# Appendix — Davis v. Passman

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0419%3A02

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 442 U.S. 228

## Text

} FILED
NOV 87 1975

APPENDIX
CLERK |
Suprenw Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-5072
SHIRLEY DAVIS,
Petitioner,
——l',—-
OTTO E. PASSMAN,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JULY 17, 1978
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 30, 1978

a eee

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-5072
SHIRLEY DAVIS,
.. Petitioner,
i
OTTo E. PASSMAN,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

INDEX

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ........................
Coe ee ne.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Filed October 9, 1974 ...........

Opinion and Judgment of District Court, Filed February 26,
a ssn epnccnensneeets

Opinion of Panel of Court of Ap , Filed January 3, 1977..

Petition of Defendant/Appellasas for Rehearing and Rehear-
ing En Banc, Filed February 16, 1977 ...............0.0.000ccceece.

Order Granting Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En
RB OE BN

Opinion of Court of Appeals En Banc, Filed April 18, 1978...

Judgment of Court of Appeals on Rehearing En Banc, Filed
pC Beat OY oe EE

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States Granting
Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis and Petition for Cer-
EIRENE Ee

96

98

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT
DOCKET ENTRIES

A. District Court

B.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action No. 74-745
SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF
Vv.

OTTO E. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Aug. 7,1974 Complaint filed.

Oct. 9,1974 Motion to dismiss filed.

Feb. 26,1975 Opinion and judgment filed.
Mar. 7,1975 Plaintiff’s notice of appeal filed.

Court of Appeals

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Apr. 9, 1975 Record certified to Court of Appeals.

Apr. 12, 1976 Oral argument before Chief Judge
Brown and Judges Goldberg and Jones.

(1)

2

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Jan. 3, 1977 Opinion of Court of Appeals by Judge
Goldberg; dissenting opinion by Judge a.

Feb. 16, 1977 Petition of defendant/appellast for
rehearing and rehearing en banc filed.

May 17, 1977 Order granting rehearing and rehear-
ing en banc filed.

Sept. 26, 1977 Oral argument before Court of Ap-
peals en banc.

Apr. 18, 1978 Opinion of Court of Appeals en banc
by Judge Clark; special concurrences by Judges
Jones and Roney; dissenting opinion by Judge
Goldberg, joined by Chief Judge Brown.

Apr. 18,1978 Judgment filed.

Lee edie A inhee SE nee

“~ pers eet pe

3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action Number 74-745
SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF
versus

OTTO E. PASSMAN, Congressman of the United States,
DEFENDANT

COMPLANT—Filed August 7, 1974

- I. JURISDICTION

1. This is a civil action seeking declaratory, injunctive
and other legal and equitable relief to redress violations
of plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitu-
tion and more particularly Fifth Amendment thereto.
This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Sections 1343, 1331, and 2201. The matter
in controversy exceeds the value of $10,000.00.

Il. PARTIES

2. Plaintiff, Shirley Davis, is an adult female citizen of
the United States and a resident of the City of Monroe,
Parish of Quachita, State of Louisiana. Plaintiff was
employed by defendant as his deputy administrative as-
sistant from February 1, 1974, through July 31, 1974.

3. Defendant Otto E. Passman is a citizen of the
United States with his domicile in the City of Monroe,
Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana. He is the duly
elected representative to the Congress of the United
States from the Fifth District of Louisiana.

Ill. STATEMENT

4. Plaintiff was an employee of defendant in the ca-
pacity of deputy administrative assistant from Febru-

A

ary 1, 1974, through July 31, 1974, on which date her
employment was terminated by defendant.

5. Plaintiff’s salary was $18,000.00 per year with the
expectation of a promotion to defendant’s administrative
assistant at a salary of $32,000.00 per year upon the
imminent retirement of defendant’s current administra-
tive assistant.

6. On June 21, 1974, defendant mailed plaintiff a
letter stating he would terminate her employment effec-
tive July 31, 1974, solely because she was a female and
despite the fact that she was “able, energetic, and a very
hard worker.” A copy of said letter of June 21, 1974, is
attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit “A.”

7. The conduct of defendant as described herein and
as will be more fully shown on trial of this cause dis-
criminated against plaintiff and continues to discriminate
plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of the United
States Constitution and the Fifth Amendment thereto.

8. Plaintiff suffered and is suffering irreparable in-
jury from defendant’s practices, policies, and customs as
set forth herein, and will continue to so suffer unless
this Court grants the relief requested.

9. There is a real controversy between the parties
and plaintiff has no completely adequate remedy at law;
unless plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive
relief is granted, she will suffer irreparable injury.

10. Plaintiff’s dismissal has seriously injured her
standing and reputation in the community in which she
lives and works and plaintiff has been refused any op-
portunity to refute the ground of dismissal.

11. Plaintiff affirmatively states she is well capable
of carrying on the position of administrative assistant
and that her dismissal was predicated solely upon sex
discrimination.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Pt ogo plaintiff respectfully prays that this
urt:

1. Declare the actions of defendant, Otto E. Passman,
described in the paragraphs hereinabove to be unlawful

rer gy TT TT

5

sex discrimination in violation of the United States Con-
stitution and the Fifth Amendment thereto;

2. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions en-
joining defendant, Otto E. Passman, his agents, em-
ployees, and those acting in concert or cooperation with
him, from engaging in policies and practices contrary to
the rights of plaintiff which are sexually discriminating
in violation of the United States Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment thereto;

3. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions re-
quiring defendant, Otto E. Passman, to rehire plaintiff
in the position she would currently hold were it not for
the unlawful sexual discrimination.

4. Issue such other and further relief as may be
proper and necessary, including, but not limited to, pro-
motion, salary increase, and back pay to plaintiff;

5. Award plaintiff the costs of the action, together
with reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution of this
action.

Respectfully submitted,

Kidd & Katz
709 Jackson Avenue
Monroe, Louisiana

Attorneys for Plaintiff

By: /s/ Stephen J. Katz
STEPHEN J. KATZ

TS fee ors Ee oan OR ORES Ue Nee ey eee Sa TS ISR

6
EXHIBIT “A”

OTTO E. PASSMAN
Congressman
5th District, Louisiana

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 21, 1974

Mrs. Shirley Davis
611 Eason Place
Monroe, Louisiana 71201

Dear Mrs. Davis:

My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss
you very much. But, in all probability, inwardly they all
agree that I was doing you an injustice by asking you to
assume a responsibility that was so trying and so hard
that it would have taken all of the pleasure out of your
work. I must be completely fair with you, so please note
the following: .

You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Cer-
tainly you command the respect of those with whom you
work; however, on account of the unusually heavy work
load in my Washington Office, and the diversity of the
job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy
to my Administrative Assistant be a man.I believe you
will agree with this conclusion.

It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste
your talent and experience in my Monroe office because
of the low salary that is available because of a junior
position. Therefore, and so that your experience and
talent may be used to advantage in some organization in
need of an extremely capable secretary, I desire that you
be continued on the payroll at your present salary
through July 31, 1974. This arrangement gives you your
full year’s vacation of one month, plus one additional

7

month. May I further say that the work load in the
Monroe office is very limited, and since you would come
in as a junior member of the staff at such a low salary,
it would actually be an offense to you.

I know that secretaries with your ability are very
much in demand in Monroe. If an additional letter of
recommendation from me would be advantageous to you,
do not hesitate to let me know. Again, assuring you that
my Washington staff and your humble Congressman feel
that the contribution you made to our Washington office
has helped all of us.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

/s/ Otto E. Passman
OTTO E. PASSMAN
Member of Congress

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

| Title omitted in printing]

MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12 (b)—
Filed October 9, 1974

NOW INTO COURT, through his undersigned counsel,
comes defendant OTTO E. PASSMAN, who respectfully
moves the Court as follows:

‘. dismiss the action because the complaint fails
to state a claim against defendant upon which relief can
be granted, for the reason that the alleged conduct of de-
fendant is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.

2. To dismiss the action because the complaint fails
a state Padi cng gna defendant upon which relief can

e gran or the reason that the law afford i
right of action to plaintiff. ener

3. To dismiss the action because the complaint fails to
“ a hei against defendant upon which relief can

gran y reason of the sovereign immunit i
and the official immunity doctrine. i —e"
ro - en with the Court’s rules, defendant at-

ches hereto a memorandum of authorities j
prs Rasen ly orities in support
Hupson, Potts & BERNSTEIN
10th Floor
Ouachita National Bank
Building
Monroe, Louisiana 71201

By: /s/ Jesse D. McDonald
vESSE D. McDONALD
Attorneys for Defendant

ret ete AT ane A chan OI

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

Civil Action No. 74-745
SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF
versus

OTTO E. PASSMAN, CONGRESSMAN OF THE
UNITED STATES, DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT—February 26, 1975

THIS CAUSE CAME ON FOR HEARING before this
Court on February 24, 1975, on the Motion to Dismiss
under Rule 12(b) filed by defendant contending the plain-
tiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against defendant
upon which relief can be granted on three grounds, viz. :
(1) that the alleged conduct of defendant is not violative
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; (2) that the
law affords no private right of action to plaintiff; and
(3) by reason of the doctrines of sovereign and official
immunity; and, the Court having considered the briefs
of counsel for both sides, and having heard the oral
arguments of counsel for both sides.

IT IS THE OPINION OF THIS COURT, that the
complaint filed by plaintiff Shirley Davis herein does
fail to state a claim against defendant Otto E. Passman,
upon which relief can be granted, for the reason that the
discharge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of sex discrimi-
nation by defendant is nov violative of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution and for the reason that the law
affords no private right of action to plaintiff therefor.
The Court is of the opinion that the doctrines of sover-
eign and official immunity urged by defendant as grounds
(3) for said motion are not well founded. Having found
that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is well founded as to
defendant’s grounds (1) and (2).

10

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of
defendant Otto E. Passman, and against plaintiff Shirley
a — the pom cowrres of plaintiff for failure to

te a claim against defendant Otto E.
which relief can be granted. Te

THIS JUDGMENT entered and signed in Sh
Louisiana, on this 26th day of Feaaey, 1975. sti

/s/ Tom Stagg
Ls STAGG
nited States Distri
Approved as to form: istrict Judge

‘s/ Stephen J. Katz
STEPHEN J. KATz
KIDD AND KATZ
Attorneys
709 Jackson Street
Monroe, Louisiana 71201
Attorneys for Plaintiff

oT

ll

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
a
OTTu 4. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OPINION—January 3, 1977

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and JONES and GOLD-
BERG, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

In this case a member of the United States Congress
unflinchingly asserts that the Constitution allows him
openly to discriminate against women. He asserts fur-
ther that he need not so much as suggest a single basis
for the discrimination. The issue is not to be trivialized.
We have here a conflict of transcendental importance be-
tween the rights of the individual and the rights of a
representative qua representative. Although representa-
tives admittedly have some insulation not wrapped around
ordinary mortals, the conflicting interests must be har-
monized, not dichotomized. Finding that our Constitution
protects individual rights even against the mighty, we
remand this case for trial.

