# Petition — Johnson v. Ohio

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 444 U.S. 826

## Text

i € Court, U.Q °
FILED

IN THE |
‘ . APR 14 197
Supreme Court of the United States .
Ocroser Term, 1978 L_MICHABL RODAK, JR., CLERR
Case No. ERS <= ] 5 v4 3
ei
JOHN JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
—_—vV.—
State oF OHI0,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

Bernarp A. BERKMAN
BERKMAN, Gorpon, KANCELBAUM,
Levy and Murray
2121 The Illuminating Building
55 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 781-5245
Attorney for Petitioner

Grorce W. Papa
J. MicnuarL Murray
Of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities...........
CAMEOS BOLO i ccc ste ce cctsesecn 1

Jursidiction..... RF ee “o 2
Questions Presented
for Review. . *e *e *ee 7? @€ = - _ 7 - J . 2

Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved.......... 7

Statement of the Case.......... 8

Reasons for Granting
the i *e @ ff @ 14

I. An Important Question is
Presented as to Whether a
Change of Venue or Continu-
ance is Required Where the
Reasonable Likelihood that
Prejudicial Pretrial Publi-
city will Prevent a Fair
Trial has been Shown by the
Voir Dire Examination of the
Jurors and by Affirmative
Proof of Prejudicial Publi-
city, Much of Which has been
Induced by Law Enforcement
Officials and Which Includes
Attacks on the Defendant's
Character, Inaccurate and
Totally Untrue Information,
Evidence Never Offered at
Trial and Facts Which Would
have been Inadmissible at
DEERE Gects ChGhbbatsescacescer L4

-i-

Se EE hk ttt

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont. )

II. An Important Question is
Presented as to Whether Peti-
tioner's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights Were Violated
by the Introduction at Trial
of Evidence Seized During a
Warrantless Midnight Search
of Petitioner's Automobile
Where the Record Shows Mere
Acquiescence to Authority
Rather Than Consent.....ceeceeee

III. An Important Question is
Presented as to Whether Peti-
tioner's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights Were Denied
by the Introduction of Evi-
dence Directly Derived from
the Illegal Arrest of the
PEtitClONEeL. cccccecsccccsessccese

IV. An Important Question is
Presented as to Whether Peti-
tioner's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights Were Violated
by the Warrantless Seizure of
Petitioner's Automobile One
Quarter of a Mile from the
Place of Petitioner's Arrest,
and the Subsequent Warrantless
Searches of the Automobile
and the Seizures of Various
Items Which Were Later Intro-
duced in Evidence..cccccccccces

V. An Important Question is
Presented Where an Affidavit
Which Supported the Issuance
of a Warrant for the Search

- ii-

Page

26

30

35

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

Page

of Petitioner's Home Failed

to Set Forth Facts to Show

the Basis for a Named Infor-

mant's Conclusory Statements

Which Were Necessary to any
Attempted Showing of Probable
Gio cbncee se Pete te eeabewaeean (“SS

VI. An Important Question is

Presented as to Whether There

was Sufficient Proof that

False Statements Were Included

in a Search Warrant Affidavit

by an Affiant with Reckless
Disregard for the Truth so as

to Have Required that the

Search Warrant be Voided....... 44

VII. An Important Question is

Presented as to Whether Peti-
tioner Made a Voluntary,

Knowing and Intelligent Waiver

of his Privilege to Remain

Silent Where Petitioner was
Subjected to a Lengthy, Con-
tinuous, Night-time, Custodial
Interrogation Prior to Making

Oral and Written Statements.... 47

VIII. An Important Question is

Presented as to Whether the
Petitioner was Denied his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Where, While Petitioner was
Being Subjected to Lengthy,
Continuous, Custodial Interro-
gation, the Interrogating
Officers Took Affirmative

Steps to Persuade Petitioner's

= 114 ‘=

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont. ) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
==a° | Page

Wife Not to Secure Counsel Appendix
for Petitioner... ceeeeeeceees 52

Order of the Supreme Court

IX. An Important Question is of the United States
Presented as to Whether Peti- Extending Time to File
tioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Petition for Writ of
Amendment Rights were Vio- COPPER S55 oe hk kee eo cclklc ae
lated by the Use at Trial of
a Statement Which Was Obtained Order of the Ohio Supreme
After Indictment, in the Court Denying Motion for
Absence of Counsel and After SAVERS. ee el ee
Petitioner had Clearly Refused
to Make any Statement Without Order of the Ohio Supreme
the Presence of His Attorney... 53 Court Dismissing Peti-

ere tioner's Appeal of Right..... A3
X. An Important Question 15S

Presented Concerning Enforce- Journal Entry and Opinion
ment of the Rule Established of the Court of Appeals,

in Miranda v. Arizona That Eighth Appellate District,

Where an Individual Indicates Cuyahoga County, Ohio,

That he Wants an Attorney, the Affirming Petitioner's
Interrogation Must Cease Until CORVECECAGRE) ccadicdivewxiscinsn aa

the Attorney is Present........ 57
Excerpts from Application

XI. An Important Question is for Rehearing to the Ohio
Presented as to Whether Peti- Court of Appeals, Eighth
tioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Appellate District........... A37
Amendment Rights Were Violated
by the Admission of Testimony Order of the Court of Appeals,
Concerning the In-court and Eighth Appellate District,
Pretrial, Post-indictment Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
Identifications of the Peti- Overruling Petitioner's
tioner When the Pretrial Motion for Reconsideration... A46
Identification Occurred in
the Absence of Petitioner's Excerpt from Petitioner's
ASCORMEVS.cccccsscccsescscsesesese 59 Memorandum in Support of
Jurisdiction, filed in
Comoluslamicccecccsvenssesveceseee Gi the Ohio Supreme Court....... A47

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont. )

Assignment of Errors to the
Ohio Court of Appeals,
Eighth Appellate District.... A5l

Judgment and Sentence in
the Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Onio........ A53

Pretrial Rulings in the
Court of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio........ A55

Excerpts from Official
Transcript of Proceedings
in the Common Pleas Court,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio -
Rulings on Pretrial Motions.. A57

Excerpts from Official
Transcript of Proceedings
In the Common Pleas Court,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio -
Trial Testimony of Detective
Ferris Concerning Oral
Statement of 11/28/75........ A63

Affidavit for Search Warrant
of Apartment 11/22/75..... eee yk

Constitution of the United
States, Fourth Amendment..... A76

Constitution of the United
States, Fifth Amendment...... A76

Constitution of the United
States, Sixth Amendment...... A76

= et

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont. )

Constitution of the United
States, Fourteenth

PRR. 2 Ck Kae EaS 6 CReR ete

Section 2905.01, Ohio
Revised Code..... ey re re ae

Section 2907.02, Ohio
ROVises Coes. s 605. cdi enews

Section 2903.01, Ohio
ROViSCG COGRs <6 625s chek eee

Section 2945.59, Ohio
ROViSOG COGBRs bic i ck vee dm ce 460m

- vii -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.

108 (CL9IGE) ow 06 6 5-0:8.0.0:8 cies se ace ora
Amos v. United States, 225
Geode SAS Cee ae AS 41 Gens i ipaaus
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
$l ¢ | Pee Serre Ce ee
Brewer v. Williams, U.S.
» FF SeGts. Sasa ASST i s.e%s

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
S90 CLS Fos pic cs hav ii ee ee bees hes

Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968) ..ccceceeees

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
UO. cs BES CLEVE) «6 wee ee eee ee es

Carroll v. United States,
IGT UcOc Lae -Laeaet kaweneascuan

Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970)... ceeeccees

Chimel v. California, 395
ee Pa LY Be kp RR reer C

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. €33 (LOTL) wcccccvcccee

Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., Inc., 391
U.8s Sh0 CAPOEl 6a 00 € 608% ke

Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) ......--eees

- viii -

56

33,34

29,40

37,38,39

37,38

37,38

37

36,37,39

38

53

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.)

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.

BEA TEPER WAL Sed we bees oe kes

Franks v. Delaware,
a , 98 TR in

BOTS TRO PO Ws 46s 5b e048 coe beaee

Gilbert v. California,

FEU Di BOS (APO) Sead bina w ene

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
PP SE OORT Cb bea cee Ka Se we ee

Johnson v. United States,
kk SF SP | 5 ee

Judd v. United States,
190 F. 2d 649 (D.C.
Cate REG os 6 kc bes dee eek ae

Lockett v. Ohio, U.S.
» 26 S.Ce. 2954 (1976) os 6.x

Manson v. Bradwaithe,
SOG WeOs. SE CaPee) oks obee wok ce

Massiah v. United States,
275 U.S. 201 (1964)

McLeod v. Ohio, 1 Ohio St.
Oe SES Poca 6. oe gue ee ee

Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1975)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)

- ix -

46,47
60
24

30

40

61
56
56
58

7,51,
53,57,58 _

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.)

Moore v. Illinois, 0. Ss

~ Be 8.CE. €596- (i976) 2.50%

Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.

794 (1975)... ccc cere cccccccces

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328

U.S. 331 (i950) cas eoeeeeve eevee

Preston v. United States,

bi GS Oe! Bk tae

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373

U.S. 723 (1963) ..cccececesecee

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218 (1973) ..ceceeees

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384

Biek BAe. VESRED cv cewxek aa esnes :

Spinelli v. United States,

393 U.S. 410 (1969) ....cceeeee

Texas v. White, 423 U.S.

G7 (1975) cccccscccvcccccsccces

United States v. Chadwick,

433 U.S. L CUiST7 ) oe cccwcccccces

United States v. Fuothman,
492 F. 2d 1260 (9th

Cir. 1973) .ccceccccccccccceces

United States v. Wade, 388

U.S. 218 (1967) ..ccwcensecsees

25
25
37,38
23
29,51
23,24
43
37,38

39

40

61

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT. )

United States v. Watson,

423 U.S. 411 (1976)

Wong Sun v. United States,

Fourth Amendment

Fifth Amendment

Sixth Amendment

371 U.S. 471 (1963)

Constitutional Provisions

Statutory Provisions

Ohio Revised Code,

Section 2903.01

> P'S 2S 2. OS. 66-8 & eo 6s

United States Code,

Section 1257 (3)

- xi -

33

3,4,5,

ee ee

26,30,35,
39,47,

6,7,
12,13

&.t.22;
13,52,53,
59,60

2,3,4,

4,5,6,7,-
123513, 26.
30,35,47,
52,53,59,
60,61

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

Case No.

JOHN JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
Vv.
STATE OF OHIO,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

Petitioner prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of
Ohio dismissing petitioner's appeal for
want of substantial constitutional
question. The dismissal of petitioner's
appeal by the Ohio Supreme Court thereby
affirmed the judgment of the Ohio Court
of Appeals - Eighth District, which had
affirmed petitioner's convictions of
aggravated murder, kidnapping and rape.

