# Petition — Scales v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2762%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1979 - **Citation:** 441 U.S. 946 ## Text In The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES = = October Term, 1978 MICHABL RODAK, JR,, CLERK — JOHN E. SCALES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. ‘PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HAROLD E. WONNELL Suite 1260 — IBM Building 140 East Town Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Petitioner JAMES C. CISSELL United States Attorney MARY JANE McFADDEN Assistant United States Attorney Room 200 — Federal Court House 85 Marconi Boulevard Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorneys for Respondent I ceeeteenedineeaialineeennieeneiiiemeeeeneeiaieeemmemiimeataeealieniemanentaimeeemenetenimemmiteemnmennameenemmnndamsmn COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. — 215 E. Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 — (513) 241-1450 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ...... 1 OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW ......... ] JURISDICTION .. eae ee were tome 2 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW .................... 2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS toc hey eave ey eee STATEMENT OF THE CASE ADIN a ROC on oh- 4 ARGUMENT ........ hewtlg dh ptite hicle), it was held error to permit an FBI agent to exhibit charts in rebuttal to destroy the defendant’s claim he was an unwitting “tool,” the error was not considered prejudicial as the charts were not offered as competent evidence. Elder 8. v. United States, 213 F2d 876 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 901, rehearing denied 348 U.S. 922 (1955). In the court from which relief is sought in United States v. Moody, 339 F2d 161 (6th Cir. 1964) cert. denied 386 U.S. 1003 (1967), a case involving the net worth approach re- garding income tax evasion, it was held that charts presented by an expert not based upon facts appearing in the record are inadmissible. A succinct statement of a problem to be encountered in the use of summaries even under Rule 1006 is found in the fifth syllabus of United States v. Smyth, 556 F2d 1179 at 1180 (5th Cir, 1977), rehearing en banc denied, 557 F2d 823, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862: “Inasmuch as summaries are elevated under rule of evidence to the position of evidence, care must be taken to omit argumentative matters in their preparation lest the jury believe that such matter is itself evidence of the assertion it makes. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006, 28 U.S.C.A.” In a long line of cases, summarized by citation only in the opinion, at page 8, of the court below, beginning with Gariepy v. United States, 189 F2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951), and ending with United States v. Lawhon, 499 F2d 352 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing en banc denied, 502 F2d 1168, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975), courts have permitted the use of sum- maries. Almost all of these cases were income tax evasion cases and all of them involved voluminous records not in- troduced in evidence. In some the summaries were admitted in evidence while in others the summaries were only used in jury presentation. In all cases where they were used as evidence, as in the instant case, the in court presentation as well as the preparation was by expert witnesses. Such is not the case in the trial of the petitioner. The only witness who testified regarding exhibit 145 described himself as a “layman.” sili i —e 9 This is the first instance known to counsel where one who describes himself as a “layman” and not an expert has ad- * mitted preparation of summaries and is then permitted to testify in narrative closing argument style, sans questions and answers, over repeated objections. The trial court final- ly, after additional objections, stopped the testimony in this fashion. This was done only after the summary of the in- dictment, later admitted as part of exhibit 145, was again summarized by a “layman.” Because of the conflict in the cases with respect to the growing use of summaries as evidenced by the instant use and the evident extension of their use in improper ways, pe- titioner urges that certiorari be granted and proper guide- lines be established. The words of two famous and eminent scholars ring through time and seem appropriate. “Justice has nothing to do with expediency. Justice has nothing to do with any temporary standard what- ever. It is rooted and grounded in the fundamental in- stincts of humanity.” Woodrow Wilson, Speech, Washington, 26 Feb. 1916, The Home Book of Quotations, p. 1028, Dodd Mead & Co., Ninth Printing. “Injustice often arises . . . over an over-subtle . . . construction of the law... .” Cicero, The Home Book of Quotation, p. 1032, Dodd Mead & Co., Ninth Printing. It is not too pedantic or far fetched to consider, in our quest for a proper and just method of using summaries to consider the words of one of the greatest of all scholars who spoke of justice as follows: : “Socrates. Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more 10 ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us— we looked not at what we vere seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her. . . .” Plato, Republic, IV, 432B, Great Treasury of Western Thought, p. 861, R. R. Bowker Company, New York and London, 1977. 