# Appendix — Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0035%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 448 U.S. 607

## Text

~ Supreme Court US
| FILE a

APPENDIX | MAY 18 1979

MICHAL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

Nos. 78-911 and 78-1036

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO,

Petitioner
=f)

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Petitioner
|

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED DECEMBER 7,
1978 (NO. 78-911) AND DECEMBER 26, 1978 (NO. 78-1036)
CERTIORARI GRANTED FEBRUARY 21, 1979

Oe

“Se aaa Ywisntmae?

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1979

Nos. 78-911 and 78-1036

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner

—V_ —

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,
Petitioner

—

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court *
Page

ETF aa ae) eRe IRN Cm er OTL mE Ne 1

Petition for Review Filed By The American Petroleum Insti-
tute In the Court of Appeals, No. 78-1253 (selected as a
representative example of the petitions filed) 000000000000... 12

Carcinogen Assessment Group, Preliminary Report on Popu-
lation Risk to Ambient Benzene Exposures (appended to
agency brief in court of appeals, June 8, 1978, as Adden-
yh ASTER BPE ERT OS ao (Es Melick Vee ene EBS NPE Bea 15

* The opinion of the court of appeals appears in the separate
appendix to the petition in No. 78-911. Copies of the briefs on the
merits filed in the court of appeals have been lodged with the Clerk.

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
Page
Affidavit of Dr. Steven H. Lamm (appended to API’s reply
brief in the court of appeals, June 19, 1978, as Appendix
RRS ee A LL RTD EP A AE RO TR LNG ee AIR rd ome 30
Judgment of Court of panne 1 EES SARIE YL 2 Ret TRE SED Ro SP OT 37
ry: aE rs ss sepeagustibionsedecnenennes 38

Proceedings Before the Agency *

Excerpted Testimony of Drs. Douglas Smith and Laigo of
NIOSH, July 25, 1977 (Tr. 859-860) ..0....0..... ec eeeeeeeeeeeee 40

Excerpted Testimony of Dr, Richard Zeckhauser, July 29,
1977 (Tr. 2104-2112, 2141-2144, 2149-2154, 2156-2160,

2167-2169, 2180-2182, 2188-2190) 2... eee 40
Testimony of Dr. Howard Maibach, August 3, 1977 (Tr.
SCSI T CR A we Bee earner do Sead en Sy Gee ee EON UO 58

Excerpted Testimony of Dr. Richard Wilson, August 4, 1977
(Tr. 2701-2711, 2721-2723, 2732-2742, 2753-2755, 2772-
EERE IE RN R Oe EN E SE ETCEIN CR ON ORE 97

G. L. Conca and A. Maltagliati, “Study of the Percutaneous
Benzene Absorption,” Med Lavoro 46:194-198, 1955 (list
of references omitted) (OSHA translation) (Exh. 2-46) **.. 95

A. N. Cesaro, “Is Percutaneous Benzene Absorption Possi-
ble?”, Med Lavoro 37:151-156, 1946 (list of references
omitted) (OSHA translation) (Exh. 2-47) 2000000000... 101

J. Hanke, T. Dutkiewixz, and J. Piotrowski, “Absorption of
Benzene Through the Sxin in Man,” Med Pracy 12:413-426,
1961 (list of references omitted) (OSHA translation)

cos 5 Aaa a neee ds UPd orien Ue OY a reat NL FEES A ON a 107
Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability on the

Proposed Benzene Standard (Exh. 41-28) 00000000000... 121
Written Statement of Dr. Richard Zeckhauser (Exh.

RR RRIND, TALLER RENE AS has SERVER | Du SVR UREN AP AA PST CI aE 134

* The benzene standard and the Secretary’s statement of reasons
for adopting the standard, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), appear in the
separate appendix to the petition in No. 78-911 at 34a-25la. The
materials printed in this appendix do not constitute the entire
administrative record compiled during the proceedings on the ben-
zene standard, now on file in the Clerk’s office. To facilitate its use,
the parties have lodged a typewritten index to the administrative
record with the Clerk.

** Diagrams and graphs in this and other studies were omitted
in printing but are available in the administrative record on file
with the Clerk.

———

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

Written Statement of Dr. Howard I. Maibach, July 11, 1977
(omieiite omitted) CHEER. BRO) oon... cnc cscicciccescccessesscesseceise

Written Statement of Dr. Richard Wilson (Exh. 149.B)
DG ALI Lee Tr CA cd, A LD

(The following materials are from
the administrative record for the
amendment to the benzene standard )

Excerpted Cross-examination of Grover Wrenn, snd 23,
ge _ sR RENER LO ELCRN SUC FD AAaee Oe

Excerpted Testimony of Dr. Roger W. Strassburg (The B. F.
Goodrich Company), May 23, 1978 (Amend. Tr. 126-137,
iar ES Rtg MEAL ANE Lg inks SS 8 EL ASR SO Re ar

Excerpted Testimony of Mr. Roy N. Johnson (The General
Tire & Rubber Company), May 23, 1978 (Amend. Tr.
RE Ett iea TOaY TAPE UL Ss Me CALPE A WOR WANTS Lice: Oke USE RA ;

Rubber Manufacturers Association (“RMA”) Motion for
Stay, March 10, 1978, with attached OSHA statement
(omiates) CAmsené. Bum. SE-F-8) .......-2-.-....02..............-.......

Affidavit of James R. Sankey (The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company), March 8, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-2) 00000000...

Affidavit of Roger W. Strassburg (The B.F. Goodrich Com-
pany), March 9, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-2)

Affidavit of Robert E. Rehm (The General Tire & Rubber
Company), March 9, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-2)

Affidavit of Roy N. Johnson (The General Tire & Rubber
Company), March 9, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-2) 0...

Supplementary Affidavit of James R. Sankey (The Goodyear
Tire & Rubber ere March 28, 1979 (Amend. Exh.
EARNER ea ince Ay A APP OO Ob Se ERO Jane aT

Affidavit of Robert W. Laundrie (The General Tire & Rubber
Company), March 29, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-3)

Secretary of Labor’s Supplemental Opposition To Petitioners
Request For Stay Pending Judicial Review, April 12,
1978, cover page and page 67 (Amend. Exh. 32-A-3) .

Affidavit of N.A. Daigle (The Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company), April 13, 1978 (Amend. Exh. 32-F-4)

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roger W. Strassburg (The
B. F. Goodrich Company), April 13, 1978) (exhibits
omitted) (Amend. Exh. 32-F-4) 0...

Amendment to Benzene Standard and Accompanying State-
ment of Reasons, 43 Fed. Reg. 27962 (June 27, 1978) _...

180

187

197

202

205

209

216

222

224

227

230

232

234

1 .
RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
[Title of court omitted in printing]

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE ET AL.
v. OSHA ET AL., NO. 78-1253

Feb. 2, 1978 Petition for review

March 18, 1978 Order granting motion of Manufacturing
Chemists Association, The American Iron And Steel
Institute, and Chemical Specialties Manufacturers for
leave to intervene. (LRM) (Also filed in 78-1257).

March 21, 1978 Order granting motion of the Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO to intervene (Also filed in
78-1257).

April 18, 1978 Order continuing temporary stay entered on
3/13/78 pending disposition of petitions for review. Fur-
ther granting motion of Independent Petroleum Associa-
tion of America for leave to intervene. Further peti-
tioners’ motion to consolidate is granted.[*] Further the
motion to dismiss petition of review filed by Am. Petro-
leum in No. 77-1973, API, et al v. OSHRC is carried with
the case. Further the motion to correct captions in 78-
1253 and 78-1257 is granted.

June 22, 1978 Case argued.

June 23, 1978 Respondents’ letter dtd 6/22/78 with copy of
amendments to the benzene standard issued June 27,
1978. (CE) (Also filed in consolidated cases).

June 30, 1978 Petitioners’ letter dtd 6/30/78 with “pro-
ducer” petitioners’ supplemental memorandum which
addresses amendment to benzene standard and copy of
Federal Register notice announcing amendment. (CE)
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

[*] This order consolidated cases nos. 78-1253, 1257, 1486,
1676, 1677, 1707, 1745, and any other cases seeking review
of the benzene standard later transferred to the Fifth Circuit.

2

July 7, 1978 Order granting motion of petitioners, the Rub-
ber Manufacturers Association, Inc., et al and the Arm-
strong Rubber Company, et al. to filed amended petitions
for review. (JPC-CC-GBT).

July 11,1978 Filing Secretary of Labor’s motion to adjourn
present supplemental briefing schedule and to set new
briefing schedule on the merits of the amendment to the
benzene standard.

July 12,1978 Filing Response of Rubber Companies and Du
Pont in opposition to motion to adjourn briefing schedule,
etc.

July 14,1978 Order denying the Secretary of Labor’s motion
to adjourn present supplemental briefing schedule. Court
does not desire briefs designed to enable it to reach the
merits of the new standards. (CC) (Also filed in con-
solidated cases).

August 4, 1978 Filing Motion of Manufacturing Chemists
Association petitioner in No. 78-1988, to file amended
petition for review. (Filed in consolidated cases).

August 4, 1978 Filing contingent motion of Manufacturing
Chemists Association to defer briefing dates on the
merits of the liquid mixture exemption amendment to
the benzene standard. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of the American Iron and
Steel Institute to file amended petition for review in No.
78-1745. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of the American Iron and
Steel Institute to defer briefing on the merits of the
liquid mixture exemption amendment to the benzene
standard (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the Manufactur-
ing Chemists Association to file an amended petition
for review; further order granting the contingent mo-
tion of Manufacturing Chemists Association to defer
briefing on the merits of the liquid mixture exemption
amendment to the benzene standard (CC) (Also filed
in consolidated cases).

3

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the American
Iron and Steel Institute to file amended petition for
review in No. 78-1745; further order granting motion
of American Iron and Steel Institute to defer briefing
on the merits of the liquid mixture exemption amend-
ment to the benzene standard. (CC) (Also filed in
consolidated cases).

August 14, 1978 Motion of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.
to file amended petition for review. (Also filed in con-
solidated cases).

August 18, 1978 Order granting motion of E.I. DuPont de

Nemours and Company to file an amended petition for
review.

October 5, 1978 Opinion and Judgment.

THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE AND THE
NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS, ET AL. v.
OSHA ET AL., NO. 78-1257

[The relevant docket entries for No. 78-1257 are the same
as'for No. 78-1253 except that the petition for review
was filed a day later (February 3, 1978) and the docket
for No. 78-1257 omits the entries for April 18 and July
7, 1978, shown above for No. 78-1253.]

THE RUBBER MANUFACTUERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ET AL. v. EULA BINGHAM, ET AL., NO. 78-1486

March 6, 1978 Petition to review and set aside an order of
the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA filed [in the
Sixth Circuit, No. 78-3114].

March 9, 1978 Order granting motion of petitioners to

transfer this cause to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1486 and made the following entries :]

March 13,1978 Filing order of the Sixth Circuit transferring
their docket No. 78-3114 to the 5th Circuit.

4

April 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO, to intervene. (LRM)
(Also filed in 78-1676, 78-1677, and 78-1707).

May 5, 1978 Filing respondents’ motion to reschedule argu-
ment. Denied JPC.

June 22, 1978 Case argued.

June 23, 1978 Filing respondents’ letter dtd 6/22/78 with
copy of amendments to the benzene standard issued June
27, 1978. (CE) (Also filed in consolidated cases).

June 27, 1978 Filing motion of petitioners in Nos. 78-1486
and 78-1677 to file amended petitions for review.

June 30, 1978 Filing petitioners’ letter dtd 6/30/78 with
“producer” petitioners’ supplemental memorandum which
addresses amendment to benzene standard and copy of
Federal Register Notice announcing amendment. (CE)
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

July 7, 1978 Order granting motion of petitioners, the
Rubber Manufactuers Association, Inc, et al, and the
Armstrong Rubber Company et al, to file amended peti-
tions for review. (JPC-CC-GBT) (Also filed in 78-1677).

July 11,1978 Filing Secretary of Labor’s motion to adjourn
present supplemental briefing schedule, and to set new
briefing schedule on the merits of the amendment to the
benzene standard.

July 14,1978 Order denying the Secretary of Labor’s motion
to adjourn present supplemental briefing schedule. Court
does not desire briefs designed to enable it to reach the
merits of the new standards. (CC).

July 24, 1978 Order granting motion of Chemical Speciali-
ties Manufacturers Association for leave to intervene
(CC).

August 4, 1978 Filing motion of Manufacturing Chemists
Association, petitoner in No. 78-1988, to file amended
petition for review. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 4, 1978 Filing contingent motion of Manufacturing
Chemists Association to defer briefing dates on the merits
of the liquid mixture exemption amendment to the ben-
zene standard. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

5

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of the American Iron and
Steel Institute to file amended petition for review in No.
78-1745. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of American Iron and Steel
Institute to defer briefing on the merits of the liquid
mixture exemption amendment to the benzene standard.
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the Manufactur-
ing Chemists Association to file an amended petition for
review; further order granting the contingent. motion of
Manufacturing Chemists Association to defer briefing on
the merits of the liquid mixture amendment to the ben-
zene standard. (CC) (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the American
Iron and Steel institute to file amended petition for re
view in No. 78-1745; further order granting motion
of American Iron and Steel Institute to defer briefing
on the merits of the liquid mixture exemption amendment
to the benzene standard. (CC) (Also filed in consolidated
cases).