In the early part of 1974 Shirley Davis was Deputy
Administrative Assistant to Representative Otto E. Pass-

12

man of the Louisiana fifth Congressional District. The
Representative terminated Davis’s employment effective
July 31, 1974. In his letter to her explaining the termi-
nation decision the Representative wrote, “You are able,
energetic and a very hard worker. . . . [H]owever, on
account of the unusually heavy workload in my Washing-
ton office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded that
it was essential that the understudy to my administra-
tive assistant be a man.” The full text of this rather
remarkable letter is set out in the margin.’

1 Dear Mrs. Davis:

My Washington staff joins me in saying that we thiss you very
much. But, in all probability, inwardly they all agree that I was
doing you an injustice by asking you to assume a responsibility that
was so trying and so hard that it would have taken all of the
pleasure out of your work. I must be completely fair with you, so
please note the following:

You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you
command the respect of those with whom you work; however, on
account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office,
and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that
the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe
you will agree with this conclusion.

It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your talent
and experience in my Monroe office because of the low salary that
is available because of a junior position. Therefore, and so that your
experience and talent may be used to advantage in some organiza-
tion in need of an extremely capable secretary, I desire that you be
continued on the payroll at your present salary through July 31,
1974. This arrangement gives you your full year’s vacation of one
month, plus one additional month. May | further say that the work
load in the Monroe office is very limited, and since you would come
in as a junior member of the staff at such a low salary, it would
actually be an offense to you.

I know that secretaries with your ability are very much in demand
in Monroe. If an additional letter of recommendation from me
would be advantageous to you, do not hesitate to let me know. Again,
assuring you that my Washington staff and your humble Congress-

man feel that the contribution you made to our Washington office
has helped all of us.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

/s/ Otto E. Passman
Member of Congress

De eile

A el a RRO 5

13

Davis then filed this action against the Representative,
claiming he had violated the equal protection component
of the fifth amendment’s due process clause. She invoked
the court’s “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1331(a), and she sought specific relief, dam-

es and declaratory relief.
*eThe = Reswonirew moved to dismiss the complaint on
three grounds: that his conduct was not unconstitutional,
that the law afforded Davis no private right of action,
and that the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity
barred the action. The district court rejected the im-
munity argument but dismissed the action on the first
two points. We reverse, finding that Davis s allegations,
if proved, will establish a constitutional violation for
which she has a private right of action. We agree with
the district court that the immunity doctrines do not
bar the suit.

I. Constitutionality

1,2] Although the fourteenth amendment’s equal
Poin fiat applies only to the states, the fifth
amendment’s due process clause contains an equal pro-
tection component applicable to the federal government.
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct.
693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); N. L. R. B. v. Sumpter Ply-
wood Corp., 585 F.2d 917, 930 n.22 | 5th Cir. 1976).
Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions establish be-
yond dispute that, just as sex discrimination by the states
violates the fourteenth amendment unless supported by
sufficient justifications, Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71, 92
S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1873, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975), sex
discrimination by the federal government violates the
fifth amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weinberger Vv.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514
(1975). We must therefore address two questions:
whether the alleged conduct constituted sex discrimina-
tion, and if so whether sufficient governmental interests
validate the discrimination.

14
A. Discrimination

[3] In the case at bar the first question is easily
answered. Davis’s allegations, which must of course be
taken as true in evaluating the Representative’s motion
to dismiss, see, e.g., Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 448, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456
(1956) ; Reeves v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 582 F.2d
491, 493 (5th Cir. 1976), clearly make out a case of sex
discrimination. The Representative’s termination letter
offered but a single reason for Davis’s dismissal: she was
a woman; the job called for a man.

The Representative argues, however, that unconstitu-
tional sex discrimination occurs only when the sex-based
classification is embodied in a statute and only when the
actor is someone other than a member of Congress. With
respect to the first point he correctly notes that the stat-
ute upon which his dismissal of Davis was predicated,
2 U.S.C. § 92, is nondiscriminatory on its face; it allows
dismissal of both male and female staff members with or
without cause. The Representative also correctly notes
that neither Frontiero nor Wiesenfeld compel rejection
of his position; both of those cased invalidated statutory
classifications.”

? Frontiero confronted a statutory scheme dealing with benefits
afforded members of the uniformed services for their “dependent”
spouses, A serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent without
regard to actual dependency, whereas a servicewoman could claim
her husband only if he was shown to be dependent upon her for
over one-half of his support. The court invalidated the scheme.
Similarly, Wiesenfeld struck down a provision of the Social Security
Act that granted a widow, but not a widower, benefits based on the
deceased spouse’s earnings.

Supreme Court decisions invalidating state sex discriminations
have also involved statutes. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251,
30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) held unconstitutional an Idaho statute under
which male candidates to administer an estate were preferred over
equally-qualified female candidates. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U-S.
7, 95 S.Ct. 1378, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975) struck down a Utah statute
a established a greater age of majority for males than for fe-
males.

Bark hg ir tat u

15

[4] The Representative’s argument that equal pro-
tection principles apply only to statutory discrimination,
however, contravenes a long and unbroken chain of de-
cisions. The Supreme Court clearly rejected the argu-
ment as long ago as 1886. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) the Court
held that the discriminatory application against Chinese
Americans of facially neutral building regulations vio-
lated the equal protection clause. The passage of time
has enhanced, not diminished, the position of Yick Wo
as a pillar of our jurisprudence. Numerous more recent
decisions have struck down nonstatutory discriminations,
usually without even pausing to note explicitly that equal
protection principles are not limited to statutes. See,
e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201,
93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) ; Foster v. Sparks,
506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974); United Farmworkers of Florida
Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799 (5th Cir. 1974).

Equal protection scrutiny of inconsistencies in the ap-
plication of facially nondiscriminatory statutes is not,
of course, without limits. In Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed.2d 497 (1944) a state
elections official refused to follow a state law requiring
that a successful primary candidate be certified for in-
clusion on the general election ballot. The Court re-
jected the candidate’s argument that this isolated failure
to apply the state law to everyone equally constituted a
denial of “equal protection of the laws.” The Court laid
down the governing standard:

The unlawful administration by state officers of
a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its un-
equal application to those who [were] entitled to be
treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection un-
less there is shown to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 321 U.S. at 8, 64 S.Ct. at 401.

Davis’s complaint clearly meets the Snowden require-
ments. The only digressions from neutral statutory pro-

16

visions that Snowden exempts from equal protection scru-
tiny are those isolated incidents not based on a classifi-
cation.» Here. Representative Passman established a
classification; he divided potential deputy administrative
assistants into one group of men and another of women.
The termination letter, at least on its face, is an open
declaration of “intentional” and “purposeful” sex dis-
crimination.

Therefore, Representative Passman will be free at
trial to demonstrate that the firing was not in fact based
upon Davis’s gender, but he can derive no support from
the nonstatutory nature of the discrimination. The con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom from invidious discrimi-
nation would ring hollow indeed if it could be bypassed
by the simple expedient of implementing the discrimina-
tion under a facially neutral statute. That the alleged
discrimination was not embodied in a statute is of no
moment.*

3 Washington V. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597
(1976) supports this analysis. There the Supreme Court upheld
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department’s use of
Test 21 to screen applicants. The test allegedly excluded a dispro-
portionate number of black applicants and would therefore have
been invalid under Title VII and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). But the action had
been brought before Title VII was made applicable to the federal
government in 1972, and the Constitution itself provided the govern-
ing standard. See 426 U.S. at 238, n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2040.

Unlike the situation in Snowden, the challenged action in Wash-
ington did reflect a classification; applicants were separated into
one groun that passed the test and another that did not. Equal
protection scrutiny was therefore appropriate. Because the Court
found no racially discriminating purpose, an issue as to which
racially disproportionate impact was relevant but not dispositive,
it did not invoke the stringent equal protection scrutiny that at-
tends racial classifications. The Court upheld the challenged classi-
fication, finding it sufficiently related to the legitimate goal of
modestly upgrading the communicative abilities of government
employees. 426 U.S. at 245-246, 96 S.Ct. at 2050, 48 L.Ed.2d at 610.

* Although Yick Wo and the other cited decisions were decided
under the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection component of
fifth amendment due process contains the same principle. There is
no reason to exempt the federal government from the principle that

Pe Ne ee ee eS oy ie Ce

17

[5,6] Representative Passman’s contention that the
constitutional ban on unjustified sex discrimination does
not restrict the actions of members of Congress is equally
untenable. He argues, in effect, that his congressional
status endows him with an open-ended right to discrimi-
nate irrespective of the time, place and condition of the
discrimination.’ A representative, however, is as subject
to constitutional standards when hiring employees as
when acting in concert with other members of Congress
to enact legislation. A representative is not an imperator
and is never above and beyond the law; any other view
could not be squared with the whole predicate upon which
our constitutional life depends. The need for wide dis-
cretion in staff employment decisions cannot be ignored,
but the constitutional proscription of blatant sex dis-
crimination does not impair Representative Passman’s
legitimate control over his staff to any extent at all.
The Constitution does not force him to hire by the slide
rule, but at the same time it does not permit him to
slide into unbridled discrimination. The geometry of
congressional discretion in hiring and firing is neither
apogean nor perigean. We must equilibrate. Representa-
tive Passman can certainly assemble a capable and com-
petent staff without engaging in the sex discrimination
alleged here. The applicable constitutional standards may
give a representative greater leeway in employment de-
cisions than other government entities possess, and at
trial Representative Passman may be able to show that
he has not transgressed the constitutional requirements.
All we need decide for purposes of this appeal, however,
is that at some point invidious discrimination_by a rep-

discriminatory applications of nondiscriminatory statutes must meet
equal protection guidelines, as Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) implicitly recognized. See
note 3 supra.

* Whether the courts can redress a representative’s transgressions
of the constitutional standards presents a separate issue. Repre-
sentative Passman asserts not only that he is immune from suit, but
also that even apart from the possibility of redress, the Constitution
does not prohibit him from discriminating on the basis of gender.

18

resentative in his or her employment decisions is uncon-
stitutional. Davis’s allegations are certainly sufficient to
entitle her to go to trial in an effort to show that this is
such a case.°

B. Justification

The next issue is whether the alleged discrimination is
constitutional because supported by sufficient governmen-
tal interests. Whether the interests supporting a sex dis-
crimination must be “compelling” is unsettled. In Fron-
tiero four justices said sex was a “suspect classification”
calling for strict judicial scrutiny. See 411 U.S. at 682-
88, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.).
Under that approach the government must show a com-
pelling interest. Three justices, however, reserved the
“strict scrutiny” issue saying the classification there was
unconstitutional in any event. 411 U.S. at 691-92, 93
S.Ct. 1764 (Powell, J., concurring). The earlier case of
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225
(1971), and the subsequent cases of Weinberger Vv.
Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514
(1975) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct.
1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975), invalidated sex discrimi-
nations without addressing the strict scrutiny issue.’ In

6To eliminate any confusion we note that appellant need not
demonstrate the denial of any “property” interest. Although the
due process clause extends only to deprivations of “life, liberty, or
property”, a violation of the clause’s equal protection component is
necessarily a deprivation of “liberty”. Therefore, decisions under
the due process clause’s equal protection component, like substantive
due process decisions, make no reference to the “life, liberty, or
property” requirement. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975).

7 The holdings of Reed, Wiesenfeld and Stanton are outlined in
note 2 supra. See also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734,
40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974) (Florida statute giving widows but not
widowers a $500 property tax exemption upheld as substantially
related to the legitimate object of cushioning the disproportionate
financial difficulties confronting a lone woman); Schlesinger Vv.

