# Appendix — Harris v. McRae

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0569%3A02

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 448 U.S. 297

## Text

FOR ARGUMENT

APPENDIX MAR 28 1980

RODAK, JR., CLERK

Iu the Supreme Cont of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-1268

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Appellant
—vs.—

CorRA MCRAE, ET AL.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Appellant
—Y3,——

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS Corp.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

APPLICATION FOR A STAY FILED FEBRUARY 11, 1980
PROBABLE JURISDICTION NOTED FEBRUARY 19, 1980

ox

wseies is

At DEERE ERS

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-1268

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Appellant
—vs.—

CorA MCRAE, ET AL.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Appellant
—v3s.—

NEW YorK City HEALTH AND HOSPITALS Corp.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

INDEX
Page
Bits Bo ies oe ee TI RN TT TLE 1
Verified Complaint (Class ie, ee SIE DY DD E08 Ce ARES 31
Exhibit A, Cong. Rec. H 10126 (daily ed., September 15,

“ct Sa SRE IEA ti ENT Nee MEE SE 45
MME ORNS fo at ce) 47
Plaintiff’s and Proposed Intervenors’ Amended Complaint

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47

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ. 1805

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF

Vv.

F’. DAVID MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, DEFENDANT

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is a civil action for injunctive, declaratory and
other relief. Plaintiff seeks (a) a declaration that an
amendment (“the Hyde Amendment”) to HR 14232 Bill
(popularly known as the HEW Appropriations Act for
Fiscal 1976-77), which prohibits any of the funds ap-
propriated therein from being used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to full term, and which was
enacted into law on September 30, 1976 is invalid under
the United States Constitution and (b) an injunction
against its implementation.

JURISDICTION

2. Jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties
to this action is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C.
1331, 13861, 2201, and 2202. The amount in controversy,
exclusive of interests and costs, exceeds $10,000.

48
PARTIES

3. The New York City Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion (hereinafter the “Corporation”) is a public benefit
corporation, organized pursuant to Section 7381, et seq.
of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York, and charged
with the duty of providing high quality, dignified and
comprehensive health and medical services and with op-
erating municipal health facilities in order to protect
and promote the health, welfare and safety of the people
of the City of New York, particularly those who can least
afford such services. The Corporation presently operates
16 municipal hospitals, three Neighborhood Family Care
Centers, and other health care facilities.

4. Twelve of the municipal hospitals perform abor-
tions. The entire municipal hospital system provided a
total of 10,324 abortions in 1974 for Medicaid eligible
patients. (Statistics for 1975 and 1976 are not yet avail-
able.) Until the enactment of the Hyde Amendment, the
municipal hospitals administered by the Corporation were
reimbursed by Medicaid for the abortions they performed
on such patients. The Hyde Amendment prohibits reim-
bursement from federal funds for the performance of
most abortions sought by municipal hospital patients who
are covered by Medicaid.

5. Defendant F. David Mathews is Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(“HEW”), and as such is responsible for the overall op-
eration and administration of the Department’s pro-
grams, and for the expenditure of sums appropriate by
the Congress for those programs, including Medicaid. He
is sued in his official capacity.

THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

6. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seg. (Title XIX of the
Social Security Act), enacted by Congress in 1965, estab-
lished the Medicaid program and authorizes appropria-
tions to enable states to furnish medical assistance to
families and individuals whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of medical care and services

49

7. New York State implemented the Medicaid pro-
gram in 1966 by enacting Social Services Law, Article 5,
Title 11, establishing a comprehensive program of medi-
cal assistance for needy persons. Abortions elected by
indigent women upon the advice of duly licensed physi-
cians within 24 weeks of the commencement of their
pregnancies are covered by this program.

THE HYDE AMENDMENT

8. Prior to enactment of the Hyde Amendment, 50%
of the cost of abortions performed upon Medicaid eligible
patients treated at plaintiff’s hospitals was uncon-
ditionally reimbursed from federal funds.

9. On September 30, 1976, Congress enacted into law
the Hyde Amendment, which was attached as a Rider
(Section 209) to H.R. 14232, the HEW Appropriations
Bill for fiscal year 1977 (October 1, 1976 to September
30,1977). The Hyde Amendment provides:

“None of the funds contained in this Act shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of

the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term.”

10. The House and Senate Conference Committee
with respect to the Hyde Amendment issued a Conference
Report (attached to the complaint filed today in the
companion case entitled McRae v. Mathews, 76 Civ.
[E.D.N.Y.]) which sets forth additional limited circum-
stances under which federal funds may be used to pay
for abortions. These circumstances are limited to when
the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.

11. Under the Hyde Amendment, the defendant Ma-
thews is prohibited from expending federal funds to pay
for abortions except as stated in paragraphs 9 and 10.

12. Without these federal matching moneys to pay for
abortions, states will have two alternatives: to assume
the total cost of each abortion performed upon patients
entitled to Medicaid coverage or to refuse to pay for any
such abortion.

ee SM ee eS ee Ek et

50

13. There is an outstanding directive from this Court
to the New York State Commissioner of Social Services
prohibiting him from refusing Medicaid reimbursement
under Section 365-a of the Social Services Law for lawful
abortional acts to indigent women who otherwise qualify
for medical assistance under that statute and its regula-
tions. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 409 F.
Supp. 731 (three judge court, E.D.N.Y., 1976), appeal
docketed No. 75-1749 (May 27, 1976).

14. Upon information and belief, New York State
will refuse to pay the Corporation for any such abor-
tions due to the enormous expense involved and the
State’s traditional financial dependence upon federal
moneys to fund Medicaid coverage for all eligible state
recipients. Without the matching federal funds, New
York State will be unwilling to fulfill its constitutional
obligation to provide medical assistance to indigent
women seeking elective abortions in the first two trimest-
ers of pregnancy.

15. hy panels of the Hyde Amendment, plaintiff Cor-
poration is subjected to immediate and irreparable harm,
namely:

(a) The Corporation will suffer an immediate and di-
rect financial loss amounting to full cost or at least 50 %
of the two million dollars which it now receives as reim-
bursement for abortions performed in its municipal hos-
pitals. Further, the Corporation will be forced to assume
costs amounting to an estimated six million dollars from
the shift of Medicaid patients seeking abortions from
clinics and private hospitals to the municipal hospitals.

(b) Planned Parenthood of New York City, a New
York State not-for-profit corporation which provides
family planning services and first trimester abortion
services at its licensed clinics, has announced that be-
ginning October 1, 1976 it will refuse to service Medi-
caid eligible women who seek abortions and who are un-
able to pay for them. See complaint filed today in com-
panion case of McRae v. Mathews, 76 Civ. (E.D.N.Y.).
Upon information and belief, other clinics, physicians,
and the proprietary and voluntary hospital will also im-

51

mediately discontinue provision of abortion services to
indigent women. Predictably, the Corporation’s hospitals
will be asked to provide care to a large number of in-
digent women no longer able to obtain abortions from
these clinics, physicians, proprietary and voluntary hos-
pitals. Unless the relief requested herein is granted, this
increasing demand for services at the Corporation’s fa-
cilities is to borne without help from Medicaid and dur-
ing a time of severe financial crisis within the municipal
hospital system and the entire City. The Corporation will
eventually be forced severely to curtail its abortion and/
or other medical services. The inevitable result will be
delays in the scheduling of abortions and necessarily in-
creased risks to women. The delays will prevent many
women from obtaining an abortion at all.

(ce) The Corporation will have to bear the immediate
increased administrative costs of instituting procedures
to identify those abortions in which Medicaid reimburse-
ment may be available because of the threat to the life
of the mother or because the pregnancy is the result of
incest or rape.

(d) If the Corporation does not have sufficient funds
to fulfill its statutory purpose to render quality health
care to its indigent female patients who seek elective
abortions in the first two trimesters of pregnancy, then
it is likely there will be unfortunate social consequences,
including a substantial increase in the number of unsafe
and illegal abortions performed elsewhere, the birth of
unwanted children, some of whom will ultimately become
public charges, and increasing illegitimacy and child

abuse.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

16. Many pregnant women have sought and will con-
tinue to seek abortions in the Corporation’s hospitals.
For many such women, the physicians in the municipal
hospitals would, in the exercise of their best professional
judgment, recommend and perform the abortions sought
by such women.

17. Defendant’s denial of reimbursement to the Cor-
poration for abortions performed upon Medicaid women

52

who request them unreasonably interferes with the free-
dom of the Corporation to render that comprehensive and
high quality medical care pursuant to its statutory
powers and purposes, in violation of due process of law
as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

18. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allega-
tions of paragraph 1 through 17 as though fully set
forth herein and further alleges as follows:

19. Public hospitals with obstetric and gynecology
services have a duty under the law to provide first and
second trimester abortions for women desirous of receiv-
ing them.

20. Proprietary and voluntary hospitals have no duty
to provide abortions or any other services for which they
are not reimbursed.

21. The defendant unfairly disfavors public hospitals
and discriminates against the Corporation by withdraw-
ing Medicaid reimbursement for abortion services that
the municipal hospitals, unlike the proprietary and
voluntary hospitals, are obligated to provide, thus requir-
ing only public hospitals to perform services without
fees in violation of the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

22. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
of paragraph 1 through 21 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

23. Denial of reimbursement by the defendant de-
prives the Corporation of substantial income from abor-
tion services normally rendered to Medicaid eligible
women in violation of the right of the Corporation to
render medical services and to receive fees for such serv-
ices, all without due process of law, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

53
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 23 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

25. The Hyde Amendment infringes upon the Cor-
poration’s right to give and its patient population’s right
to receive safe and adequate medical treatment and ad-
vice pertaining to the decision whether to terminate a
given pregnancy, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

_26. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
vf paragraphs 1 through 25 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

27. Under the Medicaid program, the Federal govern-
ment provides 90% reimbursement for funding steriliza-
tions, which together with state funds pays the full cost
of sterilization operations for Medicaid eligible women.

28. By denying payment for abortion services to Medi-
caid eligible women, the defendant coerces those indigent
women who form part of the population to be served by
the Corporation and who do not want at present to bear
a child to be irreversibly sterilized rather than risk a
pregnancy which cannot be aborted, all in violation of the
due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

29. Plaintiff repeats and realieges all the allegations

of paragraph 1 through 28 as though fully set forth
herein and alleges as follows:

30. The Medicaid program in New York State rou-
tinely pays with federal, state and city funds the full rea-
sonable costs of all pregnancy related care and services

for those eligible women who choose to carry pregnancy
to term.

54

31. Under the Hyde Amendment, defendant Mathews
is forbidden to reimburse for any portion of the cost of
abortion services for most Medicaid eligitle women who
choose to terminate their pregnancies by abortion, thus
creating an invidious classification which denies to the
class of women, mainly minority, served by the Cor-
poration in its municipal hospitals the due process and
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 31 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

33. Defendant’s denial of federal funds for reimburse-
ment for abortions as a means of terminating pregnancy
deprives the class of women, mainly -minority, served by
the Corporation in its municipal hospitals of their funda-
mental right to decide whether to bear a child, and to pri-
vacy and liberty in matters relating to marriage, sex,
procreation and the family, all in violation of the Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 33 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

35. Pregnant women who can pay the necessary costs
of abortion services can obtain such services during the
first two trimesters of pregnancy in New York-State.

