# Petition — United Methodist Church v. Barr > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0736%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1979 - **Citation:** 444 U.S. 973 ## Text AUG 14 1979 __MIOHABL RODAK, JR., CLERK IN THE Supreme Court of the Anited States OctToBER TERM, 1978 FRANK T. BARR, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al, Defendants. a PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA ALBERT KE. JENNER, JR. SAMUEL W. WITWER, Sr. Kets F.. Bopr SAMUEL W. WITWER, JR. Evucene R. WEDOFF Wrrwer, Moran, Burwacz & JENNER & BLock ATKINSON One IBM Plaza 125 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60611 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 222-9350 (312) 332-6000 Awan J. RENICHE Danrev R. Savas Wruw F. Fanry SuLuivan, Jones & ARCHER 1400 Financial Square 600 ‘B’ Street San Diego, CA 92101 (714) 236-1611 SASS ARR BONE BATE OE TOOL ES SINS LE TIS: OE AN SORES AOL AACN La Salle Street Press — Chicago Printed in U.S.A. oo ne nomena TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ee acs ike ee ee ts cous ese 2 ES eee 2 COUR OUPEte EF EREMOEUNN LEED . 0. ccc cc ceccccceses 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STAT- EE 3 RELATED MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THIS ENE Er 4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................... 4 ! ee OE ccc cn wcescccces 4 B. Allegations Concerning The United Methodist Church and Motion to Quash and Dismiss ...... 6 C. Evidence Regarding The United Methodist EOS ee 7 EES SEE 15 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 17 I. Section 388 of the California Code of Civil Pro- cedure Cannot, Consistent with Due Process, be Interpreted to Allow an Action for Damages to be Brought Against an Aggregation of Persons and Entities Who Hold No Common Assets, and Who Have No Centralized Management ........ 19 A. The Rule of Law Applied By the Court of RiGee waey ara d he sess ces escas ve 22 | B. Fact Finding by the Court of Appeal ...... 28 II. Section 388 of the California Code of Civil Pro- eedure Cannot, Consistent with the Constitu- tional Guaranty of Free Exercise of Religion, be Interpreted to Render Liable to a Suit for Dam- ages a Religious Denomination Composed of Many Separate Entities with No Unified Author- itarian Structure, Managing Board or Executive Officers and No Joint Denominational Assets ... 36 Es bigs wade be hss 0sccesceces 39 TABLE OF APPENDICES (A-1 through A-39) ..... A-1 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases PAGE Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh, 166 Cal. 140 (1913) 28 Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E. 2d 812 (W. Va. 1973) ...... 31 California Clippers, Ine. v. United States Soecer Foot- ball Assn., 314 F.Supp. 1057 (N. D. Cal. 1970) ...... 22 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974) .. 34, 35 Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agencies, 64 Cal. App. 3d 482 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 2187 (1977) .... 28 Hansherry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ..............2.. 27 Hidden Lake Development Co. v. District Court, 183 Cole, 165; SID F. 20 GEE CIGIS) «ccc nccsccecceas 22 Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.2d 756 SD er re a al Cpa Ma Me ave ey wen PARES ea 19, 20, 21, 23 Jones v. Wolf, US. ,47 U.S.L.W. 4962 (July 2, GR Cowie Ue ee eee wnaau hee kuaae es 37 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) . 36 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. UN LT un AS Rogie boa F ANOS OA RRA LAR ENNAT CAS OS 36 McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969) ......cccecceces 35 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 2 EARNS Nets mere ra) peee earie se Panny haces 25 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, US. , 47 U.S.L.W. Se Bais BEE D ecko chawoesecusateasweeees 36 North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) ............. 35 Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. SR ack d eet ecKee hk ab kees cence ERR ee 22 Roman Catholie Archbishop v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 405, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1971) .............. 38 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 ie YS et | ere nr res ry rh Ore 36, 37 nal PAGE Steuer v. Phelps, 41 Cal. App. 3d 468, 116 Cal. Rptr. 61 | RENE ee iE gare Pe ere pT St Meat LN igs 21 Charles W. Trigg, et al. v. Pacifie Methodist Invest- ment Fund, et al., No. 78-0198-S (S.D. Cal., filed NS EE SS aaesa ety eee ese 4, 7, 24 The United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Chureh, 150 Ind. App. 574, 276 N.E. 2d SCRE ies Opener wea ieee awbawel 30 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. Pe ice rh dU R ESR ye et eh we ia ks 20, 21, 23, 24 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ............. 38 Yonce v. Miners Memorial Hospital Assn., Ine., 161 F. ane RTO CWT. VG. TOUR) nnn coc cc cdaccccccuies 22 Statutes and Constitutional Provisions United States Constitution, First Amendment ....... 3, 36-38 United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment .. 3, 36 United States Code, Section 1257(3) ................ 2, 34 California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 388 ..... 19, 36, 38 California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 418.10 ... 34 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(b) ....... 4, 22 Miscellaneous The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist ae eae orcad ee aa 8-12, 14, 25-26, 28, 29 er Ms Wl ok nl ve acu ws ou au edna oxean 35 eR rs ee 6 OE, BE ois hia ac kc eek beedeancacs 35 7 C.J.S. Associations § 1 (1937) .......... 0c. ccc 22 Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1142 (1962) ................. 31 Bishop Roy Short, United Methodism in Theory lee NU ED ores ee oe 30 Bishop Jack M. Tuell, The Organization of the United Methodist Church (rev. ed. 1977) ................ 13, 14 PR Maken nee 1 -s -28 IN THE Supreme Court of the Gnited States OcroBER TERM, 1978 FRANK T. BARR, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al, Defendants. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Petitioners, Charles F. Golden, Paul W. Milhouse and James M. Walton-Myers, being the persons upon whom service of process was attempted in the name of the entire international religious denomination known as the United Methodist Church, a named defendant in the underlying action, pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal, State of California, Fourth Appellate District, entered on March 8, 1979. That judgment reversed a March 20, 1978 decision by the trial court, which had quashed service of process on the Peti- tioners and dismissed the United Methodist Church as a party defendant. 2 OPINIONS BELOW The judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeal, pub- lished at 90 Cal.App.3d 259, 153 Cal.Rptr. 322, is reproduced as Appendix (“App.”) A to this Petition. The Minute Order decision of the trial court, entered March 20, 1978 and reversed by the Court of Appeal, is reproduced as App. B. JURISDICTION The California Supreme Court refused to grant a hearing to review the Court of Appeal’s decision on May 17, 1979. See order included as App. D. This petition was filed within 90 days of that date. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeal’s judgment by Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).? QUESTIONS PRESENTED This is one of a series of California cases, brought by the same plaintiffs or related parties, against “The United Methodist Church” seeking an aggregate of over one-half billion dollars in damages. This is the first time in history that a major international religious denomination has been held to be suable as an “unincorporated association”. The case raises the following questions regarding the validity under the United States Constitution of state procedures regarding suits against such associations: 1. Can a California procedural statute relating to “un- incorporated associations” be applied, consistent with the Constitutional guaranty of due process, to make amenable to a suit for damages an international religious denomina- tion which, as a totality, (a) has no officers, executive board, or other decision-making mechanism, so that there is no 1 The finality required by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 is discussed at pp. 34- 35, infra. ee 3 person or body able to consult with counsel, plead, respond to discovery, or otherwise speak for the denomination in the course of the litigation and (b) holds no assets of any kind, so that a judgment against the denomination could be recovered only from the assets of separate jural entities bearing the denominational name? 2. Did the California Court of Appeal, by requiring the United Methodist Church to conduct litigation as if it were a unitary and quasi-corporate legal entity, based solely on the Court’s own reading of Church documents, and con- trary to expert testimony aud internal ecclesiastical inter- pretation, interfere with the chosen government of the denomination, in violation of the right of free exercise of religion? CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTE INVOLVED This case involves the interpretation of the following provisions : 1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: “ec . .. nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law .. .” 2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion, which provides in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish- ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” 3. Section 388 of California’s Code of Civil Procedure which provides: “(a) Any partnership or other unincorporated associa- tion whether organized for profit or not, may sue and be sued in the name which it has assumed or by which it is known. 