# Petition — Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1980
- **Citation:** 448 U.S. 607

## Text

& 8 «9 1 I i EC TF 1978 |
—_—_—_— — — ——
IN THI Phi
LICKEL Ls
Supreme Court of the United States is

October Term, 1978

INpDUSTHIAL UNION Deraxruentr, AFL-CIO.
Petitioner,

¥;

AMEnICAN PeTROoLEUM INSTITUTE, CitemicaL SPRCIALTIES MAN
FACTURERS ASSOCIATION, MANUFACTURING CtleMIstTs ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL PETROLEUM ReriNneKs ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PiUTRGFINA
INCORPORATED, ATLANTIC Riciurieip COMPANY, Cities Servicer Com
PANY, CONTINENTAL Ot, COMPANY, DevTra Or, COMPANY, EXXON
CORPORATION, GULF Ou, COMPANY, MAHATHON On COMPANY, Putin
Lvs Perronecm Company, Suet. Om Comvany, Sourun HAMPTON
Ou, COMPANY, STANDARD O11, Company (Indiana). STANDARD OIL
COMPANY Or Outo, Sunx On, ComMVvany or PENNSYLVANIA. SUN OL
COMPANY oF DeLaAware, Texaco Inc.. UNION O11 ComPpaANY oF
CALIFORNIA

ReseerR MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC.. Firestone Tine &
tunBER COMPANY, GENEKAL Tiree & Rusuer Company, B. F. Goop
KICH COMPANY, Goopyear Tire & Rupsen COMPANY

KE. 1. Depont pe Nemours AND COMPANY

AKSSTRONG RunbBER COMPANY AND UNInOYAL COMPANY
INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

AMERICAN IRON AND Stee. INStTITUTs, BerTucenem Stren. Coxnrora-
TION, CYCLOPS CORPORATION, JONES AND LAUGHLIN Stren. Corrora-
TION, NATIONAL STEEL CorPoRATION, Revunnic Stern COokroRration,
SHENANGO INCORPORATED, UNITED STATES Steer CORPORATION

and

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTID ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Of Counsel :

MLLioT BREDHOFY George I]. Comen
Gieneral Counsel, Roneert M. WeInbera
Industrial Union Dept., JexemMian A, COLLINS
AFL-CIO Iredholf, Gottesman, Cohen &
1000 Connecticut Ave., NW Weinberg
Washington, D.C. 20036 1000 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20056
Attorneys for Petitioner
————
see 3

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I 1
Rea Sibcc a srs eceicccscees 2
Ue Rete BP PMMMOEUIU EID Cece ete c cece eccees 2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......... 2
wpe yy fs yt ley fy) Ea 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 12
1. The Decision Below is in Square Conflict with
Decisions of Three Other Circuits .......... 12
ll. The Decision Below Incorrectly Decides an
Iinportant Issue of Federal Law Which Ought
to be Resolved By This Court .............. 17
ee A 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aqua Slide 'N Dive v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm., 569 F.2d 831 (Sth Cir, 1978) 000000000.

American Lron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 575
fg. be AD: | a aie Sone

Certified Color Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Mathews,
ofa F200 208 UDO. Cir, 1076)... kick cc ccacs

iMnvironmental Defense Fund v. WPA, No, 77-1091
LENA Rekas ee MEET chi dis Sli nike a iienk heb)

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499
EOE CAs RAE AROEED os 6d vate cae eden thse

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Ree MI GMa cd eek 6a eas Ceili

Society of Plasties Industry, Ine. v. OSHA, 509
2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 922
BREE. ie Sears wh oleate wis hone Gah co Pants bal hades

Statutory Provisions:

Occupational Safety and Health Aet of 1970, 29
CR Treen 5 tas lalduenu dod opute via taen

Consumer Product Safety Aet, 15 U.S.C. § 2058
SGPRPSMES REF Cou S Vida teee Rok ely rakes

Regulations:

BP Ade BORER ho discon pc edinds ices cekes

Legislative History:

legislative History of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, prepared by the Senate
Committee on Labor and Publie Welfare .....

il

13, 20

12-14

13

12, 14—15

passim

17

17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1978

[NpusTRIAL Union Department, AFL-CIO
,
Petitioner,
Vv.