36. By denying reimbursement for abortion services
to Medicaid recipients, defendant has created an invidious
classification which denies to the class of women, mainly
minority, served by the Corporation in its municipal hos-
pitals the due process and equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

55
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

37. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 386 as though fully set forth
herein and further alleges as follows:

38. The intent and effect of the Hyde Amendment is to

force indigent women to carry their pregnancies to term:

in violation of their constitutionally protected right to
privacy.

39. One of the principal grounds stated by Congress
for the enactment of the Hyde Amendment is: that the
use of federal funds for abortion offends the religious
beliefs of certain segments of the population.

40. The Hyde Amendment constitutes an establish-
ment of religion in violation of the First Amendment to
the Constitution.

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the Court:

1, Assume jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1331, 1861, 2201 and 2202.

2. Pending a hearing on the merits, grant a temporary
restraining order, enjoining and restraining the defend-
ant, his successors in office, agents and employees, and
all persons in active concert and participation with him,
from refusing to pay federal matching funds (at the
proportionate level they were being paid before the Hyde
Amendment was enicted) for abortions provided to
women eligible for Medicaid.

3. Declare that the Hyde Amendment is null and void
on the ground that it is unconstitutional on its face, and
as applied, and enter a final judgment declaring that
defendant’s refusal to pay federal matching funds for
abortions provided to women eligible for Medicaid vio-
lates the Constitution of the United States.

4. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions pur-
suant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
enjoining and restraining the defendant, his successors in
office, agents and employees, and all other persons in ac-

«

56

tive concert and participation with him, from refusing
to pay federal matching funds (at the proportionate level
they were being paid before the Hyde Amendment was
enacted) for abortions provided to women eligible for
Medicaid.

5. Award plaintiff its costs and disbursements in this
action and grant it such other and further relief as this
Court may deem just, proper and equitable.

Dated: New York, New York
October 1, 1976

W. BERNARD RICHLAND
Corporation Counsel

By: /s/ James G. Greilsheimer
JAMES G. GREILSHEIMER
Litigating Assistant
Corporation Counsel

/s/ Ellen K. Sawyer
ELLEN K. SAWYER
Assistant Corporation

Counsel

Office and P.O. Address
Municipal Building

New York, New York 10007
Tel. 566-5500 or 2197

57
VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK )
) SS.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK _)

_Dr. JOHN L. S. HOLLOMAN, Jr. being duly sworn, says
that“he_is President of the New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation, plaintiff herein. That the fore-
going complaint is true to his knowledge except as to
matters therein stated to be alleged upon information
and belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be
true. That the grounds of his belief as to all matters
not therein stated upon his own knowledge are as fol-
lows: Information obtained from books and records of
the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
and from statements made to him by certain officers or
agents of the aforesaid Corporation.

/s/ John L. 8. Holloman, Jr.
Dr. JOHN L. S. HOLLOMAN, JR.

Sworn to before me this
30th day of September, 1976

/s/ Sidney Schutz
SIDNEY SCHUTZ
Notary Public, State of New York
Qualified in Bronx County
Registration No. 8864475
Term Expires March 30, 1978

58

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ. 1804 (JFD)

CoRA MCRAE, JANE DOE, MARY DOE, SUSAN ROE, ANN
MOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF NEW YORK CITY,
INC.; and IRWIN B. TERAN, M.D., JANE Hopcson, M.D.,
DaviD B. BINGHAM, M.D., HuGH SAVAGE, M.D., individ-
ually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
WOMEN’S DIVISION OF THE BOARD OF GLOBAL MINIS-
TRIES of the UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THERESSA
HOOVER, its ASSOCIATE GENERAL SECRETARY, ELLEN
KIRBY, its EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PLAINTIFFS

-against-

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., Secretary, United States De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFFS’ AND PROPOSED INTERVENORS’
AMENDED COMPLAINT

CLASS ACTION

I
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is a civil action for injunctive, declaratory and
other relief. Plaintiffs seek 4 declaration that the enact-
ment and implementation of an amendment (“the 1977
Hyde Amendment”) to P.L. 94-489 (popularly known as
the HEW Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1976-77) enacted
into law on September 30, 1976 is invalid under Title 19

59

of the Social Security Act and the United States Consti-
tution. In addition, plaintiffs seek (a) a declaration that
the enactment and implementation of a superseding rider
to P.L. 95-205 (popularly known as a continuing resolu-
tion authorizing HEW Appropriations for Fiscal 1977-78
and hereinafter referred to as the “1978 Hyde Amend-
ment”) enacted into law on December 10, 1977 is invalid
under Title 19 of the Social Security Act and the United
States Constitution and (b) an injunction against its
implementation. Plaintiffs further seek damages for
funds wrongfully withheld under the 1977 and 1978 Hyde
Amendments (hereinafter the “Hyde Amendments”).

II.
JURISDICTION

2. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
and parties to this cause by virtue of 28 U.S.C. Sections
1331, 1361, 2201 and 2202. The amount in controversy,
exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $10,000.

3. This case arises under the Social Security Act, the
1977 and the 1978 Hyde Amendments, and the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

ITI.
PARTIES

4. Plaintiff CORA McRAE at the institution of this
action was a twenty-four-old female citizen of the State
of New York and the United States. Plaintiff McRAE
was in the first trimester of pregnancy and had made
a decision in consultation with her physician to terminate
her pregnancy. Plaintiff had no funds of her own with
which to pay for an abortion and was financially depend-
ent upon medical assistance (Medicaid) from the State
of New York for all medical care. On the basis of the
enactment of the 1977 Hyde Amendment plaintiff was

60

refused an abortion because of fear that Medicaid reim-
bursement would be withheld.

5. At the time of filing her intervenor’s complaint,
plaintiff MARY DOE was a nineteen-year-old female cit-
izen of the State of Connecticut and the United States.
She was unmarried and had four children, aged five
years, four years, three years and eleven months old.
Plaintiff MARY DOE was in her second trimester of preg-
nancy. She was suffering from an overt depression and
had stated that she might attempt suicide if she could
not obtain an abortion. Her physician, named plaintiff
David B. Bingham, M.D., had determined that an abor-
tion was medically necessary for her, but could not cer-
tify her pregnancy as life-endangering. Plaintiff had no
funds of her own with which to pay for an abortion and
was financially dependent upon medical assistance (Medic-
aid) from the State of Connecticut for all medical care.

6. At the time of the filing of her intervenor’s com-
plaint plaintiff JANE DOE was a twenty-five-year-old fe-
male citizen of the State of Minnesota and the United
States. Plaintiff JANE DOE was in her first trimester of
pregnancy. She suffers from a serious case of phlebitis,
a condition which would be greatly aggravated by carry-
ing her pregnancy to term. Her physician, named plain-
tiff Jane Hodgson, M.D., had determined that an abor-
tion was medically necessary for her because of the in-
creased risk of blood clots which may cause permanent
health problems and even death, but did not believe she
could certify her for an abortion under the 1977 Hyde
Amendment. Plaintiff had no funds of her own with
which to pay for an abortion and was financially depend-
en upon medical assistance (Medicaid) from the State
of Minnesota for all medical care.

7 Plaintiff SUSAN ROE is a nineteen-year-old native
American Indian women who is a citizen of the State of
Minnesota and the United States. Plaintiff SuSAN ROE is
in her second trimester of pregnancy. She is unmarried
and became pregnant four weeks after the birth of her
one child. She is suffering from severe emotional trauma
and is threatened with severe and long-lasting mental
health damage should the pregnancy continue to term.

61

In addition, the rapid succession of pregnancies threat-
ens substantial harm to her physical health and to the
physical and mental capacity of any afterborn child. Her
physician, named plaintiff Jane Hodgson, M.D., has de-
termined that an abortion is medically necessary for
her but cannot certify it as meeting the standard of
either the 1977 or 1978 Hyde Amendment. Plaintiff
has no funds of her own with which to pay for an abor-
tion and is financially dependent upon medical assistance
(Medicaid) from the State of Minnesota for all medical
care.

8. Plaintiff ANN MOE is a fifteen-year-old citizen of
the State of Minnesota and the United States. Plaintiff
ANN MOE is eleven weeks pregnant. She is unmarried
and has a long history of hospitalizations for severe men-
tal illness. She is threatened with severe and longlasting
mental health damage should she be forced to continue
her pregnancy to term. In addition, she is threatened
with all the physical health risks attendant to a teenage
pregnancy. Her physician, named plaintiff Jane Hodgson,
M.D., has determined that an abortion is medically nec-
essary for her but cannot certify her under either the
1977 or 1978 Hyde Amendment standards. In partic-
ular, with respect to severe and longlasting health dam-
age, Dr. Hodgson is unable to obtain the concurrence of
plaintiff Mor’s family physician, and expects from past
experience that any certification would be rejected. Plain-
tiff ANN MoE has no funds of her own with which
to pay for an abortion and is financially dependent upon
medical assistance (Medicaid) from the State of Min-
nesota for all medical care.

9. Plaintiff PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF NEW YorK
City, INc. (“PPNYC”), is a § 501(c) (3) tax exempt,
not-for-profit corporation incorporated in the State of
New York which provides family planning services and
first trimester abortion services at its state licensed clin-
~ ree one located in the eastern district of New

ork.

PPNYC provides an average of approximately 300
abortions per month for Medicaid eligible patients. The
Hyde Amendments prohibit reimbursement from federal

62

funds for the performance of most abortions sought by
PPNYC patients who are covered by Medicaid including
Plaintiff MCRAE. Although the State of New York has
continued to reimburse PPNYC from state and _ local
funds for all medically necessary abortions it provides
for its patients, the Hyde Amendments have placed such
reimbursement in jeopardy.

10. Plaintiff IRwIN B. TERAN, M.D., is a physician
licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York
who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. His offices
are at 757 Bushwick Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.
Many of his patients are enrolled in the Medicaid pro-
gram and he is reimbursed for the full range of ob-
stetrical and gynecological medical services he renders
for them. Federal matching funds are provided for all
such services except for those abortions which fail to
qualify under the Hyde Amendments.

11. Plaintiff JANE HopGson, M.D., is a physician li-
censed to practice medicine in the State of Minnesota
who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. Her offices
are at St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital, 640 Jackson Street, St.
Paul, Minnesota. Many of her patients are enrolled in
the Medicaid program and she is reimbursed for the
obstetrical and gynecological medical services she renders
for them. Subsequent to the implementation of the 1977
Hyde Amendment, Minnesota has refused reimbursement
for all abortions except those where the pregnancy is cer-
tified as life-endangering.