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgments of the Ohio Supreme
Court dismissing petitioner's appeal
and denying rehearing are unreported
and are set forth, respectively, in the

rately bound Appendix at A3, A2. The
98. en Fie opinion of the Ohio Court
of Appeals - Eighth District, 1S un~
reported and is set forth in the Appendix
at 44-36. The journal entry of the Court
of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
the trial court in this case, is set
forth in the Appendix at A53-54.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Ohio Supreme
Court dismissing petitioner's appeal as
of right was issued on November 9, 1978,
Appendix at A3. Petitioner's motion for
rehearing was denied by the Ohio Supreme
Court on December 4, 1978, Appendix at
A2. On February 15, 1979, Mr. Justice
Stewart, upon application by petitioner,
granted an order extending the time
within which to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari to and including
April 14, 1979, Appendix at Al.

This petition seeks review of a
final judgment rendered by the Ohio
Supreme Court, the highest court in the
State of Ohio in which a decision could
be had. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(3) because
rights, privileges and immunities under
the Constitution of the United States
are claimed to have been violated.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ie

In a state criminal trial, is a
trial court required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

grant a change of venue or a continuance
where the reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial pretrial publicity will
prevent a fair trial is demonstrated:

(1) by voir dire examination of jurors

in which a substantial number of pro-
spective jurors admit bias or are shown
to be biased and (2) by affirmative

proof of the prejudicial publicity, much
of which has been induced by law enforce-
ment officials and which has included
attacks on the defendant's character,
inaccurate and totally untrue information,
evidence never offered at trial and facts
which would have been inadmissible at
trial?

ea

Is a warrantless search of a locked
automobile which is parked in front of
the home of the owner justified on the.
basis of the owner's consent where the
search is conducted late at night, by
a group of armed, uniformed police who
state they are on official business,
who fail to advise the owner, roused
from sleep, that he may demand a search
warrant and the owner simply does not
resist the directives of the police?
Or, is a search and seizure under these
circumstances violative of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments?

Iit.

If at the time of a warrantless
arrest of an accused, the only facts
which were available to the arresting
officers concerning the accused connected
the automobile belonging to the accused
to an alleged criminal incident separate
from that for which the accused was
arrested, but the facts also indicated

that someone other than the accused was
involved in the separate incident, is
there probable cause for an arrest for
any crime and, if not, were statements
and any other evidence obtained as a
direct result of continuous interroga-
tions from the time of arrest acquired

in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the accused?

IV.

Is the warrantless seizure of an
arrestee's automobile which is parked
a quarter of a mile from the location
of the arrest, on private property, in
the lawful custody of another, an uncon-
stitutional seizure and are warrantless
searches and seizures of the contents
of the seized car, conducted approxi-
mately seven and fourteen hours after
the initial seizure of the car, also
violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments?

V.

Where an affidavit in support of
a search warrant, drafted with the assis-
tance of a lawyer, contains conclusory
statements which are essential to any
attempted showing of probable cause and
which are attributed to a named inform-
ant, but the affidavit fails to set
forth any facts concerning the under-
lying circumstances from which the
informant reached his conclusion and
there are no facts in the affidavit to
show that the informant was credible
cr his information reliable and, further,
facts are set forth which have no seeming
connection to the establishment of
probable cause and no facts to explain
their connection are supplied, does the

affidavit fail to set forth sufficient
facts to enable a magistrate to find
probable cause, and is a search of a
residence pursuant to a warrant, viola-
tive of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the occupants?

vi.

Should a search warrant have been
voided because false statements had been
included in a warrant affidavit with
reckless disregard for the truth where
the affiant testified at an evidentiary
hearing that, at the time he drafted the
affidavit with the aid of a county prose-
cutor and included an informant's state-
ment concerning an attempted abduction
which was essential to establish probable
cause, the affiant knew that the location
of the attempted abduction was one to
one and one-half miles from where the
murder victim had disappeared and that
the attempted abduction had occurred at
least one-half hour before the murder
victim's disappearance, but the affidavit
as drafted claimed that the abduction
occurred "at or near the area" and "at
or near the time" of the murder victim's
disappearance so that it appeared on
the face of the’ affidavit that the
murder victim was the victim in the
attempted abduction?

Vil.

Where after a defendant is subjected
to lengthy, continuous, night-time,
custodial interrogation, statements are
obtained from the defendant and the
question of whether the defendant was
adequately advised of his rights is
hotly disputed in the record, has the

State failed to satisfy its burden of
proving a voluntary, knowing and intel-
ligent waiver of defendant's rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment?

VIII.

Was a defendant denied his rights
to counsel and due process of law in
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments where defendant was arrested
and subjected to lengthy, continuous,
custodial interrogation and the inter-
rogating officers took affirmative
steps to persuade defendant's wife, who
had appeared at the police station, not
to get an attorney for defendant by
advising the wife that there was no
reason to secure an attorney, that she
would be advised when an attorney was
needed and that defendant would be
released as soon as he made a statement
when the officers knew that defendant
was a suspect and was being interrogated
as such?

IX.

Where, in a post-indictment inter-
rogation, a defendant clearly states to
the interrogating officer that he will
make no statements without his attorney
present, the defendant has clearly
invoked his Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel and an oral state-
ment obtained immediately following the
expressed desire for the assistance of
counsel, was the statement obtained in
violation of defendant's Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights?

ana

Where, in a post-indictment inter-
rogation, a defendant states unequivo-
cally that he will not make any statement
without his attorney present, the inter-
rogation must immediately cease and
where a statement is obtained after the
request for the presence of an attorney,
the statement must be suppressed under
the rule established in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

XI.

Are adefendant's rights to assistance
of counsel and due process of law
violated by the admission at trial of
a witness's testimony concerning pre-
trial, post-indictment identification
of the defendant which was conducted in
the absence of defendant's court-appointed
counsel, and by testimony concerning an
in-court identification where no showing
was made that the in-court identification
was based on observations other than at
the pre-trial, post-indictment identi-
fication and where prior to viewing the
defendant at the pre-trial showup, the
witness, a twelve-year-old child, was
told by police, among other things, that
the defendant had already been picked
out by other children?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The text of the Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Amendments and the pertinent portion
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution are set forth in the
Appendix at A76-77. The text of Ohio
Revised Code §§2905.01, 2907.02, 2903.01
and 2945.59 are set forth in the Appendix
at A78-82.

Ee

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner John Johnson was con-
victed on March 6, 1976, of the kid-
napping, rape and aggravated murder of
Melissa Hinke by a jury in the Common
Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

The trial -court imposed consecutive
sentences of seven (7) to twenty-five
(25) years for the counts of kidnapping
and rape, and for the count of aggra-
vated murder, the court imposed a
sentence of death. The judgment and
sentence of the trial court were affirmed
by the Ohio Court of Appeals - Eighth
District. While petitioner's appeal to
the Ohio Supreme Court was pending, the
Ohio Supreme Court modified the sentence
of death to life imprisonment, in
response to rulings by this Court that
the Ohio statutory regime for imposing i/
capital punishment was unconstitutional7

The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently
dismissed petitioner Johnson's appeal
for want of substantial constitutional
question.

On Thursday, November 20, 1975,
Melissa Hinke, eight years old, left
her home on West 67th Street in

Cleveland, Ohio, to buy a half-gallon 2/
of milk at a nearby store (41.1831-1832)——
FA
Lockett v. Ohio, v.83. , 98
S.Ct. 2954 (1978).
ef 4

All references to the transcript of
the proceedings in the trial court
will be referred to by the volume
number, the letter "T" and page
number(s) in the transcript.

She left her home at approximately 3:10 p.m.
(4T.1836) with two quart-size Pepsi Cola
bottles, and some change with which to
purchase the milk (4T.1832, 1842), and
never returned (4T.1841). Two days

later, on Saturday morning, November 22,
her body was found in a wooded area
(4T.1993) of the Metropolitan Park
System's Rocky River Reservation (4T.
1989).

Soon after the victim's disappearance,
the news media devoted extensive coverage
to the search for the missing girl and
each succeeding event.3/ The very day
the body was found, Cleveland newspapers
began to focus upon the grisly and brutal
aspects of the crime and the investiga-
tion which supposedly connected Johnson
to the crime (MA2, B3, 4). Front page
and lead story coverage continued through-
out the investigation. By the time of
Johnson's arraignment on November 28,
1975, the community was flooded with
details of the "evidence" of Johnson's
"guilt", much of which was inaccurate,
inadmissible and never offered at trial
(e.g., MA4, 5, 7, Cl, Bly DiF—-18).

John Johnson was in police
custody when Melissa Hinke's body was
found (2T.1106). Police had arrested
Johnson, without a warrant, at about
7:00 p.m. of the prior evening (3T.1243,
1337), and various teams of police had

3/
~ All references to media coverage
will be to Petitioner's Venue Motion
Exhibits filed with the trial court
and will be referred to by the letter
"M" followed by the letter and number
identifying the exhibit.

interrogated him almost continuously
(2T.1103, 3T.1253, 1287, 1348-1349),
without the presence of an attorney,
until shortly after the victim's body
was found. During this overnight period
of interrogation, police obtained oral
and written statements from Johnson.

. Even before discovery of the body,
police had conducted three warrantless
searches of Johnson's automobile (2T.
993-994, 3T.1294-1310). The first
search (for which the sole justification
urged by the State was consent (2T.963-
964)) was conducted by four uniformed
police, shortly after midnight on
November 21, 1975, in front of the
petitioner's apartment (2T.980, 1035,
3T.1336). The other two warrantless
searches were conducted by detectives
while Johnson was in custody and after
Johnson's car had been seized without
a warrant (3T.1251), at a gas station
about a quarter of a mile from where
Johnson had been arrested (3T.1263).

After discovery of the body,
Johnson's home was searched under color
of a search warrant (2T.1142). During
this same period, in connection with the
Hinke investigation, police interviewed
as possible identification witnesses
children and adults who had been con-
fronted or approached by male drivers
of automobiles.

Johnson was indicted on November 25
and arraigned on November 28, 1975.
Upon a showing of indigency, the court
appointed defense counsel to represent
him. Immediately after his arraignment,
Johnson was taken by detectives from the
courtroom to a room in the police

- 10 -

station (2T.1086) where, without an
attorney present (2T.1097), while
surrounded by police and detectives and
dressed in prison clothes (2T.863), he
was viewed by identification witnesses
(2T.1092-1093) and further interrogated .
(2T.1095-1096). A highly incriminating
oral statement was obtained from
Johnson during this interrogation.

At trial, the State offered into
evidence a semen-stained towel (SX12)
and a blue sweatshirt spotted with blood
(SX9-H) which had been seized during the
warrantless searches of the petitioner's
car. Also received in evidence was a
penknife with specks of blood on it
(SXl1). The penknife had been seized
while Johnson was in custody, following
the warrantless seizure of Johnson's
automobile. From the search of Johnson's
home, the State offered a pair of under-
shorts (SX8-K) and a washrag (SX25-E)
which were stained with blood. Extensive
testimony was elicited concerning the
seizure and testing of these items (3T.
1628-1638, 1653-1656, 1659-1675, 1687-
1689, 1692-1695, 4T.2230-2243, 2252-2253,
2257-2261). Some of the testimony
established that the blood on the under-
shorts was not the petitioner's blood-
type, but matched the victim's blood-

type.