AMERICAN PetroLeum Instirure, et al.,
AND
OccuUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HeauTH ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Industrial Union Department, AFL-CLO (here-
inafter ‘*TUD’’) respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Cireuit entered in this case on October
i- (

5, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 581
K’.2d 498 and is reprinted as Appendix A in a separate
Appendix accompanying this petition. The Occupational
Safety and Health Standard governing ‘* Occupational lx
posure to Benzene’’ and the Statement of Reasons of the
Secretary of Labor issued with the standard are reported at
43 Fed. Reg. 5918 and are reprinted as Appendices B and C.
The amendment to the standard is reported at 43 Fed. Reg.

2

27962 and is reprinted as Appendix D. The order of the
court of appeals consolidating the petitions to review the
amendment with the petitions to review the standard is un-
reported and is reprinted as Appendix K. The judgment of
the court of appeals is reprinted as Appendix F.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals’ judgment issued on October 5,
1978. (App. F). On November 1, 1978, the Court of Appeals
consolidated the petitions to review the amendment to the
standard with the petitions to review the standard (App.
KE). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Occupational Safety and Health Act delegates to the
Secretary of Labor the power to adopt standards governing
the exposure of working men and women to toxic materials
and directs the Secretary to ‘‘set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even
if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt
with by such standard for the period of his working life.’’
In enacting this law, did Congress intend to preclude the
Secretary from promulgating a regulation limiting workers’
exposure to a proven carcinogen until such time as substan-
tial evidence becomes available from which to quantify the
number of lives that would be saved by the proposed regu-
lation?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 651 et seq. provides in pertinent part:

§ 651. Congressional statement of findings and declara-
tion of purpose and policy
(a) The Congress finds that persona! injuries and

9
vo

illnesses arising out of work situations impose a sub-
stantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, inter-
state commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss,
medical expenses, and disability compensation pay-
ments.

(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and
policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate
commerce among the several States and with roreign
nations and to provide for the general welfare, to as-
sure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and
to preserve our human resources—

* * ©

(3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set
mandatory occupational safety and health standards
applicable to businesses affecting commerce, and by
creating an Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission for carrying out adjudicatory functions
under this chapter...
§ 652. Definitions
; . * *
(8) the term ‘occupational safety and health standard
means a standard which requires conditions or the
adoption or use of one or more practices, means meth-
ods, operations, or processes reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment
and places of employment.

§ 655. Standards
(b) J * =

(5) The Secretary, in promulgating standards deal-
ing with toxie materials or harmful physical agents
under this subsection, shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life. Development of standards under
this subsection shall be based upon research, demon-
strations, experiments, and such other information as
may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of

4

the highest degree of health and safety protection for
the employee, other considerations shall be the latest
available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other
health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the
standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of
objective criteria and of the performance desired.
« * -

(f) Any person who may be adversely affected by a
standard issued under this section may at any time
prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promul-
gated file a petition challenging the validity of such
standard with the United States court of appeals for
the circuit wherein such person resides or has his prin-
cipal place of business, for a judicial review of such
standard. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith
transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary.
The filing of such petition shall not, unless otherwise
ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the standard.
The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence in the record con-
sidered as a whole.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the validity of the regulation govern-
ing occupational exposure to benzene promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor (‘‘the Secretary’’) pursuant to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 et seq. (‘*the Act’’). Benzene is one of the most widely
produced chemicals in the United States, and the amount
produced is rapidly increasing. Most benzene is used as an
ingredient in the production of other organic chemicals; the
remaining amount is used primarily in the manufacture of
detergents, pesticides, solvents and paint removers, and as
a component of motor fuels. Benzene has long been recog-
nized as a toxie substance.

Shortly after the Act became effective, the Secretary
promulgated a ‘‘national consensus standard’? limiting the
amount of benzene to which employers could expose their

5

employees.’ Under that standard a permissible exposure
level for benzene was established of 10 parts per million
(ppm) as an 8-hour time weighted average, with a maxi-
mum permissible peak concentration of 50 ppm for 10 min-
utes in any 8-hour period. This standard was adopted from
the consensus standard developed by the American National
Standards Institute, and was based on evidence linking
benzene to certain blood disorders such as aplastic anemia,
but not on what was then considered the possible carcino-
genic effects of exposure to benzene,

In August, 1976, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (‘‘NIOSH’’), which was established by
§ 22 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671, and directed to ‘‘develop
and establish recommended occupational safety and health
standards,’’ found ‘‘the accumulated evidence to be conclu-
sive at this time that benzene is leukemogenic’’—i.e., that it
causes leukemia, an irreversible, fatal cancer of the white
blood cells. In accordance with its conclusion, NIOSH ree-
ommended that the existing consensus standard (which, as
noted above, was not based on the leukemogenic effects of
benzene exposure), be modified to take account of the newly-