12. Plaintiff DAvin B. BINGHAM, M.D., is a physician
licensed to practice medicine in the State of Connecticut
who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. His offices
are at 159 Sachem Street, Norwich, Connecticut. Many
of his patients are enrolled in the Medicaid program and
he is reimbursed for the obstetrical and gynecological
medical services he renders for them. Subsequent to the
implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amendment, Connec-
ticut has refused Medicaid reimbursement for all abor-
tions except those where the pregnancy is certified and
approved in advance as life-endangering.

13. Plaintiff HuGH SAvacgr, M.D., is a physician li-
censed to practice medicine in the State of Texas. His

63

offices are at 1201 West Presidio, Fort Worth, Texas.
Many of his patients are low-income women who would,
except for the Hyde Amendments, be eligible for fed-
erally funded abortions paid for either under Medicaid
or Title XX of the Social Security Act. Subsequent to
the implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amendment, Texas
refuses to reimburse for any abortion except those where
the pregnancy is certified and approved in advance as
life-endangering.

14. Plaintiff EDGAR N. JACKSON, M.D., is a physician
licensed to practice medicine in the State of Georgia who
specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. His offices are
at 384 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. Many
of his patients are enrolled in the Medicaid program
and he is reimbursed for the obstetrical and gynecologi-
cal medical services he renders for them. Subsequent
to the implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amendment,

. Georgia has refused Medicaid reimbursement for all abor-

tions except those where the pregnancy is certified as
life-endangering.

15. Plaintiff LEwis H. Kopuik, M.D., is a physician
licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico
who specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. His offices
are at 107 Girard Boulevard, S.E., Albuquerque, New
Mexico, Many of his patients are low-income women
who would, except for the Hyde Amendments, be eligible
for federally funded abortions paid for under Medicaid
or Title XX of the Social Security Act. Subsequent to
the implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amendment, New
Mexico has refused to reimburse for any abortions ex-
cept for those where the pregnancy is certified as life-
endangering.

16. The WOMEN’S DIVISION OF THE BOARD OF GLOBAL
MINISTRIES OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH (here-
after Women’s Division) is the policy-making body for
United Methodist Women comprising 1.2 million women
living in every state and the District of Columbia. The
Women’s Division sues on behalf of itself and the mem-
bership of United Methodist Women among whom are
poor, pregnant women who are dependent on Medicaid
to obtain safe, legal abortions, whose ability to obtain

64

such is impeded or precluded by the Hyde Amendments
and who object to having someone else’s religious beliefs
about abortion imposed upon them thereby inhibiting
their freedom of conscience. The membership of United
Methodist Women also includes federal taxpayers who
object to the Hyde Amendments as violating the First
Amendment’s limitations on the taxing and spending
powers, Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

17. THERESSA HOOVER, a citizen of the United States
resides in New York City and is ASSOCIATE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE WOMEN’S DIVISION. She adheres to
the Methodist teaching that Methodist women have a
religious right and duty to decide in accordance with
the principle of responsible parenthood, whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy. She is a federal taxpayer who
objects to the Hyde Amendments’ restrictions on federal
funding for abortion as embodying and advancing a dif-
ferent religious belief about abortion. She objects to hav-
ing her tax funds expended on the basis of this different
religious view of abortion, and with the intent and ef-
fect of manipulating poor women’s determination about
responsible parenthood. She also objects to the additional
social, human and tax costs which the Hyde Amendment
requires for the continuation of unwanted pregnancies,
and for medical complications resulting from self-induced
abortions or from the forced continuation of unwanted
life and health-threatening pregnancies.

18. ELLEN KIRBY is a citizen of the United States,
resides in Brooklyn, New York and is EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR OF THE WOMEN’S DIVISION. She adheres to the Meth-
odist teaching that Methodist women have a religious
right and duty to decide in accordance with the principle
of responsible parenthood, whether or not to terminate
a pregnancy. She is a federal taxpayer who objects to
the Hyde Amendments’ restrictions on federal funding
for abortion as embodying and advancing a different
religious belief about abortion. She objects to having her
tax funds expended on the basis of this different religious
view of abortion, and with the intent and effect of mani-
pulating poor women’s determination about responsible
parenthood. She also objects to the additional social,

65

human and tax costs which the Hyde Amendment re-
quires for the continuation of unwanted pregnancies,
and for medical complications resulting from self-induced
abortions or from the forced continuation of unwanted
life- and health-threatening pregnancies.

19. Defendant JOSEPH A. CALIFANO is Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(“HEW”), and as such is responsible for the overall
operation and administration of the Department’s pro-
grams and for the expenditure of sums appropriated by

the Congress for those programs, including Medicaid.
He is sued in his official capacity.

IV.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

20. Plaintiffs MCRAE, Dor, Dor, RoE and MOE sue on
their own behalf and on behalf of the entire class of
pregnant or potentially pregnant women who are eligible
for medical assistance provided under their state plans,
who with their physicians have decided on abortions;
for whom abortions are medically necessary; who have
been, are or will be prevented or impeded in obtaining
medical termination of their pregnancies by the Hyde
Amendments (hereinafter “class of women”). The class
includes women of all religious and nonreligious persua-
sions and beliefs who have, in accordance with the teach
ing of their religion and/or the dictates of their con-
science determined that an abortion is necessary.

21. The action may be maintained as a class action on
behalf of the class of women under Rule 23(b) (1) (B)
and under Rule 23(b)(2): under Rule 28(b) (1) (B)
because the prosecution of separate actions by individual
members of the class would create a risk of adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the in-
terests of the other members not parties to the adjudi-
cation or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; and under Rule 23(b) (2) because
the parties opposing the class have acted or will act on

66

grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

22. The class of women is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable.

23. Plaintiffs MCRAE, Dor, DoE, RoE and MOE will
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class
of women. Their attorneys have extensive experience in
litigation involving human rights in the field of family
planning and abortion. Plaintiffs and their attorneys
are prepared to carry forward the claims of the repre-
sentative parties to final judgment and to protect the in-
terests of all members of the class of women.

The questions of law and fact which plaintiffs MCRAE,
DoE, DoE, ROE and MOE seek to liquidate, in particular
the legality and constitutionality of the Hyde Amend-
ments and their implementation are common to the class
they seek to represent. ~

CLASS OF PHYSICIANS

24. Dr. TERAN, DR. HODGSON, DR. BINGHAM, DR.
SAVAGE, DR. JACKSON and Dr. KOPLIK sue on their own
behalf and on behalf of the entire class of duly licensed
and Medicaid certified providers of abortional services to
eligible women. Plaintiff physicians are prevented or im-
peded from performing and/or certifying abortions for
these women, because of the lack of Medicaid reimburse-
ment. On rare occasions some of these doctors perform
abortions for eligible women without fee and for which
they receive no reimbursement (hereinafter “class of
physicians’).

25. Plaintiff physicians also sue on behalf of their
patients as defined in paragraph twenty (20).

26. The action may be maintained as a class action on
behalf of the class of physicians under Rule 23(b) (1)
(B) and under Rule 23(b) (2): under Rule 23(b) (1)
(B) because the prosecution of separate actions by indi-
vidual members of the class would create a risk of adjudi-
cations with respect to individual members of the class

67

which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudi-
cation or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; under Rule 23(b) (2) because the
parties opposing the class have acted or will act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

27. The class of physicians is so numerous that joinder
of al! members is impracticable.

28. Dr. TERAN, Dr. Hopcson, Dr. BINGHAM, Dr.
SAVAGE, DR. JACKSON and Dr. KopLik will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class of phy-
sicians as well as the class of their pregnant Medicaid-
eligible patients. Their attorneys have extensive exper-
ience in litigation involving the rights of physicians to
practice their profession in accordance with their best
medical judgment, especially in the field of family plan-
ning and abortion. The named plaintiff doctors and their
counsel are prepared to carry their claims forward to
final judgment and to protect the interests of all members
of the class of physicians and class of patients.

29. The questions of law and fact which the named
doctors seek to litigate, in particular the legality and
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendments, and their en-
titlement to damages for reimbursement wrongfully
withheld, are common to the class they seek to represent.

VI.
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

30. 42 U.S.C. Sections 1896 et seg. (Title XIX of the
Social Security Act) passed by Congress in 1965, es-
tablishes the Medicaid Program. Title XIX of the Social
Security Act and the implementing regulations require
states to provide reimbursement for all medically neces-
sary physician and hospital services, with exceptions not
here applicable, to families and individuals whose income
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of medical
care and services. With the exception of abortions ex-

68

cluded by the Hyde Amendments, federal matching funds
from 50 to 83% of the cost of covered services are pro-
vided to states.

31. In 1967 an amendment to Title XIX was enacted
to require the states to establish a comprehensive health
program for children under the age of 21, entitled Early
and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment
(“EPSDT”). 42 U.S.C. § 1896d (a) (4) (B).

32. With the exception of Arizona, every state has a
medical assistance plan which receives federal funds and
which reimburses certified providers for the services they
perform.

33. With the exception of the Hyde Amendments, Title
XIX of the Social Security Act operates on a principle
of neutrality with respect to an eligible individual’s re-
ligious beliefs concerning health care. 42 U.S.C. 1396f
provides:

“$ 1396. Observance of religious beliefs

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to re-
quire any State which has‘a plan approved under
this subchapter to compel any person to undergo any
medical screening, examination, diagnosis, or treat-
ment or to accept any other health care or services
provided under such plan for any purpose (other
than for the purpose of discovering and preventing
the spread of infection or contagious disease or for
the purpose of protecting environmental health), if
such person objects (or, in case such person is a
child, his parents or guardian objects) thereto on
religious grounds.”

In addition, the Medicaid program affirmatively covers
costs of health care the form of which is dictated by an
individual’s religious beliefs; see e.g. 45 C.F.R. 249.10
(b) (17) (ii). (authorizing Christian Science Services).

69
VII.
THE HYDE AMENDMENTS

34. Prior to the implementation of the 1977 Hyde
Amendment, federal matching funds were available for
all abortions for eligible individuals which a state chose
to include in its Medicaid plan. Some states, including
New York, provided reimbursement for all abortions for
eligible individuals. Other states, including Connecticut
and Pennsylvania, limited Medicaid payments to those
abortions for eligible individuals that were certified as
medically necessary.

35. The 1977 Hyde Amendment, Section 209 of Public
Law 94-439, provides that

“None of the funds contained in this Act shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term.”

36. On October 22, 1976, this Court issued, and on
October 29, 1976, reaffirmed, a preliminary injunction
against implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amendment on
constitutional grounds. On July 29, 1977, the Supreme
Court ordered the judgment vacated and the case re-
manded to this Court for reconsideration in light of
Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366, and Maher v. Roe, 97 S.
Ct. 2376 (1977). | |

37. On July 28, 1977, this Court vacated the injunc-
tion and issued a new temporary restraining order
against the implementation of the 1977 Hyde Amend-
ment. This temporary restraining order was lifted on
August 4, 1977. Defendant Califano immediately imple-
mented the 1977 Hyde Amendment (“Exhibit A’’).

