# Respondents Brief — Forsham v. Harris

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 445 U.S. 169

## Text

f FLLED
AUG 81 1979

L RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE ;

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1118

PETER H. FORSHAM, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CourRT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

: BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DR. CHRISTIAN R. KLIMT

STEPHEN H. SAcus,
Attorney General
of Maryland,

Davip H. FELDMAN,
Assistant Attorney General,
Chief of Litigation, >
THOMAS E. PLANK,
Assistant Attorney General,
1400 One South Calvert Building,
Baltimore, Maryland 21202,
(301) 383-3737
> Attorneys for Respondent
Dr. Christian R. Klimt.

Wo. ae aN ;
yd 2a UA ADY SHON 79

FS 16 1g ony The Daily Record Co., Baltimore, Md. 21202 eS

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foi HNO euexing — |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS ERLOW "sihsccccscccresephecrececetnsedeveedeotys
SUI CTIIIN . seiiitscneaivg. naecrrnadnaninbinictabaeililigs
SATU TES THORN ID 6.6 Svesiseasechecatlan tenetedoss
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..........:::cccceessseseeeeeeees
STATEMENT OF THE CASE oeecccscsccsessseesseenees
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......cccccccceseseseeeeeees
ARGUMENT:

The Freedom Of Information Act Applies
Only To Records In The Possession Or
Direct Control Of Federal Executive
A OANE 5, 5 siicablsnchzseatrcckitadadicseaaeleiteae

I.

Il.

III.

The Receipt Of Federal Funds Does
Not Make The University Group An
Agency Or The Raw Data Agency
PROCOES oiL ccosicnnpntiseatbagbaateubioneoten
The Freedom Of Information Act
Does Not Impose Any Affirmative
Obligation Upon Federal Agencies
To Obtain Data From Private Or
State’ Emtities .......0:.ccccsccdsscsccsccssessssete

Reliance By The Federal Govern-
ment Upon The University Group
Study Does Not Transform The
Raw Data Of The Study Into
Federal Agency Records. -................

CONCLAIBION: \ssiisdiciie eis eee

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp.
BBB’ DIG. Fs: LETT). sisssccectcvcnssorcceackosssies

Columbia Packing Co. v. United States
Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d
495 (Lat Cir. 1977) ....hcccvcccccccecccscssccsisoess

PAGE

12

15

19

39

19, 22

ii

PAGE
Disabled Officers’ Association v. Rumsfeld,
428 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1977) ........... 31
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
GRD: FO FET hsicdccrickivcncestseicdan iseck 38
Greenya v. George Washington University,
512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .............. 24

Kerr v. United States District Court for the
District of California,’ 511 F.2d 192,
aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976) ou... 22

Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, No. 78-1088

(U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979) ...... 15n.4, 17n.5
Linker v. Hills, 453 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y.
APPID Sis tise osleshaclebccndehs th edad canto seedbnahes 31

Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792
(D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431

Cry WD CREED poesinbeckstncdocstbcoleettleotieatpanee 22, 23
Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41

bs 1) eels SRN ORE ete Rre gen ly wy RED 24
Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) 31
NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437

Rr ER RAPT IEE uavehtecoanseinieindebStpudcniecouas 18
NLRB v. Sears, Reebuck & Co., 421 U.S.

TISm ARO TON casiasadstasobbndinccssdcnoudiaicasnecepbeanee 10, 31, 38
Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied., 409 U.S. 966 (1972) 18

Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130
(D. Kan. 1971), aff’d, 460 F.2d 671 (10th ©

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) 18
Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Cloth-
ing’ Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) woe eeeseees 38

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press v. Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S.,
cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979) .........0.0..... 15n.4, 17n.5

Bs; PAGE
Robles v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) 38
Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir.
DE ea aac daicaebeonicatecherriabiaersjies 21
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.
eb BEE DLS OPTRA SNE AES ee aa 20
Spark v. Catholic University of Averica,
510 F.2d 1977 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ............ 24
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807
CRIT Se biise saidabs ct iacciancdnteeacaiensarecdopeensee 10, 23
Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d
OO EI Ce TOs cicndnnesey nisasactasedeavinntnsssoe 24
Washington Research Project, Inc. v.
Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 20
Statutes and Regulations
I.R.C. § 7602, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976) ........ 32n.7
6: UB. BOGE CLOT) accensorsccsasticspecesssnesooye 20
B: USC, SBR (1G TG) + viv iccecscesecsscorepssccssvccsnansen passim
B UBC, S: 2008: (TOGA) canes scecrcitniesssposavetesnoesesss 36n.10
12. US.C2§ 1006 (ROTO): Sisscesisisiipssccccigesecesiass 32n.7
15 U.S.C. §§ 78q, 78u, 78x (1976) ..........048 18n.6, 32n.7
20 U.S.C. §§ 584, 1022 (1976) oo... eee eeeeees 32n.7
21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 357 (1976)... eeecseeseeees 32n.7
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976) ..........scssecssesseeees 2
BD UT BE Sa ete Aa peneanases sa daaaeainnenee 32n.7
33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1861 (1976) ..........ceeeee 32n.7
42 U.S.C. §§ 295h-5, 2000d, 2835 (1976) .... 28
§S§ 7414, 7616 (1977) ............cccccossseees 32n.7
44 U.S.Cr§ 866 (1964) oo... ccc ccccesetseeteeeneee 16-17
ER CE TID sopinpssceseduvcennhencecenphuoavees 17

iv

41 C.F.R. § 101-11.901-3(d) (1978) .............. 17n 5
45 C.F.R. § 74.24 (1978) ......cccccccssesesceese aah 33
Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §3 (1978)............ 27
Legislative Materials

S. Conf. No. 93-1200, 98d Cong., 24 Sess.

LP RSRRRRCEA Set ARE GROCER “ee 23
H.R. Rep.—

No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 24, 25, 30, 36

No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 21
S. Rep.—

No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) 24, 36, 38

No. 94-75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) 18n.6
112 Cong. Rec. 13641 (1966) 0.2.00... eee 25

Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Govern-
ment, Freedom of Informatign, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. one!ntergov-
ernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Operations
and the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers and Administrative Pracuiice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., lst Sess.
EUAN SCE Bera ae ee eR 25, 30

Federal Public, Records Law, Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) ................. 25, 30

Freedom of Information, Hearings on S. —
1666 and S. 1663 (in part) before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
»the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
NR tea Se Tit STAN RRR DAE cA 25, 30

Vv

U.S. Government Information Policies and
Practices, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Foreign Operations and
Government Information of the House

Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 9) (1972) ....

‘Administrative Materials

40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975) .......csecerereeeeee
42 Fed. Reg. 40,959 (1977) .......ccscscerceeerees
43 Fed. Reg. 52,732 (1978) ..........sssssssesseeees
44 Fed. Reg. 20,966 (1972) ........cssssreeeeerees

Order of the Secretary Suspending Appro-
val of New Drug Applications for
Phenformin, NDA 11-624, 12-752, 17-
126, 17-127 (DHEW July 25, 1977) .....

Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New
Drug Applications for Phenformin
Hydrochloride, Docket No. 77N-0150,
(FDA initial decision Feb. 8, 1978) ....

Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New
Drug Applications for Phenformin
Hydrochloride (FDA final aecision

PAGE

28, 30

7,35
37n.11
33, 34
38n.11

37n.11

38n.11

PI,” Ree Ree inthis inlaptaov cep prabthstnecdbnboensnna 35n.9, 38n.11

Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 19666 ...........
Miscellaneous

Attorney General’s Memorandum on the
Public Information Section of the
Administrative Procedure Act (1967) .

Brief for Federal Parties in Kissinger v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, No. 78-1088, and Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press v.
Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S. cert.
granted Apr. 16, 1979) ............:2ccceeeeees

5n.1

17, 30-31

17n.5

vi

Bureau of the Budget, Special Analyses of
the United States Budget, 1967 ..........

Committee for the Assessment of Biometric
Aspects of Controlled, Trials of Hypo-
glycemic Agents, Report, 231 J.A.M.A.
PTD Mai anccinec cdi sbutindeatiabuadbdbasconss

Freedman, Administrative Procedure and

the Control of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1970) ......

