# Petition — Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2743%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 442 U.S. 929

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S
FILED

APR 2 1979

ABL RODAK, JR., CLERK

{
‘
. 5

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1978

CITICORP,

Petitioner,
against

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Joun E. Horrmay, JR.
JoHN J. RocHE

SHEARMAN & STERLING Attorneys for Petitioner

Anprew S. O’Connor 53 Wall Street

Henry 8S. WEISBURG New York, New York 10005
Of Counsel : (212) 483-1000

April 2, 1979

In i ad me

iD tT Os salesbeeesoabbhnn

I Tr cece eneniencrensaianicn remanent

AE LT OE Ter eee

OE IES SEL TR SSA PP PO

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT _____________-___-

I.

II.

IIT.

Interpretations as to the Meaning of This
Section of the Bank Holding Company Act
Should Not Be Permitted to Vary Among
A CEES SE eA Ee Yo

The Court of Appeals Wholl¥ Disregarded
.Facts That Are Part of theRecord _______-

The Court of Appeals Misapprehended the
Congressional Purpose of the Statute
Te a Nid ehsdeerbdnnton

CoNcLUSION eas Ch ailiieibinaeriscinorsaunceiebieapesdhaneipmtoen

Appenpix A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals -___-

Appenpix B—Portions of Section 4 of the Bank Hold-

ing Company Act of 1956, as amended,
I A os a

to

5
PAGE
CasEs
Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 583
Pg eZ Es | NRE eerel ee egern ae 10
Citicorp v. Board of Gcvernors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1979) ______ passim

North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. v.
Board cf Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tom, 005 7.20 28 (7th Cir. 1977) _......._.._.. 6, 7

Tri-State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, 524 F.2d 562

oy BE. Sa RR RST REM te Geo ES
STaTuTEs
12 U.S.C. § 1842(b), §3 of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956, as amended _________-________ 6
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c), § 4(¢) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956, as amended _________________ passim

12 U.S.C. § 1848, § 9 of the Bank Holding Company
Bet Of lees, OF enees 6. lt

Oe ee SED hind enceiine une 1

OrHeR AUTHORITIES
Application by Citicorp, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 321

EI sbchearisbints Scho oeic ss, << cocaieape eee Ulesanle aka gepeteeslacd akan 15
12 Code of Federal Regulations § 225.4(b)(2) ____ 4,8,9
12 Code of Federal Regulations § 262.3(b) ________ 4
Federal Reserve Board Form F.R. Y-4B, 3 Fed.

Banking L. Rep. (CCH) { 44,058 (1977) ________ 8
H.R. Rep. 91-387, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ______ 10

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TErm, 1978

BN ete
CiTI1coRP,
Petitioner,
against
Boarp oF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SyYsTEM,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

Citicorp petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit which denied a petition for review and
affirmed an order of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System which purportedly denied Citicorp’s
application for approval to retain ownership of the Ad-
vance Mortgage Corporation.

Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A) is
reported at 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1979). The opinion of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(‘‘Board’’) is reported at 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 321 (1978).

Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered Jan-
uary 2, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

Question Presented
Is Citicorp’s application to retain ownership of Advance
Mortgage Corporation (‘‘ Advance’’) ‘‘deemed to have been
granted’’ by operation of law by reason of the failure of the
Board to act on the application within the ninety-one-day
period prescribed by § 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)?

Statute Involved
The statute involved is the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, as amended (the ‘‘ Act,’’ relevant portions of which
are set out at Appendix B), and specifically § 4(c), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(¢), which provides in part:

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any
application for an order under paragraph (8) of this

subsection within the ninety-one-day period which be--

gims on the date of submission to the Board of the
complete record on that application, the application
shall be deemed to have been granted.

(Emphasis added.)

Statement
In July 1970, Citicorp acquired 100 percent of the
voting stock of Advance Mortgage Corporation. At the
time of its acquisition, Advance maintained 19 offices located
in 11 states. By late 1977, Advance had grown to 44 offices
located in 22 states, which were engaged in:

(i) the origination and placement with institutional
investors of Federal Housing Administration, Veterans
Administration and ‘‘conventional’’ mortgage loans on
one-to-four family residences ;

(ii) the servicing of mortgage loans for institutional
investors;

(iii) the origination and servicing of mobile home
installment contract loans to be held for investment,

3

and the extension of credit to mobile home dealers for
the financing of inventory; and

(iv) the extension of credit secured by second mort-
gages on one-to-four family residential properties and
the servicing of such loans.

Advance is not a dominant force in the industry or in
any local geographic market. Advance operates in 27
SMSA’s,* in 24 of which it originates less than two percent
of the one-to-four family residential mortgage loans. In the
other three SMSA’s, Advance’s market share is 3.5 percent
or less. The number of competitors in the areas serviced by
Advance ranges from 12 to 109. In 1976, Advance was re-
sponsible for originating only 1.8 percent of the dollar vol-
ume of all one-to-four family mortgage loans made by mort-
gage bankers, and only 0.31 percent of such loans made by
the entire mortgage finance industry.