! Section 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9), defines a ‘‘national consensus
standard’’ as:
any occupational safety and health standard or modification
thereof which (1) has been adopted and promulgated by a
nationally recognized standards-producing organization under
procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of
the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adop-
tion, (2) was formulated in a manner which atforded an oppor-
tunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consulta-
tion with other appropriate Federal agencies.
Under § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) the Secretary was required ‘‘as
soon as practicable’’ within the first two years after the Act became
effective to promulgate as a legally binding regulation ‘‘any na-
tional consensus standard’’ unless the Secretary determined that
the promulgation of such a standard ‘‘ would not result in improved
safety or health for specifically designated employees.’’

6

obtained evidence establishing benzene as a leukemogen.,
Specifically, NIOSH recommended that ‘‘sinee it is not
possible at this time to establish an éxposure level at which
henzene may be regarded to be without danger... exposure
to benzene be kept as low as possible.’’ NIOSH concluded
that 1 ppm was the lowest level to which exposure could be
reduced ‘tat this time’? and suggested that the exposure
limit be set at that level? NIOSH further recommended that
an emergency temporary standard be promulgated ® estab-
lishing the 1 ppm limit.

On May 3, 1977, the Secretary issued an emergeney tem-
porary standard as proposed by NIOSH.‘ ‘SShortiy there-
after the Secretary, as required by §6(e) (3) of the Aet,
29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (3), initiated rulemaking proceedings to
develop a new, permanent standard, A proposed rule, in-
corporating the emergency temporary standard, was pub-
lished in the Federal Register along with a lengthy explana-
tion, incorporating the preamble to the temporary standerd.

* Two years earlier, NIOSIL had concluded that ‘the possibility
that benzene can induce leukemia cannot be dismissed,’’ but had
not recommended any change in the national consensus standard in
light of what it viewed as the then-uncertain link between benzene
and leukemia.

* Section 6(¢) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1), direets the
Secretary to adopt, without going through rulemaking proceedings,
“an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon
publication .. . if he determines (A) that employees are exposed
to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined
to be toxie or physically harmful... and (B) that such emergency
standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.’

‘The emergency temporary standard was never enforced, Peti-
tions for review of the standard were filed first in the District of
Columbia and then in the Fifth Cireuit. The Fifth Cireuit issued
a stay of the standard pending the decision of the D.C. Cireuit as
to whether the petition filed with it was premature. That decision
was not issued for almost six months, at which time the statutory
life of the emergency standard had virtually lapsed. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 655 (¢) (2),(3).

7

42 Fed. Reg. 27452-59. At the same time, notice was given
that an informal publie hearing would be conducted begin-
ning on July 19, 1977, and interested persons were invited
to “submit written data, views and arguments’’ and ‘‘oral
testimony’? with respcet to the issues raised by the emer-
gency standard and the proposed permanent standard, /d.

at 27459.

The public hearings on the proposed standard were held
as scheduled.’ A total of 95 persons testified, including
representatives of and medical and technical experts re-
tained by various employers and labor organizations, and
independent experts from public health organizations (such
as representatives of NIOSH and of the National Cancer
Institute) presented by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (*fOSHA’’). Hach witness was subject to
cross-examination by all interested parties. The hearings
extended over seventeen hearing days, at the end of which
interested parties were provided with an opportunity to
submit additional written evidence and briefs. In all, the
hearing transcript consumes over 5400 pages, and in addi.
tion over 1400 exhibits and comments were made a part of
the record. _

Although Congress antic pated that the Seeretary would
he able to issue standards within 60 days after the close of
the standard-setting peat see 20 U.S.C. § 655(b) (4), the
Secretary took over four months to study the benzene ree-

*The Act does not specify the nature of the informal hearing
required by § 6(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (3). By regulation the
Secretary has provided that:

The oral hearing shall be legislative in type. Hlowever, fairness
may require an opportunity for cross-examination on crucial
issues, The presiding officer is empowered to permit cross-
examination under such circumstances. The essential intent is
to provide an opportunity for effective oral presentation by
interested persons which can be carried out with expedition
and in the absence of rigid proceedures whieh might unduly
impede or protract the rulemaking process, 29 C.FUR. § 1911.15

(a) (2).