19

these decisions the Court clearly applied more than the
minimal rationality test that characterizes equal protec-
tion decisions in some other areas, however, and sex-based
classifications must withstand at least middle-level equal
protection scrutiny.*

In the case at bar we can follow the Supreme Court’s
lead and refrain from specifying the applicable standard.
Indeed, we need not even apply the substantial scrutiny
that has characterized the Court’s decisions. For here
Representative Passman offers no governmental interest
at all in support of the sex-based classification, and we
can imagine none.’ The qualifications for the post of
deputy administrative assistant simply have nothing to
do with gender. The Representative’s suggestion in his
letter that the job requires a man because of the “un-
usually heavy work load” and the “diversity of the job”
is patently ridiculous. Understandably, the Representa-
tive has abandoned that rationale on this appeal. The
Representative will be free at trial to pursue his con-
tention that gender was not the basis of Davis’s dismis-
sal, but if he is unsuccessful the firing cannot escape
constitutional condemnation.

Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975) (different
tenure provisions for military men and women sustained because,
under unchallenged scheme restricting the military role of women,
service men and women are not similarly situated).

8 For discussion of intermediate equal protection standards, see
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,
98-110, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.
2d 63 (1973) (White, J., concurring) ; Gunther, The Supreme Court.
1971 Term—Forword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
7 Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.Rev.
1 (1972).

* We therefore need not decide whether we would consider justi-
fications occurring to us but not asserted by the Representative.
The extent to which equal protection courts will consider supporting
interests not put forward by the government is unsettled and may
vary with the governing equal protection standard.

20

II. Availability of Relief

Having determined that Davis has alleged a constitu-
tional violation, we must now determine whether the
claim is one upon which relief can be granted. In sub-
stance, Davis seeks three forms of relief: specific relief,
damages, and a declaration. We deal with each in turn.

A. Specific Relief

The specific relief Davis seeks includes reinstatement,
promotion and an injunction against unlawful discrimi-
nation directed toward her. The injunction claim might
raise a sovereign immunity issue under our decisions in
Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971) and Beale
v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973), even though
the Supreme Court has said in Larson v. Domestic and
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457,
93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609,
83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963) that sovereign im-
munity does not bar suits against federal officials alleg-
ing that they acted unconstitutionally. See Penn Vv.
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1973), rev’d
on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49 L.Ed.
2d 385 (1976). In addition, the reinstatement and pro-
motion prayers, while impervious to sovereign immunity
attack because in the nature of mandamus, see Penn v.
Schlesinger, supra; Beale v. Blount, supra, would raise
difficult issues concerning the proper exercise of equita-
ble remedial discretion. In Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d
1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) we refused to order a
judge to reinstate his chief probation officer because the
probation officer’s personal criticisms of the judge made
the necessary cooperative and confidential relationship
impossible.’ Although Davis has not, so far as this rec-
ord shows, done anything to antagonize the Representa-
tive other than bring this lawsuit to vindicate her consti-
tutional rights, we would remain very hesitant to order

1°In Abbott the en banc court adopted Judge Gewin’s dissent
from the panel opinion, see 529 F.2d 695, 701-08 (5th Cir. 1976).

——-— 7 we

nei ais Sateen ds bh
Se RE ee ee 7

Pili ot hse ren owe

21

reinstatement of a representative’s personal assistant.
Cf. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG., M. & G. 604, 42 Eng.
Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).

Intervening events, however, have blunted the import-
ance of these issues. We take notice that Representative
Passman was defeated in the 1976 primary election.
His tenure in Congress will therefore apparently come
to an end on January 3, 1977. That the term is not yet
completely over saves the specific-relief claims from tech-
nical mootness, but they have certainly lost their signifi-
cance. We assume Davis will not press her reinstate-
ment or injunction prayers, and we pass on to other
remedies.

B. Damages

Davis’s damages claim takes us through a five-stage
analysis. First, damages are available under the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Second, the Su-
preme Court’s more recent decision in Brown v. General
Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48
L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) does not affect the Bivens remedy
under the circumstances here. Third, sovereign immunity
does not bar Davis’s claim for damages against Repre-
sentative Passman individually. Fourth, the speech or
debate clause does not shield the Representative. Fifth,
although the Representative can assert qualified official
immunity at trial, that doctrine is insufficient to support
a motion to dismiss. In sum, Davis’s damages claim must
be remanded for trial.

1. Bivens

[7] Davis’s claim for damages is predicated upon
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, supra. There the Supreme Court
held that a damages remedy for an unconstitutional
search and seizure could be implied directly from the
Constitution itself. The Court rejected the government’s
argument that the complainant should have been relegated

22

to a state law tort action and that the Constitution’s sole
function was to limit the scope of the officers’ privilege
defense, holding that the constitutional damages action
was independent of state tort law. The Court explicitly
rejected the government’s argument that damages should
be available only if “necessary to enforce the Fourth
Amendment.” 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. Among
other things, the Constitution is a compendium of rights,
and their enforcement does not depend upon statutory
enrollment. As Bivens establishes, legislative inaction
does not vitiate constitutional rights. Statutory actions
may give breath to constitutional rights, but congres-
sional inaction cannot suffocate them.

[8] Although Davis’s claim arises under the fifth
amendment, not the fourth, we find no basis in Bivens’
language or rationale for according any significance to
this distinction. The rights protected by the fifth amend-
ment due process clause are every bit as fundamental as
fourth amendment rights. Here, as in Bivens, damages
simply constitute “a particular remedial mechanism nor-
mally available in the federal courts,” 403 U.S. at 397,
91 S.Ct. at 2005.

Indeed, here the case for implying a damages remedy is
even stronger than in Bivens. In the Bivens situation
state tort law is available to remedy some constitutional
violations, and the exclusionary rule also sometimes pro-
vides a remedy. The case for implying a constitutional
damages remedy becomes more compelling when, as here,
there is no meaningful alternative remedy. Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall’s time-honored call for justice provides
a guiding principle not lightly to be ignored: “The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 187, 168, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), quoted in
Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 397, 91-S.Ct. [1999] at 2005.

Our conclusion that Bivens is not limited to fourth
amendment claims draws support from various court of
appeals decisions. We have ourselves upheld an arrested
person’s complaint seeking damages directly under the

7

sl MOODLE he, NED, wl IK! apa.

23

Constitution for the denial of proper medical care. We
said that the conduct might have violated the fourteenth
amendment’s due process clause or the eighth amend-
ment, and that the complaint stated a damages claim.
See Reeves v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 532 F.2d 491,
495 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Roane v. Callisburg Inde-
pendent School District, 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Fourteenth amendment due process). Other circuits
that have decided the issue are in accord. See Brault
v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734 (2nd Cir.), rev’d
en banc on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1975)
(damages action for fourteenth amendment due process
violation “comes within Bivens’ sweeping approbation of
constitutionally-based causes of action”) ;" United States
ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1972)
(fifth amendment due process) ;* States Marine Lines,
Inc. Vv. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974), (fifth
amendment due process).** In extending Bivens to fifth
amendment due process claims, States Marine used lan-
guage squarely applicable in our case:

11 Brault addressed the complicating issue, not present in our case,
of whether the exclusion of cities from the definition of “person” in
42 U.S.C. § 1983 affected the existence of the Bivens cause of action.
See generally Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for
Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922 (1976). Brault upheld
the constitutional action despite § 1983. We reached the same result
in Roane V. Callisburg Independent School Di rict, supra and Reeves
v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, supra. See also Cox v. Stanton, 529
F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70,
77 (2d Cir. 1975) (Smith, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf.
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3rd Cir. 1976):
Amen V. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).

12 Moore extended Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3rd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 1061, 92 S.Ct. 747, 30 L.Ed.2d 749 (1972)
(fourth and fifth amendments).

13 In addition to the Second, Third and Fourth Circuit holdings
cited in text, the Tenth Circuit has intimated that Bivens extends
beyond the fourth amendment. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United
States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975). The issue is open in the
D.C. Circuit. See Lewis v. D.C. Dep’t. of Corrections, 174 U.S.App.
D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 710 (1976). Although the district courts have
split, the best reasoned opinions have reached our result. See, e.g.,
Penzarella v. Boyle, 496 F.Supp. 787 (D.R.I. 1975).

24

The necessity and appropriateness of judicial relief
is no less compelling in this case than it was in
Bivens. As in Bivens: A common law or state tort
remedy may or may not afford a means of redress-
ing this wrong, but in any case, will not be tailored
specifically to cases of lawlessness pursuant to fed-
eral authority; the claim presented is obviously ap-
propriate for money damages; and other remedies
such as injunctive or relief in the nature of man-
damus are no longer viable alternatives.

498 F.2d at 1157.

[9] Finally, we note that measuring damages pre-
sents no insuperable problem. Representative Passman
was free, within constitutional limits, to dismiss Davis
at any time. But if the actual dismissal is found at
trial to have been unconstitutional, then lost salary
should be taken into account in assessing damages. The
situation is analogous to a substantively justified dis-
missal accomplished in a procedurally unconstitutional
way. That a defendant could have dismissed an employee
without violating the Constitution has never been thought
to preclude the award of damages for a dismissal that
was in actuality unconstitutional. Cf. Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 365 n.18, 83 S.Ct. 1246,
10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963).

2. Brown

{10} Our conclusion, then, is that Bivens gives Davis
a damages remedy for Representative Passman’s depriva-
tion of her due process rights. We pause briefly, how-
ever, to reject the notion that sweeping language in a
recent Supreme Court decision dictates a contrary result.
In Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S.
820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) the Court
held that the 30-day limitation on bringing Title VII
employment discrimination suits against the federal gov-
ernment could not be avoided by the simple expedient of
bringing the action directly under the Constitution. The
Brown holding is inapplicable here because Davis never

25

had a Title VII action. Title VII excludes members of
congressional staffs from its protection."*

The inapplicability of the Brown holding does not,
however, answer the contention that some of its language
seems on casual examination to preclude Davis’s con-
stitutionally based claim. The issue arises from Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart’s framing of the Brown issue:

The principal question presented by this case is
whether § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
vides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment.

425 U.S. at 821, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 405.
Taken for all it might be worth, this language would
deny Davis not only a damages remedy but any remedy
whatesoever.

We refuse to accord the language such broad scope.
In the first place, a moment’s reflection indicates the
incongruity of importing Mr. Justice Stewart’s language
into our case. It simply makes no sense to speak of an
“exclusive judicial remedy” when there is no remedy
at all. Brown establishes that Title VII is the exclusive
judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination
to which Title VII extends, but in areas not touched by
Title VII other remedies are not affected.

This is conclusively established by Hampton v. Mow
Sun, Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 495
(1976), decided the very same day as Brown. In Mow
Sun Wong the Court invalidated the Civil Service Com-
mission’s rule excluding aliens from most federal em-
ployment.'® Title VII does not prohibit discrimination

14 42 U.S.C. §$ 2000e-16(a) makes the federal government employ-
ment discrimination provisions inapplicable to legislative branch
positions not in the competitive service, and. congressional staffs
are not in the competitive service.