38. The Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare failed to issue and make known any standards,
regulations or guidelines which clarify what abortions
will be federally reimbursed under the 1977 Hyde
Amendment standard.

70

89. State agencies administering the various state
medical assistance programs do not know which abor-
tions will be federally reimbursed under the 1977 Hyde
Amendment standard.

40. Medicaid providers and eligible pregnant women
do not know which abortions will receive federal reim-
bursement under the 1977 Hyde Amendment standard.

41. The defendant failed to advise the states of their
continuing obligations under Title XIX to reimburse for
medically necessary abortions or to enforce the same.

42. In response to implementation of the 1977 Hyde
Amendment most states adopted policies limiting reim-
bursement for abortions for the members of the plaintiff
class of women to those cases where it was necessary to
terminate a pregnancy which would endanger the life
of the woman if the fetus were carried to term.

43. Because of the vagueness of the language of the
1977 Hyde Amendment, the failure of defendant Califano
to provide clarifying regulations, and prior approval and
other procedural requirements adopted in some states,
many women in the plaintiff class have been and con-
tinue to be unable to obtain an abortion financed by
Medicaid even in situations in which the life of the
woman is endangered by the continuation of the preg-
nancy.

44. On December 10, 1977, the President signed a
continuing resolution authorizing Labor-HEW expendi-
tures through fiscal year 1978, containing a rider super-
seding the 1977 Hyde Amendment (the “1978 Hyde
Amendment”). The 1978 Hyde Amendment reads as
follows:

“None of the funds contained in this Act shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term; or except for such medical pro-
cedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest,
when such rape or incest has been promptly reported
to a law enforcement agency or public health serv-
ice; or except in those instances where severe and
long-lasting physical health damage to the mother

71

would result if the pregnancy were carried to term
when so determined by two physicians. Nor are
payments prohibited for drugs or devices to prevent
implantation of the fertilized ovum, or for medical
procedures necessary for the termination of ectopic
pregnancy. The Secretary shall promptly issue regu-
lations and establish procedures to ensure that the
provisions of this section are rigorously enforced.”

45. On December 10, 1977, defendant Califano an-
nounced the implementation of this amendment by mail-
ing the text of it to all state Medicaid agencies along with
a brief interpretative statement (“Exhibit B’’).

46. On information and belief, as of the filing of this
amended complaint, no state, except Alabama, has liberal-
ized its policy on the reimbursement of abortions in re-
sponse to the 1978 Hyde Amendment.

VII.
IRREPARABLE INJURY

47. As a result of the Hyde Amendments, the plain-
tiffs and the members of the classes they represent have
been and continue to be subjected to immediate and ir-
reparable harm, namely:

(a) Plaintiffs MCRAE, DoE, DoE, ROE and MoE
and others in the class of women have been and will
be refused Medicaid abortions and will be unable to
obtain the abortions they desire and/or which are
medically necessary without the relief sought in this
complaint. ;

(b) Drs. TERAN, HODGSON, BINGHAM, SAVAGE,
JACKSON and KOPLIK and members of the class of
physicians are, with rare exceptions, not able to per-
form such abortions without reimbursement and
have refused or will refuse and continue to refuse,
this treatment.

(c) Plaintiff PPNYC’s ability to serve Medicaid-
eligible women who seek abortions and who are un-
able to pay for them is placed in. jeopardy by the

12

Hyde Amendments. Plaintiff PPNYC will he fi-
nancially unable to serve such women if Medicaid
reimbursement should be cut off.

(d) Plaintiff women and members of their class

' who are discouraged, impeded and/or prevented from
obtaining abortions are subjected to the imposition
of one religious-belief about abortion. Some members
of the class of plaintiff women and of United Metho-
dist Women are restrained in the free exercise of
their religious beliefs that an abortion is necessary
or appropriate under the circumstances.

(e) The taxpayer plaintiffs are required to pay
for the added cost of services related to carrying
unwanted normal pregnancies to term; of treatment
of complications arising from self-induced and illegal
abortions as well as unwanted health- and life-
threatening pregnancies and their effects, and of
additional physician consultations and administrative
expenses.

IX.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT CLAIMS
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

48. By allowing states to exclude state financed Medi-

id reimbursement for medically necessary abortions,
including those reimbursable under the Hyde Amend-
ments, defendant Califano violates Title XIX of the
Social Security Act which mandates that a state Medicaid
plan provide reimbursement for medically necessary hos-
pital and physician services provided to eligible indi-
viduals.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

49. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 48.

50. The Hyde Amendments’ failure to provide for
reimbursement for all medically necessary abortions, and
defendant Califano’s failure to mandate state coverage
for those members of the plaintiff class of women who

73

are under twenty-one years of age, violates Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (4) (B),
and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

51. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 50.

52. By permitting the states to eliminate Medicaid
reimbursement for abortions whether or not federally
reimbursable under the Hyde Amendments, Defendant
Califano violates the framework of Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, and particularly 42 U.S.C. 1396f,
and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, assuring
that Medicaid assistance be provided consonant with and
not in violation of a person’s religious beliefs except in
cases of danger to the public health.

X.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE WOMEN
PLAINTIFFS: EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE
PROCESS AND PRIVACY

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

58. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege ali of the allega-
tions of paragraphs 1 through 52.

54. The enactment or implementation of a Medicaid
program which provides payment for all medically neces-
sary physician and hospital services but excludes medi-
cally necessary abortion services denies plaintiff class of
women equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

55. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 54.

56. Under the Social Security Act, Defendant Califano
routinely authorizes reimbursement of a substantial per-

74

centage of the cost of all pregnancy related care and
services for Medicaid-eligible women who choose to carry
their pregnancies to term. Such costs are paid by all
states which participate in the Medicaid program.

57. The Hyde Amendments’ prohibition of federa! re-
imbursement for the cost of a substantial proportion of
medically necessary abortion services for eligible women
who seek to terminate their pregnancies by abortion
creates an invidious classification which denies plaintiff
class of women due process and equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

58. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 57.

59. The enactment or implementation of a Medicaid
program which provides payment for all medically neces-
sary physician and hospital services for eligible men but
excludes medically necessary abortion services for eligible
women constitutes an unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sex in violation of the due process and equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

60. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 59 and further allege as follows:

61. Under the Social Security Act, the federal govern- ©

ment provides 90% matching funds which together with
state funds pay the full cost of sterilization.

62. By denying payment for medically necessary abor-
tion services to Medicaid-eligible women, the Hyde
Amendments operate to coerce women to resort to irre-
versible sterilization in order to terminate an existing
pregnancy and/or to avoid the risk of a future pregnancy
which cannot be aborted, all in violation of the due
process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by

75

the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the
Constitution.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

63. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 62.

64. The Hyde Amendments on their face and as ap-
plied are vague and overbroad in violation of plaintiffs’
rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

65. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 64.

66. Under the Social Security Act the federal govern-
ment provides matching funds for all medically neces-
sary procedures covered by state plans and particularly
for all pregnancy related services including complications
from pregnancy and self-induced or illegal abortions.

67. By denying payment the Hyde Amendments
punish pregnant women for whom abortions are medi-
cally necessary in violation of the due process and equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
Ninth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

68. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 67.

69. The requirement of a two-physician certificate in
the 1978 Hyde Amendment impermissibly burdens the
fundamental right of plaintiff class of women to obtain
an abortion as guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

70. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 69.

ey a ee ee

76

71. Pregnant women who can pay the costs of med-
ically necessary abortion services can obtain such services.

72. On their face and as implemented, the Hyde
Amendments discourage and prevent doctors from per-
forming abortions necessary to terminate health- and life-
threatening pregnancies and encourage them to provide
unnecessary and dangerous treatment, such as a D & C
(dilation and curettage) or DES (di-ethylstilbestrol) to
prevent implantation, thereby causing doctors to engage
in conduct which could be deemed malpractice with re-
spect to paying patients. .

73. Black and third world women are disproportion-
ately represented among Medicaid-eligible women, and
the Hyde Amendments have a disparate impact on their
ability to obtain medically necessary abortions.

74. On their face and as applied, the Hyde Amend-
ments’ restrictions on funding of medically necessary
abortion services to eligible women constitute an invidious
and discriminatory classification based on poverty, race
and minority status, which deprives and punishes the
plaintiff class of women in violation of due process and
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitu-

tion.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

75. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 74.

76. The reporting requirements of the 1978 Hyde
Amendment violate the privacy, due process, and equal
protection rights of those members of plaintiff class who
are victims of rape or incest in violation of the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

717
XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF PHYSICIAN PLAIN-
TIFFS AND PPNYC: EQUAL PROTECTION,
DUE PROCESS AND PRIVACY

THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

77. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 76.

78. Many pregnant women, including the named
plaintiffs, and their class have consulted and will con-
tinue to consult Drs. Teran, Hodgson, Bingham, Savage,
Jackson, Koplik and the class of physicians and PPNYC.
For many such women such physicians would, in the exer-
cise of their best professional judgment, agree that abor-
tions are medically necessary and would perform the
abortions sought by such women.

79. Defendant’s prohibition of reimbursement to the
members of the physician class for such abortions per-
formed upon Medicaid patients who request them deprive
plaintiff class of physicians of the right to practice medi-
cine in accordance with their best medical judgment as
guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution.

80. The Hyde Amendments infringe upon the right
of plaintiffs class of physicians and PPNYC to give and
their patients’ right to receive necessary medical treat-
ment and advice, in accordance with accepted medical
standards, pertaining to the decision whether to termin-
ate a pregnancy, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

81. Implementation of the Hyde Amendments by the
defendant deprives plaintiff class of physicians and
PPNYC of substantial income from abortion services
normally rendered to Medicaid-eligible women, in viola-
tion of the right of members of plaintiff class of phy-
sicians and PPNYC to render medical services and to
receive fees for such services, all without due process of

law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution.

78
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

82. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 81.

88. The class of physicians is subject to federal and
state civil and criminal sanctions for certifications
deemed to be improper or fraudulent under the Hyde
Amendment standards. There are no sanctions on the
class of physicians should they fail to certify a qualify-
ing abortion.

84. The Hyde Amendments are vague and overbroad
in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.

FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

85. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 84.

86. The 1978 Hyde Amendment requires a two-physi-
cian certificate in cases where severe and long-lasting
physical health damage to the mother would result if
the pregnancy were carried to term.

87. This requirement impermissibly infringes on a
doctor’s right to practice medicine in accordance with his/
her best medical judgment as guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution
and is in violation of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.

XII.

ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAIM
SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

88. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the alegations
of paragraphs 1 through 87.

89. The Hyde Amendments constitute an exercise of
the taxing and spending powers of the Congress under
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

90. The purpose and effect of the Hyde Amendments
is to impede and/or prevent indigent pregnant women
from obtaining abortions.

