# Petition — Air Freight Haulage Co. v. Ryd-Air, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 444 U.S. 864

## Text

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In cries JUL 5 1979
Supreme Court of the TWnited | Me oon se. cue

OCTOBER THERM, 1978
W9-2%

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Ain Fretaur Taunacn Co., INne.,

Petitioner,
against

Ryp-Air, Inc., Am Carao, Inc., Ryper System, Ino., AMeri-
CAN Ainuines, Inc., Mastenn Aimnines, Inc., Norrarasr
Ainuines, Inc., Arm Canapa, AnLeacueny Atruines, INc.,
Snanive Armways, Ine., Brarrisu Overseas Arnways Conrpe.,
Decra Arruines, Inec., Fnying Tiger Lines, [nc., MonawKk
Ainuinns, Inc., Nartonan Ainways, Inc., New Yorn Arr-
ways, Inc.,, Norrawest Amunes, Ine., Ozark Arkiines,
Inc., Pan American Wortpo Aiways, Ine., Prepmont
Aviation, Inc., Atruier PNrernationaL, [NC., SEABOARD
Wortp Atiuines, Inc., Sournern Airways, INe,

, TRANS
Wornp Ai Lines, Inc., Unrren Ain Lines, Ine.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Guy L. Hrtnemann
Attorney for Petitioner
866 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
(212) 753.1400

Kpowarp M. Cuikorsky,
Miron Horowrrz,
of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions of the Courts Below ..........-......45.
GER CERCA SAV EGD AAV ord watecesdecins
Er a ee ee eee
Le ey are ne
RO SU MN aviv acaba nsdsterreccecss

CN CSW has 92 60h VedNd Ord Kowa ed 55sec

Statement of FMissential Facts .....................
Reasons For Grantine tHe Writ:

Port One—The combination of all the airlines, in
forming their own exelusive trucking enterprise
constituted a per se violation of Seetion One of
ee I CGO ay sabia e Cea bres esanes

Ne te eabeaee

A. Respondents’ Conduet Constituted A Collee-
SOU MU OO MR ss isha des acecertyecss

B. The Airlines Through the Ryd-Air Venture
Mngaged in Industry-Wide Price-Fixing of
Pick-Up and Delivery Rates ...............

Point Two—The relevant market is the service of
pick-up and delivery for all the Airlines in New
ETE ES = Ga

III ict a oi

I na re ore

APPENDIX!

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the See-
IS a SO

Opinion, United States Distriet Court for the South-
ern Distriet of New York ......;... ides vas

RENE A TE Se

.)
9

24

il TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE
Air Freight Haulage Co., Inc. v. Ryd-Atr, Inc., 408

F Upp. G60 TDN. 2c TPC) oie venciccawenscces 6, 7
Big Bear Cartage, Inc. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F.Supp.

DOR CMAN CMs BRON Vac ccsunekeusSeakeeuckets 10

Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d
767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932
EeWee Chis 4 ue Kent bnrens Catan eiee eens 4, 6,9, 10, 15

Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S, 294 (1962) .... 21

Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educa-
tional Advertising Service, Inc., 516 F.2d 1092
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986

(ROVE Bh be sich mati ad este cetae lin keaaenen 20, 21, 22
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164
SE METS Sw cawend eas abun Ceee akan s 12

E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972),

cert. dened, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ...........005 14
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airtines, Inc., 409

Sees Ne CRD” ws. ba 00 dd and wk 0k 30s HEA OS 10
International Boxing Club, Inc, v. United States, 358

Sh VEO 5 kdic cdc wecnake ced Vans ceewken 22
Jim Cain v. Air Cargo, Inc., —— F.2d —— (9th Cir.,

June 26, 1979, Dkt. No. 77-1461) ............5. 10, 15
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagrams & Sons, 340 US, 211

bh Pee ee ee or Te ere tee 11
Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Ilale Stores, 359 U.S. 207

CRUE: vides Gakks cam kke eons hau tes wees 11, 13
Nat. Society of Professional Engineers v. United

States, 4385 U.S. 679 (1978) .......ccceccecnee 17,18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ill
PAGE

Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 340 (1978) ......... 12

Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.

Se BAUS vviaw's bonnes bores Ve CETROE eee 12
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282

Se te CEDOD 50s Aes wha Pea cae eee eae kc hes 13
Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.

cg) BRA a one cane a EMSA Ee” Mere bara dey fhe 10
St. Pau Fire & Marme Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S.

RRP vic ds a VRS GN Lh FERS ER TE ere the 13
United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ...... 13
United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S.

Ne RTD bis via Ricans ks Cae eae bad we Mees 18, 22
United States v. Crowell, Collier & McMillan, 361 F.

Supp: 560 (B.D. 2s TRO) ads cn tecy swe eaiany 23
United States v. FE. 1, duPont de Nemours & Co., 351

Rae, Oe Ls ok Keke wes ree eae ai 21
United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282

ae | Ore ec ORE OE Een ere 13
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S, 127

PE res fe eee ee So ceug ier es ea vemae 14

United States v. Grimnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) 22

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 478
PM EE. , SUMP reors tedieet re Nereen Lg he? pan 23

United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967) ........ 17

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S, 596
CATR. armen PEAS Rec AAS Ha RRR EAN Re ENR AS 13

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Agency Decisions:

Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850 (1952) i)

Air Freight Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536
(20GR) «02 ciiclsciaviee nobis Cesar eka One er ees 9)

Statutes:

1b U.S.C. § 1 (Section One of the Sherman Act) .. passim

15 U.S.C. § 2 (Seetion Two of the Sherman Act) . .3, 6,8,

18, 23

15 U.S.C. $18 (Section Seven of the Clayton
AMR) oni ccd beens ee eee 3, 6, 18, 23

49 U.S.C. § 1882 (Section 412 of the Federal Aviation
Abt) .. .itnaskaia ecient ene 4,9

49 U.S.C. § 1884 (Former Section 414 of the Federal
Aviation B@Q) i.:.00 .

8

will show at the trial that the airlines in fact knew
the material facts involved in the formation of Ryd-
Air and ratified its formation.

It must be remembered that the airlines own 100%
of the stock of ACI and control the actions of ACT’s
management through a board of directors comprised
of airline vice presidents.

Id., p. 14 (Emphasis in original).

Despite Respondents’ own position that ACI acted spe-
cifically at the direction of the airlines, the Distriet Court,
without any factual basis, found that ACI acted independ-
ently in making the crucial decision to replace all existing
independent truckers with Ryd-Air. Accordingly, the Dis-
trict Court rejected Petitioner’s contentions that Respond-
ents’ actions were collective in nature and constituted a
per se violation of Section One. Without explanation, the
District Court made no finding on Petitioner’s price-fixing
claim, despite undisputed evidence of uniform price-fixing
resulting from the Ryd-Air venture.*

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seeond Cireuit, a panel consisting of Cireuit Judges
Mulligan, Timbers and Van Graafeiland heard oral argu-
ment on April 2, 1979. On April 6, 1979, the Court of
Appeals entered judgment affirming the District Court
without opinion.**

* Similarly, without explanation, the Distriet Court made no
findings at all with respect to Petitioner’s claim of conspiracy to
monopolize (15 U.S.C. § 2).