8

ord. On February 10, 1978, the Secretary promulgated a
new benzene standard lowering the permissible exposure
level to what he determined to be the lowest feasible level—
1 ppm. At the same time, the Secretary issued a comprehen-
sive Statement of Reasons which takes up 45 pages in the
Federal Register. App. at 67a-251a.°

In the Statement of Reasons the Secretary made a num-
her of findings and conclusions of critical importance to this
case. First, the Secretary found that

**the accumulated evidence is conclusive that benzene
exposure is causally related to the induction of
leukemia (a cancer of the blood-forming system), vari-
ous cytopenias (decreased levels of a formed element
[red cells, white cells, and platelets] in the circulating
blood), aplastic anemia (a non-functioning of bone
marrow) and to the development of chromosomal aber-
rations.’ [/d. at 8la).
With particular regard to the leukemogenie properties of
benzene, the Secretary reported that from the published
literature alone one scientist had been able to identify at
least 250 cases in the United States in which workers had
contracted leukemia as the result of benzene exposure. /d.
at 12la. The Secretary further reported that a series of
retrospective studies of groups of benzene-exposed workers
had found the rate of leukemia deaths among these persons
to be many times higher than the leukemia death rate in
the population as a whole. /d. at 99a-119a, And the Secre-

*On June 27, 1978, the Secretary published in the Federal Regis-
ter an amendment to the standard which, infer alia, exempted from
the standard all work operations in which the exposure to benzene
derives solely from liquids containing .5% or less of benzene by
volume. App. at 252a. Petitioner herein and several of the re-
spondents herein filed petitions seeking review of the amendment.
Subsequent to the issuance of its decision thvalidating the standard
the court sua sponte consolidated the petitions to review the amend-
ment with the petitions to review the standard, thereby disposing
of the former petitions. The judgment challenged here thus en-
compasses the dismissal of IUD’s petition to review the amendment.

9

tary correctly notedthat even ‘‘{i]ndustry participants in
the benzene rulemaking did not, for the most part, challenge
benzene’s leukemogenicity.’’ 7d. at 123a.

With respect to the industry participants’ contention that
at low exposure levels benzene is safe, the Secretary con-
cluded, as had NIOSH, gee p. 6, supra, and numerous
experts quoted by the Secretary, App. at 184a-86a,’. that
there is no evidence to support that claim. /d. at 123a-25a,
182a-87a. The Seeretary explained that because of the long
latency period for cancers generally-an? the variability in
individual/sensitivity to carcinogens, determining whether
low levels of benzene are harmless would require studying
the mortality rates of large groups of workers who could
be shown to have been exposed to iow levels of benzene up
to 30 years earlier. The Secretary found that ‘‘to recon-
struct and define employees’ exposure retrospectively’’ and
then to trace the exposed population for a prolonged period
of time is ‘‘extremely difficult’? and that because of these
and other difficulties there are no reliable studies. /d. at
124a, 182a. Indeed, the Secretary concluded that ‘‘there
does not exist an adequate scientific basis for establishing
the quantitative dose-response relationship between expo-
sure to benzene and the induction of leukemia and other
blood diseases [7.e., the number of persons who will be made
ill by various incremental doses of benzene].’’ /d. at 160a.
But the Seeretary did find that there is ‘‘ general agreement
that a dose-response relationship is likely to exist; that is,
exposure > higher doses carries with it a higher risk of
cancer, and conversely, exposure to lower levels is ac-
companied by a reduced risk, even though a precise quan-

7The Secretary quoted reports in the record by the National
Cancer Institute’s Ad Hoe Committee on the Evaluation of Low
Levels of Environmental Carcinogens, the International Workshop
on the Toxicology of Benzene, the MAK-Werte Working Group,
and the testimony of Drs. Kraybill (of the National Cancer Insti-
tute), Goldwater (testifying for respondent Manufacturing Chem-
ists Association) Goldstein, and Aksoy.

10

titative relationship cannot be established.’’ 7d. Thus, the
Secretary concluded that it ‘‘is apparent... that a decrease
in exposure level and/or duration will result in a decreased
risk of leukemia.’’ Jd, at 183a.

Based on all of these findings—and given the large
number of workers exposed to benzene—the Secretary de-
cided, as he has consistently done in regulating carcinogens,
that ‘‘prudent public health policy’’ requires that the
permissible exposure level for henzene be set as low as
feasible. The Secretary concluded that the decreased risk
to the health of workers that would be achieved by so re-
ducing the exposure level justified this decision.