79

91. The Hyde Amendments constitute enactment into
law of one religious belief respecting abortions and the
nature of the fetus and the imposition of that religious
view on Medicaid-eligible women who would otherwise
choose abortion in accordance with their religious or non-
religious beliefs.

92. There is no secular justification for th
Amendments. oo
_ 93. The enactment of this religious view of abortion
into law as exemplified by the Hyde Amendments has
created and threatens further excessive entanglement and
political divisiveness.

94. The Hyde Amendments discourage, impede and/or
prevent plaintiff women and their class from obtaining
safe, legal abortions in accordance with the different
teachings of the religions to which they adhere and/or
with the dictates of their conscience.

95. The Hyde Amendments, on their face and as ap-
plied violate the prohibitions of the First Amendment
against laws respecting the establishment or religion and
interfering with the free exercise thereof.

XIII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that:

(1) This Court declare that the Hyde Amendments
— and as applied are unconstitutional, null and
void.

(2) This Court enter preliminary and permanent in-
junctions pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure enjoining the defendant, his successors
in nei was employees, and all other persons
in concert wi im from giving any effect

a Amendment. iu eas we

3) This Court, in the alternative, declare that d

; e-
spite the Hyde Amendments, Title XIX of the Social
Security Act mandates that states continue to reimburse
for medically necessary services, and

80

(4) This Court enter preliminary and permanent in-
junctions pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requiring the defendant, his successors
in office, agents and employees and all other persons In
concert with him to disapprove state Medicaid plans
which limit reimbursement for medically necessary
abortions.

(5) This Court award damages for reimbursement
unlawfully withheld under the Hyde Amendments.

(6) This Court award plaintiffs their costs herein,
attorneys fees, and grant them such other and further
relief as this Court may deem just, proper and equitable.

Dated: January 5, 1977

GREENBAUM, WOLFF w ERNST
437 Madison Avenue

New York, NY 10022
212/758-4010

By: /s/ Eve W. Paul
HARRIET PILPEL
EvE W. PAUL
FREDERIC S. NATHAN
LAURENCE VOGEL

Attorneys for Plaintiff PLANNED
PARENTHOOD OF NEW YORK CITY,
INC.

SyLv1A A. LAW

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012
212/598-7642

/s/ Rhonda Copelon
RHONDA COPELON
NANCY STEARNS
Center for Constitutional Rights
853 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
212/674-3303

Dah Tattle an be? 6 ARE. a Ore ne

81

JANET BENSHOOF

JILL LAURIE GOODMAN

ELLEN LEITZER

NADINE TAUB

American Civil Liberties Union
22 Kast 40th Street

New York, NY 10016
212/725-1222

By: /s/ Janet Benshoof
JANET BENSHOOF

Attorneys for Women and Doctor
Plaintiffs and for the Women’s
Division of the Board of Global
Ministries of The United Meth-
odist Church and its Members.

82
EXHIBIT “A”
[SEAL]
HEW NEWS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 4, 1977
iS aiaed Marcus .. (202) 245-6738
Winston . (202) 245-6343
Statement
by

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Section 209 of Public Law 94-439, the Labor-HE W
Appropriation Act of 197 7—popularly known as the
Hyde Amendment—provides that:

“None of the funds contained in this Act shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term.”

Last October, a Federal District Court issued an order
enjoining the Department from enforcing the Hyde
Amendment. That injunction has now been dissolved.
Accordingly, the Department will provide Federal finan-
cial participation in the cost of abortions only where the
attending physician, on the basis of his or her profes-
sional judgment, has certified that the abortion is nec-
essary because the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term.

.
PR ar nation

83

The legislative history of the Hyde Amendment, how-
ever, makes clear that the Amendment does not bar
funding for certain medical procedures. Specifically, the
Conference Committee Report interpreting the Hyde
Amendment states as follows:

“Nor is it the intent of the Conferees to prohibit
medical procedures necessary for the termination of
an ectopic pregnancy or for the treatment of rape
or incest victims; nor is it intended to prohibit the
use of drugs or devices to prevent implantation of
the fertilized ovum.” (HR Rep. No. 95-1555, at p. 3)

Thus Federal funds will continue to be available for
such medical procedures. “Treatment for rape or incest
victims” is, however, limited for these purposes to prompt ~
treatment before the fact of pregnancy is established.
As in all cases, Federal funds for abortions for rape
or incest victims will be available where the physician
has certified that the life of the mother would be en-
dangered if the fetus were carried to term.

(The Department is transmitting this statement to all
State Medicaid agencies, HEW regional offices, Public
Health Service Hospitals and grantees, and State medical

associations. The statement will be published in the
Federal Register.)

84
EXHIBIT “B”
[SEAL]
HEW NEWS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Saturday, December 10, 1977
Winston: (202) 245-6343

Statement by
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

The President signed a continuing resolution today
authorizing Labor-HEW expenditures through the fiscal
year 1978. This resolution contains language, which su-
persedes Section 209 of Public Law 94-439, the Labor-
HEW Appropriations Act of 1977. Section 209 has po; «
ularly been referred to as the Hyde Amendment.

The new language is as follows:

“Provided, That none of the funds provided for in this
paragraph shall be used to perform abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical
procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest,
when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to
a law enforcement agency or public health service; or ex-
cept in those instances where severe and long-lasting
physical health damage to the mother would result if
the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined
by two physicians.

“Nor are payments prohibited for drugs or devices
to prevent implantation of the fertilized ovum, or for
medical procedures necessary for the termination of an
ectopic pregnancy.

85

“The Secretary shall promptly issue regulations and
establish procedures to ensure that the provisions of this
section are rigorously enforced.”

Accordingly, from this point-forward, the Departmen‘
will provide Federal financial participation in the cost of
abortions, including those following rape or incest, where
a physician, on the basis of his or her professional judg-
ment, has certified in writing that the abortion is nec-
essary, because the life of the mother would be en-
dangered if the fetus were carried to term or where two
physicians, on the basis of their professional judgment,
have certified in writing that severe and long-lasting
physical health damage to the mother would result if
the pregnancy were carried to term.

In addition, when a case of rape or incest has been
reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public
health service, the Department will provide Federal fi-
nancial participation in the cost of medical procedures
where a physician, on the basis of his or her professional
judgment, has certified in writing that such procedures
are necessary for the victim of such rape or incest.

Federal funding will also be provided for drugs or
devices to prevent implementation of the fertilized ovum
and for medical procedures where a physician, on the
basis of his or her professional judgment, has certified
in writing that such procedures are necessary for the
termination of an ectopic pregnancy.

I have asked the Genera’ Counsel to prepare regula-

tions and establish procedures as soon as possible to en-

sure that the foregoing limitations established by Con-
gress are rigorously enforced.

As I promised the Senate during my confirmation
hearings, I will carry out the laws passed by the Congress
poi best of my apility in this sensitive area, as in all
others.

(The Department is transmitting this statement to all
State Medicaid agencies, HEW regional offices, Public
Health Service Hospitals and grantees, and State medi-
cal associations. The statement will be published in the
Fedzral Register.)

86

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 C 1804
CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DEFENDANT

—and—

SENATORS JAMES L. BUCKLEY, ET AL.,
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable John F. Dooling, Jr., District Judge, presid-
ing, and the issues having been duly tried, and a decision
having been duly rendered it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECLARED that

1. The plaintiffs and plaintiffs intervenors are entitled
to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to
F.R.C.P. Rule 23(a), (b) (1) and (2) on behalf of
medicaid-eligible pregnant women desiring and denied
medicaid abortions because of the federal legislation re-
stricting abortion funding, including medicaid-eligible
pregnant women whose attending physicians have ad-
vised them that abortion is medically necessary in their
cases and who have been denied medicaid abortions be-
cause of the federal legislation restricting abortion fund-
ing, and on behalf of providers of abortions, including
providers of medically necessary abortions.

2. Section 209 of Public Law 94-439 of September 30,
1976, 90 Stat. 1434, Section 101 of Public Law 95-205
of December 9, 1977, 91 Stat. 1460, Section 210 of Public
Law 95-480 of October 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1586, and Sec-
tion 109 of Public Law 96-103 of November 20, 1979,

87

are unconstitutional as applied to abortions that are
necessary in the professional judgment of the pregnant
woman’s atending physician exercised in the light. of all
factors, physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and
the woman’s age, relevant to the health-related well-
being of the pregnant woman.

3. Defendant, her successors in office, agents, servants,
employees, attorneys and those other persons in active
concert and participation with her who receive actual
notice of this order by personal service or aeowies

A. Cease to give effect to Section 209 of Public Law
94-439, Section 101 of Public Law 95-205, Section 210
of Public Law 95-480, and Section 109 of Public Law
96-103 so far as they forbid the making of medicaid pay-
ments for abortions performed by qualified medicaid pro-
viders in cases in which the abortions are necessary in
the professional judgment of the pregnant woman’s at-
tending physician ;

B. Continue to authorize the expenditure of federal
matching funds for medically necessary abortions pro-
vided by duly certified providers for medicaid-eligible
women at the proportionate level and in accordance with
the standard of medical necessity set forth in subpara-
graph 2 above; and

C. Forthwith communicate the substance of this Judg-
ment to the Regional Directors of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, with instructions that
they promptly disseminate that communication to all
State medicaid authorities within their regions, with in-
structions that they in turn communicate it to all local
medicaid authorities and providers of pregnancy-related
care to medicaid-eligible women.

Brooklyn, New York |
January 15, 1980 / a

Approved
January 15, 1980

/s/ John F. Dooling «
JOHN F. DOOLING/
US.D.J.

4

/

88

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 C 1805

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION,
PLAINTIFF

—against—

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable John F. Dooling, Jr., District Judge, presid-
ing, and the issues having been duly tried, and a deci-
sion having been duly rendered, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECLARED that

1. Plaintiff is a qualified provider of medicaid serv-
ices and provides medically necessary abortional services
to medicaid-eligible women ;

2. Section 209 of Public Law 94-489 of September 30,
1976, 90 Stat. 1434, Section 101 of Public Law 95-205
of December 9, 1977, 91 Stat. 1460, Section 210 of Public
Law 95-480 of October 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1586, and
Section 109 of Public Law 96-103 of November 20, 1979,
are unconstitutional as applied to abortions that are
necessary in the professional judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician exercised in the light of all
factors, physical, emotional, psychological, familial and
the woman’s age, relevant to the health-related well-
being of the pregnant woman;

8. Defendant, her successors in office, agents, servants,
employees, attorneys and those other persons in active

89

concert and participation with her who receive actual
notice of this order by personal service or otherwise.