3. Trial Court As Advocate Should a trial court in the presence of the jury interrupt cross-examination upon a relevant matter indicating the court’s intention to sustain an objection if one is made? We think not. At page 3 of the opinion of the court below, the court agrees that a question put to the witness Needham, Comp- troller for the Laborers’ ‘nternational Union was relevant. The exchange which occurred is as follows: “By Mr. Wonnell (appellant’s counsel ) Q. Are you familiar with the procedure in some locals of giving a per diem without submission of an expense voucher or an expense account? Psy Court: I am going to sustain an objection to t. Mr. Palmer: The Government does so object, Your Honor. The Court: I will sustain the objection to that.” The court below reasons that since the trial court had established by questions by the court that Needham had no contact with determinations as to the reasonableness of payments of per diem, he was not competent to answer the question set out above. This is most difficult to understand since the question is designed specifically to determine his competency or familiarity with the subject of the inquiry. The witness could have answered “yes” or “no.” 11 It was a critical point in the trial since petitioner had ad- mitted no expense vouchers were submitted and that this had been the procedure and custom for as long as he and others could remember. If Needham was familiar with this custom and procedure, it would have gone far to corroborate lack of intent. At this sensitive and delicate point in the trial for the court to intervene as an advocate was prejudicial error. It is quite easy for one to argue that since the jury ac- quitted the petitioner on six counts of the indictment, _it is clear they were not misled and, therefore, were not prej- udiced. There is a much more persuasive argument to the contrary. Petitioner was acquitted in those six points on his denials that he committed the act alleged. As to the charges under 29 U.S.C. 501(C) in question, Scales admitted the acts and insisted on absence of mens rea. The signal from the trial court is clear, before the jury, that either such corroboration as sought is inadmissible or not to be taken into account in any event. Petitioner urges that the United States Supreme Court, both in review in accordance with the plain error doctrine and the supervisory powers in Rule 19, that lower courts should follow the prescription of conduct laid down in United States v. Harris, 501 F2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), where when cross-examination was interrupted the Court held in syllabus 12: “Trial Court must be ever mindful of the sensitive role it plays in a jury trial and avoid even appearance of advocacy or partiality.” While the court below cites United States v. Wright, 542 F2d 975, 978-979, (7th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 1073 (1977), in that case the trial judge was held not to become an advocate or litigant by stopping on his own motion direct or cross-examination when an improper line of inquiry is 12 being explored. How can Wright be authority here when the court below held the inquiry relevant? To continue to condone such conduct is to invite it on a continuing basis. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons set forth herein, the petition for writ of certiorari should be allowed. Respectfully submitted, HAROLD E. WONNELL Suite 1260 — IBM Building 140 East Town Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 (614) 224-7291 Attorney for Petitioner APPENDIX A No. 78-5322 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,’ Plaintiff-Appellee,| On AppeaL from the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Divi- Joun E. SCALEs, sion. Defendant-Appellant. V. Decided and Filed March 8, 1979. Before Livety and Kertu, Circuit Judges, and Taytor,° District Judge. Taytor, District Judge. John E. Scales has appealed his conviction on nine counts of unlawfully converting to his own use assets of Local 423 of the Laborer’s International Union in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) and one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. He was acquitted on the six remaining counts, which included three charges under Section 501(c), two charges for conversion of funds from an em- ployee insurance fund in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 664, and one charge of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. He was given an aggregate sentence of ten years. * The Honorable Robert L. Taylor, District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by des- ignation. la 2a From 1968 through 1977, appellant was the business mana- ger of Local 423 of the Laborer’s International Union, a labor organization as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 401.531. Count I of the indictment charged him with conspiracy to embezzle and misapply the funds of Local 423 and the Ohio Laborer’s District Council — Ohio Contractor’s Association Insurance Fund. A number of overt acts were alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy including receiving double pay- ments for expenses, receiving payment for expenses not in- curred, using Local 423 funds for personal expenses of no benefit to the members of the Union and receiving interest free loans made for fraudulent purposes from union funds. All but one of the substantive counts upon which appellant was convicted were also charged as overt acts. Count XV involved similar self dealing with union funds. At trial, the Government introduced 161 exhibits, con- sisting of thousands of pages of documents, and the testi- mony of eight co-conspirators who had previously pleaded guilty to conspiring with appellant to embezzle union funds. Seventeen other witnesses also testified, including FBI Agent Charles A. Tosi, who prepared Government’s summary ex- hibit, Exhibit 145. The trial lasted eight days. Appellant raises two questions on appeal: One, whether the trial judge erred prejudicially in interrupting the testimony of a Government witness on cross-examination and inviting the Government to object; and Two, whether the trial judge erred