordered that the petition
for rehearing en banc be, and it is hereby, denied.

Considering the petition for rehearing en banc as a
petition for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for
rehearing also be, and it is hereby, denied.

July 23, 1979

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_1133%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
