# Petitioners Brief — United States v. Ward

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 448 U.S. 242

## Text

orp t st Vt, We F .

FILED
JAN 2 1980

‘

No. 79-394 {j

| _ MICHAEL RODAK, JR. CLERR
Iu the Supreme Court of the Waited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

L. O. WARD d/b/a L. O. WARD OIL
AND GAS OPERATIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

JAMES W. MOORMAN
Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Assistant to the Solicitor General

JACQUES B. GELIN
MICHAEL A. McCorpD
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

ME I oeeshscoicorscaenchs aces taasackemoee adeconseune
RRR rei epee Sr ee EN ee
Ar ose ccisi bndintondcp cons ecaaaee

Constitutional and statutory provisions in-
NEE cited eine hh taaeniocenes i icaeacasuteciccaeobionioubenaenncees

UIMIMRTY OF GTBUMIONE ......0<...cc.ccccsccccececseccscne
Argument:

I. Section 311 is designed to prevent and
provide for the clean-up of discharges
of oil in furtherance of the Act’s broad
remedial purpose to maintain the in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters ..............

II. The penalty assessed under Section 311
(b) (6) is plainly civil in nature, fur-
thering the Act’s remedial purposes .......

A. Section 311(b) on its face mani-
fests a clear congressional intent
that the “civil penalty” provided in
Section 311(b) (6) is civil for Con-
stitutional purposes .......................-

B. The penalty provided in Section 311
(b) (6) is also civil under the test
set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
ko, RETRO a ede RRR

1. Whether the sanction involves
an affirmative disability or re-
cue

12

17

26

27

34

35

II

Argument—Continued

2.

Whether the sanction has his-
torically been regarded as pun-
RE SEP ARCnet

Whether the sanction comes in-
to play only on a finding of
SE sivchaumteatani aime

Whether the sanction’s opera-
tion will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribu-
tion and deterrence ..................

Whether the behavior to which
the sanction applies is already
I tke

Whether an alternative purpose
other than punishment may
rationally be ascribed to the
I Ssetncececce teint:

Whether the sanction appears
excessive in relation to the al-
ternative purpose assigned ......

III. The proceedings under Section 311(b)
(6) for assessment of a civil penalty
are not “quasi-criminal” for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment privilege ........

Conclusion ....

Appendix ......

Cases:

CITATIONS

Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 5380 F.2d
1291, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 _.........

Page

37

38

39

42

45

46

49
54
la

31

Ill
Cases—Continued Page

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 518 F.2d
990, aff’d on other grounds, 430 U.S.

OE ree a 9, 37
Bell v. Wolfish, No. 77-1829 (May 14,
cc, Se RO See CE RNS: 26, 36, 47

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616..49, 50, 51-52
California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416

WO WE aeienicc dng ek 31
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 26
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220

keen MEER AMER Ol ced ed nee 28
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

Ps cdnciaan eta ate is 0 ME Neh 35-36, 42
Daley, In re, 549 F.2d 469, cert. denied,

ee ee eee a 52

. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 37
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins,
ee OP ieee res. 30

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603....12, 36, 42, 45
Garland, Ex parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

ce ET OE AE Aone RR Oe en OD 35
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 30
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391... 17, 26, 28,

30, 37, 48, 45, 47, 53

Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103. 28, 51
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, No. 78-

too (ies. 4, 1079) iC 18
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

Oe ies! 9, 11, 15, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43
Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 49,51
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 43
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348. 38
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39... 30

IV

Cases—Continued Page
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Strana-
Te Bae I ses iretthineecunemiesnaniness 28, 40
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 282 .......... 9, 26, 20, 48, 44, 45,
47, 51
Perrin v. United States, No. 78-959 (Nov.
a 5 seicisetiencchlsastciesdtcsanessatiaesrbiptpicamssbioete 27
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
iis, SNES * aids tdiicsstioiptdcasapiebadaeapnisaniiesenebeis 30
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
RRS, eae ea Ee 28, 47
EV Ee Ve Bete BEd ett BOD icine, 27
EVO UV. EPUTOR, TOG CTs BG saosin 41, 42
United States v. Allied Towing Corp., 578
I le ccinaiicnibiink 31
United States v. Ashland Oil and Trans-
portation 'Co., 504 F.2d 1317 -............... 18
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
429 F.Supp. 830, aff’d sub nom., United
States ¥. Gulf Oil Corp., 573 F.2d 1303... 25, 31
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
BI ei ine acca tas ecoieaialateeand oi deden 41, 43, 46
United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401
EE SN pasa chs oeinrttnswntoonaiionaiiaasiants 25
United States v. General Motors Corp.,
I. BIER Siidicenieineeoens
United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498
SII « cteinscocusenicsouatonnnonincaaieubch pap uscveiet 26, 28
United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
II INI secdisiscantncsisesinainlcod cachensitcaclineestlpaon 6, 21
United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S.
RIE esetsienceiia edna ilallensniad aiernladaceniic assignable 43

United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing
Co., 377 F.Supp. 558, rev’d, 537 F.2d
149, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 -......0....

Cases—Continued Page
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 308 ...... 35, 36
United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,

RN I citi acccebnhansgdaess ei 23
United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d

iG TORR we aire ene ee oC PN 44
United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 87 ........ 51
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 491

Np A ns ee ree Ih at A 44
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d

RE laces ERMA Tce Te Se 24
United States v. United States Coin &

Currency, 401 U.S. 7165 ...................... 43, 49, 51
United States v. W. B. Enterprises, 378

IR PR SG ee a 25
United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498

Pe io ase ee 39
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317

ME ae ersccbacgcet ace 25, 28, 30, 45, 47
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.

SSSR Ene MOLE, eee 36
Wilson, Ex parte, 114 U.S. 417 _........... 38

Constitution, Treaty, statutes
and regulations:

United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-
I ceils isc tharehince bnldies nceciigenteceeaiSdsceteccia passim

the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.C. 1606,

T.LA.S. No. 5639, Article 24 19
Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, Section 3,
BI tnt etd 51

Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, Section 12,
Be I I acectetsaacontnschidiseeidancttngrsKebeseicesies., 50

VI vit

Constitution, Treaty, statutes Constitution, Treaty, statutes
and regulations—Continued Page and regulations—Continued Page
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95- Section 311(f), 33 U.S.C. 1821(f).... 20, 23,
art, Oe GR TUE Sikes 3, 22 40
Section 58(a)(7) and (8), 91 Stat. a ls
LSD on neeeeeneneeeennnnerenenenneneeeenanneeee ” Section 311(k), 33 U.S.C. 1321(k).. 10, 14,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 20, 23, 30, 33, 45
U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et segq..... 12,17 Section 311(0), 33 U.S.C. 1821(0).... 24
Section 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).. 12, 17 Section 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 1362(4).... 18
Section 308, 33 U.S.C. 1318 -............. 7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Section 308(a)(A), 33 U.S.C.-1318 Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
LS LES Se MeN Crate Hee se 6, 7 224, Section 102, 84 Stat. 91, 98:
Section 310(¢c), 33 U.S.C. 1819(c).... 7 :
Section 310(d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d)... 7 peony Ha, 83 USC. (1970 ed.) ”
Section 311, 33 U.S.C. 1321......5, 12, 17, 18, Section 12, 33 U.S.C. 1162 17

30, 33
Section 311(b), 33 U.S.C. 1821(b)-..... 3,30
Section 311(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1821

POS F siciccuicencinaeaiee eens 18
Section 311(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.
pth he 2 i. | enema 24, 25

Section 311(b) (3), 33 U.S.C. 1321
(b) (8) -.... anita NM! 3, 5, 13, 16, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 53

Section 311(b) (4), 338 U.S.C. 1321
CRE Sickie ee 19

Section 311(b) (5), 33 U.S.C. 1821
LSM ty ME sad ST: passim

Section 311(b) (6), 33 U.S.C. 1821
PUNE PD niricsnctavaensonsmmmaaaanaiadl passim

Section 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1321
L | eee aEID Ai voy A 20

Section 311(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1321
i | — snsemennsuaentiaetin 23

Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 862 et seq. _W.... ee. 18
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
576, 92 Stat. 2467 et seq.:

iis cstrrnneee 25
ER 3, 19, 22

Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 38 U.S.C. (1964
Se 18

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
401 et seq.:

Section 13, 33 U.S.C. 407 ........ 11, 16, 38, 42
Section 16, 33 U.S.C. 411 00... 11, 16, 38

VIIt

' Constitution, Treaty, statutes
and regulations—Continued Page

Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119, et seq.:

Section 2, 90 Stat. 1119 -.................. 8

section 7, 90 Stat. 1120 .................... 8
Zo U.ca. (iSTO ae.) BES ;.........0.--00:0.0 8,12
Be rei ie PANTY esieiceetscenerecencersctensnceee 18
Se Ge BUIEIND coicnttsnereanrensnecineceenens 6
oo UF .m. 166.200 (1976) .........0.......... 6
Be kL eae 6
Be A Re eT, | nee ee 6
et A 8 | ee ae 19
ee eG |S | | ee een 5, 19

Exec. Order No. 11735, 3 C.F.R. 798
(1971-1975 Compilation) :

TE ier are eR RR OReS 6, 19

a 6

44 Fed. Reg. 50766 (Aug. 29, 1979)........ 22
Miscellaneous:

Comment, Compelled Self-Disclosure and
Civil Penalties: The Limits of Corpo-
rate Immunity in Oil Spill Cases, 55

Buus Bev. ite eS) 44-45
124 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) :
Bat SE Sp Re ae OEE 19, 24-25
I ea ae a oh 25
H.R. Rep. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 1st
oe TCR Mette 18
S. Rep. No. 91-351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
I aie eiin riper maguanntetiias cocina 18, 21, 24

S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
NI cethgubiitbcashane ceo oa ne ee ae 24

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-394

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
9.

L. O. WARD d/b/a L. O. WARD OIL
AND GAS OPERATIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
la-19a) is reported at 598 F.2d 1187. The opinion
of the district court (Pet. App. 22a-35a) is reported
at 423 F. Supp. 1352.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
20a-21a) was entered on May 10, 1979. On August

(1)

2

2, 1979, Mr. Justice White extended the time for
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and in-
cluding September 7, 1979. The petition was filed
on September 7, 1979, and granted on November 5,
1979 (A. 16, 62). The jurisdiction of the Court rests
on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a proceeding under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act for the assessment of a “civil
penalty” against the individual owner or operator of
a facility from which oil was discharged in violation
of the Act, is a “criminal case” within the meaning
of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution in which the government is
barred from using any information about the dis-
charge that the individual is required by the Act to
report under pain of criminal sanctions.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ex-
cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time
of war or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-

3

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

Section 311(b) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,’ 33 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974) 1821(b),
as in effect when this case arose,’ provided in per-
tinent part:

* * * * *

(3) The discharge of oil or hazardous sub-
stances into or upon the navigable waters of
the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into
or upon the waters of the contiguous zone in
harmful quantities as determined by the Presi-
dent * * * is prohibited, * * *.