15 The Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs challenged the commission’s rule
under the fifth amendment’s equal protection principle. The Court
noted that overriding national interests might conceivably provide
a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service.
Without resolving that issue, the Court held that due process re-
quired that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule

26

against aliens, see Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 S.Ct. 334, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973),
just as Title VII does not prohibit sex discrimination
against congressional staff members. In Mow Sun Wong
the Supreme Court thus accorded a non-Title VII judicial
remedy for a claim of federal employment discrimination.
By its action on the very same day Brown was decided,
the Court made clear that the “exc’sive remedy” lan-
guage applies only to employment discrimination covered
by Title VII.

[11] We need not, however, rely solely on Mow Sun
Wong. The whole structure of the Court’s argument in
Brown has no relevance to discriminations not within
Title VII’s domain. The Court first argued that when
Congress extended Title VII to federal employment in
1972 it believed, rightly or wrongly, that no other remedy
existed. From this the Court deducted that Congress
fashioned a remedy believed adequate standing alone to
cure the discriminatory ills being brought within the
ambit of Title VII. But Congress’s belief that no remedy
existed, coupled with its failure to enact any remedy,
scarcely demonstrates a belief that no remedy was needed
for discrimination left outside Title VII. For, as is well
established, Congress need not address all facets of a
problem in a single piece of legislation; it is free to enact
remedial legislation element by element at a pace most
acceptable to the legislative mind. See, e.g., Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct.
463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949).

was actually intended to serve the asserted national interest. Because
the rule had been adopted by the Civil Service Commission, whose
only concern was the promotion of an efficient federal service, the
Court found no basis for assuming that it was in fact intended to
further any overriding national interests. Accordingly, the Court
invalidated the rule, at least pending presidential or congressional
approval of its policy.

1* Mow Sun Wong was not a damages case and does not preclude
Brown from being read to make Title VII the exclusive damages
remedy for claims of federal employment discrimination. Mow Sun
Wong does conclusively establish, however, that the Court’s broad
language in Brown is subject to qualifications, and for the reasons
developed herein we see no reason to strain to make Brown’s lan-
guage applicable to our case.

27

The Brown Court’s second line of argument is equally
inapplicable to discriminations outside Title VII. It rea-
soned that

[t]he balance, completeness and structural integrity
of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner’s con-
tention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c)
was designed merely to supplement other putative
judicial relief.

425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48 L.Ed.2d at 411.

The Court was certainly correct that the “balance,
completeness and structural integrity” of the statute
would be undermined if its 30-day limitations period
could be rendered meaningless by bringing an action on
some other basis. The “structural integrity” of the
statutory prerequisites to invoking Title VII cannot be
undermined, however, by the provision of a remedy for
conduct not governed by Title VII. Our decision leaves
Title VII fully operative within its sphere.

In addition, we note another obstacle preventing Brown
from affecting our case. The Bivens remedy is based on
the Constitution itself. We remain ever willing to defer
to congressional views, but we cannot do so at the ex-
pense of constitutional principles. Nothing in Bivens
suggests Congress could repeal the damiages remedy with-
out enacting a suitable alternative. The Court did say,
in rejecting defendants’ argument that the issue was
whether the damages remedy was “necessary” to enforce
the fourth amendment, that “we have here no explicit
congressional declaration that persons injured by a fed-
eral officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may
not recover money damages from the agents, but must
instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective
in the view of Congress.” 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at
2005. The case at bar is no different in this respect than
Bivens. The 1972 additions to Title VII cannot be said
to constitute an “explicit” congressional disapproval of
the damages remedy, and more fundamentally there is
not “another remedy, equally effective in the view of Con-
gress,” to which Davis has been remitted. Moreover,
even if we somehow ignored these plain truths, the Bivens

28

passage would simply mean that the relevant inquiry
would be whether a damages remedy is “necessary” to
enforce the fifth amendment due process clause. Under
this framing of the issue, at least until an alternative
remedy were made available, Davis would still prevail.
Congress is free to enact an adequate substitute remedy;
to that extent the Bivens remedy therefore constitutes
constitutional common law. See Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term—Forword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 23-24 (1975). Congress has not
done so, however, and the constitutionally-based Bivens
damages remedy is available to Davis here.

When we deal, as we do here, with centrifugal and
centripetal forces in operation, we, as judges, must come
to a stasis, but in arriving there we do not draw the life-
blood from the legislative process nor skeletonize the con-
stitutional rights with which every citizen is endowed
even when dealing with Congress. The exemption of Con-
gress from Title VII does not have a cosmic cover. Title
VII among other things implements constitutional rights,
but here an open declaration of non-implementation be-
cause of the exemption accorded Congress does not im-
port into our case the exclusivity of Title VII actions.
When the statute affords relief from a constitutional in-
vasion, the statutory methodology should be followed, but
when the statute does not attempt to implement the con-
stitutional rights sought to be vindicaed, we cannot then
use the statute as the sword to demean or to eliminate
the constitutional right. The constitutional right stands
on its own words without the necessity of Title VII’s
supporting procedures. Title VII’s exemptions cannot
build a haven for constitutional transgressors.

[12] One last issue regarding Brown’s effect on the
Bivens cause of action remains to be canvassed. Con-
gress could attempt to remove the federal courts’ juris-
diction to hear such claims. Jurisdiction here is predi-
cated upon 28 U.S.C. § 13381(a), as it was in Bivens.
The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Any argu-
ment that in expanding Title VII in 1972 Congress ex-
cepted constitutionally-based federal employment discrimi-
nation claims from § 1331 must be rejected out of hand.

SG NED.

SNe es

—
= oe E

ee Se ees @:

SE LE IS EE PCR wae

29

Congress did not speak in jurisdictional terms, nor did
the Court in Brown v. General Services Administration,
supra, when it employed the “exclusive judicidal remedy”
language. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, supra, the
Court exercised § 1331 jurisdiction over a constitutional
challenge to federal employment discrimination, indicat-
ing that the Court did not read Title VII’s provisions as
taking such claims out of § 1331." We hold that the dis-
trict court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis’s Bivens
action on its merits. The damages remedy is available."

3. Sovereign Immunity

After carefully reviewing a variety of sovereign im-
munity decisions we are perhaps to be excused for con-

17 Moreover, any denial of jurisdiction to hear Davis’s claim would
itself raise grave constitutional issues. Congress can limit the fed-
eral courts’ jurisdiction to afford one remedy when minimally ade-
quate alternative remedies are available, see, e.g., Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943), but our
entire constitutional structure and the great esteem we accord
individual rights dictate the conclusion that Congress cannot fore-
close the last avenue of redress for a constitutional deprivation. See
generally, P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro and H. Wechsler, Hart
and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 330
60 (2nd Ed. 1973) (the “Dialogue’”). In the usual situation Con-
gress may have plenary authority to remove the federal courts’
jurisdiction because the state courts, having general jurisdiction,
remain open to redress constitutional wrongs. The authority of
state courts to render relief against a United States Representative
under the circumstances here, however, is subject to doubt. Cf.
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 20 L.Ed. 597 (1872). In the
absence of any indication that Congress intended the Title VII
amendments to cut back on § 1331, we will not attribute to them a
meaning of such doubtful constitutionality. Cf. Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 366-67, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); Wein-
berger Vv. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d
522 (1975); Gallo v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1976).

18 Indeed, at oral argument the Representative’s attorney appar-
ently conceded that Bivens controls:

Your honor, I acknowledge to the court that if this court should
find that there is a federally constituted right then Bivens
versus the seven narcotics folks does imply a right of action.

30

cluding that the doctrine’s primary effect has been to in-
ject confusion into lawsuits involving the government
and its agents. In the case at bar, however, the district
court was not misled. It properly rejected the sovereign
immunity plea.

[13] At this point we address the applicability of
sovereign immunity only to damages actions. When, as
here, an action seeks to impose liability upon a govern-
ment official in an individual capacity, sovereign im-
munity poses no bar. Although sovereign immunity
sometimes shields the United States Treasury from a
plaintiff’s claims, it does not protect the personal check-
book of an individual government official to any extent
at all.

Representative Passman does not contest these prin-
ciples, nor could he in light of the myriad cases incon-
sistent with any other view of sovereign immunity. For
example, Bivens itself would have been barred if actions
against government officials individually came within the
sovereign immunity doctrine.

[14,15] The contention Representative Passman does
make is that this action is really an attempt to recover
against the United States Treasury. Admittedly, Davis’s
complaint is not free of ambiguity. She did use the phrase
“back pay” in her relief prayer, and we could conceiv-
ably construe “back pay” as limited to salary from the
government rather than damages from Representative
Passman individually. Her claim would then contravene
Penn Vv. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49
L.Ed.2d 385 (1976) where we held sovereign immunity
a bar to two forms of money relief “both of which would
impinge upon the Treasury.” 490 F.2d at 705. We re-
fuse, however, to give the complaint such a niggardly,
technical construction. Davis’s position in this court
makes clear that she seeks damages from the Represen-
tative individually, not merely government-paid salary.
Moreover, a reading of the complaint as a whole accords
with this ~ She alleged other items of damages

Od CA a ME hn

;
1
i
|
4

31

besides lost salary, including injury to reputation,”® and
in addition to “back pay” her relief prayer sought “such
other and further relief as may be proper.” The named
defendant was, of course, Representative Passman, not
the United States of America. To read Davis’s com-
plaint as not seeking damages against Representative
Passman individually would require a return to the
technicalities of the common law writ system. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure countenance no such result.
Sovereign immunity does not bar Davis’s claim.”°

4. Speech or Debate

[16,17] We turn now to whether the doctrine of
legislative immunity, which in the federal context as-
sumes constitutional stature under the speech or debate
clause,” absolutely shields Representative Passman from

1° Davis can of course recover lost salary in addition to these
other items of damages; we advert to the other items to illustrate
that Davis did not use “back pay” in any restricted sense meaning
government-paid salary only.

20 A somewhat related line of cases in this circuit deals with
whether a city employee can recover money when unconstitutionally
discharged. Because a city is not a “person” within 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that statute does not authorize a “back pay” award that would run
against the city, even if the nominal defendants are city officials.
Thurston V. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1976). But a re-
covery of money from individuals rather than the city is available.
See Muzquiz Vv. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 500 n. 5 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S.
May 27, 1976). Although the issue of who is a “person” within
§ 1983 obviously is not the same as the issue of the scope of federal
sovereign immunity, the Muzquiz distinction between money awards
against governments and those against individual officers has the
same effect in both situations. Whatever relief Davis’s complaint
would be construed as seeking if this were a § 1983 action involving
a city, however, we construe it under the circumstances here as
seeking damages against Representative Passman individually.

21 The Constitution provides:

The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged
from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of the
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the

32

any suit challenging a decision to dismiss an employee.”

The Supreme Court has decided a series of speech or
debate cases but has not confronted the precise situation
before us. The Court has held that members of Con-
gress are immune from judicial inquiry into their votes,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377
(1881); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018,
36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973), their speeches on the floor of
Congress, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 86
S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966), their decisions to
circulate information to other members of Congress, Doe
v. McMillan, supra, their participation in committee
investigations and proceedings, Doe v. McMillan, supra;
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33
L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967); cf. Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019
(1951), and their issuance of subpoenas pursuant to a
legitimate committee investigation, Eastland v. United
States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1818,
44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975). Members of Congress are not
immune, on the other hand, from judicial inquiry into
their public distribution of materials gathered by com-
mittees, Doe v. McMillan, supra; Gravel v. United States,
supra, or their acceptance of bribes in return for votes
on pending legislative business, United States v. Brews-
ter, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972).

same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.