A. Cease to give effect to Section 209 of Public Law
94-439, Section 101 of Public Law 95-205, Section 210
of Public Law 95-480, and Section 109 of Public Law
96-103 so far as they forbid the making of medicaid
payments for abortions performed by qualified medicaid
providers in cases in which the abortions are necessary
in the professional judgment of the pregnant woman’s
attending physician;

B. Continue to authorize the expenditure of federal
matching funds for medically necessary abortions pro-
vided by duly certified providers for medicaid-eligible
women at the proportionate level and in accordance with
the standard of medical necessity set forth in subpara-
graph 2 above; and

C. Forthwith communicate the substance of this Judg-
ment to the Regional Directors of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, with instructions that
they promptly disseminate that communication to all
State medicaid authorities within their regions, with
instructions that they in turn communicate it to all local
medicaid authorities and providers of pregnancy-related
care to medicaid-eligible women.

Brooklyn, New York
January 15, 1980
/s/ Richard H. [Illegibie]
RICHARD H. [ILLEGIBLE]
Approved

January 15, 1980
/s/ John F. Dooling

JOHN F. DOOLING
U.S.D.J.

90

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ. 1804
CokA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

STIPULATION

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the undersigned
parties that the amended complaint in this action filed
January 9, 1978, should be amended as follows:

All allegations and claims should include and in-
corporate a challenge to the Rider to the 1978-79
HEW-Labor Appropriations Bill passed on October
14, 1978 entitled Public Law 95-480. No responsive
pleadings are necessary and all evidence and briefs

submitted are hereby deemed to incorporate the
new rider.

/s/ Janet Benshoof
JANET BENSHOOF
American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016
For All Plaintiffs

paneer een

So Ordered:

/s/ John F. Dooling
JOHN F. DOOLING
U.S.D J.

Dated: November 28, 1978

91

/s/ Richard P. Caro

/8/

/s/

RICHARD CARO

Assistant United Statets
Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York

225 Cadman Plaza

Brooklyn, New York 11201

For Defendant Califano

Gerald Bodell

GERALD BODELL

102 East 35th Street

New York, New York 10016
For Defendant-Intervenors

_ Buckley, et al.

A. Lawrence Washburn

A. LAWRENCE WASHBURN

117 Pennsylvania Avenue

Brooklyn, New York 11207

For Defendant-Intervenor
Pernicone

FD RE OR Fike © A a oe a

92

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CorRA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
DEFENDANT

—and—

SENATOR JAMES L. BUCKLEY, ET AL.,
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

* * * *

2. The defendant Secretary has questioned whether the
case is to be considered a class action, in light of the
vacatur of the 1976 injunction by the Supreme Court, and
plaintiffs show from the record that the successive
amendments of the complaint have been made on the
basis that the case has been a class suit from the be-
ginning and has been continued as such. The original
Memorandum and Order on the injunction motion de-
termined the class and standing issues and it had been
assumed that there was no issue on these points. How-
ever, it may be best to go over the ground again.

The evidence has left no doubt that the class of Medi-
caid-eligible women who, with their physicians, have de-
cided to terminate their pregnancies before viability is
too numerous for all to be joined in this action, and that
the class of providers of the medical service required for

the performance of such legal abortion services who are |

es re ale ee ee ek ee te el dt ee ee Bt eS ee >

Oe

93

qualified and willing to render such service is too numer-
ous for all to be joined in the action. The issues of law
and the issues of fact relevant to the determination of
the issues of law presented by the case are common to
all members of each class, and the claims of the plaintiff
members of each of the classes are typical of the claims
of ali other members of the class. The plaintiffs, as they
have been represented in this case, have fairly and ade-
quately protected the interests of the classes and will con-
tinue to do so. The action is one within Rule 23(b) (1)
and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
action has to this date in fact been maintained as a class
action and it should continue to be so maintained. The
two classes are defined substantially as described in the
amended complaint filed January 9, 1978:

1, The class of pregnant or potentially pregnant
women who are eligible for medical assistance pro-
vided under their state plans, who with their phy-
sicians have decided on abortions; for whom abor-
tions are medically necessary; who have been, are
or will be prevented or impeded in obtaining medi-
cal termination of their pregnancies by Public Law
94-439, Section 209, Public Law 95-205, Section
101, and Public Law 95-480, Section 210. The
class includes women of all religious and non-
religious persuasions and beliefs who have, in ac-
cordance with the teaching of their religion and/or
the dictates of their conscience determined that an
abortion is necessary; and

2. The class of duly licensed and Medicaid certified
providers of abortional services to eligible women
who are prevented or impeded from performing
and/or certifying abortions for the class of women
represented by the plaintiff women because of the
lack of Medicaid reimbursement.

8. Counsel will have observed that the page number-
ing of the transcripts for September 6 and December 4,
1978, duplicates that of earlier transcripts. In order to
make certain that there will be no confusion in citation,

SR RE eae ener ne ee

94

I have asked the Court Reporter to renumber the pages
of the September 6, 1978 transcript through the conclu-
sion of Congressman Hyde’s testimony.

It is so ORDERED.

Brooklyn, New York

January 29, 1979.
/s/ John F. Dooling
JOHN F. DOOLING
U; &- a.

95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ. 1804 (JFD)
CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

PATRICIA HARRIS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

ORDER AMENDING COMPLAINT

Upon the agreement of the parties, it is hereby ordered
that the Amended Complaint in this action filed January
9, 1978, shall be amended as follows:

All allegations and claims shall include and incor-
porate a challenge to the rider to the Fiscal Year
1980 Labor-HEW Appropriations enacted by joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 440), and entitled Pub. L. No.
96-123, § 109.

It is further ordered that no responsive pleadings are
necessary and all evidence and briefs submitted are
hereby deemed to incorporate the new rider.

/s/ John F. Dooling, Jr.
JOHN F. DOOLING, JR.

U.S.D.J.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York

January 15, 1980

96

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 C 1804
CoRA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DEFENDANT

—and—

SENATORS JAMES L. BUCKLEY, ET AL.,
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS

ORDER

The parties stipulated the authenticity of Exhibits Nos.
300-454 and 456-471 for identification, and defendant and
defendant-intervenors objected to their receipt in evi-
dence on grounds of relevancy and competency; final rul-
ing on their admissibility was reserved until the de-
termination of the case on the merits because a part of
the defense contentions was that the dispositive legal is-
sues in the case required decision of the case without
reference to the existence or content of the types of ma-
terial embraced in the exhibits, and plaintiffs contended
that the First Amendment issues could not be resolved
without considering the nature and content of the exhibits
and their place in the movement for the adoption of a
“pro-life amendment” and the successive “Hyde Amend-
ments.” As indicated by the decision, the objection to
the receipt of the exhibits in evidence has been overruled
and they have been considered and relied upon to the ex-
tent. indicated in the decision; to the extent that, the ex-

97

hibits are or contain hearsay the i

y have not been received
and considered for the truth of the matter asserted but
have been received and considered on the basis that their
publication and dissemination formed a part of the abor-

tion debate and were an element of i
pew the ambience of the

It is so ORDERED.
Brooklyn, New York
February 14, 1980

/s/ John F. Dooling, Jr.
JOHN F. DOOLING, Jr.
Uv. 8. DB. Fg,

98

RT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ.
CorRA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
Vv.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MICHIGAN )
Ss. :

COUNTY OF WASHTENAW )

JOHAN W. Euiot, M.D., having duly affirmed, deposes

and says: pe
re ; : ae we

. I am a physician with special skills in e c

of pation: pia the performance of abortions, and
have Board certification in Pediatrics and in Ergin
Medicine, with specialization in maternal and i he J"
and adolescent medicine. My offices are at the a o>
ment of Community Health Services, School of Public
Health, University of Michigan, and at 912 North Main
Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. I reside at 1027 Miller

Arbor, Michigan. +e
“—? = a member of the class of Medicaid-certified

providers of abortional services to Medicaid-eligible
1s ie making this Affidavit in support of a tempor-
ary restraining order and preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the imminent cut-off of federal reimbursement for
abortions if the Hyde amendment is implemented.

a ee

99

4. I am making this Affidavit to call to this Court’s
attention the impact the implementation of the Hyde
Amendment will have in the State of Michigan.

5. Currently in the State of Michigan there is federal
reimbursement for abortions for Medicaid-eligible women
under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

6. In 1975 the Michigan State Legislature enacted
legislation restricting payment for abortion from Medi-
caid funds to cases of therapeutic abortion for “medical
necessity.” The Department of Social Services issued a
bulletin on this subject (10/22/75) stating that “docu-
mentation of medical necessity” must be provided for
therapeutic abortions. The Executive Director of the
Washtenaw County League for Planned Parenthood,
Carol Peacock, called the Department of Social Services in
Lansing to ask what constituted “medical necessity.” She
was told that this referred to medical conditions only, and
did not include emotional or mental health considerations,
and that therapeutic abortion applied to “life-death situa-
tions” only, where “the mother is in danger of losing her
life.” Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General of Michi-
gan, Frank Kelley, issued a ruling that the new law was
not in conformity with the United States Supreme Court
decision in Roe versus Wade, and that the law was there-
fore judged to be unconstitutional and therefore inopera-
tive. The Hyde amendment passed by Congress under re-
view by this Court bears a considerable resemblance to
the Michigan legislation of 1975. I would therefore ex-
pect, if it were put in effect, that the Michigan Depart-
ment of Social Services would issue equally restrictive
interpretive regule‘ions. The result would very probably
be that nearly all Michigan Medicaid patients needing
and desiring an abortion would be denied payment for it
under Medicaid.

7. I seek to represent both the claims of the class of
doctors, and the claims of the class of pregnant Medi-
caid-eligible women.

8. I am the Medical Director for the Washtenaw
County League for Planned Parenthood Clinic located at
912 North Main Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. This

ee ee a

ee Fae WK Pee

100

clinic is incorporated as a nonprofit medical clinic which
provides abortion, contraceptive and minor gynecological
care to women, and vasectomy for men. Last year I per-
formed 872 abortions. The clinic performed 2533 abor-
tions. Approximately six percent of these were reim-
bursed under Title XIX. About six percent of the income
of the clinic ($26,600) is from federally reimbursed abor-
tions.

9. If the Hyde Amendment is not restrained, I and
other physicians at the Washtenaw County League for
Planned Parenthood will have to refuse to do virtually
any abortions for Medicaid-eligible women becase the
Washtenaw County League for Planned Parenthood will
receive no reimbursement, and this agency can afford to
do very few free abortions. We shall be denying many
poor women abortions I consider medically necessary.
However, we would have to increase our fees for all
women seeking abortions.

10. I and two other physicians on the staff of the
Washtenaw County League for Planned Parenthood treat
many pregnant Medicaid-eligible women who seek abor-
tions which are medically necessary for many reasons.
For example, I present summaries of five cases:

Case 1.

A 19-year-old woman was threatened with a knife
and was raped by an unidentified tall man on a less-
traveled residential street, at night. Because there
had been a series of rapes in the area within the
past month, she was terrified that she might be
targeted for further attack if she attempted to re-
port it. Two months later, pregnancy symptoms
forced her to seek help. Because she was currently
jobless and without income, she was helped to apply
for Medicaid. Her abortion was uncomplicated, but
she was given supplementary counselling, both be-
fore and after the procedure to assist her in emo-
tional adjustment to this traumatic experience.