* * * * *

(5) Any person in charge of a vessel or of an
onshore facility or an offshore facility shall, as
soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of
oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel or

1 Since enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1977, the
amended Federal Water Pollution Act has cemmonly been
referred to as “the Clean Water Aci.” However, because
this case only directly concerns the pre-1977 version of the
statute, we will refer to it as “the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,” “the Act,” or “the FWPCA.”

* Section 311 was amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, and the Federal Water
Poliution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
576, 92 Stat. 2468 (see notes 10, 13, 15, 16 and 18, infra), but
these amendments have no direct bearing on the present case.

4

facility in violation of paragraph (3) of this
subsection, immediately notify the appropriate
agency of the United States Government of such
discharge. Any such person who fails to notify
immediately such agency of such discharge shall,
upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both. Notification received pursuant to this para-
graph or information obtained by the exploita-
tion of such notification shall not be used against
any such person in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury or for giving a false
statement.

(6) Any owner or operator of any vessel, on-
shore facility, or offshore facility from which oil
or a hazardous substance is discharged in viola-
tion of paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be
assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operat-
ing of not more than $5,000 for each offense.

No penalty shall be assessed unless the owner or -

operator charged shall have been given notice
and opportunity for a hearing on such charge.
Each violation is a separate offense. Any such
civil penalty may be compromised by such Secre-
tary. In determining the amount of the penalty,
or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the
appropriateness of such penalty to the size of
the business of the owner or operator charged,
the effect on the owner or operator’s ability to
continue in business, and the gravity of the vio-
lation, shall be considered by such Secretary. * * *

+ * * * .

5

Section 311, as in effect when this case arose, is re-
produced in its entirety in Appendix D to the petition
for a writ of certiorari (Pet. App. 36a-57a).

STATEMENT

1. On or about March 23, 1975, oil escaped from
an oil retention pit at a drilling facility on premises
leased by respondent L. O. Ward, d/b/a L. O. Ward
Oil and Gas Operations, near the City of Enid, Okla-
homa (Pet. App. 2a, 23a; Tr. 47-48; A. 19, 29, 44-
45). On March 25, a sanitarian with the Oklahoma
State Department of Health, conducting a routine in-
spection of a landfill near respondent’s property, ob-
served that oil had seeped from the retention pit,
down a gully, and into Boggie Creek (Tr. 47-51; A.
44-47), a tributary of the Arkansas River system
(Pet. App. 2a). On the same day, one of respondent’s
employees received a telephone call from the Okla-
homa State Department of Health, notifying him of
the discharge (Tr. 77; A. 51).

As required by Section 311(b) (5) of the FWPCA,?

8’ Section 311(b) (5) provides that the person in charge
of a facility shall immediately notify the “appropriate agency”
of the federal government as soon as he has knowledge of a
discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from the facility
in violation of Section 311(b)(3) of the Act. The latter
section prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous substances
into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines in quantities
determined in regulations issued by the President to be “harm-
ful.” Because the oil discharged in the present case was
visible on the surface of Boggie Creek (Tr. 50; A. 46-47),
it was in a “harmful” quantity under the applicable regula-
tions, 40 C.F.R. 110.3 (1974), issued by the Administrator of
EPA pursuant to authority delegated by the President in

6

respondent notified the regional office of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) by telephone on
April 2 that a discharge of oil had taken place.‘
Respondent submitted a more complete written report
of the discharge to EPA on June 25 (Plaintiff’s Exh.
1; A. 21-23, 31), as required by Section 308(a) (A)
of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1818(a) (A).°

Section 1 of Exec. Order No. 11735, 3 C.F.R. 793 (1971-
1975 Compilation).

In Section 7 of the same Executive Order, the President
designated the Coast Guard as the “appropriate agency” for
purposes of receiving the notice of a discharge required by
Section 311(b) (5). Current Coast Guard regulations pro-
vide that such notification may be given, inter alia, to the
government official predesignated as the On-Scene Coordinator
for the geographic region in which the discharge occurs. 33
C.F.R. 153.203(a) (2). The Administrator of EPA is re
sponsible for furnish ng the On-Scene Coordinator for inland
waters, 33 C.F.R. 153.103(p), and EPA is therefore an ap-
propriate agency to receive notification under Section 311
(b) (5). Notice to EPA apparently was also appropriate

at the time of the discharge in this case. 33 C.F.R. 153.203 (a) P

33 C.F.R. 153.105 (1975). Cf. United States v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 523 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1975).

* A memorandum of the conversation prepared by the EPA
employee who received the telephone call was included as
part of the administrative record but not introduced at the
trial de novo in the district court. Because this memorandum
is relevant to the constitutional issue presented, it was in-
cluded as an appendix to the government’s brief in the court
of appeals and is reproduced in the Appendix in this Court
(A. 17-18).

* Section 308(a)(A) of the FWPCA authorizes the Ad-
ministrator of EPA to require the owner or operator of any
point source of effluents to make such reports, maintain such
records, and provide such other information as the Adminis-
trator may require in order to enable the Administrator to de-

7

By letter dated August 15, 1975 (A. 24-25),
EPA forwarded respondent’s June 25 report of
the discharge to the Coast Guard (Pet. App. 3a),
which is responsible for assessing civil penalties
under Section 311(b)(6) of the Act against those
responsible for the discharge of “harmful” quantities
of oil or hazardous substances into or upon navigable
waters or adjoining shorelines. On December 19, 1975,
following notice and opportunity to be heard, the
Coast Guard assessed a civil penalty against respond-
ent in the amount of $500 (Pet. App. 3a). There is
no indication in the record that this assessment was
based on information other than that forwarded to
the Coast Guard by EPA, which had in turn received
the information from respondent pursuant to Sec-
tions 311(b)(5) and 308(a)(A) of the Act. Re-

velop effluent or other limitations, to determine whether a
person has violated existing limitations or standards, or to
carry out other provisions of the FWPCA. There are civil and
criminal penalties for the failure to comply with these re-
quirements. 33 U.S.C. 1819(c) and (d).

By letter apparently sent in late May of 1975, EPA re-
quested respondent to submit a written report of the discharge
and advised him that failure to do so could result in im-
position of civil or criminal sanctions. (This letter was not
included in the record in the district court, but because it is
part of the administrative record and relates tw the consti-
tutional issue presented, it is reproduced in the Appendix
(A. 19-20)). Because respondent was therefore compelled
to submit this report to EPA under Section 308, use of that
report in the collection of a civil fine from respondent raises
the same constitutional question as does the use of informa-
tion furnished by respondent on April 2 to the “appropriate
agency” (again, in this instance, EPA; see note 3, supra) as
required by Section 311(b) (5) of the Act.

8

spondent filed an administrative appeal from this
ruling, contending that the reporting and enforce-
ment scheme violated his Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, but this ad-
ministrative appeal was denied (Pet. App. 3a, 23a;
A. 26-28).

2. On April 138, 1976, respondent filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma against the Secretary of Transportation,
the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Admin-
istrator of EPA to enjoin enforcement of Sections
311(b)(5) and (6) and collection of the adminis-
tratively assessed penalty (Pet. App. 8a). Respondent
moved to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 2282.° On June 4, 1976, the United
States filed a separate action in the district court to
collect the unpaid penalty (Pet. App. 3a). The court
denied respondent’s motion to convene a three-judge
court on the ground that no substantial challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute was presented (Pet.
App. 23a n.2) and ordered the two cases consolidated
(id. at 24a).

The court denied respondent’s motion for summary
judgment, in which he again argued that the civil
penalty described in Section 311(b) (6) is criminal
or “quasi-criminal” in nature and that use of infor-
mation furnished under the self-reporting scheme
therefore violated his Fifth Amendment privilege

* Section 2282 of Title 28, United States Code, was repealed
by Section 2 of Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (August 12,
1976), but, under Section 7 of that Act, 90 Stat. 1120, it re-
mained in effect with respect to cases previously filed.

9

against compulsory self-incrimination (Pet. App. 24a-
dla, 35a).

The court reasoned that whether a given sanction
is civil or criminal is a question of statutory construc-
tion (Pet. App. 24a, citing One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 287 (1972) ).
The court found (Pet. App. 26a) that Section 311(b)
(6) is “unambiguous” in this regard and that “con-
gressional intent to impose a civil penalty can be dis-
cerned from its face.” The court concluded (ibid.)
that the penalty is expressly labelled “civil,” provision
for administrative assessment of the penalty is in-
dicative of congressional intent to impose a civil sanc-
tion, and the civil nature of the penalty is underscored
by its juxtaposition with a provision for criminal pen-
alties in the immediately preceding Section 311(b) (5)
for those who fail to report a discharge immediately
to the appropriate agency of the federal government.
The court also found (Pet. App. 27a-3la) the civil
nature of the penalty to be supported by reference to
the factors set forth in this Court’s decision in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169
(1963), quoted at pages 34-35, infra.

The case was then tried to a jury,’ which found
that oil from respondent’s facility did spill into Boggie
Creek (Tr. 1385; A. 58). The court reduced the
penalty to $250 in view of the amount of oil that
escaped and its conclusion that respondent had been

7 A jury trial was not required by the Seventh Amendment.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 442 (1977).

10

diligent in his clean-up efforts after the discharge was
discovered (Tr. 138-139; A. 60-61).

3. The court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. 1la-
19a), holding that the civil penalty proceeding in Sec-
tion 311(b) (6) is criminal in nature, at least for pur-
poses of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and that notification given to the appro-
priate agency as required by Section 311(b) (5) could
not be used in determining either liability for or the
amount of the civil penalty assessed under Section
311(b) (6).