Knatterud, Meinert, Klimt, Osborne, and
artin, Effects of Hypoglycemic
Agents on Vascular Complications in
Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes,
IV, A Preliminary Report on Phenfor-
min Results, 217 J.A.M.A. 777 (1971)

Knatterud, Klimt, Levin, Jacobson, and
Goldner, A Study of the Effects of
Hypoglycemic Agents in Patients with
Adult-Onset Diabetes, VII, Mortality
and Selected Nonfatal Events with
Insulin Treatment, 240 J.A.M.A. 37
CRIED abainaustakeaescenbovede ibd lane bli tatec dis

Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Con-

cerning Academic Freedom, 41
A.A.U.P. Bull. 753 (1956) ...........cccccccee.

Madden, Future Directions for Federal , \

Assistance Programs: Lessons from
Block Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36
Ei. gs Sete eran
Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty
Oaths, 28 L. & Contemp. Prob. 487
COE sihvsseasheuneihasasseeaierncsbied ssmuicbeiebhdorin’ ;
U.S. Dep’t Health, Education, and Welfare,

Resources for Medical Research, Report
BOs TD TREE, Satiracenicntabipaccnnssindibedpaitecgions

PAGE

26

27

vii

University Group Diabetes Program, A
Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic
Agents on Vascular Complications in

é Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, I
& II, 19 Diabetes 747 (Supp. 2, 1970)

University Group Diabetes Program, A
Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemi¢
Agents on Vascular Complications in
Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, V,
Evaluation of Phenformin Therapy, 24
Diabetes 65 (Supp. 1, 1975) .................

Webster’s New International Dictionary
CBE) CG: BOBS): cwinsersceesccccpsrednovpessacoseseessverece

PAGE

6-7

30

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1118

PETER H. FORSHAM, ET AL., |
Petitioners,

Vv.

PATRICIA R. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE
District OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DR. CHRISTIAN R. KLIMT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (A. 217-37), the
concurring opinion of Judge MacKinnon (A. 238-39),
and the dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon (A. 240-57)
are reported at 587 F.2d 1128, 1139, and 1140 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The order of the court of appeals denying
rehearing (A. 258) and Judge Bazelon’s statement
explaining his vote for rehearing (A. 259) are reported
at 587 F.2d at 1148. The order of the district court (A.

2

180-81) denying the petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment and granting the respondents’ motions to
dismiss is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on July 11,
1978. On July 25 a timely petition for rehearing and in
the alternative suggestion for rehearing in banc was
filed (A. 261-68). On October 17, 1978, the court of
appeals denied the petition for rehearing (A. 258-60) and
the suggestion for rehearing in banc (Ct. App. R. 9). The
petition for writ of certiorari was filed on January 15,
1979, and was granted on May 14, 1979. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976).

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case turns upon the interpretation of the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1976),
which is reproduced in the appendix to the petitioners’
brief at 25a.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A continuing research study conducted by private
and state medical schools and hospitals and funded by
federal grants has collected raw data upon which it has
based certain conclusions. The federal government. has
never controlled the research and has never owned,
controlled, or possessed the raw data that the petition-
ers seek pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.
Accordingly, this case presents the following juéstions
of the interpretation of the Act:

1. Does the federal government’s funding of the study
transform the private and state institutions into federal
agencies or transform the raw~data into “agency
records” under the Act? ne

2. Must the federal government, in response to a
request for records under the Act, exercise whatever

Ss

= i

3

rights of access it may have to obtain private and state
documents, such as the raw data of the medical schools
and hospitals, and thereafter make them available?

3. Does the reliance by the federal government upon
the published findings of the study and upon an audit
of some of the raw data transform all of the data into
“agency records” under the Act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioners seek reversal of the decision of the
court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district
court, which had dismissed the petitioners’ request for
the production of the raw data generated in a study
conducted by the University Group Diabetes Program
and funded by federal grants. The court of appeals held
that the federal funding of the study, federal access to
the raw data compiled by the University Group, and
reliance upon the published findings of the study do not
convert the raw data into “agency records” under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

In June 1959, a number of private physicians and
scientists conceived of the idea of a long-term prospec-
tive clinical study to determine whether the treatment
of mild adult-onset diabetes with insulin or tolbutamide
prevented, delayed, or alleviated the principal complica-
tions (retinopathy, cardiovascular disease, nephro-
pathy, and neuropathy) of this disease (A. 96; D. Ct. R.
4, ex. 2 to affidavit of G. Donald Whedon at 5, 7, and 8).
As a result of the efforts of these physicians and
scientists, a number of private and state medical
schools and hospitals formed the University Group
Diabetes Program to perform the study. The University
Group eventually grew to include twelve participating
clinics and a coordinating center at the University of
Maryland School of Medicine. Between 1959 and 1961,
the principal investigators o were to conduct the
study prepared and evaluated its design, methods, and

4
Ss

objectives. The clinical part of the study began in 1961
(A. 145-46), and 1,027 patients entered the study
between 1961 and 1965 (A. 134, 146).

In each of the participating clinics, the investigators
allocated on a random basis recently diagnosed cases of
mild adult-onset diabetes to one of four treatment
groups. These groups consisted of: (1) standard diet plus
placebo tablets; (2) standard diet plus a fixed dose of
tolbutamide; (3) standard diet plus a fixed insulin dose;
and (4) standard diet plus insulin in varying amounts
dosed to maintain normal blood sugar levels. In 1963 a
fifth group of standard diet plus a fixed dose of
phenformin was added (A. 146).

When a patient entered the study, the clinics made an
initial evaluation of his or her health. Thereafter, the
clinics performed quarterly examinations to determine

the degree of control of, the diabetes and the develop-

ment, if any, of the complications of the disease (A. 97-
98). The clinics forwarded the records of these examina-
tion results to the coordinating center. The coordinating
center collected and computerized these results and
subjected them to periodic statistical analyses. The
treatment groups were compared for the number of
deaths observed in each group and the proportion
among each group developing one or more complica-
tions. In addition, the coordinating center was responsi-
ble for maintaining uniformity in the records and in the
laboratory techniques employed. For example, whe-
never a patient died, the coordinating center would
forward the patient’s records to two or more specialists
for examination. This was done to ensure the consist-
ency and quality of the findings. These consulting
specialists were unaware of the treatment that the
patient was receiving (A. 97-99).

5

Each of the schools and hospitals in the University
Group applied for and received separate research grants
from the National Institute of Arthritis, Metab.\ism,
and Digestive Diseases! (the “NIAMDD”) of the
National Institutes of Health to fund its participation
in the study. The NIAMDD provided these funds as
part of its responsibility to support research in the field
of diabetes and without any specific regulatory objec-
tive in mind. In 1966 the NIAMDD renewed the grants
to continue the study, and in 1971 the grants again
came up for review. The National Advisory Arthritis
and Metabolic Diseases Council recommended their
approval and gave the study a rating of “high program
relevance”, which was in effect a direction to the staff
of the NIAMDD to provide financial support for the
study (A. 146-47).

The Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA’’) was
not involved in the planning, inception, design, or
conduct of the study. The raw data of the study, such as
patient charts and forms, are the property of the
participating schools and hospitals and the individual
investigators. The NIAMDD does not own these data.
Furthermore, it is not the normal practice of either the
NIAMDD or the National Institutes of Health to require
grantees to submit their data for review, and submis-
sion of raw data is extremely rare. In this case, the
University group has not submitted any of the data to
the NIAMDD (A. 146-48).

1 The NIAMDD is one of a number of a research institutes
that collectively form the National Institutes of Health, all of
which are part of the Public Health Service. The Public
Health Service is the operating agency within the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare principally engaged
in providing health services, conducting and supporting
health research, and providing state and local aid. The Food
and Drug Administration is a separate agency within the
department primarily responsible for regulating the manuv-
facture, labeling, and distribution of drugs. See generally

Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, reprinted in 5 U'S.C. app., at 391-
95 (1976) and in 80 Stat. 1610 (1966).

¢

6

The participating clinics are responsible for manag-
ing the day-today operations of the study. Representa-
tives of the NIAMDD reviewed the design, methods,
and objectives of the study before it began the clinical
phase, but it had no involvement in the clinical phase
except to review the periodic reports submitted to it.
Finally, no officer or employee of the NIAMDD or of the
National Institutes of Health has ever seen or possessed
any of the raw data. It is estimated that the raw data
consists of millions of separate documents, possibly as
many as 55,000,000 documents, and many contain
information that identifies patients (A. 146-48).