August 18, 1978 Order granting motion of E.I. duPont de
Nemours and Company to file an amended petition for
review. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

October 5, 1978 Opinion and Judgment.

E. Il. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. v. OSHA ET AL.,
NO. 78-1676

March 10, 1978 Petition for review of an order of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, received March 10, 1978, filed [in the
Third Circuit, No. 78-1290]. (10 cc) Service attached.

March 31, 1978 Order (Aldisert and Adams, C.J.) granting
the motions by petitioner for expedited consideration of
“petitioner’s Motion for Transfer” and to transfer Peti-
tion for Review to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit filed.

6

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1676 and made the following entries: ]

April 3, 1978 Filing Order of the Third Circuit transferring
their docket No. 78-1290 to the 5th Circuit.

April 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO, to intervene. (LRM).
(Also filed 78-1486, 78-1677 & 78-1707).

May 5, 1978 Filing Respondents’ motion to reschedule argu-
ment. Denied JPC.

June 22,1978 Case argued.

June 23, 1978 Filing respondents’ letter dtd 6/22/78 with
copy of amendments to the benzene standard issued
June 27, 1978. (CE) (Also filed in consolidated cases).

June 30, 1978 Filing petitioner’s letter dtd 6/30/78 with
“producer” petitioners’ supplemental memorandum which
addresses amendment to benzene standard and copy of
Federal Register Notice announcing amendment. (CE)
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

July 11,1978 Filing Secretary of Labor’s motion to adjourn
present supplemental briefing schedule, and to set new
briefing schedule on the merits of the amendment to the
benzene standard.

July 14,1978 Order denying the Secretary of Labor’s motion
to adjourn present supplemental briefing schedule. Court
does not desire briefs designed to enable it to reach the
merits of the new standards. (CC) (Also filed in consoli-
dated cases).

August 4, 1978 Filing motion of Manufacturing Chemists
Association, petitioner in No. 78-1988, to file amended
petition for review. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

August 4, 1978 Filing contingent motion of Manufacturing
Chemists Association to defer briefing dates on the merits
of the liquid mixture exemption amendment to the ben-
zene standard. (Also filed in consolidated cases).

7

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of the American Iron and
Steel Institute to file amended petition for review in No.
78-1745. (also filed in consolidated cases).

August 7, 1978 Filing motion of American Iron and Steel
Institute to defer briefing schedule on the merits of the
liquid mixture exemption to the benzene standard. (Also
filed in consolidated cases).

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the Manufactur-
ing Chemists Association to file an amended petition for
review; further order granting the contingent motion
of Manufacturing Chemists Association to defer briefing
on the merits of the liquid mixture exemption amend-
ment to the benzene standard (CC) (Also filed in con-
solidated cases).

August 11, 1978 Order granting motion of the American
Iron and Steel Institute to file amended petition for re-
view in No. 78-1745; further order granting motion of
American Iron and Steel Institute to defer briefing on
the merits of the liquid mixture exemption amendment
to the benzene standard (CC) (Also filed in consolidated
cases).

August 18, 1978 Order granting motion of E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. to file an amended petition for review.
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

October 5, 1978 Opinion and Judgment.

THE ARMSTRONG RUBBER COMPANY AND
UNIROYAL, INC. v. EULA BINGHAM, ET AL., NO. 78-1677

March 6, 1978 Filed Petition for review [in Second Circuit
No. 78-4034].

March 27, 1978 Filed Order granting motion to transfer
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1677 and made the following entries: ]

8

April 3,1978 Filing Order of the Second Circnit transferring
their docket No. 78-4034 to the 5th Circuit.

[The remainder of the relevant docket entries made by
the Fifth Circuit in No. 78-1677 are identical to those
beginning April 11, 1978, by the Fifth Circuit in No.
78-1676. ]

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
ET AL., NO. 78-1707

1978 Petition for review filed.

[The remainder of the relevant entries for No. 78-1707
are identical to those shown for No. 78-1676 beginning
with the entry for April 11, 1978, with the exception
that the docket in No. 78-1707 omits the entry for July
11, 1978.]

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE, ET AL. v.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL., NO.
78-1745

April 3, 1978 Petition for Review of an order of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration United States
Department of Labor, received April 3, 1978, filed [in the
Third Circuit as No. 78-1388]. (6 cc) Service attached.

April 7, 1978 Order (Aldisert and Adams, C.J.) granting
petitioners’ motion for transfer of Petition for Review to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
filed.

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1745 and made the following entries:]

April 10,1978 Filing Order of the Third Circuit transferring
their docket no. 78-1388 to the 5th Circuit.

{The remainder of the relevant entries for No. 78-1745
are identical to those shown for No. 78-1676, beginning
with the eutry for May 5, 1978, with the exception that
the docket in No. 78-1745 omits the entry for July 11,
1978. ]

9

MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION
v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., NO. 78-1988

March 30, 1978 Petitioner’s petition for review of an order
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(m-30) [filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 1287].

May 5, 1978 Per curiam order granting petitioner’s motion
to transfer this case to the Fifth Circuit; Bazelon and
Leventhal, CJ’s.

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1988 and made the following entries :]

May 8, 1978 Filing order of the District of Columbia Circuit
transferring their docket No. 78-1287 to the Fifth Circuit.

June 22,1978 Case argued.

June 30, 1978 Filing petitioners’ letter dtd 6/30/78 with
“producers” petitioners’ supplemental memorandum
which addresses amendment to benzene standard and
copy of Federal Register Notice announcing amendment.
(CE) (Also filed in consolidated cases.)

July 14,1978 Order denying the Secretary of Labor’s motion
to adjourn present supplemental briefing schedule. Court
does not desire briefs designed to enable it to reach the
merits of the new standards. (CC) (Also filed in con-
solidated cases).

[The remainder of the entries for No. 78-1988 are identi-
cal to those beginning with August 4, 1978, for No. 78-
1676, except that the docket for No. 78-1988 omits the
entry for August 11, 1978, granting motion of AISI to
file amended petition and to defer briefing on amend-
ment. ]

10

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION ET AL., NO. 78-1989

April 4, 1978 Petitioners’ petition for review of an order of
the OSHA (m-4) [filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 1308].

May 3, 1978 Per Curiam Order granting Petitioners’ motion
for transfer and this case is transferred to the Fifth
Circuit: Bazelon and Leventhal, CJ’s.

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-1989, and made the following entries:]

May 8, 1978 Filing Order of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit transferring their docket no. 78-1308 to the 5th
Circuit.

June 22,1978 Case argued.

July 14,1978 Order denying the Secretary of Labor’s motion
to adjourn present supplemental briefing schedule. Court
does not desire briefs designed to enable it to reach the
merits of the new standards. (CC) (Also filed in con-
solidated cases).

August 18, 1978 Order granting motion of E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. to file an amended petition for review.
(Also filed in consolidated cases)

October 5,1978 Opinion and Judgment.

November 1, 1978 Order consolidating this appeal with 78-
1253, et al (CC).

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO v.
DR. EULA BINGHAM, ET AL., NO. 78-2642

July 11, 1978 Petitioner’s petition for review of order of
the Dept. of Labor (p-10) [filed in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
No. 1644].

July 26, 1978 Per curiam order granting petitioner’s motion
to transfer and this case is to be transferred to the
USCA for the 5th Circuit as promptly as the business
of office permits; CJ Wright and McGowan, CJ.

POSTER GS see

11

[After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the case
No. 78-2642 and made the following entries :]

August 1, 1978 Filing order of the District of Columbia
Circuit transferring their docket no. 78-1644 to the
5th Circuit.

August 18, 1978 Order granting motion of E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. to file an amended petition for review.
(Also filed in consolidated cases).

October 5,1978 Opinion and judgment.

November 1, 1978 Order consolidating this appeal with 78-
1253 et al (CC).

THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE AND THE
NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS ASSOCIATION, ET
AL. v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, ET AL, NO. 78-2779

August 18,1978 Petition for review filed.
October 5,1978 Opinion and judgment.

THE ADHESIVE AND SEALANT COUNCIL, INC.
v. EULA BINGHAM, ET AL, NO. 78-3023

[This case was filed in the Fourth Circuit on August 18,
1978, and transferred to the Fifth Circuit on September
11, 1978. The record does not include the Fourth Circuit’s
docket entries but does disclose the filing and transfer
dates. After transfer, the Fifth Circuit renumbered the
case No. 78-3023, and made the following docket entries :]

Sept. 18, 1978 Filing Order of the Fourth Circuit transfer-
ring their docket no. 78-1544 to the Fifth Circuit.

October 5,1978 Opinion and Judgment.

November 1, 1978 Order consolidating this appeal with 78-
1253 et al. (CC).

12

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-1253

THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

Vv.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Pursuant to Section 6(f) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), The Ameri-
ean Petroleum ‘Institute, the National Petroleum Re-
finers Association on behalf of their respective members,
and American: Petrofina, Incorporated, Cities Service
Company, Continental Oil Company, Delta Oil Company,
Exxon Corporation, Gulf Oil Company, Husky Oil Com-
pany, Marathon Oil Company, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell Oil Company, South
Hampton Oil Company, Standard Oil Company (Indi-
ana), The Standard Oil Company (Ohio), Sun Oil Com-
pany of Pennsylvania, Sun Oil Company of Delaware,
Texaco Inc., Union Oil Company of California, U.S.A.
Petrochem Corporation, and Williams Pipe Line Com-
pany, hereby challenge the validity of, and petition this
Court for review of, the Permanent Standard for Oc-
cupational Exposure to Benzene released by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, Department of
Labor, on February 2, 1978.

The Permanent Standard for Occupational Exposure
to Benzene challenged by this Petition supplants and
replaces the Emergency Temporary Standard for Occu-
pational Exposure to Benzene (42 Fed. Reg. 22516) pre-
viously challenged by the same petitioners in American
Petroleum Institute, et al. v. OSHA, et al., No. 77-1973,
presently pending before this Court.

13

By this Petition, the above captioned petitioners also
challenge OSHA’s procedural regulations dealing with the
official time for issuance of agency actions (29 C.F.R.
§ 1911.18(d), 42 Fed. Reg. 65166) on the ground that
such regulations may be invalid and inconsistent with
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Industrial Union Dept.
AFL-CIO, et al. v. Bingham, et al., Nos. 77-1395, 77-
1516 which retransferred API, et al. v. OSHA, et al.
(No. 77-1973) to this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Gene W. Lafitte
J. Berry St. John, Jr.
John M. Wilson
of
Liskow & LEWIS
50th Floor—One Shell Square
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139
(504) 581-7979

Edward W. Warren
Robert F. Vanvoorhees
Arthur F. Sampson

of
KIRKLAND, ELLIS & ROWE
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 857-5000

Counsel for Petitioners
February 2, 1978.

14

[The following document was appended to
the agency brief in the court of appeals]

CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT GROUP’S
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
POPULATION RISK TO AMBIENT
BENZENE EXPOSURES

This document is being released by
EPA for external review

Roy E. ALBERT, M. D.
Chairman

wo ow ais esi
aed

~~ = """PARTICIPATING MEMBERS

Elizabeth L. Anderson, Ph. D.
I. Nathan Dubin, M. D.
Richard N. Hill, M.D., Ph. D.
Robert E. McGaughy, Ph. D.
Lakshmi C. Mishra, Ph. D.
Ruth Pertel, Ph. D.

Wade T. Richardson, J. D.
Todd W. Thorslund, Se. D.

STAFF ASSISTANT
Claudia Slacik

sia aol LS re ote

15
[Table of Contents Omitted in Printing]

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF POPULATION RISK
TO AMBIENT BENZENE EXPOSURES

I Summary

There is substantial epidemiological evidence that ben-
zene is a human leukemogen. However, no validated ani-
mal model has yet been developed for benzene as a car-
cinogen. There are several large series of case reports
indicating a high risk of leukemia in individuals who
developed aplastic anemia consequent to benzene expo-
sure. In addition there are a number of epidemiological
studies in the rubber and shoe industries that demon-
strate an excess risk of leukemia. From the standpoint
of making quantitative estimates of the leukemia risk

- “associated with current general population exposures to

benzene in the United States there are only two epi-
demiological studies that provide some estimates of both
exposure to benzene and data on the occurence of leu-
kemia. These studies are by Infante (3) and by Ott,
et al. (5).

The Infante study, which showed an excess incidence
ia, is not yet completely analyzed. Hence, some
(ptions have had to be made about the average dura-
and magnitude of exposures. For this reason, this

w#eport should be considered as preliminary. The Ott
f study indicated no excess leukemia risk with relatively
- well-documented exposures.

The results of the Infante study were used as the basis
for an extrapolation of the leukemia risk to the low levels
of general population exposure, which averages one part
per billion (4). A linear non-threshhold model was used
for the extrapolation; such a model is expected to give
an upper limit to the estimated risk. Using this extra-
polation model, and using the leukemia rates observed
in the cohort of workers exposed to benzene over a period
of about 30 years (in the Infante study), we estimated
that the number of cases of acute myelogenous and my-
onocytic [2] leukemia per year in the general population

\
16

due to ambient atmospheric benzene is somewhere be-
tween 30 and 80 cases. The lifetime risk to an individual
continually exposed to benzene at a level of 1 ppb is
estimated to be between 10° and 2.5 x 10°, depending on
which exposure assumptions are made in the Infante
study. The risk from individual sources of benzene emis-
sions ranges from about 10° to 5 x 10°. The Ott study,
which reported no excess leukemia risk, is consistent with
the Infante study on statistical grounds given their rela-
tive exposures. However, the negative results of the Ott
study suggest that the level of calculated risk in the
general population is not likely to be higher than 10°
to 2.5 x 10°, but it could be lower.