** Counsel for Petitioner is constrained to suggest that the is-
sues raised by this antitrust case were not meaningfully reviewed
by the panel of Judges of the Seeond Cirenit that heard the
appeal. The panel affirmed the judgment on the opinion of the
District Judge. Sinee the District Judge did not even decide two
of Plaintiff's claims (price-fixing and conspiracy to monopolize),
the abruptness of this appellate determination, in light of the
seriousness of the issues—dealing with an industry-wide combina-
tion—was indeed puzzling.

.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT |

POINT ONE

The combination of all the airlines, in forming
their own exclusive trucking enterprise constituted a
per se violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.

Introduction

The immunity from antitrust liability hitherto enjoy ed
by the airline industry has been described as the brosuest
ever granted any segment of American industry. As a
general rule, the airlines, often agreeing among them-
selves to perform certain tasks in common or to create
industry-wide standardization, submitted such agreements
to the CAB for approval, and often for continued sur-
veillance by the Board.* As a result of such regula-
tion, the antitrust implications of the airline-ACT relation-
ship to the air freight trucking market has, in the past,
normally been shielded from judicial serutiny by the
Federal Aviation Act to the extent that CAB orders ap-
proved specific activities.**

* Indeed, the 1947 CAB order approving the airlines’ creation
of ACI noted the Board’s belief that “the future development of
Air Cargo, Ine. is uncertain and . . . its activities may require
future reconsideration of the approval granted herein.’’ Breen,
supra, 470 F, 2d at 774 n. 7 (emphasis added). Notably, on two
oceasions when the airlines sought CAB approval to expand ACI’s
activities, the CAB refused on antitrust grounds. See, eg., Local
Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 854 (1952); Air Freight
Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 625-26 (1955).

** Where agreements affecting air transportation were approved
by the CAB, any person affected by such an order was automati-
cally exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws (49 U.S.C.
former § 1384), since the CAB, in approving such an agreement,

is required to consider “the promotion of adequate . . . service
by air carriers . . . without unjust diserimination . . . or un-
fair . . . competitive practices . . .” (49 U.S.C. § 1802). The

(footnote continued on following page)

10

Because of this immunity, predicated upon the regulated
nature of the industry, there are few judicial decisions
analyzing the antic. npetitive effect of industry-wide agree-
ments among airlines, such as the one in this case dealing
with air freight trucking.* Thus, despite anticompetitive
practices in their trucking activities, the airlines (and ACI)
have sometimes been held immune from antitrust liabil-
ity.** However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that the airlines’ trucking agent, ACI, was not
immune from antitrust liability when, acting beyond the
scope of its original authority, it involved itself in the
actual organization of the trucking industry. Jim Cain v.
Air Cargo, Ine. F.2d —— (9th Cir., June 26, 1979,
Dkt. No. 77-1461).

In this case the airlines in New York departed dramat-
icaly from their past practice of having ACI merely super-
vise contracts be'ween the airlines and independent truck-
ers. Instead, the airlines themselves, using ACT as “agent”,
combined to form a new trucking company, Ryd-Air,
taking a substantial ownership interest, and agreed to use
this new enterprise as their exclusive trucker in New York
City, excluding all independent truckers. This agreement,
unlike previous airline trucking agreements, was never
disclosed to the CAB, prompting the Court of Appeals to
deny it exemption from the antitrust laws. Breen Air
Freight Ltd., swpra.***

(footnote continued from preceding page)

standards governing such authority “are taken from the antitrust
laws themselves. Hughes Tool Company v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973). See new § 1384, effective October
24, 1978, and text, infra at p. 11.

*The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has ex-
pressed the view that control over airline activities which are only
incidental to air transportation is not a proper area for CAB
regulation and immunity. Note, 39 J. Air Lew & Commerce 453,
457n. (1973).

** See, e.g., Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F. 2d 1124 (5th
Cir. 1976); Big Bear Cartage, Inc. vy. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F.Supp.
982 (N.D. Ill. 1976).

*** Perhaps sensing vulnerability on the merits, the Respondents
attempted on appeal below to reassert immunity from the anti-
trust laws, an argument plainly foreclosed by Breen.

. RS

11

In light of the nationwide importance of the airline-ACI
trucking arrangement, this Court is respectfully urged to
grant the writ to consider the application of traditional
antitrust benchmarks of liability to evaluate the industry-
wide conduct of the airlines. Such an evaluation will well
serve the CAB and the airline industry since the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 makes the granting of immunity
discretionary with the CAB. Pub. L. 95-504, § 30(a); 49
U.S.C. § 1384 (reproduced in the Appendix at 18a).

A. Respondents’ Conduct Constituted A Collective
Refusal to Deal

This Court has long held that “the Sherman Act makes
it an offense for [businessmen] to agree among them-
selves to stop selling to particular customers.” Kiefer
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
Yet, the Ryd-Air venture accomplished precisely that,
since all domestic airlines serving New York City agreed
to refuse a trucking contract to any trucker other than
Ryd-Air—their own creation. Petitioner and _ others
whose “trade” was performing trucking for individual
airlines were henceforth precluded from performing these
services because of the airlines’ agreement to use Ryd-Air
on an industry-wide exclusive basis.

The Ryd-Air venture was far more pernicious than the
restraint of trade condemned by this Court in Klor’s, Inc.
v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), in
which “a wide combination consisting of manufacturers,
distributors and a [single] retailer’? by mutual agree-
ment, refused to sell to Klor’s, another retailer. Even
though the boycott of Klor’s was engaged in by only one
other retailer at Klor’s level, this Court unanimous:
condemned such activity as a boycott and as per se illegal.*

* This analysis under Klor’s leaves aside, for the moment, the
vertical integration resulting from all the airlines’ wholly owning

(footnote continued on following page)

12

Notably, in this case, the District Court did not dispute
that joint conduct by the airlines in terminating their ACI
truckers (including Petitioner) would have constituted a
per se restraint of trade under Sherman Act Section One.
Rather, the Court unexplainably and without justification
totally ignored the relationship between the airlines and
ACI and decided the matter solely as a simple unilateral
refusal to deal with the truckers by ACI, as though it were
a separate entity—even though ACI’s sole existence was
as the airlines’ agent and the Ryd-Air contract thus defined
it. This finding, however, was clearly erroneous since Re-
spondents below admitted their conduct was joint. Thus,
Respondents’ ACI and Ryder agreed to form Ryd-Air
(Appellees’ Brief p. 9), which action was authorized by
ACI’s Board (Id., pp. 9-10), which, in turn represented its
airline owners (Id., p. 19 n.). Finally, the ACI-Ryd-Air
contract itself, as well as Appellee’s own Brief (p. 10),
described ACI as “agent for . . . the Air Carriers”.

The District Court apparently read the Second Circuit’s
recent decision in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579
F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 340
(1978) (Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun dissenting),
as controlling this case.* Oreck, Sissies was a single

(footnote continued from preceding p page)

ACI, which itself controlled Ryd-Air. Sueh horizontal industry-
wide ownership of a vertically integrated entity but contributes to
the trade-restraining nature of the Ryd-Air venture.