4 “(b) Any member of the partnership or other unincor- porated association may be joined as a party in an action against the unincorporated association. If ‘serv- ice of process is made on such member as an individual, whether or not he is also served as a person upon whom service is made on behalf of the unincorporated asso- ciation, a judgment against him based on his personal liability may be obtained in the action, whether such liability be joint, joint and several, or several.” RELATED MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THIS COURT The essential issues raised in this petition are also raised in the context of Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on June 11, 1979, in Milhouse, et al., v. United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Trigg, et al., Real Parties in Interest, No. 78-1855 (hereinafter “Trigg”’). There, the United Methodist Church, named as a “control person”, has been defaulted in a $5 million securities fraud case for failure to answer and conduct litigation as though it were a single party defendant. Petitioners respectfully request that the instant petition and the petition previously filed in Trigg be considered for consolidated review by this Court. STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Nature of the Litigation. All of the actions pending in California against ‘The United Methodist Church”, including the Trigg case, now pending before the Court on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pertain to the financial difficulties of Pacific Homes, Inc. (Pacific Homes), a California not-for-profit corporation which has, for many years, operated a group of facilities for the care of the elderly in California, Arizona and Ha- waii. Many of the residents in the homes had entered into “lifetime care contracts” with Pacific Homes whereby, in 5 th ary acl 5 exchange for defined payments, Pacific Homes agreed to provide housing and care for the remainder of the resi- dents’ lives. On February 18, 1977, Pacific Homes petitioned for relief under Chapter XI of the Bankruptey Act. Subsequently, the proceeding was converted into a Chapter X reorganiza- tion proceeding with a court-appointed trustee who has since operated the Homes without any interruption in services.” The financial condition of Pacific Homes required changes in the lifetime care contracts. In September of 1977, some 150 residents of Pacific Homes, purportedly on behalf of its 1,900 residents, brought the present case seeking either specific performance by all defendants of the contracts made with Pacific Homes, or, alternatively, damages allegedly caused by non-performance. Because Pacific Homes is in proceedings under Chapter X the Bankruptcy Act, plaintiffs are looking to other par- ties, all of whom are strangers to the Pacific Homes contracts, to pruvide this relief. The defendants include four specified religious units within the United Methodist denomination: the Pacific and Southwest Annual Confer- ence of the United Methodist Church, a California not-for- profit corporation, within whose geographic bounds the Homes functioned as an annual conference-related ministry ; the General Council on Finance and Administration of the * During the pending Chapter X reorganization proceedings, eash flow imbalances have stabilized, positive cash flow has been achieved and there is no expectation of closure of the Homes. In fact, the percentage of occupancy is increasing. To date, no resident has been required to leave the Homes for inability to pay increased rates. Contingency funds donated by concerned United Methodists and others are available to meet hardship cases, should any arise. Phillips Affidavit, Appendix exhibit B to Application for Stay Pending Review on Certiorari (filed June 12, 1979). 6 United Methodist Church, an Illinois not-for-profit corpora- tion (“GCFA”); the General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, a New York not-for-profit corporation; and the Division of Health and Welfare Min- istries of the United Methodist Church, an Illinois not- for-profit corporation. Finally, Plaintiffs name as a defend. ant “The United Methodist Church” (“the denomination”) in its entirety. No issue is raised here, nor was any raised below, con- cerning the jural status of the four specifically named church units or of any other specific units within the de- nomination. All of the named units have appeared through their own separate counsel, answered, complied with dis- covery, and are prepared to defend on the merits. The issue before this Court is confined to the additional effort to name and sue generally the entire denomination as an “gnincorporated association”. B. Allegations Concerning the United aa Methodist Church and Motion to Quash and Dismiss. The Consolidated Complaint herein broadly describes “The United Methodist Church” as: “|. an unincorporated association doing business in San Diego County, California, and consisting of numer- ous persons, associations, and corporations which were and are organized, and denominated and doing business as conferences, boards, commissions, councils and agencies.” (Consolidated Complaint at Par. 2). In fact, as detailed below, the denomination is composed of over 45,000 largely independent units, and 10 million individual members, with- out a common head, managing board, headquarters, or joint assets. After so defining the denomination as a broad “unin- corporated association” the Complaint goes on to allege that the denomination is involved in a web of “alter ego” eb . 0 beh ent 0 a Seay ate! he te Rb matin Sw 7 or “agency” relationships with Pacific Homes and the other named defendants. In an attempt to obtain personal jurisdiction over the denomination, plaintiffs served process upon the present petitioners, Charles F. Golden, a bishop who presides over the defendant Pacific and Southwest Annual Conference ; Paul W. Milhouse, a former president of the denomination’s Council of Bishops; and James M. Walton Myers, a former Assistant General Secretary of the defendant GCFA. Messrs. Golden, Milhouse and Walton-Myers, appearing specially under Section 418.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, moved to quash service upon them and dismiss the Complaint, as against the denomination, for want of personal jurisdiction, (1) because the denomination does not have any quasi-corporate or unified structure or centralized administration which would render it an “un- incorporated association” amenable to suit under Section 388 of the Code, (2) because neither they, nor anyone else, under the ecclesiastical law of United Methodism, is au- thorized tu answer the Complaint, decide litigation issues, or otherwise appear and speak for the entire denomination— in fact, they are specifically forbidden to do so; and (3) be- cause they personally had no authority to receive service of process for the entire denomination. The petitioners did not argue for any form of “religious immunity,” but rather pointed out that any or all of the separate units composing United Methodism are amenable to suit. This is essentially the same position taken by the two persons chosen by plain- tiffs to receive process in the name of the denomination in the Trigg case. C. Evidence Regarding the United Methodist Church. As in Trigg, petitioners supported their motion to quash and dismiss with the affidavits of several ecclesiastical experts within the United Methodist Church, explaining 8 the non-authoritarian and decentralized features of the denomination, and demonstrating that the denomination has never conducted affairs as if it were a single legal entity. Plaintiffs responded with an affidavit and chart prepared by their attorney, presenting his personal inter- pretation (a) of the ecclesiastical law and polity of the denomination and (b) of several documents concerning individual units of the denomination. The plaintiffs offered no expert testimony of any kind to refute the statements made by petitioners’ church experts in support of the motion. Petitioners’ expert evidence reflected the ecclesiastical law of the United Methodist denomination, as officially stated in The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church (1976), the highest constitutional and legislative pronouncement of the denomination. Declaration of Murray H. Leiffer (January 6, 1978), Ex. H. Ex. AA thereto, 75; Affidavit of Ewing T. Wayland (March 7, 1978), Ex. V. Ex.H thereto; Affidavit of Paul Milhouse (January 5, 1978), Ex. H, Ex. G theret¢, 73.2 The denomination as a whole has never been incorporated. Ex. V, Ex. J thereto, {[ 5. As detailed by T..e Book of Discipline, and explained in the affidavits, the denomination is an aggregation of many largely independent entities brought together in what is called “a connectional structure.” See The Book of Disci- pline, at 231. There are basically four types of entities within the denomination, defined by the geographical scope of their ministry. 1. First, there are approximately 39,000 local churches affiliated with the United Methodist Church in the United States, and another 4,400 outside this country. Leiffer dec- laration, Ex. H, Ex. AA thereto, 10. Each local church is 3 “Ex.” refers to the exhibits contained in the jointly compiled record on review consisting of the materials submitted to the trial court regarding the motion to quash and dismiss. 9 responsible for its own financial and operating affairs. Id. The affairs of each locai church are administered by an Administrative Board acting as an executive agency. The Book of Discipline, J{| 247-250. No local church has been named as a defendant in the Barr ease. 2. Operating in a broader geographical area, there are other church entities known as “annual conferences.” The Book of Discipline, J 700-751. This term refers to a meet- ing of clergy and laymen from many local churches in an area, and also refers to the area from which they come. There are 72 annual conferences within the United States and 42 such conferences distributed throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia. (These conferences are listed in App. F at A-33 to A-36.) See Leiffer declaration, Ex. H, Ex. AA thereto, {] 10. The members of the annual conferences regu- larly meet once a year to review matters of common con- cern, and to develop and support benevolent programs within their boundaries. /d., 13. An example of such pro- grams is provided by the Pacific Homes project which gave rise to the present litigation; this was a ministry related to the Pacific and Southwest Annual Conference. There are several hundred annual conference related agencies, such as hospitals, homes and orphanages, across the denomination. The funds necessary for such annual conference programs are soughtgirectly or indirectly from the local churches, The Book of Discipline, 711, but an annual conference has no power to bind financially the denomination or any church unit associated with the denomination, other than itself. id., 1 702(2). The annual conferences are continuous bodies. They may meet more than once a year and have interim governing boards (id. 701(4)); they may incorporate (id. $701(1)); they each have a treasury and a treasurer (id. 717-718). No argument has been raised in this lawsuit about the jural status of the annual conferences or any other constituent 10 units of the denomination. In the Barr ease, only one annual conference has been named as a defendant, the Pacific and Southwest Annual Conference, a California non-profit cor- poration. It has appeared and answered. 3. Next, in order of increasing geographical scope, are fo-rteen “jurisdictional” and “central” conferences. The Book of Discipline, {{] 620-652; Leiffer declaration, Ex. H, Ex. AA thereto, §/ 21. One of their principal functions is the election of bishops. Id., { 22. The bishops of the denomina- tion ordain and appoint ministers to the local churches. The Book of Discipline, 9] 514-515, and preside, without voting, over annual conferences, whose direction the bishops must follow, Leiffer declaration, Ex. H, Ex. AA thereto, { 22. The bishops of the denomination, active and retired, compose the Council of Bishops, The Book of Discipline, 1525. This body is essentially a consultative group; it has no power to speak for or control the denomination or to commit any entity within the denomination to action. Leiffer declaration, Ex. H, Ex. AA thereto, {/ 22; Milhouse affidavit, Ex. H, Ex. G thereto, 7. Neither the Council of Bishops nor any of the jurisdictional or central conferences has been named as a defendant in Barr. 4. The national and global operations of the United Methodist denomination are the concern of the remaining denominational entities—the General Conference and “gen- eral” boards. The Book of Discipline, J] 601-612. Every four years, delegates elected by the annual conferences assemble to form the General Conference, which serves as a legislative assembly. Leiffer declaration, Ex. H, Ex. thereto, § 18. The Book of Disctpline is the body of law en- acted by the General Conference.* Only the General Con- ference can speak for the denomination as a whole. The 4 The highest judicatory of the denomination, charged with in- terpretation of The Book of Discipline, is the Judicial Council. The Book of Discipline, {{] 60-63. 