Four detectives testified at trial
about the statements obtained from John
Johnson during custodial interrogations
on November 22 and 28, 1975. The jury
also heard "prior acts" testimony
(Revised Code §2945.59, Appendix at 82)
by three young girls concerning alleged
attempts by a man, who the State urged
was Johnson, to entice the girls into

- ll -

his car. Included in the "prior acts"
evidence was the testimony of twelve-
year-old Lisa Chambers concerning her
police station show-up identification

of Johnson on November 28, 1975, immedi-
ately following his arraignment, without
the presence of his court-appointed
attorneys. Lisa Chambers also made an
in-court identification of the petitioner
as the man who talked to her.

Despite clear evidence ,#hown by the
defense in motion exhibits as well as
in the voir dire of prospective jurors
of the prejudicial effect of the massive
barrage of pretrial publicity, a pre-
trial motion by the defense for change
of venue and/or continuance was over-
ruled (Appendix at A56, 2T.783-784). The
motion for change of venue and/or.
continuance was renewed later at trial
and again was overruled (5T.2466, 2470).

Pretrial motions to suppress the
evidence obtained from the searches and
seizures detailed above because of the
violation of petitioner's Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were over-
ruled by the trial court (Appendix at
A55, A57-58). Similarly, motions to
suppress the custodial interrogation
statements of the petitioner because they

were obtained in violation of petitioner's

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were overruled by the

4/
~ Prior to voir dire, stipulations were
entered into the record concerning
the circulation of the newspapers and
the accuracy of copies of newspaper
articles and television scripts
submitted by the defense.

trial court (Appendix at A55, A58-61), as
waS a motion to suppress the identifi- /
cation testimony of Lisa Chambers
concerning a "prior act" (Appendix at
A55-62).

All of the subjects of the pretrial
motions were asserted in the assignments
of error lodged with the Ohio Court of
Appeals - Eighth District (Appendix at
A51-52). After the court of appeals in
its opinion of Janaury 30, 1978, affirmed
petitioner's convictions (Appendix at
A4-36), petitioner timely applied for re-
hearing and urged that the issues raised
under the United States Constitution
required reversal and that the court of
appeals should consider issues which it
failed to address in its opinion, in-
cluding the constitutional validity of
identification testimony of Lisa Chambers
(Appendix at A37-45). However, rehearing
was denied by the court of appeals with-
Out elaboration (Appendix at A46).

Petitioner next turned to the Ohio
Supreme Court and again raised the same
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims in the Propositions
of Law submitted in his brief in support
of appeal as had been raised before
trial court and the court of appeals
(Appendix at A47-50). However, the Ohio
Supreme Court, without opinion, dis-
missed petitioner's appeal for want of
substantial constitutional question
(Appendix at A3) and, subsequently,
denied petitioner's application for
rehearing (Appendix at A2).

f

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT guilt of the sensational kidnapping-
; ‘rape-murder. Deputy Coroner Lester

I. Adelson was quoted by the media as
saying that the killing was "one of the
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED most disturbing cases I've handled" in
AS TO WHETHER A CHANGE OF VENUE OR 25 years_as coroner (M. A3, A7, B19,
CONTINUANCE IS REQUIRED WHERE THE Dl, F4)*2/ The media frequently referred
REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT PREJUDI- . to the fear and anger of the residents
CIAL PRETRIAL PUBLICITY WILL PREVENT in the community. For example, a
A_FAIR TRIAL HAS BEEN SHOWN BY THE television film report included the
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF THE JURORS following exchange from a resident:
AND BY AFFIRMATIVE PROOF OF PREJUDI- "Tt is awful, it is terrible, a young
CIAL PUBLICITY, MUCH OF WHICH HAS girl like that...Someone should do the
BEEN INDUCED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT same thing to him." (1T.630-631. See
OFFICIALS AND WHICH LNCLUDES ATTACKS also M. A3, Al4-15, C103, D18-19, Ell-
ON THE DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER, IN- 12, 19-20, F115).
ACCURATE AND TOTALLY UNTRUE INFOR-
MATION, EVIDENCE NEVER OFFERED AT Both Cleveland newspapers carried
TRIAL AND FACTS WHICH WOULD HAVE the case as a headline or front-page
BEEN INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL. story fcr a full week following the
disappearance of Melissa Hinke (M. Al-
The crime with which John Johnson 4, A7, Al2, Bl-5, B7, B9). Cleveland's
was charged was one of the most sensa- three television stations devoted large
tional and horrifying in the experience segments of air time to the details of
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. During the the crime. Every news show for a com-
three-month period between the victim's plete week, often as the lead story (M.
death and Johnson's trial, the community 'D7, D9, Dll, E8, E16, E19, E22, E27,
in which he stood trial for his life F3, F6, F9), carried news of the crime
was saturated with pretrial publicity and the police investigation focused
of the most prejudicial, hostile and in- upon John Johnson. Film reports in-
criminating kind. All of the newspapers cluded scenes of Johnson's appearances
and television stations in Cuyahoga in court, surrounded by police and
County transmitted in lurid and volu- sheriff's deputies (M. D13-15, D2l, E4-
minous detail daily news accounts of 53:

Melissa Hinke's death, the fears and
outrage of her neighbors, the police

investigation of John Johnson, the chain 5/7

of incriminating evidence against him, ~All references to the Petitioner's
his partial confession of guilt, details Venue Motion Exhibits will herein-
of his character defects, sexual per- after be referred to as "M" followed
versions and prior crimes of a violent by the letter and number(s) identi-
or sexual nature, as well as prior fying the exhbit.

unrelated violent crimes of members of
his family, the opinions of police and
public figures, prior to trial, of his

» 24 «= » 15 .°

Newspaper articles and television
reports wove bits of information with
rumors and innuendoes to connect Johnson
with the crime. On November 24, 1975,
the date of the petitioner's preliminary
hearing, all three television stations
broadcast details of the status of the
case. WJW-TV, Channel 8, began its
6:00 p.m. news show by announcing that
"police believe they have their man in
the brutal murder...." (M. F6). The
news report speculated that "whoever
abducted the girl probably had cruised
this area before." This observation
was followed immediately by the comment
that the petitioner worked at a neighbor-
hood gas station and was arrested after
his license number matched an earlier
report of an attempt to lure a little
girl into a car. The announcer commented
that the petitioner was "isolated" in
jail "for his own protection." WEWS~-TV,
Channel 5, reported that the petitioner
was charged with murder, kidnapping and
rape, and then stated, "police [are]
accusing him of luring Melissa into his
car, attacking her, and then stabbing
and strangling her to death" (M. E17).
In a later WEWS newscast, as the lead
story, a picture of ‘the petitioner was
displayed on the screen and the announcer
stated, "police are saying this man 1s
the one who kidnapped her, raped her,
and then killed her. This is John Albert
Johnson...." (M. E19).

WKYC-TV, Channel 3, featured a film
report of Johnson “as he was being led
into the courtoom...." (M. D13-14). The
news report stated that the petitioner
was ordered held on $750,000 bond and
that "then, a curious thing happened.
Judge Matia told Johnson, 'May God have

mercy On your soul.'" (M. D14). The
newscaster noted that the "comment is
usually reserved for cases in which a
death sentence has been pronounced...."
Channel 3 also reported that Johnson

was traced through his license number
(M. D15), much like the report on Channel
8. All three of the television stations
reported that Johnson's brother was
currently in prison for killing a woman
(M. D17-18, E17, F6). The Cleveland
Plain Dealer also reported this "fact"
iM. AS).

The Plain Dealer reported on
November 24, 1975, that Johnson became
a suspect after he was stopped on the
day of the murder "as a suspicious
character" (totally unsupported by testi-
mony in the record) and was in "isola-
tion...to protect him from other inmates."
(M. A3). On the same date, the Cleveland
Press as a front-page story reported
that police indicated that petitioner
"tried to lure another girl into his
car earlier that day." (M. B5). A
later edition of the Press, in a front-
page story, carried a picture of Johnson
and described his appearance in Municipal
Court. The article repeated the state-
ment that he was arrested "when police
got his license number after he tried
to lure another girl into his car" (M.
B7). Also included were statements that
police "declared they have sufficient
evidence to bring [the petitioner ] to
trial...," that "the suspect allegedly
had traces of blood...on his clothing
and under his fingernails." The article
further detailed the coroner's report
that the victim "had been stabbed
repeatedly in the face, neck, chest and
abdomen. Her face had been battered

“a > ee

instrument," and that she
es ag adh gga ne Ne and sexually molested.
Another article in the Press that day
reported that the police had said
Johnson had "a violent temper when
drinking" (M. B15).

November 25th, the Plain Dealer
akiianen a large front-page photograph
of the petitioner as he left Municipal
Court. The accompanying article ee rs
peated the claim of the attempted abduc
tion of another girl and apnea ee
through license plates. It also state :
that police searched Johnson Ss agpiary
and car and "among the items they saic
they found were a pair of cerns rn sae gre
undershorts in the apartment, blood an
a semen-stained towel in the car. The
article also claimed that a lie detector
test was given to the petitioner and he
"told police he had been in a Lorain :
Ave. adult book store earlier Thursday.
It further reported that "police said
he [Johnson] had magazines portraying
nude children in his possession" (M.
ye The assertion concerning the ae

ession of magazines portraying nu

sag en was totally false. There was
absolutely no testimony in the record
to substantiate such a statement.
Nevertheless, this statement was re-
peated by much of the media (M. Al8,
Cl, C2, El). In fact, Channel 5 con-
cluded a November 25th report on the
case with the remark that police said
the petitioner tried to pick up another
child, that police "found pictures of
nude children in his home and blood-
stained underwear" (M. El, emphasis
added).

A Cleveland Press article on
November 25th carried a headline of
"Police seek swift indictment of sus-
pect...." After describing the slain
girl in her casket, the article dis-
closed in bold-face type, that "blood-
stained undershorts were found in a
trash can at [the petitioner's ] home,"
that there was "blood under his finger-
nails and...a stained towel was found
in the auto." It noted that Johnson
"explained that the blood was the result
of a fight he got into...," that police
"placed" the petitioner "in an adult
bookstore about two hours before Melissa
was kidnapped" and that the petitioner
"claimed he had 'popped a pill' that
afternoon." (M. B16).

The Plain Dealer, ina front-page
story on November 26th, referred to
comments by Art Modell, grand jury fore-
man and Cleveland Browns owner, concern-
ing how disturbing the coroner's testi-
mony in the grand jury had been. The
article then proceeded to itemize all
the "evidence" gathered to prove the
guilt of the petitioner (mM, avs... fe
reported that a police search of
Johnson's home "uncovered a blood-soaked
penknife...bloody undershorts, work
shirt and pants and three wet rags."

