# Opposition — Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 444 U.S. 898

## Text

No. 79-19

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

PAULEY PETROLEUM INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCreEr, Jr.
Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN
Acting Assistant Attorney General

MYLES E. FLINT
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Page
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Clark Grave Vault Co. v. United States,

Se BI IU ieicteeichcethincbicahdidneswidnieninciiibies 14

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141... 10
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d
EE Aipibinicdpilia cin Ncaleteaindicighondnianaiabisicsindies sats 10, 12, 15

Statutes and regulations:

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
19538, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C.
ES ae aa ee 2,3
© US.C, GEB(a) (1) on enceccccccccceccccsccenees. 12
80 C.P.R. 250.48 (b) ............ccccccccccceoceo.-ce 7
80 C.F.R. 250.48 (@) ooecccecccccccccccececccecceee. 7

Miscellaneous:

6 A. Corbin on Contracts (1962) .............. 14
34 Fed. Reg. (1969) :

p. 7381 (May 7, 1969) 20...
p. 7383 (May 7, 1969) 0.00...
p. 18544 (August 22, 1969) ...........
p. 18547 (August 22, 1969) ..............

Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1974) ooeceececcccccccccececeeceee 14

IANA

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 79-19
PAULEY PETROLEUM INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Claims (Pet. App. A-1
to A-35) is reported at 591 F.2d 1308. The Court of
Claims’ findings of fact (Pet. App. A-37 to A-40,
A-43 to A-334) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Claims was entered
on January 24, 1979 (Pet. App. A-1) and a timely

(1)

2

motion for rehearing was denied on April 6, 1979.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
July 5, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1255(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Department of the Interior
breached a lease contract with petitioners, or whether
petitioners were injured, when the Department de-
clined to rule on their application to drill an explora-
tory well in the Santa Barbara channel because peti-
tioners had failed to submit all technical data neces-
sary to enable the Department to review their appli-
cation following a serious oil spill in the channel, and
where petitioners had abandoned any intention of
drilling the well soon after they filed their application.

2. Whether this Court should consider whether
state law or federal regulations promulgated under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
1331-1343, govern the liability of a lessee to third
parties for damages resulting from an oil spill on
the lessee’s tract even though the present case does
not involve an oil spill on petitioners’ leased tracts
and resolution of the choice-of-law question would
have no bearing on petitioners’ substantive claims of
breach or frustration of their lease agreement.

3
STATEMENT

Petitioners are members of a consortium of oil
corporations that acquired two oil and gas leases of
submerged lands in the Santa Barbara Channel off
the coast of California in 1968.1 The leases were
issued by the Department of the Interior pursuant
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1958, ch.
345, 67 Stat. 462-471, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1343.

After the leases were acquired, petitioners or their
predecessors in interest conducted extensive explora-
tory drilling operations on the leased acreage. No oil
or gas was found in commercially usable quantities
in any of the eight exploratory wells drilled by peti-
tioners. The results were discouraging and caused
several members of the consortium to express reluct-
ance about further exploratory drilling, to sell their
interests or to offer to sell their interests, or to write
off a substantial part of their investment by early
1969 (Findings 66(c)-(i), 78(j) and 79, Pet. App.
A-221 to A-226, A-328 to A-329, A-330 to A-333).

1 At the time this litigation was initiated those companies
holding interests in the leases were Pauley Petroleum, Inc.,
Colorado Oil and Gas Corporation, Mesa Petroleum Company,
McCulloch Oil Corporation of California, J. M. Huber Corpo-
ration, Husky Oil Company, Midwest Oil Corporation, Ke-
wanee Oil Corporation and Forest Oil Company. Of these
only Pauley, Colorado Oil and Gas, Mesa, McCulloch, Huber
and Husky initiated the action. The remaining companies
were joined as involuntary plaintiffs and, although~ they
adopted the original petitioners’ case, did not participate at
trial. At this time only Pauley, Colorado Oil and Gas (now
Derby Refining Company), Mesa, McCulloch, Husky and
MacDonald (now Adobe Oil and Gas Corporation) have
petitioned for certiorari. ‘

4

A major environmental emergency occurred on
January 28, 1969, when a well on a nearby tract
leased by Union Oil Company of California blew out.
The blow-out created a 50-mile square oil slick and
coated the shores of Santa Barbara Channel with oil
(Pet. App. A-4; Finding 71(a), Pet. App. A-285 to
A-286).