At the annual meeting of the American Diabetes
Association on June 14, 1970, the University Group
presented some of the results of its continuing study.
These results indicated that, among other things, the
use of tolbutamide to control mild adult-onset diabetes
was no more effective than diet alone in prolonging life
and that it led to a greater death rate from cardiovascu-
lar disease than was found in the groups treated with
diet alone, a fixed dosage of insulin, or a variable
dosage of insulin. Later that year, the University Group
published these results in the Journal of the American
Diabetes Association. The University Group Diabetes
Program, A Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic
Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with
Adult-Onset Diabetes, I & II, 19 Diabetes 747 (Supp. 2,
1970) (A. 72). Both the American Diabetes Association
and the American Medical Association’s Council on
Drugs supported the validity of the study (A. 72).
Subsequently, the University Group published its
findings that phenformin also generated a higher
incidence of cardiovascular disease. Knatterud, Mei-
nert, Klimt, Osborne, and Martin, Effects of Hypogly-
cemic Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients
with Adult-Onset Diabetes, IV, A Preliminary Report
on Phenformin Results, 217 J.A.M.A. 777 (1971); The

7

University Group Diabetes Program, A Study of the
Effects of Hypoglycemic Agents on Vascular Complica-
tions in Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, V, Evalua-
tion of Phenformin Therapy, 24 Diabetes 65 (Supp. 1,
1975). From time to time, additional findings have been
r ublished. See, e.g., Knatterud, Klimt, Levin, Jacobson,
and Goldner, A Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic
Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with
Adult-Onset Diabetes, VII, Mortality and Selected
Nonfatal Events with Insulin Treatment, 240 J.A.M.A.
37 (1978).

The University Group study has been criticized (A.
12-13). Accordingly, to assess the scientific quality of
the study, the Director of the National Institutes of
Health, in 1972, invited the President of the Biometric
Society, a private organization of scientists, to appoint
a committee to consider the statistical aspects of the
study (A. 144). This committee evaluated the methods
used in the clinical study, reviewed the published
criticisms of the study, interviewed both critics and
supporters of the study, and made new analys.s from
some of the original data. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587, 28,590
(1975). None of the data that the University Group
made available to the committee was ever submitted to
the NIAMDD or any other agency of the federal
government, nor were they required to be submitted (A.
148). The committee commented on the major criticisms
of the study and concluded that the study’s evidence of
harmfulness was moderately strong. 40 Fed. Reg. at
28,590. See also Committee for the Assessment of
Biometric Aspects of Controlled Trials of Hypoglycemic
Agents, Report, 231 J.A.M.A. 583, 599 (1975).

Before the report of the committee of the Biomatric
Society was’ published, counsel for the petitioners
requested from the NIAMDD, the FDA, and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare a copy
of a draft of this report and also “access to the raw data

cot

8

which was accorded to the biometric study” (A. 40, 42-
43, 49). On January 27, 1975, G. Donald Whedon,
Director of the NIAMDD, supplied to counsel for the
petitioners the galley proof of the final version of the
committee’s report. In addition, Dr. Whedon explained
that no one in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare had ever possessed any of the raw data of
the study (A. 54). On May 6, 1975, counsel for the
petitioners renewed his request for access to the raw
data (A. 55). Counsel also requested the research design
and protocol for the study submitted to the NIAMDD
and a statement detailing all budget appropriations,
allocations, and expenditures for the study (A. 56). He
subsequently made a detailed request for records in the
NIAMDD’s files relating to the grants to the University
Group (A. 63-65).

In a series of subsequent correspondence, Theodore
Cooper, Acting Assistant Secretary for Health, re-
sponded that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare had never possessed any of the raw data on
which the study was based (A. 57); that all of the
grantees’ working documents remained in their posses-
sion and were not considered in any way to be part of
the grant files maintained at the National Institutes of
Health; that the National Institutes of Health had no
duty to request that a grantee submit data not required
as part of the grant; that, because the raw data did not
belong to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the Freedom of Information Act did not apply
to the material requested (D. Ct. R. 4, app. to ex. 1); that
neither the grants to the University Group nor the
contract with the Biometric Society required the
submission of the raw data to the National Institutes of
Health; that the raw data was at that time in the form
of microfilm and was being stored in a Maryland bank
vault; and that Dr. Cooper was informed that Dr. Klimt,
the director of the coordinating center, believed that the

9

data are protected from disclosure under Maryland law
(A. 68-69). Nevertheless, all records in the NIAMDD’s
files on the University Group’s grants and study were
released to counsel for the petitioners, with two
deletions that they have not challenged (A. 66-67).

On September 30, 1975, the petitioners filed suit
against the respondents, the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Assistant
Secretary for Health, the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, the Director of the NIAMDD, and Dr. Christian
R. Klimt, Director of the Division of Clinical Investiga-
tion at the University of Maryland School of Medicine
and director? of the coordinating center for the
University Group (A. 1, 3-11). The petitioners sought an
order directing the respondents to produce the raw data
of the University Group study which respondents may
have possessed or to which any of the respondents may
have had a right of access. The petitioners also
requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment
that they were entitled to these records and perman-
ently enjoin the respondents from refusing to produce
them (A. 10). On October 31, Dr. Klimt filed a motion to
dismiss and a motion to quash service of process, and
on November 21, the federal respondents filed a motion
to dismiss and in the alternative a motion for summary
judgment. The petitioners responded on December 5
with a motion for summary judgment.

On February 5, 1976, the district court entered an
order denying the petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment and granting the respondents’ motions to
dismiss. Considering the various motions and the entire

2 In July 1978, Dr. Genell L. Knatterud, Deputy Director of
the Division of Clinical Investigation, became the principal
investigator for the coordinating center. Dr. Klimt, however,
is a co-investigator, and he remains the Director of the
Division of Clinical Investigation, Department of Epidemiol-
ogy and Preventive Medicine of the University of Maryland
School of Medicine.

o~ >

10

record in the case, the court found that no official or
employee of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the National Institutes of Health, the NI-
AMDD, or the FDA was then.or had ever been in
possession of the raw data of the University Group
study, that the raw data were the property of the
individual investigators and the coordinating center
and remained in the possession, custody, and control of
the coordinating center, chat neither the individual
investigators nor the coordinating center was an
agency within the purview of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, and that, consequently, the raw data were not
agency records subject to disclosure under the Act (A.
180-81).

The petitioners appealed this order to the court of
appeals on February 27, 1976. On July 11, 1978, the
court issued its opinion and judgment affirming the
district court’s order. Relying on United States v.
Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976), the court held that persons
or institutions that receive grants from the federal
government do not on that account become government
agencies. Further, citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132 ‘1975), the court concluded that the
Freedom of Information Act did not impose upon
federal agencies the obligation to exercise whatever
rights of access they may have to the raw data to
obtain the raw data to which they have access and to
supply them to the general public. The court held that
the general public may only demand a record that a
federal agency has created or has obtained in the course
of doing its work. 587 F.2d at 1136. The court also
concluded that the policy considerations presented by
the petitioners did not authorize it to extend the
Freedom of Information Act beyond the federal agen-
cies and agency records to which it applies. Moreover,
the court discussed the policy considerations for not
applying the Act to the records of federal grantees, e.g.,

11

the importance of preserving the autonomy of private
and state entities conducting research.

Judge MacKinnon authored a short concurring
opinion. In this opinion, he stated: “The plain implica-
tion derived from the language of the statute is that it
does apply to records which belong to the agency or are
in its possession—that is, records which the agency has
created or obtained.” 587 F.2d at 1139. Judge MacKin-
non rejected the approach of the dissent because under
it the interpretation of the statute would turn upon
what a federal judge considered a significant degree of
federal involvement. 587 F.2d at 1140.