[3] II Introduction

The Carcinogen Assessment Group (CAG) has been
asked by the Office of Air Quality Planning and Stand-
ards (OAQPS) to estimate the carcinogenic risk to the
United States population of ambient benzene concentra-
tions. This type of information is useful in judging the
overall contribution of benzene emissions to the national
rates of cancer mortality, and will be used by OAQPS
in the decision whether to regulate benzene.

As the primary basis for this estimation the CAG is
using the Infante (Infante, et al. 1977) mortality study
of workers exposed to benzene in the production of a
natural rubber cast film product. The reasons for this
choice are: (1) the worker exposures are said to have
_been almost exclusively restricted to benzene, since it is
used throughout the plant as the principal solvent in all
major processes; (2) the individuals in the cohort all
worked before 1950 and were followed until 1975, thus
allowing long latency diseases to be observed and (3)
acute myelogenous leukemia was observed, which is the
same cell type of leukemia observed in other studies
where workers have had known benzene exposures. The
disadvantages of relying on this study for determining
general population risks are (1) the authors essentially
give no estimate of worker exposures except to say that
the levels were less than the prevailing recommended oc-

17

cupational limits at the time various monitoring surveys
were made; (2) the cohort studied actually worked at
two separate plants (Akron and St. Mary’s, Ohio). Air
monitoring information in the former plant is almost
non-existent (Baier, 1977), and therefore the exposure
to half of the members of the cohort is almost completely
unknown. However, it is known (Young, 1977) that the
crude rates (leukemia cases/total people in the cohort)
are similar in the two [4] lecations; (3) Warren et al.
(1977) have claimed that over 400 workers known to be
exposed to low benzene levels were deliberately excluded
from the cohort.

In spite of these difficulties the Infante study is the
only one currently available which reports an excess rate
of leukemia among benzene-exposed populations. Another
occupational study (Ott, et al. 1977) of workers exposed
to benzene has documented the exposures relatively well
and reports no excess leukemia risk. The risk estimates
based on Infante’s study are used to calculate the num-
ber of cases expected in the cohort examined by Ott, et
al. If this is not significantly different than the observed
number of cases, the estimates are not grossly in error.
A more complete evaluation of the Infante study will be
possible after the authors have made a final evaluation
of their data. ,

III. Description of Infante Study

In a retrospective study of mortality among a cohort
of 748 white male workers in two Ohio plants manufac-
turing a natural rubber cast film product, Infante, et al.
(1977) observed a statistically significant higher rate of
leukemia than both of two control groups. The leukemia
mortality rate was 5.06 times higher than the general
U. S. white male population standardized for age and
time period of the cohort exposure, and 4.74 times higher
than a cohort of 1447 white males employed at an Ohio
fibrous-glass construction products factory. These results
were based on a 75% follow-up of the vital status of the
workers. A total of 160 deaths were observed and of
these there were 7 leukemia deaths four of which were

18

acute lyelogenous, one chronic myelogenous, and two
monocytic leukemia. The worker exposure information
is discussed in IV B below.

[5] IV. Analysis of Myelogenous and Monocytic Leu-
kemia Risks due to Benzene Exposures

A. General Approach

As was noted in the benzene health document (Gold-
stein, et al. 1977), very little information exists that
can be utilized to obtain a dose response relationship be-
tween benzene and leukemia in humans or animals.

However, if a number of simplifing assumptions are
made, it is possible to construct a crude dose response
model whose parameters can be estimated using vital
statistics, the Infante study, historical benzene workplace
standards, and a recent environmental benzene exposure
study. (Mara and Lee, 1977)

We assume that for low exposures the lifetime prob-
ability of death from leukemia may be represented by
the linear equation

P=a+ px

where a is the rate in the absence of benzene exposure
and x is the average lifetime exposure to atmospheric
benzene expressed in ppm. The term § is the change in
the leukemia rate for each increase of one ppm of ben-
zene in the air.

From the Infante, et al. study the relative risk of
leukemia for benzene workers compared to the general
population was obtained. We will denote this ratio as R
and niake the assumption that

R= R,=a+ B(x, +x,)
R, a+ BX,

where x, is the exposure of the general population to
benzene and x, is the industrial exposure to benzene.

19

[6] From our two assumptions we have the two linear
equations in two unknowns of the form

RR,=a~+ Bx, + BX,
R,=a~+ Bx,
so that
B=R, (R-1) /x,

and 8 x, is the average lifetime risk due to ambient
benzene exposures.

To utilize this technique to predict risk it is necessary
to obtain estimates of R,, R, X,, and X.. The estimation
of each of these quantities is discussed in a separate
section.

B. Estimation of Relative Risk R

Infante, et al. (1977) established as a lower bound a
total of seven acute myelogenous or monocytic cases of
leukemia in their studied cohort of 748 members. They
calculated an expected value of 1.3831 cases for all forms
of leukemia. From the 1971 U.S. Vital Statistics (U. S.
DHEW, 1971) we note that of 7,564 cases of leukemia
in white males, a total of 3,260 or 43% were myelogen-
ous or monocytic. Thus an estimate of the relative risk
for acute myelogenous and monocytic leukemia in white
males is

7
R= 1.3831 x0.43=11.77
[7] C. ESTIMATION OF BACKGROUND LEUKEMIA

RATE R,

The lifetime risk to a disease can be estimated from
age-specific deaths rates in the following manner. We
assume that during different segments of a lifespan the
total and disease specific death rates are constant. we
define the following terms:

aj=death rate due to a specific disease during the jt life-
time segment.

aj+ \j=total death rate during jt* lifetime segment.

S; length of j* lifetime segment.

=>

20

P,,=- ., = = probability of death due to the specific diseaes
4 aj*AJ given that death occurred during the jt life-
time segment.

P,,=1-e-(aj +Aj)S,= probability of death during the j®
lifetime segment given survival up
to the start of the jt lifetime seg-
ment.

Posed 1-P,,.) = probability of survival until the start of
k= the j' lifetime segment.

If we assume that the entire lifetime is divided into
m mutually exclusive segments then by definition P;,—1,
P.m==1 and the entire lifetime probability of the disease is

m

P=> P,; P.; Ps;

j=1

[8] The age specific rates for white males for myelo-
genous and monocytic leukemia were estimated from the
total leukemia rates by multiplying the entries in Table
I-13, disease categories 204-207, white male (U. S.
DHEW, 1971) by 0.43. This gives the entries j} shown
in Table 1. The total mortality aj + Aj is also obtained
from table I-13 and is shown in Table 1. The other terms
are calculated by the given definitions and the final result,
the lifetime risk of white males exposed to background
levels of benzene is found to be

R, =0.38987 x 102

TABLE 1

[9]

COMPUTATION OF LIFETIME RISK OF MYELOGENOUS-MONOCYTIC LEUKEMIA

.0000072_
.0000659
.0001348
.0000920
.0000983
.0001287
.0002287
.0005061
.00095 10
.0011108
0005752

Xs
.0038987

aj aj + Aj

Sj

Age
Intervals

rE

.9816

2

9785
9745

—

9621

9473
.9184
.8556
.7268
.5078

- -+- #+¢§ = + +

.3940x10-*

1,852.8

73
1.68
1.38

.2111x10"

79.6

1-4

5-14
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
74-85

85+

4042x10-

3407x100"

40.5
127.6
155.4
309.6

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

.7445x10

95
1.03
1.38
2.58
6.41

15.57
31.43
43.65

.6628x10-

.3049x10-

4457x107

.3640x10-2

708.7
1,632.0
3,586.1

.15058
30135
53919

3928x107

4342x107

4057x107

7,747.6
17,758.1

.2340

.2458x10

R, =0.0038987

22

[10] D. ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE AMBIENT BEN-
ZENE EXPOSURE

In a recent EPA contractor report (Mara and Lee,
1977), data relating to benzene exposure in the United
States was compiled. For each of several annual average
concentration ranges, the population exposed to seven
categories of benzene emissions was calculated. The seven
categories were: (1) chemical manufacturing, (2) coke
ovens, (3) gasoline service stations (separately for peo-
ple using self-service stations and for people living in the
vicinity of the stations), (4) petroleum refineries, (5)
solvent operations, (6) storage and distribution of ben-
zene and (7) urban exposures related to automobile tail-
pipe and gasoline tank emissions. The general procedure
used was to start with production data for benzene or its
major products, estimate emission factors (benzene re-
lease per kg of end product), apply an appropriate air
dispersion model to obtain concentrations as a function of
distance from the source, and to use population density
information for each location to calculate the number of
people exposed to each concentration range. Air monitor-
ing data were used whenever it was available. The re-
sults are summarized in Table 2. From this data one
can calculate that the annual average exposure of an indi-
vidual to ambient benzene from all sources is 1.03 ppb.

TABLE 2.

[11]

SUMMARY OF POPULATIONS EXPOSED (THOUSANDS) TO ATMOSPHERIC BENZENE EMISSIONS ¢

Gasoline Stations

Urban

Solvent
Operations Exposures

Petroleum
Vicinity Refineries

Coke Self
Mfg. Ovens Service

Chem.

Total
Population

(ppb)

Concen-
trations
0.042
0.50

37,000
7,497 15,726 87,000 6,529 208 68,337
45,353

37,000
185,297

23

31,000

301,684

0.5404 0.042 0.7627 0.5112 0.5465 0.8989

2.0885

0.7514

Population
Weighted
Averages
(ppb)

Average exposure to the population of 220 million is 0.7514 x 301,684=1.030 ppb

220,000

* Adapted from Mara and Lee (1977).

24

[12] E. ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE OCCUPATION-
AL EXPOSURE

Information about the plant benzene levels is contained
in the Appendix to the testimony of Baier at the OSHA
benzene hearings (Baier, 1977).

From the opening of the factory in 1940 until 1946,
no monitoring records were available. Following the in-
stallation of new ventilation equipment in 1946, a survey
showed that “most areas” in the plant ranged from 0 to
15 ppm and that all areas were less than the maximum
safe limit of 100 ppm which prevailed at that time. From
this information, one can guess that the average expo-
sure to all people in the plant before 1946 is probably
not much more than 100 ppm, and not less than 15 ppm.

Benzene levels were monitored after 1946 at various
plant locations but they were all instantaneous samples
and no reliable information is available about how many
man-hours were spent at those locations or whether pro-
tective masks were worn. These are case reports of ex-
posures of 1000 ppm for short time intervals. Since the
average levels were generally close to the occupational
standard, we will make the assumption that the average
worker exposure was the same as the prevailing recom-
mended occupational limits. These are tabulated below
along with the time weighted average for the 36 years
of the total exposure period.

Time Average Time-Weighted
Interval Exposure( ppm) Average(ppm)
1940-46 (7) 100-15

1947 (1) 50 39.9-23.3
1948-56 (9) 35
1957-68 (12) 25
1969-1975 (7) 10

[13] The actual levels to which the workers were ex-
posed was a subject of heated debate at the OSHA ben-
zene hearings. The CAG would like to see a realistic es-
timate of the population weighted average exposure and
its uncertainty limits. The time-weighted averages for
occupational exposure must be converted to a continuous
exposure life-time basis. It will be assumed that the

25

maximum likely lifetime exposure would result if a work-
er entered the factory in 1940 and was exposed to 82 ppm
for 10 years and 23.7 ppm for 25 years (which is equiva-
lent to an average of 40.36 ppm for 35 years) and the
least likely exposure would occur if a worker started in
1950 and was exposed to 23.7 ppm for 25 years. There-
fore the equivalent continuous lifetime exposures are:

High estimate: 40.36 x 240 x 1x 35=4.4 ppm

865 3 70
Low estimate: 23.7 x 240 x 1x 25=1.8 ppm
865 3 70

[14] F. CONCLUSIONS

Given the following derived estimates of our para-
meters of interest:

R =11.77

R, = 0.38987 x 10~
X, =1.030 x 10-** ppm
X,=1.8 to 4.4 ppm

the parameter @ and the resulting lifetime risks and ex-
pected number of acute myelogenous and monocytic leu-
kemia deaths can be derived in_the manner previously
indicated. In table 3 the average risk rates and expected
number of cases per lifetime and per year are shown for
total benzene exposure. In Table 4 the total rates and
cases are subdivided by source of exposure. We note that
about 85% of the total number of cases are directly re-
lated to the use of gasoline.

It should be emphasized that due to the very crude
methods that were necessarily employed in the estima-
tion of benzene exposures by both CAG for Infante’s
cohort and Mara and Lee (1977) for the U.S. population,
the estimates could easily be in error by several orders
of magnitude. This is true even if the form of the mathe-
matical response model used is a correct rescription of
benzene induced leukemia, which is also open to question.