The article next shifted to the gruesome
nature of the slaying: "a piece of blue
cloth...knotted so tightly around
Melissa's neck that the imprint of a
button...was left in the skin." Then
shifting back to the police investiga-
tion: "Found in Johnson's car, police
Said, were two empty soft drink bottles,
a semen-stained towel, a piece of bloody
fingernail, strands of brownish-blond
hair and a quart of Lawson Milk Co. milk."

- 19 -

report remarked, "Melissa had been
pase = a Lawson store...." The article
stated that "bits of shrubbery" were .
found in the car, implying that Johnson's
car was at the scene of the crime. The
article next focused on the petitioner,
"in an isolation cell...to protect him
from other prisoners...." The paper
claimed Johnson had said "I don't
remember doing it, if I did it," and
that he had "celebrated his birthday
the day of the murder, "by visiting
several taverns." Also mentioned was
that the appellant "was fined $100.00
in Cleveland Municipal Court for pander-
ing obscenities..." a year earlier. —
Finally, the article noted that public
"Sentiment has been growing for Melissa s
family," and followed with details of
the funeral of the victim. :

The article was highly inaccurate,
inflammatory and prejudicial. Nowhere
in the record is there a shred of testi-
mony concerning a "bloodsoaked" penknife
(see 3T.1660-1661, 47.2240, 2291), or
soft drink bottles somehow connected to
Melissa Hinke (4T.1882, 5T. 2370-2371, .
2385-2386), or a “bloody fingernail"
(3T.1601, 4T.2221-2224, 2263), or strands
of hair belonging to Melissa Hinke
(3T.1628-1629, 1643). The alleged
statement by Johnson, tantamount to a
confession, potentially the most damaging
single piece of publicity, is not sub-
stantiated anywhere in the record.

Cleveland television stations
covered the Hinke funeral extensively.
Juxtaposed with the funeral service
publicity were stories of petitioner's
arraignment. Channel 3 reported that
Johnson was “brought to and from court
under heavy guard" and that he “has been

- 20 -

kept in a-cell by himself because jail
officials fear other inmates could try
to harm him." The film report also
noted that "because the case has stirred
such emotion and received heavy news
coverage...it is almost certain the
trial will be held outside of Cuyahoga
County" (M. D20-21).

The Plain Dealer focused further
attention on the case by devoting a full
page to the case in section one of the
Sunday, December 7, 1975, edition. A
headline asked the question, "Did porn
shops incite killing?" (M. Al5).

Below the headline, the caption on a
photograph of an adult bookstore read:

"A typical Lorain Avenue smut
shop...Police Capt. Jerome
Poelking, chief of detectives,
says police information is
that John A. Johnson, who has
been charged with the rape
murder of 8-year-old Melissa
Hinke, was in a Lorain Avenue
porno store...the morning of
Melissa's disappearance. A
homicide detective said Johnson
had looked at pictures of nude
children while in the store."
(Emphasis added).

On the remainder of the page were
letters to the editor, the texts of
which were based on the details of the
crime which had been publicized by the
media. For example, "Johnson reportedly
told police he had been in a[n]...adult
bookstore...the day of the murder.

Police also said he had in his possession
magazines portraying nude children."

o 2)

Intermittent television and news-
paper coverage of the case continued
until the time of the jury selection
(e.g., M. Al6-18, Bl1-14, C2-3, E9-12,
E29, F18-20).

On the very first day of jury
selection, February 23, 1976, Channel 5
began the first of a series of documen-
tary reports on the subject of child
molesting (1T. 350). The first program
featured an interview with the victim's
mother (1T.351) and contained damaging
remarks about Johnson, including that
Johnson had committed other crimes of
a sexual nature (1T.351), that he had
been under surveillance (1T.351), and
that he attempted to abduct another girl
for sexual purposes (1T.352). Adver-
tisements announcing the start of the
series appeared in the Plain Dealer and
the Press on February 23, 1976 (1T.351).

The effects of this barrage of
publicity were apparent at the voir
dire of the jury. Of the forty-two
talismen who were questioned in regard
to pretrial publicity, eleven persons
volunteered, unequivocally, that they
could not be impartial as jurors because
of bias formed from exposure to such
publicity. All but one of the special
jury panel admitted exposure to the pre-
trial publicity and that they had read
Or seen news reports about the case.
Even after a court admonition against
reading any newspapers or monitoring
radio or television news programs,
almost one-third of the panel admitted
further exposure, either deliberate or
inadvertent, to news media stories about
the trial. In total, almost 40 percent
of the entire panel of prospective

- 22 -

jurors questioned were dismissed on the
basis of some taint as to their inabi-

lity to try the accused impartially.

In their effort to empanel a fair jury,
defense counsel exhausted all of their

peremptory challenges.

During the course of the trial and
hearings on pretrial motions, the court-
room was filled with spectaiurs. In
order to obtain seating, prospective
spectators were searched for weapons by
sheriff's deputies stationed outside
the courtroom doors. Because of crowded
conditions in the courtroom, a table was
provided for the press inside the rail
separating the trial working area from
the spectator section (5T.2467). During
the voir dire, anews reporter copied,
and used in a highly prejudicial news
story (1T.354-355, and see M. Al8), a
confidential psychiatric report on the
sanity of the accused which he took
without authorization from the private
desk area of the judge's bench.

Ultimately, because of the un-
relenting barrage of publicity, the
trial court sequestered the jury. But
the damage had been done.

Although trial courts have initial
discretion to determine whether a change
of venue or continuance should be
granted in a criminal case, such dis-
cretion is limited by constitutional
imperative, “where there is a reasonable
likelihood that prejudicial news prior
to trial will prevent a fair trial...."
(Emphasis supplied). Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362-363 (1966); accord,
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);

= 23 «

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).

Under such circumstances, grant of change
of venue or continuance is constitution-
ally compelled. Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra. Here, the invidious effect of
pretrial publicity was shown both by
lodging copies of the newspaper articles
and television scripts with the court,
and by voir dire examination of the
prospective jurors.

Furthermore, the record can fairly
be read as revealing a trial judge more
concerned with orchestrating a voir dire
designed to gloss over the problem of
pretrial publicity than he was with
probing deeply so that the effect of the
publicity could accurately be gauged.
For example, the trial judge posed
leading questions to potential jurors
designed to elicit statements of their
ability to be impartial (See 1T.42-44,
47-50, 62). When defense counsel asked
the court to excuse two jurors who had
evidenced bias due to the massive publi-
city, the trial judge accused defense
counsel of posing questions designed to
confuse the jurors (1T.291-297). The
court then posed additional leading
questions to those jurors designed to
cause them to recant their previous
testimony (1T.297-303).

"To deny that bludgeoning or
poisonous comment has power
to influence or at least to
disturb the task of judging
is to play make believe and
to assume that men in gowns
are angels. The psychological
aspects of this problem become
particularly pertinent in the
case of elected judges with

- 24 -

zig

short tenure.” Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 359
(1956) (concurring opinion).

In overruling this assignment of
error, the court of appeals relied
principally upon Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794 (1975). However, the facts
presented in Murphy are easily distin-
guishable from those presented here.

The Court in Murphy emphasized that most
of the jurors had only a vague recollec-
tion of any publicity concerning the
accused and many jurors considered the
publicity irrelevant, 421 U.S. at 800-
801. This is in sharp contrast to the
profound effect the publicity had upon
prospective jurors in this case.
Furthermore, the Murphy court stated
that it is necessary to "distinguish
between mere familiarity with [the
accused] or his past [as in Murphy] and
an actuai predisposition against him,
just as we have in the past distinguished
largely factual publicity from that
which is invidious or inflammatory."

421 U.S. at 800, n. 4 (see, also, 421
U.S. at 802). In the instant case,
thirteen prospective jurors demonstrated
a clear bias toward Johnson as a result
of publicity directed to this case.
Moreover, this case presents vivid
evidence of publicity which was invi-
dious and inflammatory.

The publicity surrounding this
trial focused on and pointed a guilty
finger at the petitioner; it included
vicious attacks upon his character; it
included inaccurate and totally untrue
information; it reported evidence that
was never offered at trial; it reported
evidence that would have been inadmis-
sible had it been offered at trial,

much of it was induced by law enforce-
ment officials; all of it was untempered
by cross-examination. This case pre-
sents a ripe opportunity for the Court
to reaffirm and clarify a trial court's
duty to effect adequate prophylactic
measures against prejudicial pretrial
publicity in order to assure an accused
a fair trial before an impartial jury..
Petitioner respectfully urges the Court
to grant certiorari and reverse his
conviction.

Il.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER'S FOURTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED BY THE INTRODUCTION
AT TRIAL OF EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING
A_WARRANTLESS MIDNIGHT SEARCH OF
PETITIONER'S AUTOMOBILE WHERE THE
RECORD SHOWS MERE ACQUIESCENCE TO
AUTHORITY RATHER THAN CONSENT.

Shortly after midnight (2T.980,
1035, 3T.1336), on November 21, 1975,
police officers Hanton, Charvat, McGuire
and Wayne (2T.972) approached John
Johnson's apartment at 2006 West Boule-
vard in Cleveland and knocked on the door
(2T.696). They were investigating the
Melissa Hinke case (T.979, 1031) and
had been requested to check out Johnson's
auto in regard to that case (2T.967).

All four of the police gathered in
the hallway outside of John Johnson's
apartment door (2T.983). Charvat knocked
on the door for a period estimated to
be less than one minute (2T.983).

Johnson had been in bed for approximately

- 26 -

sa

one hour (3T.1333). Prior to that time,
he had not slept for thirty hours (3T.
1334). He got out of bed and answered
the door (3T.1334); he was dressed in

a T-shirt and undershorts (2T.983), and
appeared to have been sleeping (2T.
984).

When Johnson, a short man of small,
thin build (3T.1411), opened the door
to his apartment, four armed, uniformed
policemen were standing there (2T.

985, 3T.1334). Their uniforms, badges
and guns were plainly visible (2T.981l-
982, 1036, 3T.1334). One of the police
officers was very tall and two others
were of medium build. An older man,
wearing glasses, appeared to be in
charge (3T.1410). Either Charvat or
Hanton (2T.1038, 970) announced that

they were on official business (2T.1038);
they wanted to talk to him (2T.970).

After Johnson got dressed, he was
told that they all had to go outside to
his car (2T.989, 1039-1040, 3T.1335,
1377). On the way to the car Officer
Hanton made it plain to Johnson that he
wanted to look in the interior of the
car (2T.992, 3T.1378). Sometime before
reaching the car, one of the policemen
told Johnson to open the trunk of his
car (2T.1040).