The Department of the Interior initiated three pro-
grams to cope with the particular disaster and to
insure against similar spills in the future. First,
engineers and scientists were directed to determine
the cause of the blow-out and to stop the flow of oil.
Second, another group of experts was assigned to
review and, where necessary, modify all relevant
regulations and orders. A third group was assigned
to review geological and geophysical information on
each lease in tie Santa Barbara Channel to ascertain
if operations could be safely conducted thereon (Find-
ing 72(d), Pet. App. A-291; Findings 75-77, Pet.
App. A-302 to A-317). While these efforts were in
process, petitioners filed an application on February
11, 1969, to drill a new well on one of their leases
(Pet. App. A-6, A-7; Finding 71(b), Pet. App.
A-286).

On February 20, 1979, a meeting was held in
Washington with oil industry representatives to dis-
cuss proposed changes in Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) Orders pertaining to drilling procedures in
response to the Secretary’s directive that existing
regulations and orders be reviewed. Petitioners previ-
ously had received copies of the proposed changes,
and petitioners’ representative commented on the

proposed changes at the meeting (Finding 75(b),
Pet. A-303 to A-304).

On February 21, the Secretary published in the
Federal Register a regulation concerning lessees’ re-
sponsibility for oil spills occurring on their leases
(Pet. App. A-5 to A-6; Finding 75(g), Pet. App.
A-306 to A-308).’ Petitioners apparently interpreted
this regulation to impose absolute liability, not only
for the costs of cleaning up oil spills, but also for
damage caused to third parties (Pet. App. A-6; Find-
ing 78(a), Pet. App. A-317 to A-318).

In furtherance of his directive that technical data
pertaining to the Santa Barbara channel be reviewed
on a lease-by-lease basis, the Secretary sent a tele-
gram on March 1, 1969, to all lessees of tracts in the
channel requesting them to furnish all available
geological, geophysical and structural information to
the regional supervisor in Los Angeles. The telegram
noted that this information was in addition to that
required under existing regulations with respect to
wells, platforms, and other matters (Finding 77(c),
Pet. App. A-312 to A-313).

At a March 12, 1969, meeting of the operating
committee responsible for petitioners’ operations,
most of the members present stated that they would

* The regulation (Pet. App. G) provided that if the high
seas are polluted by the drilling or production operations
of a lessee in a manner that threatens damage to wildlife
or public or private property, “control and removal of the
pollutant and the reparation of any damage, to whomsoever
occuring, proximately resulting therefrom shall be at the
expense of the lessee.”

6

not participate in the drilling of another well as long
as the regulation promulgated by the Secretary on
February 21 remained in effect. The members also
discussed the possibility of filing a lawsuit against
the United States. Finally, the members decided that
the question of furnishing additional information to
the regional supervisor as requested in the March 1
telegram would be held in abeyance pending a de-
cision regarding the proposed lawsuit (Finding
78(a), Pet. App. A-317 to A-319). On March 17, a
representative of petitioners wrote the regional super-
visor asking him to confirm petitioners’ understand-
ing that the additional information requested had to
be furnished only if and when they requested another
drilling permit on one of their leases. On March 20,
the regional supervisor notified petitioners of the
nature of the information required under the Secre-
tary’s March 1 telegram and confirmed that this addi-
tional information would be required only before
applications to drill additional wells could be ap-
proved (Findings 78(c) and (d), Pet. App. A-320
to A-323).

On March 28, 1969, the Secretary issued OCS
Order No. 10 establishing more stringent require-
ments for casing, cementing, mud drilling, and blow-
out procedures (Pet. App. A-7; Finding 75(e), Pet.
App. A-305 to A-306). This order was issued as
part of the review of OCS Orders the Secretary had
directed in response to the January 28 oil spill.