However, an additional independent negative study of
workers exposed to benzene (Ott, et al. 1977, Dow Chemi-

26

cal Company) can be used to ascertain whether our
model, based on Infante’s data, grossly over-estimates
the leukemia risk to benzene exposure. They reported
the mortality [15] experience of a cohort of workers
whose exposure to benzene had been carefully documented
since 1940. No excess of leukemia was observed in the
cohort by 1973. Since the prediction model was previous-
ly discussed based upon workers with highly uncertain
exposures, it was felt to be important to estimate the
number of leukemia cases we might expect in Dow’s
cohort if our model was valid.

Using Dow’s exposure estimates and expected number
of cases for its workers, it was found that our model
predicted from 1.43 to 1.74 cases of leukemia where one
case was actually observed. Since this estimate is well
within the limits of normal statistical variability we can
be confident in claiming that the Dow study does not of-
fer any evidence upon which to question the validity of
our model.

of

Expected Number
Cases/Year

Lifetime
Exp. Leukemia
Cases in U.S.
2.177 ..

5,436

TABLE 8
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION RISKS TO BENZENE
Average Risk
BX,
.9897x10-"
.2471x10~

.4149x107/X,

.9609x107
.2399x10"

B

4.4 ppm
1.8 ppm

(X,)

Industrial

Exposure

* This represents about 1.2% of cases observed in 1971.

[16]
High

Low

1.8
499
211

37

81

2,456

**5 449

X,

85
15
865
32
1.2
982

Lifetime Expected
200

of Leukemia Cases

X,=4.4
**2,180

X,=1.8
5.00x10°°
1.30x10-°
1.01x10*
1.83x10-°
1.23x10-°
1.35x10°
2.16x10-°

Risk Rates

TABLE 4.
X,=4A4

2.x10°
5.19x10*
4.04x10°
7.33x10-°
4.91x10°°
5.41x10-°
8.64x10°

9.98
16.30
37.00

22

118.00
6.60

Population
Exposed
220.00*

113.69
* Does not sum due to multiple exposure.

Average

Level of
Exposure ppb. Millions

2.0885
5404
.042
.7627
5112
5465
8989
1.030

EXPOSURE FOR DIFFERENT SOURCES ~-
Source
of
Exposure

** This represents about 1% of the number of cases expected in a lifetime assuming current incidence
rates.

RISK AND LIFETIME EXPECTED NUMBER OF LEUKEMIA CASES DUE TO BENZENE

Self-Ser. Gas
Vicinity of
Gas Stations
Petroleum
Refineries
Solvent
Operations
Urban
Exposures

Coke Ovens
Stations

Chem. Mfg.
Total

[17]

29
[18] REFERENCES

1. Baier, E. J. “Statement of the National Institutes of
Occupational Safety and Health’, Exhibit 64A,
OSHA Benzene Hearings, July 19-Aug. 10, 1977.

2. Goldstein, B. D., C. A. Snyder, R. Snyder, R. and
S. R. Wolman, “Review of Benzene Toxicity,” pre-
pared for EPA, August 18, 1977.

3. Infante, P. F., J. K. Wagoner, R. A. Rinsky, R. J.
Young, ‘Leukemia in Benzene Workers,” Lancet, p.
76-78, July 9, 1977.

4. Mara, S. J. and Lee, S.S., “Human Exposures to At-
mospheric Benzene” EPA contract 68-01-4314 with
Stanford Research Institute, September, 1977.

5. Ott, M. G., J.C. Townsend, W. A. Fishbeck, R. A.
Langner, “Mortality Among Individuals Occupation-
ally Exposed to Benzene” Exhibit 154,,OSHA Ben-
zene Hearings, July 19-August 10, 1977.

6. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
“Vital Statistics of the United States, 1971, Volume
II-Mortality, Part A’, Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Stock No. 017-022-
00378-3.

Warren, E. W., R. F. Van Voorhee, A. F. Sampson,
“Post Hearing Brief of API, NPPA, and Individual
Member Companies Regarding the Proposed Revised
Permanent Standards for Occupational Exposure to
Benzene”, OSHA Docket No. H-059 September 22,
1977.

Young, R. J. National Institute of Occupational Safe-

ty and Health, Personal Communication, October,
1977.

39

[The following document was attached to the reply brief
of the American Petroleum Institute in the Court of
Appeals]

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN H. LAMM

I, Dr. Steven H. Lamm, being duly sworn, do state
and depose as follows:

1. I was graduated from the University of Southern
California in 1968 with the degree of Doctor of Medi-
cine. From 1968 to 1969, I held a rotating internship
at the University of-Oregon. From 1969 to 1970, I held
a residency in pediatrics at the Montreal Children’s Hos-
pital. From 1970 to 1972, I was employed by the United
States Public Health Service as an epidemiologist at-
tached to the Connecticut State Department of Health.
From 1972 to 1973, I was Senior Pediatrie Resident at
the Bronx Memorial Hospital, Albert Einstein School of
Medicine. From 1973 to 1974, I attended the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, in London,
England. From 1974 to 1976, I was Senior Epidemiolo-
gist at the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development of the National Institutes of Health. From
1976 to 1977, I was in private practice as a pediatrician
and as a consultant in epidemiology. From 1977 to the
present time, I have been an associate with Tabershaw
Occupational Medicine Associates.

2. I appeared as a witness for the Manufacturing
Chemists Association during the hearing held last sum-
mer by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) on the proposed standard for occupational
exposure to benzene. In the course of preparing my
testimony and attending the hearing, I became thoroughly
familiar with the evidence associating occupational ex-
posure to benzene with leukemia, particularly the study
conducted by Infante, et al.’

3. In December of 1977, I prepared and presented
to the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Ad-

1 Infante, Rinsky, Wagoner & Young, Lewkemia Among Workers
Exposed to Benzene (April 28, 1977) (OSHA Exhibit 40).

SELLA RPM te phe ED

2 ne a ee

°

31

visory Board a review and critique of the preliminary
report by EPA’s Carcinogen Assessment Group (CAG)
entitled “Population Risk to Ambient Benzene Expos-
ures.” * I have the following comments on the CAG re-
port as it compares to the risk estimate developed by
Dr. Richard Wilson, presented to OSHA during the 1977
benzene hearing.* I have reviewed and am thoroughly
familiar with both documents.

4. In its brief filed in the above-captioned case on
June 8, 1978, OSHA cites the CAG’s preliminary find-
ings of 30-80 cases of leukemia from exposure to ambient
levels of benzene as discrediting Dr. Wilson’s analysis,
which concluded that OSHA’s 1 ppm standard will pre-
vent, at most, 2 cases of cancer every six years.‘ OSHA’s
use of the CAG estimates, which are based on the lifetime
continuous exposure of a population of 220 million people,
is specious and seriously misleading as applied in the
occupational context. I have performed a series of cal-
culations (See Exhibit A) which show that the CAG’s
risk estimate, when translated to the occupational con-
text, is fully consistent with—indeed, somewhat lower
than—Dr. Wilson’s estimate.

5. The CAG and Wilson estimates are based on risk
estimates of two different populations with two different
sets of exposure assumptions. The CAG estimate of 30-
80 cases is an estimate of the number of cases of acute
non-lymphocytie leukemia deaths that might occur an-
nually if the USA total population of 220 million people
were exposed continually throughout their lifetime, 24
hours a day, 365 day a year, to a benzene concentration
of one part per billion in air.

6. The Wilson estimate of one leukemia case and one
additional cancer case in 6 years is based on the assump-
tion that for a year 30,000 workers exposed to benzene
at a level between 1-10 ppm are exposed 8 hours, 240
working days a year at an average level of 3 parts ner

2The CAG Preliminary Report is attached as Addendum C to
OSHA’s brief filed on June 8, 1978 in the above-captioned case.

3’ Testimony of Dr. Richard Wilson, Ex. 149.B.
* OSHA Brief 87 n.80.

32

million benzene in the air. The figure of 30,000 is ob-
tained from page 1-7 of the Economic Impact Study of
the proposed standard prepared by OSHA by Arthur D.
Little, Inc.

7. In order to compare these estimates, they must be
related to the same exposure level and time and to the
same population. CAG indicates that their case numbers
are based on an estimation that the lifetime (70 year)
risk of leukemia due to lifetime (70 years), continuous
(24 hours/day, 365 days/year) exposure to 1 ppb ben-
zene in air is from 1 x 10° to 2.5 x 10°. Wilson’s case
numbers derive from the assumption that 1.8 x 10° is
the yearly risk of a worker dying from leukemia from
having been exposed for one work year of 8 hours/day,
240 days/year to a level of 1 part per million benzene.
Attached Exhibit A reviews the algebra necessary to com-
pare the two estimates.

8. Assuming an average lifetime of years, Equation 2
divides the CAG risk by 70 and identifies the lifetime
risk for 1 year, continuous exposure to 1 ppb of benzene
as [from 0.14 to 0.36] x 10, or [from 140 to 360] x
10°. In Equation 3, I again divide by 70 to produce
the annual risk of 1 year, continuous exposure to 1 ppb
of benzene, which is [from 2.0 to 5.1] x 10°.

9. Workers do not work 24 hours a day, which is the
exposure period assumed in the CAG model, but generally
work only one-third of a day (8 hours). Therefore, Equa-
tion 4 divides the CAG risk by 3, to produce a risk of
[from 0.7 to 1.7] x 10°, as the annual risk for 1 year
of eight-hour daily exposure to 1 ppb of benzene.

10. In addition, the CAG estimate assumes exposure
every day of the year, but workers do not work every
day. Therefore, weekends, holidays and _ vacations,
amounting to about one-third of the full year, must be
excluded. Equation 5 accomplishes this, and shows an
annual risk for 1 work-year of eight-hour workday ex-
posure to 1 ppb [from 0.45 to 1.1] x 10°.

11. Finally, the CAG assumes exposure to 1 part per
billion of benzene. To obtain the risk of exposure to 1

5 CAG Preliminary Report, Table 3.

33

part per million of benzene, the risk must be multiplied
by a factor of 1000, and Equation 6 reveals that, based
on the CAG’s risk estimate, the annual risk of 1 work
year of eight-hour workday exposures to 1 part per mil-
lion of benzene is [from 0.45 to 1.1] x 10”.

_12. Thus it is shown that CAG’s estimate of lifetime
risk of acute non-lymphocytic leukemia (ANLL) death
of [1.0 to 2.5] x 10° for lifetime continuous environ-
mental exposure to 1 ppb benzene is equivalent to a
[0.45-1.1] x 10° annual risk of ANLL death for 1 year
of occupational exposure (8 hours/day, 240 days/year)
to 1 ppm benzene.

13. Dr. Wilson has based his case count on an annual
risk of death from all types of leukemia (not just ANLL)
of 1.8 x 10° for one work year of occupational exposure
to 1 ppm benzene. Since only 43% of leukemia deaths are
due to acute nonlymphocytic leukemia, the Wilson risk
can be translated into a 0.77 x 10° risk of acute non-
lymphocytic leukemia death from one work year of oc-
cupational exposure to 1 ppm benzene.

14. Thus, Wilson and CAG have reached the same
estimate of the annual risk of acute non-lymphocytic
leukemia death due to one work year of occupational
exposure to 1 ppm benzene, to wit,

CAG estimate = [from 0.45 to 1.1] x 10°
Wilson estimate — 0.77 x 10°

15. Based on the data provided in the Arthur D. Little
Study, Dr. Wilson assumed that the 30,000 workers
exposed to between 1 and 10 ppm are exposed to an
average of 3 ppm benzene. It therefore follows, using the
CAG estimate, that a reduction in these workers’ ex-
posure to benzene from 3 ppm to 1 ppm might reduce
“sg ANLL mortality annually for each year of exposure
y
(0.45 to 1.1 x 10°) x (1 work year) x (3 ppm-l
ppm) x (30,000 people) = ([0.45 to 1.1] x 10°)
x 1 x 2 x 30,000 = (.027-.066) cases ANLL/year.
= one case every 15-3714 years

Use of the Wilson estimate of .77 x 10° would predict
046 excess cases ANLL each year or 1 case every 21
years.

34

16. Wilson’s estimate of one leukemia case and one
other cancer case in 6 years was based on three addi-
tional conservative assumptions.

a. All leukemias (not just ANLL) are benzene re-
lated.

b. For every benzene leukemia there would be an-
other cancer at another site in the body due to
benzene exposure.

ce. Benzene exposure of those currently exposed to
1 to 10 ppm benzene would be far less than 1
ppm if a new standard were introduced.

There is no reason to believe the need for any of these
pessimistic assumptions, but these assumptions account
for the different numbers derived from the Wilson risk
estimate.

17. It is concluded, based on the CAG estimate and
its underlying assumptions, that reduction of occupa-
tional benzene exposure from 10 ppm to 1 ppm for each
year of work might reduce the annual mortality for acute
non-lymphocytic leukemia by 1 case every 15-38 years.

18. The CAG estimated range was based on the
premise that the Infante cohort was exposed to a mean
occupational exposure of 24-40 ppm benzene. This was
based on the assumption that the exposure was at the
maximum permissible exposure level in effect from time
of hire in the forties to the end of study period 1975.
This assumption leads to an under-estimation of the levels
of exposure because: 1) industrial hygiene data show
that nearly half the surveys indicated levels greater than
the TLV at that time; and 2) the inclusion of exposure
estimates through 1975 is inappropriate since all the
leukemia deaths occurred prior to 1962 and the period
of exposure necessary to inclusion in the study ended
in 1949; and 3) the estimate ignores exposures prior to
1941 when no maximum exposure standard existed and
during which many employees worked. Evidence in the
hearing indicated that levels of exposure exceeded 100
ppm in the forties.’ If the CAG estimates was recal-

® See Brief of API, AISI, MCA and IPAA, the printed version

of which was filed in the above-captioned case on June 13, 1978,
at pp. 15-18, 26-37.