The court acknowledged the “remedial” purpose of
the provision (Pet. App. 9a), reflected in the statutory
direction to pay the civil penalties assessed under
Section 311(b) (6) into a revolving fund to defray the
costs of administration and enforcement of Section
311 and of cleaning up oil spills where those costs are
not otherwise recoverable (see Section 311(k), 33
U.S.C. 13821(k); Pet. App. 58a). But, in concluding
that the civil penalty provision is nevertheless penal
or criminal for purposes of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, the court relied (Pet. App. 9a-12a) upon the
requirement that a civil penalty be assessed in every
case without regard either to fault for the discharge
or the subsequent mitigation of damage through clean-
up efforts; this automatic assessment, the court con-
cluded, is indicative of a punitive or retributive pur-
pose. The court found (Pet. App. 1la-12a, 14a, 17a)
the punitive or retributive purpose of the penalty to
be reenforced by implementing instructions issued

11

by the Commandant of the Coast Guard (A. 38-40).°
These instructions stated that the Coast Guard would
assess some penalty in every case, that a penalty at or
near the maximum of $5000 would be assessed unless
one of the factors listed in Section 311(b) (6) justified
a lesser penalty, that the degree of culpability and prior
record of the person responsible for the discharge would
be taken into account, and that the penalty would not be
based on the responsible party’s clean-up effort or ex-
pense. The court also attached importance to the fact
that the conduct involved—a discharge into navigable
waters—may already be a crime under Sections 13 and
16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
407 and 411 (Pet. App. 13a, 15a-16a, citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963) ),
and what it viewed as the possibly excessive amount of
the penalty in relation to the remedial purposes ascribed

8 Commandant Instruction 5922.11A (Feb. 23, 1973) relied
upon by the court of appeals, was reprinted in an appendix
to the opinion in United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co.,
377 F. Supp. 558, 568-570 (E.D. La. 1974), rev’d, 537 F.2d
149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977).
Neither petitioner nor respondent cited or relied upon this
Instruction in the briefs in the court of appeals, and that
Instruction had been superseded by Instruction 5922.11B
(Oct. 10, 1974) by the time of the occurrences and decisions
in this case. Instruction 5922.11A is reprinted in the Appen-
dix (A. 38-40), and pertinent portions of Instruction 5922.11B
are reprinted as an Appendix to this brief (App., infra, la-
7a). The Coast Guard is in the final stages of preparing a
revision of the Instruction, which will then be incorporated as
a new chapter in the Coast Guard Merchant Marine Safety
Manual. The revision, undertaken in part to reflect the 1977
and 1978 amendments to Section 311, is not expected to depart
materially from the existing Instruction 5922.11B in areas
relevant to this case.

12

to it where the penalty is assessed without regard to
fault (id. at 16a-17a).

The court did not strike down either the self-
reporting requirement in Section 311(b)(5) or the
civil penalty provision in Section 311(b) (6); in-
stead, it fashioned a use and derivative use im-
munity and remanded the United States’ collection
suit to the district court for further proceedings con-
sistent with its opinion.°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et segq., sets forth a comprehen-
sive statutory framework “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). In furtherance of
this goal, Section 311 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321,
regulates the discharge of oil and hazardous sub-
stances into the Nation’s waters.

® The court of appeals also concluded (Pet. App. 4a-6a) that
the district court had properly declined to convene a three-
judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 2282 in the action
brought byepetitioner. The court of appeals noted that a
judgment for respondent in the district court would not have
restrained enforcement or operation of the FWPCA because
the self-reporting system would have remained intact, and
civil penalties could still have been assessed if the govern-
ment proved its case on the basis of information other than
that derived from the notification required by Section 311
(b) (5). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 607
(1960). The court therefore remanded respondent injunctive
action to the district court with instructions to dismiss (Pet.
App. 19a, 21a). Neither petitioner nor respondent has sought
review of the court of appeals’ remand of that action, and
there is, as a result, no issue before the Court regarding the
convening of a three-judge court.

13

Section 311(b)(3) prohibits the discharge of
“harmful” quantities of oil and hazardous substances
into the waters. Section 311(b) (5) requires the per-
son in charge of any facility from which oil or a haz-
ardous substance is discharged in violation of Sec-
tion 311(b)(3) to immediately notify the federal
government so that prompt clean-up and mitigation
measures may be taken. Section 311(b) (5) express-
ly provides, however, that this notification and infor-
mation derived from it may not be used against
the reporting person “in any criminal case.” Sec-
tion 311(b) (6) provides that a “civil penalty” shall
be assessed against the owner or operator of the
vessel or facility where the discharge occurred, the
amount of the penalty to be determined accord-
ing to the gravity of the violation, the size of the busi-
ness operation, and the effect of the penalty on the
ability of the owner or operator to remain in business.

The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
applies only in a “criminal case.” The court of ap-
peals held that the “civil penalty” prescribed in Sec-
tion 311(b) (6) is criminal in nature and that infor-
mation about a discharge the person in charge of a_
facility or vessel is required by Section 311(b) (5)
to furnish the federal government cannot, under the
Fifth Amendment privilege, be used in the proceed-
ing to assess and collect the penalty. This conclusion
was plainly in error.

A. The question whether a given penalty is crimi-
nal or civil is one of legislative intent. Here, Con-
gress could not have been clearer in expressing in
the very language of the Act its intent that the
penalty is civil, not criminal in nature. It is denomi-

14

nated a “civil penalty,” and the administrative pro-
cedure for its assessment demonstrates that it was
not intended to be criminal. Moreover, in the
immediately preceding Section 311(b) (5), Congress
provided what are plainly criminal sanctions for
the failure to notify the federal government of a
discharge, thereby demonstrating that it knew how
to provide for criminal sanctions when it so desired.
Congress was sensitive to the Fifth Amendment im-
plications of the self-reporting scheme, and expressly
provided in Section 311(b)(5) that the compelled
notification could not be used against the reporting
individual “in any criminal case.” The quoted lan-
guage is drawn directly from the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, when Congres used the term “civil penalty”
in Section 311(b) (6), it must be presumed that it
did so advisedly, with full knowledge of the tradi-
tional distinction between criminal and civil sanc-
tions, and its judgment that the civil penalty proceed-
ing was not a “criminal case” to which the statutory
—and therefore the constitutional—immunity at-
taches is entitled to great weight.

B. There is, moreover, no indication that this plain
language of the Act masks a contrary congressional
intent to impose what amounts to a criminal sanction.
The penalty is remedial, not punitive, under this
Court’s cases.

The penalties are paid into a special contingency
fund established in the Treasury under Section 311
(k), from which the government’s costs of cleaning
up discharges of oil and hazardous substances are
paid. Although the government’s clean-up costs may

15

in many cases be recovered from the owner or op-
erator of the facility or vessel where the discharge
occurred (see Section 311(f)(1)), the civil penalties
assessed in all cases serve to underwrite the govern-
ment’s costs of removing those discharges for which
the costs cannot be recovered—because the owner or
operator has a statutory defense to liability for clean-
up costs, is insolvent, or cannot be identified. Thus,
the civil penalty section imposes a type of absolute,
enterprise liability for these costs on those who en-
gage in the activity of handling oil and hazardous
substances and, as a result, create the risk of causing
the discharges into the Nation’s waters that Section
311 was intended to prevent.

The civil penalty provision was also intended to
deter discharges of oil and hazardous substances by
causing those who handle them to take the economic
consequences of the penalty into account and to
heighten the degree of care they exercise. Finally,
the civil penalty may be viewed as compensation to
the United States, acting parens patriae, for the eco-
logical harm that may be presumed to follow a dis-
charge of oil or a hazardous substance, even where
that discharge is cleaned up promptly.

C. The penalty is also plainly not criminal in na-
ture under the analysis suggested in this Court’s
opinion in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-169 (1963). A monetary penalty imposes
no affirmative disability or restraint on personal lib-
erty, such as the exile involved in Mendoza-Martinez
itself or disqualification from the practice of a pro-
fession involved in the cases cited in that opinion.

16

Monetary penalties have long been accepted as a
legitimate civil remedy, and, accordingly, have not,
unlike banishment or professional disqualification,
been historically regarded as punishment.

A penalty is imposed under Section 311(b) (6) for
all discharges, without regard to fault, and therefore
does not come into play only upon a finding of scien-
ter—another factor identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, supra. The penalty is not retributive in its
purpose; and while it has the broad, prospective de-
terrent function of encouraging a higher standard of
care by interjecting an additional economic considera-
tion into the handling of oil and hazardous substances,
the penalty does not deter in the manner of a criminal
sanction by an in terrorem effect or by a monetary
sanction that is wholly disproportionate to the harm
that may be caused.

Although discharges of oil and hazardous sub-
stances may in some cases be a crime under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 407 and 411, the
civil penalty in Section 311(b) (6) was not designed as
additional punishment for violation of those provi-
sions; it imposes a penalty for violation of a different
provision, Section 311(b) (3) of the FWPCA, which
contains no criminal sanctions. Finally, the civil
penalty has remedial purposes not tied to any intent
to punish, so that the penalty in this case ($250) and
generally (up to a maximum of $5000) cannot be
regarded as excessive in relation to those remedial
purposes.

D. Nor can the penalty be regarded as “quasi-
criminal,” implicating the Fifth Amendment privi-

17

lege against compulsory self-incrimination, even if it
is not criminal for purposes of all constitutional pro-
tections normally attaching in a criminal proceeding.
The Court has made clear that a nominally civil pro-
ceeding for the forfeiture of goods or recovery of a
monetary penalty can be regarded as criminal only
where a finding of liability depends on the commis-
sion of an underlying criminal offense. The Fifth
Amendment privilege therefore does not apply where
the civil penalty is remedial in nature, and is not
intended to result in the equivalent of criminal pun-
ishment. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404 n.
12 (1938).
ARGUMENT
I,

SECTION 311 IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT AND
PROVIDE FOR THE CLEAN-UP OF DISCHARGES
OF OIL IN FURTHERANCE OF THE ACT’S BROAD
REMEDIAL PURPOSE TO MAINTAIN THE INTEG-
RITY OF THE NATION’S WATERS

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1974) 1251 et seq., sets forth a comprehen-
sive statutory framework designed “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).
As a part of this overall plan, Section 311 of the Act,
33 U.S.C. 1321,” regulates the discharge of oil and

10 The substance of Section 311 was first added as Sections
11 and 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1161 and 1162, in
1970. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, Section 102, 84 Stat. 91, 98. These
sections were added to replace the Oil Pollution Act of 1924,

18

hazardous substances into navigable waters in fulfill-
ment of the congressional policy that “there should be
no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or
upon the navigable waters of the United States * * *.”
Section 311(b) (1).

Congress employed a number of different measures
to accomplish this “no discharge” objective. Section
311(b) (3), as in effect when this case arose, pro-
hibited the discharge into the navigable waters of
the United States'* or upon adjoining shorelines *

33 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 431 et seg., which had proven to be in-
effective because it applied only to discharges that were grossly
negligent or willful, because it applied only to vessels and
therefore did not cover discharges from stationary sources, and
because it did not extend beyond oil to other hazardous sub-
stances. The addition of these new sections in 1970 was spur-
red by the breakup of the tanker Torrey Canyon, “with its in-
calculable damage to the coast of England and its nearly $8
million cleanup cost,” and by the Santa Barbara Channel oil
spill, which caused “vast” and “appalling” damage to marine
life and recreation in the area. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-127, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969); see also S. Rep. No. 91-351, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 6 (1969). The provisions were combined
in Section 311 of the Act (33 U.S.C. 1821) in the compre-
hensive Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 862 et seq., and with modifi-
cations not directly relevant to this case, have been carried
forward to the present time.