Judge Bazelon, dissenting, would have applied the
Act to the University Group’s raw data. In his view, the
federal funding for the University Group, the govern-
ment’s right of access to the data, and the government’s
reliance upon the University Group’s study established
a significant degree of federal involvement with the raw
data, and that therefore this federal involvement
converted the data into agency records. 587 F.2d at
1140.8 ,

3 The petitioners have presented to this Court numerous
allegations of fact unsupported by any evidence in the record.
The petitioners have done this in three ways. They have
made bare assertions without citing any sources for these
assertions. See, e.g., petitioners’ brief at 4 (the amount of
grants to the University Group); 12 (concerning petitioners’
knowledge about an earlier draft of the report of the
Biometric Society); 32 n.39 (concerning liaison officers to the
University Group); 32-33 (concerning a policy advisory
board); and 39 (details of the conduct of the FDA audit). The
petitioners also cite documents and sources not in the record
and not provided by the petitioners. See, e.g., petitioners’
brief at 16 & n.i7 (letter dated January 5, 1977 from Neil L.
Chayet to J. Richard Crout, M.D. ); 22 & n.30 (telegram from
American Medical Association Executive Vice President
James H. Sammons, M.D., February 2, 1979); 41 n,48 (letter
from Dr. Christian R. Klimt to Dr. Crout, March 1, 1976); 53-
54 (two memoranda of telephone coversations concerning the
FDA audit and a letter from Dr. Crout to Dr. Klimt). Further,
the petitioners have included in an appendix to their brief

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552
(1976), first enacted by Public Law No. 89-554, 80 Stat.
383 (1966), provides that all federal executive agencies
are to make available to any person agency records
unless those records fall within one of nine exceptions.
§ 552(a)(3). The Act also provides a judicial remedy for
an‘ person who believes that the agency is improperly
withholding “agency records”. § 552(a)(4)(B). “Agency
records” are those records made or received by any
federal agency, that is, any documents and other
similar material within the possession or day-to-day
control of a federal agency.

The raw data that the petitioners seek are not the
records of any federal agency. They are the property of
the participating private and state medical schools and

documents which are not in the record and have cited these
documents at 16, 17 & n.18 and at 36 n.42).

Many of these putative facts concern events that preceded
the petitioners’ complaint or the district court’s hearing on
the parties’ motions, and the petitioners could have intro-
duced into the district court proceedings evidence supporting
these allegations. The respondents then would have had an
opportunity to review and question any of these allegations
or to place them in their proper context. The respondent
believes that the petitioners’ attempt to bring these allega-
tions before this Court now is improper. However, the
respondent also believes that all of these allegations, as well
as the allegations of facts not found in the record but recited
in secondary sources cited by the petitioners, are essentially
irrelevant, and they do not contradict the undisputed facts
upon which the district court’s order was based. Accordingly,
the respondent will not attempt to refute these allegations.

The respondent does not mean to suggest by his silence on
these matters that he accepts the accuracy of the allegations
or the implications that can be derived from them. In fact, he
rejects these allegations and the implications that the
petitioners attempt to draw, and he urges that this Court do
the same. Nevertheless, even if all of these allegations were
true, the respondent believes that they would not change the
outcome in this case.

13

hospitals that comprise the University Group. The
University Group, and not any agency of the federal
government, possesses the raw data and has day-to-day:
control over them. Because neither the University
Group nor its participating institutions are federal
executive agencies, the data are not agency records.
Furthermore, federal funding of the University Group’s
study, federal access to the University Group’s records,
and federal reliance upon both the University Group’s
published findings and a limited audit of some of the
data do not make the University Group or its participat-
ing schools and hospitals federal agencies, and they do
not change the raw data into the records of any federal
agency.

The application of the Act to “agency records” and
the definitions of “agency” demonstrate that Congress
did not intend the Act to apply to a private or state
recipient of federal funds or to its records. Indeed, the
legislative history of the 1974 amendments states that
the definition of agency does not include entities that
receive federal appropriations but that are not con-
trolled by the federal government. The language of the
Act and its legislative history is consistent with federal
court decisions holding that the federal government
does not control a private or state institution because it
provides it with federal funds and that such institutions
are not federal agencies. Consequently, federal funding
does not make the records of such entities “agency
records’.

Congress’ choice of words requiring an agency to
“make available” the records in its possession or
subject to its control and the crafting of a judicial
remedy for the improper “withholding” of such records
expresses its intent that agencies need not use whatever
rights of access that they may have to the documents of
private and state entities in order to comply with a
request under the Act. This intent has been recognized

14

by the Attorney General’s contemporaneous construc-
tion of the Act and by many courts, including this
Court. Such right of access or even the exercise of the
right does not amount to possession of records still in
the hands of private or state entities or control over
those entities or their records. Thus, this access does not
transform the raw data into agency records.

Finally, that a federal agency may have relied upon
both the published findings of the University Group’s
study and an audit of some of the raw data does not
make the raw data “agency records”. The University
Group and its participating institutions have retained
day-to-day control of their raw data. In relying upon
published findings, the federal government did not
obtain possession of the raw data, and in conducting a
limited audit of some of the raw data, the federal
government did not exercise control over the raw data
or take such control away from the University Group.

Congress deliberately chose to apply the Aet only to
records in the possession or direct control of federal
agencies. Those individuals and organizations that
must deal with the federal government know that their
records are not subject to the Act unless the federal
government obtains possession of their records or
exercises such control over them or their records as’to
make them, in effect, federal agencies. Petitioners’
argument, however, would obliterate these expectations.
If the petitioners were to prevail, then every individual
and every private and state entity that receives federal
funds or that is subject to federal audit, or every non-
federal individual or body whose work product may be
relied upon by the federal government would in effect
become federal agencies, and their records would be

15

subject to access by any person. It is clear that
Congress intended no such result.‘

ARGUMENT

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPLIES ONLY TO
RECORDS IN THE POSSESSION OR DIRECT CONTROL
OF FEDEF AL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.

«he petitioners present to this Court a strained
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. They
argue that the federal “involvement” with the Univer-
sity Group makes the data of the University Group’s
private and state medical schools and hospitals
“agency records” under the Act. This “involvement”
consists: of the funding by the NIAMDD of the
University Group’s research study, the NIAMDD’s
alleged right of access to all of the University Group’s
data, and the unquantified reliance by the FDA on the
published findings of the study, the Biometric Society
committee report, and the FDA’s limited audit of the
raw data. The respondent suggests, however, that the
specific language of the Act, in the context of commonly
understood conventions of language and principles of
law, expresses the specific as well as the general intent

4 The issues in this case are distinct from those in
Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
No. 78-1088, and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press v. Kissinger, No. 78-1217 (U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16,
1979). Those cases involve the issues of whether transcripts
of telephone conversations of former Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger are personal notes not subject to the
Freedom of Information Act or are agency records under the
Act, and whether the district court has jurisdiction to compel
an agency to obtain records not in its possession because it
had physical possession of them at one time. In this case, the
NIAMDD and the FDA never had physical possession of the
raw data that the petitioners seek. Moreover, the raw data
were created by nongovernmental scientists and physicians
working at state and private institutions, unlike the trans-
cripts in the Kissinger cases, which were created by a

government official on government time a ar use of
government facilities. /

16

that, notwithstanding any putative federal “involve-
ment” with the University Group, the Act does not
apply to the raw data that the petitioners seek.

The Act requires “each agency, upon any request for
records,” to “make the records” available. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1976). If the agency does not comply with
the request, a court may enjoin the agency from
withholding “agency records” and may order the
production of “agency records improperly withheld’. 5
U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B) (1976). Thus, the Act applies only
to “agency records”.

Although the Act does not contain a definition of
“agency records”, standard usage and commonly
understood principles of the English language provide
the meaning. “Agency records” means records of an
agency. The records of an agency are the records that
an agency creates, possesses, or directly controls.

This definition directly follows the earlier congres-
sional definition of records in the Records Disposal Act
of 1943, 57 Stat. 380 (1943). When Congress adopted the
Freedom of Information Act, the Records Disposal Act
contained the following definition of “records”:

{T]he word “records” includes all books, papers,
maps, photographs, or other documentary mate-
rials regardless of physical form or characteristics,
made or received by an agency of the United States
Government in pursuance of federal law or in
connection with the transaction of public business
and preserved or appropriate for preservation by
that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence
of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,

17

procedures, operations or other activities of the
Government or because of the informational value
of data contained therein.