35

culated under the assumption that the exposure was at
100 ppm (rather than 24 or 40 ppm), the risk estimate
would be further reduced by 60% to a risk estimate of
about 0.20 x 10°, which would predict that OSHA’s 1
ppm standard would avoid .012 cases ANLL per year,
or about one case in 83 years.

19, The purpose of this exercise has been to indicate
the similarity between the risk estimates produced by
CAG and by Dr. Wilson. My purpose has not been to
prepare a new, independent estimate of the effect of
OSHA’s standard. As indicated by CAG’s acknowledge-
ment that its risk estimate may be off by several orders
of magnitude, risk estimates are necessarily imprecise
because of the large number of variables (such as eXpos-
ure levels, non-occupational exposures, etc.) for which
accurate information is not available. Nonetheless, it is
encouraging that the two different attempts to conserva-
tively address these issues compared here have reached
results so similar.

STEVEN H. LAMM

36

EXHIBIT

(1) [1.0 to 2.5] x 10-5

(2) [10 to 25] x 10
70

(3) [140 to 360] x 10°
70

(4) [2.0 to5.1] x 10-°
3

(5) 240 x [0.7 to 1.7] x 10°
365

(6) [0.45 to 1.1] x 10-® x 108

A

[10 to 25] x 10-°

CAG estimate of lifetime risk
of lifetime, continuous ex-
posure to 1 ppb of benzene

[0.14 to 0.36] x 10-°

140 to 360 x 10-°

lifetime risk for 1 year, con-
tinuous (24 hour) exposure
to 1 ppb

[2.0 to 5.1] x 10-°
annual risk for 1 year, con-

tinuous (24 hour) exposure
to 1 ppb

[0.7 to 1.7] x 10-*

annual risk for 1 year, 8 hour
daily exposure to 1 ppb

[0.45 to 1.1] x 10-°

annual risk for 1 work year
of 8 hour, workday exposure
to 1 ppb

[0.45 to 1.1] x 10-6
annual risk for 1 work year

of 8 hour workday exposure
to 1 part per million

37

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 78-1253, 78-1257, 78-1486, 78-1676, 78-1677,
78-1707, 78-1745, 78-1988, 78-1989, 78-2642, 78-2779, ©

and 78-3023
OSHA No. 77-1395

Before Coleman, Clark and Tjoflat, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the petitions of
the American Petroleum Institute, et al., and were ar-
gued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the petitions
for review of an order of the American Petroleum
Institute, et al., in this cause be, and the same are
hereby granted; the provisions of the order reducing
the airborne permissable exposure limit and the dermal
contact prohibition are set aside and the remaining pro-
visions of the standard in this cause be and the same are
hereby vacated.

It is further ordered that respondents pay to peti-
tioners the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of
this Court.

October 5, 1978
Issued As Mandate:

38
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-911
INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO, PETITIONER
Vv.
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.
ORDER ALLOWING Cermionady) Filed February 21, 1979
The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is

granted. The case is consolidated with No. 78-1036 and
a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.

39
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-1036
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, PETITIONER
| v.
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL.
ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI. Filed February 21, 1979
The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

is granted. The case is consolidated with No. 78-911 and
a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.

40

[The following testimony is from the reporter’s
transcript of the rulemaking hearing on the
proposed benzene standard]

* * * *

[859] MR. JACOBSON: Thank you. One other ques-
tion here and that is the employes that were cited here
had considerable dermal exposure as well as exposure in
the working atmosphere as far as inhalation. Does any-
one on the panel have any feeling as to whether this
dermal exposure is a contributing factor or [860] is the
addressing of the dermal problems with benzene in this
proposed standard for problems other than leukemia.

DR. DOUGLAS SMITH: I can start it off and then
if someone wants to continue it a little bit, they can.
Yes, the problem of dermal absorption is, I think, real.
Benzene in relation to other aromatic materials, by com-
paring it let’s say to toluene and xylene. Apparently it
is not absorbed through the skin at the same rate as
toluene and xylene but it nonetheless can be absorbed.

Even if you take and have a situation in which you
have got an inflamed skin or some abnormal situation,
or if you have got it contained in a mixture, I| believe
that a considerable amount can be absorbed. I believe
that this has been demonstrated in the past with meas-
urements of urinary phenol from dermal absorption of
benzene.

We don’t consider that it is absorbed as a clear com-
pound extensively. It can be. -

MR. BAIER: Maybe Blair or ;Bob would want to dis-
cuss it from a medical standpoint» .

DR. LAIGO: Well, it can be absorbed through the
skin, it is readily absorbed through -the skin. To what
extent it would be absorbed in any. particular exposure,
you don’t really know. You can’t mesure that. It cer-
tainly is a significant thing and if pele are getting it
on their skin, it certainly could be signi¥icant.

* * * «A

[2104] MR. WARREN: Dr. Zachauses?
DR. ZACHAUSER: I am Richard |
fessor of Political Economy at Harvard |

achauser, Pro-
niversity. My

41

fellow witnesses have testified on the adequacy and in
adequacy of the Arthur D. Little report. I will not focus
on that for two reasons: [2105] First, I think that the
Arthur D. Little Company, assuming that it was at all
responsive to its assigned task, was given the wrong
task. Second, I don’t think that the findings of the Ar-
thur D. Little study, whatever they might reasonably
have been, would likely have influenced the final deci-
sions that OSHA would make. This suggests that we
are in an unfortunate position where analysis is not
employed to affect decision making, but might be thought
of more as a charade.

Let me discuss the way an economist looks at this
problem, indeed, at any problem. The science of econom-
ics is basically devoted to a very simple problem. How
should we allocate resources to competing objectives. With
this problem there are two objectives: One is to have
economic resources available to accomplish other purposes.
The second one is to promote human health.

The economic resources that are involved here are

quite substantial accepting on face value the Arthur D.
Little report. We are talking about $267 million worth
of capital costs, $124 million worth of first year operat-
ing costs, $76 million of continuing operating costs. At
any reasonable rate of discount, this is a $1 billion deci-
sion. It would be reasonable to ask, under the circum-
stances, what are we accomplishing? What are we buy-
ing for our $1 billion expenditure or rather, what are
the people who are being forced to spend their money
buying for their $1 billion expenditure.
[2106] We have a little bit of information in the Ar-
thur D. Little report. For example, we know that there
are 30,000 who are at risk levels above one part per
million. We do not know, however, what happens to
these 30 thousand workers. We know they are to be
moved below a standard, but we don’t know whether we
are getting rid of 20 cases of leukemia, 10 cases of leu-
kemia, one case of leukemia, the expected vaiue of .001
cases of leukemia. I think that information is obviously
vital to our decision making process.

The objection might be raised that we do not want to
put a price tag on human lives. OSHA has continually

42

maintained that there is no legitimate procedure for put-
ting a price tag on human lives and I wouldn’t disagree
with that. I would say that we want full information
so that people in authority in the decision making process
will be able to see what trade off they are making.

Basically to adopt the notion that we don’t have to
quantify the health benefits. Not just saying that there
are health benefits, however small. There was testimony
earlier that they might be non existent. To say what the
actual health benefits are, I think, is essential and to
argue the contrary is to say that ignorance is better than
knowledge. I think that is not a very sensible thing to
do.

Is there anything that we can do where we don’t want
to put a price tag on human lives? I think the answer is
[2107] yes we can try to follow what economists refer
to as a cost-effectiveness approach. Basically, for what-
ever resource dollars we are going to spend for promot-
ing health, we try to achieve the maximum level of bene-
fits. In order to do this, you have to know what benefits
are going to come out of that type of expenditure.

All the time we are incurring risks because we think
we get other benefits. We let people drive cars even
though we know that if we put the speed limit down 20
miles pe. «r., we would have fewer accidents. At zero
miles per ‘cur, we would have no accidents. We allow
people to ec ich desserts, live in wooden houses instead
of brick houses which would be safer and I would say
in all of these areas the level of risk, even if you make
the most exagerated estimate of the leukemic affect of
the exposure to benzene and other health consequences
are much greater than the ones we are confronting here
today.

I say also that the government in its regulatory proc-
esses is getting into this problem in a very major way.
I was reading the Washington Post this morning and
there was an article on what is called CAT scanners,
computer assisted tomography which is a sophisticated
diagnostic technique that assists in various medical pro-
cedures. The Federal government is presently getting
into the position of regulating the use of these scanners

43

not that it doesn’t help in an occasional instance to diag-
nose a very difficult disease, but the benefits in terms of
improved diagnosis and medical treatment aren’t worth
the cost.

[2108] Here we know what the costs are, or at least
we know one estimate of costs. We have no notion of
what the benefits are. I should say, by the way, that
other areas of government have followed the approach
of putting a price tag on human lives. For example,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
which is responsible for such things as tire standards or
air bags, uses a figure of $250,000 per life safed. I
would say that if you figure the $1 billion cost per 30,-
000 workers, that is $30,000 per worker. That would
mean that if we are being consistent with NHTSA, we
would have to save one out of every eight workers.

I don’t think that anybody would argue that one out
of every eight workers who is presently above the one
part per million standard is going to suffer from leu-
kemia, much less die of it.

Consumers Union, which is a consumer oriented pro-
tection group, uses a figure of $1 million. Various other
studies have cited numbers ranging from $150,000 to
perhaps $3 million. I think it is critical that we recog-
nize that trade off’s are being made here and that we
have to at least have the information as to what types
of benefits one part per million offers us.

Let me get to my point about it not mattering what
Arthur D. Little found. Let’s assume that all the costs
of the Arthur D. Little study were multiplied by three.
This becomes a $3 billion rather than a $1 billion ex-
penditure. Would any de- [2109] cision, would any of
the evidence presented today, vary in any way. Take
another hypothetical. Let us assume that the previous
witnesses had been able to quantify exactly how many
lives would have been saved. Then they corrected their
testimony and they said no, we are off by a factor of 10.
Only one tenth as many people would be affected as we
originally said. Is there anything that is part of this
decision making procedure that would reflect that change
in evidence?

44

I think that the answer is no. Unfortunately we
haven’t acquired the evidence so that we could even test
that particular hypothesis. I would like to make one
further point about how one should treat costs here. All
of the costs in the Arthur D. Little report and indeed
in virtually all of the OSHA standards that I have read
about, deal with average costs. They say how much will
it cost us to move from ten parts per million to one part
per million.

They don’t ask the question about the benefits, but
what we should like to know is not only how much does
it cost us to move from 10 to one but how much does
it cost us to move from 10 to two. We could always set
the standard at two parts per million. We don’t have to
deal with rounder numbers. Then we could see whether
the further reduction to one part per million was worth-
while.

For example, if 20 cases of leukemia per year would
be saved by this particular standard, then the cost of
saving one [2110] life would be $50 million. Let’s as-
sume, though, that we could save 19 of those cases for
half of the expenditures by moving to two parts per
million. Then that last life is costing us ten times as
much. I think that the point that should be recognized
is that when ADL or OSHA, when ADL conducts a
study or when OSHA formulates and promulgates a
standard, some attention should be marginal benefits and
costs to further reductions seems absolutely essential.

I would like to pose one disagreement I did have with
OSHA in general and its treatment of economic costs
which is that generally they only count when they get
above a threshold. This is surprising for an agency that
doesn’t accept thresholds going in the opposite direction
to say that only if something is above five percent or
only if an industry is closed down, in which case the
real resources spent are, as Professor Henderson and Dr.
Searbrough testified, are underestimated. Should we
count this as economic costs that conceivably should af-
fect our decision?

So let me summarize very briefly what I say in my
testimony. First, the proposed permanent standard: It

45

is not clear that any principal was used to set the stand-
ard. One part per million is just as good as two parts
per million or three parts per million. There is an avail-
able technology methodology widely accepted in economics,
widely accepted in the health care area, which is cost-
effectiveness where we attempt to achieve [2111] maxi-
mum benefits per dollar expenditure.

Second, no attempt was made to determine marginal
benefits. What will you gain if you tighten or lossen
control? Third, no attempt was made to measure bene-
fits. We get the same conclusion that I suggested ear-
lier. Do we have much greater benefits or much lower
benefits? Within the standard itself, there is little at-
tempt to direct resources to where they would do the
most good. It is noteworthy that this standard, one-
third of the operating costs during the first year are
directed to medical survailance, one third are directed
to monitoring of conditions and one third are directed
to reducing the risks.

Well, do we have the appropriate information as to
what gains we get out of either one of these different
areas? If we did, then we could use even $1 million
worth of resources to achieve substantially more health
benefits both within the benzene related industries and
in other industries.

I guess what I would recommend for action is to un-
derstand that we do not have the appropriate informa-
tion that would enable OSHA to adopt, to reject, or to
modify its standards. What is needed now are analyses
to compute the total benefits from various levels of stand-
ards and also information which was not provided on
marginal benefits and costs.