On April 9, 1969, petitioners filed the complaint in
this action, noting that the Secretary’s promulgation

7

of the February 21 regulation (which they inter-
preted to impose absolute liability for oil spills) had
“rendered it economically and practically impossible”
for petitioners to continue further drilling or produc-
tion operations under their leases (Finding 78(h),
Pet. App. A-326 to A-327). However, as the Court
of Claims noted (Pet. App. A-17), the February
regulation appears to have been under continuous
review in the Department of the Interior. In early
May, the Department announced a set of proposed
amendments to the OCS regulations. These included
a proposed new 30 C.F.R. 250.43(b) that restated
the substance of the regulation published on Febru-
ary 21. 34 Fed. Reg. 7381, 7383 (May 7, 1969).
In response to a number of comments received re-
flecting confusion about the meaning of that pro-
vision, the Department of the Interior promulgated a
new 30 C.F.R. 250.43(c) in August providing that
the “lessee’s liability to third parties, other than for
cleaning up the pollutant in accordance with para-
graph (b) of this section shall be governed by ap-
plicable law. 34 Fed. Reg. 13544, 18547 (August 22,
1969).

Petitioners never submitted all information the
regional supervisor stated in his March 20 letter was
required to be submitted and never amended their
February 11 drilling application to comply with OCS
Order No. 10 issued by the Secretary on March 28.
Based on this and other evidence, the trial judge
found that petitioners did not intend after mid-March
to conduct further drilling operations on their leases

8

because of the issuance of the February 21 regulation
“and that this is the reason why they failed to pursue
the Department of the Interior’s clearance procedures
to permit future drilling operations, and why they
failed to file an application for a permit to do further
drilling in compliance with the requirements of OCS
order No. 10” (Finding 78(k), Pet. App. A-329 to
A-330). Petitioners did not take exception to this
finding.

Petitioners’ complaint in the court below alleged
four causes of action. In their primary cause of
action, they alleged that the Secretary’s issuance of
the February 21, 1969 regulation concerning the
responsibilities of a lessee for oil spills had made it
commercially impossible for petitioners to operate un-
der the leases, thereby giving rise to a claim of frus-
tration. The second cause, premised on the same facts
as the claim of frustration, was that there had been
a mutual mistake of law as to the standard of lessee
liability to third parties and that petitioners could
rescind the contract as a result. The third cause of
action was for breach of contract based on the Febru-
ary 21 regulation, the failure of the Secretary to
approve petitioners’ February 11 drilling application,
and the clearance procedure for reviewing leases on a
case-by-case basis, which petitioners characterized as
a camouflage for an indefinite suspension of drilling.
In the final cause of action, petitioners alleged that
the United States had by its actions taken petitioners’
leasehold interests. The Court of Claims, after a
lengthy trial and receipt of extensive briefs and find-

\

9

ings of the Trial Judge, found against petitioners on
each count and dismissed their petition. Petitioners
do not press their mutual mistake and taking con-
tentions in this Court (Pet. 25 n.* * *).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners contend (Pet. 37-46) that the gov-
ernment breached the lease agreement by failing to
approve their application for additional drilling filed
February 11, 1969, improperly relying on petitioners’
failure to comply with the lease-by-lease clearance
procedure established by the Secretary in the wake of
the January 28 oil spill. This argument, however, is
foreclosed by the uncontested finding of fact, quoted
above, that petitioners did not intend after mid-
March to conduct further drilling operations on their
tracts and for this reason failed to pursue the In-
terior Department’s clearance procedures or to file an
amended drilling application to comply with the new
drilling standards in OCS Order No. 10, issued on
March 28, 1969. This finding is fully supported by
the record (Pet. App. A-22). Accordingly, petition-
ers cannot now assert that they were injured by the
Department’s clearance procedure or by the failure
of the Department to approve their drilling appli-
cation.

Moreover, as the Court of Claims noted (Pet. App.
A-25), the serious blow-out at the Union Oil well on
January 28 fully warranted a reasonable suspension
of drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel pending the
gathering and evaluation of additional technical data

10

about leases in the channel. See also Sun Oil Co. v.
United States, 572 F.2d 786, 802 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morion, 493 F.2d 141, 146 (9th
Cir. 1973).