All the police walked to the car
with appellant, grouped all around him
(2T.1040), some in front, some alongside
and behind him (2T.993). They remained
in close proximity to Johnson through-
out the search (2T.1040, 1042). Hanton
and McGuire claimed that the police
asked the appellant to open the car
(2T.994, 1041). Johnson testified that

- 27 -

he was told to open the car door (3T.
1335, see also 1384); the police
instructed him what to do (3T.1378),
and he complied (3T.1335, 1337, 1410).

On intense cross-examination,
Johnson maintained consistently that
he did not give permission but was
instructed and simply did not resist
(3T.1378, 1383, 1387). He testified
that “you don't go around telling a law
officer you are not going to do this"
(3T.1415). Johnson was never advised
that he could refuse the search and
demand a warrant (2T.997-998, 1039,
3T. 1336-1337).

Once the doors were opened,
Hanton and McGuire went inside (2T.
994) and searched tle mr with flash-
lights (3T.1382). Hanton determined
what was to be taken (2T.998, 1044,
3T.1336, 1380). Police seized a towel
and two sixteen-ounce Pepsi~Cola bottles
from the car (2T.1027, 1028). After
the search of the entire car was com-
pleted, Hanton advised Johnson that if
nothing showed up in the tests of the
items seized, he would not hear from
the police. If he heard from the police,
there would be trouble (3T.1383, 2T.
999-1000). Johnson was then told by
either Hanton or Charvat that he could
return to his apartment (2T.1043).

The towel, later tested and found
to be semen-stained (4T.2265), the
Pepsi-Cola bottles and a carton of
Lawson's milk, observed but not seized
from the car (2T.1042-1043), were used
in support of the probable cause
alleged in an affidavit in application
for a warrant to search the appellant's
home shortly thereafter. The semen-

- 28 -

stained towel was admitted at trial
(5T.2448), over objection, as State
Exhibit 12. The State's only justifi-
cation for this search was its claim
that appellant consented to it (27.963,
964) ~6/ On the basis of the alleged
consent, the trial court overruled
appellant's motion to suppress (3T.
43533) 3

A prosecutor has the burden of
proving that consent was freely and
voluntarily given. Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). This
burden cannot be discharged by showing
no more than acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority. Id. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.SW®218 (1973), teaches
that in determining whether a claimed
consent is in fact voluntary, voluntari-
ness "is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from the totality of all the
circumstances," Id., at 227. Schneckloth

v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 229,
mandates consideration of the "vulnerable
subjective state of the person" who has
allegedly consented. Moreover, courts
must be especially alert for coercion,
express or implied, no matter how subtle.
Id., at 228.

Viewed in their totality, the facts
here amount to nothing more than a tired

_6/

From the inception of the motion
hearing, the prosecution's only justi-
fication for the search of the appel-
lant's car at midnight on November 21,
1975, was its claim of consent by the
appellant (2T.963, 964) and testimony
was limited to that question by the
trial court (2T.978).

- 29 -

and intimidated individual of slight
stature who, awakened from sleep, unin-
formed of his rights and confronted by
four armed police officers in the middle
of the night, submitted to the demands
of open and obvious police authority.

As such, the only conclusion possible

is that the State utterly failed to meet
its burden of proving a free and volun-
tary consent, and the trial court's.
denial of appellant's motion to suppress
was clearly erroneous. See Amos V.
United States, 225 U.S. 313 (1921);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
68 (1948). Therefore, certiorari should
be granted and petitioner's convictions

should be reversed.

Til.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER'S FOURTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE DENIED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE DIRECTLY DERIVED FROM THE
ILLEGAL ARREST OF THE PETITIONER.

John Johnson was arrested without
a warrant by Cleveland detectives on
November 21, 1975, at approximately
7:00 p.m. while at work at a gasoline
station (317.1243, 1249, 1251, 1284).
Detectives Murphy and Mulhull wanted
Johnson to make a statement at the
police station concerning his activities
on November 20th (3T.1338). When
Johnson told them he couldn't leave his
job (3T.1338), he was arrested (3T.1249,
1251, 1284, 1338) and subsequently
booked in connection with the dis-
appearance of Melissa Hinke (3T.1255,
see also 2T.949-951).

At the time of Johnson's arr
all of the information possessed ae tke
arresting officers Murphy and Mulhull
related to an alleged attempt, the day
before, to lure a girl named Kimberly
Stephens into an auto on Eichorn Avenue (3T.
1241, 1257-1259), a mile and a half from
where the victim was last seen (2T.1177).
Detective Murphy had personally investi-
gated the incident and had studied police
reports (3T.1241). He knew that the
girl was safe and had reported the inci-
dent. to her parents (3T.1257-1258). He
was also aware (3T.1241) that a Mr. Bosak
had reported to police the license number
of the auto involved in the Eichorn
Avenue incident (listed to Johnson) and
that Mr. Bosak described the driver of
the car as having a full beard (2T.1)92,
3T.1754). But Johnson had no beards /

At the time of arrest, the police
had no information to connect Johnson
with the Hinke case. The midnight
search of Johnson's car had yielded two
pop bottles of a size different from
those the victim had in her possession
at the time of her disappearance (2T.
1001). The towel which was found in the
car was tested on November 21st and,
again, on November 22nd (47.2265). But
Detective Marisch testified that the
police were not aware of the test results
which showed a semen stain at the time
of the arrest (2T.258). Marisch

as

The record indicated that the police
first attempted to ascertain whether
someone other than Johnson had used
his car on November 20th, fourteen
hours after Johnson's arrest, during
interrogation (2T.932).

jndicated that the police became aware

of the results some time prior to taking
Johnson's written statement (27... 227”
930, 958). Detective Koelliker also
indicated that he was unaware of any

test results seven hours after the arrest
when he questioned Johnson (2? 4140"

1136).

Immediately following his arrest,
Johnson was taken to another gas
station, at least a quarter of a mile
away (3T.1263) to obtain the release of
his car to the police (3T.1250). The
car was subsequently towed (3T.1250) and
searched at the police station (3T.1301,
1315). Johnson was taken to the police
station (3T.1245) and questioned almost
continuously (2T.1103, 37.1253, 1348-
1349) until 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. on
November 22nd (3T.1348). The interro-
gation was interrupted once when Johnson
was taken by police to a Lakewood
address to obtain a key ring (3T 1287,
1300) which held a trunk key to Johnson's
car (3T.1275) anda penknife (3T.1296).

With no more than two hours of
sleep (3T.1349), nothing to eat (3T.
1356), and promises of being released
(3T.1256, 1351, see also 5ST. 2512),
Johnson made a written statement at
9:00 a.m. on November 22nd (27.932,
37.1255). After the statement was
obtained, Johnson was not released (2T.
1111, 37.1353), but was subjected to
further questioning by another team of
detectives (2T.1100-1101, 3T.1353-1354).

Evidence obtained from the searches
of the car, the seizure of the key ring
and the statements obtained during the

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471

se aphid tae was admitted at the tria1—?/
. roe the court denied the petitioner's
otions to suppress (3T.1534-1536, 1542)

An arrest is invalid Le 2
pursuant to probable Seuee teen a
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415
ee Beck ¥: Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91

04). 1s clear tha i
available to the police meee
of Johnson's arrest justified no more
than a mere Suspicion of the commission
of any crime by Johnson, certainly not
: sufficient basis to justify the arrest

y Murphy and Mulhull in connection with

the Hinke di
ey @ disappearance (37.1249, 1254-

Furthermore, evidence
a result of an unlawful areac Gake a
Suppressed unless the primary taint is
sufficiently attenuated. Brown v
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592 (1975); Wong

(1963). Here, as in Brown, there was

8/
Evidence derived from the se
the car included testimony et
2224, 5T.2371-2374) and State Exhibits
9-H, a blue sweatshirt (marked 3T
1698 and received 5T.2447) and 20,
20A, 20B, photographs of the car
begenispey 4T.2217 and received 5T.1561
partial 4T.1917, 1921, 2239-2243).
tate Exhibit 1, a penknife taken
from the key ring (marked 3T.1558 and
received ST. 2437). Evidence derived
from the interrogations included
testimony (4T.1916-1934, 2161-2168)
and State Exhibit 13 and 13A
Johnson's written statement Of

November 22nd (marked 4T.1
received 5T.2448). Fes sos

o intervening factor to eragen ones ats

or innel taint of the unlawful raat y

aad vy. Illinois, 422 U.S. says cde

(1975), nor was the arrest a eareree

i te e *

ant in time to attenua

ms at 603-604. Finally, as in Brown,
ev

the

"(I]llegality here,.--, had a
quality of purposefulness. 5
The impropriety of the argees ‘
was obvious; awareness of tha
fact was virtually conceded
by the two detectives when
they repeatedly acknowledge,
in their testimony, that the
purpose of their action was
igation oO
woe toning: <o) The detectives
embarked upon this expedition
for evidence in the hope that
something might turn Up.
Id., at 605. (Emphasis
supplied).

Here, the statements ery ¥
interrogations and physices a ai ceck ly
¥
seized from Johnson s ca ge
t on the heels
om - indeed, came fas 2
oe the illegal arrest ieee
ts of the
ingly, all statemen : sete 4
that illega
obtained as a result oO
arrest should have been gage
Since they were not because the s
courts' decisions on this re eae
conflict with decisions of agen sort
certiorari should be granted and p
tioner's convictions reversed.

- 34 -

IV.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER'S FOURTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED BY THE WARRANTLESS
SEIZURE OF PETITIONER'S AUTOMOBILE
ONE QUARTER OF A MILE FROM THE
PLACE OF PETITIONER'S ARREST, AND
THE SUBSEQUENT WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE SEIZURES
OF VARIOUS ITEMS WHICH WERE LATER

Following John Johnson's arrest,
he was taken in custody by the detectives
from the Martin gas station where he
worked to a Shell gas station, located
at least a quarter of a mile away (3T.
1263). Prior to arresting Johnson, the
detectives had determined that Johnson's
automobile was parked at the Shell
Station (3T.1242-1243). Johnson's car
was parked at the Shell station for
repair of one of the windows in the car
(3T.1339, see also 2T.968, 5T.2494-2495).
The detectives drove to the shell station
for the express purpose of seizing
Johnson's car so that it could be
searched (3T.1263-1264, 1266).

The detectives did not have a
warrant to seize the car (3T.1251). Nor
did they advise Johnson of his right to
demand a warrant or to request the
police not to tow the car (3T.1339).
They never asked his permission to take
his car (3T.1339), but simply told him
they were going to tow the car (3T.1339)
and thereafter the detectives ordered a
police tow truck to take the car to the
police pound (3T.1271).

= ao”

Hours after the seizure of Johnson's
car, warrantless searches of oomepan ves
auto were conducted td ae a a

a during the early morn
Nowambee 22, 23975 (38.32 7S2 1293, eon
at approximately 2:00 a.m. (ibid. ) =
again later that morning, at niga a
mately 9:00 a.m. (3T.1315), when a oem
police from the Scientific InVSSTS9Ss2
Unit (3T.1317) searched for trace te
dence of a crime of violence (3T.13 ’
at the request of the detective bureau

(3T. 1318-1319).