11 Book of Discipline, | 612(1). Successive General Confer- ences have established various boards and councils to carry out the work of the denomination on a worldwide basis. There are presently 13 such “general” boards. Leiffer decla- ration, Ex. 11, Ex. AA thereto, {] 20. All of these boards, and most of their subsidiary units, are incorporated. Id. How- ever, the General Conference itself is not a continuing body. It meets quadrennially for approximately two weeks and then adjourns, sine die. It has no offices, and no permanent staff. Jd., 18. The General Conference may not delegate its functions to any other unit within the denomination during the four-year interval between its sessions. Decision No. 364 of Judicial Council, Ex. V, Exs. J, J-1 thereto. The boards and councils established by the General Con- ference to perform the denomination’s worldwide ministry receive their funds from the voluntary contributions of 10 million individual members of the denomination, through the local churches and annual conferences. About 941% percent of the amounts donated by members of the denomination remain at the local level, for use by the local churches and annual conferences; the remaining 514 percent contributed for world ministries, are identified as “general funds.” This term does not denote unrestricted assets, but rather is used to signify that the funds are destined for ministries by the 13 “general” level agencies so designated because they are related to the General Conference, as opposed to some other sector of the denomination. Wayland Dep. at 215-217, 236-237; Wayland Affidavit No. 1, Trigg App. Ex. 2, 7. These funds are routed, under The Book of Discipline to GCFA, one of the 13 general level boards and an Illinois non-profit corporation. GCFA then acts as conduit to distribute these funds, in the manner specifically budgeted and directed by the General Conference. In this activity it is on occasion referred to as rendering “central treasury” services, but it is not the treasury or treasurer of the entire denomination. Wayland Dep. at 231. 12 In fact, GCFA’s functions are essentially devoted to servicing eight of its twelve sister general level boards, and do not bring it into contact with the thousands of local churches or the vast majority of other non-general units composing the denomination. Wayland Dep. at 245-247; Wayland Affidavit No. 1, Trigg, App. Ex. 3, 4. In carry- ing out certain of its functions, GCFA sometimes works with a second general level board, the General Council on Ministries, which is charged with reviewing the Church’s ministries. The Book of Discipline, { 1001-1005. There is no question in this case about the jural, suable status of the general level boards.® GCFA and two other such units, the General Board of Global Ministries and the Health and Welfare Division have been named as defendants in Barr. All have appeared, answered, and provided extensive dis- covery. The evidence before the trial court demonstrated that the church units listed above are interrelated and inter- connected by a common faith and tradition, and by common representation at various conferences. However, it also showed that they operate with a high degree of independ- ence. There is no chain of command linking these units nor are the levels described above layered vertically in any ascending order of authority or control. Rather, the basic constitutional units in the denomination are the 114 annual conferences, and no substantial changes in the organization and constitution of the denomination can be adopted with- out the concurrence of these conferences. The Book of Dis- cipline, | 37, 64. In the use of their funds, the separate annual conferences are not subject to the control of other 5 GCFA contested the “long-arm” jurisdiction of a California court in the underlying case, General Council on Finance and Ad- ministration v. Superior Court, No. 78-300 in this Court, cert. denied, USS. , 99 S. Ct. 281, (1978), but has never asserted that it was not a jural entity, nor did it raise in that case the issues presented here. atin ID Adee ey ns at's nt. Poca onde 13 denominational bodies. Leiffer declaration, Ex. H., Ex. AA thereto, {| 13. Likewise, the general level boards are not sub- ject to the control of any single person or council, but seek to carry out the programs of the General Conference in largely independent fashion. Jd., J 20. This and other decentralized characteristics of the de- nomination are noted by Bishop Tuell in his text. The Organization of The United Methodist Church, (rev. ed. 1977) at 127-129: “Tf someone had a complaint, and wanted to go to the head of the United Methodist Church with it, that head person would be hard to find. One might try the presi- dent of the Council of Bishops, but would discover that this person is primarily a presiding officer over the semi-annual meetings of the Council of Bishops. The president has no particular authority in the church at large not possessed by all other bishops. . . “One might try the general secretary of the General Council on Ministries, but would discover that this person, though head of an agency involved in co- ordinating the total work of the program agencies of the church, is by no means in charge of the total work of The United Methodist Church. If our complainant went to see the executive head of one of our boards or agencies, he or she would be told that that person has charge of only a certain portion of the work of the church. One might approach the presiding bishop of a session of the Generai Conference, but would be told that anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five bishops may share in the task of presiding at any quadrennial meet- ing of the General Conference. If one were to go to the president of the Judicial Council, he or she would be told, ‘All we do is decide cases.’ “This is simply tv illustrate the fact that power and authority are widely dispersed within The United Methodist Church, undoubtedly deliberately so. We have inherited from the founders of America a rather keen distrust of too much power centralized in one 14 person. There is not only not a head person, there are no headquarters of our church. This is not necessarily bad, but we should recognize that this general lack of central direction over the years has resulted in our various boards and agencies pretty much going their own independent ways, each developing its own pro- grams which sometimes overlapped with programs of our other agencies and sometimes actually conflicted. . .” Except for the quadrennial General Conference, there is no person or group who can speak for or commit the entire denomination to action. The Book of Discipline, { 612. The affidavit of Ewing Wayland (Ex. V, Ex. L thereto) demon- strates, without contradiction by the plaintiffs below, that the United Methodist Church, in its denominational entirety and as distinguished from its affiliated organizations, has never: (1) Employed any person or held any employer identi- fication number ; (2) Held any bank account; (3) Issued any check, note or draft; (4) Held legal title to any property, real or personal ; (5) Except for “covenants” of religious cooperation and comity with other religious groups, entered into any contract; (6) Filed a tax return; (7) Maintained a denominational headquarters; or (8) Established any officers for the entire denomina- tion, and specifically, has never had a chief execu- tive or other head person. Ex. V, Ex. L thereto, (2; Ex. H, Ex. G thereto at 17; Wayland Dep. at 231. The plaintiffs in Barr and the related cases have never specifically stated who they believe controls or can speak for the entire denomination. They have indicated that they a NettO ink wR dts th Toes oe 4 be 15 would seek to enforce any judgment they obtain against the entire denomination by levying against all gifts of “general funds” made by local church numbers for the specific sup- port of national and global ministries of the Church, regard- less of what denominational unit is in possession of such funds at a particular time. Thus the possible targets for levy would include United Methodist local churches, the annual conferences, the General Council on Finance and Administration acting as conduit, its twelve sister general boards and any of the hundreds of denominational units for whose religious and charitable ministries the funds are given in the first instance. Plaintiff’s Answer to Petition for Hearing below, 4th Civ. No. 18244 (Supreme Court of California, 1979) at 43 n. 25. D. Rulings Below. On March 20, 1978, after considering the evidence of the parties and the arguments of counsel, the trial court, Hon- orable Ross G. Tharp, entered its Minute Order decision (App. B). The court found: “The ‘United Methodist Church’ is an international religious denomination consisting of over 10,000,000 persons who worship in some 43,000 churches and mis- sions throughout the world. The ‘United Methodist Church’ is a connectional structure maintained through a chain and series of periodic conferences. It has never been incorporated.” App. B at A-22. The court held that the denomination was not sufficiently centralized to be deemed an unincorporated association sub- ject to suit, citing an article in the Encyclopedia Brittanica which noted the diffuse organization of the denomination. Id. Finally, the court warned that: “A contrary ruling would effectively destroy Methodism in this country, and would have a chilling effect on all 16 churches and religious movements by inhibiting the free association of persons of similar religious beliefs.” App. B at A-22, 23. Plaintiffs appealed. On March 8, 1979, the California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the United Methodist Churel vas a legal person, subject to suit. The Court of Appeal recognized that the denomination “may be unique in that it has no single chief operating officer” (App. A at 11), but “the clearly defined operating and conceptual levels of responsibility starting with the General Conference ... cannot be ignored.” Id. The court also stated, without reference to the contrary expert testi- mony that “a persuasive argument can be made that the Council of Bishops is equivalent to the [denomination] board of directors.” Jd. The court similarly accepted other factual arguments made by plaintiff’s counsel. It explicitly rejected the contrary expert testimony. App. A at A-17, 18. The court held, however, that the question of the denom- ination’s status was not a question of fact but involved only the application of law to uncontested facts. The court stated the law bluntly: “The criteria applied to determine whether an entity is an unincorporated association are no more compli- cated than (1) a group whose members share a common purpose, and (2) who function under a common name under circumstances where fairness requires the group to be recognized as a legal entity. Fairness includes those situations where persons dealing with the asso- ciation contend their legal rights have been violated.” App. A at A-8, 9. The Court of Appeal saw no due process or First Amend- ment problem in requiring the denomination to litigate as if it were a cohesive entity. And, in any event, it declined to apply First Amendment protections against judicial re- vision of church doctrine and polity, taking the position this would require a grant of religious immunity. App. A Nn ee eee ee eee oe Deki ne! Bgsewbe reer SEP iewtek 17 at A-18, 19. Finally, the Court perceived no due process problem in suing a denominational name without naming as defendants the component religious units whose assets might later be sought, in execution of a judgment against such a commonly named group, as purported “associational” assets. App. A at A-17. Petitioners’ Petition For Rehearing, filed with the Court of Appeal on March 23, 1979, was denied, without opinion, by Order of said Court entered on March 29, 1979 (App. C). After the California Supreme Court denied hearing, by Order dated May 17, 1979 (App. D), petitioners sought this Court’s review. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT For many years, both federal courts and the courts of various states have permitted suits to be brought, as a matter of convenience in pleading, against “unincorporated associations.” However, no such action has ever before in- volved a major international religious denomination. Rather, these suits have generally involved labor unions or other entities with a quasi-corporate structure. Nor has any court, to petitioners’ knowledge, ever before defined the minimum characteristics necessary for treatment as a suable “unin- corporated association.” The Court of Appeal below devised and applied just such a definition. It held that any aggre- gation of persons or groups can be sued as an entity so long as its members (1) share a “common purpose” and (2) “function under a common name under circumstances where fairness requires the group to be recognized as a legal entity.” App. A at A-9. The court made clear that con- siderations of “fairness” in this context could be limited to the interests asserted by those who seek to bring the action. For the individuals and units who make up any aggre- gation alleged to be an unincorporated association, the 18 consequences of such a lawsuit may be severe. Their individ- ual property may be at stake, so long as it can be claimed to be held for the benefit of the association, yet the suit may be in a distant forum, and the “association” may have | no ability to present a concerted defense. Indeed, the asso- ciation may have the independence of its members as a central tenet. Under the definition of the Court of Appeal, precisely such “aggregation” may be fused into a single legal person and deemed subject to suit. Surely every religious denomination fits the common purpose/common name rubric, even those whose members and units are most independent of one another—Congregationalists, Baptists, Unitarians. Any major religious denomination, regardless of structure, can be forced to respond, in any court, to any suit premised on the alleged acts or omissions of local religious units bearing the common name. The rubric ap- plies equally well to wholly secular “associations” like “the Bell System” or “the Women’s Movement.” Individuals or groups affiliated with any such associations, under the rule of the Court of Appeals, can be subjected to lawsuits brought against the common name, regardless of their con- tacts with the forum state and regardless of the “associa- tion’s” ability to defend. In the present case, a loosely-structured, “connectional” religious denomination consisting of over 45,000 largely independent local churches, with no joint assets and no central management, has been subjected to a lawsuit seek- ing hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. To defend the lawsuit would require a restructuring of the government of the denomination to create a monolithic unit, able to speak with one voice and act in a unified manner; to de- fault would threaten each local church, conference and board with a judgment against whatever is later deemed “association” property in its control. The rule of Court of the Appeal has created a manifest in- justice in the present case and it has potential for enormous ice tease tell 19 harm in other cases. It is an invitation for in terrorem litigation against a new class of defendants. This Court should grant certiorari to clarify the extent to which States can, consistent with the United States Constitution, allow aggregations of individuals and groups to be sued as en- tities. I. SECTION 388 OF THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT, CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS, BE INTERPRETED TO ALLOW AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST AN AGGREGATION OF PERSONS AND ENTITIES WHO HOLD NO COMMON ASSETS, AND WHO HAVE NO CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT. The leading California case regarding suits against un- incorporated associations is Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.2d 756 (1931). In that decision, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 388 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provided for such suits. In so doing, the court noted the historical treatment of unincorporated associations: “For a long time the established rule was that in the absence of statute, an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in its common name; all the mem- bers thereof had to appear in their own names as par- ties plaintiff or defendant. The basic reason was that the association was not, in the eyes of the law, a legal unit or entity, and had no legal capacity to become a party to an action. The difficulty was only one of pro- cedure, and the objection was purely technical. The liabilities or rights of the members were in no way involved, and were not, in theory, impaired by the operation of the rule. They might have brought actions if they all joined as plaintiffs, and they might have been held to any liability imposed upon them by law, if sued and served individually.” 2 P.2d at 759. The Court then noted that various statutes, such as Sec- tion 388, were enacted to change the rule regarding suits 20 against unincorporated associations, but only as to proce- dure. “These statutes dealt solely with the manner of bring- ing actions, and were not intended to effect any change in the substantive law. Members of associations had the same rights and were subject to the same liabilities as before, only now they could be sued by a less compli- cated and cumbersome process. Id. No question was raised in Jardine as to whether the de- fendant stock exchange was an unincorporated association. Its sixty members paid dues and governed their affairs through elected trustees. The only question as to applicabil- ity of the statute was whether the exchange as whole “con- . ducted business,” a requirement which has, by amendment, been removed from Section 388.° Accordingly, the court in Jardine was not called upon to determine the characteris- tics of an unincorporated assogiation subject to suit. In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 44 (1922), this Court had earlier held, as a matter of federal common law, that the United Mine Workers of America could be sued as an unincorporated association. There, too, the Court was not required to specify the pregise param- eters of an unincorporated association. However; the Court did specify those aspects of the-union’s organization which made suit against it appropriate. “The body governing the union in the interval between conventions is the International Board consisting of the principal officers, the president, vice-president and secretary-treasurer, together with a member from each district. The president has much power. He can remove - or suspend International officers, appoints the national 6 The section now reads, in relevant part, “Any partnership or other nnincorporated association, whether organized for profit or not, may sue and be sued in the name which it has assumed or by which ittis known.” . Aa ate EN aT ti Bad oe a ATR ERTL 1 SAA OLN AOL ARETE Ban heel SOE es on ei sascha Wa iedlet LN ALi ek. A-3 The Procedural Background Plaintiffs commenced their class a¢tion on behalf of approximately 1,950 present and former residents of the 14 retirement homes operated in California, Hawaii and Arizona by Pacific Homes Corporation (Pacific Homes) for equitable relief or damages.* The complaint alleged each member of the class had entered into a “continuing care agreement” with Pacific Homes ;* that on or about February 18, 1977 Pacific Homes petitioned for relief under Chaspter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and that the defendants Pacific and Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (PSWAC), a California cor- poration, the General Council on Finance and Administra- tion of the United Methodist Church (GCFA), and the United Methodist Church (UMC), were each financially responsible for the operations of Pacific Homes. Plaintiffs sought a declaration requiring each of the defendants to specifically perform the continuing care agreements be- tween each plaintiff and Pacific Homes or for damages. 3 The original complaint, filed September 21, 1977, contained six causes of action. The first amended complaint, filed December 2, 1977, with seven causes of action, sought the same relief as the original complaint, but added as defendants the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand, and the General Council on Finance and Administra- tion of the United Methodist Church (GCFA), a corporation. Refer- ence to the complaint includes reference to the first amended complaint. *The continuing care agreement provided that Pacific Homes would furnish lifetime care, including medical, nursing and conva- lescent care, accommodations and in most instances, food service. Many of the plaintiffs had pre-paid their contracts and were entitled to lifetime care at no additional cost; agreements involving the remaining plaintiffs required fixed monthly payments for life, guar- anteed never to increase or limited to deferred increases based upon inflation. A-4 Plaintiffs’ bases for jurisdiction over UMC in each cause of action are the allegations which state UMC was an un- incorporated association, Pacific Homes was the agent of the defendants PSWAC, GCFA and UMC and in doing the acts alleged was acting within the scope of its authority as agent and with the permission, knowledge and consent of PSWAC, UMC and GCFA; each defendant or predecessor in interest was the agent of each other defendant and in doing the acts alleged, each was acting within the scope of his authority with the permission, knowledge and consent of each other defendant; and Pacific Homes was the alter ego of each defendant. Persons upon whom service of process was attempted on behalf of UMC moved to quash the service under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 on the grounds that (1) UMC was merely a loose connectional system and not a jural entity capable of being sued under Code of Civil Procedure section 388, subdivision (a); and (2) to permit suit against UMC was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process, free exercise and establishment of religion provisions of the United States and California Constitu- tions. Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting the motion to quash service of summons (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (c)). The United Methodist Church is a Jural Entity under Code of Civil Procedure Section 388, Subdivision (a) The Status of UMC in the Litigation is a Question of Law and Not of Fact The initial argument made by UMC is that as an ele- mentary principle of appellate procedure, we must uphold the trial court order if it is supported by any substantial evidence. (See gen. Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 245, p. 4237.) The first difficulty we encounter 4 q a : — , , . iste scesinsn es SAARLAND AT BIS 1G BP nk A-5 with this proposition is it assumes the trial judge made a factual determination. Although there was a plethora of evidence on the issue of whether UMC was an unincorpo- rated association, the trial court explained its holding by reference to two sets of considerations. One was peculiar to Methodism with apparent reliance on the Encyclopedia Britannica as an unbiased source; the other was of general applicability to ‘all churches and religious movements” with the apparent assumption that the suit against UMC involved the unconstitutional interference with the free exercise of religion. Nothing is contained in the trial court order which suggests a factual determination was made which involved the process of weighing the evidence which was presented. Secondly, the analysis of whether UMC is a jural entity involves a review of data relating to the crea- tion, existence and operation of UMC. The facts contained in the affidavits and declarations submitted, including the information in the Book of Discipline of the United Meth- odist Church (1976), are not in dispute. The only ostensible factual conflict which arises is related to the ultimate issue expressed in opinions of witnesses on behalf of UMC to the effect that UMC cannot be sued. “In short, this is not a true case of conflicting evidence in which a reviewing court will refuse to disturb findings based thereon.” (Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co. (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 77, 81; see also Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 861, 866, fn. 2.) The result which must be reached in this case does not rest on ecclesiastical expertise, but rather on principles of law. The question as to the jural status of UMC is one of law and not of fact. (Ibid.; ef. Brandeburg v. New York Tel. & Tel. Co. (1975) 49 Cal. App. 3d 893, 896; Agalite-Bronson Co. v. K. G. Limited (1969) 270 Cal. App. 2d 308, 310.) The Criteria to be Applied to Determine Whether an Entity is Capable of Being Sued as an Unincorporated Association A-6 “For a long time the established rule was that in the absence of statute, an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in its common name; all the members thereof had to appear in their own names as parties plaintiff or defendant. The basic reason was that the association was not, in the eyes of the law, a legal unit or entity, and had no legal capacity to become a party to an action. [Citations.] The difficulty was only one of procedure, and the objection was purely tech- nical. The liabilities or rights of the members were in no way involved, and were not, in theory, impaired by the operation of the rule. They might have brought actions if they all joined as plaintiffs, and they might have been held to any liability imposed upon them by law, if sued and served individually. But where asso- ciations with large membership were involved, the operation of the rule frequently has inconvenient and unjust consequences, and various exceptions came to be recognized.” (Jardine v. Superior Court (1931) 213 Cal. 301, 307-308.) Code of Civil Procedure section 388, enacted to eliminate procedural problems in actions against an unincorporated association, was held cunstitutional in Jardine v. Superior Court, supra. In its original form, only persons transacting business under a common name could be sued in that name, but “business” was ultimately construed so broadly it consti- tuted a slight limitation on the right to sue an unincorpo- rated association. (See Law Revision Commission Comment (1967 Amend.) Herald v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289 (1920) 46 Cal. App. 325, 330.) The 1967 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 388 made clear an unincorporated association, whether organized for profit or not, could either sue or be sued in the name which it had assumed or by which it was known. The trend of case law has been the rejection of legal niceties to assure full recognition of the unincorpo- rated association as a separate legal entity. The basis for a, eB ng SAL g i i 3 # ‘ A-7 this rejection of procedural rigidity has been specifically articulated in labor law disputes. “The social and economic realities of the present-day organization of society has thus led this court and others to recognize the suability of unions. [footnote omitted.] ... We must recognize that the society of today rests upon the foundation of group structures of all types, such as the corporation, the cooperative society, the public utility. Such groups must, of course, operate successfully within the society; one of the prerequisites to that functioning is, generally, liability to suit and opportunity for suit. To frustrate that viability by the imposition of outmoded concepts would be to impair the institutions as well as to impede the judicial process.” (Daniels v. Sanitarium Assn., Inc. (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 602, 607-608; see also Marshall v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 781.) Statutory enactments in California involving the unincor- porated association have been consistent with case law development. In 1967 the Corporations Code was amended to include the definition of unincorporated association as “any partnership or other unincorporated organization of two or more persons, whether organized for profit or not....” (Corp. Code, § 24000, subd. (a).) It has been made liable to third persons to the same extent as if the associa- tion were a natural person (Corp. Code, § 24001) ; and may protect its name and insignia (Corp. Code. §§ 21300-21310). On a national basis, the trend continues to assure legal status to organizations where in fairness it is appropriate. For example, in State of Georgia v. National Democratic Party (D.C. Cir. 1971) 447 F.2d 1271, cert. den. Oct. 12, 1971, the National Republican Party, one of the named defend- ants, was found to be an unincorporated association con- trary to its argument that it was composed only of state republican parties which acted in concert to conduct national A-8 party business and that between the quadrennial conven- tions, the Republican National Committee handled the national affairs of the Republican National Convention. In Ripon Society v. National Republican Party (D.C. Cir. 1975) 525 F.2d 567, responding to the assertion that “no such national [Republican] party is formally constituted under any state or federal law, and that the term is merely a collective description of the individual state and territorial Republican Parties,” the court said: “We know, either from the record or through judicial notice, that there is commonly understood to be a National Republican Party, that it is commonly re- ferred to, and contributed to, as such, that it meets quadrennially in a national convention, and that at the last such convention it formally declared itself ‘a nationwide Party,’ whose ‘general management’ it en- trusted to the Republican National Committee ‘subject to direction from time to time of the National Conven- tion.’” (id., at pp. 571-572, fn. 5.) Groups which have been included as unincorporated asso- ciations in addition to labor unions (United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U.S. 344 [42 S.Ct. 570] ; Juneau Spruce Corp. v. I. L. 6 W. Union (1953) 119 Cal. App.2d 144) and political parties are social clubs, religious organizations, environmental societies, athletic organizations, condominium owners, lodges, stock exchanges and veterans. The criteria applied to determine whether 5 See, for example, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 US. 163 [92 S.Ct. 1965] (social club) ; Presbyterian Ch. v. Mary E. B. Hull Mem. Pres. Ch. (1969) 393 U.S. 440 [89 S.Ct. 601] (church) ; Alyska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240 [95 S.Ct. 1612] ; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 247 (environmental societies) ; California State University, Hayward v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1975) 47 Cal. App. 3d 533 (athletic organization) ; White v. Cox (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 824 (condominium owners) ; Herald v. Glendale Lodge, supra, 46 Cal. App. 325 (lodge) ; Jardine v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal. 301 (stock exchange) ; and Schlesinger v. Reservists Com- mittee To Stop The War (1974) 418 U.S. 208 [94 S.Ct. 2925] . (veterans). A-9 an entity is an unincorporated association are no more complicated than (1) a group whose members share a com- mon purpose, and (2) who function under a common name under circumstances where fairness requires the group be recognized as a legal entity. Fairness includes those situa- tions where persons dealing with the association contend their legal rights have been violated. (See Operative Plasterers’, Etc., Assn. v. Case (D.C. Cir. 1937) 93 F.2d 56, 65.) Formalities of quasi-corporate organization are not required (Law v. Crist (1940) 41 Cal. App.2d 862, 865; Estate of Irwim (1925) 196 Cal. 366, 372.) Courts have even assessed liability against a church association with no officers where there were only nine persons whose sole busi- ness transaction (aside from small purchases of printed religious material) was the purchase, by down payment, of a station wagon. (Steuer v. Phelps (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 468). UMC contends an essential element for legal status, the creation of associate liability in furtherance of the common purpose (Jardine v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal. 301, 317) is absent in the instant case because all members and connected bodies of the denomination have not delegated agency authority to Pacific Homes to act on behalf of UMC. This circuitous argument, however, assumes actual agency must be conferred on Pacific Homes before any defendant can be liable. Whether Pacific Homes had actual authority to aet on behalf of UMC is unnecessary for the application of doctrines relating to either alter ego or agency. To hold otherwise would permit an unincorporated association to escape liability by the simple technique of requiring express consent from all units of the association. The Organization of UMC In resolving intra-church schisms or property disputes, courts have identified at least two categories of church A-10 polities ;> congregational and hierarchal. (See gen., Watson vy. Jones (1872) 80 U.S. 679, 722 [74-81 S.Ct. 666]; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian O. Ch. (1952) 344 U.S. 94 [73 S.Ct. 143].) UMC is not congregational, i.e., the local church is not the highest authority in all matters of doctrine and usage. It is hierarchal; the 43,000 local churches and 114 Annual Conferences are governed through the structure described by the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church (Discipline).? In United Method- ism, “the local church is a part of the whole body of the general church and is subject to the higher authority of the organization and its laws and regulations.” (Carnes v. Smith (1976) 222 S.E.2d 322, 325, cert. den. 429 U.S. 868.) “The Methodist Church .. . is a connectional church, governed by representative bodies, with an episcopacy whose powers and duties are constitutionally defined. It has an itinerant ministry in that its ministers are assigned by officials of The Methodist Church and are not called by local societies or subject to the control or discipline of local societies. The basic representative body of The Methodist Church is the Annual