44 U.S.C. § 366 (1964) (emphasis added). This definition
has been recodified with only insignificant changes in
44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).

In interpreting the Freedom of Information Act
shortly after its passage, the Attorney Genera! cited
this definition of records and concluded that the Act
refers “only to records in being and in the possession or
control of an agency.” Attorney General’s Memoran-
dum on the Public Information Section of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 23-24 (1967) [cited in this brief as
Attorney General’s Memorandum], reprinted in Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Source Book, S. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 194, 222 (1974) [cited in this brief as Source Book].
Although Congress has amended the Act three times, it
has yet to question the Attorney General’s reference to
the definition of records in the Records Disposal Act of

5 Although this definition contains two elements, that is,
whether the documents are (1) made or received by an agency
and (2) preserved or appropriate for preservation by that
agency, the important element for purposes of the Freedom of
Information Act is the first. Government documents made or
received by an agency that are not appropriate for preserva-
tion are “nonrecord materials”. 41 C.F.R. §101-11.401-
3(d)(1978). See also brief for federal parties in Kissinger v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, No. 78-1088,
and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v.
Kissinger, No. 78-1217, (U.S., cert. granted Apr. 16, 1979), at
39-42. In this case, the Court need not reach the question of
whether “nonrecord materials” are “agency records” within
the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, because the
raw data that the petitioners seek are not documents “made
or received” by a federal agency.

18

1943 or to change his interpretation of the meaning of
“agency records’”’.6

Similarly, this Court has recognized the plain mee
of “agency records”. In summarizing the salient
features of the Act in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978), the Court stated that the
Act “requires that records and material in the posses-
sion of federal agencies be made available on demand
to any member of the general public” (emphasis added).
See also Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671, 673 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) (stating that the
Act applies to “all records and information in agency
possession’), aff’g Nichols v. United States, 325 F.
Supp. 130, 137 (D. Kan. 1971) (holding that “the Court
may not require production of records not in custody or
control of an agency”).

The University Group’s raw data are not the records
of the federal government or any federal agency. The
raw data that the petitioners seek are not contained in
the records of the NIAMDD, the FDA, or any other
agency in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and were not created by any agency, officer, or
employee of the department. They have never been in
possession of any officer or employee of the department
(A. 54, 57, 68, 69, 143, 147, 148). The raw data are the
property of the individual investigators and the

6 See also Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 19, 89 Stat. 158 (1975), which
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 24, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78x (1976) (emphasis added), as follows:

(a) For purposes of section 552 of Title V, the term
“records” includes all applications, statements, reports,
contracts, correspondence, notices, and other documents
filed with or otherwise obtained by the Commission
pursuant to this chapter or otherwise.

The purpose of this amendment was to make all documents
filed with the Commission agency records for purposes of the
Act and to provide that the Act governed all requests for
these documents. S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-
37 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
179, 313-14.

19

University Group and are not owned by any agency of
the federal government (A. 147). The University Group
has not submitted any raw data to the federal
government (A. 148). The FDA performed a limited
audit of some of the University Group data, see 43 Fed.
Reg. 52,732 (1978), and any documents or records that
the FDA collected or created in this audit have been
turned over to the petitioners (A. 202). In addition, all
other documents and records in the possession of the
federal government (with two deletions not challenged
by the petitioners) have been turned over to the
petitioners (A. 143, 202).

Faced with these facts, the petitioners have con-
structed an argument that the raw data are agency
records because various federal agencies have had some
involvement with the University Group’s study. How-
ever, this involvement—funding of the study and access
to certain records of the University Group by the
NIAMDD and reliance by the FDA upon published
findings and a limited audit—cannot transform the raw
data into agency records unless the federal government
has possessed the raw data or has caused the Univer-
sity Group’s participating medical schools and hospi-
tals to become federal agencies. As the respondent
demonstrates, the factors that the petitioners cite, either
separately or in combination, do not produce such a
transformation. See Ciba-Geigy v. Mathews, 428 F.
Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), (rejecting identical argu-
ments raised by Ciba-Geigy, a manufacturer of phenfor-
min.)

I.

THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS DOES NOT MAKE
THE UNIVERSITY GROUP AN AGENCY OR ITS
RAW DATA AGENCY RECORDS.
When the Freedom of Information Act was first
passed by Public Law No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966),
and codified as part of the United States Code by Public

20

Law No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967), it did not contain a
definition of “agency”. Because the Act is an amend-
ment to the original section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the definition of “agency” in the
Administrative Procedure Act applies to it. That
definition states:

“{Algency” means each authority of the Govern-

ment or the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency... .

5 U.S.C. §551(1) (1976).

The federal courts have interpreted this definition of
agency to mean any administrative unit of the federal
government “with substantial independent authority in
the exercise of specific functions”. Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Office
of Science and Technology was an agency of the federal
government and hence was subject to the Freedom of
Information Act). It has also been interpreted to mean
any federal entity with authority in law to make
decisions. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238,
248 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that initial review groups
consisting of non-governmental consultants are not
agencies within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act and hence are not subject to the Act). See
generally Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the
Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 4-13 (1970).

Because certain federal entities, such as the United
States Postal Service, attempted to avoid complying
with the Act by claiming that they were not agencies
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act
in 1974 to include a broader definition of “agency”.
Section 552(e) now states:

21

For purposes of this section, the term “agency”
as defined in section 551(1) of this title includes
any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled
corporation, or other establishment in the executive
branch of the Government (including the Executive
Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency.

As House Report No. 93-876 explained, “the definition
of ‘agency’ has been expanded to include those entities
which may not be considered agencies under § 551(1) of
title 5, U.S. Code, but which perform governmental
functions and control information of interest to the
public.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 8,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 6267,
6274. Thus, in addition to entities in the executive
branch of government which have authority to make
decisions, the definition of “agency” also includes
corporations which are subject to substantial federal
control over their day-to-day operations. Rocap uv.
Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 177, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding
that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was
an agency within the meaning of section 552(e)).

The University Group does not fall within any of
these definitions of agency. It is not an establishment
in the executive branch or an independent regulatory
agency. It was not created by federal law or by any of
the federal agencies. It has no authority to make
decisions. It exercises no power of the federal govern-
ment. It is not a government corporation or a govern-
ment controlled corporation. It is subject to no more
control by the federal government than many other
private or state institutions.

The University Group consists of twelve private and
state medical schools and hospitals and a coordinating
center at the University of Maryland. The physicians
and scientists at the various participating institutions,

22

and not any agency of the federal government,
originated the continuing clinical study conducted by
the University Group. The only involvement of any
agency of the federal government in the study was the
NIAMDD’s reviewing the design, methods, and objec-
tives of the study, granting research funds to the
University Group, and reviewing periodic reports
submitted by the University Group (A. 146). The FDA
was not involved in its planning, inception, or design
(A. 146). The University Group, and no agency of the
federal government, had full responsibility for the
management of its day-to-day operations (A. 147).

The sole function of the University Group has been to
conduct a clinical research study. It has analyzed the
data from the clinical study and from time to time has
published its conclusions about that data. At no time
has it purported to make any governmental decisions or
to exercise any governmental authority. Nor has it ever
considered itself an agency of the federal government.
For these reasons, the University Group is not an
agency of the federal government within the meaning
of the Act. See Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792,
302 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1276), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977) (holding that the
National Academy of Sciences and its committee on
motor vehicle emissions, private entities which con-
tracted with the government to conduct studies, are not
agencies within the meaning of the Act); Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 526-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (holding that the University Group is not an
agency within the meaning of the Act). See also Kerr v.
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 426
U.S. 394 (1976) (holding that the California Adult
Authority is not an agency subject to the Act).

That the University Group was funded completely by
federal grants does no alter this conclusion. As

23

Conference Report No. 93-1200 on the 1974 amendments
indicates, Congress did “not intend to include [in the
definition of agency] corporations which receive ap-
propriated funds but are neither chartered by the
Federal Government nor controlled by it, such as the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.” Conf. R. No. 93-
1200, 938d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285, 6293. See also Lombardo
v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D.D.C. 1975), aff’d
mem., 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977).