Among the items seized as a result
of the searches was a blue sweatshirt
with a minute spot of blood on it (4T.
2221-2222), taken from the trunk ee
1312). It was received into evidence
at trial, over defense objection, as |
State Exhibit 9-H (5T.2447). aera
also was offered that the search of : e
car revealed a small blood spot on the
interior of the car (4T.2221).

It is clear that the courts below
were in clear error in rejecting peti-
tioner's arguments because the record
demonstrates that none of the Spang eg
to th¢ warrant requirement wi hae a |
cases Furthermore, it 1S CEETaSS 4 :
ture that "the word ‘automobile’ 1s jae
a talisman in whose presence the Four

Amendment fades away and ae gO
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. ’

461 (1971).

4 nying the petitioner's motion,
aa McLee tae held only that the
police had a right to tow and search
the car, without specifying the
exception to the warrant requirement
(Appendix at A58, 3T.1534).

- 36 -

The petitioner's auto was seized at
least a quarter of a mile from where he
had earlier been arrested (3T.1263).

In light of Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969), which restricted
a search incident to arrest to the
"arrestee's person and the area ‘within
his immediate control'," it can hardly
be asserted that the seizure here was
incident to a valid arrest. See also,

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403
U.S. at 456.

AS a unanimous Court held in Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964): “Once an accused is under
arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without warrant,
is seemingly not incident to the arrest."

Moreover, the record clearly Shows) 9 /
that, unlike the Carroll-Chambers cases*
police had no probable cause to believe
that the auto contained evidence relating
to the crime for which the car was
eeacciadeet The information about the
car, which the police had at the time

107

E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 158-159 (1925); Chambers
Vv. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 587
(1974); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67,
68 (1975).

11/
Petitioner was arrested in connection
with the Hinke disappearance cans
1255) and the searchers were looking
for trace evidence of a violent crime
(3T.1313, 1315), clearly not descrip-
tive of the alleged attempted abduc-
tion of Kimberly Stephens.

- 37 -

of the seizure, had been, for the most
part, in their possession nineteen hours
earlier when the first search of
Johnson's auto occurred (3T.1257-1259)
and related only to the alleged attempted
abduction of Kimberly Stephens, who had
never been in or ever touched the Cas
involved in that incident (37.1258) +2/
As in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 368 (1964), and Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., Inc., 391 U.S. 216,
221, 222 (1968), here there was no
probable cause to believe that evidence
of the crime was concealed in the auto.

Further, the exception exemplified
by Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970), Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974) and Texas v. White, 423
U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304 (1975), does not
apply here. Warrantless car searches
were permitted in this line of cases
"because circumstances which furnish
probable cause to search a particular
car for paiticular articles are most
often unforeseeable; moreover, the
opportunity to search is fleeting since
a car 1s readily movable." Chambers v.
Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 5l.

12/7
At the time of arrest, the officers
didn't know that the towel seized
from Johnson's car at midnight on
November 2lst was stained with semen
(2T.258, 1135-1136, see also 2T.929-
930). All they knew, other than
information concerning Stephens, was
that a towel and two pop bottles, of
a different size than those possessed
by the victim (2T.1001), were seized
from Johnson's car.

The instant case, like Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
furnishes none of "the exigent circum-
stances" esac SY a the Carroll-Chambers
line of cases+3/ Like Coolidge, id., at
461, Johnson had not resisted the police
(4T.1902) when his car had been searched
nineteen hours earlier in connection
with the Hinke disappearance (2T.991);
the car was not being used for an
illegal purpose, but was undergoing
repair at a gas station (3T.1339), the
location of which the police were aware
well in advance of Johnson's arrest
(3T.1242). There were, in short, abso-
lutely no circumstances to avoid the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, United States v. Chadwick,
433 0.8. 3 Ca9tiThs

Nor can the seizure of the car and
subsequent searches and seizures at the
police pound be justified on the basis
of consent. The Ohio Court of Appeals -
Eighth District contended that Johnson's
alleged consent to the midnight search
of his car nineteen hours earlier con-
tinued to permit the seizure of the car
subsequent to his arrest. Appendix at
A24. The court of appeals' analysis
ignored the plain facts that Johnson was
under arrest at the time of the seizure
(3T.1263). When the police saw Johnson's
car, they ordered a tow (3T.1271).
Johnson's permission to tow the car was
never requested nor received (3T.1339).
Johnson was also not informed that he
had a right to a warrant (id.).

13/7

~~ See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 596 (1974).

= 39 =

The burden on the prosecution of
showing consent, free from intimidation
and duress, Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968), is particularly
heavy where the individual is under
arrest; non-resistance to orders or
suggestions does not constitute consent.
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649,

651 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v.
Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1974).
The record here demonstrates nothing
more than mere non-resistance while in
custody, clearly not the free and volun-
tary consent required by this Court's
decisions.

Having failed to prove an exception
to the general requirement of a warrant,
the State's warrantless seizure of
Johnson's car and the subsequent warrant-
less searches and seizures of the con-
tents of the car were clearly unconsti-
tutional and the decisions of the courts
below upholding the searches and seizures
were in direct conflict with decisions
of this Court. Certiorari should there-
fore be granted to resolve this question
and petitioner's convictions should be
reversed.

vi

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
WHERE AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH SUPPORTED
THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT FOR THE
SEARCH OF PETITIONER'S HOME FAILED
TO SET FORTH FACTS TO SHOW THE BASIS
FOR A NAMED INFORMANT'S CONCLUSORY
STATEMENTS WHICH WERE NECESSARY TO
ANY ATTEMPTED SHOWING OF PROBABLE

A night search of Johnson's home

was conducted on November 22, 1975,
pursuant to a warrant issued earlier
that day (2T.1141-1142). Among the
items seized in the search of Johnson's
apartment and admitted in evidence at
trial was a pair of undershorts stained
with blood (4T.2251-2253) which was
received as State Exhibit 8-K (5T.2446),
a wash rag found to have traces of
blood (4T.2255) which was received as
State Exhibit 25-E (5T.2452) and numer-
ous photographs depicting the condition
of the apartment and the position of
various items at the time of the search
which were received as State Exhibits
25, 25-A through 25-D (5T.2452).

Detective Volk, with the aid of
Assistant County Prosecutor Garver, had
prepared the affidavit (Appendix at A74)
in application for warrant to search
Johnson's apartment (2T.1141). Every-
thing presented to the judge in support
of the application for the search warrant
was contained in the affidavit (2T.1146) ;
on the affidavit alone, the judge issued
the warrant (2T.1167). The affidavit
set forth in the following two paragraphs
the information provided to the judge
in support of probable cause:

"Affiant states that on November
20, 1975, the Cleveland Police
Department commenced an investi-
gation into the abduction of

one MELISSA HINKE upon receiving
a report from MRS. JANICE HINKE
that her daughter MELISSA HINKE
age 8 was missing her absence
being unexplained. Affiant
further states that during the
course of said investigation,

it was learned from one MR. BOZAK

that JOHN A. JOHNSON's 1968
Buick Ohio license number 350184
red body black vinyl top, was
seen at or near the area where
said MELISSA HINKE was last seen
and that MR. BOZAK further
observed the driver of the above
described vehicle attempt to
abduct a young female child the
same having occurred at or near
the time of MELISSA HINKE's
disappearance. Subsequent in-
vestigation revealed that JOHN
A. JOHNSON was the owner of the
above described automobile.

As a result of the above infor-
mation, officers of the Cleveland
Police Department went to JOHN
JOHNSON's address at 2006 West
Blvd., at which time JOHN A.
JOHNSON allowed these officers
to check his car. As a result
of this cursory search, 2 Pepsi
bottles, 1 carton of Lawson's
milk in a bag, a towel which

was analysed by the scientific
investigation unit and found to
have semen present.

"Affiant further states, that

On November 22, 1975, the par-
tially clothed body of MELLISA
HINKE was found in a wooded area
of the Cleveland Metropolitan
Park-North Olmsted, Ohio with
numerous puncture wounds of the
upper torso and bleeding from
the rectal area. Affiant further
states, the body of MELISSA
HINKE was conveyed to the county
coroner's office by the Park
Rangers."

Here, as in Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the infor-
mation supplied by Mr. Bosak, the named
informant, "has a fundamental place in
this warrant application. Without it,
probable cause could not be established."
Id. at 414.

However, there are absolutely no
facts or underlying circumstances
detailed from which an independent
magistrate could have concluded that an
attempted abduction had taken place.
The magistrate was left to rely solely
upon Mr. Bosak's totally unsupported
conclusion that he, in fact, had wit-
nessed an attempted abduction.

Furthermore, the affidavit failed
to set forth any factual basis to support
the credibility of the informant or the
reliability of his information. Cer-
tainly a mere name does not supply the
basis to believe the credibility of the
informant. The absence of a factual
detailing of the basis for either the
informant's conclusory statement, or the
credibility of the informant or the
reliability of his information should
be fatal to the question of sufficiency
of this affidavit. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964). Here, neither of
the requirements mandated in Aguilar,
supra, and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969), are met.

Furthermore, the recital in the
affidavit of the items found in the
search of Johnson's car is completely
without significance. There are no facts
to establish that the items are material
or relevant to establishing probable
cause to believe that Johnson committed

a crime against the person of Melissa
Hinke. Although the affidavit details
that the victim's bloody body was found,
the stains on the towel found in
Johnson's car were from semen, not blood.

Most importantly, there are abso-
lutely no facts or conclusions whatsoever
in the affidavit to support a belief
that evidence of a crime would be found
in John Johnson's apartment. Indeed,
the only facts set forth point solely
to Johnson's car. .

There can be no doubt, therefore,
that the decisions of the courts below
are in clear conflict with the decisions
of this Court. Certiorari should be
granted to review this question and
petitioner's convictions should be
reversed.

VI.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
PROOF THAT FALSE STATEMENTS WERE
INCLUDED IN A SEARCH WARRANT AFFI-
DAVIT BY AN AFFIANT WITH RECKLESS
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH SO AS TO
HAVE REQUIRED THAT THE SEARCH
WARRANT BE VOIDED.

The affiant, Detective Volk, testi-
fied that he had prepared the affidavit
in support of the warrant to search
petitioner's apartment with the aid of
an assistant prosecutor (2T.1141). Volk
expressly testified that he reviewed
all the police reports which were avail-
able when he prepared the affidavit (2T.
1147, 1151). Volk admitted that he knew

at the time that he drafted the affida-
vit that the location of the attempted
abduction was on Eichorn Avenue and that
Melissa Hinke was last seen at West 65th
near Lorain Avenue, one to one and one-
half miles from the scene of the attempted
abduction. Volk was also aware that

the attempted abduction on Eichorn Avenue
occurred at 2:30 p.m., on November 20,
1975, but that Melissa Hinke disappeared
sometime after 3:00 p.m., more than one-
half hour later (2T.1178). However,

none of these details were included in
the affidavit. Instead, it was indicated
that the attempted abduction occurred

"at or near" the time and place of the
victim's disappearance, creating the
false impression that Melissa Hinke was
the victim of the attempted abduction.
The statement concerning the attempted
abduction was essential to the establash-
ment of probable cause (see Appendix at
A73).