' Boggie Creek is part of the navigable waters of the
United States for purposes of Section 31 1, which is not limited
in coverage by technical notions of navigability. See Pet.
App. 2a n.1; United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation
Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); 33 C.F R. 2.05-25 (b) ;
33 U.S.C. 1862(7); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, No.
78-738 (Dec. 4, 1979), slip op. 9-10.

12 Section 311(b) (8) also prohibits the discharge of oil and
hazardous substances into the “contiguous zone” of waters
adjacent to territory of the United States, as established

19

of oil or hazardous substances in quantities deter-
mined by the President under Section 311(b) (4) to
be “harmful to the public health or welfare of the
United States.” The President delegated the function
of determining what constitutes “harmful” quantities
under this provision to the Administrator of EPA.
Exec. Order No. 11735, Section 1, 3 C.F.R. 793
(1971-1975 Compilation). Under EPA regulations
in effect now and in 1974, discharges of oil are de-
fined as “harmful” if they violate applicable water
quality standards or cause a film or sheen upon or
discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining
shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion to be de-
posited in or upon either. 40 C.F.R. 110.3. Because
the discharge in this case caused a sheen on the sur-
face of Boggie Creek (Tr. 50; A. 46-47), it was of
a harmful quantity under the regulation.”

or to be established by the United States under Article 24
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 40 C.F.R. 110.1(g).

13 Jn his motion for summary judgment, respondent chal-
lenged the validity of the “sheen test” of harmfulness, but
this challenge was rejected by the district court (Pet. App.
32a-35a), and respondent did not pursue this issue in the
court of appeals. Sections 311(b) (3) and (4) were amended
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to prohibit the
discharge of oil and hazardous substances “in such quantities
as may be harmful” (emphasis added), as determined by
the President. This change was intended to make clear that
the Act “does not require an assessment of actual harm in
the variety of circumstances in which such substances might
be discharged.” 124 Cong. Rec. S18995, H13599 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978).

20

Section 311(c)(1) authorizes the President to re-
move or to arrange for the removal of any oil or
hazardous substance discharged into or upon the
navigable waters of the United States or adjoining
shorelines, unless he determines that the owner or
operator of the vessel or facility from which the sub-
stance was discharged will properly do so. The gov-
ernment’s clean-up costs are paid out of a special
revolving fund established in the Treasury by Section
311(k).

The owner or operator of the vessel or facility from
which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in
violation of Section 311(b) (3) is liable to the United
States for the actual costs incurred by the government
in clean-up operations except where the discharge was
caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, negli-
gence on the part of the United States, or an act or
omission of a third party. Section 311(f). Funds

recovered pursuant to this provision are deposited in ~

the revolving fund established under Section 311(k).
Although Congress has from time to time appro-
priated money for the fund, it is in general intended
to be replenished by recoveries from those responsible
for prohibited discharges.

Section 311(b) (5) of the FWPCA requires “Taljny
persor in charge” of a vessel or facility from which
oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation
of Section 311(b) (3) to “immediately notify the ap-
propriate agency of the United States Government of
such discharge.” This notification enables the federal
government to ensure that clean-up and other reme-

21

dial measures are taken promptly in order to mini-
mize the ensuing damage. See S. Rep. No. 91-351,
supra, at 16. Failure to notify the appropriate
agency immediately is a criminal offense punish-
able by a fine of up to $10,000 and imprison-
ment for one year. In recognition of the Fifth
Amendment privilege, however, Section 311(b) (5)
provides that the “[n]otification réceived pursuant
to this paragraph or information obtained by the
exploitation of such notification shall not be used
against any such person in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false state-
ment.” “*

Section 311(b) (6), as it read at the time of the
discharge involved in this case, provided that the
“owner or operator” of a facility from which oil.or
a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of
Section 311(b)(3) shall be assessed a civil penalty
by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating in an amount not to exceed $5,000

14 Respondent notified EPA eight days after one of his em-
ployees was informed of the discharge (A. 17-18). This notifi-
cation would not appear to have been “immediate,” as Section
311(b) (5) requires. See United States v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 523 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Ashland
Oil and Transportation Co., supra. The government argued in
the court of appeals that because respondent did not notify
the appropriate agency immediately, he could not take advan-
tage of the statutory grant of use and derivative use im-
munity in Section 311(b) (5), which was intended to imple-
ment the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. We did not present this question in the petition for a
writ of certiorari. See Pet. 2, 8.

22

for each offense.* In determining the amount of the
penalty or any settlement thereof, the Secretary is to
take into account “the appropriateness of such penalty
to the size of the business of the owner or operator
charged, the effect on the owner or operator’s ability
to continue in business, and the gravity of the vio-
lation.” *°

Civil penalties recovered in proceedings brought
under Section 311(b) (6) are paid into the revolving
fund established by Section 311(k), along with re-

*® Section 311(b) (6) was amended by Sections 58 (a) (7)
and (8) of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566, 1594, to provide that the “person in charge”
of a facility is liable for a civil penalty in addition to the
owner or operator of the facility.

‘6 Section 311(b) (6) was further amended by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to permit the Administrator of
EPA to bring an action directly in the district court to recover
a civil penalty of up to $50,000 against the owner, operator,
or person in charge of a vessel or facility from which a sub-
stance is dicharged in violation of Section 311(b) (3). The
amount of the penalty is to be determined by the same three
factors utilized by the Coast Guard in assessing a penalty
administratively, as well as the “standard of care manifested”
and efforts to “minimize or mitigate the effects of such dis-
charge.” The penalty may be in an amount of up to $250,000
if the Administrator can show willful negligence or mis-
conduct on the part of the\defendant. This provision for the
Administrator of EPA to recover a much larger civil penalty
in an action in the district court is designed for more serious
discharges, and it cannot, by its terms, be utilized if the
Coast Guard has already assessed a penalty administratively.
EPA recently issued regulations and entered into a memo-
randum of understanding with the Coast Guard governing
the assessment of civil penalties in the district court. 44 Fed.
Reg. 50766 (Aug. 29, 1979).

23

coveries under Section 311(f) from owners or opera-
tors of the costs incurred by the United States in
cleaning up discharges. Thus, as the court of appeals
acknowledged (Pet. App. 9a), the collection of civil
penalties in all cases helps defray the cost of cleaning
up those oil spills for which the government’s clean-
up costs are not otherwise recoverable—e.g., where
the discharge cannot be traced to a particular source;
where the discharge is caused by an act of God, an
act of war, or negligence on the part of the United
States; where the owner of a facility at which the
discharge occurred is insolvent; or where the clean-up
costs exceed the limitations on liability established in
Section 311(f). Moneys from the revolving fund are
also used for implementation of the National Con-
tingency Plan for removal of oil and hazardous sub-
stances. See Sections 311(c) (2) and 311(k).

By the operation of these sections, the civil penalty
provision furthers the FWPCA’s goal of pollution-
free weer by imposing a type of absolute or enter-
prise liability on those who engage in activities creat-
ing a risk of the discharges the FWPCA was intended
to prevent—and by imposing that liability only where
the risk has manifested itself in an actual discharge
—in order to assist in the funding of clean-up efforts
generally. See United States v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978). This re-
flects a congressional judgment that the industry con-
cerned, rather than the public, should bear the direct
costs of the water pollution caused by discharges.
Ibid.; see also United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589
F.2d 1310, 1314-1315 (7th Cir. 1978).

24

The civil penalty was also expected to have an in-
cremental impact in deterring discharges. S. Rep.
No. 91-351, supra, at 16. In many cases, the amount
of the penalty will be considerably less than the clean-
up costs. The clean-up costs (and potential liability
to third parties for damages under state or federal
law for injury to property)'’ would operate as a
significant deterrent to such discharges. But Con-
gress anticipated that there would be other discharges
that, although not lending themselves to effective
clean-up, would nevertheless “present a hazard to the
water environment” (zbid.). The civil penalty was
expected to discourage these discharges for which
clean-up costs were not likely to be recovered (ibid.) .’®
In those cases in particular, but to an extent in all

1 Section 311(0) provides that nothing in Section 311
shall be construed to affect the liability under federal or state
law of an owner or operator of a vessel or facility to the
owner of property that is damaged by an oil spill.

18 At the time of the discharge in this case, Section 311
(b) (2)(B) provided for the recovery of a civil penalty—
in effect, liquidated damages—from the owner or operator
of a facility or vessel from which a hazardous substance
was discharged if the Administrator of EPA determined at
the time he designated the substance as hazardous that it was
not actually removable from water. This provision, enacted
in 1972, was expected to discourage discharges of hazardous
substances because each carrier or handler would evaluate the
risk of discharge and determine whether the potential penalty
made engaging in the risk-prone activity worthwhile or
whether a higher standard of care was in order. S. Rep. No.
92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 66 (1971) ; see also 124 Cong. Rec.
S18995 (daliy ed. Oct. 14, 1978). There was, contrary to the
court of appeals’ apparent belief (Pet. App. 8a-9a), no simi-
larly distinct provision for liquidated damages in the case of
oil discharges that could not readily be cleaned up in a particu-

was

25

cases, the civil penalty helps to prevent harmful
spills “by making care more economical than care-
lessness” (Pet. App. 29a n.9, quoting United States v.
General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D.
Conn. 1975)). See also United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 841 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573
F.2d 13803 (3d Cir. 1978). And, as the court of ap-
peals conceded (Pet. App. 16a), the penalty may also
be viewed as compensation to the United States (act-
ing parens patriae, to preserve the integrity of the
Nation’s waters for the benefit of the general citi-
zenry) for the presumed ecological harm to the waters
resulting from the discharge, even though it may be
cleaned up promptly. See United States v. W. B.
Enterprises, 378 F. Supp. 420, 422-423 (S.D. N.Y.
1974) ; see also United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co.,
401 F. Supp. 934, 940 (N.D. W. Va. 1975). “[T]he
Congress obviously believed: (a) that no clean up ef-
fort could be complete because, after discharge, it is
impossible to guarantee against residual harm from
quantities of oil too small or too well dispersed to be
detectable; and (b) that even the transitory pollu-
tion of waters was deleterious to the environment.”
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 429 F.
Supp. at 837.

lar case. The “liquidated damages” provision in Section 311 (b)

“(2) (B) effectively repealed by Subsection (b) (3) of the Fed-

eral Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-576, 92 Stat. 2467. The civil penalty assessed under Section
311(b) (6) can, however, serve the same function by forcing
the handler or carrier of oil or hazardous substances to take
the monetary cost of a civil penalty into account and to
exercise a higher standard of care as a result.