The Secretary recognized that the absence of evidence
as to the precise effects of exposure to low levels of benzene
‘*place[d] the estimation of benefits [from the reduced
exposure level] on ‘the frontiers of scientific knowledge.’ ”’
Id, at 160a. Even without an exact estimate of the number
of lives to be saved, however, the Secretary was still able to
conclude, based on the evidence establishing that reducing
the exposure to benzene would reduce the risk of leukemia
and other blood disorders faced by thousands of workers,
that the lower exposure level is ‘‘necessary in order to ef-
fectuate the statutory purpose of the Act and to adequately
protect employees from the hazards of exposure to ben-
zene.’’ Id. at 163a.

Immediately upon the issuance of the standard (and
Statement of Reasons) a number of trade associations rep-
resenting producers and users of benzene as well as indi-
vidual.companies that produce or use benzene* sought
review of the standard under 46(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(f).° The cases were consolidated in the Fifth Cireuit

* All parties who sought review of the standard below are listed
as respondents on the cover of this petition.
® Section 6(f) provides:

(f) Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard
issued under this section may at any time prior to the sixtieth

11

and were heard on an expedited basis. On October 5, 1978,
a division of that Circuit issued its opinion vacating the
permissible exposure level for benzene, and with it the en-
tire benzene standard.

In overturning the benzene standard the court of appeals
did not disturb the Secretary’s findings as to the dangers
posed by benzene, the absence of a known safe exposure
level to this poison, or the beneficial impact that a reduction
ot the exposure level would have. To the contrary, the court
acknowledged that the Secretary’s conclusion ‘‘that the
standard is likely to result in benefits is not unsupported.”’
App. at 18a. The court concluded that the record *‘ provides
substantial evidence which would support the finding that
exposure to benzene at the present level of 10 ppm poses
some leukemia risk,’’ id., and the court further found
that ‘‘[t]he general agreement in the scientific community
that exposure to carcinogens at low levels is safer than
exposure at higher levels permits the further factual deduc-
tion that reducing the permissible exposure limit from 10
ppm to 1 ppm will result in some benefits,’’ id2° What
the court held, quite simply, was that these findings by
the Secretary were not sufficient to sustain the regula-
tion. Rather, the court concluded, the Secretary also was
required to make a specific ‘‘estimate of benefits supported
by substantial evidence.’’ Jd. at 19a-21la. Since the Secre-
tary had not done so because in his view present scientific
knowledge did not permit such an estimate, the court found
that the standard could not survive.

day after such standard is promulgated file a petition chal-
lenging the validity of such standard with the United States
court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or
has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of
such standard. .. . The determinations of the Secretary shall
be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole.

‘The court also left undisturbed the Secretary's finding that

reducing benzene exposure to 1 ppm was feasible.

12

The court of appeals candidly acknowledged the neces-
sary consequence of its decision: it has disabled OSHA
from adopting a standard more stringent than the pre-
existing national consensus standard for benzene, notwith-
standing the fact that in the court’s own words ‘*exposure
to benzene at the present: level... poses some leukemia
risk.’’ The court expressly rejected ““OSHA’s argument
that ‘iis standard should be upheld since the lack of knowl-
edge concerning the effects of exposure to benzene at low
levels makes an estimation of benefits from reducing the
permissible exposure level impossible.’’ 7d. at Wa. Ae
cordingly, the court concluded that ‘‘[u]ntil such estimates
[of the extent of benefits expected from reducing the per-
missible exposure level from 10 ppm to lt ppm] are pos-
sible,’? OSHA will be barred from acting." 7d. at 21a,

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CONFLICT
WITH DECISIONS OF THREK OTHER CIRCUITS

The Fifth Cireuit’s decision is in direct confliet with
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974), Society of Plastics Industry, Ine. vy, OSTLA,
509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 US, 922 (1975);
and American Tron and Steel Institute (AIST) vy. OSITA,
575 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978). Indeed, the court below reecog-
nized this conflict but expressly declined to ‘‘attempt to
reconcile’’ its decision ‘‘with the eases from other cireuits
which uphold other standards regulating exposure to car-
cinogens.’’ App. at 2la. And those cases cannot be so
reconciled. For each upheld an OSHA standard limiting
exposure to a carcinogen on findings by the Secretary ana-

'’ Tn the course of so concluding the court dropped the following
telling citation; ‘‘But see Society of Plastics Industry, Ine. v.
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, (2d Cir. 1975).’’ Society of Plastics Indus-
fry, the decision upholding OSHA’s regulation of vinyl chloride, is
discussed at pp. 14-15 infra.