U.S. Const. art. 1 § 6.

The freedom from arrest does not prohibit service of process, see
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614-15, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33
L.Ed.2d 583 (1972), and is inapplicable here.

22 We view “legislative immunity,” sometimes referred to as “con-
gressional immunity,” as coextensive in the federal context with
speech or debate protection. The terms all refer to the absolute im-
munity that members of Congress (and sometimes their function-
aries) possess for certain legislative acts. We use the phrase “official
immunity” to describe more generally the varying levels of “good
faith,” “privilege” or “immunity” defenses that numerous govern-
ment officials can assert.

33

While none of these cases involved the dismissal of a
staff member, we think their language and rationale com-
pel a rejection of Representative Passman’s immunity de-
fense. We begin with a statement of the defense’s
purpose:

The purpose of the protection afforded legislators
is not to forestall judicial review of legislative ac-
tion but to insure that legislators are not distracted
from or hindered in the performance of their legis-
lative tasks by being called into court to defend
their actions.

Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 505, 89 S.Ct. 1944,
1955, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

One could argue on Representative Passman’s behalf
that calling him into court to defend any action, whether
related to congressional business or to his personal con-
tracts or torts, risks distracting him from “legislative
tasks.” Supreme Court decisions, however, make clear
that the speech or debate clause does not prohibit all
such distractions. Calling Senator Gravel into court to
testify concerning his arrangements with Beacon Press
to publish the “Pentagon Papers,’’ which he had earlier
read into the Congressional Record, might have distracted
him from legislative business, but the Court said Gravel
was nonetheless not exempt from the inquiry. Gravel v.
United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 622, 92 S.Ct. 2614.
Gravel and other opinions finding the legislative im-
munity cloak wanting in particular settings, see United
States v. Brewster, supra; Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412
U.S. at 314-15, 93 S.Ct. 2018, conclusively establish that
subjecting Representative Passman to a damages action
does not, without more, contravene the speech or debate
clause.

[18,19] Rather than blanket immunity from burden-
some litigation, the clause provides protection only against
inquiries into legislative policy-formulation processes. En-
acting legislation is the province of Congress and Con-
gress alone. The speech or debate clause assures mem-
bers of Congress that their actions in formulating and
enacting legislation, from the committee stage through

34

voting, will not be subjected to judicial (or executive )
inquiry. But the immunized act must be intimately cog-
nate to the legislative process. The reason for an absolute
rather than qualified immunity is that the prospect of an
unsuccessful but burdensome lawsuit might affect a legis-
lator’s performance of his or her legislative duties, thus
distorting the democratic process. Because of our devo-
tion to an unfettered representative government, we
foreclose even well-founded lawsuits challenging the per-
formance by members of Congress of their legislative
roles.

The language of the Supreme Court’s speech or debate
decisions supports this view. Tenney v. Brandhove, supra,
announced that legislators are protected when “acting in
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 841 USS.
at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788 (emphasis added) .* More re-
cent cases have elaborated on Tenney’s oft-cited formula.
In Gravel v. United States, swpra, the Court said:

The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to as-
sure a co-equal branch of the government wide
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without
intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.
It thus protects Members against prosecutions that
directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative
process.

408 U.S. at 616, 92 S.Ct. at 2622 (emphasis added).™
The Court said the clause’s purpose was “freeing the
legislator from executive and judicial oversight that
realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legis-
lator,” 408 U.S. at 618, 92 S.Ct. at 2623 (emphasis

23 We adopted the Tenney formula in City of Safety Harbor vy.
Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976).

2*This passage from Gravel was emphasized again in EZastiand
v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, supra, 421 U.S. at 503, 95
S.Ct. at 1821-22, 44 L.Ed.2d at 336. The issuance of subpoenas as
part of a legitimate committee investigation was found to be an
integral part of the process by which members participate in House
proceedings with respect to the formulation and consideration of
legislation; accordingly, speech or debate protection attached.

59

added), adding that the three earlier speech or debate
cases, Kilbourn, Dombrowski and Powell,

reflect a decidedly jaundiced view towards ex-
tending the Clause so as to privilege illegal or un-
constitutional conduct beyond that essential to fore-
close executive control of legislative speech or de-
bate and associated matters such as voting and com-
mittee reports and proceedings.

408 U.S. at 620, 92 S.Ct. at 2625. The Court reiterated
that “the Clause has not been extended beyond the legis-
lative sphere”, and, of particular relevance here, the
Court emphasized that the fact that “Senators generally
perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators
does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in
nature.” 408 U.S. at 624-25, 92 S.Ct. at 2627. The
Gravel Court continued:

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The
heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either
House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach
other matters, they must be an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House pro-
ceedings with respect to the consideration and pas-
Sage or rejection of proposed legislation or with re-
spect to other matters which the Constitution places
within the jurisdiction of either House. As the
Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or de-
bate in either House, but “only when necessary to
prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.”
United States v. Doe, tst Cir., 455 F.2d at 760.

408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct. at 2627. The Court then stated
its holding:

“Here, private publication by Senator Gravel
through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in
no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate;
nor does questioning as to private publication
threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate

36

by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to execu-
tive influence.

408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct. at 2627.

A year later in Doe v. McMillan, supra, the Supreme
Court reiterated the limited scope of the clause. In re-
jecting the argument that publication and distribution
of a committee report was essential to the legislative
process and therefore within the speech or debate clause,
the Court said, “Our cases make perfectly apparent .. .
that everything a Member of Congress may regularly
do is not a legislative act within the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause.” 412 U.S. at 318, 93 S.Ct.
at 2025. The Court added, “‘[t]his Court has not hesi-
tated to sustain the rights of private individuals when
it found Congress was acting outside its legislative

3 ae

role.” 412 U.S. at 320, 93 S.Ct. at 2028, quoting Tenney /

v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783 \

(brackets in original). Finally, the Court said,

The business of Congress is to legislate; Congress-
men and aids are absolutely immune when they are
legislating. But when they act outside the ‘sphere
of legitimate legislative activity,’ Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S., at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, they enjoy no
special immunity from local laws....

412 US. at 324, 93 S.Ct. at 2030.

These statements compel the conclusion that representa-
tives are not immune from inquiry into their decisions
to dismiss staff members. Such dismissal decisions cer-
tainly are not “an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters which the Con-
stitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.”
Gravel v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct.
at 2627. Peripheral or tangential activities of a rep-
resentative must not be confused with the legislative
core. A representative’s transgressions are not given ab-
solute absolution. The Constitution establishes an im-

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37

munity for aberrations in a representative’s legislative
activities, but members of Congress become mere mortals
when they operate in more mundane fields. When mem-
bers of Congress dismiss employees they are neither
legislating nor formulating legislation. The fear of ju-
dicial inquiry into dismissal decisions cannot possibly
affect a legislator’s decisions on matters pending before
Congress. The democratic process remains unfettered.’

Our decision today does no more than give effect to the
Supreme Court’s mandate in Gravel: “Legislators ought
not to stand above the law they create but ought gen-
erally to be bound by it as are ordinary persons.” 408
U.S. at 615, 92 S.Ct. at 2622. If legislators are bound
by the law they create, they are even more clearly bound
by the United States Constitution. The very premise

*° One could argue on Representative Passman’s behalf that, be-
cause high-ranking staff members may sometimes affect a legis-
lator’s performance of his or her deliberative role, dismissal de-
cisions should be protected by the speech or debate clause. The justi-
fication for establishing absolute immunity would be that the fear
of an unfounded but burdensome lawsuit might influence a decision
whether to fire an assistant, thereby impermissibly affecting the
legislative process.

We find, however, that such an argument cannot help Representa-
tive Passman. Our decision leaves members of Congress free to dis-
miss staff members for any reason or for no reason, so long as broad
limits established by the Constitution are not exceeded. Represent-
atives will be afforded a broad good faith defense, see page 881,
infra, and will be subject to liability in only the most egregious
cases. The very low likelihood of recovery in unfounded cases will
make the number of filings low. Moreover, summary judgment
procedures, if applied judiciously, will minimize any burden. The
chance that a legislator’s dismissal decision will be affected by the
prospect of a burdensome but meritless suit is therefore remote.
The prospect that a dismissal decision will in turn affect the legis-
lative process is also extremely remote. These layered causation
gaps defeat the argument for absolute immunity. By limiting repre-
sentatives to qualified immunity we achieve the immunity doctrine’s
goals without needlessly sacrificing the availability of redress for
clear constitutional violations.

Moreover, on this record we have no way of knowing whether
Davis’s position gave Ler a meaningful input into the Represent-
ative’s legislative decisionmaking. Even if speech or debate pro-
tection extended to decisions to dismiss high-ranking assistants, the
clause would not sustain the Representative’s 12(b)(6) motion here.

38

upon which the Constitution stands is the equality of all
persons before the law. Exceptions to that premise must
be limited, guarded, and sparingly employed. Davis is
entitled to have her claim heard on the merits.

5. Qualified Immunity

The inapplicability of speech or debate protection does
not foreclose Representative Passman from asserting the
same qualified immunity available to other government
officials. See generally Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) ; Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1688, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).*
Although Wood and Scheuer were § 1983 actions, their
reasoning is equally applicable to this action founded
directly on the constitution. Cf. Bevins v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1848 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand) (Lum-
bard, J., concurring).

[20,21] The inapplicability of speech or debate pro-
tection does, however, foreclose Representative Passman
from asserting an absolute official immunity such as that
recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct.
984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Speech or debate protection
is coextensive with the need to afford members of Con-
gress absolute immunity. Absolute immunity extends
only to certain key governmental officials, and then only
when they are governing. It extends to prosecutors when
they are prosecuting, Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, to
judges when they are judging, see Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), and to
legislators when they are legislating, e.g., Kilburn Vv.
Thompson, supra. As indicated, however, legislators are
not legislating when they dismiss staff members. For the
same reasons that the speech or debate clause does not
extend to staff dismissals, Representative Passman can-
not invoke absolute immunity.

Qualified immunity is available “in varying scope,”
“the variation being dependent upon the scope of dis-
cretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-

26 We use “qualified immunity” as synonymous with “good faith
defense.” See note 22 supra.

39

cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of
the action on which lidpility is sought to be based.”
Scheuer v. Rhodes, suprd, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct.
at 1692. The legitimate interest in assuring members
of Congress broad discretion in their staffing decisions
and the importance of staffing decisions to a legislator’s
performance dictate that the scope of the Representative’s
qualified immunity is broad. In limiting the immunity
to “good faith, non-malicious action,” however, the Court
in Wood v. Strickland made clear that a violation of
constitutional rights could not be justified by “ignorance
or disregard of settled, indisputable law”. 420 U.S. at
321, 95 S.Ct. at 999-1000, 43 L.Ed.2d at 225.*7 In light
of the settled, indisputable principle that federal govern-
ment sex discriminations not supported by rational (or
perhaps compelling) legitimate justifications are uncon-
stitutional, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), the like-
lihood that Representative Passman will be able suc-
cessfully to maintain a good faith defense even under
the liberal standard governing congressional staffing de-
cisions appears very remote.** Because this case must
be remanded for a trial at which Representative Passman
will be free to press his claim that the dismissal was not
based on Davis’s gender, however, we need do no more
at this stage than point out that any qualified immunity
plea will be governed by the principles to which we have
adverted. The determniation that Representative Pass-
man cannot claim absolute immunity is sufficient to re-

“7 Wood involved school officials, but we have applied its principles
more broadly. See Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv-
ice, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Morris v. Travisono, 528
F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1976); Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep’t of
Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1976); Hanneman v.
Breier, 528 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).