| :
’ ; ;
:

26
II.

THE PENALTY ASSESSED UNDER SECTION 311
(b)(6) IS PLAINLY CIVIL IN NATURE, FURTHER-
ING THE ACT’S REMEDIAL PURPOSES
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person
shall be compciied “in any criminal case” to be a
witness against himself. The court of appeals held
that a penalty provided for in Section 311(b) (6),
although denominated “civil” is, in reality, “crimi-
nal in nature” and that the Fifth Amendment there-
fore precluded the use in proceedings to assess and
collect the penalty of the notice of the discharge re-
spondent was required by Section 311(b) (5) to give
to the “appropriate agency” of the federal govern-
ment. The conclusion may follow if the premise is
correct (but see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971) ). But, in our view, the court below wrongly
characterized the proceeding in suit as a “criminal
case” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
“The question of whether a given sanction is civil or
criminal is one of statutory construction.” One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972); accord, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391, 399 (1938); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, No. 77-1829
(May 14, 1979), slip op. 16-17. This is not to say, of
course, that Congress could effectively dispense with
applicable constitutional protections merely by at-
taching the “civil” label to what is otherwise un-
questionably a criminal sanction. United States v.
J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974);
cf. Beil v. Wolfish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20. The proper
judicial inquiry in any given case is whether Congress
intended the finding of liability under the statutory

27

provision and the adverse effect on the person in-
volved—here, a monetary penalty—to carry with them
the usual implications or consequences of an adjudi-
cation of guilt under the criminal law. Among these
are the stigma that is intended to attach following a
conviction, the legitimacy of characterizing the ad-
verse consequences as punishment, the satisfaction of
whatever retributive impulses may underlie the crimi-
nal law, and, in appropriate cases, the imposition of
disabilities or restraints, such as imprisonment or
other custody, expulsion from the jurisdiction, or
disqualification from the practice of a profession.
Where Congress intends a finding of liability un-
der a particular statutory provision to carry these
consequences normally associated with conviction for
commission of a criminal offense, the determination
of liability cannot occur, and the penalty provided
cannot be imposed, without the protection afforded
by the Constitution in criminal cases or prosecutions.
But evidence of such congressional intent is wholly
lacking with respect to Section 311(b) (6).
A. Section 311(b) On Its Face Manifests A Clear Con-
gressional Intent That the “Civil Penalty” Provided

in Section 311(b)(6) Is Civil for Constitutional
Purposes

The very language of the Act here, which must be
the starting point in statutory interpretation, Perrin
v. United States, No. 78-959 (Nov. 27, 1979), slip
op. 4; TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978), amply
demonstrates that the penalty is not criminal. Con-
gress used the term “civil penalty” in describing the
assessment under Section 311(b)(6). It must be
assumed, absent compelling evidence of congressional

28

intent to the contrary, that this term was used ad-
visedly. Congress must be presumed to be aware of
the traditional distinction between civil and criminal
sanctions, not merely with respect to the procedural
protections that must be afforded, but also in the
vastly different legal and societal consequences that
follow when one is adjudged guilty of a crime on the
one hand and, on the other, has paid a mere monetary
penalty under a regulatory statute.

For this reason, as Judge Friendly stated, “[w]hen
Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and
the only consequence of a judgment for the Govern-
ment is a money penalty, the courts have taken Con-
gress at its word.” United States v. J. B. Williams
Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974). This Court
has, as a result, repeatedly upheld monetary penal-
ties designated by Congress as civil penalties against
contentions that they were actually criminal in nature.
See ¢.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
148, 151-154 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-552 (1943); Helvering v.
Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 400, 402-403; Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 577-579
(1911) ; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 338-339 (1909); Hepner v. United
States, 213 U.S. 103, 108-111 (1909).

The administrative procedure for assessment of
the penalty under Section 311(b) (6) is also indica-
tive of a congressional intent that the penalty be civil.
In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for
example, in which the question presented was whether

29

a 50% penalty on a federal income tax defici-
ency was a criminal penalty and therefore barred
under the circumstances by the Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy, the Court stated:
That Congress provided a distinctly civil pro-
cedure for the collection of the additional 50
percentum indicates clearly that it intended a
civil, not a criminal, sanction. Civil procedure
is incompatible with the accepted rules and con-
stitutional guaranties governing the trial of
criminal prosecutions, and where civil procedure
is prescribed for the enforcement of remedial
sanctions, those rules and guaranties do not

appply.
303 U.S. at 402.

But it is not necessary to rely on the language of
Section 311(b) (6) alone to determine from the face
of the Act that the penalty is civil. In Section
311(b) (5), the immediately preceding section, Con-
gress provided for what are clearly criminal sanc-
tions for those who fail to notify the appropriate
agency of the federal government of a prohibited
discharge:

Any such person who fails to notify immediately

such agency of such discharge shall, upon con-

viction, be fined not more than $10,000, or im-

prisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Thus, when Congress wished to impose a criminal
sanction in the Act, it knew how to do so.

Even more significantly for present purposes, how-
ever, is Congress’ treatment of the Fifth Amendment
implications of the self-reporting requirement in
Section 311(b) (5). To safeguard the Fifth Amend-

30

ment privilege, Congress expressly provided in that
section that the compelled notification, or information
obtained by the exploitation of that notification, shall
not be used against the reporting person “in any
criminal case.” The quoted phrase is, of course,
drawn verbatim from the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Thus, when Congress termed the monetary assess-
ment in Section 311(b) (6), the very next section, a
“civil penalty,” it must have been of the view that a
proceeding under Section 311(b) (6) is not a “crimi-
nal case” for purposes of the immunity granted by
Section 311(b) (5) or, therefore, for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. When Congress has shown such
a sensitivity to Fifth Amendment concerns by in-
cluding an express grant of immunity (compare
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)), and
characterized a sanction provided in the same statu-

tory scheme as a “civil penalty” that was intended to -

be outside of the protection afforded by the statutory
and Fifth Amendment immunity, the statutory char-
acterization of the penalty as civil is especially com-
pelling.”

20 Commandant’s Instruction 5922.11B, issued in 1974, pro-
vides that there is no statutory immunity from the use of the
notification in a civil penalty proceeding (App. 2a, infra).
The administrative construction that a “civil penalty” pro-
ceeding is not a “criminal case” for purposes of the statutory
(and, therefore, the constitutional) immunity “should be fol-
lowed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.”
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 482 U.S. 46, 54-55
(1977), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
267, 381 (1969).

31

Finally, the provision for payment of penalties
assessed under Section 311(b) (6) into the revolving
fund established by Section 311(k) to defray costs of
administering Section 311 further demonstrates a
remedial, not punitive purpose. One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) ;
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
549-550 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303
U.S. at 401.

Thus, in a number of different ways, Section
311(b) unmistakably reveals a congressional intent
that the civil penalty in Section 311(b) (6) is indeed
civil. This conclusion is reinforced by the decisions
of a number of courts that a proceeding under Sec-
tion 311(b) (6) is not a “criminal case” for purposes
of the statutory grant of immunity in Section 311(b)
(5), which, as noted above, implements the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See United States v. Allied
Towing Corp., 578 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1978) ;
United States v. LeBeouff Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d
149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987
(1977); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d
1291, 1293 n.7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976) ; United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429
F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d sub. nom. United
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir.
1978) .”

*1 None of these cases involved the possible application of
the Fifth Amendment privilege because the defendants were
corporations, which do not enjoy the privilege. California
Bankers Ass’n Vv. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 71 (1974). However,
because Section 311(b) (5) uses the phrase “in any criminal
case” drawn from the Fifth Amendment and was presumably

32

The court of appeals determined (Pet. App. 9a,
12a), however, in looking to the face of the statute,
that a punitive intent—and therefore an intent to
impose a criminal sanction—was indicated by the
statutory language that a civil penalty “shall be
assessed” for a violation. To be sure, the Coast
Guard Instructions relied upon by the court of ap-
peals—as well as those actually in effect at the time
—support the view that Congress intended that some
penalty be assessed in all cases. See A. 38-40; App.,
infra, la. But it does not follow that the provision
is criminal in nature. The approach may simply be to
impose a type of enterprise liability on the basis of the
activity engaged in by the person generally—the stor-
age, transportation, processing, or other handling of
oil or hazardous substances—which creates an inherent
risk of ecological harm, rather than to focus on the
degree of fault underlying the specific act or omission
at the time of the discharge actually occurred.

The court of appeals also found a punitive tone
in the Commandant’s Instructions, which give con-
tent, inter alia, to the phrase “gravity of the offense,”’
one of the factors to be taken into account under the
statute in determining the amount of the penalty to
be assessed. As implemented in the Instructions, this
factor embraces such considerations as the amount
of oil discharged, whether the discharge was inten-
tional or negligent, and the prior record of the person

intended thereby to have the same scope (both for individuals
and corporations) as the constitutional privilege, these cases
reflect a judicial consensus of the underlying nature of the
civil penalty in Section 211(b) (6) that is relevant here.

33

involved.” But, the amount of the oil discharged is
clearly relevant if the penalty is viewed as compen-
sation to the government for the ecological harm that
is presumed to follow an oil spill, even one that is
cleaned up promptly. See page 25, supra. So, also,
the size of the spill is relevant in allocating the
costs of government clean-up and stand-by prepared-
ness measures funded by Section 311(k) to those
who, as demonstrated by the magnitude of the par-
ticular spill, present the greater risk of the ecological
harm Section 311 is designed to prevent.

Similarly, the prior record of the person involved
is directly pertinent to the remedial purpose of pre-
venting discharges. A long history of discharges con-
firms that the person’s activities present a greater
risk of ecological harm than do the activities of others
and that a larger portion of the government’s costs
associated with administering Section 311 should
therefore be allocated to that person. By the same
token, if the discharge was intentional or negligent
(a factor the Coast Guard instructions also take into
account), this activity demonstrates a sufficient dis-
regard for the purposes of the Act, and therefore a
sufficient possibility of future harm, such that a
proportionately greater penalty is warranted to fur-
ther the purpose of preventing spills.”

22 Although the Instructions on which the court relied and
those actually in effect at the time are differently worded,
these considerations are generally contained in both. See
A. 38-40; App., infra, 2a-3a.

23 The court of appeals’ conclusion that taking the degree
of culpability into account in determining the amount of a
penalty to be assessed demonstrates an intent to impose

34

Thus, nothing on the face of Section 311 or the
Coast Guard’s enforcement of it indicates an intent
in the least inconsistent with Congress’ characteriza-
tion of the penalty as civil or with the section’s
remedial purposes.