prejudicially in admitting Government Exhibit 145 and in admitting the testimony of Special Agent Tosi of the FBI in connection with said exhibit. Testimony of Thomas Needham Thomas Needham, Comptroller of the Laborer’s Interna- tional Union, testified on direct examination to the absence of official union business at various time and places in 1974-76, and also to the issuance of per diem expenses and payments for airfare from the International to appellant on the occasion 3a of the September 1976 International Union convention in Mi- ami, Florida. On cross-examination, he was asked if he were familiar with the practice in some local unions of paying a per diem in addition to funds paid by the International. He re- plied that he did not have “first-hand knowledge” of such a practice. Over the Government’s objection, he was neverthe- less permitted to testify that it was his understanding that the International did permit such a practice, if payment were reasonable, and that some local unions did in fact supplement expenses payments from the International. At this point, the Court inquired further of the witness concerning his personal familiarity with the determination of the reasonableness of payments by the local unions. The witness answered that he had no contact with that determination. At this point, the following exchange occurred: By Mr. Wonnell [appellant’s counsel] Q. Are you familiar with the procedure in some locals of giving a per diem without submission of an ex- pense voucher or an expense account? The Court: I am going to sustain an objection to that. Mr. Palmer: The Government does so object, your Honor. The Court: I will sustain the objection to that. Appellant claims that the Court committed error in sustaining the objection, and suggested bias against appellant by inter- vening before an objection was made by the Government. Although the Court agrees with appellant that the question posed was relevant,' the trial judge committed no error in ruling that the witness could not answer the question at issue. 'The Government argues, inter alia, that the question posed was irrelevant to the crimes charged because appellant was charged with receiving double airfare rather than double per diem. The Court notes that Counts X and XIV included an allegation of double pay- ment of expenses as well as double payment of airfare. 4a The witness had stated at the outset of cross-examination that he lacked personal knowledge of local union practices in regard to additional expense payments and was therefore not com- petent to answer the question. Nor was there any error in the manner in which the trial judge sustained the Government’s objection. A trial judge must not give an impression of partisanship on either side. United States v. Ornstein, 355 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1966). That duty, however, does not require the trial judge to sit idly by while incompetent evidence is presented to the jury. See United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 978-979 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1073 (1977).? The trial judge’s action in this case did not contain any suggestion of bias against the appellant. In addition to the foregoing, the court’s action in inviting objection was particularly appropriate in this instance because the Government had objected moments earlier apparently on the basis of the witness’ lack of personal knowledge of the subject matter. The court overruled the objection at that time. The trial judge may well have felt that the Government would not renew its objection in view of the court’s earlier ruling. In such a case, a ‘rial court would have to give some indication that an objection might be reconsidered before the Government could be expected to bring the matter up again. Government Exhibit 145 and Related Testimony Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in allowing Government Exhibit 145 to be admitted into evidence as well as in permitting Special Agent Charles Tosi to testify con- cerning the exhibit. Appellant argues that the exhibit was inadmissible and prejudicial because it summarized the in- 2 United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977), was overruled by United States v. Hol- linger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1977), on a different issue from that presented here. ta a 5a dictment and part of the Government’s proof, thereby con- stituting conclusion and argument, and that Agent Tosi’s tes- timony contained improper conclusions and argument. Exhibit 145 consisted of a series of large charts. The first chart summarized all the charges contained in the indictment. Each of the remaining charts summarized a count or an overt act, or both, by reproducing, or making reference to, some of the documentary proof already in evidence. The only references in Exhibit 145 that were not to documents ad- mitted previously into evidence were several statements in the charts that union records did not contain certain informa- tion. The charts were authenticated by Agent Tosi. There was no prejudicial error committed by the admission of Exhibit 145. In regard to the summary of the indictment, the rule is clear that the trial judge has discretion to submit the indictment to the jury in a criminal case as long as limiting instructions are given to the effect that the indictment is not to * be considered as evidence of the guilt of the accused. See Garner v. United States, 244 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832; United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1244 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974). Such a charge was given in this case. Indeed, the actual in- dictment was submitted to the jury in this case, and appellant raises no objection in that regard. Nor can appellant claim that he was prejudiced by this chart because it was a summary rather than a copy of the full in- dictment. Not only was the Government’s summary not in- flammatory or prejudicially worded, the summary contained only enough description of the charges to remind the jury of the substance of each count. The trial judge carefully charged the jury as to all of the elements necessary for con- viction on each count. The summary of the indictment clearly was intended to aid the jury in organizing the proof and no rights of appellant were prejudiced by its admission into evi- dence. Cf. United States v. Swan, 396 F.2d 883, 886-887 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923. 