The language that Congress did use in defining an
agency and the conclusion that a federal agency does
not include a private or state recipient of federal funds
that is not controlled by the federal government are
consistent with a number of decisions of this Court and
other federal courts. For example, this Court held in
United: States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976), that a
community action agency funded under the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 was not a federal instrumental-
ity or agency for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims
Act. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that
the determinative question was not whether the
community action agency received federal money and
must comply with federal standards and regulations,
but whether its day-to-day operations were supervised
by the federal government. The Court noted that the
federal government spent billions of dollars on projects
performed by people and institutions under contracts
with the federal government and that federal funding
affected innumerable activities of local and state
government and of private institutions. The Court
stated, “It is inconceivable that Congress intended to
have waiver of sovereign immunity follow congres-
sional largesse and cover countless unidentifiable
classes of ‘beneficiaries’.” 425 U.S. at 816. Finally, the
Court observed that the federal government did not
control the “detailed physical performance” of all the

24

programs and projects that it finances by gifts, grants,
contracts, or loans. 425 U.S. at 816. See also Maryland
v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965) (holding that
civilian caretakers of aircraft owned by the United
States and assigned to the Maryland Air National
Guard were state, not federal employees, even though
the caretakers were paid from federal funds and were
required to comply with federal standards); Greenya v.
George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556, 559-62
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that federal funding of a
university without any federal involvement
in the actual management of the funded program, and
the existence of a contract between the university
and the federal government to teach government
employees at government facilities did not make the
university a governmental agency subject to the first
and fifth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion); Spark v. Catholic University of America, 510 F.2d
1977 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that the receipt of federal
funds did not convert a private university into an
agency of the federal government for purposes of
federal question jurisdiction); Wahba, v. New York
University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
the receipt of federal funds by a university and by
the chairman of the Biochemistry Department who
was conducting a research project funded by the
National Institutes of Health did not transform the
university or the chairman into governmental actors for
purposes of the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution).

There is nothing in the Act’s legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended the Act to apply to the
recipients of federal grants. The Act did broaden the
public’s rights to obtain records of federal agencies so
that the public may be informed about what its
government is doing. See generally S. Rep. No. 813,
89th Cong., lst Sess. 2-3, 5, 10 (1965), reprinted in
Source Book 36, 37-38, 40, 45; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th

25

Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 12 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2429; 112 Cong. Rec.
13,641 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss). Nevertheless, all
of the examples of the unwillingness of federal officials
to make available even the most innocuous records
(such as a telephone book) that led to the Act’s passage
involved records that were in the possession of a federal
agency, not in the possession of a recipient of a federal
grant. See H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-5, [1966] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23; Freedom of Information,
Hearings on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in part) before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. passim (1963) [cited in this brief as 1963 Senate
Hearings]; Federal Public Records Law, Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 89th Cong., lst Sess. passim (1965)
[cited in this brief as 1965 House Hearings]. Even after
the Act took effect, Congress’ focus remained upon
providing access to government records and the
reluctance of federal agencies to give up documents in
their possession. See Executive Privilege, Secrecy in
Government, Freedom of Information, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations and the
Subcomms. on Separation of Powers and Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. passim (1973) [cited in
this brief as 1973 Senate Hearings].

It is reasonable to expect that, had Congress intended
the Act to apply to private and state recipients of
federal grants, it would have directed some attention to
the significant implications of such an application, that
is, the effect upon private and state institutions
receiving federal grants and upon the federal govern-
ment’s program of supporting research through grants.
In the context of research grants, such an application
would conflict with one of the major principles of

26

academic freedom—that a scientist be free to investi-
gate an area, to locate data, to interpret that data, and
to decide whether and when to publish the results of his
investigations without the fear of interference or
harassment by outside agents. See generally Machlup,
On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Free-
dom, 41 A.A.U.P. Bull. 753 (1955), reprinted in Ameri-
can Association of University Professors, Academic
Freedom and Tenure, 177, 178 (L. Joughlin ed. 1967).
See also Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths,
28 L. & Contemp. Prob. 487, 489-90 (1963). However, if
the Act applied to a research grant recipient, any
member of the public could require a private or state
researcher to open up his files before he has finished
gathering or analyzing his data or publishing his
findings. Thus, his research efforts could be subjected to
harassment, misappropriations, or premature disclo-
sures by outside interests motivated» by financial,
emotional, or philosophical considerations.

This prospect also raises serious questions about the
federal effort to support research. Prominent physicians
and scientists may not be willing to accept federal
grants for research if others with a particular financial
or ideological stake in the subject matter of the research
could have ready access to the research documents
under the Act. Thus, a decision to apply the Act to
recipients of research grants requires a careful weigh-
ing of the benefits and detriments to the conduct of
scientific research in the United States and the role of
the federal government in this research, as well as a
thorough airing of the many conflicting interests
attending these issues.

On a larger scale, the extension of the Act to
recipients of federal grants raises issues of federalism,
for the states receive a large number of grants totallpng
billions of dollars. Many states have their own acts
requiring varying degrees of disclosure of state records.

a oe

27

Maryland, for example, has determined that a custo-
dian of records, such as Dr. Klimt, may deny access to
the specific details of research projects conducted by a
state institution and shall deny access to hospital
records relating to medical care and other medical
information. Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §§ 3(b)(iii) &
3(c)(vii) (1978). To the extent that the Maryland statute
and other state statutes conflict with the Federal
Freedom of Information Act, the application of the
Federal Act to Maryland and other state agencies
receiving federal grants would either make those
agencies ineligible for grants or would abrogate the
Maryland and other state statutes.

The proper forum for resolving these policy issues is,
of course, Congress and not a court. If Congress had
intended the Act to apply to federal grantees, then it
would have addressed the policy questions. Certainly,
Congress was aware of the tremendous amount of
money it has appropriated for grant programs. In 1966,
the year the Act was adopted, Congress appropriated
approximately $808 million to the National Institutes of
Health for medical research, which included almost
$675 million in the form of grants and contracts for
research at nonfederal institutions. U.S. Dep’t of
Hee’th, Education, and Welfare, Resources for Medical
Research, Report No. 10 at 9 (1967). For the fiscal year
July 1, 1966-June 30, 1967, the federal government
budgeted approximately one and one-half billion dollars
for basic research at universities and colleges through
grants and contracts. Bureau of the Budget, Special
Analyses of the United States Budget, 1967, at 116-17.
For that fiscal year, grants to state and local govern-
ment totaled 14.5 billion dollars. Id. at 137.

Furthermore, during the hearings in 1972 on the
operation of the Act, John F. Sherman, Deputy Director
of the National Institutes of Health, described the
mission of the National Institutes of Health in detail

28

and the mechanism by which the Institutes awarded
research grants. Dr. Sherman advised the subcommit-
tee that the National Institutes of Health planned
expenditures in fiscal year 1972 of $792 million for
research grants and $232 million for research and
development contracts. Significantly, Dr. Sherman and
the subcommittee were concerned not about informa-
tion and records in the possession of the grantees or
contractors but about the information submitted by the
grantees and contractors to the Institutes, that is,
whether that information in the possession of the
Institutes should be subject to disclosure under the Act.
U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations
and Government Information of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 9)
3617, 3627,,3629 (1972) [cited in this brief as 1972 House
Hearings}. :

Congress has not been reluctant to impose obliga-
tions and conditions upon the recipients of federal
grants. It has by statute imposed requirements that
grant recipients keep books and establish accounting
systems and that they be subject to audits. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 295h-5 (1976) (grants concerning allied health
professions, enacted in 1965); 42 U.S.C. § 2835 (1976)
(grants relating to the prevention and treatment of
alcohol abuse and alcoholism, enacted in 1970).

It has also subjected grant recipients to federal
requirements on matters of social policy not related to
handing out and accounting for grant money. For
example, in 1964, Congress imposed upon all recipients
of federal grants an obligation not to discriminate
against any person on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in the utilization of federal funds. 42

U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). In addition, one author has listed |

at least eighteen additional statutes imposing condi-
tions, apart from the requirements of the statutes

ne eee Se Dee ene eee een Seen

29

creating the grant program, upon the expenditure of
federal grant moneys. Madden, Future Directions for
Federal Assistance Programs: Lessons from Block
Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36 Fed. B.J. 107, 115 n.48
(1977). If Congress had wanted to extend the reach of
the Act to records of grant recipients, it knew how to do
so.