Volk reasonably should have been
aware, simply by the disparity in time
and location, that the victim of the
reported attempted abduction was not
Melissa Hinke. By drafting the affidavit
to create the false impression that
Hinke was the victim in the Eichorn
incident, Volk demonstrated a reckless
disregard for the truth.

Further evidence of Volks's reckless
disregard of the truth in his drafting
of the affidavit was supplied by his
testimony that he had no personal know-
ledge of the informant Mr. Bosak or the
manner in which Mr. Bosak's information
was related to the police (2T.1150-1151,
1165); he received all his information
from sources within the police department

(27.2263)... in fact, it is ciear that
at the time Volk prepared and signed
the affidavit, he had no factual basis
for a belief that Mr. Bosak was a
credible informant or that Mr. Bosak's
information was reliable (2T.1163-1166).
Indeed, Volk didn't even know who
originally contacted the police (2T.
1165, 1166), or through how many levels
of hearsay the information had gone
before it trickled down to him (2T.
1166).

Volk's claim that he didn't know
the child's name who was involved in the
attempted abduction on Eichorn Avenue
(2T.1148), can be construed as another
indicator of Volk's reckless disregard
for the truth. However, his testimony
in this regard is simply incredible, in
light of his testimony that he reviewed
- all the police reports which were
available on November 22nd (2T.1147,
1151) and also obtained information from
other detectives (2T.1150). Newspaper
articles published on the afternoon of
November 22nd carried details of the
attempted abduction and clearly indicated
that a child other than Melissa Hinke
had been involved (see, M. B. 3,4).
Furthermore, Detective Murphy, a parti-
cipant in the search with Detective Volk
(2T.1141), testified that there were
several reports on the alleged attempted
abduction on Eichorn Avenue which were
available on the afternoon of November
2lst and Murphy had been able to review
them at that time (3T.1241).

Franks v. Delaware, U.S. ’
98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978), clearly mandates
that where a defendant establishes at
an evidentiary hearing on the veracity

of statements in the affidavit that the
affiant included false statements in an
affidavit, either knowingly and intention-
ally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, and the false statement is essen-
tial to establish probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment considerations require
the voiding of the search warrant.

On the facts presented here, the
lower courts' failures to follow the
teaching of Franks denied petitioner
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights and this Court showld grant review
and reverse petitioner's convictions.

Vil.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED

AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER MADE A
VOLUNTARY, KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
WAIVER OF HIS PRIVILEGE TO REMAIN
SILENT WHERE PETITIONER WAS SUBJECTED
TO A LENGTHY, CONTINUOUS, NIGHT-TIME,
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION PRIOR TO
MAKING ORAL AND WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

From the time of John Johnson's
arrest at about 7:00 p.m. on November 21,
1975, until late the following morning,
Johnson was, with few interruptions,
subjected to incessant custodial inter-
rogations by rotating teams of detectives
(see,e.g., 3T.1245-1248, 1252-1253, 1272,
1293, 1342+1343, 27.953, 1133, 47.2345).

At 2:00 a.m., on November 22, 1975,
Detectives Koelliker and Leppelmeier of
the Homicide Unit began to question the
appellant (2T.953, 1133). Although
Koelliker asserted that Johnson was read
his constitutional rights (2T.1130),

there was no signed writing, or any
other record, which indicated that
Johnson had been informed of his rights
and had decided to speak to the detec-
tives (2T.1132). Petitionerdenied that
Koelliker or Leppelmeier ever advised
him of his rights (3T.1347).

-

Koelliker also claimed that Johnson
was advised that he was being questioned
in connection with the suspected murder
of Melissa Hinke (2T.1134)., even though,
Koelliker agreed, the police had no
knowledge that the girl had been
murdered (2T.1134), and his written
report did not mention any such advice
to Johnson (2T.1135). Johnson did not
remember being asked any questions about
Melissa Hinke (3T.1347). He stated that
he was questioned about his activities
and wi:ereabouts on November 20th (3T.
1347).

After two or three hours of question<~
ing by Koelliker and Leppelmeier during
the course of which Johnson was forced
to strip naked (4T.2168), the interroga-
tion ceased (3T.1348). Petitioner was
taken to an occupied cell (3T.1349) at
five or six o'clock a.m. (3T.1348).
Johnson could not sleep because of the
men milling around (3T.1349). There was
no mattress, so he tried to sleep on the
floor (3T.1409).

At approximately 8:00 a.m., Johnson
was brought to an interview room (3T.
1248, 1349). Detectives Murphy and
Marisch were present (2T.923, 3T.1249,
1279). Johnson testified that Murphy
again told him that as soon as he made
a statement he would be released (3T.
1351). This testimony was never refuted

- 48 -

gt

and, in fact, was partially corroborated
by Murphy who admitted that he earlier

had stated that Johnson would be released
as soon as he made a statement (3T.1256).

Johnson testified that he was not
advised of the purpose of the statement
(3T.1352, 1353, see also 2T.930). Johnson
testified that he asked for an attorney
but was told he did not need one because
as soon as he was finished, he would be
released (3T.1350). Detective Mulhull
also had informed the petitioner's wife
the previous evening that no attorney
was needed and he would advise her when
one was needed (3T.1282-1283, 5T.2504).

Although police suspect statements
are headed by a paragraph setting forth
the suspect's constitutional rights
(2T.956), Johnson's written statement
contained no such paragraph (2T.956).
The absence was explained by Detective
Marisch's blatant denial that Johnson
had been arrested or that he was even a
Suspect in the Hinke case (2T.935, 3T.
1303), even though Murphy and Mulhull
testified that they had arrested Johnson
(3T.1256-1257), Johnson was booked in
connection with the arrest in connection
with the disappearance of Melissa Hinke
by Marisch himself (2T.950), and the
caption on the written statement indi-
cated that it was in regard to the
victim's disappearance (2T.942). In
spite of these facts Marisch stated that
Johnson was asked to make only a witness
statement. Marisch admitted that
witnesses are not advised of their
rights prior to taking statements (2T.
957), but claimed that this time the
petitioner was advised of his rights,
orally, because of the "Severity of the

- 49 -

matter" (27.956-957) +4/ a contradiction
of the claim that Johnson wasn't even a
suspect. Johnson did not remember ever
being advised of his rights prior to the
taking of the written statement (3T.
1353).

At trial, testimony was received
from Detectives Koelliker (4T.2163-2167)
and Marisch (4T.1929-1935) concerning
the details of the whereabouts statements
which Johnson made during the interroga-
tion at 2:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on
November 22, 1975. The introduction of
both statements of November 22nd allowed
the prosecution to offer witnesses to
destroy, point by point, the time which
Johnson's statements indicated he spent
at certain locations on November 20,
1975.

The oral statement was taken after
Johnson had been questioned for almost
seven hours (2T.1103, 3T.1253, 1348-1349).
The written statement was obtained after
Johnson had been allowed no more than
two hours sleep (3T.1349), and nothing
to eat since his arrest thirteen hours
before (3T.1356). It is clear that:

"([w]hatever the testimony of

the authorities as to waiver

of rights by an accused, the
fact of lengthy interrogation

or incommunicado incarceration
before a statement is made is
strong evidence that the accused

14/

~ At trial, Marisch testified that prior
to taking the written statement, he
only asked Johnson "if he recalled
his rights" (4T.1926).

did not readily waive his
rights. In these circum-
stances, the fact that the
individual eventually made

a statement is consistent
with the conclusion that the
compelling influence of the
interrogation finally forced
him to do so. It is incon-
sistent with any notion of

a voluntary relinguishment
of the privilege." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at
476 (1966) (emphasis supplied).

The Ohio Court of Appeals explained
its rejection of petitioner's argument
on this issue partially on the basis
that "the challenged statements...were
in substance consistently exculpatory"
(Appendix at Al5). However, this Court
has expressly stated that "the prosecu-
tion may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of pro-
cedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966) (emphasis supplied). Furthermore,
Miranda makes clear that the State bears
the burden of showing that a defendant
has made a voluntary, knowing, and intel-
ligent waiver of the privilege to remain
Silent. Id. at 475-479. But the Ohio
Court of Appeals applied solely the
voluntariness of consent analysis,
set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973), when it overruled
petitioner's assertion of error.

In light of the clear failure of
the Ohio courts to apply the correct

standards to the claimed waiver of peti-
tioner's privilege to remain silent, and
the compelling facts of this case, this
Court should grant certiorari and reverse
the convictions.

VIII.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED

AS TO WHETHER THE PETITIONER WAS
DENIED HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHERE, WHILE PETI-
TIONER WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO LENGTHY,
CONTINUOUS, CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION,
THE INTERROGATING OFFICERS TOOK
AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO PERSUADE PETI-
TIONER'S WIFE NOT TO SECURE COUNSEL
FOR PETITIONER. #

John Johnson was arrested for
questioning in connection with the dis-
appearance of Melissa Hinke (3T.1254-
1255) and was continuously interrogated
from the time of his arrest at 7:00 p.m.
until the following morning (see, e.g.,
3T.1245-1248, 1252-1253, 1272, 1293,
1342-1343). His wife went to the police
station and met with detectives who were
questioning Johnson (3T.1282-1283, 4T.
2504, 4T.2552). Detective Mulhull ad-
mitted that he told Mrs. Johnson that an
attorney wasn't needed and that he would
advise her when an attorney was needed
(3T.1282-1283). Mulhull's testimony was
corroborated by Mrs. Johnson (5T.2504).
Detective Murphy testified that he
advised Johnson's wife on the night of
Johnson's arrest that as soon as Johnson
made a statement, Johnson would be
released (37.1256, 5T.2512-2513).

Although Johnson was clearly arrested

and booked in connection with the

disappearance of Melissa Hinke (3T.1256-
1257, 2T.950), and although the continu-
ous interrogation belies any claim that
Johnson was a mere witness, detectives
attempted to put Mrs. Johnson at ease
concerning the need for an attorney.
Their actions demonstrate a determina-
tion to prevent the one person who would
have been able to contact an attorney
from doing so. Their action is in
direct conflict with the policies enun-
ciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), to afford a suspect,
who is the focus of a police investiga-
tion, the assistance of counsel. Both
Miranda and Escobedo recognize that un-
fettered access to counsel is absolutely
necessary to enable a suspect to fully
protect his privilege to remain silent.
The record in this case demonstrates
that the police used the considerable
pressure of isolation, continual inter-
rogation and fatigue to wrest statements
from the petitioner which could later

be used to convict him. This Court
should grant certiorari in order to
address the important question presented
here.