* While Petitioner does not regard Oreck as controlling, we
note that the Circuits have split on the question of whether a
per se violation is made out when a manufacturer (or a supplier)
and a customer arrange together for the manufacturer or supplier
to eliminate another customer in favor of the first. Compare,
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.
1979) with Oreck, supra and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 248 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 355 U.S.
822 (1957). If the analogy to Oreck is controlling, then the split
in Cireuits should be resolved.

13

manufacturer-distributor termination case. See Comment,
Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors,
92 Harv. L. Rev. 1160 (1979). Petitioner does not dispute
that each individual airline, acting independently, could
legally have terminated any ACI trucker and substituted
another. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
However, the airlines—themselves competitors with each
other for air freight business—could not legally agree to
eliminate competition at the pick-up and delivery level by
agreeing to do business with only one trucker of their

_ mutual choice (and creation). This is because:

“[T Jhe illegality consists, not in the separate action of
each, but in the conspiracy and combination of all to
prevent any of them from dealing with the [targets].”

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
545 (1978).

The airline combination was horizontal at two levels.
First, at the airline level, each airline could not compete
with all the others in the pick-up and delivery of air freight
(both as to price and service). Such a result was illegal.
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611
(1972). Second, at the trucker level, although “the boy-
cotters and the ultimate target need not be in a competitive
relationship with each other,” St. Paul Fire and Marie Ins.
Co., supra, at 543 (collecting cases), the airi.nes and Ryder
entered the truckers’ market by creating a new trucking
company, and through the exclusive ACI-Ryd-Air con-
tract, prevented any other company from working as an
airline trucker. The boycott of independent truckers was
thus carried out by a combination of three levels of
separate business entities—the airlines, ACI, and Ryd-Air.
See Klor’s supra, 359 U.S. at 213; L. Sullivan, Antitrust,
231 n. 1 (1977). However, unlike Klor’s, this was more
than a group boyeott of several traders; it was effectively
a cartel of the whole industry. See Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United

14

States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) ;
Sullivan, Antitrust at 257 (1977).

The industry-wide collective action by the Respondents
is not saved by its purported lack of an illegal motive.*®
Even though the District Court found that there was no
“sinister anti-competitive intent,’ this Court has held in
a group boycott case:

“Where businessmen concert their actions in order
to deprive others of access to merchandise which the
latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire
into the economic motivation underlying their conduct.”

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146
(1966).

The airline combination in the Ryd-Air venture thus
was a group boycott, or refusal to deal, because it con-
stituted an organized industry-wide combination which de-
prived all other truckers from doing pick-up and delivery
work for any domestic airline.

This Court is respectfully requested to examine this
powerful combination of ACI and its airline owners, es-
pecially since the ACI-airline combination has continued
to interfere with the trucking industry throughout the
nation.

Indeed, in 1975, the airlines, through ACI, actively in-
stigated the acquisition of one local trucking company by

* The lack of anti-competitive motive on the part of the manu-
facturers and distributors in Klor’s was irrelevant. As noted by
the Fifth Cireuit in F.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated
Air Tour Manual Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).

“Since the effect of the agreement was to drive Klor’s out of
competition with Broadway [another retailer], the Court found
the three-cornered agreement illegal per se notwithstanding
the fact that the manufacturers and wholesalers, not in eom-
petition with Klor’s probably had no such anticompetitive
motive.” (Id., 467 F.2d at 187) (Emphasis added).

15

another, for the alleged purpose of insuring that ACI’s
revenues be maintained and enhanced. Jim Cain vy, Air
Cargo, Inc., swpra. The Ninth Circuit in that case re-
versed the District Court’s granting of summary judg-
ment in favor of ACI, and held that such conduct was
not within the scope of the authority given by the CAB
to ACI and the airlines. The Court stated:

‘‘In Breen, prior to awarding the contract, ACI
involved itself in the horizontal organization of the
freight-hauling industry by affiliating with Plaintiffs’
competitor to establish its own trucking firm.’’ Jim
Cain, supra (typescript copy, p. 6).

ACI’s expansions beyond mere supervision of contracts
into actual involvement in the air freight trucking business
in New York City (via the Ryd-Air venture) and in Los
Angeles (by instigating acquisitions) are not isolated. As
already noted, ACI itself took over the pick-up and de-
livery service in New York in 1973, by forming the ‘‘New
York Trucking Division’’ of ACI—again without notifying
the CAB. In 1978, the ‘‘New York Trucking Division’’—
an organ of all the airlines, designated itself as the trucker
for all of the domestic airlines for Long Island, in the face
of competitive “bids” for this contract by truly inde-
pendent truckers. Likewise, throughout the nation ACI
acts virtually dictatorially in cities where it can designate
itself as the exclusive cartage agent for all airlines to the
exclusion of all independent truckers. Once ACT does the
pick-up and delivery for all the airlines in an area, it can-
not help but eliminate rate and service competition among
the airlines in the pick-up and delivery of air freight.

B. The Airlines Through the Ryd-Air Venture
Engaged in Industry-Wide Price-Fixing of
Pick-Up and Delivery Rates

By the formation of Ryd-Air, which became the exclu-
sive trucking agent for all domestic airlines in New York
City, Respondents directly fixed uniform industry-wide

16

prices to their shipping customers for the service of air
freight trucking.

Prior to Ryd-Air’s creation, the airlines could and did
vary the prices charged to their customers for pick-up
and delivery of air freight, since the cost to them was
determined by the competitive interplay of free market
forces resulting from the varying rates charged to them
by independent truckers such as Petitioner.

Effective October 1, 1970—when Ryd-Air began its op-
erations—price competition among the airlines was elimi-
nated. Rates rose dramatically from $3.85 to $5.00 for
minimum shipments and soon were raised yet another
20%—to $6.00, effective January 1, 1971. By December 1,
1971, the minimum again was raised to $6.60, once again
with industry-wide price uniformity. And, since all the
airlines were parties to the same ‘‘contract” with Ryd-Air,
each airline was assured that none of its competitors
could undereut it, either as to the rates charged or the
services provided.

ACI’s automatic power to raise rates for pick-up and
delivery service during the Ryd-Air period® for all the
airlines—a power hitherto forbidden by the CAB—was
thus exercised to insure that the airline-stockholders of
ACI did not lose money on Ryd-Air, which was guaranteed
a profit.**

* This power was enhanced in 1973 when ACT itself directly
took over the New York City pick-up and delivery operation as
“the New York Trucking Division.” By 1976, the minimum rates
had almost tripled.

** Incredibly, although ACI (which was required to file rate
increases with the CAB) reported to the CAB at length the eco-
nomic difficulties of its New York trucker—Ryd-Air—it studiously
concealed the fact that it was was an owner of Ryd-Air. Rather,
ACI deseribed itself as dealing with “independent motor carriers.”
Furthermore, it conveniently omitted telling the CAB that Ryd-Air
was guaranteed a 5% profit by the airlines.

17

As this Court only recently repeated:

“Price is the ‘central nervous system of the
economy,’ United States v. Socony-Vacuum Ou Ce.,
310 U.S. 150, 226 n. 59, 60 S. Ct. 811, 845, 84 L. Ed.
1129, and an agreement that, ‘interefere[s] with the
setting of price by free market forces’ is illegal on
its face. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S.
333, 337, 89 S. Ct. 510, 512, 21 L. Ed. 2d 526.’’