B. The Penalty Provided in Section 311(b)(6) Is Also

Civil Under the Test Set Forth In Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez

In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963), the Court held punitive a section of the
Nationality Act of 1940 which “automatically
strip[ped] an American of his citizenship * * *
whenever [he] depart[ed] from or remain[ed] out-
side the jurisdiction of this country for the purpose
of evading his military obligations.” Jd. at 166.
Accordingly, the Court held that this punishment
could not be imposed “without affording the pro-
cedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.” Jbid. That result is hardly
relevant here. Nor is the primary basis on which
it was reached—the Court having concluded that
the legislative history of the provision afforded
“conclusive evidence of congressional intent” to treat
the sanction of de-nationalization as punishment. Jd.
at 169. But the Court went on to identify seven
factors useful in determining whether an Act of
Congress is penal or regulatory in character (7d. at
168-169 ; footnotes omitted).

criminal sanctions is, of course, inconsistent with the court’s
earlier conclusion (see page 10, supra) that assessment of
some penalty in every case without regard to fault (cul-
pability) reflects a punitive intent.

BF niet meee mn ewvess <n ¥

35

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint, whether it has historically

been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes

into play only on a finding of scienter, whether

its operation will promote the traditional aims of

punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a

crime, whether an alternative purpose to which

it may rationally be connected is assignable for

it, and whether it appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned are all rele-

vant to the inquiry, and may often point in

differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence

of congressional intent as to the penal nature of

a statute, these factors must be considered in
relation to the statute on its face.

In the present case, the court below invoked this

passage to support its conclusion that the Section

311(b)(6) penalty is criminal in nature, and we

accordingly consider the several factors here.

1, Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint

This factor clearly points to the remedial nature of
the Section 311(b) (6) penalty. The type of “affirma-
tive disability or restraint” to which the Court re-
ferred was one imposed on personal liberty, not the
adverse consequences of a monetary assessment. This
is evidenced by the Court’s citation (372 U.S. at 168
n.22) to Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1866), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946). The former case held that a statute barring
from the practice of law in federal courts any person
who did not subscribe to an oath that he had not
been an active supporter of the Confederacy consti-

36

tuted punishment for past conduct that was or may
have been criminal and was therefore a prohibited
ex post facto law. Similarly, Lovett held that a
statute barring the payment of certain named govern-
ment employees constituted punishment for their sup-
posed subversive activities “without the safeguards
of a judicial trial,” 328 U.S. at 316, and was there-
fore a prohibited bill of attainder. Jd. at 316-318.
Cf. Bell v. Woljish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20 (suggest-
ing that certain restrictions on the liberty of pretrial
detainees “may on [their] face appear to be punish-
ment,” but that they may in fact be incidents of a
lawful ‘nonpunitive governmental objective).
Monetary penalties, on the other hand, do not 'm-
pose affirmative disabilities or restraints under «he
Mendoza-Martinez analysis. This is indicated by the
Court’s citation (372 U.S. at 168 n.22) to Flemming
v. Nestor, supra, by way of contrast to Ex parte

Garland, supra, and United States v. Lovett, supra.

In Flemming v. Nestor, supra, the Court upheld the
statutory termination of social security benefits of a
person who had been deported because of past member-
ship in the Communist Party. Finding an absence of
compelling evidence of punitive intent, the Court re-
jected contentions that the provision was an ex post
facto law or bill of attainder and that it resulted in
punishment without benefit of a judicial trial. 363 U.S.
at 612-621. Significantly, the phrase “affirmative
disability or restraint” used in Mendoza-Martinez is
drawn from a passage in Flemming v. Nestor (372
U.S. at 617) in which the Court cites Wong Wing v.
Umted States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) and Cummings v.

me ae.

37

Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), both of
which involved restrains on liberty,* and notes that
Flemming v. Nestor itself involved no such “affirma-
tive disability or restraint.”

Thus, the court of appeals erred in concluding that
because a monetary penalty may inflict a ““pocket-
book deterrence or restraint on the recipient” (Pet.
App. 18a-14a, quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d
990, 1001 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d on other grounds,
430 U.S. 442 (1977)), the first of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors offers “little indication as to Con-
gress’ intent” (Pet. App. 14a). A “pocket-book” im-
pact distinctly points to a remedial rather than puni-
tive intent.

2. Whether the sanction has historically been re-
garded as punishment

This factor, too, clearly supports the remedial, non-
criminal nature of the penalty provision. As the
Court stated in Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S.
at 400:

Forfeiture of goods or their value and the pay-
ment of fixed or variable sums of money are
other sanctions which have been recognized as

** Wong Wing invalidated a statute providing for imprison-
ment at hard labor, without a criminal trial to establish guilt,
of a person unlawfully in the United States, and Cummings
V. Missouri invalidated as an ex post facto law a state con-
stitutional provision barring from the clergy any person who
failed to subscribe to an oath that he had never supported
the Confederacy. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889),
also cited in Flemming v. Nestor at the pertinent page, in-
volved a defendant who had been indicted and convicted and
is relevant only for its discussion of Cummings v. Missouri.

38

enforcible by civil procedings since the original
revenue law of 1789. * * * In spite of their
comparative severity, such sanctions have been
upheld against the contention that they are es-
sentially criminal and subject to the procedural
rules governing criminal prosecutions.

Unlike the historically punitive sanction of exile in-
volved in Mendoza-Martinez itself (see 372 U.S. at
168 n.23), and the similarly criminal sanctions in-
volved in the other cases cited in Mendoza-Martinez
on this point—imprisonment at hard labor, Wong
Wing v. United States, supra; Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 426-429 (1885); Mackin v. United States,
117 U.S. 348, 350-351 (1886) (discussing Ex parte
Wilson), and exclusion from a profession, Cummings
v. Missouri, swpra—monetary penalties have tradi-
tionally been recognized as appropriate civil remedies.

3. Whether the sanction comes inte play only on a_

finding of scienter

This factor furnishes no support whatever for the
argument that the penalty in Section 311(b) (6) is
criminal in nature, because there is no scienter re-
quirement for the imposition of a civil penalty under
that section. The court of appeals agreed, “at first
blush” (Pet. App. 14a), but then resorted to the
somewhat inverted logic that Section 311(b)(6) is
punitive in this regard because Sections 13 and 16 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which may im-
pose criminal sanctions for the discharge of oil and
hazardous substances, likewise do not contain a scienter

ihc NID

39

requirement (Pet. App. 14a, citing United States v.
White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974) ).
We, of course, recognize that a statute may be crimi-
nal although it contains no scienter requirement. Yet,
the absence of such a requirement in Section 311
(b) (6) tends to establish that the measure is reme-
dial, not criminal.

The court of appeals was also influenced (Pet. App.
14a) by the fact the Commandant’s Instructions ap-
peared to contain a scienter element in determining
the amount of the penalty to be assessed in a given
case. See A. 38-40; App., infra, 2a-3a. But the only
pertinent statutory factor is the “gravity of the of-
fense.” This is not the equivalent of a scienter require-
ment. As the implementing instructions make clear,
this factor can embrace such considerations as the
amount of oil discharged, the degree of care exercised
by the discharger, and whether the discharge was in-
tentional. The inquiry under Mendoza-Martinez, on
the other hand, is whether the penalty “comes into
play only on a finding of scienter.” 372 U.S. at 168
(emphasis added). This question must be answered
in the negative, both as it pertains to the assessment
of at least some penalty and the determination of its
amount.

4. Whether the sanction’s operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence

The court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. 15a)
that the deterrence factor does not come into play

under Section 311(b) (6) to a significant degree be-

40

cause the deterrence of spills under the section as
a whole results from the provision in Section 311(f)
for the recovery of clean-up costs from the owner or
operator. We agree that the potential for assessment
of a civil penalty will have a relatively small deter-
rent effect where the potential clean-up liability is
substantial. But, as noted above (see pages 24-25,
supra), Congress expected Section 311(b)(6) to
serve some deterrent function, especially where the
oil could not readily be removed. This prospective
deterrent effect was expected to result because hand-
lers of oil and hazardous substances would make
an economic calculation whether the possibility of a
penalty warranted the taking of certain risks in the
handling of those materials, and it was anticipated
that those responsible would be impelled by economic
considerations to take protective measures.

Such essentially regulatory deterrence, by imposing

additional costs or responsibilities in connection with.

doing business for the purpose of accomplishing reme-
dial goals, does not render the sanction criminal. This
is clear, for example, from Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 337-338 (1909):

[The Senate] report leaves no doubt that the
sole purpose of §9 was to impose a penalty,
* * * to secure the efficient performance by the
steamship company of the duty to examine
[aliens] in the foreign country, before em-
barkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the
policy of Congress to exclude from the United
States aliens afflicted with loathsome or dan-
gerous contagious diseases as defined in the act.
The contention that because the exaction which

ee ne

41

the statute authorizes the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor to impose is a penalty, therefore
its enforcement is necessarily governed by the
rules controlling in the prosecution of criminal
offenses, is clearly without merit, and is not open
to discussion.

The deterrent effect of which the Court spoke in
Mendoza-Martinez must therefore be more than that
which would predictably follow from the assessment
of a penalty for remedial purposes. It must, instead,
result from an in terrorem effect akin to that of being
adjudged guilty of a criminal offense or from a mone-
tary penalty far in excess of that reasonably related
to the remedial purposes of the provision, as in the
two cases cited in Mendoza-Martinez (372 U.S. at 168
n.25, citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
287 (1935), and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ).
Although the court of appeals did not find a pro-
hibited deterrent function in the civil penalty, it did
find that Section 311(b) (6) manifested a retributive
purpose, at least as implemented by the Coast Guard
Instructions. In setting the amount of penalty, the
Instructions take into account the gravity of the vio-
lation, the degree of culpability, and the prior record
of the party and preclude consideration of good faith,
the absence of fault, or subsequent clean-up efforts.
As noted above, however (see pages 32-33, supra),
the gravity of the violation, the prior record, and the
degree of culpability are all relevant to the alloca-
tion of the special costs of administering Section 311

42

to those who engage in the activity that creates the
risk of the ecological harm the statute was designed
to prevent, whatever the nature of the conduct (or
absence thereof) at the specific moment of the dis-
charge. Similarly, subsequent cleanup efforts do not
erase the fact that the occurrence of the dis-
charge itself confirms that the particular facility
poses a risk of discharge or the possibility that
ecological harm may have resulted to the waters
notwithstanding the clean-up efforts. This is in no
sense retributive purpose.** Where, as here, the stat-
ute’s aim is to reach the conduct engaged in, rather
than the person engaging in it, it is remedial, not
punitive. See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S.
at 616, quoting Cummings v. Missouri, supra, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320 (there must be a persuasive
showing of a purpose “to reach the person, not
the calling” to find the provision punitive or crimi-
nal in nature).
d. Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies
is already a crime

The court below found here a clear indication that
the Section 311(b) (6) penalty is criminal for present
purposes because Section 13 of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 407, makes criminal
the discharge of refuse of any kind into the navigable
waters of the United States. But the fact that crimi-

*5 This factor must also be considered in light of the facts of
Mendoza-Martinez itself, in which the legislative history made
unmistakably clear that Congress aeted for the repeatedly
expressed purpose to punish those who left the country in
time of need. 372 U.S. at 170-184. See also Trop v. Dulles,
supra, 356 U.S. at 96 (plurality opinion).