Consequently, the language of the Act, its legislative
history, and the authorities that have interpreted and
applied it require one conclusion. Because the federal
government did not exercise day-to-day control over the
activities of the private and state organizations
comprising the University Group, the receipt of federal
research grants by those organizations does not
transform them into federal agencies subject to the Act
or their records into agency records. These same
considerations also lead to the conclusion that the
NIAMDD’s right of access to certain records or the
FDA reliance upon the University Group’s published
findings and a limited audit do not transform these
organizations into agencies or their records into agency
records.

Il.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT DOES NOT IMPOSE
ANY AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION UPON FEDERAL AGENCIES
TO OBTAIN DATA FROM PRIVATE OR STATE ENTITIES.

The Freedom of Information Act requires each
agency, upon any request for its records, to “make the
records promptly available to any person”. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1976). By this language, Congress did not
intend to enact an information retrieval system. Its
goal was simply to require federal agencies and federal
employees to provide the documents that they had in
their possession to any person who requests those
documents. See pages 16-17 and 24-25 above. Neither
the language of the Act nor its legislative history
suggests that a federal agency must exercise whatever

30

auditing rights it may have and must obtain documents
from private or state entities in response to a request for
records. In short, the words “to make. . . available” do
not mean “to obtain from outside of the government
and make available”.

The enforcement provisions of the Act support this
conclusion. Section 552(a)(4)(B) states:

On complaint, the district court of the United
States ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the
production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant.

“Withhold” means “to hold back’’, “to keep back or in
one’s possession”. Webster’s New International Diction-
ary 2941 (2d ed. 1953). If Congress had intended that
federal agencies must acquire documents not in their

possession in response to a request, Congress would not

have limited the district court’s power to (1) enjoining
federal agencies from “keeping” agency records in their
possession, and (2) ordering the production of records
improperly kept in their possession.

The language that Congress chose accurately reflects
its goal to make available to the public documents in
the possession of federal agencies. None of the in-
stances of agency reluctance to give access to agency
records that motivated Congress to pass the Act
involved a refusal by an agency to exercise its auditing
powers and obtain documents not in its possession. See
generally H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-5 [1966], U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23; 1963 Senate Hearings
passim; 1965 House Hearings passim; 1972 House
Hearings passim; 1973 Senate Hearings passim.

The Attorney General’s interpretation of the Act
recognizes this specific intent:

The requirement of this subsection [5 U.S.C.
§ 552(3)] imposes no obligation to compile or
procure a record in response to a request.

31

Attorney General’s Memorandum at 23-24, Source Book
at 222-23. Similarly, this Court and other federal courts
have given effect to this plain meaning of the Act. In
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 182, 161-62
(1975), this Court stated:

The Act does not compel agencies to write
opinions in cases in which they would not
otherwise be required to do so. It only requires
disclosure of certain documents which the law
requires the agency to prepare or which the agency
has decided for its own reasons to create.

See also Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) (holding that the Act
does not require a federal agency to produce missing
records and that the United States Army complied with
the Act when it made available all of the requested
Army records that were extant); Linker v. Hills, 453 F.
Supp. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the
Securities Exchange Commission diligently searched
missing records and exhibited good faith in assuring
that upon locating these records it would make them
available and therefore its failure to produce the
missing records was not an improper withholding
under the Act); Disabled Officers’ Association uv.
Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 459 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding
that the Act obligates an agency only to produce
nonexempt records which it presently has and hence
the court should not order the Secretary of Defense to
provide in the future the names and addresses of
officers who will be retired with a disability).

Since the publication of the Attorney General’s
Memorandum, Congress has amended the Act three
times. The two most recent amendments came after this
Court’s decision in Sears. Yet, Congress has not
changed the Attorney General’s interpretation or the
holding of this Court in Sears. If Congress wished to
change the plain import of the Act and the Attorney

32

General’s and this Court’s interpretation, then Con-
gress would have done so.

Congress most likely did not extend the Act to the
records of private or state entities that are subject to
audit by the federal government because of the drastic
impact that such action would have on private and
state entities. There are few activities in today’s society
that are immune from federal auditing powers.’ In
addition, the application of the Freedom of Information
Act to private and state organizations subject to federal
audit would abrogate many state public information
policies as expressed in state statutes and would violate
the reasonable expectations of many private persons
and organizations that their records are not subject to
disclosure to the world at large, but only to one or more
particular federal agencies which will only exercise
their auditing powers when they need to do so to carry
out their functions. If Congress had intended the Act to
have so broad a reach, it would at the very least have

7 The following statutes are merely an example of the
federal government’s broad powers to require that private
and state entities keep records, to demand access to those
records, and to acquire the records of private or state entities:
I.R.C. § 7602, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976) (any taxpayer or
potential taxpayer); 42 U.S.C. §§7414, 7616 (1977) (any
person who owns an emission source or is subject to the
Clean Air Act or any recipient of assistance under that Act);
15 U.S.C. §§78q, 78u (1976) (any person subject to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 12 U.S.C. § 1906 (1976) (any
person subject to the Credit Control Act); 20 U.S.C. §584
(1976) (state education agency responsible for administering
state plans under the National Defense Education Act of
1958); 20 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976) (institutions of higher education
and other public and private nonprofit library institutions
receiving grants for the acquisition of library resources); 21
U.S.C. §§ 355, 357 (1976) (persons engaged in manufacturing
drugs or introducing drugs into interstate commerce); 33
U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1361 (1976) (the owner or operator of any point
of discharge and any recipient of financial assistance under
the Clean Water Act of 1977); and 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976) (each
visi. subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970).

PO ae a Ml a nO ge a re tO me tine 38

Pe a al

33

considered the interests of these private and state
entities before acting.

In the instant case, the NIAMDD has a right to audit
certain records of the University Group. 45 C.F.R.
§ 74.24 (1978). The FDA did a limited audit of the data
for 150 patients. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,732, 52,733 (1978). Any
documents that the FDA created or obtained in the
course of the audit have been turned over to the
petitioners (A. 202). The purposes of the Act have been
served well.

Because the Act imposes no obligation upon a federal
agency to acquire records in response to a request for
records and because the Act only applies to records in
the possession or day-to-day control of a federal agency,
the petitioners’ argument fails. Neither the NIAMDD’s
putative right of access or the FDA’s limited audit of
some of the data amount to sufficient possession or
control of the data to make the data ageficy records.
Similarly, the right of access and a limited audit does
not make the University Group’s participating schools
and hospitals federal agencies.* The University Group
created the data and it possesses and controls them.
The federal government does not. The University Group
controls its day-to-day activities. The federal govern-
ment does not. Here, the data are not subject to the Act.

Ill.

RELIANCE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UPON THE
UNIVERSITY GROUP STUDY DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE RAW
DATA OF THE STUDY INTO FEDERAL AGENCY RECORDS.

The petitioners argue that the FDA and the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare have brought the
raw data of tne University Group’s study under the

8 There is nothing in the record or in the petitioners
unsubstantiated allegations in their brief to suggest that the
University Group has served as a data haven to subvert the
Act.

34°

Freedom of Information Act because in taking certain
regulatory actions they have relied upon the published
findings of the study, upon the published report of the
committee of the Biometric Society, and upon the
limited FDA audit of some of the data. They assert that
this alleged reliance is tantamount to reliance upon the
raw data and hence that the raw data have been
absorbed into the regulatory process.

This argument founders for a number of reasons. In
the first place, reliance upon published findings of a
study is not reliance upon the unpublished raw data
generated by that study. The published findings result
from the efforts of the University Group’s private and
state investigators to analyze the data, to organize
them in patterns that the investigators deem approp-
riate, and to draw conclusions from them. These
findings cannot be equated with the raw data any more
than a legal brief can be equated with all of the facts
and legal authorities that a lawyer may gather in
preparing the brief.° Similarly, a limited audit of some
of the data (see 43 Fed. Reg. 52,732, 52,733 (1978)) and
reliance upon that data or upon the audit does not
“absorb” all of the data into the FDA regulatory
process. Accordingly, neither reliance upon published
findings nor the FDA’s limited audit of some of the data
and its reliance upon that audit can reasonably be
deemed to create possession of or control over all of the
data. In short, neither the FDA nor any other agency of
the federal government has ever obtained possession of
the raw data or ever exercised day-to-day control over
the data or the University Group. Therefore, they are
not agency records.