National Society of Professional Engimeers, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978).

The Ryd-Air venture’s effect on price competition
among the airlines was quite similar to, but far more
egregious than that in United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S.
350 (1967), where the Sealy Company, owned by approxi-
mately thirty Sealy “licensees,’’ manufactured and sold
Sealy-named mattresses at pre-set prices. As the Court
stated, “this flagrant and pervasive price-fixing . . . was

. . the activity of the ‘stockholder representatives’ act-
ing through and in collaboration with Sealy mechanisms.
This underlines the horizontal nature of the enterprise, and
the use of Sealy, not as a separate entity, but as an
instrumentality of the individual manufacturers.” Jd., 388
U.S. at 355-56 (emphasis added). ACI (and Ryd-Air)
similarly were nothing but instrumentalities of their airline
owners.

Unfortunately, the District Court did not rule on Peti-
tioner’s price-fixing claim and the Second Circuit’s sum-
mary affirmance leaves the Court (and the industry)
without any insight into its reasoning. Nevertheless, as-
suming that the District Court viewed the price-fixing
conduct of Respondents as permissible under the Rule of
Reason, such a holding is manifestly in error. Only last
term, this Court made clear that even in the face of a
purportedly noble reason for a restriction on price com-
petition, any attempt at justification under the Rule of
Reason is still restricted solely to a consideration of its

18

impact on competitive conditions. National Society of
Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
Clearly, the instant case has the industry-wide control
of prices by anticompetitive activities of the participants
—ostensible competitors—that this Court enjoined in
National Society.

POINT TWO

The relevant market is the service of pick-up and
delivery for all the Airlines in New York City.

The District Court, in dismissing AFH’s monopoliza-
tion claim under Section Two of the Sherman Act* and
its claim under Section Seven of the Clayton Act, based its
decision upon a finding that the relevant service market
consisted of ‘‘the ground transportation of air freight to
and from the Metropolitan New York airports.” (6a).
The Court also found that ‘‘this service is provided, with-
out significant differences, by air freight forwarders, in-
dependent contractors, house truckers, as well as ACI”
Id.

Because the District Court analyzed the relevant market
question from the viewpoint of all potential air freight
shippers, rather than the viewpoint of the airlines who
contract, through ACI, with truckers to offer a total
door-to-door air freight service, Petitioner submits the
District Court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s monopoli-
zation claim.**

* The District Court never decided Petitioner’s claim of con-
spiracy to monopolize under Section Two.

** It is not necessary to assert that the District Court’s specific
findings of fact, or all of them, were “clearly erroneous” on the
issue of relevant market. Rather, on an uncontroverted record,
Petitioner submits that the District Court misapplied the appro-
priate legal standards, thereby compelling reversal. See United
States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974).

19

The factual difficulty apparently encountered by the Dis-
trict Court was that shippers of air freight have other
means, besides the ACI truckers, of getting their freight
to the airline cargo terminals at the airports. Thus, air
freight forwarders, independent (non-ACI) truckers and
house truckers (working for a given shipper), deal di-
rectly with shippers. The ACI trucking service, on the
other hand, is a trucking service provided under contract
to the airlines, who included this service in their door-to-
door air freight service to shippers.

The actual carriage of goods by air is, in all instances,
performed by CAB-certified airlines. However, very dis-
tinct (and separately regulated) boundaries divide the
different trucking services which cart goods to the airport.
Air freight forwarders, which handle the majority of air
freight and are denominated by the law as ‘‘indirect air
earriers,’’ consolidate shipments of their various shippers
to achieve bulk rates, and arrange for consolidated ship-
ments to be flown by a direct air carrier—an airline. An
air freight forwarder also assumes total responsibility to
the shipper to whom it issues its own air waybill for the
shipment door-to-door, providing its own pick-up and de-
livery service.

When an airline makes a “door-to-door” contract with a
shipper, the airline issues its own air waybill and delegates
the pick-up and delivery task to its ACI trucker, which has
no direct relationship with the shipping public, acting in-
stead solely as the airline’s agent.

While air freight forwarders and truckers might have
individual contracts with shippers, the ACI truckers’ cus-
tomers are, in fact, the airlines not the shippers. Indeed,
the ACI truckers are paid by the airlines, through ACI.
The ACI trucker’s geographic jurisdiction and schedules
are set by the airlines and ACI pick-up and delivery rates
are filed with the CAB by the airlines.

20

Finally, the ACI trucking service alone provides for
door-to-door liability by the airline for the shipment. The
ACI trucker picking up the shipment, as agent for airlines,
executes an air waybill for the airline—an authority not
given other truckers or forwarders. This airline liability
for shipments carried by the ACI trucker is regulated
by the CAB.

The ACI trucker, as the airline’s agent, is in essence,
providing a dual service primarily to its airline, which
requires a trucker to pick-up and deliver shipments it con-
tracted for directly with shippers—but also to the shipper
itself, which needs a method of transporting freight to
the airport, but which deals with the airline alone in obtain-
ing such service.

Petitioner asserted that the ACI trucking market was
monopolized by the airlines and Ryd-Air. Indeed, the
District Court noted that, on Petitioner’s theory of relevant
market, it is “inescapable that ACI has a monopoly”.*
Nevertheless, the District Court ignored the dual nature of
the service provided by airline truckers and chose a
relevant market viewpoint of all potential shippers. This
was clearly incorrect. Cass Student Advertising, Inc., 516

F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1976).

Cass dealt with a service industry consisting of the sale
of advertising space in college newspapers to national

*The District Court apparently viewed the relevant market
question as dispositive of all Petitioner’s claims (including Section
One of the Sherman Act), since it stated:

“T believe that the ease should be approached—the decider
of the case should approach it first from the point of view
of determining what the relevant market is.

“We don’t need to get to the question of immunity, for
example, if the relevant market is not what the plaintiff con-
tends it is. If I decide that the plaintiff is correct in that
regard, then we certainly have to get to the immunity question
because by definition it seems almost inescapable that ACT has
a monopoly of the market which is the relevant market.”’

—-

21

advertisers. Plaintiff Cass charged that defendant Na-
tional, which represented over eighty percent of the college
newspaper business largely through exclusive contracts,
had monopolized this market. National was the exclusive
representative of the newspapers it served in soliciting
advertising from national advertisers. The District Court
in Cass noted that the service of the defendant National
was only one method by which national advertisers could
reach college students—since college newspapers are
theoretically in competition with other types of newspapers,
television, and &ll other media. The District Court thus
concluded that national advertisers had significant alterna-
tives to college newspapers for reaching the college student
market and concluded that the relevarit market was “all
modes of communication used to present national advertis-
ing to college students” rather than the narrower market
suggested by plaintiff: (“the market for representing col-
lege newspapers in the placement of national advertising’’).

The Seventh Circuit reversed,* relying on the principles
of United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours € Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956), and the submarket principles of Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 394 (1962). The Seventh
Cireuit noted that the District Court had misunderstood

- the ‘‘dual nature’’ of the services offered by Cass and

National. By viewing only the national advertisers as
“buyers” of the service—and ignoring the fact that the
college newspapers were also “buyers’’ of the service—
the District Court incorrectly chose an overly large rele-
vant market.