Confer- ence made up of ministerial and lay delegates from local societies in each area embraced within an Annual Conference. An Annual Conference is divided for purposes of administration into Districts. The admin- istration of a District is entrusted to a District Super- intendent. The General Conference of the Methodist 6 “Polity refers to the general governmental structure of a church, the organs of authority and the allocation and locus of its judicatory powers as defined by its own organic law.” (Brady v. Reiner (1973) 198 S.E.2d 812, 827; see also Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property (1962) 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1142, 1143-1144. ) 7™“The content of the Discipline changes quadrennially. The con- cept of the Discipline as setting forth the plan, polity and process by which United Methodists govern themselves remains constant...” (Discipline (1976) Episcopal Greetings, p. v.) A-11 Church, made up of delegates from each Annual Con- ference of the Church, is the highest legislative body of the Church, determining the ecclesiastical and tem- poral policies of the Church. The Judicial Council is the highest judicatory body of the Church, deciding appeals taken on legal issues raised within the Church. The Discipline of The Methodist Church is the book of law of the Church containing the Articles of Religion, the Constitution, the rules of the church concerning the moral conduct of its members, and the legislation of the various General Conferences defining the form of government, the duties, powers and privileges of the members, ministers and various bodies of the Church, including the law of the Church with reference to the acquisition, conveyancing and alienation of real estate.” (Goodson v. Northside Bible Church (1966) 261 F.Supp. 99, 101.) UMC may be unique in that it has no single chief operat- ing officer, but the clearly defined operating and conceptual levels of responsibility starting with the General Confer- ence, “[t]he legislative body for the entire Church” (Disci- pline, Glossary, p. 598), the Annual Conference, the District Conference, the Charge Conference, the Local Church Con- ference and the local church cannot be ignored. Moreover, a persuasive argument can be made that the Council of Bishops is equivalent to the board of directors of UMC. According to the Book of Discipline, the “Council of Bishops is thus the corporate expression of episcopal lead- ership in the Church” which is required “to meet at stated intervals” in order to oversee “the spiritual and temporal affairs of the whole Church.” (Discipline, par. 525.) Control over the local church ranging from the restric- tions on purchase or sale of estate which requires authori- zation from the Charge Conference and the written consent of the pastor and district superintendent (Discipline, par. 2429, 2431, 2433, pp. 547-549) to the selection of local church A-12 pastors is more reflective of a single entity than completely autonomous and independent units. The day to day operation of UMC is in keeping with the reality of its organization. The GCF A, characterized by UMC in this appeal as merely a non-discretionary conduit rendering non-discretionary auditing and financial service to some of the general level agencies with United Method- ism, has in fact held itself out somewhat differently. In applying for a group exemption under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, GCFA described itself as “the central treasury and fiscal agent of the United Meth- odist Church. The Council has been established by the General Conference to act as its finance committee and accordingly its duties are legislated in Paragraphs 837-865 of the Book of Discipline.” In that application, the GCFA made reference to paragraph 843.3 of Discipline which authorizes GCFA “to take all necessary legal steps to safe- guard and protect the interest and rights of the United Methodist Church.” A reasonable legal inference which can be drawn from this grant and description of authority to an agent is the existence of UMC as principal. This is par- ticularly true where that agent, in addition to being account- able for “all matters relating to the receiving, disbursing, and reporting of general church funds” ® (Discipline, par. 906, p. 333) ; is required “[t]o take all necessary legal steps to safeguard and protect the interests and rights of The United Methodist Church; to maintain a file of legal briefs related to cases involving The United Methodist Church, and to make provisions for legal counsel where necessary in 8 Approximately five and one-half percent of total member con- tributions are given annually to GCFA. In “What Happens To All That Money?” (1977 ed.) United Methodist Communications, Dr. Ewing T. Wayland, described as the treasurer of UMC, said: “In 1975, United Methodists giving to the support of the general church totaled $58,155,600—5.38 percent of the total amount paid by local churches for all purposes.” (at p. 5) A-13 order to protect the interests of the Church at the request of a general agency or a bishop, as the Council deems ad- visable.” (Discipline, par. 907, subpar. 4, pp. 338-339). In addition to the cases cited previously (Carnes v. Smith, supra, 222 §.E. 2d 322; Brady v. Reiner, supra, 198 S.E. 2d 812; Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, supra, 261 F.Supp. 99, affd. 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967)), UMC has appeared as principal in other litigation. (See United Meth. Ch. v. St. Lowis Crossing Ind. Meth. Ch. (1972) 276 N.E. 2d 916; The United Methodist Church, Dr. McCoy Johnson, in his representative capacity as the District Superintendent of the American District of the South Georgia Annual Con- ference, ete. v. J. W. Sparrow, Civil Action No. 6881 (Superior Court of Dooly Co., Georgia, 1976).)® Other cases in which an agency of the UMC has been involved reiterate the hierarchal and organizational structure of Methodism. (See, e.g. Hoffman v. Tieton View Community M. E. Church (1949) 34 Wash. 2d 83, 207 P.2d 699, 705-706 ; Trustees of Peninsula Annual Conference v. Spencer (1962) 183 A.2d 588, 589; Turbeville v. Morris (1943) 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E. 2d 821, 825.) The possibility of UMC’s liability has not gone unnoticed by those responsible for insurance coverage. UMC is a named insured on a high limit contract of insurance com- mencing June 1, 1976 to June 1, 1979, with a broad range of fidelity, casualty, property, fire, theft, medical malprac- tice and comprehensive general liability coverage. The policy as issued describes UMC as a corporation engaged in business as a religious organization. ® We are aware that counsel for UMC in the Georgia case filed his affidavit indicating the decison to include UMC as plaintiff was his alone. Whether actually authorized or not, the belief by UMC’s own lawyer as to the jural status of UMC is certainly relevant to our inquiry. A-14 In summary, UMC is a highly organized religious body working through specific agencies to accomplish laudable goals. The Relationship Between Pacific Homes and UMC Requires UMC be Recognized as a Legal Entity Before we examine the circumstances surrounding the activities of Pacific Homes and the alleged involvement of UMC, we wish to stress that our decision in the pleading phase of this litigation does not imply any lack of com- passion by UMC or infer liability on its part. Our holding based upon neutral principles of law simply determines UMC is suable. What the outcome of that suit will be or should be is not before us. Pacific Homes, a non-profit organization, was formed in 1929 by the Southern California Annual Conference (the predecessor of the PSWAC) of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Amended Articles of Incorporation signed in Jan- uary 1929 expressly provided that the powers of the cor- poration subject to California law shall be “subject to the uses and Discipline of The Methodist Church as from time to time authorized and declared by the General Conference of said Church and by the Annual Cenference within whose bounds the said corporation is located.” The articles also provided that before either voluntary or involuntary dis- solution, the corporate assets shall be subject to the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church or its successors; by- laws adopted or amended shall not be inconsistent with the Book of Discipline; and membership in the corporation was restricted to the Southern California-Arizona Annual Con- ference of the Methodist Church. The relationship between Pacific Home: and UMC has continued since 1929 in a similar fashion. Through the years, the Board of Directors of Pacific Homes has been A-15 either appointed by the Methodist Church’s Annual Con- ference in Southern California or composed of Methodist ministers and lay persons of the Annual Conference. In the first List of Hospitals and Homes of The Methodist Chureh published in 1967 by the Methodist Health and Welfare Certification Council of the Board of Hospitals and Homes of the Methodist Church, Pacific Homes was given affiliate status, the highest level attainable for that year. In addition to its relationship with UMC, certification established the quality of services rendered by Pacific Homes met the minimum basic standards for professional health and welfare services recognized by the General Board of Hospitals and Homes of the Methodist Church. Until financial difficulties started, the successful perform- ance by Pacific Homes was pointed to with pride over a number of years in many public statements by the Presi- dent of UMC’s Council of Bishops. The literature prepared by Pacific Homes distributed to persons interested in either a convalescent hospital or a retirement residence expressly stated that Pacific Homes was an agency of the United Methodist Church Southern California-Arizona Conference. In describing the cost, Pacific Homes referred to itself as being sponsored by the Southern California-Arizona Conference of the United Methodist Church and offered a special program of assist- ance to help a limited number of United Methodists. Plaintiffs’ complaint mirrors the literature of Pacific Homes alleging agency, sponsorship and control over Pacific Homes. The events referred to in the pleadings and described in the documents presented to the trial court refer to activ- ities which not only involve spiritual concerns relating to the health and welfare of either the elderly or infirm, but A-1o which are commercial activities. ‘The costs for lodging and the type of accommodations are primarily business deci- sions. UMC, in fulfilling its commitment to society, has elected to involve itself in worldly activities by participat- ing in many socially valuable projects. It has enjoyed the benefits, both economic and spiritual, of those projects. It has even on occasion filed suit for the protection of its interests. It must now, as part of its involvement in society, be amenable to suit. Due Process of Law Does Not Preclude UMC From Being Sued UMC argues the due process implications of this case are inescapable. If suit against UMC is permitted, the assets of the scores of thousands of United Methodist in- stitutions throughout the world having no contacts with either California or Pacific Homes will be subject to levy— a constitutionally impermissible result because distant Methodist units would have been unable to defend them- selves on the merits of the controversy. The complexities, both legal and factual, in the