® The distinction between published findings and the data
underlying those findings was specifically recognized by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs in the administrative
proceedings for the withdrawal of approval of new drug

POs ety en

a at ees a ete

ee ee ee

35

Moreover, even if reliance upon published findings
and a limited audit were the same as reliance upon the
raw data—or, even if the FDA were to inspect every one
of the millions of documents in the University Group’s
possession and were to attempt to rely upon those
documents for any regulatory action without acquiring
them—the Act would still not apply to the raw data.
Such inspection and reliance are not possession of the
data and are not sufficient control over the data to
make them agency records. FDA’s attempt to rely upon
the raw data as a basis for regulatory action may not be
valid. That, however, is of no concern here.

It follows that the petitioners’ reliance argument is in
reality an argument that the federal government should
have obtained all of the raw data. This of course raises
the issue of whether the materials relied upon are
substantial evidence upon which regulatory decisions
may be based. For example, whether the published
findings of the University Group’s study and the other
material relied upon by the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs in proposing the relabeling for all oral hypogly-
cemic drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975), are sufficient to
support the proposed relabeling is an issue which must
be considered first by the Commissioner and second by
any court to which the final decision of the Commis-
sioner may be appealed. It is not an issue before this

applications for phenformin hydrochloride. Proposal to
Withdraw Approval of New Drug Applications for Phenfor-
min Hydrochloride (FDA final decision Nov. 15, 1978)
reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967, 20,969 (1979). In his final
order withdrawing such approval the Commissioner noted
that the record in the withdrawal proceedings contained
nearly 400 articles published in the medical literature, none
of which were accompanied by the raw data upon which they
were based. The Commissioner also observed that the
University Group’s study was relied upon in those proceed-
ings in the same way as the other articles. Accordingly, the
Commissioner did not accept the petitioners’ assertions that
the administrative law judge erred in admitting the Univer-
sity Group’s study into evidence.

36

Court and it has never been an issue in this case.
Indeed, in considering this issue, the court of appeals
stated that its holding that the raw data are not agency
records raised no implications about the petitioners’
ability to obtain the data in the proceedings before the
FDA. 587 F.2d at 1134.

The petitioners’ argument that reliance makes private
and state records federal agency records under the Act,
aside from having no basis in the language of the Act,
fails for another reason. This argument contradicts one
of Congress’ main goals in passing theAct: to establish
clear and simple guidelines for determining what
records are to be made available and to whom.
Congress provided that “agency records” should be
made available to “any person”. These words replaced
the elastic and uncertain standards in the original
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act.!° That
section contained such vague phrases as “matters of
official record”, “persons properly and directly con-
cerned”, and “confidential for good cause”, which were
difficult to apply and which federal agencies used as
grounds for withholding federal documents. See S. Rep.
No. 813 at 5, Source Book at 40; H.R. Rep. No. 1497 at 4-
5, [1966] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2422-23. The
test put forth by the petitioners would inject into the
interpretation of the Act an equally elastic and
uncertain standard. There is no way to determine how
much reliance would be necessary before this metamor-
phosis of private and state records into federal agency
records happened. Moreover, this standard would

10 This section stated:

(c) Public Records. — Save as otherwise required by
statute, matters of official record shall in accordance
with published rule be made available to persons
properly and directly concerned except information held
confidential for good cause found.

Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), formerly codified in 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (1964).

a a Dn tN re Rint mses a SAO ee Ld bnew —

Re ee

37

inextricably entangle the interpretation of the Act with
the collateral administrative proceedings in which the
federal agency’s reliance occurred.!!

Finally, the reliance test is inappropriate because it
attempts to incorporate into the Act consideration of
the need for records as a criterion for determining
whether those records are “agency records”. The
petitioners allege a tremendous need for acquiring the
raw data. Petitioners’ brief at 28, 52. This putative need
derives solely from the reliance by the FDA and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare upon the
published findings of the University Group study. The
petitioners in effect argue that, when the government
relies upon the published findings of a study, or a
portion of the raw data generated in the study—that is,
when the government creates a perceived need in
certain persons fqy,all of the data—then all of the data
become “agency records” under the Act, even though
those data are the records of private and state entities.
On the other hand, under the petitioners’ argument, if
there is no reliance and hence no need, then those
private or state records do not become agency records.

11 The difficulty in applying such a test is illustrated by the
administrative proceedings for the suspension and withdraw-
al of approval of new drug applications for phenformin. On
July 25, 1975, the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare suspended the approval of new drug applications for
phenformin because the drug posed an imminent health
hazard. The Secretary based this decision upon reports to the
FDA of deaths due to lactic acidosis, data submitted by drug
companies and hospitals, reports from other countries, and
the published findings of the University Group study. Order
of the Secretary Suspending Approval of New Drug Applica-
tions for Phenformin, NDA 11-624, 12-752, 17-126, 17-127,
(DHEW July 25, 1977).

At the same time, the FDA began the hearings on the
permanent withdrawal of approval of the new drug applica-
tions. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,959 (1977). After the hearings, the
administrative law judge issued an initia! decision, in which
he ruled that the University Group’s study could not be
substantial evidence in the proceedings but could form the

38

It is clear that Congress did not intend this result.
The Act eliminated the requirement that the person
requesting documents demonstrate a need for those
documents. See S. Rep. No. 813 at 5, Source Book at 40;
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10
(1975); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 86 (1973); Columbia Packing Co. v. United
States Department of Argiculture, 563 F.2d 495, 499 (1st
Cir. 1977); Robles v. Environmental Protection Agency,
484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973). The need for
documents arising out of regulatory proceedings is
similarly irrelevant. The Act was intended to be a
disclosure statute, not a discovery statute. NLRB uv.
Sears, 421 U.S. at 143 n.10; e.g.; Renegotiation Board v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974);
Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 563 F.2d at 499, 500.

Consequently, whether and to what extent the federal
government has relied upon the published findings of
the University Group does not alter the plain import of
the language of the Act. A person may obtain “agency
records”. “Agency records” are the records that an
agency has created or acquired or that it possesses. Just
as federal funding of the study that generated the

basis for expert testimony and for consideration of the safety
of phenformin. Proposal to Withdraw Approval of the New
Drug Applications for Phenformin Hydrochloride, Docket No.
77N-0150, (FDA initial decision Feb. 8, 1978), reprinted in 44
Fed. Reg. 20,977, 20,979 (1979). The Commissioner of Food
and Drugs adopted this decision with some modifications.
Proposal to Withdraw Approval of New Drug Applications
for Phenformin Hydrochloride (FDA final decision Nov. 15,
1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967 (1979). In doing so, the
Commissioner stated that he did not consider the University
Group’s study in reaching his final decision and that he was
not adopting the references to the study in the substantive
portions of the initial decision. 44 Fed. Reg. at 20,979. See
also 44 Fed. Reg. 20,966, 20,966-67 (1979) (denial of petition of
reconsideration of final order). Thus, the FDA’s reliance upon
the published findings of the University Group has varied
from some reliance to no reliance.

39

records or federal access to the records is not equivalent
to possession of the records or control over the
University Group sufficient to make it a federal agency,
federal reliance—by itself or in conjunction with federal
funding and federal access—is not possession of the
data or control over the University Group. The raw data
that petitioners seek are not agency records.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the respondent requests that this
Court affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and
hold that the raw data generated by private and state
institutions that conduct a research project funded by
federal grants are not agency records within the
meaning of the Act and that the Act does not impose an
obligation upon federal agencies to acquire these
private or state records simply because the federal
government may have access to them or may have
relied upon published reports based on them.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN H. SAcus,
Attorney General
of Maryland,
Davip H. FELDMAN,
Assistant Attorney General,
Chief of Litigation,

{ THOMAS E. PLANK,

Assistant Attorney General,

1400 One South Calvert Building,

Baltimore, Maryland 21202,
(301) 383-3737

Attorneys for Respondent
' Dr. Christian R. Klimt.

August 31, 1979

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0052%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.