13

lytically indistinguishable from the findings on which the
standard at issue here was based."

In Industrial Union Department, supra, the District of
Columbia Circuit reviewed the validity of an OSHA stand-
ard governing exposure to asbestos dust. The standard was
promulgated at a time when, in the court's words, ‘reliable
data [was] not available with respect to the precisely
predictable health effects of various levels of exposure to as-
bestos dust.’’ 499 F.2d at 475. Unlike the court below, which
held (with respect to benzene) that the Secretary was dis-
abled from acting until such evidence becomes available, the
District of Columbia Cireuit unanimously found no infirm-
ity in the regulation. Writing for the court, Judge McGowan
reasoned that in delegating authority to promulgate oceu-
pational health standards to the Secretary, Congress had
intended to authorize the Secretary to make decisions which
implicate questions ‘‘on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge’’ as to which ‘‘insufficient data is presently available
to make a fully informed factual determination.”’ Id. at 474.
With respect to such decisions, Judge MeGowan concluded
that Congress had vested in the Seeretary the power to
make ‘‘a prediction based upon pure legislative judgments.”
Id. Accordingly, the court found the asbestos standard law-

'? The decision below is also inconsistent with decisions that have
been rendered under numerous other statutes upholding an adminis-
trator’s authority to regulate carcinogens without waiting for con-
elusive evidence establishing the extent of harm that the carcinogen
is likely to cause at the levels being regulated and thus the extent
of benefits likely to result from the regulation. See, e.g., Environ-
mental Defense Fund vy. EPA, No, 77-1091 at 54-58 (D.C. Cir., Nov.
3.1978) (Tamm, J.) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act amend-
ments) ; Certified Color Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Mathews, 543 F.2d
284, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J.) (Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetie Act); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Clean Air Act) ; Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,
514 F.2d 492, 527-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).

14

ful notwithstanding the absence of evidence as to the
extent of the benefits that would be realized, since ‘‘the pro-
tection of the health of employees is the overriding concern
of OSHA,” and the Secretary’s determination ‘over strong
employer objection [to set] a relatively low limit © * * rests
in the final analysis on an essentially legislative policy
judgement rather than a factual determination concerning
the relative risks of underprotection as compared to over
protection.” fd, at 475.

In Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc., supra, the vinyl
chloride ease, the Second Cireuit reached a decision in ae-
cord with Industrial Union Department and equally in con-
fliet with the decision below. In Plastics Industry the em
ployers challenged the vinyl chloride standard on the
ground

that the available scientific medical evidence does not
establish that the 1 ppm exposure level adopted by the
Secretary is required by health or safety considera-
tions. They claim[ed] that ne proof exists in the record
to justify such a low standard, since all of the medical
witnesses testified that no one can say whether exposure
sure to [vinyl chloride] at low levels was safe or un-
safe. [509 F.2d at 1308. ]

Writing for the court, the late Mr. Justice Clark rejected
that argument, concluding ‘that the evidence is quite sufh
cient to warrant the Seeretary’s choice,’? notwithstanding
the absence of data as to the effects of exposure to low
levels of vinyl chloride. /d. Mr. Justice Clark explained:

As in Industrial Union Department, APL-CIO vy.
Hodgson, supra, the ultimate facts here in dispute are
‘on the frontiers of selentifie knowledge,’ and though
the factual finger points it does not conelude. Under the
command of OSILA it remains the duty of the Seere-
tary to net to protect the workingman, and to act even
in circumstances where existing methodology or re-
search is deficient. The Secretary .. . has chosen to
reduce the permissible level to the lowest detectable one.

15

We find no error in this respect. [lnphasis added. | '

Finally, in American Iron and Steel Institute [AISI),
supra, the Third Cireuit, per Judge Rosenn, also upheld an
OSHA standard requiring that exposure to a proven ecar-
cinogen—in that case coke oven emissions—be redueed to
the lowest level that is technically and economically feasible.
The Court concluded that the Secretary's findings that coke
oven emissions are carcinogenic and that there is no known
sale exposure level to them is sufficient to sustain the stand.
ard. In the course of its opinion the court explained:

The Secretary’s decision to establish a .15 mg/m* ex-
posure level... was a policy judgment on the basis of
the best available evidence as to what the industry
could achieve in an effort to best protect its coke oven
employees, This decision is not a f _tual determination
for which we need to find substantial evidence in the
record to support. Under the Act, the Seeretary’s task
combines elements of legislative policy determinations
and fact finding... . In this instance his ultimate deter-
mination of the appropriate exposure level is a legis-
lative decision in the exercise of congressionally dele-
gated powers. [577 F.2d at 833. |