Unless we have this information, any decision taken
by OSHA now must reflect an emotional or political re-
sponse to an uncharted situation where the information
isn’t available. [2112] I would hope that intelligent and
well informed decision making should be giver a chance.
Thank you.

» * * _
[2141] MR. LE SOURD:

Let me turn to Dr. Zeckhauser’s testimony if I may.

Do I understand, Dr. Zeckhauser, that you are advocat-

46

ing the use of the techniques of the discipline called policy
analysis and specifically that the application of cost ef-
fectiveness analysis in the formulation of occupational
health standards? I am correct?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: I would say it is more than
policy analysis. It is basically the way most effective
government decisions are made and are sometimes put
under that head. It is part of economics. It is part of
government decision making.

MR. LE SOURD: You are recommending cost effec-
tiveness?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: Yes, I am.

MR. LE SOURD: Yes. Further, are you recommend-
ing that no action be taken to promulgate such a stan-
dard as this proposal?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: I wouldn’t make that recom-
mendation. The reason being all that I have learned
from reading the Arthur D. Little report and I have
not reviewed the medical evidence. I have heard a little
bit of it. I have discussed it with people at API and with
their legal counsel. All we know is the cost of [2142]
this information, It is $1 billion. We know nothing about
the benefits of this information. That strikes me as mak-
ing a decision in ignorance. I think we should get some
notion of what the effectiveness will be before we decide
to make a decision of this sort. So my answer would be
yes. We have no basis to make any possible decision.

However, there are some improvements we could make
even if we had to make a decision. I tried to be cost ef-
fective within the standard. Looked to see which expen-
ditures seemed most wasteful. But I would prefer to
get the basic information as to what level of protection,
if any, would be afforded.

MR. LE SOURD: Is cost effectiveness always of the
dr tn principal for use in regulatory action of this
sort?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: In protective regulation, it is
frequently very useful. There are some times where a
government regulatory agency may feel that it can
put a price on a level of protection that is afforded.
Otherwise it might chose to value a life.

47

I generally don’t think that that is very helpful. OSHA
has objected violently to it and has therefore stopped its
analysis more or less burrying its head in the sand.

Cost effectiveness analysis just gives you a way of
utilizing information to see, for example, that here maybe
we are saving a life at a cost of $50 million where as
we are failing to save lives, for example with the CAT
scanner that I [2143] mentioned earlier, that would cost
$500,000. We put more of our resources into CAT scan-
ners which has been identified as a rather wasteful!
technology by the government and less into protecting
workers in this way possibly offering very minimal bene-
fit, then we would be using cost effective analysis to do
that determination. The basic principal is that it high-
lights the trade off’s and allows decision makers at all
levels. As you know, the President of the United States
has expressed an interest in OSHA’s decision making
processes to learn what is being gained at what cost.

This is precisely the information, for example, that
the workers in the refineries themeselves and the other
establishments would use if they owned the refinery and
had to make the decision, should we protect ourselves?
My guess that if they did attempt to make that decision,
they might decide that it was worthwhile living with a
little more protective equipment. As you know, that is a
very cost effective way of protecting people, but as you
know that is also ruled out by traditional OSHA pro-
cedures.

I think that quantifying the effectiveness and the
costs of various types of impositions would immediately
inform decision makers within OSHA, within the govern-
ment and within the nation as a whole as to what is be-
ing gained at what cost and would enable OSHA to ration-
alize its interventions getting more occupational safety
and health for whatever level of re- [2144] sources that
are spent.

[2149] MR. LESOURD: Dr. Zeckhauser, you have said
that the guiding principle of cost effective analysis is
that for whatever level of resource expenditure we are
undertaking we should attempt the maximum possible

48

level of effectiveness. Is this a correct definition, then,
of cost effectiveness analysis?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: That is part of it. The other
part of it is that ultimately the decision maker should
look at cost and effectiveness and decide what level of
resources we want to spend. But, yes, that is an import-
ant component, and we want to get maximum effective-
ness for whatever level of resources we expend.

MR. LESOURD: Would you agree that it is OSHA’s
obligation to provide insofar as can be accomplished a
safe and healthful workplace for workers?

DR. ZECKHAUSER: As I remember the original
enabling legislation, it was insofar as possible. Also, in
the original legislation there was the term feasible, which
has generally been interpreted to include technologically
feasible. I think that any decision maker concerned for
the total resources of cur nation—and this is the lesson
of economics that you shouldn’t forget anything when you
make your decision— [2150] would want to interpret that
as being economically feasible as well. We shouldn’t
buy miniscule protection for an extra-ordinarily high
amount. The problem with saying safe and healthful is
how safe is safe? At what level? Why one part per mil-
lion? Why not .001 parts per million Why not zero parts
per million and put the petroleum industry maybe out of
business if we got an absolute zero because there is no
way you can assure nothing will creep through any mode
of protection?

So the problem with saying safe and healthful by it-
self, without qualification, is that there is no level that
is safe and healthful. OSHA has run into this problem
with regard to a number of its standards in that they
haven’t been able to define that level. We had a stand-
ard of ten parts per million. If that was safe and health-
ful, then it is still safe and healthful. It is not as though
the biology has changed at all. That was a decision we
chose to make at that time on the basis of not very good
information. We now it seems do not have much more
good information, and we are just changing our standard.

dout being
killed in a hurricane. Now this might be true in the
United States, but it may not be true in another country
where hurricanes are an annual hazard. So isn’t it a
question of selection of priorities?

DR. WILSON: Oh, absolutely. Risk is certainly right
to question. Of course, there are numbers on hurricanes
in the United States which is also very important to note
that although a hurricane is widely defined to be an act
of God and of course in that sense it is. Nonetheless you
can protect against it and reduce your risk, and a [2735]
cautious person would look, in fact it is quite notable the
people who calculate risks in this business of calculating
risks, calculating them will in fact start avoiding hurri-
canes and choosing their airlines rather carefully and
so on.

MS. KALARIS: Would you agree, then, if one’s prime
objective is to protect as many workers as possible, one
may not be willing to accept a risk which entails a few
workers being exposed to a hazard?

DR. WILSON: I am sorry, I don’t understand the
question.

MS. KALARIS: We said that, if I understood you
correctly, you agreed that risks are relative.

DR. WILSON: Correct.

MS. KALARIS: Ok. If one’s primary objective is
to protect as many workers as possible from a particular
risk, one may not be willing to accept the risk which
entails few workers being exposed to the hazard. In that
case doesn’t the risk become a significant risk rather than
an insignificant one?

DR. WILSON: I am still not quite sure to understand
it but let me try to answer and see if I have got it
correctly.

There is a prime objective for protecting human life,
that is correct. In the framework of this hearing, [2736]

re

87

one can talk about that limit that particular groups of
people who are working people. Now indeed risk is a
variable question and as I said, it is somewhat an in-
dividual question. It is important not only to make sure
that the risk to all of society be small, but there is no
individual group in society which is unfairly being called
upon to shoulder a very large section of the risks. I
believe that that is perhaps what you were trying at in
that question. I would agree with that that you should
not ask one limited section of people to take unusually
large risks merely for the benefit of the rest of society
without some concomitant benefit for these people or
giving them perhaps the opportunity of rejecting that
particular option of accepting that risk.

I will give an example. We all know that being an
astronaut is a very risky business. Quite apart from the
risk of the thing failing and exposed to cosmic rays and
radiation at a level far exceeding the ordinary industrial
level. Approximately one trip to the moon is 20 times the
yearly dose for an occupational worker. The astronaut is
asked to shoulder that risk. They shoulder it willingly;
they would have an opportunity declining. Although they
are exposed to a larger share of risk than anyone of the
general population, I don’t think it is unreasonable.

MS. KALARIS: On Tables III & IV, would you turn
to [2737] those please? You state that on the basis of
these tables, occupational exposure to benzene presents an
insignificant risk. Are the risks calculated for these tables
all hypothetical risks?

DR. WILSON: No, they are not. Some of them are
real. Some of them are known. Let’s see.

MS. KALARIS: What —

DR. WILSON: —Some of them are rather certain,
and the ones on benzene are hypothetical and may be
overstated.

MS. KALARIS: Ok. What did you hypothesize? Or
what assumptions did you make in calculating the risk of
benzene?

DR. WILSON: Oh, I went back. That is back on
several pages back. That is a fairly normal, if I may go
through the assumptions I made.

88

Starting with Figure 4, my Figure 4, I tried to make
sense out of this highly discorded set of data. As I plot
the data, I put various dotted lines on it. I have tried to
assume that no one was completely wrong; that no one
was actually lying or anything like this, but there was
some misinterpretations of some parts of the data. Mr.
Aksoy, for example, he found twice the standard cancer
in Turkey, 13 parts per thousand. It is possible he missed
quite a few cases so one can, I didn’t put it on the figure,
but one [2738] might assume as Pat Faulker that twice
as many cases is the dose level I thought was 200 parts
per million. I believe he stated that. Faulker could clearly
have missed some cases and one could go upwards on that.
I was not quite sure what to make of recent NIOSH
study. I had assumed as had Dr. Tabershaw gave testi-
mony yesterday, that he was talking about these cases
being 15 parts per million. I am not quite sure that he
still holds to that, but we looked at it last night.

It doesn’t explicitly say. Anyway, I was guessing that
he had understated it, and that was more like to be 100
parts per million or even some different chemical. Because
otherwise it is very hard to make sense of that data and
at the same time assume that there aren’t too many
shoemakers left in Turkey. Vigliani’s data, I assume, was
slightly high.

So I took the bottom curve on this, bottom line, the
risk liner 1.8 times 10° per year at one part per million
dosage. That is the slope of that line. That probably what
the data really is assuming a straight line instance. That
is saying a straight line is pessimistic.

I could have taken one of the other lines with this
discordant set of data, but I was reluctant to admit that
everyone in Turkey was going barefoot. Then I said I
have seven other cancer case in tobacco smoking, for
[2739] example, we all know that the first case we found
was lung cancer. Yet that there are lots bladder cancers
we now come across, perhaps twice as many cancers as
the number in the final cite. So I doubled that risk and
brought it up to 3.5 times 10° at one part per million.

Now, this would be risk—Oh, this risk by the way is

89

slightly overestimated risk, because that is by taking the
ratio to the normal instance.

Now if you look at, now the one reason for taking the
ratio to a normal instance is to save myself work, and
to use the work that other people have done. Because
when you want to calculate the normal instance, you have
got to complicate age correction on what the age of the
people concerned with. I didn’t want to go through that
work, but the people who have done these studies have
done that work. By taking that ratio, you can factorize
that part out.

Now, this risk then becomes correct if people were ex-
posed to this benzene not only their working life but until
they die. But in fact, they are not exposed to the benzene
for age 65 to age 80, and it is quite likely therefore the
risk is overstated by a fact of two. Nonetheless, I have
left that stand. So that number, 3.5 times 10°° per year
at one part per million becomes 3.5 times 10-° per year
at 10 parts per million. That is I calculated that risk.
[2740] DR. WILSON: I don’t know that benzene
might be a direct carcinogen. If it is a co-carcinogen only,
then it is wildly overstated.

MS. KALARIS: Doctor, what is the risk at 10 ppm
as compared with the risk at one ppm?

DR. WILSON: According to this way of calculating,
it will be 10 times as much. Incidentally, that is one of
the advantages of taking a linear calculation. Everytime
people plan to do risk calculations and do these general
calculations; Dr. Pochin, myself, other people; we always
try and assume over a wide range there is a straight line
curve.

If you don’t do this, the calculations become tricky. It
becomes much harder to visualize them, and so on, and
so although this is perhaps overstating the benzene figure,
I believe if you want to do public policy on a risk ealeu-
lation basis, this is a fairly prudent and slightly conserva-
tive thing to do.

MS. KALARIS: Thank you. On page 28 of this state-
ment, you assume that 30,000 people are now exposed to
three ppm benzene concentrations.

DR. WILSON: Yes, that was—

MS. KALARIS: Can you explain the basis?

90

DR. WILSON: Yes.

MS. KALARIS: For the level assumption?

[2741] DR. WILSON: Yes, I was taking this report,
the report of Arthur D. Little for OSHA. Now, the page
number I have got here, Page six, second paragraph, was
from the preliminary draft of this, and I must apologize.
I only got the final thing a couple of days ago, and I
should have updated that page reference.

But they say in there somewhere, and it was page SIX,
second paragraph, that the standard would effect 150,000
people, and only 30,000 of these now have concentrations
above one part per million.

I tried to get out of that study a number, a sort of
graph of who is exposed to what. Maybe it is in there,
but I didn’t find it. It is not very clear. It seems to me
perhaps a weakness, it is not clear. I shouldn’t be
grumbling about a report not being clear because many
of mine aren’t either, but I couldn’t find that so I made
the estimate; there is clearly going to be some distribu-
tion. They won’t all be at the top. So I made a very
rough guess that they were three parts per million.

I believe that if you are to do this job properly, you
are supposed to improve my risk estimate and go over
this rather carefully and probably do a complete integra-
tion over these numbers, but I am trying here to pull in
what is, I believe, a major gap in the justification [2742]
OSHA had for what they are doing, what they are pro-
posing, and outline the method by which OSHA would
do it.

MS. KALARIS: On page 29, I believe you stated that
only a few 100 people would be regularly exposed to 10
ppm of benzene concentration. Can you explain the basis
of that statement?