101
Case 2.

A 33-year-old mother of three children was fur-
loughed from the state mental hospital, for weekends
at home with her family, after nine months of treat-
ment for a cyclic depressive state for which she had
been under treatment for several years. Although
she had been prepared for her home furlough by
fitting with a diaphragm, and used it conscientiously,
she became pregnant, apparently on her second visit
home. The family had low income, as the husband
was only intermittently employed, and the family
already received welfare assistance. The patient was
much disturbed at discovery of the pregnancy and
her doctors judged it definitely inadvisable for her
mental health to try to carry the pregnancy to term.
With Medicaid support she was promptly given an
abortion, with careful counselling. She recovered
quickly and well, and seemed to be continuing her
progressive mental health improvement when last
seen two months later.

Case 8.

A 30-year-old woman was greatly burdened by
care of two retarded children. She urgently re-
quested an abortion because she found herself un-
expectedly pregnant despite use of an intrauterine
device. She feared that this pregnancy might pro-
duce another retarded child, and that even if the
child were normal, the burdens of care for the two
older retarded children would deprive her of time
and energy to give the new child the physical care
and loving attention needed for normal growth. Her
pregnancy was terminated uneventfully, with Medi-
caid financial assistance, and she was provided with
information and referred for a tubal ligation, at her

request.
Case 4.

A young woman, 1€ years old, came to the clinic
in great distress, with knowledge, permission and
support of her mother, but without knowledge of her

ne

102

father or foster brother. She requested an early
abortion with deep and bitter regret, as the preg-
nancy was the result of a momentary lapse of self
control in relation to her foster brother, who was not
a blood relation, and with whom she had fallen
deeply in love. She recognized that there was no pos-
sibility at all of carrying through with a marriage
in this situation, and that if the pregnancy were
known to her father and foster brother, very severe
emotional ‘eactions would ensue which were likely to
split the family asunder, with great mental anguish
for all. The family was not well off, and was regis-
tered already for Medicaid assistance, so that it was
possible to terminate this pregnancy in a confiden-
tial manner with Medicaid financing. The mental
health of this young woman, both present and future,
and the integrity of this family, were preserved.

Case 5.

A 14-year-old deaf young woman with juvenile

diabetes was brought by her mother for termina-

tion of a pregnancy that resulted from a transient
affair with a young man who took advantage of
this socially handicapped young woman. While the
diabetes was under adequate control and a preg-
nancy could quite possibly have been successfully
managed with good and intensive obstetric care,
there was clearly increased risk to this young woman
and to her infant if the pregnancy were allowed to
continue. There would, in addition, have been inter-
ruption of her schooling, and impairment of her emo-
tional adjustment, as she was greatly distressed by
the reality of her situation and very much wanted
the abortion. It was carried out with Medicaid as-
sistance, since her mother was divorced and already
receiving welfare assistance.

Minor details of these cases have been altered or omitted
so as to make specific identification of persons very un-
likely.

a .

NO SO mem)

103

These are several examples of abortions which I con-
sider medically necessary, but which I have to refuse to
do if the Hyde Amendment is implemented, because the
woman’s life was not in danger in any of these cases.

11. The Washtenaw County League for Planned
Parenthood, of which I am the Medical Director, is the
only provider for Medicaid abortions in Washtenaw
County, with the exception of a small number of very
sick women, whose pregnancies cannot safely be ter-
minated in a clinic. If the Hyde Amendment is imple-
mented, approximately 150 Medicaid-eligible women in
the area who need abortions will be denied services per
year. The only other provider, the University Hospital,
will have great financial difficulty in providing abortions
for the very sick women now cared for there, if the Hyde
Amendment is implemented. I don’t know of any chari-
table institutions or other organizations which will be
able to provide free abortions for all those women who
need them, much as they might wish to.

12. I also feel that the unavailability of safe legal
abortion will put an unconscionable pressure on poor
women to avoid pregnancy at all costs, thereby coercing
them into being sterilized, at an earlier age than they
might really be ready for this step.

13. I consider the cut-off of federal funds for abor-
tions to be an unconscionable interference with my ability
to render necessary medical treatment and the right of
my Medicaid-eligible patients to receive it. I consider this
impending cut-off of funds to be a violation of my con-
stitutional rights as well as those of my pregnant pa-
tients.

14. If a restraining order is not granted by this Court,
the Washtenaw County League for Planned Parenthood
will suffer irreparable harm, both financially and profes-
sionally, in what it will be unable to render some of its
patients the medical care they need, and it will lose
approximately six percent of its income.

15. Pregnant Medicaid-eligible patients will also suffer
irreparable harm if a restraining order is not granted.
I believe, in Washtenaw County alone, up to 150 Medi-

104

caid-eligible women who need abortions will seek cheap,
illegal abortions, try to self-abort, or try to carry un-
wanted and health-threatening pregnancies to term.
Deaths and serious health problems are likely to result
from these procedures.

16. A temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction was sought previously from this Court, and
was granted. This present motion involves new con-
siderations arising from the Supreme Court’s order of
June 29, 1977. Since the Supreme Court order of June
29, I have not made a similar application to this or any
other court.

17. Because of the imminence of the irreparable harm
that would be caused by the implementation of the Hyde
Amendment, I am advised by my attorneys that it may
be necessary ‘to proceed by order to show cause.

WHEREAS, affiant respectfully moves this Court for
a temporary and preliminary injunction against the im-
plementation of the Hyde Amendment.

/s/ Johan W. Eliot, M.D.
JOHAN W. ELIOT, M.D.
Affirmed before me this
24th day of July, 1977

DUANE G. WEBER
Notary Public, Washtenaw County, Mich.
My Commission Expires August 18, 1979

/3s/ Duane G. Weber
DUANE G. WEBER
Notary Public

105

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ.
CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
Vv.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
) 98:
COUNTY OF NEW LONDON )

Mary Dok, being duly sworn deposes and says:

1. I reside at 48 Franklin Street, New London, Con-
necticut, and I am eligible for Medicaid through the Con-
necticut Department of Social Services.

2. 1 am 19 weeks pregnant and want to have an
abortion. I am making this Affidavit to intervene and
for a temporary restraining order to restrain the im-
plementation of the Hyde Amendment.

3. I am 19 years old. I am not married. I have 4
children, aged 5 years, 4 years, 3 years, and 11 months
old.

4. On July 29, 1977, I went to the office of Dr. David
Bingham at 159 Sachem Street, Norwich, Connecticut,
to request an abortion. He informed me that a new law
may prohibit any federal or state reimbursement for
abortions except those necesary to save the life of the
mother and that they cannot admit me to the hospital
to do this operation unless payment to the hospital is
made in advance.

ore
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x at Taha ge sat zy te Moopet haerrk
=—2)., Jo erie era Ns or. oak ry BS oP nhs AE ee

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fe Pee bee ee

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ee LSE TE 6 Et yaar Bete, - 7 tor Sys

106

5. I cannot afford to pay for an abortion myself, and
without Medicaid reimbursement, I cannot obtain a safe,
legal abortion.

6. I have been told by Dr. Bingham that he can sched-
ule an abortion for me if the Hyde Amendment does not
go into effect and they are assured of reimbursement.

7. If Iam unable to obtain an abortion at the hospital,
I will try to end the pregnancy in any way I can.

8. If I am unable to end the pregnancy, I believe I
may take my own life.

MARY DOE (not my real name)
/s/ Mary Doe

Sworn to before me this
29th day of July, 1977
Norwich, New London County, Connecticut

/s/ Harry Swetsburg
HARRY SWETSBURG
Notary Public

July 29, 1977

sini mee

107

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ.
CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
Vv.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
)

COUNTY OF NEW LONDON )

Dr. David B. Bingham, being duly sworn, deposes and
Says:

1. I am a member of the class of doctors in this action.

2. I am engaged in private practice at 159 Sachem
Street, Norwich, Connecticut.

3. I have examined Mary Doe and find she is 19 weeks
pregnant. I feel an abortion is medically necessary for
her because of an overt depression with suicida] thoughts
and because I believe she would try to terminate the
pregnancy herself if unable to obtain a safe abortion.

4. If a restraining order is not obtained and the
Hyde Amendment goes into effect, I will not be able to
do an abortion on Mary Doe because I will be unable
to admit her to the hospital without guaranteed payment
for the hospitalization.

5. I feel that without an abortion Jane Doe risks se-
rious and permanent health problems if she is forced to
carry the pregnancy to term. She is not covered by the
Hyde Amendment, however, because I believe I could pre-

———e ew

108

vent a suicide, and could prevent fatal complications of
a self-induced abortion.

Dr. DAVID B. BINGHAM
/s/ Dr. David B. Bingham

Sworn to before me this
29 day of July, 1977
Norwich, New London County, Connecticut

/s/ Harry Swetsburg
HARRY SWETSBURG
Notary Public

July 29, 1977

~~ ao

109

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ.
CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
Vv.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MINNESOTA )
SS. 4
COUNTY OF RAMSEY )

JANE DOE, being duly sworn deposes and says:

1. I reside at 1007 Grove St. Brainerd, Minnesota
56401, and I am eligible for Medicaid through the Min-
nesota Department of Social Services.

2. I am eight weeks pregnant, and want to have an
abortion. I am making this Affidavit to intervene and
for a temporary restraining order to restrain the imple-
mentation of the Hyde Amendment.

3. I am 25 years old. I am married with four living
children. Following the birth of my third child in No-
vember of 1976, I developed a serious case of phlebitis
from which I have not completely recovered. Carrying
another pregnancy to term would greatly aggravate this
condition and increase the risk of blood clots to the lung.

4. On July 29, 1977, I went to the Fertility Control
Clinic at St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota
to request an abortion. They informed me that a new
law prohibits any federal reimbursement for abortions
except those necessary to save the life of the mother

110

and that they cannot afford to do this operation free
for me. :

5. I cannot afford to pay for an abortion myself, an
without’ Medicaid reimbursement, I cannot obtain a safe,
legal abortion. According to the doctor, Dr. Jane E.
Hodgson, without an abortion I might suffer serious and
permanent health problems.

6. I have been told by the Fertility Control Clinic
that they can schedule an abortion for me if the Hyde
Amendment does not go into effect and they are assured
of reimbursement. Without Medicaid I would have to
deprive my children of the actual necessities in order
to pay for the procedure.

/s/ Jane Doe

: JANE DOE
Sworn to before me this
29 day of July, 1977

/s/ Carol J. Muellner
CAROL J. MUELLNER
Notary Public
Ramsey County
My Comm. Expires Nov. 1, 1978

111

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

76 Civ.

CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
Vv.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., DEFENDANT

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MINNESOTA _)

SS.:
COUNTY OF RAMSEY )

Dr. JANE E. Hopcson, being duly sworn, deposes and
Says:

1, I am a member of the class of doctors in this action.