28 The good faith defense must of course be distinguished from a
defense denying that the firing was discriminatory. The former
asserts that the firing was unconstitutiunal but that the Represent-
ative acted in good faith and therefore should not be held liable.
The latter asserts that gender was not the basis of the dismissal
and that the dismissal therefore was not unconstitutional. Wood
makes a successful assertion of the former defense unlikely, Wood
does not affect the latter defense.

40

quire reversal of the dismissal given in his favor. See,
e.g., Scheuer V. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 282, 239, 94 S.Ct. 1683,
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829

(5th Cir. 1976).

C. Declaratory Relief

The final form of relief that Davis seeks is declaratory.
Although a claim for declaratory relief could be pursued
independently of any right to other types of relief, see
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944,
23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the absence of any forward-
looking scope of operation for any declaration of Davis’s
rights as against Representative Passman, whose con-
gressional tenure is virtually at its end, would make the
propriety of such a declaration questionable.” This issue
loses its significance, however, in view of our holding
that a damages remedy is available. We therefore de-
cline to pass on the propriety of declaratory relief.

III. Conclusion

In summary, taking the complaint’s allegations as
true, Representative Passman’s dismissal of a staff mem-
ber on the basis of gender violated the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment due process clause.
Under Bivens the Constitution itself affords the dis-
missed staff member a damages remedy. Sovereign im-
munity does not bar a damages award against the Rep-
resentative individually. The speech or debate clause
does not extend to staff dismissals because they are not
“legislative tasks” within the Supreme Court holdings.
Finally, the existence of qualified immunity cannot sup-
port the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
JONES, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

It seems to me that the judges should refrain from
wearing their robes in the halls of the Congress. The
doctrine of separation of powers should, I believe, require
the affirmance of the dismissal of the action.

2° Davis has not alleged a desire to work for other representatives
whose employment decisions might be affected by the resolution of
her constitutional claims.

a

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RE ON - DO

A: AP BOR LYE Ih A 5

41

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

(Title omitted in printing)

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC—
Filed February 16, 1977

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel,
comes Defendant-Appellee, OTTO E. PASSMAN, who

respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing en banc
for the following reasons:

A.

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied
professional judgment, that the panel decision is con-
trary to the following decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States and that consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of
decisions: Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund,
421 US 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 US 306
(1973); and Gravel v. United States, 408 US 606, reh
den 409 US 902 (1972).

2.

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied
professional judgment, that this appeal involves one or
more questions of exceptional importance: 1. Whether
the hiring and firing of staff members by Congressmen
is protected from judicial inquiry by Article 1, Section
6 of the United States Constitution. 2. Whether the
hiring and firing of staff members by Congressmen is a

42

political question, thus rendering the controversy non-
justiciable. i

HupDsoNn, Potts & BERNSTEIN
Post Office Drawer 3008
Monroe, Louisiana 71201

By /s/ Jesse D. McDonald
JESSE D. MCDONALD
Attorney of record for
Otto E. Passman,
Defendant-Appellant

rhe MOE” LLL ES, te ibis 4 bl

Ce el OL CEE 57,

SB Ft HO ITE 1

SRLS Aaa

48

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
versus

OTTO E, PASSMAN, CONGRESSMAN OF THE UNITED STATES,
DEFENDANT-APPFLLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion January 3, 1977, 5 Cir. 197—, ——- F2d ——-)

ORDER—May 17, 1977

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN,
GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, MORGAN,
CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL and FAy,

Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:

A member of the Court in active service having re-
quested a poil on the application for rehearing en banc
and a majority of the judges in attive service having
voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,

IT IS ORDERED that the cause shall be reheard by
the Court en banc with oral argument on a date here-
after to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing sched-
ule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

44

HE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
sage FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1691

SHIRLEY DAVIS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.

OTTO E. PASSMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CouURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

OPINION—April 18, 1978

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, JONES, THORNBERRY,
COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, MORGAN,
CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL and Fay, Circuit

Judges.

CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:

In today’s decision the court en bane reverses a panel
opinion which implied a cause of action for money dam-
ages from the Due Process Clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution.’ ‘

1 The opinion of the panel, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), had, in
turn, reversed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint filed by
a discharged female congressional employee.

45

In her complaint, Ms. Shirley Davis alleged that former
Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman dismissed her as
his Deputy Administrative Assistant solely because she
was a woman and he wanted a man in the position. Davis
claimed Passman’s actions violated the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment Due Process Clause.
Invoking the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331
(a), she sought specific relief, damages, and declaratory
relief. Because Passman’s service in Congress ended after
the suit was brought, the claim has narrowed to one for
recovery of money damages. The district court based its
dismissal of the complaint on alternative grounds: (1)
that the law affords Davis no private right of action and
(2) that the conduct of which she complained did not
violate the Constitution. Addressing only the surviving
claim for money damages, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal on the first ground.

The roster of constitutional rights which have been
held to support implied damage actions began its growth
with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971). In Bivens, the Court noted that historically dam-
ages have been regarded as the “ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty,” and implied a
cause of action for money damages for the invasion of the
plaintiff’s liberty which abridged his fourth amendrient
rights. 403 U.S. at 395, 91 S.Ct. at 2004, 29 L.Ed.2d at
626.

Although the Supreme Court has neither extended nor
further explained its initial position, many inferior fed-
eral courts have cited Bivens as authorizing implied ac-
tions for money damages based on constitutional rights
other than the fourth amendment.? Generally, these deci-

* Apart from the Due Process Clauses, lower federal courts have
looked favorably upon Bivens actions based upon the first, sixth,
eighth, ninth, and thirteenth amendments. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton,
529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 870 (3d Cir. 1975) (first
amendment) ; Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F.Supp. 1132 (E.D.Mich. 1976)
(first and eighth amendments); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rums-

46

sions have recognized implicitly that Bivens has some yet
unreached limits. Only isolated district court decisions
have asserted that Bivens created damage actions for
violation of constitutional rights as broadly as if it had
decreed that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 applied to the federal
government. This appeal requires either that we join
other circuits in projecting the scope of Bivens to the Due
Process Clauses of the fourteenth and fifth amendments,*

feld, 410 F.Supp. 144, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1976) (first and sixth amend-
ments); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F.Supp. 737 (E.D.Ill. 1975) (fifth
and eighth amendments). See also M. Lehmann, Bivens and Its
Progency, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 531, 566-72 (1977).

3E.g., Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 53 n.1 (D.D.C. 1975)
(“This holding [Bivens] has been interpreted almost unanimously
as recognizing a cause of action for damages for violation of any
constitutionally protected interest.”); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F.
Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974). (“Bivens recognizes a cause of
action for damages for violation of any constitutionally protected

interest.” )

4 Several circuits have allowed plaintiffs to base Bivens implied
actions solely upon the concept of due process: the Second Circuit,
Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth
amendment); the Third Circuit, United States ex rel. Moore V.
Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment) ; but
see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (declining to
allow cause of action on fourteenth amendment alone) ; the Fourth
Circuit, States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57
(4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment) ; the Seventh Circuit, Fitzgerald
v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 & n.7 (7th Cir.
1975) (denying relief, but holding action could be brought solely
under fourteenth amendment) ; the Eighth Circuit, Owen v. City of
Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amend-
ment in suit seeking back pay); the Ninth Circuit, Jacobson V.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 936-37, 941-43
(9th Cir. 1977) (one cause of action available on fifth amendment
just compensation clause and another on fifth amendment due
process clause).

Other circuits have commented favorably upon extension of
Bivens to actions implied from the concept of due process: the
Tenth Circuit, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d
926, 982 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1975) (apparently referring to the fifth
amendment) ; the D.C. Circuit, e.g., Lewis v. D.C. Dep’s of Correc-
tions, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 483, 484, 533 F.2d 710, 711 (1976).

[Footnote continued on page 47 |

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47

or decline to follow their precedents. A choice is not
foreclosed. In more than one decision the Supreme Court
specifically has pointed out that this issue remains open.‘

Our own decisions appear equivocal on this point. We
have ruled district courts erred in finding no jurisdiction
to consider damage claims based upon implied causes of
action under the Due Process Clauses of both the fifth
amendment, Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976)
and the fourteenth amendment, Reeves v. City of Jack-
son, 582 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Roane v.
Callisburg I ndependent School District, 511 F.2d 683, 635
n.l (5th Cir. 1975) ; United Farmworkers of Florida
Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799, 801-02 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Traylor v. City of
Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974). How-
ever, in Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1977) (en bane), we expressly declined to speak as
an en banc court on the appropriateness of extending
Bivens beyond the fourth amendment. Now we find our-
ny face-to-face with the necessity to take a firm posi-

ion.

To decide whether to imply a cause of action fo
damages from the fifth amendment Due Wiaites Slenns,
we must examine Bivens itself. While Bivens is not with-
out ambiguity, the analysis employed by the Court shows
that the cause of action created is not wholly of constitu-

* [Continued]

The First Circuit has declined to im j i
ie First ply a cause of action against
municipalities from the fourteenth amendment Due Process -, 0

to grant damages for wrongful death. Kostka v
37, 44 (1st Cir. 1977). a Vv. Hogg, 560 F.2d

°In several cases since Bivens, the Supreme Court

left open the question whether an alin for renin ren img
implied from the Due Process Clauses. Mt. Healthy School Dist. v
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277, 97 S.Ct. 568, 571, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 477
(1977) ; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 3 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 2413 2415
16 n.3, 49 L.Ed.2d 276, 280 n.3 (1976); City of Charlotte v. Local
660, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 284 n.1, 96 S.Ct. 2036
2038 n.1, 48 L.Ed.2d 636, 639 n.1 (1976) ; District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33, 93 S.Ct. 602, 610, 34 L.Ed.2d 618. 624
(1973). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507. 514. 93
S.Ct. 2222, 2227, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, 116 (1973). aes

48

tional dimensions. The opinion of the Court expressly
states:

we cannot accept respondents’ formulation of the
question as whether the availability of money dam-
ages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
For we have here no explicit congressional declara-
tion that persons injured by a federal officer’s viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents, but must instead be
remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the
view of Congress.

403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 627. The
cases relied upon for guidance by the Court in Bivens
dealt with implying a cause of action from federal stat-
utes that created rights but provided no federal remedy.‘
Moreover, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45
L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court’s most compre-
hensive treatment of implied statutory causes of action,
the Court relied upon Bivens to support two points of its
four-part statutory analysis.’