DR. WILSON: That is maybe incorrect. It came out
of a page in this report here, and again, they were vague
on this particular question. Therefore, I am a little vague
on it. Probably, as I was thinking about it last night, I
think a few hundreds; it is probably closer to 1,000 than
100, but I really don’t know.

* * * *

eT ee Srse

91

[2753] DR. LLOYD: Dr. Wilson, on page four, the
paragraph on the [2754] page, you say, “I wish to make
it clear that, of course, we did testify. I satisfied myself
that benefits should be included. The manufacturing of
benzene at ten parts per million level up-graded the
potential risks associated therewith.” I would ask, bene-
fits to whom and risks to whom?

DR. WILSON: Okay. I possibly answer that ques-
tion, of course, just now. There is a point here which
your question brings out, that in fact, the potential risk
will be to the benzene worker. It is going to be in my
view a considerable benefit to society. There is an im-
portant feature in any one of these cases, as in fact in
all cases where anyone that is employed in any sort of
occupation riding a bus or an aeroplane that some meas-
ure of this benefit be passed upon individual workers,
and there are various ways of doing it in society.

A classic way in a really dangerous occupation, which
this isn’t, is giving a worker hazard pay, but this is no
way near that. But this has to be born in mind.

DR. LLOYD: And then you do that since in com-
parison to other risks which society regards as insig-
nificant. Would you say that that little worker is insig-
nificant?

DR. WILSON: Pardon?

DR. LLOYD: Would you say that the death of a
[2755] worker is insignificant?

DR. WILSON: The said the risks can be insignificant.
I have never regarded death as insignificant. I can re-
gard a risk as insignificant, but not a death.

DR. LLOYD: Well, then, what are you referring to
when you say, “Society regards them as insignificant.”
What do you mean by “insignificant”?

DR. WILSON: “Insignificant” in this case is much
less than other—“Insignificant” would be in this regard
a risk which in most people’s ordinary caiculation of
what to do from one day to the next, you would not take
account of even if you were aware of the details of the
calculation.

DR. LLOYD: Is that what we are talking about here
ee “4p are talking about workers who died from leu-

emia

92

DR. WILSON: Iam sorry. That is what I was talk-
ing about on page five. Indeed, that is why I think the
main important feature is my table, Table Three and
Table Four. I think. Table Three is particularly im-
portant. It is particularly important, it seems to me, to
make sure that society is not asking a worker in a benzene
factory to shoulder a risk which is appreciably greater
than risk in any other occupation.

That is the reason why I listed some of these.

* * - *

[2772] DR. LLOYD: When you said you estimated
the risk of the benzene-leukemia problem, you described
it as inspired guesswork.

DR. WILSON: No. I think it is—in one direction
it is a guess. In the following sense: I have, we have
some data. It is a lousy set of data as we have had several
times during this hearing. It is data on the interpretation
of which people have disagreed, and now I have made a
estimate, I think it is slightly better than a guess, on
what the risk might be. Now you might—it is open to
other people to disagree, but the reason why I think that
it is more than a guess is, for example, suppose I was
to assume that the latest NIOSH study of Infante and
Young and people was literally correct and was five times
the normal instance at ten parts per million of benzene.
[2773] And I was also to assume that there was a plot
which was approximately linear and no worse than linear
between effect and dose. I see no reason why it should
turn over. Then it would be very hard to say why at
two hundred parts per million you would not just be
getting five times the normal instance, you would of
course have to be getting one hundred times the normal
instance. As I said before, I just don’t see how there can
be a shoemaker in Turkey left. And although I know, no
doubt, there are some people in Turkey that go without
shoes, I don’t think everybody does.

And therefore, I don’t believe that it is merely guess-
work. It is correlated. Trying to correlate this piece of
information, trying to explain—that is why somewhere
in here I may have said it is very hard to take that study

aii na.

93

completely literally. Of course, I must say that I made
an error in my reading. I don’t think they said that those
cases were ten parts per million. There may have been
some sort of implication there, that I thought there was.
If there are higher figures, or in fact due to other chemi-
cals, then that could be the explanation of that figures.
It is hard to say that it turned out not to be benzene at
that dose level. It might be, but that would be very much
upsetting all the indications that we have got.

* * * *

[2820] MR. MACDONALD: Your Honor, we do know
that Dr. Aksoy has done extensive industry research.

DR. WILSON: I knew that and I forgot that.

DR. LLOYD: You have made reference a number of
times to Dr. Aksoy and to shoemakers. In reference to
your statement that all of the shoemakers in Turkey
should be dead on the basis of the Infante estimate—

DR. WILSON: Yes. No. Not on the Infante esti-
mates but upon the estimates of the Iufante Study if they
were at 10 parts per million.

DR. LLOYD: I realize what you are saying. Now,
couldn’t it be that with benzene we might have a situa-
tion analogous to what we have in beryllium and with
asbestos where the people who are at the very high ex-
posures show an acute disease which is not presented as
cancer as is presented in beryllium and asbestos and it
turns out in the end result when we look at these patients
that the people who have the long latent disease are
people who got essentially lower exposures. Couldn’t that
be the case with benzene? Particularly in light of Dr.
Aksoy’s report with so many of the shoemakers dying
from their blood dysecrasia.

DR. WILSON: What you are suggesting to me is that
there might be really different dose-response curves for
this particular case?

DR. LLOYD: Yes.

[2821] DR. WILSON: It is conceivable, I suppose, that
any dose—response curve is possible. I would— It would
be a rather unusual, almost I think, revolutionary con-
tribution to the literature on cancer to have a dose-
response curve on cancer.

94

DR. LLOYD: You agree with what I am describing
is true for beryllium and for asbestos?

DR. WILSON: Well, beryllium is not a carcinogenic
in this way.

DR. LLOYD: It i: not a carcinogen?

DR. WILSON: Not in this way. I mean it is not a
direct carcinogen. I don’t know that it is direct. The
people I know who had beryllium poisoning have not died
from a carcinogen. It does not have the carcinogenic
properties. They have mostly died of ankylinicosis which
is not a carcinogen.

DR. LLOYD: Are you going to be attending the
beryllium hearings?

DR. WILSON: No.

DR. LLOYD: I would suggest you do.

DR. WILSON: I haven’t time to attend all hearings
and still try and understand what is going on in one or
two of them.

DR. LLOYD: Now in reference to insignificant [2822]
risk when talking about risk as a personal guess in
compared to other things and how you do this yourself
relative to matters like jumping off—

DR. WILSON: That is right.

DR. LLOYD: Do you know whether in general work-
ers exposed to benzene, or for that matter, any person,
were ever given a chance to make such a conscious choice?

DR. WILSON: Yes. Some workers are. I don’t know
if all workers are. A person is given—certainly in the
radiation field which I know a little more than in the
carcinogenicist’s field. A person who is employed is told
that he is a radiation worker and told to carry a film
badge and can deem to accept this job or you can accept
it if you wish. And you can take another job, maybe in
the same company.

95
[Exhibit 2-46 (list of references omitted in printing) |

OSHA TRANSLATION
OSHA-76-62

Med Lavoro
46:194-198, 1955

STUDY OF THE PERCUTANEOUS BENZENE
ABSORPTION

By

G. L. Conea and A. Maltagliati
“L. Devoto” Labor Clinic, Milan University
Director: Prof. Enrico C. Vigliani

We believe that a study of percuteaneous benzene ab-
sorption is timely; accordingly, we performed a series of
experiments in man, involving direct contact with liquid
benzene, i.e., the tests were implemented under conditions
which actually reproduce those forms of contact which
occur during industrial use.

For a prolonged period of time—we may safely say
ever since the professional study of benzene pathology
started—various authors investigated the possible pene-
tration of the toxin through the cutis surface.

The characteristics of the substance which is a power-
ful lipid solvent, soon led to the assumption that benzene
with its significant lipolytic properties active at skin level.
could break through the protective cutaneous barrier; it
was suspected that the substance enters the circulation
over that path and disperses in the organism.

Santesson was first to investigate the problem experi-
mentally in 1897. His tests were performed in rabbits
with the application of pure benzene pads on the shaved
cutis. He reached the conclusion that benzene absorption
does occur.

Translated for US Department of Labor, OSHA from Italian by
LEO KANNER ASSOCIATES, P.O. Box 5187, Redwood City, Cali-
fornia 94063, (415) 365-3046, October, 1975.

96

[2] Later Mauro, Lazarew, Brussilowskaja, Lawrow and
Lifshitz, expressed analogous opinions, always on the
basis of animal experiments.

Mauro used guinea pigs, placing pure benzene packs on
their cutis and leaving these in place for two hours every
second day. Introducing an alternative of the Santesson
method, depilation was used instead of shaving the guinea
pigs so as to avoid abrasions through which benzene might
penetrate. LORE

Lazarew, Brussilowskaja, Lawrow and Lifshitz experi-
mented with rabbits, soaking a paw in a pure benzene
bath and attempting to prevent the animals from inhaling
vapors originating from the bath.

In a monographie study on solvent pathology, Lehmann
and Flury contested the conclusions reached by the above
authors. They found instead that no cutaneous absorption
could take place, nor would the absorption be of any
interest in practice; they limited the question to an ex-
clusively theoretical level.

Petrilla conducted interesting research work in labora-
tory animals. He tested 15 guinea pigs, in part with
intact fur, in part after mechanical or chemical depila-
tion. The animals were subjected to benzene evaporation
involving the cutis of the entire body, excepting the head.
The presence of intoxication symptoms was verified in
almost all animals, including some guinea pigs with intact
fur. The last-mentioned animals showed, after 6 days of
testing, cutaneous modifications as well as macroscopic
changes such as hyperemia, edemas and chapped skin
lesions. The author interpreted the results by confirming
the possible capacity of benzene to transgress the cuta-
neous barrier, even when said barrier is intact.

More recently, Nunziante Cesaro showed interest in the
problem. This [3] author refers to experiments per-
formed in man. Individuals with perfectly sound cutis
were placed for a period of 20 to 30 minutes into a metal
tank in which the atmosphere was saturated with ben-
zene. The head of the test subject was kept outside
through an opening in the tank; a rubber tube linked to
a face mask provided inhalation of vapor-free air. The
dosage of the urinary sulfate derivatives was determined

97

before, immediately after, one hour after and two hours
after the start of the experiment.

The practically unchanged SI/ST ratio and the absence
of benzene in the air led the author to the conclusion that
percutaneous absorption does not take place, at least not
when the cutis is perfectly intact.

Subsequent investigations resulted negative as well;
they involved the application of cotton wool layers satu-
rated with benzene on the upper limb cutis of some test
subjects. The limb was kept for 20 to 30 minutes in a
sealable sleeve. No benzene was recovered, not even in
traces, from the exhaled air of this second test subject
group.

Based on the total opinions stated in literature, the
conclusion can be reached that two diametrically opposite
views exist, both supported by a considerable number of
authoritative researchers.

However, early experiments performed in animals are
readily subject to criticism because the applied techniques
either fail to guarantee the perfect integrity of cutaneous
surfaces in contact with benzene, or do not strictly exclude
possible inhalation of the toxin. On the other hand, under
close scrutiny even research in man does not prove to be
entirely convincing.

In our opinion, the principal objection against the work

of these authors concerns the use of air saturated with
benzene and the use of pads saturated with the solvent;
these contact methods can be defined as “indirect”.
[4} Said methodology can be justified by the attempt
made to preserve the test subject from any morbid symp-
toms, including their cutaneous forms; the method never-
theless results in a questionable solution of the problem
since (said method) is incomplete.

We do not believe—even from a purely theoretical
viewpoint—that it is actually suitable to investigate
possible percutaneous absorption of a liquid such as ben-
zene in contact with the skin of a worker by using vapors
in saturated form or by extending the contact over the
entire body surface; physiologic knowledge concerning
cutaneous permeability does a priori exclude any absorp-
tion in that form in case of lipo-solvents as well.

98

bove objection essentially also applies to the use
of perio wool tae with benzene, placed on the cutis
of a limb in a sealed sleeve. Under such conditions a
transient and incomplete contact with the liquid ehh
will evidently occur; but, since benzene evaporates rapi y;
it will never be present in a volume sufficient for vee
absorption, and the result will merely be a vapor-saturate
ere in the sleeve.
“S) an above-mentioned reasons our research work
pased on different criteria.

We alectaa test subjects, including a female, to evaluate
the effect of individual cutaneous characteristics. The
tests were performed on alternate days.

Direct contact with the toxin was accomplished by im-
mersion in “commercial” benzene of the type used by a
large factory manufacturing rubber articles. Maximal
contact duration was limited to 25-35 minutes because
already after a contact duration of 5 to 10 minutes from
the start of testing the exposed cutis surface became in-
tensely and increasingly painful; the [5] pain was char-
acterized by a burning sensation.

The following technique was applied (see the photo-
graphic description of the instruments) :

The subject introduces a hand and 2/3 of the forearm
into a metal tank supported by a tripod; the surface of
the tank has an opening fitted with a rubber sleeve and
can be completely sealed; a face mask with double valve
is then applied to the subject who starts to inhale, through
a long rubber tube, air from the external environment.
This protects against vapor inhalation during the test.
Benzene is introduced in to the tank through a tube at-
tached to a suitable container.