2. I work at the Fertility Control Clinic, St. Paul-
Ramsey Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota.

3. I have examined (Jane Doe) and find she is eight
weeks pregnant. I feel an abortion is medically neces-
sary for her because of recent phlebitis.

4. If a restraining order is not obtained and the Hyde
peste are goes ri effect, I will not be able to do a
abortion on (Jan i i
pb stain ol e Doe) because I will receive no

5. I feel that without an abortion (Jane Doe) risks
serious and permanent health problems if she is forced

112

to carry the pregnancy to term. She is not covered (or
I don’t think she is covered) by the Hyde Amendment,
however, because her life is not endangered.

/s/ Jane E, Hodgson, M.D.

JANE E. Hopason, M.D.

Sworn to before me this
29 day of July, 1977

/s/ Carol J. Muellner
CAROL J. MUELLNER
Notary Public
Ramsey County
My Comm. Expires Nov. 1, 1978

113

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, DEFENDANT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT _ )

)
COUNTY OF )

Dr. Jane E. Hodgson, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:

1. I am a named representative of the class of doctors
in this action.

2. I am engaged in teaching and clinical practice at
St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital, St. Paul, Minn.

3. I have examined 15 yr. old Ann Moe, a resident of
Minnesota. She is 11 weeks pregnant. Her family
is currently receiving medical assistance and is un-
able to pay for an abortion.

4. While she might qualify for Medicaid under the
exemption for statutory rape, she became pregnant
more than two months ago. I do not know what
“prompt” reporting means; furthermore the patient
refuses to report because of her desire to protect
her boy friend.

5. The increased risks of pregnancy in the young teen-
ager are generally known (increased incidence of
toxemia, hemorrhage, caesarian section, prematurity,
etc.) However I don’t believe I could certify as to
her life endangerment as required by 1977 Hyde
Amendment.

f
%
‘
:
7
f

og

10.

11.

114

I have called the family physician who referred her
to me. He is not willing to state that “severe and
long lasting physical health damage” would result
from the pregnancy. Therefore she cannot be cer-
tified under the new 1978 Hyde Amendment.

The patient has spent most of the past 3 years in
adolescent psychiatric wards and correctional institu-
tions. There have been repeated episodes of running
away, poor school attendance, and a diagnosis of
schizophrenia.

I feel an abortion is medically necessary for Ann
Moe because of the increased physical risks of preg-
nancy for a teen-ager as well as the increased men-
tal risks for one with her unstable past. I believe
a compulsory pregnancy would result in severe and
long lasting mental health damage.

However I am unable to certify her under either
the 1977 or 1978 Hyde Amendments standards. I
cannot obtain two physician certificates certifying
that severe and long lasting physical health damage
would result if her pregnancy were carried to term.
And even if I could, the interpretation of her ap-
plication by the Minnesota Medical Assistance Pro-
gram, Department of Public Welfare is very uncer-
tain to me. On 12-21-77 the Department of Public
Welfare rejected my application for abortion of an
18 year old victim of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis
already the mother of one. Her application was sup-
ported by letters from two physicians as well as the
Mayo Clinic. (See attached rejection slip). Whether
the Department of Public Welfare is applying 1977
or 1978 standards is uncertain and their interpreta-
tions of each law have been inconsistent and ar-
bitrary.

While Ann’s age (15) should entitle her to come un-
der statutory rape in Minnesota, I am unaware of
the exact requirements.

Because the St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital will not extend
credit to Ann Moe without the assurance of Medic-

12.

115
aid payment, she will be unable to obtain an abor-
tion and will suffer irreparable harm.

I have used a pseudonym for the above name pa-
tient in order to preserve her privacy rights.

/s/ Dr. Jane Hodgson
Dr. JANE HODGSON

Sworn to before me this
4 day of January 1978.
STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF RAMSEY

/s/ Berniece F. Wersal

BERNIECE F’. WERSAL
Notary Public, Ramsey County, Minn.
My Commission Expires Feb. 6, 19. .

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117
[SEAL]

SAINT PAUL-RAMSEY HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101

612-221-3718

October 7, 1977

Department of
Obstetrics & Gynecology

Ismail Barrada, M.D.

Charles H. Blomquist, Ph.D.
William F. Dickes, M.D.

Laura E. Edwards, M.D.

Erick Y. Hakanson, M.D.

Jane E. Hodgson, M.D.

Michael F.. Koszalka, M.D.

Gary T. Lundborg, M.D.
Bonnie J. Stickles, M.S.N., C.J.

To whom this may concern:
Re:

The above 18 year old patient has been a victim of
juvenile rheumatoid arthritis which has incapacitated
her to the extent that she required tutoring at home dur-
ing the last two years of schooling. In November of 1976
she was delivered by cesarean section of a term preg-
nancy. During her pregnancy she was incapacitated most
of the time.

At the present time she was found to be 20 weeks
pregnant by ultrasound. Due to menstrual irregularities
she did not suspect that she was pregnant until two
weeks ago, on 9-26-77, when she was diagnosed as being
pregnant at the Mayo Clinic, 3 mo. Subsequently an
ultrasound done at St. Paul-Ramsey revealed a 20 week
gestation. The patient is requesting interruption of preg-
nancy on the basis of her pre-existing medical condition.
Letters are enclosed from her physician, Tames E. Brown,
as well as a copy of a medical evaluation at the Mayo
Clinic written on June 1, 1976.

118

If this pregnancy is to be terminated, it must be done
so immediately because of the advanced stage of the

pregnancy.
/s/ Jane E. Hodgson, M.D.

JANE E. Hopcson, M.D.

JEH:mr
Enclosures: 2

119

Proud, M.D. 1515 CHARLES AVENUE
Ahrend, M.D. SAINT PAUL
Brown, M.D. MINN.

55104

; October 6, 1977
Dr. Jane Hodgson

640 Jackson Street

St. Paul, Minnesota 55101

Re:
Dear. Dr. Hodgson:

The above named patient has been intermittently under
my care for some time. She suffers from chronic active
rheumatoid arthritis. This has necessitate usuage of
several drugs including Indocin on a regular basis. It
is noteable that this drug is contraindicated in pregnancy.
It is my understanding that the patient is presently
pregnant. I feel that her chronic disease and drug ther-
apy make the pregnancy inimical to both her and the
baby’s future welfare.

Sincerely
/s/ James E. Brown

JAMES E. BROWN, M.D.
JEB/DHB

120

[MAYO CLINIC COPY]

June 1, 1976
3-202-951
Harold R. Mundahl, M.D.
1703 Selby Avenue
St. Paul, Minnesota 55104

Dear Doctor Mundahl:

Miss [name deleted] was seen at the Mayo Clinic
from May 14, 1976, through May 26, 1976, for an
evaluation of her arthritis. Shari does have rheumatoid
arthritis which has been present the last three years
and currently her knees and feet were giving her the
most trouble. She was having one to two hours of morn-
ing stiffness. Shé has been homebound the last two years
and has not gone to school, but has received tutoring at
home. Her program has consisted of aspirin 6 to 8
tablets a day and she has been on Sterazolidin, Indocin,
and Motrin without success and has been on four or five
short courses of a cortisone preparation.

Her weight was 125 pounds and blood pressure in the
left arm was 100/60. She had mild acne about the face
and a warty eruption over the right third toe. The
uterus was enlarged 214 times the normal size. There
was synovitis of the elbows, right wrist, right third
metacarpohalangeal joint bilaterally and the right third
proximal interphalangeal joint and the left second and
fourth proximal interphalangeal joints. There was syno-
vitis of the knees and a loose body distal and lateral
to the right patella. There was synovitis of the ankles
and and metatarsophalangeal joints of the feet. X-ray
of the knees did not reveal any bony changes. The
hemoglobin was 10.5 mg. per cent (normal 12 to 15)
with diminished mean corpuscular volume at 67, normal
84 to 99. The flocculation test for rheumatoid factor was
reactive at a titer of 1:40. The erythrocyte sedimenta-
tion rate was elevated at 34 mm. in one hour (normal
up to 20). The following laboratory tests were within
normal limits: electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, urinalysis,
white blood count 8,200, platelet count 376,000, serum

121

protein electrophoresis normal, cervical Papanicolaou
smear negative, antinuclear antibody negative, ART se-
rology nonreactive, potassium 3.8 mEq. per liter, calcium
9.3 mg. per cent, glucose 79 mg. per cent, alkaline phos-
phatase 82 units per liter, serum glutamic oxalacetic
transminase 9 units per liter, uric acid 2.9 mg. per cent,
and creatinine .8 mg. per cent.

[Name deleted] was instructed in a program of phys-
ical therapy and advised to take Ascriptin 3 tablets four
times a day for her rheumatoid arthritis. It will con-
tinue to be important for her to get an extra amount
of rest. The situation at this time is complicated by
the fact that she is pregnant. Dr. L. A. Aaro, gynecol-
ogist, evaluated [name deleted] on two occasions and
on May 26, 1976, he felt that she was at about 10 to
12 weeks gestation, the fetal heart tones were detected
and the ultrasound beta scan confirmed the pregnancy.

Because of the pregnancy, I would not consider any
other modalities of treatment for the rheumatoid ar-
thritis other than rest, physical therapy, and Ascriptin.
If her feet continue to give her difficulty it might be
reasonable for her to have metatarsal bars placed on her
shoes. If we can be of any further assistance, please
contact us.

Sincerely,

D. L. CONN, M.D.

DLC :tjp

_—— .- Pee Ss ew eee a le

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122

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, DEFENDANT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
)
COUNTY OF )

ADDENDUM to affidavit of 1-2-78 regarding Susan
Roe. ;

What I have said regarding the uncertainties of in-
terpretation of both the 1977 and 1978 Hyde Amend-
ments by the Minnesota State Welfare Department, ap-
plies equally well to Susan Roe. In her case I could not
certify that an immediate second pregnancy would be
“life-endangering” nor could I obtain two consultants who
could certify to “long lasting and serious physical health
damage”. And if I did obtain such written opinions,
they have had no apparent effect upon the final inter-
pretation by the State Welfare Department. (based on
my experience with rejection of case referred to in af-
fidavit regarding Ann Moe.)

/s/ Jane E. Hodgson, M.D.
JANE E. HODGSON, M.D.
Sworn to before me this
4th day of January, 1978
STATE OF MINNESOTA
COUNTY OF RAMSEY

/s/ Berniece F. Wersal
BERNIECE F’. WERSAL
Notary Public, Ramsey County, Minn.
My Commission Expires Feb. 5, 19..

123

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CorA MCRAE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
—against—

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, DEFENDANT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
) ss:
COUNTY OF )

Susan Roe, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

(1) I am a Minnesota resident and am receiving Medi-
cal Assistance.

(2) Due to contraceptive failure, I am 15 weeks preg-
nant and want to have an abortion. I am making this
affidavit to intervene as a

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0569%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