The Court of Appeals observed that, in the context of
the factual situation in Cass, “it may not be easy for a
Court to choose one of the ‘end’ parties as the sole
purchaser of the middleman’s services” (/d., 516 F.2d
at 1098) but concluded that:

‘*It is conceivable that both end parties in a middle-

* The late Mr. Justice Clark sat on the panel.

22
man market could be purchasers of the middleman’s
services. In such cases, two relevant market deter-
minations might be necessary. For example, if this
case were viewed as a dual purchaser case, the district
court’s opinion would represent a finding that [Na-
tional] has no market power with respect to its national
advertiser customers. The question would remain open
whether [National] has market power among the other
purchasers of its services, college newspapers seeking
national advertising. It would therefore be possible
for a middleman to lack the requisite market power
in one direction while achieving a complete strangle-
hold in the other direction.

Id., 516 F.2d at 1098-99 (Emphasis added).

The Court then went on to note that National’s primary
relationship began, and continued, with the college news-
papers, with which it made ‘‘exclusive arrangements’? and
by which it was paid. Applying the submarket indicia
of Brown Shoe, the Court of Appeals found that the busi-
ness of providing representation was a ‘‘specialized ven-
dor,’’ that the college newspapers were ‘‘distinct
customers,’’ that there was ‘‘industry recognition of the
submarket,’’ and ‘‘distinet prices.’’ Jd., 516 F.2d at 1099-
1100.*

In the instant ease, the District Court failed to make
just such an analysis. First, since ACI truckers work
under contract for the airlines, the airlines themselves are
the ‘‘distinct customers’’ of the ACI truckers, who are
prohibited from soliciting air freight trucking for them-

* The Court also relied on United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563 (1966); International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States,
358 U.S. 242 (1956); and United States v. Connecticut National
Bank, supra—all of which rejected assertions of a large market
paso? on the supposed interchangeability of products or services
offered.

23

selves.* Second, distinct prices” are charged by the ACI
truckers, to ACI, which then billed the airlines. ‘‘Public
recognition of the submarket’’ is present, since ACI
truckers, required to paint their trucks with the ACI logo
become ‘‘agents’’ of the airlines, and are not permitted
to solicit business on their own.

The District Court, viewing the ‘‘relevant market’’ from
the shippers’ viewpoint, thus ignored the real customer
of ACI trucking—the airlines themselves.

In surveying the difficulty of choices in the relevant
market analysis, a court

“would be remiss in selecting between two otherwise
appropriate product markets that one which, on anal-
ysis, will not reflect the full brunt of any and all anti-
competitive effects...”

United States v. Crowell, Collier & McMillan, 361 F.Supp.
983, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Tyler, J.).

Such an admonition is appropriate in this case, where
Sherman Section Two and Clayton Section Seven claims
are clearly applicable to this unprecedented industry-wide
combination and monopoly by all domestic airlines serv-
ing New York.

In analyzing the markets present here, two principal
modes of door-to-door air freight service under an air
waybill are available: either under that of a direct air
carrier (the airline) or that of an indirect air carrier
(the air freight forwarder), each separately defined and
licensed under statute and regulations by the CAB. The
airlines’ door-to-door service required a trucking com-

* Notably ACI, the airlines’ contracting agent, was the subject
of specific CAB regulation. As this Court has noted, an antitrust
market should ‘normally be defined by reference to the existing
regulatory framework.” United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974).

24

ponent, which, in New York City, was totally pre-empted
by the airlines’ own exclusive trucker, airline-owned,
profit-guaranteed and interlockingly directed. It follows
that, however denominated, the exclusive handling of air
freight in New York for all of the domestic airlines, by a
single airline-owned and controlled trucker, giving no ac-
cess to other truckers, is an illegal monopoly of a discrete
submarket. Legitimizing the airlines’ conduct in New
- York can only have serious implications for the rest of
the nation.

Summary

The Second Circuit’s countenancing cf the industry-wide
collective refusal to deal embodied in the Ryd-Air venture
together with the total fixing of uniform rates, is a serious
departure from the per se standards of liability established
by this Court in the above-cited cases. Certiorari should
be granted to ensure that the continuing industry-wide
illegal actions of the Respondents in New York and nation-
wide are dealt with by the Courts.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.

Dated: New York, New York
July 5, 1979

Respectfully submitted,

Guy L. HermyemMann

866 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
(212) 753-1400

Attorney for Petitioner

Epwarp M. CurkorFsky,
Miiron Horowitz
Of Counsel

la
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Seconp Circuit

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-
house in the City of New York, on the 6th day of April,
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine.

Present: Hon. William H. Mulligan
Hon. William H. Timbers
Hon. Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland
Circuit Judges.

78-7557

Arr Freicut Havuuace Co., Inc.,
. Plaintiff-Appellant,

against

Ryp-Air, Ivc., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

a
sd

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

2a

On ConsmperaTION WHeEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the order and judgment of said
District Court be and it hereby is affirmed on the opinion
below of the Hon. Morris E. Lasker, 1978-2 CCH Trade
Cas. {] 62,321 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1978).

s/ Wim H. Mutuican
William H. Mulligan

s/ Wru1am H. Timsers
William H. Timbers

s/ ExvuswortH A. Van GRAAFEILAND
Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland

Filed: April 6, 1979
United States Court of Appeals
A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk

3a

Opinion of District Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SourHern District or New York

’

71 Civ. 3428

+
7

Am Freicht Hautace Co., Lye.,
Plaintiff,
against

Ryp-Ar, Ivc., Am Carco, Inc., Ryper System, Inc., AMER-
ICAN AtRLINES, INc., EASTERN AIRLINES, Inc., NORTHEAST
Arrurnes, Inc., Arr Canapa, ALLEGHENY AIRLINE:, Inc.,
BranirF Airways, Inc., British Overseas Airways Corp.,
Detra Ar Lives, Inc., Fiyrne Ticer Lrvzs, Inc., Monawk
AruineEs, Inc., Nationau Arrways, Inc., New York ArrR-
ways, Inc., NorrHwest Arrives, Inc., OzarK Arr LINES,
Inc., Pan Amertcan Wortp Arrways, Ino., PIEDMONT
Aviation, Inc., Arrtirt INTERNATIONAL, Inc., SEABOARD
Worip Arrunes, Inc., SourHern Armways, Inc., Trans
Worwtp Arruines, Inc., Unrrep Ar Lings, Inc.,

Defendants.

y%
+

Lasker, D. J. Since 1947, Air Cargo, Ine. (ACT), has
provided terminal and cartage services on behalf of a
large number of airlines operating in the United States.
From 1957 until 1970, it employed Air Freight Haulage
as one of its cartage agents in the New York City area.
In 1970, ACI terminated its contracts with Air Freight
and its two other agents in New York City, Breen Air
Freight, Ltd., and Mereury Air Freight, Inc., and, to-
gether with Ryder Systems, Inc., formed a new entity,
Ryd-Air, to take over the pickup and delivery of air

4a
Opinion of District Court.

freight in this area. This arrangement lasted until Octo-
ber of 1973, when ACI terminated its contract with Ryd-
Air and began to conduct its own direct pickup and de-
livery service in New York City.