present litigation are immense. To ada a constitutional require- ment, however, that before UMC can be recognized as an entity, plaintiffs must also identify each asset that may be reached to assure the absence of any third party claim in that asset, is to create an issue where one does not exist. We recognize the inextricable relationship between obtain- ing a judgment and having it satisfied; nevertheless, to adjudicate questions on ownership of property before judg- ment is essentially a reversal in the process of litigation. The due process issue described by UMC is reflected in Code of Civil Procedure section 388, subdivision (b), which provides: 4 a n MINUTE ORDER THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al., Defendants. y, THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH The “United Methodist Church” is an international re- ligious denomination consisting of over 10,000,000 persons who worship in some 43,000 churches and missions through- out the world. The “United Methodist Church” is a “con- nectional” structure maintained through a chain and series of periodic conferences. It has never been incorporated. A respected unbiased source, “The Encyclopedia Britan- nica”, 1959 Ed., Vol. 15, p. 358, states : “Methodism has con- tinued for more than two centuries to proclaim a freedom of spirit as opposed to the bondage of an organization, and its appeal has been based on the reality of a personal expe- rience of spiritual emancipation through faith in Christ.” The Court rules that: “The United Methodist Church” is no more than a “spiritual confederation” and is not a jural entity or unincorporated association subject to suit under Code of Civil Procedure 388. A contrary ruling would effectively destroy Methodism in this country, and would have a chilling effect on all churches and religious move- A-23 ments by inhibiting the free association of persons of similar religious beliefs. If all members of a particular faith were to be held personally liable for the transgres- sions of their fellow churchmen, church pews would soon be empty and the pulpits of America silent. Accordingly, the motion to quash service of process on “The United Methodist Church” is granted. /s/ Ross G. THarp Judge of the Superior Court A-24 A-25 APPENDIX C Page 13, line 7, insert “real”; “. .. sale of real estate...” COURT OF APPEAL—STATE OF CALIFORNIA Page 15, line 2, delete “Methodism” and insert “UMC.” FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT Page 22, line 5, delete period after “freedom,” lowercase DIVISION ONE “s” in “(See,” delete period after “1560],” and lowercase COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DIST. “n” in “Nevertheless.” : none t, FOND Cer Praag R.J.SMITH Acting Presiding Justice DEPUTY CLERK Copies to: Witwer, Moran, Burlage & ; 5 Atkinson—Chicago FRANK T. BARR, et al., Sullivan, Jones & Archer—SD L.A.D.J. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Musick, Peeler & Garrett—LA B.W. 4 Civil O’Melveny & Myers—LA Trial Judge vs. q Po: tsa Le : a L.A. County Law Lib. ied, Gra ford—SD D. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, init: Milberg, Weiss, beschad : The id nai et al., Specthrie—SD Defendants-Respondents. Superior Court—SD - West Publ. Co. BY THE COURT The petition for rehearing is denied. The following corrections are made: Page 1, line 5 from bottom, “Le’Estrange” should be “L’Estrange.” Page 1, line 2 from bottom, omit “Musick, Peeler & Gar- rett, William McD. Miller III and Wayne B. Littlefield; Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, William H. Levit, Jr.” Page 2, line 1, omit “and John H. Blue”. Page 2, line 3, omit “Defend.nt and Respondent” and insert “National Council of Churches of Christ of United States of America.” Page 2, line 5, delete “Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi and Allen Woodard.” Page 6, line 8, “t” should be “T” in “The Book of Dis- cipline...” Page 8, line 5 from bottom, should read “. . . cert. den. 404 U.S. 858 (Oct. 12, 1971),...” mmc A-26 APPENDIX D CLERK’S OFFICE, SUPREME COURT 4250 State Building San Francisco, California 94102 A-27 APPENDIX E THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH Judicial Council PRESIDENT TOM MATHENY P.O. Box 221 Hammond, Louisiana 70401 VICE PRESIDENT May 17, 1979 TRUMAN W. POTTER Cae We san I have this day filed Order Charleston, W. Va. SECRETARY HOOVER RUPER': 212 South Park Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 As Secretary of the Judicial Council of the United Methodist HEARING DENIED Church, I certify that the following decision was rendered by the Council in session May 25, 1979 in Chicago, Illinois: IN RE: AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL ON FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION TO REPRESENT THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH IN LITIGATION. In re: 4 Civ. No. 18244 DECISION: Paragraph 907.4 of the 1976 Discipline does Barr et al., not delegate to the General Council on Ad- vs. ministration and Finance either the authority : or the duty to sue, or to file an answer or to United Methodist Church, et al. otherwise plead, on behalf of the United Respectfully, Methodist Church as a denomination. This is Decision No. 458 of the Judicial Council, and is dated ie age in our records, May 25, 1979. DR. HOOVER RUPERT Secretary, The Judicial Council The United Methodist Church Certified, May 29, 1979. Kalamazoo, Michigan CHARLES B. COPHER ELIZABETH B. GENE E. SEASE 3340 Lake Valley Rd. N.W. GUNDLACH 1400 East Hanna Ave. Atlanta, Georgia 30331 326 East Main Street Indianapolis, Ind. 46227 Springville, N.Y. 14141 PAUL A. DUFFEY FLORENCE V.LUCAS LEONARD D. SLUTZ P.O. Box 6128 (Mrs. D. Rex Edwards) 900 Tri State Bldg. Montgomery, Alabama 36106 144-07 228th Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Rosedale, N.Y. 11413 OT ee ee " A-28 APPENDIX F WITWER, MORAN, BURLAGE & ATKINSON Samuel W. Witwer, Sr. Samuel W. Witwer, Jr. 125 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2700 Chicago, Ilinois 60606 (312) 332-6000 SULLIVAN, JONES & ARCHER Allan J. Reniche Daniel R. Salas William F. Fahey 1400 Financial Square 600 “B”’ Street San Diego, California 92101 (714) 236-1611 Attorneys For The Persons Upon Whom Service Of Process Was Attempted On Behalf Of The United Methodist Church SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO FRANK T. BARR, et al., 7 Plaintiffs, vs. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al., Defendants. No. 404611 ANSWER TO GEORGE HALL, et al., CONSOLIDATED Intervenors, COMPLAINT vs. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al., Defendants In Intervention. | PAUL W. MILHOUSE, CHARLES F. GOLDEN and JAMES M. WALTON-MYERS, on their motion to quash A-29 having been determined by the California courts to be representatives of the alleged unincorporated association described and designated in Paragraph 2 of the Consoli- dated Amended Complaint as “The United Methodist Church,” while continuing to deny that they are such rep- resentatives, and denying that the United Methodist re- ligious denomination has capacity or duty to answer as an unincorporated association under its polity and ecclesi- astical law, or under the due process and freedom of reli- gion protections afforded by the California Constitution and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, now cause “The United Methodist Church,” as described in Paragraph 2 of the Consolidated Amended Complaint, not voluntarily but under protest, solely to comply with the mandate of the civil courts of California and to avoid the entry of a default, to answer as follows: Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, {| 431.30, each and every allegation of the Consolidated Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) is denied. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES Without waiving the general denial set forth above and continuing to deny each and every allegation of the Com- plaint, the following affirmative defenses are asserted: FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 1. By its written opinion on March 8, 1979, in Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reinstated The United Methodist Church as a named defendant in this action, holding thet it can be sued as an unincorporated association. The California Supreme Court denied hearing on May 17, 1979. OEE eee A-30 2. On May 25, 1979, the Judicial Council of The United Methodist Church ruled that neither the General Council on Finance and Administration of The United Methodist Church, nor any other person, is empowered to answer, or otherwise appear in legal proceedings on behalf of the United Methodist denomination as a totality, since the chosen polity of that denomination is not centrally directed, and, under the constitution of United Methodism (The Book of Discipline, at Paragraph 612), no person or unit may presume to officially represent, speak for or bind the thousands of separate religious units comprising the de- nomination. A copy of the Slip Opinion of the Judicial Council, now in the process of printing and publication, is attached hereto marked Exhibit “A”, and incorporated by reference herein. 3. Upon application by the individuals served, the Su- perior Court for the County of San Diego granted the named denominational defendant an extension of time to plead until July 2, 1979. 4. Given their understanding that none of them is em- powered to receive service of process on behalf of The United Methodist Church, that they are unable to speak for the denomination, and that the denomination, because of the nature of its chosen polity, lacks capacity to litigate as a unity and legal entity, the individuals served on behalf of The United Methodist Church are in the process of pre- paring a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari for filing in the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of the Cali- fornia appellate decision that The United Methodist Church can be sued as an unincorporated association. That petition will assert that The United Methodist Church is an inter- national religious denomination and spiritual confederation but is not, either under ecclesiastical law or under federal or state constitutional principles, a single legal entity. a A-31 0. The conflict between the chosen religious polity and ecclesiastical law of United Methodism and the decision of the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, of the Cali- fornia Court of Appeal, must be resolved after July 2, 1979, the last day the Superior Court will allow The United Methodist Church to file responsive pleadings. The indi- viduals served are not prepared to allow The United Methodist Church to suffer entry of a default in a case alleged to involve hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, solely because they honestly and steadfastly believe they have no authority to speak for the denomination, and that the denomination lacks capacity to litigate as a single entity. 6. The individuals served, therefore, file this Answer under protest. The requirement that they submit an answer on behalf of The United Methodist Church violates the due process of law and freedom of religion provisions of the California Constitution and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. All juris- dictional objections which have been tendered to the civil courts to date, including, without limitation (a) matters which may be raised upon Petition For Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, described in Para- graph 4 hereinabove, and (b) any post-judgment review herein which may become appropriate, are specifically reserved. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 7. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 5 of the First Affirmative Defense are referred to and incorporated by reference herein as though fully set forth. 8. The requirement that The United Methodist Church be restructured and its ecclesiastical law be ignored so as to conduct litigation as a monolithic unit, rather than pre- a A.-32 serving the denomination’s integrity as a spiritual con- federation is objected to. The individuals served specifically disclaim the capacity of The United Methodist Church to be or become an unincorporated association. Such inter- pretation and requirement is violative of the due process of law and freedom of religion provisions of the California Constitution and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- ments to the United States Constitution. THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 9. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 5 of the First Affirmative Defense are referred to and incorporated by reference herein as though fully set forth. 10. Neither the individuals nor the purported unincor- porated association, The United Methodist Church, as de- scribed in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint possess (a) any authority to speak for or represent, or (b) any power to issue directions to the following constituent units and per- sons of United Methodism which have separate identities, substantial autonomy, and their own distinct decision mak- ing mechanisms: a. Approximately ten million individual adherents of United Methodism throughout the world; b. Local Churches; a total of approximately 39,000 in the United States, and approximately 4,400 over- seas; e. Jurisdictional and Central Conferences; Five Jurisdictional Conferences as follows: NORTH CENTRAL JURISDICTION (U.S.) NORTHEASTERN JURISDICTION (U.S.) SOUTH CENTRAL JURISDICTION (U.S.) SOUTHEASTERN JURISDICTION (U:S.) WESTERN JURISDICTION (U.S.) A-33 Nine overseas Central Conferences, as follows: AFRICA CENTRAL CONFERENCE LIBERIA CENTRAL CONFERENCE CHINA CENTRAL CONFERENCE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN EUROPE CENTRAL CONFERENCE CENTRAL CONFERENCE IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CENTRAL CONFERENCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN NORTHERN EUROPE CENTRAL CONFERENCE SOUTHEAST ASIA-PHILIPPINE CENTRAL CONFERENCE SOUTHERN ASIA CENTRAL CONFERENCE d. Annual Conferences: A total of seventy-three (73) in the United States as follows: PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST ANNUAL CONFERENCE (“PSWAC”), a California not- for-profit corporation, named as a defendant here- in and represented by its own counsel, ALABAMA- WEST FLORIDA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, ALASKA MISSIONARY ANNUAL CONFER. ENCE, BALTIMORE ANNUAL CONFER. ENCE, CALIFORNIA-NEVADA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, CENTRAL ILLINOIS AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, CENTRAL NEW YORK ANNUAL CONFERENCE, CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, CENTRAL TEXAS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, DETROIT ANNUAL CONFERENCE, EAST OHIO ANNUAL CONFERENCE, EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, FLORIDA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, HOUS. TON ANNUAL CONFERENCE, IOWA AN- A-34 NUAL CONFERENCE, KANSAS-EAST AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, KANSAS WEST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, KENTUCKY AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, LITTLE ROCK AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, LOUISIANA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, LOUISVILLE ANNUAL CON- FERENCE, MAINE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MEMPHIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MINNE- SOTA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MISSISSIPPI ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MISSOURI-EAST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MISSOURI-WEST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NEBRASKA AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, NEW HAMPSHIRE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NEW MEXICO AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, NEW YORK ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH ALABAMA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH ARKANSAS AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH CAROLINA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH DAKOTA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH GEORGIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH INDIANA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH MISSIS- SIPPI ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH TEXAS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTH- ERN ILLINOIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY ANNUAL CON- FERENCE, NORTHERN NEW YORK AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, NORTHWEST TEXAS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, OKLAHOMA AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, OKLAHOMA INDIAN MISSIONARY ANNUAL CONFERENCE, OREGON-IDAHO ANNUAL CONFERENCE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, PENINSULA ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, PUERTO RICO ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, RED BIRD MISSIONARY ANNUAL CONFERENCE, RIO GRANDE ANNUAL CON- FERENCE, ROCKY MOUNTAIN ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA ANNUAL A-35 CONFERENCE, SOUTH DAKOTA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTH GEORGIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTH INDIANA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOUTH- ERN NEW JERSEY ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, SOUTHWEST TEXAS ANNUAL CON- FERENCE, TENNESSEE ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, TEXAS ANNUAL CONFERENCE, TROY ANNUAL CONFERENCE, VIRGINIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, WEST MICHIGAN ANNUAL CONFERENCE, WEST OHIO AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, WEST VIRGINIA AN- NUAL CONFERENCE, WESTERN NEW YORK ANNUAL CONFERENCE, WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA ANNUAL CONFERENCE, WEST- ERN PENNSYLVANIA ANNUAL CONFER- ENCE, WISCONSIN ANNUAL CONFERENCE, WYOMING ANNUAL CONFERENCE, YEL- LOWSTONE ANNUAL CONFERENCE. A total of 43 overseas Annual Conferences as fol- OWS: ANGOLA ANNUAL CONFERENCE CENTRAL ZAIRE ANNUAL CONFERENCE NORTH SHALA ANNUAL CONFERENCE RHODESIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE SOUTHEAST AFRICA ANNUAL CONFERENCE SOUTHERN ZAIRE ANNUAL CONFERENCE LIBERIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE CHINA MAINLAND CONFERENCES AUSTRIA PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE BULGARIA PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE HUNGARY PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE POLAND ANNUAL CONFERENCE A-36 SWITZERLAND-FRANCE ANNUAL CONFERENCE YUGOSLAVIA PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ANNUAL CONFERENCE GERMAN NORTHWEST ANNUAL CONFERENCE GERMAN SOUTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE GERMAN SOUTHWEST ANNUAL CONFERENCE BALTIC PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE DENMARK ANNUAL CONFERENCE FINLAND-FINNISH PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE FINLAND-SWEDISH PROVISIONAL CONFERENCE NORWAY ANNUAL CONFERENCE SWEDEN ANNUAL CONFERENCE MIDDLE PHILIPPINES ANNUAL CONFERENCE MINDANAO ANNUAL CONFERENCE NORTHEAST PHILIPPINES ANNUAL CONFERENCE NORTHWEST PHILIPPINES ANNUAL CONFERENCE PHILIPPINES ANNUAL CONFERENCE SOUTHWEST PHILIPPINES ANNUAL CONFERENCE AGRA ANNUAL CONFERENCE BENGAL ANNUAL CONFERENCE BOMBAY ANNUAL CONFERENCE DELHI ANNUAL CONFERENCE GUJARAT ANNUAL CONFERENCE HYDERABAD ANNUAL CONFERENCE KLUCKNOW ANNUAL CONFERENCE MADHYA PRADESH ANNUAL CONFERENCE MORADABAD ANNUAL CONFERENCE NORTH INDIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE SOUTH INDIA ANNUAL CONFERENCE A-37 e. Annual Conference-related institutions numbering approximately 542, and including homes, hospitals, orphanages, day-care centers, colleges, and seminaries ; f. The general-level boards and agencies of United Methodism, as follows: The General Council on Finance and Administration of The United Methodist Church (“GCFA”), an [Illinois not-for-profit corporation, named as a defendant herein and represented by counsel; The Board of Global Ministries of The United Methodist Church, a New York not-for-profit corpora- tion, named as a defendant herein and represented by counsel; The Health & Welfare Ministries Division of the Board of Global Ministries of The United Methodist Church, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, named as a defendant herein and represented by counsel; and the following additional boards together with their divisions and sub-units: GENERAL COUNCIL ON MINISTRIES UNITED METHODIST COMMUNICATIONS GENERAL BOARD OF CHURCH AND SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD OF DISCIPLESHIP UNITED METHODIST YOUTH MINISTRY ORGANIZATION GENERAL BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND MINISTRY GENERAL BOARD OF PENSIONS GENERAL BOARD OF PUBLICATION COMMISSION OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY COMMISSION ON RELIGION AND) RACE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS AND ROLE OF WOMEN g. Any other denomination-related institution not specifically enumerated above. 11. This Court is without jurisdiction over any of the units within or related to United Methodism referred to A-38 above, except those units which have been specifically named as defendants herein. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 12. The allegations of Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Third Affirmative Defense are referred to and incorporated by reference herein as though fully set forth. 13. To the extent that this Answer is deemed to be on behalf of any of the units within or related to United Methodism which are referred to above, such violates the due process rights of those units. FIFTH THROUGH TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 14. The allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 5 of the First Affirmative Defense are referred to and incorporated by reference herein as though fully set forth. 15. On December 20, 1978, defendant herein, GCFA, filed its First Amended Answer By Defendant GCFA To The Consolidated Amended Complaint (As Modified By Plaintiffs’ Motion To Dismiss) asserting 17 affirmative defenses. 16. The allegations of the Second Affirmative Defense through the Seventeenth Affirmative Defense, inclusive, asserted by defendant, GCF ‘A, are referred to and incorpo- rated by reference as though fully set forth herein as the Fifth Affirmative Defense through the Twentieth Affirma- tive Defense, inclusive. A-39 WHEREFORE, relief is prayed for as follows: 1. That plaintiffs and intervenors take nothing by their complaint; 2. For such further relief as the Court deems just. DATED: July 2, 1979 WITWER, MORAN, BURLAGE & ATKINSON By Samuel W. Witwer SULLIVAN, JONES & ARCHER By Daniel R. Salas Attorneys for the Persons Upon Whom Service of Process Was At- tempted on Behalf of The United Methodist Church --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0736%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.