43

nal sanctions apply under another statute, passed at
a distant time, has little bearing on Congress’ intent
in enacting Section 311(b) (6). “ ‘Congress may im-
pose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to
the same act or omission.’” One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, supra, 409 U.S. at 235, quot-
ing Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 399.
Once again, a consideration of the facts in Mendoza-
Martinez is in order. In that case, the Court found
that Congress had enacted the expatriation provision
for the specific purpose of imposing additional punish-
ment for conduct that was already criminal under
the Selective Service laws but which could not be
prosecuted when the violator was outside the country.
372 U.S. at 170-184. There was therefore a clear
nexus between an underlying criminal offense and the
particular disability.

Such a nexus was also plain in the three cases cited
by the Court by way of explaining this factor. All
three statutes involved premised liability for a moue-
tary sanction on a finding that the person engaged in
conduct that was criminal under a statutory provision
referred to in the very section that provided for the
monetary penalty. 372 U.S. at 168 n.26, citing Lipke
v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922); United States
v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-573 (1931); United
States v. Constantine, supra, 296 U.S. at 295. See
also United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
401 U.S. 715, 721-722 (1971); compare One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, 409 U.S.
at 236 n.6. It is apparent, then, that the Court
in Mendoza-Martinez had in mind something substan-

44

tially more than the fact that the conduct involved
might also be criminal under some other statute or
provision. There must be a basis for concluding that
Congress specifically intended the sanction in question
to be additional punishment for engaging in that crimi-
nal conduct. There is no basis for such a conclusion
here.

Moreover, the Court has held that the fact that a
concededly criminal provision falls in a different part
of the statutory scheme than the provision whose
penal or remedial character is in issue weighs in
favor of a finding that the provision in issue is not
criminal. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, supra, 409 U.S. at 286. Viewed from this
perspective, the fact that the conduct here covered
by Section 311(b)(6) may also be criminal under
the Rivers and Harbors Act, enacted some 70 years
earlier, attenuates any relationship to underlying
criminal activity to the breaking point. There is no
mention of the Rivers and Harbors Act in Section
311(b) (6), nor is there any indication that Congress
intended for the civil penalty assessed under Sec-
tion 311(b) (6) to be an additional punishment for a
violation of that statute.”

*6 In fact, although the committee reports do not elaborate,
a principal motivation for the incorporation of a statutory
grant of immunity under Section 311(b) (5) against the use
“in any criminal case” of information about discharges re-
quired to be furnished under that section was no doubt to
prevent the use or derivative use of that information under
the Rivers and Harbors Act. See, e.g., United States v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 491 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972) ; see

45

6. Whether an alternative purpose other than punish-
ment may rationally be ascribed to the sanction

Although sanctions that have no conceivable legiti-
mate purpose other than to punish are considered
punitive in nature, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
supra; Trop v. Dulles, supra, the sanction will not
be regarded as punitive or criminal in nature if the
statute may rationally be thought to have another
purpose. Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S. at
615-617. In the present case, it is clear that a num-
ber of alternative purposes may rationally be ascribed
to Section 311(b) (6). The court of appeals conceded
as much (Pet. App. 16a). It specifically noted the
remedial aspects of the penalty resulting from the
payment of moneys recovered into the revolving fund
established under Section 311(k), which is utilized to
defray the costs of administering the program. See
also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,
supra, 409 U.S. at 237; United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943) ; Helvering v. Mitchell,
supra, 303 U.S. at 401. The court also conceded the
reasonableness of the government’s argument that the
penalty compensates the United States for tortious

generally Comment, Compelled Self-Disclosure and Civil
Penalties: The Limits of Corporate Immunity in Oil Spill
Cases, 55 B.U.L. Rev. 112, 114-118 (1975). The fact that
Congress termed the penalty in Section 311(b) (6) a “civil
penalty” demonstrates that it did not view a proceeding for
the assessment of such a penalty as the equivalent of a
“criminal case” for purposes of the statutory (and therefore
the constitutional) grant of immunity.

46

damage to the environment (Pet. App. 16a, citing
United States v. W.B. Enterprises, supra). However
the court declined to accept this rationale because the
factors involved in determining the amount of the
penalty did not, in its view, reasonably relate to the
possible damage to the environment.

But the statute by its terms states that the “gravity
of the violation” is to be taken into account in de-
termining the amount of the penalty, and this has,
quite appropriately, been interpreted by the Coast
Guard to involve a consideration of the amount of oil
discharged. Plainly the amount of oil discharged may
in general be though to be reasonably related to the
ecological damage to the waters that could result even
if the discharge was cleaned up promptly. At the
very least, Congress, in addressing the generality of
cases, could reasonably have so concluded. Finally,
as discussed above, Section 311(b)(6) has the broad

remedial purpose of encouraging compliance with

the Act’s “no discharge” policy through the imposi-
tion of a type of enterprise liability on those who
engage in risk-prone activity.

7. Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned
Where a monetary penalty is “grossly dispropor-
tionate” (United States v. Constantine, supra, 296
U.S. at 295) to the amount that could reasonably
be imposed in furtherance of the asserted remedial
purposes of the provision, the courts may construe

47

the penalty as punitive in nature. See also Bell v.
Wolfish, supra, slip op. 17 n.20. However, it is
well settled that a civil penalty need not be limited
to the amount of the government’s actual dam-
ages in order to constitute a remedial measure.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra,
409 U.S. at 237 (forfeiture of goods for custom law
violation) ; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148, 152-154 (1956) ($2000 liquidated damages
recoverable by government against fraudulent pur-
chasers of surplus property without proof of actual
damages); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
supra, 317 U.S. at 550 (recovery of double damages
by government for filing of false claims) ; Helvering
v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 401 (50% addition to
tax deficiency).

Whatever the outer limits of this test, it is clear
that a civil penalty of $250 in the present case is not
so grossly disproportionate as to smack of punish-
ment. In the vast majority of cases, even the
maximum penalty of $5000 could not be considered
excessive. Significantly, as well, the statute expressly
requires that the penalty be tailored in amount to
meet the “gravity of the violation” as well as the
size of the business of the owner or operator charged
and the effect of the penalty on his ability to remain
in business. Thus, far from showing the type of
cavalier disregard for the consequences of the pen-
alty that might lead a court to find a punitive in-
tent, Congress manifested a meticulous concern for
the appropriateness of the penalty under the circum-
stances of the particular case.

48

The court of appeals concluded that the penalty
nevertheless “could be excessive” in certain cases, at
least where the owner or operator attempted in good
faith to clean up and was not at fault for the discharge
(Pet. App. 17a). If the statutory factors are prop-
erly applied, however, an accidental or otherwise
innocent discharge should not result in as severe a
penalty as would an intentional or negligent one
(other things being equal), because the violation would
not be so “grave.” Moreover, even where the dis-
charge is innocent or clean-up efforts are diligently
pursued, these factors do not erase the fact of the dis-
charge itself, nor do they necessarily erase all en-
suing ecological harm (see page 42, supra). In any
event, speculation that a penalty might prove excessive
in some future case (the court of appeals did not ex-
pressly find the penalty excessive in this case) does
not support the conclusion that Congress must have
intended the sanction to be criminal in all cases. The
more prudent judicial course would be to invalidate
an excessive penalty in whatever case it may be im-
posed on the theory that it is inconsistent with the
statutory scheme.

Thus, each of the factors enumerated by the
Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, sup-
ports the conclusion that thé “civil penalty” under
Section 311(b) (6) was intended by the Congress to
be exactly that.

49

ITI.

THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 311(b)(6) FOR
ASSESSMENT OF A CIVIL PENALTY ARE NOT
“QUASI-CRIMINAL” FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

Respondent argued in the court of appeals (Ap-
pellant’s Br. 11-22) that even if Section 311(b) (6)
does not state a criminal offense for purposes of all
constitutional protections applicable in criminal pros-
ecutions, it should nevertheless be regarded as crimi-
nal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination. The court
below did not specifically address this argument, al-
though it did note (Pet. App. 18a n.7) that it was not
deciding the question whether Section 311(b) (6) is
criminal for any purpose other than the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege—perhaps thereby suggesting that the
privilege does have something of the broader reach
respondent urged the court to consider.

Respondent primarily relied on Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Lees v. United States,
150 U.S. 476 (1893); and United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). Those
cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that
monetary penalties that are plainly civil in char-
acter should nevertheless be regarded as criminal in
order to further the “policies” of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Amendment by its terms applies only to a
“criminal case,” and there must therefore be a dem-

50

onstration that the procedure for imposition of the
penalty here is—or is part of—a “criminal case.”

Boyd v. United States, supra, arose under Section 12
of the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 188,
which prohibited the fraudulent importation of mer-
chandise and provided that a person violating the sec-
tion “shall * * * be fined in any sum not exceeding
$5000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time
not exceeding two years, or both; and, in addition to
such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.” See
116 U.S. at 617. The government filed an informa-
tion for forfeiture of certain goods, but did not file a
criminal charge. The Court held that the Fifth
Amendment attached in the forfeiture proceeding.
But that conclusion was not based on a doctrine that
forfeitures and monetary sanctions are generally
“quasi-criminal” and that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege may uniformly be invoked in such proceedings.
Instead, the Court premised its holding on the spe-
cific finding that the forfeiture of goods was one of
the “penalties affixed to the criminal acts” prohibited
by the statute. 116 U.S. at 634. The Court explained
(2bid.) :

If an indictment had been presented against the
claimants, upon conviction the forfeiture of the
goods could have been included in the judgment.
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an
indictment, and to file a civil information against
the claimants—that is, civil in form—can he by
this device take from the proceeding its criminal
aspect and deprive the claimants of their im-
munities as citizens, and extort from them a

51

production of their private papers, or, as an
alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot
be.

It was on this basis alone that the Court stated that
“proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring
the forfeiture of a man’s property, by reason of
offences committed by him, though they may be civil
in form, are in their nature criminal.” 116 U.S. at
634 (emphasis added).