In or about 1971, Breen and Air Freight Haulage
brought separate suits against the defendants charging
them with violations of the antitrust laws. In the Breen
case, the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that
the Civil Aeronautics Board had primary jurisdiction
over the dispute and that the operations of ACI were
immunized from the antitrust laws under the exception
contained in § 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S. C.
§ 1384. The motion was denied and the denial was af-
firmed on appeal. 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972). In
the case at hand the parties made cross-motions for
summary judgment, both of which were earlier denied.
Defendants’ motion was denied on the authority of Breen;
plaintiff’s because of residual factual disputes. Although
in their pretrial memoranda and at trial both parties laid
considerable emphasis on factual matters relating to the
immunity of the defendants from the antitrust laws, we
do not. determine that question because we find that the
plaintiff has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendants have violated Sections 1 or
2 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Air Freight charges the defendants with conspiring to
monopolize and unreasonably restraining trade in the
trucking of air freight to and from New York City’s
major metropolitan airports in violation of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §$1 & 2, and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. $18. Trial was
had to the court, and we now make the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law.*

* The findings of fact stipulated to by the parties are contained
in the Appendix to this opinion.

da
Opinion of District Court.

ACI concluded its contractual relationship with Air
Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury because, by the
spring of 1969, it was experiencing severe problems with
its pickup and delivery service in New York’s Area A.
A large number of hijackings and truck heists had taken
place, (Bernhard, 262; Champley, 664; Miller, 817) ; claims
ratios almost doubled in a brief period and ACI in-
curred serious deficits (Bernhard, 262; Miller, 817). Offi-
cials at several of the airlines were “fed up” with the
service (Miller, 817), and found it “far, far below stand-
ard’’ (Milton, 737). ACI felt that the service lacked “the
proper image” and was not “according to [its] contractual
service requirement’? (Champley, 584). ACI therefore
decided to replace its current contractors with the legiti-
mate business purpose of improving the quality of its
pickup and delivery service.

ACI solicited proposals from ‘‘about every trucker in
the telephone directory in New York” (Bernhard, 349)
to replace its existing service but found none of the pro-
posals satisfactory (Bernhard, 349-50; Champley, 593-94).
At a meeting on March 12, 1970, the ACI Board of Di-
rectors decided to ask Ryder Systems, Inc., to submit a
proposal to take over the pickup and delivery service in
Area A. (Miller, 819) Later that spring, after ACI’s
management concluded that it was not feasible for ACI
itself to take over the pickup and delivery service (Ex-
hibit 7), the ACI Board of Directors decided to accept a
proposal by Ryder to form a subsidiary, Ryd-Air, to
perform the service (Miller, 819; Exhibit 7). On June 30,
1970, ACI entered into an agreement with Ryd-Air under
which Ryd-Air agreed, commencing October 1, 1970, to
provide pickup and delivery service for the airlines in
New York’s Area A on a cost plus 5% basis. (Exhibit 30)
Under an agreement with Ryder, ACI received a 20%
stock interest in Rvyd-Air and the right to elect two di-

6a
Opinion of District Court.

rectors to the Board of Directors of Ryd-Air. (Miller, 820;
Exhibit 88).

The contract between ACI and Ryd-Air provided that
ACI and the air carriers reserved the right “to employ
additional parties to compete with Contractor [Ryd-Air]
in providing pickup, delivery and transfer services for all
or any part of the air freight traffic moving between the
points covered by this Contract . . .” (Exhibit 30).

Ryd-Air consistently lost money while it acted as ACI’s
contractor (Bernhard, 448-50; Pelletier, 1105) and ex-
perienced a lower volume than the ACI contractors it re-
placed (Champley, 643). Because ACT found the service
provided by Ryd-Air costly and unsatisfactory, ACT
terminated its contract with Rvd-Air on October 1, 1973,
and since then has conducted, through its New York City
Trucking Division, its own pickup and delivery service to
the metropolitan New York airports from Area A.

The court makes the following findings of fact on the
issue of relevant market:

The parties agree that the relevant geographic market
is Area A of New York, which consists of the boroughs of
the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens.

The relevant product market in this case is the ground
transportation of air freight to and from the metropolitan
New York airports. The testimony establishes that this
service is provided, without significant differences, by
air freight forwarders, independent contractors, house
truckers, as well as ACI. A comparison of the alternatives
indicates that the following substantial similarities exist
between the services provided by the various carriers:

a. A shipper in Area A can ship to the airport by house
trucker, independent trucker (Hood, 860), freight for-
warder or by ACI (Groves, 996-997).

7a
Opinion of District Court.

b. A shipper in Area A can procure door-to-door service
whether he uses an air freight forwarder, an independent
trucker, his own house trucker, or an ACI contractor
(Cirami, 193; Groves, 1051, 1074; Hood, 840, 861).

e. An air freight shipment is likely to arrive at its
destination at approximately the same time, regardless of
whether the shipment is made through an air freight
forwarder, an independent trucker, a house trucker, or
ACI (Groves, 1002-04).

There is no evidence that the cost of shipment is greater
whether the shipment is made through a forwarder, in-
dependent, house trucker or ACI. There is no evidence
that the shippers in Area A, in practice, prefer the services
of the ACI contractor to those of any other carrier. To
the contrary, the credible testimony establishes that ACI
competes for customers with air freight forwarders, house
truckers, and independent truckers (McQuade, 545; Miller,
817, 822-23; Groves, 995-96, 1071; Hood, 860, 865, 878;
Smick, 979; Exhibit 33) and that there is cross-elasticity
of demand between ACI’s services and those of the other
carriers. For example, T. M. Miller, a former director of
ACI, testified that when the ACI contractors’ service was
deteriorating in the late 1960s, ACI was “losing sub-
stantial business to forwarders and other carriers . . .”
(Miller, 817) and Mr. George L. Groves, the President of
ACI, testified that, since 1968, ACT has steadily lost busi-
ness as its prices have gone up. We credit this testimony:
indeed, there is no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly,
on the basis of the evidence described above, we conclude
that the relevant product market consists of the services
of air freight forwarders, house truckers, independent
truckers and the ACI contractor in Area A.

The credible testimony establishes that from 1968 until
1977, the ACI contractors’ share of the relevant domestic
market never rose above 10.1%, which it achieved in 1969,

8a
Opinion of District Court.

In 1977, their share of the domestic market was 5.4%. The
ACI contractors’ share of the combined domestic and in-
ternational market during the same period reached a high
of 6.4% in 1968. In 1977, ACL’s share of this market was
2.6% (Groves, 1007-09; Exhibit E).

The barriers to entry in the air freight pickup and
delivery business in the relevant market are extremely
low. All that is necessary to enter the business.is a truck
and a driver (Groves, 1022-23; Cirami, 117-18, 175).