If the fourth amendment had mandated a cause of
action for monetary damages, Bivens would have had no
oceasion to consult or discuss the action or inaction of
Congress. Since the Court explicitly reasoned its prece-

6 See 403 U.S. at 396-97, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 626-27,
citing J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560,
12 L.Ed.2d 423, 428 (1964) (federal securities laws); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963) (action
for abuse of process through misuse of statute governing Congress’
subpoena power); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S.Ct.
695, 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954) (indemnity action by government under
Federal Tort Claims Act) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301, 311, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609-10, 91 L.Ed. 2067, 2073 (1947)
(government sought implied remedy, based upon established com-
mon law action).

7 Bivens is cited in Cort to support the proposition that causes of
action for damages should not be implied to govern matters ‘‘tradi-
tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States,” 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36, and
the proposition that where such actions have been implied, “there
has generally been a clearly articulated federal right in the plain-
tiff,” id. at 82, 95 S.Ct. at 2090, 45 L.Ed.2d at 39.

Sia SRR PILING 2 1 ee La

ee ee Te ere

~

49

dent on the latter ground, we take the Bivens remedy to
be one implied as a matter of federal common law®* and
therefore subject, like all such law, to the power of Con-
gress to alter or withdraw. Therefore, we employ a two-
step analysis. First, we look to the jurisprudence of
statutory implication to determine whether to imply a
damage action of non-constitutional dimensions. Second,
if this initial inquiry does not suggest that such an ac-
tion should be implied, we must determine whether the
Constitution nevertheless compels the existence of a rem-
edy in damages to vindicate the rights asserted. See
Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977). Apply-
ing this analysis to Davis’ claim, we find that the district
court properly concluded that no cause of action existed.

1] Courts have considered several factors in deter-
mining whether to imply a cause of action from a statu-
tory right: (1) whether the provision asserted creates
an especial right in the plaintiff, (2) whether the action
of Congress in the field indicates an intent to allow such
a remedy or at least an intent not to deny the remedy
(3) whether implication of the remedy would be con-
sistent with the purpose of the right asserted, and (4)
whether the cause of action implied would be one appro-

8 See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1977). See
also Rodriguez Vv. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1198-94 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc). See generally Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 937 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) ; C. Wright, Fed-
eral Courts §60 (3d ed. 1976), citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. V.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 465-75, 62 S.Ct. 676, 683-
88, 86 L.Ed. 956, 966, 971 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) :

Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and
statutes, and is conditionel by them. Within these limits, federal
courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique
. decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common
Et oases

315 U.S. at 472, 62 S.Ct. at 686, 86 L.Ed. at 969; Monaghan, Fore-
pire Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 10-13, 22-26
( y.

Where a remedy is of constitutional dimensions and particular
elements are not subject to revisions by Congressional legislation,
the Court has clearly so indicated. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142 (1933); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co. Vv. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1928).

50

priate for federal law. Cort Vv. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95
S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36 (1975). Of course, the
factors examined in questions of implied statutory causes
of action, as set forth in Cort and preceding cases, cannot
be applied in precisely the same way where implying a
Bivens-type action is at issue. However, this circuit has
held that the Cort factors do not set forth a rigid pattern
of analysis that a court must follow precisely. Rather,
“the Court simply said that several factors were relevant
and worthy of consideration.” Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561
F.2d 1178, 1188 (5th Cir. 1977).

Where federal courts have inferred a federal private
cause of action not expressly provided, there generally has
been a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, 45
L.Ed.2d 26, 38 (1975), citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2003-
04, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 625-26 (1971). While the fifth amend-
ment right to due process certainly confers a right upon
Davis, the injury alleged here does not infringe this right
as directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable
search of Webster Bivens offended the fourth amendment.
The concept of due process encompasses virtually all of
the civil liberties derived from the Constitution. While
the fifth amendment Due Process Clause surely exists for
the “especial benefit” of Davis, as Cort required, it does
not exist with equal certainty to protect her tenure in a
noncompetitive personal aide position statutorily denomi-
nated as service at will. 2 U.S.C.A. § 92.

Cort looked to “legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one.” 422 U.S.
at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36. Bivens recog-
nized that congressional intent to create a remedy must
guide a court in determining whether to imply a remedy
from provisions of the Constitution. 403 U.S. at 396-97,
91 S.Ct. at 2004-05, 29 L.Ed.2d at 626-27. Congressional
remedial legislation for employment discrimination has
carefully avoided creating a cause of action for money
damages for one in Davis’ position. In Section 701, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress excluded
the federal government from the general definition of

nee Deri mint DIOR le ae eT a i

51

“employer,” thus denying federal employees a statutory
damage actior under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b).
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to add Section 717,
which provided a separate administrative remedy for dis-
crimination in federal employment, but did not extend
the remedy to employees of Congress not in the competi-
tive service. Under Section 717, other federal employees
may have review in the federal courts of final action by
their employing agencies or the Civil Service Board of
Review, 42 US.C.A. § 2000e-16(a) (1974). Congres-
sional action in designing Title VII remedies shows Con-
gress adhered te the legislative judgment expressed in
the statute under which Davis was hired: Members of
a congressman’s personal staff are removable by him “at
any time .. . with or without cause.” 2 U.S.C.A. § 92.
Implying the cause of action asserted by Davis would
Lave the anomalous result of granting federal employees
in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did not in-
tend to protect, a remedy far more extensive than Con-
gress adopted for federal employees in the competitive
service, whom it did intend to protect. When Congress
enacted Section 717, it believed that no other effective
remedy existed for federal employees treated discrimina-
torily. See Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S
820, 826-28, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1965-66, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 407-
08 (1976); H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News. pp. 2137, 2160.
However, in amending Title VII to make it the “exclu-
Sive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for
the redress of federal employment discrimination” for
those federal employees it covered,’ Congress did not
grant federal employees in the competitive service an
action for damages against their superiors in their in-
dividual capacities.» The Supreme Court has upheld the
exclusivity of Title VI Ias a remedy for federal employ-
ment discrimination against employees in the competitive
service whom it covers. In Brown, the Court held that
Congress could require federal employees alleging dis-
crimination to seek relief solely within the confines of
Title VII, a limitation which plaintiffs could not sur-
mount by the simple expedient of putting a different label

52

on the pleadings. 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968, 48
L.Ed.2d at 411. Congress cannot have intended to deal
more generously with those in Davis’ position, from
whom it deliberately withheld protection.

Implying the cause of action asserted by Davis would
have the anomalous result of granting federal employees
in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did not in-
tent to protect, a remady far more extensive than Con-
gress adopted for federal employees in the competitive
enacted Section 717, it believed that no other effective
service, whom it did intend to protect. When Congress
remedy existed for federal employees treated discrimina-
torily. See Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S.
820, 826-28, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1965-66, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 407-
08 (1976); H.R.Rep.No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.,
[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2137, 2160.
However, in amending Title VII to make it the “ex-
clusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme
for the redress of federal employment discrimination”’
for those federal employees it covered,’ Congress did not
grant federal employees in the competitive service an
action for damages against their superiors in their indi-
vidual capacities.° The Supreme Court has upheld the
exclusivity of Title VII as a remedy for federal employ-
ment discrimination against employees in the competi-
tive service whom it covers. In Brown, the Court held
that Congress could require federal employees alleging
discrimination to seek relief solely within the confines
of Title VII, a limitation which plaintiffs could not sur-
mount by the simple expedient of putting a different
label on the pleadings. 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1968,

® 425 U.S. at 828, 96 S.Ct. at 1966, 48 L.Ed.2d at 408.

10 Section 717, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e 16(c) (1974), allows an em-
ployee or applicant aggrieved by final action or a failure to take
final action on his administrative complaint to file a civil action
under Section 706, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1974), in which “the head
of the department, agency, or unit . . . shall be the defendant.”
However, under this section, federal defendants may be sued only
in their official capacities, and not as individuals. See Keeler v.
Hills, 408 F.Supp. 386, 387 (N.D.Ga. 1975); see also Jones v. Bren-
nan, 401 F.Supp. 622, 627 (N.D.Ga. 1975).

53

48 L.Ed.2d at 411. Congress cannot have intended to
deal more generously with those in Davis’ position, from
whom it deliberately withheld protection.

Cort calls for an examination of the consistency of a
Statutory cause of action with the statutory scheme en-
acted by Congress. 422 U.S. at 78, 84, 95 S.Ct. at 2088
2090-91, 45 L.Ed.2d at 39. The Court in Bivens made
an analogous inquiry in considering the particular diffi-
culties presented in enforcing the guarantees of the
fourth amendment. The fourth amendment has presented
the Court with a series of remedial dilemmas. not en-
countered in other contexts, with which the Court has
wrestled actively for over half a century. The amend-
ment’s subject matter is such that law enforcement of-
ficials, who necessarily make the searches and seizures
it governs, are themselves the group most likely to be
hostile to its barriers. Thiiz hostility of law enforce-
ment officials to the restraint of the fourth amendment
led the Court initially to adopt the exclusionary rule
for federal causes. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S
383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and then to
apply it te the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 81
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), when criminal ac.
tions and state law tort actions proffered as a substitute
remedy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 IS. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359
93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), showed{ themselves ineffective
However, the exclusionary rule+the remedy chosen to
secure the right—also has proved-Jess than satisfactory
See Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at
411, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971) (Burger
C. J., dissenting). Thus the Court continues to struggle
Ca b just ag cre: the fourth amendment

one V. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, Ct.
s2 det cae 5, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.

Violations of fourth amendment rights occur i -
defined setting familiar to the ening The aims de
always one between law enforcement officials and citi-
zens suspected of possessing evidence of crime. The con-
text in which these violations may arise is sufficiently
limited to allow the court to determine that an action for
damages would be consistent with the purpose of the

54

fourth amendment in future instances in which such an
action might be invoked. The fifth amendment Due
Process Clause presents no similarly focused remedial
issue. To the contrary, the breadth of the concept of
due process indicates that the damage remedy sought
will not be judicially manageable and that there is sim-
ply no way a court can judge whether this remedy
will be appropriate for securing the right in future
situations where some plaintiff might assert it.

The final factor considered in Cort is whether “the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law.” 422 U.S. at 78, 84-85, 95
S.Ct. at 2088, 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d at 36, citing Bivens Vv.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 394-95, 91
S.Ct. at 2003-04, 29 L.Ed.2d at 625-26. Under this
factor we consider the effect that implying a remedy
would have upon both state law and the federal ju-
diciary. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
477, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 1808, 51 L.Ed.2d 480, 494 (1977) ;
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 728,
739-741, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1927-28, 44 L.Ed.2d 539, 551-52
(1975). While the particular circumstances of the case
at bar raise questions of federal rights in federal em-
ployment, adoption of the broad principle upon which
the granting of relief to Davis hinges would expand
federal jurisdiction into broad fields of law presently
occupied by state court systems. Therefore, we prop-
erly consider this factor.

Adoption of Davis’ interpretation of Bivens would
project the penumbra of federal court constitutional due
process jurisdiction over every legally cognizable tortious
injury inflicted by persons acting under color of federal
law because, by its nature, every tort deprives the victim
of due process through unlawful appropriation of liberty
or property or both. Indeed, logically, the expansive ef-
fect of such a holding would not end there. It also would
extend federal jurisdiction to cover all state action tort
claims, either under pendent jurisdiction, cf. Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1872, 39 L.Ed.2d 577

nn. See aan Eee

55

(1974), or under a cause of action implied from the
fourteenth amendment. The latter of these state action
claims would be cognizable without regard to diversity
of citizenship, amount in controversy or other present
statutory limitations. Because of the breadth of due
process, a decision implying an action for money dam-
ages from the fifth amendment Due Process Clause alone
would extend an action for damages to any constitu-
tional guarantee. Thus, the danger of deluging federal
courts with claims otherwise redressable in state courts
or administrative proceedings looms far more ominously
than in Bivens. 403 U.S. at 391 & n.4, 91 S.Ct. at 2002
& we 29 L.Ed.2d at 623 & n.4.