The Secretary moved expeditiously to establish the
mechanism for the review. By March 1, the Secretary
had sent telegrams to all lessees in the channel re-
questing additional information, and by March 28,
1969, the Secretary had issued OCS Order No. 10
establishing more stringent standards for drilling
new wells. The lease-by-lease clearance procedure was
designed to precede and provide necessary background
information for the review of subsequent applications
for permits to drill on each lease. The clearance of a
particular lease and the approval of an application
to drill under that lease could therefore not proceed
until the lessee had furnished the information re-
quested in the March 1 telegram (Finding 77 (h), Pet.
App. A-316 to A-317).

Petitioners did not submit any of the requested
data to the regional supervisor until April 4, more

n a month after the telegram requesting the data
was sent to all lessees, and they never zubmitted all
necessary information to the Interior Department or
amended their application to conform to OCS Order
No. 10. The record establishes that these failures by
petitioners were the reason their February 11 drilling
application was not approved (Finding 77(i), Pet.
App. A-317).

11

Petitioners’ correspondence with the regional su-
pervisor during this period made no mention of the
February 11 application, and instead created the im-
pression that petitioners were only concerned about
the need to submit the newly requested information
should they choose to submit an application at a later
date (Findings 78(c)-(h), Pet. App. A-320 to A-
327). And after the present lawsuit was abruptly
begun on April 9, 1969—when petitioners alleged
that further drilling on their lease was impossible—
the Department of the Interior “could rightly assume
(particularly since [petitioners] did not indicate
otherwise) that the February 11th drilling applica-
tion was no longer being pressed” (Pet. App. A-26).
Because of the court’s finding that petitioners did
not, and did not intend to, press their February 11
drilling application, they cannot complain of the De-
partment’s clearance procedure that was made ap-
plicable to lessees who did submit new applications or
seek to resume operations at existing wells.

In any event, there is no basis for petitioners’ con-
tention that the clearance procedure was a bureau-
cratic facade to conceal a departmental decision to
shut down drilling operations altogether. A task force
was promptly created to analyze technical data on
each leased tract to determine whether production
operations shut down by order of the Secretary on
February 7 could be resumed and whether explora-
tory drilling could be conducted safely on other tracts
should applications for such drilling be filed (Find-
ing 77(b), Pet. App. A-312). Clearance was granted

12

by April 1, 1969, to four of the five tracts of other
lessees whose production operations had been suspend-
ed immediately after the oil spill, and clearance for
the fifth lessee was subsequently granted (Pet. App.
A-26 to A-27; Sun Oil Co. v. United States, supra,
572 F.2d at 797-800).

Although petitioners now contend (Pet. 41-46)
that the Department failed to inform them of what
was required to comply with this clearance procedure
and that they were injured as a result, the court
below expressly found that petitioners did promptly
learn of the lease clearance requirements and proce-
dures and were informed by the regional supervisor
that submission of the additional technical informa-
tion requested in the Secretary’s March 1 telegram
was a prerequisite to consideration of drilling appli-
cations (Findings 78(b) and (c), Pet. App. A-319
to A-320). Because they had actual notice of these
essentials of the lease-by-lease review and drilling
application procedures, they have no basis to complain
that the Secretary should have published this infor-
mation. 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (1).

Moreover, the court below further found that In-
terior officials were prepared to and did contact and
meet with other lessees of tracts in the Santa Barbara
Channel to explain the clearance procedure in greater
detail, to request additional information, and to re-
view information furnished (Finding 77(f), Pet.
App. A-314 to A-315). But petitioners did not pur-
sue the clearance procedure or comply with the thresh-
old requirement of submitting complete geological

13

data, of which they were aware (Pet. App. A-27 to
A-28). The reason for this, no doubt, may be found
in the Court of Claims’ well-supported evidentiary
finding that petitioners never intended after mid-
March to pursue drilling in the channel.