6a The remainder of Exhibit 145 consisted of a summary of some of the objective proof relating to a number of the counts and overt acts charged. The Government argues that the exhibit was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 1006, which pro- vides as follows: The contents of voluninous writings, recordings, or pho- tographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court. Insofar as Exhibit 145 contained summaries of other ex- hibits in evidence, appellant contends that Rule 1006 does not apply because each document listed could have been, and was, examined at the time of its admission. There is no re- quirement in Rule 1006, however, that it be literally impossible to examine the underlying records before a summary or chart may be utilitzed. All that is required for the rule to apply is that the underlying “writings” be “voluminous” and that in- court examination not be convenient. With 161 exhibits, in- volving facts relevant to sixteen counts and twenty-one overt acts, comprehension of the exhibits would have been dif- ficult, and certainly would have been inconvenient, without the charts utilized by the Government. See United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing en banc denied, 576 F.2d 931. } Exhibit 145 also contained written statements that union records did not contain certain information, primarily au- thorization for travel. Appellant argues that this information is not covered by Rule 1006 because this is information that records do not contain, and thus is not a summary of their contents as required by the rule. Appellant admits that the underlying union records could have been introduced to prove the nonoccurrence of the . relevant matters under Fed.R.Evid. 803(7). If the records eee Ta themselves could have been admitted to show what their con- tents did not include, there appears to be no reason why Rule 1006 would not apply to a summary of their contents. It is true that in such an instance the content of the records is negative, but that does not render the fact of omission any less an accurate summary of the content of the records. The Court is strengthened in this conclusion by the similar view of 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1230 (Chadbourn rev. 1972): [T]estimony, by one who has examined records, that no record of a specific tenor is there contained is re- ceivable instead of producing the entire mass for perusal in the courtroom. (Emphasis in original ) It is to this section in Wigmore, though apparently to an earlier edition, that the Advisory Committee referred in its explanatory note for Rule 1006. See Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 345-346 (1972) (Advisory Committee’s Note); cf. United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179®)183 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing en banc denied, 557 F.2d 823, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862. Of course even under Rule 1006, the summary or chart must be accurate, authentic and properly introduced before it may be admitted in evidence. See United States v. Denton, 556 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892. In this regard appellant urges in general terms that Exhibit 145 is replete with characterizations and conclusions, and is deceptive. After a careful examination of Exhibit 145, the Court is unable to find any misleading or conclusory ref- erences. Exhibit 145 appears to present merely an organiza- tion of some of the undisputed objective evidence in terms of the relevant counts of the indictment. Appellant also complains that the charts were too large and that the authenticating testimony was insufficient because Agent Tosi was not an expert. Size alone does not render inadmissible an exhibit containing otherwise unobjectionable 8a objective evidence. Cf. United States v. Nathan, 536 F.2d 988, 992 n. 5 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 930. Given the nature of Exhibit 145, it is difficult to see how Agent Tosi’s lack of expertise could have prejudiced appellant. The chart did not contain complicated calculations that would require an expert for accuracy. In order to authenticate Exhibit 145 it was necessary only that Agent Tosi had properly catalogued the exhibits previously admitted and had knowledge of the analysis of the union records referred to in the exhibit. Neither of these requirements necessitated any special expertise. As the one who supervised the compilation of Exhibit 145, Agent Tosi was the proper person to attest to the authenticity and accuracy of the chart. See Weinstein’s Evidence, J 1006[06]. Entirely aside from Rule 1006, there would still be ample authority for the admission of Exhibit 145 into evidence. There is an established tradition, both within this circut and in other circuits, that permits a summary of evidence to be put before the jury with proper limiting instructions. See e.g., Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951); Epstein v. United States, 246 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868; Barber v. United States, 271 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); United States v. Rath, 406 