_Not only does this case fail to present speci
dial difficulties analogous to those se by ag Se 8
dealing with the fourth amendment, but also Congress
avoided creating an action for money damages for Con-
gressional aides in non-competitive positions. Moreover
implying this damage action necessarily would draw into
the federal judicial system a wide range of cases whose
resolution Congress has not committed to the federal
judiciary and whose resolution is better suited to courts
of general jurisdiction. These special considerations, not
present in Bivens, eliminate any question of our creat-
ing a remedial right under our federal common law
powers. This conclusion does not end our inquiry, how-
ever, for we still must determine whether the Constitu-
tion nevertheless compels an action for money dam-
ages implied from the fifth amendment Due Process
Clause.

[2] Therefore, we next consider whether, in this case,
a damage action is indispensible to the effectuation of the
fifth amendment Due Process Clause and thus beyond
the power of Congress to preclude. Cf. Kostka v. Hogg,
560 F.2d at 44. We conclude that the proposed damage
remedy is not constitutionally compelled. Not every right
that conceivably could be wedged within the literal
breadth of due process demands federal protection
through a cause of action for monetary damages. In
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d
405 (1976), the Court considered the reach of federal

56

remedies where Congress, in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, ex-
pressly provided that violation of constitutional rights
by one acting under color of state law would give rise
to a cause of action for monetary damages. Even with
an express statutory mandate to provide a federal dam-
age action, the Court noted that “ ‘the range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite.
424 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. at 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d at 418
(1976), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556— (1972).
Here, we do not consider, as the Court did in Paul,
what due process may encompass given an express statu-
tory mandate to extend a cause of action for money
damages to the full reach of the right. Rather, we con-
sider the extent to which the Constitution requires that
we countermand the clearly discernible will of Congress
to create a cause of action where Congress declined to
provide one. Paul thus teaches that we should restrain
our reach far more than the Court did there.

Denying an implied cause of action for money dam-
ages does not render meaningless any constitutional
rights of congressional employees. A plaintiff might still
seek equitable relief where the employer remained in
office, although congressional employees — in the non-
competitive service whose allegedly discriminating em-
ployers are not in office may be left without a remedy
for sex discrimination in employment unless Congress
reverses its present statutory stand.” Other due process
wrongs would either continue to be remedied in tradi-
tional ways through tort actions in courts of appro-
priate general jurisdiction or through special statutory
remedies provided by state legislatures or Congress.
Admittedly, some not now covered would remain inac-
tionable. pn

Another provision of the Constitution must also be con-
sidered. Our rejection of the broad principle asserted by
Davis is premised upon much more than just another

11 Davis has not challenged the distinction in Title VII between
federal employees in competitive positions and those non-competitive
positions for the purposes of Title VII remedies.

57

“floodgates” argument. The prospect here is of so crush-
ing an already precariously overloaded federal judicial
system as to render meaningless the power the Constitu-
tion vests in Congress under Article III, Section 1, of
the Constitution to establish the jurisdictional ambits
of the inferior courts it has created. We decline to hold
that by implication the fifth amendment requires such
an anomalous result.

[3] Given these consequences and our inability to
construct a plausible measure for acceptable limits on the
right of action Davis would have us imply to remedy
the wrong alleged, we refuse to take even a first step
down the slippery slope until the Supreme Court answers
the open question of whether any such right should exist.
Because no right of action may be implied from the
Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, the district
court correctly ruled that no civil action for damages
may be maintained here. Absent such a right of civil
action, the district court cannot exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a), which confers jurisdic-
tion only for “civil actions wherein the matter in contro-
versy .. . arises under the Constitution . . . of the
United States.” To the extent that Weir is inconsistent
with this position, it is overruled. Our affirmance on
the jurisdictional ground means we do not reach Davis’
second contention. Therefore, we vacate the district
court’s decision on the ground that Passman’s conduct
in firing her did not violate the Constitution.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART VACATED.

JONES, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

If there is a constitutional barrier against the exer-
cise of the judicial power to decide the controversy be-
tween Mrs. Davis and Mr. Passman then, so I believe,
that bar should be raised rather than denying relief be-
cause the Congress has failed to enact legislation provid-
ing a remedy.

58

o not believe that the constitutional provisions here
viata are to 2 confined to the Speech and Debate
clause. The broader provision by which all legislative
powers are vested in the Congress’ is relevant to this
cause. It might be said that the doctrine of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterious permits or requires a con-
struction that a Congressman may be judicially ques-
tioned for any and all else that a Congressman might
do in the exercise of the legislative power except in
speech or debate. Obviously the Constitution has no
such meaning. We may remind ourselves of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s reminder as to constitutional construc-
a no small measure the genius of the Founding
Fathers in framing that most wonderful work ever
struck off by man‘ is the separation of powers among
the three branches of government. Although the need
for checks and balances requires that no one of the de-
partments shall be wholly unrelated to each of the
others * the essential functions of each are, by the terms
of the instrument, separate from those of the others.°

1 The Senators and Representatives . .. for any speech or debate
in either House . . . shall not be questioned in any other place. U.S.

Const. Art. 1, § 6(1).
2U.S. Const. Art. 1, §1.

3’“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579
(1819).

William E. Gladstone, 127 North American Review 179 (Sept.
—Cot. 1878).

5 J. Madison, The Federalist, No. XLVIII (1852 ed.).

6‘ It may be appropriate to take note of a recent comment of the
Attorney General that although the Constitution and Statutes pro-
vide that the President shall nominate and by and with the advice
and consent of the State shall appoint federal judges and US.
attorneys the reality is that “the Senate nominates and the Presi-
dent confirms persons to fill those cfficers.” Griffin B. Bell, Washing-
ton Post, February 27, 1978.

59

Notwithstanding the Gravel’ and Brewster * cases and
Senator Ervin’s critical comments upon them® the doc-
trine of separation of powers survives.

It is not necessary to say that all of the activities
of the members of a Congressman’s staff are legislative.
It will not be said that they are not so in large measure.
Their activities are as many and as varied as those of
the members served by them. It has been well stated
that “the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical
to the Members’ performance that they must be treated
as the latter’s alter egos . . .” Gravel v. United States,
supra, 408 U.S. at 616-17, 92 S.Ct. at 2623.

It seems to me the court held that judicial relief is
denied because the Congress has failed to provide a
judicial remedy. Rather I think the court should say
that the hiring and firing of his “alter ego” is a legis-
lative activity and a part of the exercise of the legis-
lative power. The question is not one of whether there
is a judicial remedy. The question, as I see it, is whether
or not the controversy is one involving the exercise of
the legislative power and within the jurisdiction of the
Congress. Let it decide whether there should be abso-
lute immunity. Let it determine whether there is a
right and if so to fashion a remedy and designate a
tribunal to declare and enforce it. I think it should
have been held that the complaint does not state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

RONEY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion,
but I am constrained to articulate the difference I see
between this case, in which I agree that plaintiff has no
constitutional damage remedy based on an alleged fifth

* United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 38 L.Ed.2d
583 (1972).

* United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.
2d 507 (1972).

®Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster cases: An Assault
on Congressional Independence, 59 Va.L.Rev. 175 (1973).

60

amendment violation, and the case of Rodriquez V.
Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), in
which I joined a dissent on the ground that plaintiff
there could claim damages against federal officers for an
alleged due process violation.

In his concurring opinion in Bivens, Justice Harlan
intimated that “the appropriateness of money damages
may well vary with the nature of the personal interest
asserted.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 408 n.9, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2011, 29 L.Ed.2d
619, 634 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). The dis-
tinction I find between Rodriguez and the instant case
lies in the nature of the personal interest asserted in
the “due process” violations alleged. In Rodriguez the
plaintiff was indicted, arrested, and held in bail for
many months for a crime she knew nothing about and
of which she was altogether innocent, because of the al-
legedly unconstitutional acts and conduct of a federal
agent. In dissent, both Judges Coleman and Goldberg,
with whom I concurred, held that plaintiff had a Bivens-
type damage claim if the agent’s acts were so reckless
as to constitute a willful violation of the plaintiff’s “right
to remain free of unconstitutional intrusions by govern-
mental agents.” 556 F.2d at 1195.

To me, there is little distinction between the per-
sonal liberty invasion by arrest and indictment in Rod-
riguez and the personal liberty invasion by the pri-
vate apartment search, seizure, and arrest in Bivens.
Both cases involved the citizen’s right to be let alone by
Government agents, unless the agents act within the
governmental powers ordained by the Constitution. The
Constitution gave limited power to the Government it
created. Without a constitutional base, no individual has
the legal authority to act against another individual in
the name of Government. Some governmental powers
are specifically given, but to make absolutely sure that
certain powers not given would not be read into the
Constitution by overzealous Government officers, either
executive, congressional, or judicial, there is a list of
“shall nots” in the Bill of Rights. Many of the indi-
vidual rights enumerated there were neither “created”

61

nor “given” by the Constitution, but rather were recog-
nized as being inherent rights of individuals long before
the summer of 1787. The framers’ approach to those
rights in the written Constitution was to try to assure
they would remain forever free of governmental intru-
sion.

Such were the fundamental rights at stake in Bivens
and Rodriguez. Even before the drafting of our Bill
of Rights, plaintiffs Bivens and Rodriguez had an in-
herent right to be free from the type of intrusions
they suffered. The constitutiona: amendments, in Bivens,
the fourth, and in Rodriguez, the fifth—merely protected
those rights by specific prohibition against encroachment.
I saw Rodriguez as being controlled by Bevins and would
have there held that the case law provided plaintiff
Rodriguez with a damage remedy, a damage remedy
rooted in preconstitutional notions of tort law.

In this case, however, no similar right is at stake.
The defendant has not intruded upon a liberty interest
with preconstitutional origins. Historically, employers
had an inherent right to hire and fire whom they pleased,
for whatever reason, arbitrarily, with no need to ac-
count to anyone for their actions, except perhaps to
their conscience and their God, and for governmental
employers, to their voters. This understanding of the
employer-employee relationship prevailed when the Con-
stitution was drafted and, indeed, formed the basis for
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this
century. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28
S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1908); Copvage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915). Under
this early theory, Ms. Davis had no right to be hired
in the first place, and if hired, held her job subject to
ie whim of the individual who had the power to hire and
re.

But the Constitution has allegedly given her a right
not to be fired on the basis of her sex. This right is
not, however, a protected inherent right, but a right
“ereated” by the Constitution, a right which in fact en-
croaches upon what was historically viewed as an in-
herent right of her employer.

62

uestion is, Where does one find the roots
on rag oots remedy for a violation of this right so oe
cently discovered in the recesses of the fifth eee
The dissenting opinion of Judge Goldberg repeatedly
invokes the oft-q

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0419%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