2. Petitioners also ask the Court to consider
whether a lessee’s liability for injury to third parties
caused by an oil spill on the lessee’s tract is governed
by state law or federal regulations issued under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Pet. 3-4, 46-
50). However, petitioners present this issue in the
abstract, suggesting only that it would be useful for
the Court to address it in view of the substantial
number of oil and gas leases on the outer continental
shelf, without indicating why the issue is of any
importance in this particular case. They do not as-
sert, for example, that any spill has resulted from
drilling on their leased tracts. Petitioners’ failure to
elaborate on the reasons why the Court should con-
sider this choice-of-law question is understandable
because, as explained below, that question had no
bearing on the outcome of this case.

Petitioners raised the choice-of-law question below
in connection with their contention that the Secre-
tary’s February 21 regulation governing a lessee’s
responsibility for oil spills was a marked departure
from prior law and thereby frustrated petitioners’
ability to perform under the lease. The government
argued that prior to issuance of the regulations, state
law, not pre-existing federal regulations, governed the
standard of liability for damages to third parties

14

and that California law already imposed a strict
standard of liability on oil drilling as an ultrahazard-
ous activity. Thus, under the government’s theory,
even if the February 21 regulation established a
standard of strict liability, it did not depart from
prior law. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that
federal law previously governed liability for oil spills
and that negligence, not strict liability, was the stand-
ard under prior federal regulations. Alternatively,
petitioners argued that only oil drilling in inhabited
areas was necessarily ultrahazardous under Califor-
nia law (Pet. App. A-14 n.12). Based on these
premises, petitioners argued that the February 21
regulation changed the standard of liability (Pet.
App. A-16). See generally Pet. 28, 30-33.

But whatever the law governing lessees’ liability,
petitioners’ claim of frustration failed, as the Court
of Claims properly held (Pet. App. A-18 to A-19),
because petitioners had failed to prove that perform-
ance of the contract was rendered impossible by the
standard of liability prevailing (or believed by peti-
tioners to be prevailing) at the time they elected to
file this action. Impossibility sufficient to enable a
party to be released from his contract must be deter-
mined by an objective standard. The contract must
be found unreasonable to all, not to a particular party
only. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281,
Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974); Clark Grave
Vault Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 459, 461 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) ; 6 A. Corbin on Contracts § 1332 (1962).
The record here reveals that other companies are and

15

have been since 1969 operating under existing reg-
ulations in the Santa Barbara Channel (Pet. App.
A-26 to A-27; Finding 77(g), Pet. App. A-316). See
also Sun Oil Co. v. United States, supra, 572 F.2d
at 797-800.

In addition, the Court of Claims properly held
(Pet. App. A-15 to A-18) that petitioners had failed
to establish another essential element of the doctrine
of frustration: the occurrence of an unexpected con-
tingency not accounted for in negotiations between
the parties. The court concluded that the state of the
law on lessees’ liability was plainly unsettled prior
to February, 1969, whether one looked to California
law, as the government urged, or to federal regu-
lations, as petitioners suggested (id. A-15 to A-17).
The state of the law remained unsettled even after
the February 21 regulation was issued (id. A-17 to
A-20). The Department of the Interior amended its
regulations in August, 1969, less than five months
after this case was filed, expressly to provide that
although the lessee was responsible for cleaning up
any pollutant, liability to third parties for damages
caused by an oil spill was to continue to be governed
by “applicable law” (Finding 76, Pet. App. A-309
to A-310). Thus, the effect of the February and
August regulations, read together, was to leave the
law on liability to third parties for damages exactly
where it was at the time petitioners entered into
their lease. Such repose can hardly be termed an
“unexpected contingency” giving rise to impossibility
of performance.

16

In sum, because petitioners failed to establish either
an unexpected contingency or impossibility of per-
formance, they would not be entitled to recovery,
irrespective of the manner in which the Court might
resolve petitioners’ choice-of-law issue. Accordingly,
there is no occasion for the Court to consider the
choice-of-law issue.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN
Acting Assistant Attorney General

MYLES E. FLINT
Attorney

SEPTEMBER 1979

W ov. S. Goveanment printing orrice; 1979 300443 68

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0506%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