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920; United States v. Lattus, 512 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1975); Carlson v. United States, 187 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1951); Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828; United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897; United States v. Lawhon, 499 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing en banc denied, 502 F.2d 1168, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975). These cases normally involve violation of income tax laws but there has never been any formal distinction between the use of summaries in that type of case and in other types of criminal cases. Cf. United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534, 538 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831, and United States v. Jalbert, 9a 504 F.2d 892, 894 (Ist Cir. 1974) (both citing United States v. Gordon, supra, a case involving misapplication of bank funds). Some cases allow the summary of purely testimonial evidence, e.g., Epstein v. United States, 246 F.2d at 570; Barber v. United Stutes, supra, so strictly speaking, such sum- maries cannot be said to come within the requirements of Rule 1006. The purpose of the summaries in these cases is simply to aid the jury in its examination of the evidence al- ready admitted. See United States v. Downen, supra. Au- thority for such summaries is not usually cited, but would certainly exist under Fed.R.Evid. 611(a). See Weinstein’s Evidence {| 1006[03]. The danger of permitting presentation of a summary of some of the evidence in a criminal case is plain. The jury might rely upon the alleged facts in the summary as if these facts had already been proved, cf. United States v. Moody, 339 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1003 (1967), or as a substitute for assessing the credibility of wit- nesses. Cf. Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957), rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 875. This danger has led to the requirement of “guarding instructions” to the effect that the chart is not itself evidence but is only an aid in evaluating the evidence. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 128 (1954); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d at 461. Even with such instructions, a summary may still be considered as too con- clusory or as emphasizing too much certain portions of the Government’s case, or as presenting incompetent facts. See United States v. Conlin, supra; United States v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975); Elder v. United States, 213 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 901, rehearing denied 348 U.S. 922 (1955). Trial courts may take care that such unfair summaries are not presented to juries. Despite the danger, however, most summaries are routinely admitted. See cases, supra. In fact, not only are the sum- 10a maries themselves admitted, but computations and evalua- tions are often permitted on the basis of such summaries. E.g., Epstein v. United States, supra. In contrast to such extensive use, this appeal presents a very limited utilization of an evidence summary. The facts of the case were complex. Thus the summary was likely to have been very helpful to the jury. The facts summarized were entirely objective, and, for all that appears from this appeal, uncontested. No issue of credibility was presented. The exhibit was in no sense conclusory, but stated the facts shown in a neutral way. The facts summarized did not even directly undermine appellant’s theory of the case. Finally, the trial judge did instruct the jury as to the limited purpose that such a summary could serve.? Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court improperly permitted Agent Tosi to deliver a closing argument during his authentication of the summary. Ultimately the trial court accepted appellant’s objection and limited Agent Tosi’s testi- mony. Because Exhibit 145 was essentially a presentation of objective material which aided the jury in remembering portions of the evidence and sorting out the charges, there was really no need for Agent Tosi to restate the portions of the evidence contained in Exhibit 145. Under these circum- 3 Appellant has not specifically raised the issue of permitting such a summary to go to the jury during deliberations. At is appears that Exhibit 145 did accompany the jury, appellant’s objection to this course may be viewed as implicit. It is certainly not unsual for such demonstrative evidence to go to the jury. See United States v. Downen, supra; United States v. Goichman, 407 F.Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd 547 F.2d 778. In most cases, however, once the summary is con- sidered properly admitted, the issue of its going to the jury is not separately raised. It appear: generally that when such summaries are kept from the jury, it is either because they were not properly offered into evidence, cf. Gordon v. United States, supra, or because the summary was considered unfair or unreliable for the reasons listed above. See Steele v. United States, supra; cf. United States v. Abbas, supra. For essentially the same reasons we rule that this ex- hiL# was properly admitted, we conclude that no right of appellant was prejudiced by its submission to the jury. ee lla stances, it would perhaps have been preferable had the trial judge ruled from the start of Agent Tosi’s testimony that Exhibit 145 was essentially self-explanatory. The Court need not decide this issue, however, because the early portion of Agent Tosi’s testimony consisted of an accurate recounting of certain objective evidence already before the jury. No rights of appellant could have been prejudiced by such a recital. 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