Air Freight Haulage has not established that the defend-
ants are guilty of an illegal combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The plaintiff contends that the airlines jointly
decided to terminate the three ACI contractors and to
form Ryd-Air with Ryder Systems, thereby engaging in a
horizonta! combination to restrain trade which would con-
stitute a per se violation of Section 1. Although there was
some testimony that individual airlines were dissatisfied
with the service provided by the prior ACI contractors
(Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury), there is no
evidence that the airlines, collectively, decided to terminate
such contractors. Rather, the evidence establishes that
ACI, the airlines’ independent subsidiary, was responsible
both for the initial decision to replace the contractors with
Ryd-Air and the subsequent decision to provide direct pick-
up and delivery service. Indeed, Air Freight Haulage
itself attempted to prove at trial, during the examination
of Mr. Lambert (Lambert, 557) and Mr. Miller (Miller,
825), that ACI alone was responsible for replacing the
earlier service in order to refute the contention of the
defendants that the airlines supervised and ratified the
decision and thus immunized the actions from the opera-
tion of the antitrust laws. (See Breen Air Freight v. Air
Cargo, Inc., 470 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972)).

Since there is no evidence that the airlines engaged in a
horizontal restraint of trade but only that ACI decided to

Ya
Opinion of District Court.

change its pickup and delivery service with the help of
Ryder Systems, the plaintiff's argument that a per se
violation of the antitrust laws is involved fails. In this
case, as in those involving the replacement of a distributor
by a single manufacturer, the actions in dispute should be
tested in light of their anticompetitive purpose or effect.
See Oreck Corporation v. Whirlpool Corporation and
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1978-1 CCH Trape Cases, § 62,026
(2d Cir. 1978); Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Kohn, Inc.
318 F. 2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963).

The testimony at trial indicates that ACI terminated its
contracts with Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury
not out of any “sinister anticompetitive intent”, Bushie v.
Stenocord Corp., 460 F. 2d 116, 120 (9th Cir. 1972), but
only to improve the quality of its pickup and delivery
service. There is no evidence that competition has lessened
among suppliers of pickup and delivery service in Area A
since 1970. To the contrary, the evidence at trial! indicated
that competition in this market is healthy and that ACI’s
share has actually decreased since the formation of Ryd-
Air. Moreover, Air Freight Haulage, even though it is no
longer one of ACI’s exclusive agents, remains a competitor
in the market. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff has not
established that ACI’s termination of Air Freight Haulage,
Breen and Mercury had an anti-competitive purpose or
effect in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Air Freight Haulage has failed to establish that ACI’s
use of Ryd-Air for pickup and delivery service and ACI’s
subsequent independent operation constituted monopoliza-
tion or an attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act or that this conduct substantially
lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

To establish monopolization, it must be proven that the
defendants posseassed monopoly power in the relevant

10a
Opinion of District Court.

market and that this power was “willfully acquired” rather
than a natural development as a result of ‘‘a superior
product, business acumen or historical accident.” United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The
Supreme Court defines ‘‘monopoly power’’ as the “power
to control prices or exclude competition” and the “relevant
market” to include “commodities reasonably interchange-
able by consumers for the same purposes.” United States
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 395
(1956). As stated above, the evidence establishes that
the services of air freight forwarders, independent
truckers, house truckers and ACI are ‘reasonably inter-
changeable” services available to shippers in Area A. The
type of service provided by all four types of carriers is
substantially the same; there is no evidence that one pos-
sesses a cost or service advantage over the other; and
there is substantial evidence that ACI competes for cus-
tomers with the other three carriers and has suffered from
price and service competition from them in the past.

Although Air Freight Haulage argues that ACI’s pickup
and delivery service constitutes a submarket for purposes
of the antitrust laws, there is no evidence that the
characteristics of a submarket, as set out in Brown Shoe
v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 325 (1962), are present
here. Thus the plaintiff has failed to show that ACI’s
service enjoys ‘‘industry or public recognition” as a sub-
market, “peculiar characteristics and uses, distinct cus-
tomers” or “distinct prices”.

There is no evidence that the defendants possess monop-
oly power in this market. The testimony on market share
establishes that, during the last ten years, ACI has pos-
sessed, at most, only 10.1% of the domestic market for
ground transportation of air freight in Area A and, in
1977, possessed only 5.4% of this market. These figures
do not alone support an inference that ACI has the ability
to “exclude competition” or ‘‘control prices” within the

lla
Opinion of District Court.

market, and, in the absence of any other evidence in sup-
port of this contention, we reject the claim of monopoliza-
tion.

The plaintiff has also failed to establish an attempt to
monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
To prevail on such a claim, it is necessary to prove that
the defendants have the “specific intent to destroy com-
petition or build monopoly”, Times-Picayune v. United
States, 345 U. S. 594, 626 (1953), and a “dangerous
probability of success’, Lorain Journal v. United States,
342 U. S. 143, 153 (1952); Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U. S. 357, 396 (1905); FILM Collision Parts, Ine. v.
Ford Motor Co., 543 F. 2d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1976) ; Bowen
v. New York News, Inc., 522 F. 2d 1242, 1252 n. 7 (2d Cir.
1975). The testimony establishes that ACI terminated its
contracts with Air Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury
because it was dissatisfied with the quality of service they
were providing and not as a result of any anti-competitive
motive. Moreover, the testimony on market share in-
dicates that, even if the defendants did have the requisite
intent, they were so far from achieving a monopoly as to
preclude a finding of “dangerous probability of success”,
the second part of the test for attempt. Accordingly, this
claim is also rejected.

Finally, there is no evidence that the formation of Ryd-
Air substantially lessened competition or tended to create
a monopoly in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Indeed, the creation of Ryd-Air can be said to have in-
creased competition in the market since it added a new
carrier to the field while the former ACI contractors, Air
Freight Haulage, Breen and Mercury, remained in. busi-
ness. The cause of action is therefore dismissed.

For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s complaint
is dismissed in its entirety.

12a
Opinion of District Court.

It is so ordered.

Dated: New York, New York
October 10, 1978

8/ Morris E, Lasker
U.S.D.J.

Appendix

Under the pre-trial order herein dated March 31, 1977,
the parties have stipulated that the following facts are
not in dispute:

(1) Air Cargo, Ine. (“ACI”) was incorporated in 1941
in Delaware by several airlines. In 1943, ‘the activities
of ACI were discontinued and it was preserved by its
stockholders as a mere paper corporation,

(2) On March 1, 1947, seventeen airlines entered into
an agreement entitled “Agreement Among Certain Air
Carriers Relating to Air Cargo Services,” which agree-
ment (hereinafter the “ACI Agreement”) provided for
the reactivation of ACI. ACI is wholly owned by the
domestic airlines who own varying amounts of ACT stock.
The largest stockholders are American Airlines, Ine.,
Trans World Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines, Ine., East-
ern Airlines, Inc., and Delta Air Lines, Ine.

(3) The ACL Agreement was filed by the airlines with
the Civil Aeronautics Board on April 14, 1947.

(4) The Civil Aeronautics Board officially designated
the ACI Agreement as “Agreement C. A. B. No, 1041.”
On December 31, 1947, the Civil Aeronautics Board ap-
proved the ACI Agreement by its Order Serial Number
E-1086 pursuant to the provision of Section 412(b) of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, which section required the Board
to either approve or disapprove an agreement so filed.