The conflict created by the decision below requires imme-
diate resolution. There are presently pending before courts
of appeals challenges to three OSHA standards involving
toxic substances: inorganic arsenic (before the Ninth Cir-
cuit) ; cotton dust (before the District of Columbia Circuit) ;
and lead (before the Fifth and Third Circuits). In each
ease the Secretary was unable to determine the precise
effect of low level exposure to the particular substance and
thus to make the finding required by the Fifth Cireuit (but
not by the other circuits) as to the extent of benefits that
will result from reducing exposure to the lowest feasible
level. The validity of those standards, each of which affects
hundreds of workplaces and thousands of workers, thus
depends upon how the question presented here is resolved.

8 This is the portion of Plastics Industry that the court below
cited as contrary to its holding. See n. 11 supra.

16

Moreover, the standards presently under review are only
the first of the standards that must be set to regulate the
myriad of carcinogens in the workplace. Tf the Court does
not settle the question presented here as to the Seeretary's
power to issue standards regulating carcinogens, the See
retary will be unable to get on with the congressionally
mandated job of protecting the health of American workers,
As matters now stand, employer organizations, by filing the
first instituted review petition in the Fifth Cireuit, will be
able to use the decision below to defeat the Seeretary’s
power to issue each new standard, Mmployers will be unable
to do so, however, if the first petition is filed in the District
of Columbia, Second or Third Cireuits.'' The misehief
ereated by this situation was reeently highlighted by a
courthouse race which ended ina dead heat when those who
thought the new standard governing occupational exposure
to lead went too far filed in the Tifth Cirenit’ while those
who felt the standard did not go far enough simultaneously
filed in the Third Cireuit.

‘

“Under $602), see n. 9 supra, any person “adversely affeeted™’
by an OSTLA standard ean bring a pre-enforcement petition to
review the standard in the eirewuit ino whieh sueh person “
or has his prineipal place of business.” This means that every
standard which impacts upon an employer in the Fifth Cireuit

whieh is to say every OSTLA standard could be challenged before
that court if employer groups arrange their filings so that the first
review petition is filed by an employer in the Fifth Ciruit, and
if no other aggrieved group first files for review elsewhere, (Under
28 USC. (2112(a) all challenges to an ageney’s orders are to be
transferred to and heard by the court in whieh the first challenge

is filed.)

resides

ee

V7

HW. THE DECISION BELOW INCORRECTLY DE
CIDES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF FEDERAL
LAW WHICH OUGHT TO BE RESOLVED BY
THIS COURT,

The court of appeals’ decision requiring the Secretary
before promulgating a regulation lowerine the permissible
exposure level for a carcinogen to estimate with some pre
cision the number of workers who thereby would be saved
from contracting cancer is inconsistent not only with the
decisions of three other eirenits; the eourt’s decision is also
at war with the language, history and purpose of the Aet
itself, as we proceed to show.

The purpose of the Act is stated in its preamble: ‘to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and. to
preserve our human resourees,’? 29 U.S.C. 6 651. OF partion
lar concern to Congress in enacting this statute was what
Representative Daniels, the floor manager of the bill in the
House, aptly called the ‘‘on-the-job pollution erisis’’—that
is, the fact that there are ‘millions of ... men and women
in our workforee whose lives are daily being plaeed in
Jeopardy from chemicals, insecticides, and pestieides.’?
The method Congress adopted to deal with this ‘“erisis’’
was to delegate to the Seerctary of Labor broad discretion
fo promulgate ‘‘oceupational safety and health stand
ard[s|,"" 29 U.S.C. §655(b), and to impose upon employ.
ers the duty to “comply with occupational safety and health
standards [thus] promulgated,’’ id. § 654(a) (2).

Congress defined in express terms the substantive eviteria
hy which the Secretary is to exercise the power delegated

'® The Subeommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Public
Welfare has published a compilation of the Act's legislative history
entitled, Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Wealth
Act of 1970. Representative Daniels’ statement appears at pp. 1002
03.