Towards the end of the testing period a hog bladder
with an approximate capacity of 3 liters is attached to
the exhalation valve of the mask; it becomes thus possible
to collect an air sample and verify whether it contains
any benzene vapors.

[Figure 1 omitted in printing]

We used two methods to determine the eventual per-
cutaneous penetration [6] of benzene. With these meth-

99

ods, the elimination of the toxin from the organism can
be controlled, i.e., the dosage of urinary sulfa derivatives
can be determined and the presence of benzene in the
exhaled air can be investigated.

We applied the Folin gravimetric method to determine
the urinary sulfa derivatives. We took urine specimens
before and two hours after terminating the experiment
when—according to various authors—the elimination of
sulfa derivatives, caused by the absorption of benzene, is
maximal.

For benzene verification in exhaled air we used the
following procedure: the air exhaled by the test subject
during the final minutes of the experiment is collected
in a hog bladder, it is subjected to effervescence (bub-
bling) with the use of a suitable pump (Orsat apparatus)
in a solution constituted by 10 ce of H.SO, and 1 ce of
40% formaldehyde. The presence of benzene in the
bubbling air causes brownish-red discoloration of the
solution, which is colorimetrically compared with a solu-
tion sample containing 1% nitroprussiate of sodium.
With the aid of a suitable scale, benzene concentration in
the exhaled air is determined from the number of pump-
ing strokes (pompate) needed to obtain a coloration simi-
lar to the color of the control sample.

The obtained results are shown in the Table, see next
page.

On the basis of these results we exclude the possible
percutaneous penetration of benzene under the testing
conditions adopted by us, i.e., with intact cutis, by means
of contact between liquid benzene and a limb surface
including the hand and two thirds of the forearm, during
25 to 35 minutes.

The above statement is confirmed by the collected data,
primarily by the constant absence of benzene, even in

[Table I omitted in printing]

minimal traces, from the air exhaled [7] by the subject
at the termination of the experiment; secondly, the above
is confirmed by variations of urinary sulfa derivative
excretion which do not exceed physiologic fluctuations con-

i all

100

sidered normal (Vigliani and Gemelli: maximal daily
variation = + 7; hour by hour variations = + 2).

Moreover, we feund that none of the tested subjects
complained during or after the experiments about dis-
orders of a general or local type which could be inter-
preted as benzene intoxication symptoms; nor were al-
terations or lesions of any kind found on cutis surfaces
exposed to contact with the toxin.

We therefore share the opinion of researchers who con-

tend that the penetration of benzene into the organism
through the skin is impossible and [8] that the problem
is not significant for practice. The penetration did in fact
prove to be non-existent, even when testing methods were
applied which involved direct contact maintained to the
limit of the test subject’s sensitivity, according to systems
which do not only reproduce, but even emphasize systems
used in industrial practice.

SUMMARY

An experiment was carried out to study the possibility
of benzene being absorbed through the skin. Three sound
men were subjected to the immersion of their hands and
forearms in commercial benzene for 25-35 minutes. Urine
sulfates were then determinated and researches made for
benzene in the expired air. No benzene was found in the
air expired by the subjects at the end of the experiment;
no modification was noted in the inorganic-total urine
sulfates ratio. The possibility of a percutaneous passage
of benzene in the experimental conditions adopted is
therefore rejected.

101
[Exhibit 2-47 (listing references omitted in printing) ]

OSHA TRANSLATION
OSHA-76-60

Med Lavoro
37:151-56, 1946

IS PERCUTANEOUS BENZENE ABSORPTION
POSSIBLE?

By

Dr. Angelo Nunziante Cesaro, volunteer assistant
“Luigi Devoto” Labor Clinic, Milan University
(Director: Prof. Enrico C. Vigliani)

Percutaneous penetration is mentioned among the pene-
tration modes of benzene into the human organism. We
refer to Santesson (1897) (Ref. 1), who was one of the
first researchers to state that such a possibility definitely
exists. His experimental research was carried out in
rabbits to the cutis of which pure benzene packs were
applied after removal of the fur; the packs were kept in
place with bandages. Subsequently (1925) Mauro (Ref.
2), obtained a similar result when testing chemically
depilated guinea pigs: packs of pure benzene were applied
for 2 hours each for two days. Said author, while never
able to verify death among these animals, observed modi-
fications of the morphologic-hematic aspect, a definite
indication of starting intoxication.

Lazarew, Brussilowskaja, Lawrow and Lifschitz (Ref.
3) kept the paw of a rabbit immersed in a benzene bath,
while preventing the animal from inhaling vapors origi-
nating from the bath; they likewise determined the pres-
ence of benzene in the exhaled air and therefore reached

the conclusion that percutaneous absorption of the solvent
is possible.

Translated for US Department of Labor, OSHA from the Italian by
LEO KANNER ASSOCIATES, P.O. Box 5187, Redwood City, Cali-
fornia 94063, (415) 365-3046, October, 1975.

102

At variance from the above, K. B. Lehmann and F.
Flury (Ref. 4), in [2] their monograph on solvent path-
ology, state that the penetration of benzene through the
cutis should be considered from a theoretical standpoint
only, since they were never able to determine the per-
cutaneous absorption of the toxin chemically.

Recently, the problem was re-examined by Petrilli
(Ref. 5). This author experimented with five groups of
guinea pigs. Each group included three guinea pigs
weighing 450 to 600 g each. The five groups differed as
follows: No. 1 guinea pigs with intact fur; No., 2 fur
sheared off with scissors; No. 3 depilated with a razor;
No. 4 depilated with chemical agents; No: 5 control ani-
mals. Benzene was applied to them by means of vaporiza-
tion while the animals were sealed in appropriate devices;
their heads were kept outside of the environment con-
taining the vaporized solvent. The overall result of the
investigation revealed that the animals of Groups No. 1—
of primary interest here because they were intact—
showed slight intoxication symptoms on the 4th day; but
only two of the three animals were affected. The author
states that the animals showed cutaneous changes on the
6th day, evident to the unaided eye, such as hyperemia,
edema, scaly skin lesions; he believes that benzene is able
to break through the cutaneous barrier, even in some
cases when said barrier is intact.

A critical evaluation of the research work carried out
by the cited authors prompts us to divide their work into
two groups; the first includes Santesson and Mauro’s
studies and the second those of Lazarew, Brussilowskaja,
Lawrow and Lifschitz and Petrilli.

The investigations of Santesson and Mauro are of con-
siderable interest insofar as these authors were among
the first to provide some data on slow benzene intoxica-
tion. But the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that
[3] the animals on whom the benzene packs were applied
might have inhaled the toxin. Therefore the work of these
authors cannot be taken into consideration for the pur-
poses of present study. On the other hand, said authors
mainly intended to investigate the first symptoms of slow
benzene intoxication.

103

The research work of Lazarew, Brussilowskaja, Lawrow
and Lifschitz and of Petrilli are subject to criticism inso-
far as it cannot be ascertained whether the cutis of the
animals treated by them were entirely intact. In fact,
Petrilli found macroscopic cutaneous lesions already on
the 6th day of treatment, while the first slight intoxi-
cation symptoms appeared only two days earlier. The
possibility can therefore not be entirely excluded that
cutaneous lesions caused by fur shaving or by the pro-
longed effect of benzene on the cutis—while roughly de-
terminable only—could already have been active during
the days preceding the appearance of the initial symp-
toms.

* * * *

Since the actual status of the problem had reached this
point, we believed that a study of the question would by
useful, also in view of the authoritative statements made
by Lehmann and Flury.

We used men free from skin lesions as test subjects. A
few days before the experiment, we prescribed a diet » ‘ch
in carbohydrates (bread, potatoes, etc.) and green vege-
tables. The diet contained very little protein, so as to
reduce matter causing intestinal putrefaction to a mini-
mum.

Each test subject was placed nude into a metal tank for
20’ to 30’. The tank had a capacity of 8,317 me and was
perfectly airtight. The head of the subject remained out-
side, for which purpose the tank lid had an aperture;
rubber sleeves prevented the escape of air from the inside
of the tank to its exterior, and sealed the aperture through
which the subject’s neck was [4] passed. Moreover, after
closing the subject’s nostrils with a clasp, a mask was
applied. The subject breathed through the mouth, using
the 5 meter-long rubber tube fitted to the mask, and in-
haled air originating from a courtyard beyond the cham-
ber where the tank was located; the tube passed through
a window. A benzene-saturated atmosphere was obtained
in the tank by introducing several cotten wool pads soaked
with the solvent. Furthermore, the subject applied liquid
benzene to his skin within the tank, using cotton wood
pads, also saturated with the solvent (see Fig. 1).

[Figure 1 omitted in printing]

104

Urine eliminated before the subject was placed into the

tank, eliminated immediately after placement in the tank,
one hour and two hours later was used for the determi-
nation of total inorganic sulfates with the aid of the
Folin gravimetric method.
[5] We wish to premise, so as to justify the research
work and sulfate dosage as well as the ratio between in-
organic sulfates: total sulfates, that the research work of
Yant, Schrenk, Sayers, Horwarth and Renharth (Ref.
6), Yant, Schrenk and Patty (Ref. 7), Gueffroy and Luce
(Ref. 8), Vigliani and Giannini (Ref. 9), Girino (Ref.
10), Vigliani and Gemelli (Ref. 11) showed a rapid and
significant decrease in the ratio between inorganic sul-
fates and total sulfates. As a consequence of benzene
absorption, the first diminish while the second increase.
The modifications reach their maximum two hours after
the termination of the test subject’s exposure to benzene
vapors.

Urine sulfate dosage determination is carried out with
the Folin method, which we will briefly describe here.

INORGANIC SULFATES.—25 ce urine is filled into
an Erlenmeyer of 200 to 250 cc; then 100 cc H.O and
10 ce HCl, diluted in H.O with a volumetric ratio of 1:4
is added. 10 cc of an aqueous 5% BaCl, solution is added
drop by drop during continuous agitation with a glass
rod. The mixture is left standing for one hour; filtration
of the same follows through a Schleicher-Schull filter
(blue band) ; the filtration is carefully accelerated, using
a vacuum bottle connected with a water pump. The filter
is burned in a porcelain crucible which had been ac-
curately weighed; the crucible is kept at a temperature of
700 to 800° for a couple of hours. Cooling follows in the
desiccator and a final exact weighing is performed.

The weight difference in mg is the (weight of) in-
organic sulfates contained in 25 ce of urine.

TOTAL SULFATES.—25 ce urine and 20 ec HCl,
diluted as specified above, are filled into an Erlenmeyer
of 200 ce capacity. Boiling for at least 20’ follows, while
the Erlenmeyer’s outlet is covered with a crucibie slide
{6] (vetrino da crogiolo) which has the overall function

105

of cooling, heating and regulating the boiling process,
moderating the same to prevent the desiccation of the
container.

The container is then cooled under running water for
2’-3’; 50 ce of H.O is added; then 60 ce of 5% BaCl, is
added drop by drop during continuous agitation with a
glass rod. The next steps are similar to the procecure
followed in case of inorganic sulfates.

[Table omitted in printing]

[7] Our investigations show that the ratio inorganic
sulfates, total sulfates was not significantly modified as
a consequence of cutis exposure to benzene vapors and
simultaneous cutaneous application of the liquid solvent.
The observed slight variations are within the limits of
fluctuations found in normal subjects, since the S.I. : S.T.
ratio is near-constant at various hours of the day; fluctu-
ations generally do not exceed + 2%. (Vigliani and
Gemelli). (1.c.).

In addition to the examination of urine sulfates, we
also investigated the benzene content of air exhaled by
the same test subjects. For this purpose, the apparatus
suggested by the British Home Office was used, previously
tested in this Clinic by Vigliani and Reina (Ref. 12).
The apparatus proved to be suitable for the determination
of minor solvent volumes in the exhaled air as well, and it
is suitable for the qualitative verification of traces.

The apparatus consists of a mechanism to activate
bubbling of the exhaled air through a solution of formalin
in concentrated sulfuric acid. The presence of benzene
causes brownish discoloration of the solution, which is
more or less accentuated. The color is comparable to a
test tube containing a 1% solution of sodium nitroprus-
siate. Starting from the air volume needed for bubbling,
so as to obtain a color equal to the sample color, the
benzene concentration in the air is determinable with the
aid of a suitable calibration table.

The examination of benzene in air exhaled while the
test subjects remained in the tank and while their cutis
was exposed to benzene vapors and kept in contact with
liquid benzene, always resulted negative.

106

Another investigation involved the application of ample
cotton wool [8] layers soaked in pure benzene on the

[Figure 2 omitted in printing]

cutis of an upper limb of all test subjects. These re-
mained on the limb which was kept in a cardboard tube,
sealed at its end and perfectly airtight, fitted with rubber
sleeves (see Fig. 2). During the final minutes of the test,
for approximately 20’ to 30’, the possible presence of
benzene was examined in the air, with the aid of the
above-mentioned method. Not even traces of the solvent
could ever be determined nor recovered in any of the
performed experiments.

In view of our experiments, we can therefore exclude
a percutaneous absorption of benzene, at least to any ap-
preciable extent, through intact cutis.

SUMMARY

An investigation was performed to determine whether
benzene absorption through the intact cutis of man is
possible. The cutis of the trunk and the limbs of 8 sound

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0035%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