IX.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED

AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER'S SIXTH

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED BY THE USE AT TRIAL OF A
STATEMENT WHICH WAS OBTAINED AFTER
INDICTMENT, IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL
AND AFTER PETITIONER HAD CLEARLY
REFUSED TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT WITHOUT
THE PRESENCE OF HIS ATTORNEY.

The petitioner was indicted on
November 25, 1975, and arraigned on

November 28, 1975. Immediately after
the arraignment, Johnson was rushed from
the courtroom by Detectives Comodeca and
Terpay to the interview room in the
police station (2T.1086) for the purpose
of further interrogation (2T.1077) as
well as viewing for possible identifi-
cation (2T.1092, 1093). Comodeca and
Ferris were aware that following the
arraignment, two attorneys were to be
appointed to represent the petitioner
(27.1093, 1075). In spite of the immi-
nent appointment of new counsel to
represent the petitioner, Comodeca pro-
ceeded with the interrogation (2T.1087).

Detective Ferris entered the room
between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. (2T.1088,
1092). Both Ferris and Comodeca claimed
that petitioner asked to talk to Ferris
alone (2T.1077, 1088), but Johnson testi-
fied that Ferris came into the room and
asked Comodeca if Ferris could talk to
Johnson alone (3T.1360). Johnson stated
that Ferris told him that everything
could be “off the record" and that they
didn't have to even talk about the case
(3T.1361). Comodeca twice entered the
room during the conversation between
Ferris and Johnson (2T.1088, 1099).
Although Comodeca claimed that Johnson
made statements in his presence (2T.
1089), Johnson denied doing so (3T.1363),
and the trial court so found (3T.1536-
1538, Appendix at A60-61). Johnson
testified that each time Comodeca entered
the room, Ferris asked if Comodeca could
listen to what was off the record, but
he refused and requested an attorney
before making any statements (3T.1362-
1363). Ferris offered no testimony
concerning Comodeca's return to the
room.

- 54 -

Despite claims that Johnson was
advised of his rights (2T.1067) and had
waived them (2T.1068), Ferris admitted
that on several occasions during the time
they talked, Johnson stated that he would
not make any statement without his
attorney present (2T.1078), and that
this refusal was not limited to written
statements (2T. 1079). Johnson speci-
ficially denied that Ferris advised him
of his rights (3T.1406), and maintained
that Ferris said the conversation was
"off the record" (3T.1362).

At 2:00 p.m.; when the petitioner's
appointed attorneys arrived, the conver-
sation between Ferris and the petitioner
ended. Ferris denied telling the petition-
er's attorneys that it was a shame
they had shown up, because "I would have
gotten more out of him" (2T.1080).
However, when Detective Comodeca was
asked if he heard such a statement, he
testified, "I don't know how to word
it,...there was some--I can't recall"
(2T.1098).

Police confiscated a grey sweat-
shirt (3T.1324) which had been brought
from home by Johnson's wife (3T.1326)
after Johnson indicated to Ferris that
he had worn the sweatshirt on November
20th, the day of the victim's dis-
appearance (3T.1324, 1372). The grey
sweatshirt, found to have traces of
blood on it, was subsequently marked
(5T.2415) and received (5T.2455) in
evidence as State Exhibit 32.

At trial, Ferris offered extensive
testimony of Johnson's statements of
November 28th (5T.2408-2416). The
testimony included several highly in-'
criminating statements allegedly made

- 55 -

by Johnson, including the statement that
he was never ina fight that day but
made up the story (5T.2411), that the
sweatshirt he wore on November 20th was
muddy and had blood on it from the waist
to the chest and on the sleeves (5T.
2416) and that "when he took his trousers
off, he saw his shorts were full of
blood, and...he thought of the little
girl" (5T.2409). Full text of this
statement appears in Appendix at A63.

In Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964), authorities surrepti-
tiously elicited incriminating statements
from a defendant in counsel's absence,
after the defendant had been indicted
for the crime to which the statement
pertained. The Supreme Court held:

"[T]he petitioner was denied
the basic protection (of the
right to assistance of counsel)
when there was used against him
at his trial evidence of his
own incriminating words, which
federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had
been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel." Ibid.,
377 U.S. at 206.

Accord, McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356
(1965).

Recently, this Court affirmed the

teaching of Massiah in Brewer v. Williams,

U.S. » 97 BCC. i232 (4977)

In Brewer, this Court noted that Williams'

statements that he would talk after he
consulted with his attorney “were the

clearest expressions...that he desired
the presence of an attorney before any

interrogation took place," U.S. ’
97 S.Ct. at 1242. In the instant case,
no clearer expression of the desired
presence of an attorney could have been
made by the petitioner when he stated
several times (as admitted by Detective
Ferris) that he didn't want to make any
statement without an attorney present
(2T.1078-1079).

This Court should grant certiorari
and should reverse petitioner's convic-
tions.

,

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULE
ESTABLISHED IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
THAT WHERE AN INDIVIDUAI INDICATES
THAT HE WANTS AN ATTORNEY, THE
INTERROGATION MUST CEASE UNTIL THE
ATTORNEY IS PRESENT.

The record in this case is clear
that on November 28, 1975, John Johnson
requested to consult with an attorney
before making any statements. Detective
Ferris specifically admitted that several
times during his questioning of Johnson
on November 28, 1975, Johnson told Ferris
that Johnson didn't want to make any
statement without an attorney present
(2T.1078-1079). The State produced no
evidence to rebut this testimony; indeed,
it could not.

The record shows that the interroga-
tion of Johnson by Ferris lasted from
two (2) to two and one-half (2 1/2) hours
(2T.1079, 1088, 1092) and that Johnson's
first request for an attorney would have

occurred just fifteen (15) minutes after the
interrogation had begun, when Detective
Comodeca entered the room (2T.1088).

It if clear that Ferris should have
immediately ceased the interrogation

after Johnson made his desire for an
attorney apparent.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), unequivocally dictates that the
State must either immediately honor a
request for the assistance of counsel or
refrain from further questioning until
counsel is obtained:

"If an individual states that

he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present." 348
U.S. at 474 (Emphasis supplied)...

This Court's decision in Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), leaves little
doubt that the rule enunciated in Miranda
enjoys continued vitality. See Mosley,
supra, fn. 7 and 10.

Petitioner urges this Court to grant
certiorari to consider the clear and
compelling facts of this question and
to reverse his conviction.

XI.

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS PRESENTED
AS TO WHETHER PETITIONER'S SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED BY THE ADMISSION

OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE IN-
COURT AND PRETRIAL, POST-
INDICTMENT IDENTIrICATIONS OF

THE PETITIONER WHEN THE PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATION OCCURRED IN THE
ABSENCE OF PETITIONER'S ATTORNEYS.

On November 28, 1975, three days
after petitioner Johnson had been
indicted and on the same day of his
arraignment, twelve-year-old Lisa
Chambers was escorted by police to
a room in the Cleveland police station
where she was asked to look through a
two-way mirror and identify John
Johnson (2T.847, 892), in the absence
of counsel for Johnson (2T.892-893,
1093). Lisa earlier had told detec-
tives investigating the Hinke case
about an incident which occurred on
November 14th where a man had tried
to entice her into his car by offering
her a ride to school (2T.882).

Before viewing Johnson,’ detectives
told Lisa that Johnson had tried to
get another girl into his car and that
he had already been identified by
other children (2T.864-866). When
Lisa looked through the mirror she
saw a number of men she knew were
detectives and uniformed police in
the room (2T.862, 4T.1817). Johnson,

dressed in prison clothes (2T.862-863)
and the only person who was not a
police officer (ibid.), was seated in
the room, surrounded by the older men
(4T.1811).

At trial the State offered Lisa's
testimony to prove an alleged prior
act by Johnson pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code §2945.59 (Appendix at A82) to
prove Johnson's motive, intent, scheme,
plan, etc. Lisa testified at trial
about her police-station identification
of Johnson as the man who offered her
the ride (4T.1809-1810) and also made
an in-court identification of Johnson
(4T.3807-1809). Lisa's mother was also
permitted to testify and buttress
Lisa's pretrial identification of
Johnson (4T.1825).

The introduction of testimony
concerning the identifications denied
petitioner his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. However, the courts
below completely failed to address the
obvious trial court error even though
it was specifically brought to their
attention (see e.g. Appendix at A45,
50). This Court has recently re-
affirmed its holding in Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), that
trial testimony concerning a pretrial
identification, held in the absence
of counsel, after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings,
is subject to a per se exclusionary
rule. Moore v. Illinois, U.S.

, 98 S.Ct. 458 (1978). Here, Lisa
Chambers' testimony about the pretrial
identification clearly should have been
excluded.

- 60 -

Moreover, the in-court identifi-
cation of Johnson by Lisa in light of
the post-indictment identification was
Subject to the rule enunciated in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218

(1967). The State completely failed

to prove "by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the in-court identifications
were based upon observations of the
suspect other than the lineup identi-
fication." United States v. Wade,

Supra, at 240.

Furthermore, the unnecessary
suggestiveness of the pretrial identi-
fication procedure created a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentifi-
cation in violation of petitioner's due
process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98 (1977). Petitioner urges this
Court to accept review and correct the
obvious and serious prejudicial error
left unremedied by the courts below.
This Court should grant certiorari and
reverse petitioner's convictions.

CONCLUSION

This case arises out of ugly
beginnings--a brutal and senseless death
of a young child. It is a case in which
the cry for vengeance is a natural
response to the outrage of a frightened
community and the frustrations implicit
in society's continuing struggle to
control criminal conduct.

It is precisely in such cases as
this, however, that the interposition of
constitutional protections and orderly
process are most needed--and most sorely

tested. And so it is vital that each
sordid case in which the provocation is
mighty and the public outcry vast and
unremitting--including this one--must
evoke the most dispassionate analysis

and thoughtful response of those charged
with administering our system of criminal
justice. For, “not the least significant
test of the quality of a civilizations

is its treatment of those charged with...
offenses which arouse the passions of

a community." Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
729 (1961).

Petitioner has demonstrated that .
from his first contact with police
officers through his trial and sentencing,
the protections of the law and the con-
stitution guaranteed to all citizens
were denied him. He was illegally
arrested. His home and car were illegally
ransacked by police. He was illegally
detained and illegally interrogated. He
was forced to stand trial in a community
atmosphere in which the newspapers and
television, and everyone exposed to them,
were passionately conviced of his guilt
and anxious for vengeance, before a juror
was sworn or a word of testimony taken,
and in a courtroom in which the poisonous
effects of such publicity, on judge and
jury, were readily apparent.

It remains for this Court to apply
the rule of law to this case. Petitioner,
therefore, respectfully urges this Court

to grant the writ of certiorari and
accept this case for review.

Respectfully submitted,

BERNARD A. BERKMAN

BERKMAN, GORDON, KANCELBAUM,
LEVY and MURRAY
2121 The Illuminating Building
55 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 781-5245

Attorney for Petitioner

George W. Palda
J. Michael Murray

Of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0116%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