In Lees v. United States, supra, the Court likewise
indicated that the statutory penalty could have been
recovered in either a criminal or civil action. 150 U.S.
at 479. The Court also stressed that the penalty was
intended as punishment (150 U.S. at 480), and the
statute in question referred to a violation as an “of-
fence,” Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, Section 3, 23
Stat. 333, thereby underscoring the punitive nature
of the penalty. Accordingly, the Court followed Boyd
in concluding (150 U.S. at 480-481) that the action,
though civil in form in the particular instance, was
criminal in nature and therefore one in which the de-
fendant could not be compelled to be a witness against
himself. See also United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37,
47, 50 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.
103, 111-112 (1909).

Similarly, United States v. United States Coin &
Currency, supra, held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is applicable in a forfeiture proceeding un-
der the internal revenue laws where the forfeiture
is intended to be imposed “only upon those who are
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.” 401
U.S. at 721-722. See also id. at 718, quoting Boyd

52

v. United States, supra, 116 U.S. at 634 (proceeding
for forfeiture of a person’s property “by reason of
offences committed by him” are in their nature crimi-
nal for Fifth Amendment purposes). This reading
of Boyd v. United States and its progeny—that ap-
plication of t’» Fifth Amendment privilege is limited
to situations in which the monetary penalty or for-
feiture is premised on commission of an underlying
criminal offense—was expressly reaffirmed by the
Court in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, supra, 409 U.S. at 236 n.6.

Thus, in the cases upon which respondent relied in
the court of appeals, the monetary penalty or forfei-
ture was dependent on the occurrence of an integrally
related criminal offense and was, in actuality, but a
form of punishment for the commission of that of-
fense. See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 474-475 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). This nexus
to a criminal offense serves to illuminate the ap-
parent rationale of these holdings: Although a civil
penalty or forfeiture proceeding is not a “criminal
prosecution” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,
it may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered
part of a broader “criminal case” for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment privilege—a “criminal case”
that could fairly be thought to embrace not only the
prosecution itself, but certain ancillary or closely re-
lated proceedings the government may pursue to exact
additional punishment for the same underlying crimi-
nal conduct. And if the defendant is compelled to give
information that will result in a finding of liability in

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53

a civil penalty or forfeiture proceeding that is in-
tended to be the practical equivalent of an adjudica-
tion of guilt in a prosecution for the criminal offense,
he may, as a practical matter, effectively “incrimi-
nate” himself even if he is never formally prosecuted.

That rationale is inapplicable here. The civil
penalty provision in Section 311(b)(6) lacks such a
direct nexus to an underlying criminal offense; it is
imposed for violations of Section 311(b) (3), which
contains no criminal sanctions. There is no indication
that it was also intended to be an alternative or addi-
tional means of punishing offenses under the Rivers
and Harbors Act. Our case is like Helvering v.
Mitchell, supra, in which the Court rejected the argu-
ment that a provision for a 50% penalty on income tax
deficiencies was barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause following an acquittal on criminal charges of
fraudulently evading income taxes, finding that the
assessment was remedial, not punitive in character.
The Court there observed that where the monetary
penalty or forfeiture is remedial, the defendant does
not have the protection of a number of procedural
rights normally associated with the criminal process,
including the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. 303 U.S. at 404. The
Court noted that it did not read Boyd v. United
States, supra, or Lees v. United States, supra, as
holding to the contrary “where the sanction involved
is remedial, not punitive.” 303 U.S. at 404n.12 Here
also (as explained in Parts I and II of the brief), the

a ttti(a lll

54

civil penalty is remedial, not punitive. It follows that
Section 311(b) (6) does not trigger the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

JAMES W. MOORMAN
Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Assistant to the Solicitor General

JACQUES B. GELIN
MICHAEL A. McCorp
Attorneys

JANUARY 1980

la
APPENDIX

Instruction 5922.11B issued by the Commandant of
the Coast Guard on October 10, 1974, provides in
pertinent part:

GUIDELINES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT, SECTION 311

I. It is the policy of the Coast Guard to assess a
civil penalty for every violation of Section 311(b) (3)
of the FWPCA.

* * * * *

II. Notification.

* * * * *

(2) The notification required by Section 311(b) (5)
confers a statutory immunity from exploitation of
that notification in any criminal case upon the per-
son required to notify the Coast Guard (i.e., “person
in charge” [U.S. v. Mobil Oil, 4 ERC 1405]).

(3) Any employee of any corporation, firm, part-
nership, etc., who notifies the Coast Guard of a dis-
charge in accordance with Section 311(b)(5), en-
titles his corporation to that same immunity from
exploitation of the notification in any criminal case
if (1) that employee is acting for or on behalf or as
an agent of that corporation and (2) that corpora-
tion is “tn charge” of that vessel or onshore or off-
shore facility from which oil is discharged.

2a

(4) The notification does not confer a statutory
immunity from exploitation of that notification in a
civil penalty proceeding. Assessment of a civil penalty
is not affected in any way by the fact that the owner
or operator initially notified the Coast Guard of the
discharge.

(5) Therefore, if, during any stage of the investi-
gation or civil penalty procedure, it becomes evident
that there has been a failure to notify, a litigation
report should be referred to the U.S. Attorney for
the district in which the alleged violation took place
for possible criminal action. The referral should give
notice that the Coast Guard will institute civil
penalty procedures under Section 311(b)(6). The
fact that criminal action for Section 311(b) (5) may
be pending, or prospective, should not affect the civil
penalty procedure in any way.

(6) The immunity from criminal action based on
notification extends generally to the Refuse Act, 33
U.S.C.A. § 407. There is, however, no immunity from
prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.

* * * * *

III. Assessment of Civil Penalty.
* * * * *
C. The gravity of the violation—This factor en-
compasses multiple considerations. The following

questions should be considered by the Hearing Officer
in weighing the gravity of the violation:

(1) Was the discharge intentional?

3a

(2) Could the discharge have been prevented using
reasonable care?

(3) Was the discharge caused by an act or omis-
sion of a type previously attributable (according to
official records) to that same owner/operator so as
to place him on notice of the particular hazard?

(4) Was the cause of the discharge a violation of
the prevention regulations? Note that a separate vio- |
lation may have occurred under Section 311(j).

(5) Did the owner/operator take speciai steps to
try to avert the specific discharge?

(6) Was the discharge “unforseeable”’ by an ex-
perienced owner/owner knowing the weather, sea
conditions and equipment?

(7) Was there a minimum amount of oil dis-
charged?

Note that an affirmative answer to 1-4 increases
the gravity of the violation and an affirmative answer
in 5-7 decreases the gravity of the violation. Under
no circumstances may response action by the owner/
operator be considered as decreasing the gravity of
the violation.

D. The size of the business and the impact of the
civil penalty on the ability of the owner or operator to
remain in business

These two factors go hand in hand and should be
considered together. By requiring the Coast Guard to
consider these factors, Congress intended that com-
panies not normally be forced out of business or seri-
ously impaired in remaining in business by the size
of the civil penalty. It should be noted that there is

4a

no provision to decline to assess a penalty altogether,
but only to consider the size of the business of the
owner/operator in assessing the civil penalty. The
basic objective to be gained is to assess a civil penalty
which will not, if all other considerations warrant a
maximum penalty, place the business of the owner/
operator in jeopardy or seriously impair his ability
to continue to operate.

The “notice” letter solicits information concern-
ing the size of the business of the owner/operator and
the owner/operator’s own evaluation of the effect a
preliminarily determined civil penalty would have.
Before the notice letter is sent, the size of the busi-
ness of the owner/operator should have been. con-
sidered in making the preliminary determination.
This is normally possible because the businesses are
generally known to the Hearing Officer or his staff
or may be discovered by a call to the appropriate
Captain of the Port or district finance personnel. If
information is then received from the party charged
which differs materially from the Hearing Officer’s
preliminary consideration, the Hearing Officer should
reevaluate and adjust the preliminary determination
before making the assessment. If no information is
received, or if information is received which does
not differ materially from the Hearing Officer’s pre-
liminary consideration, no adjustment because of the
size of the business or effect on ability to continue
to operate should be made prior to assessment.

The Hearing Officer should properly consider the
overall corporate structure of the owner/operator.

5a

For example, a small, wholly owned subsidiary of a
large conglomerate or holding company should be
considered as the larger conglomerate for purposes
of considering the size and impact of a civil penalty.
Most frequently, when one-vessel corporations are
controlled by a parent operating company, the size of
the parent company shall control.

E. Minimum penalty—Neither assessing a zero
penalty nor issuing a letter of warning in lieu of a
penalty meets the requirements of the statute that a
penalty “shall be assessed.” If the facts warrant the
imposition of a minimum penalty, then the penalty
should be reasonably sufficient to motivate owners
and operators of vessels and facilities to take ade-
quate measures to prevent future unlawful dis-
charges. In a district where pollution incidents are
somewhat controlled, a figure of $150.00 per incident
might be adequate to provide the necessary motiva-
tion. In another district where violations are flagrant
and preventative measures frequently disregarded, a
somewhat higher minimum figure might be required
to provide the same motivation. However, it must
always be remembered that in any one case, the as-
sessed penalty must be based on its own set of facts.

* * * * *

I. Use of records kept in accordance with Section
308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in
actions brought under Section 311(b)(5) and 311
(b) (6) of that Act

6a

Section 308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act provides authority for the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency to require the
owner or operator of any point source to install,
use, and maintain monitoring equipment or methods,
to sample effluents, and to maintain records and
make reports whenever required to carry out the
objectives of several sections of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, including Section 311. Section
308 also gives the Administrator of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency or his authorized representa-
tive the right to have access to and to copy these
records. These records are also to be available to
the public except in certain narrowly defined situa-
tions.

Section 308 specifically cites a purpose of the record
keeping as “determining whether any person is in
violation of any .. . limitation, prohibition or efflu-
ent standard... of this Act...” It is appropriate
to use records kept in accordance with Section 308
in the assessment of a civil penalty for discharges
of oil or hazardous substances in harmful quantities
under Section 311(b) (6) against the owner or opera-
tor and to use the records to notify under Section
311(b) (5). Use of Section 308 records should only
be used where Section 308 information is forwarded
to the Coast Guard by EPA and where obtaining
such information is otherwise not practical. The
Hearing Officer may obtain Section 308 records in
cases where Coast Guard investigation is not practi-

Ta

cal, by initiating a request to the appropriate EPA
Regional Administrator.

Use of Section 308 required records will not violate
the discharger’s constitutional rights against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, because -
that provision applies only to criminal actions and
the penalty assessed under Section 311(b).(6) is
civil.

¥ + * * ¥

5 ¢ ©. 8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicEe; 1979 30759! 169

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0884%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