18

to him. Those criteria are set forth in §6(b)(5) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5), which provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this
subsection shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity even uf
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt
with by such standard for the period of his working life.
[Mmphasis added. ]

Under § 6(b)(5) the Secretary is thus required to regulate
occupational exposure to a toxic material when he concludes
from the ‘‘best available evidence’’ that absent such regula-
tory action employees will suffer material impairment of
health from regular exposure to the particular toxie sub-
stance. That section does not leave room for an interpreta-
tion that would render the Secretary powerless to act in
such circumstances until further evidence becomes available
showing how mmany employees will suffer health impair-
ments. Yet that is precisely what the holding of the court
below requires.

The Fifth Cireuit was of the view that it was unnecessary
to reconcile its holding with the substantive criteria sect
forth in §6(b) (5). See App. at 15a-16a, 21a. The court ap-
parently believed it was relieved of that burden by a sub-
section of the general definitional section of the Act. That
subsection, §3(8), 29 U.S.C. §652(8), defines an ‘‘occupa-
tional safety and health standard’’ as a standard ‘‘ which
requires conditions ... reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-
ployment.’ The court below thought that without a finding
as to the extent of benefits that will result from an OSHA
standard, the Secretary could not ‘‘determine that [the]
standard ... is reasonably necessary.’’?® But §3(8) does

16 The court below pointed to nothing in the legislative history of

19

not state that a standard must, in the abstract, be *‘reason-
ably necessary’’—whatever that might mean. Rather, the
Act declares that a standard must be reasonably necessary
or appropriate to achieve a particular end. That end is the
one stated in §6(b)(5): to provide the most adequate as-
surance feasible that no employee will suffer health impair-
ment from exposure to the substance being regulated, even
if the employee’s exposure is both regular and prolonged.
The Secretary can determine what is reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide that assurance without a finding
as to the number of employees who would otherwise actually
suffer a health impairment. Thus the language of §§ 3(8)
and 6(b)(5) cuts against, not for, the decision below.

Further, the interpretation of the statute just set forth,
but not the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, is consistent with
Congress’ intent in enacting this law. The Fifth Cireuit has
read into the Act a requirement that would preclude the
Secretary from regulating any carcinogen until he is able
to resolve an issue on the ‘‘frontiers of science’’: the extent

the Act or in the cases interpreting it to support the court’s inter-
pretation of §3(8). Instead, the court relied entirely on its own
decision in Aqua Slide ’N Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Comm.
[CPSC], 569 F.2d 831 (1978). But that decision involved inter-
pretation of a very different Act with very different language and
a very different history applied to a very different problem. The
question in Agua Slide was whether the CPSC could require a
particular label—one warning users of swimming pool slides of the
danger of beeoming paralyzed through improper use—without
making a determination as to whether anyone was likely to heed
such a warning—a determination which plainly is not on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge. In holding that such a finding was
required, the court relied on the peculiar language of 15 U.S.C.
§ 2058(¢) (2) (A) which compels the CPSC, before promulgating a
regulation, to find that the regulation is ‘‘reasonably necessary to
eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury’’ and on the
special legislative history of that section. See 569 F.2d at 839-40.
Thus, whatever its merits, Aqua Slide sheds no light on the meaning
of §3(8).

20

to which exposure to low levels of carcinogens causes can-
cer (and thus the extent of the benefits that would be real-
ized by regulating low level exposures). Yet in adopting the
Act Congress expressly authorized the Secretary to act on
the basis of available evidence and declared it ‘‘vital’’ that
the Secretary not ‘‘be paralyzed by debate surrounding
diverse medical opinions.’"? The importance of avoiding
such paralysis was recently explained by Judge Tamm:

What scientists know about the causes of cancer is
how limited is their knowledge. The record in this case
demonstrates that it may take decades for human ex-
posure to result in cancer; in the meantime, the case
for inferring a cancer danger with respect to an in-
completely understood substance is vigorously dis-
puted. If regulation were withheld until the danger was
demonstrated conclusively, untold injury to public
health could result.®

The court below thus was wrong in holding that the Secre-
tary lacked sufficient information to restrict the exposure
of employees to benzene to the lowest feasible level.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.

Of Counsel: Respectfully submitted,
ELuiot BrepHOFF Grorcr H. CoHen
General Counsel Rosert M. WEINBERG
Industrial Union JEREMIAH A, CoLLINs
Department Bredhoff, Gottesman,
1000 Connecticut Cohen & Weinberg
Ave., N.W. 1000 Connecticut Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

1” ALR. Rep. No. 91-1291 at 18, in Legislative History, supra note
15, at 848.

18 Pnvironmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No, 77-1091, Slip. op.
at 57-58 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 3, 1978).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385006_0035%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.