13a
Opinion of District Court.

(5) Five amendments to C, A. B. No. 1041 were also
filed with the Civil Aeronauties Board, and each has been
approved by the Board, Amendments 1 and 2 by Order
Serial No, E-6913, dated October 24, 1952; Amendment 3
by Order Serial No. 6-9532 on August 30, 1955; Amend-
ment 4 by Order Serial No, -22044 dated April 6, 1965;
and Amendment 5 by Order 75-6-37 dated June 6, 1975.

(6) The initial undertaking by ACT toward implementa-
tion of the duties assigned to it by the airlines under
Agreement C. A. B, No. 1041 was to prepare a standard
form “Service Contract” to be used by ACT at each air-
port city for contracting with a loeal trucking company
to perform air freight pickup and delivery service for
the airlines serving that city.

(7) Salvatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co.,
first acted as an ACI contractor serving one or more of
the domestie airlines in the metropolitan New York City
area at JK International, LaGuardia and Newark air-
ports in 1957, After the incorporation of plaintiff Air
Freight Haulage Co., Ine., a New York corporation, it
succeeded, with the approval of ACI to the company’s
contracts, and continued the pickup and delivery of air
freight for one or more domestic airlines at these airports
until October 1, 1970.

(8) A Serviee Contract, between ACI and Salvatore
Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage, Co., dated May 1,
1957, and applicable to services in the New York City
area was filed with the C. A. B. along with other Service
Contracts. The Board assigned to that Service Contract
the designation “Agreement C. A. B. No. 10981.’’ On
August 9, 1957, by its Order Serial No. E-11546, the
Board approved the Service Contracts so filed, including
Agreement C. A. B. No. 10981 between Air Cargo, Ine.
and Salvatore Cirami.

l4a
Opinion of District Court.

(9) In 1958, a short-form Service Contract between ACI
and Salvatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co.
dated December 1, 1958, and assigned ‘‘Agreement C. A. B.
No. 12708,’’ was filed. The Board approved that Service
Contract and four subsequent amendments — thereto
(C. A. B. Order Nos. F-13601, F-14052, and E-15278).

(10) In 1960, the standard-form Service Contract was
again amended. A new Service Contract between Sal-
vatore Cirami, d/b/a Air Freight Haulage Co., and ACI
applicable to New York City was filed with the Board
and assigned Agreement C. A. B. No. 14470, and was
approved by the Board on August 26, 1960 (Order No.
B-15700).

(11) The Board, effective March 8, 1962, dispensed with
the requirements that agreements between certificated
route air carriers or indirect air carriers on the one hand
and surface motor carriers on the other hand fer pickup
and delivery of property be filed under Section 412 of the
Act. CAB Economie Regulations, § 289.3 (14 C. F. R.
Part 289).

(12) In addition to the ACI contract with Air Freight
Haulage Co., Inc. for pickup and delivery services in New
York City, ACI also throughout the same period had such
standard-form Service Contracts with two other local
motor carriers for such services in New York City—
Mercury Air Freight and Breen Air Freight.

(13) The Economic Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board require that all rates and charges for pickup,
delivery, and transfer services provided by the airlines

for the public be published in tariffs filed with the Board-

(14 C. F. R. Parts 221.102 and 222.2). The rates so pub-
lished consist of two elements: first, the rate paid to the
contractor under the Service Contract, and second, the
administrative service charge of ACT.

15a
Opinion of District Court.

(14) At a meeting of the Board of Directors of ACI
on April 28, 1970, the Direetors voted.to enter into an
agreement with Ryder System, Ine. in which a new sub-
sidiary corporation would be formed to conduct pickup
and delivery services of air freight in New York City
Area A. The subsidiary created, called Ryd-Air, Inc.,
was created with Ryder System owning 80% of the out-
standing stock and ACI owning the remaining 20%, and
with ACI designating 2 of the 5 directors. The agreement
also called for Ryd-Air, Inc. to be paid for the services
on a cost plus 5% basis.

(15) The new service in New York City by Ryd-Air
was to commence October 1, 1970. On or about April 29,
1970, ACI served written notices of contract termination
upon the three ACT contractors in New York City (Air
Freight Haulage, Mercury and Breen).

(16) On June 30, 1970, ACI entered into ACI’s stand-
ard-form contract with Ryd-Air for the air freight cartage
services in New York City Area A commencing October 1,
1970.

(17) Ryd-Air commenced operations on October 1, 1970.
In the summer of 1972, ACI proposed to Ryder System
that ACI take over the management of Ryd-Air on Octo-
ber 1, 1972, and eliminate the 5% management fee. This
proposal was accepted by Ryder System. On October 1,
1973, ACI terminated its pickup and delivery contract
with Ryd-Air and commenced its own direct operation on
that date, which operation by ACI has continued to the
present. ,

l6a

Statutes.
Section One of the Sherman Act (in part), 15 U.S.C. § 1.

§ 1. Trusts, ctc., in restraint of trade illegal; exception of
resale price agreements; penalty

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal... .

Section Two of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (in effect
in 1970).

§ 2. Monopolizing trade a misdemeanor; penalty

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Section Seven of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

§ 18. Acquisition by one corporation of stock of another

No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no corporation subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corpora-
tion engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merece in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.

17a

No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of one or more corporations engaged in com-
merece, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or
assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting
of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1382
(in effect in 1970)

§ 1382. Pooling and other agreements; filing; approval by
Board

(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true
copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of
every contract or agreement (whether enforceable by provi-
sions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds, or other-
wise) affecting air transportation and in force on the ef:
fective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, between such air car-
rier and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or
other carrier for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses,
traffic, service, or equipment, or relating to the establish-
ment of transportation rates, fares, charges, or classifica-
tions, or for preserving and improving safety, economy,
and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating,
preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppres-
sive, or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, —
schedules, and character of service, or for other cooperative
working arrangements.

(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such con-
tract or agreement, whether or not previously approved by
it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in

18a

violation of this chapter, and shall by order approve any
such contract or agreement, or any modification or cancella-
tion thereof, that it does not find to be adverse to the public
interest, or in violation of this chapter; except that the
Board may not approve any contract or agreement between
an air carrier not directly engaged in the operation of air-
craft in air transportation and a common carrier subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, governing the
compensation to be received by such common carrier for
transportation services performed by it.

Former Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1384 (in effect in 1970)

§ 1384. Legal restraints

Any person affected by any order made under sections
1378, 1379, or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby,
relieved from the operations of the ‘‘antitrust laws’’, as
designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other re-
straints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, au-
thority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such
person to do anything authorized, approved, or required
by such order.

Present Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1384 (effective October 24, 1978)

§ 1384. Antitrust exemption

In any order made under section 1378, 1379, or 1382 of
this title, the Board may, as part of such order, exempt
any person affected by such order from the operations of
the ‘‘antitrust laws’’ set forth in subsection (a) of section
12 of Title 15 to the extent necessary to enable such per-
son to proceed with the transaction specifically approved
by the Board in such order and those transactions nee-
essarily contemplated by such order, except that the Board
may not exempt such person unless it determines that
such exemption is required in the public interest.

s\

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0509%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