Following the acquisition of Advance, Citicorp, as a
result of a statutory amendment, fell within the definition of
a bank holding company covered by the Act. Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1763. As such,
Citicorp would be prohibited from retaining its shares of
Advance after December 31, 1980, unless the Board granted
approval for retention under § 4(c)(8) of the Act.

In 1973, Citicorp (then known as First National City
Corporation) applied to the Board for approval to retain
Advance. The Board determined that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that the public benefits produced by the
retention of Advance would outweigh the possible adverse
effects. However, the Board noted that Citicorp had applied
for retention approval well ahead of the statutory deadline
and that additional evidence might become available to

* An SMSA is a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; sec,
County and City Data Book—1972, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, at xxi.

4

Citicorp before the deadline. \ccordingly, the Board denied
the 1973 application without prejudice to renewal. 60 Fed.
Res. Bull. 50 (1973)

On October 28, 1977, Citicorp filed a new application to
retain Advance, which was submitted by Citicorp to the
Board by delivery to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, as required by the Board’s Regulations. 12 C.F.R.
$$ 225.4(b)(2) and 262.3(b). As also required by the
Board, within the thirty days prior to filing the application
Citicorp published a notice, in late September, in 45 news-
- papers in 25 states announcing the application. This notice,
which stated that comments on the application would be
accepted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for
thirty days, was published pursuant to the Board’s Regula-
tions, and in compliance with the statutory requirement of

‘‘due notice and opportunity for hearing.’’ 12 U.S.C. :

§ 1843(c) (8); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2). No comments were
received.

After analysis of the application, the Federal Reserve
Bank, by letter dated November 18, 1977, requested Citi-
corp to provide specific additional information. On Decem-
ber 5, 1977, Citicorp complied by delivering the requested
documents, by hand, to the offices of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. By letter dated December 13, 1977, the
Federal Reserve Bank acknowledged that Citicorp’s Decem-
ber 5 submission had completed the record for the Board’s
consideration and that the application had been forwarded
to the Board’s office in Washington, D.C. The record is
unclear as to when the application actually arrived at the
Board’s office.*

Thereafter, the Board received no additional material
or relevant information concerning Citicorp’s retention

* The opinion of the Court of Appeals at one point states that the
application was received on December 13 (Citicorp v. Board, supra,
589 F.2d at 1187, App. A at 7a) and at another, on December 14 (id.,
589 F.2d at 1189, App. A at 12a). In fact, the record does not show
the actual date of receipt.

5

application. On January 9, 1978, the Board published a
notice of Citicorp’s application in the Federal Register,
which invited interested persons to submit comments to the
Board by January 27. No comments were received in
response to this second invitation for comments. Sometime
in January or February 1978, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York requested Advance’s 1977 year-end financial
statements. These were provided to the Board by Citicorp,
which specifically stated its belief that the financial state-
ments were unnecessary and that it did not acquiesce in any
extension of the statutory mandate that an application
under § 4(c)(8) be acted upon within ninety-one days.

The Board did not act upon Citicorp’s retention appli-
cation until the ninety-eighth day after Citicorp’s final
relevant submission of December 5. On March 13, 1978,
the Board issued an order (‘‘ March 13 Order’’) purporting
to deny the application. 64:-Fed. Res. Bull. 321 (1978).
(The year-end financial statements of Advance were not a
factor in the Board’s ultimate decision, or in the decision
of the Court of Appeals.)

Citicorp thereupon petitioned the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review and reversal
of the March 13 Order, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1848. Citi-
corp argued, inter alia, that the ninety-one day statutory
period commenced on December 5, 1977, the day that Citi-
corp made its final relevant submission to the Board’s
designated agent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Therefore, the application was ‘‘deemed granted’’ ninety-
one days later, on March 6, 1978, seven days prior to the
Board’s belated March 13 Order.

. The court below held that the ninety-one-day statutory
time period ‘‘began no earlier than January 28, 1978,’’
following the close of the second comment period, thus
rendering the March 13 Order timely. Ctiicorp v. Board,
supra, 589 F.2d at 1189, App. A at 13a. The panel also
expressed its opinion that the statutory period could not

6

commence before the time the application was received at
the Washington, D.C., office of the Board from the New
York Federal Reserve Bank.

Reasons for Granting the Writ
This appeal brings before this Court for resolution an
explicit conflict between the decision below and the rule of
law established in the decisions of another court of appeals,
as well as an important question as to the meaning of the
Bank Holding Company Act.

Interpretations as to the Meaning of This
Section of the Bank Holding Company Act Should
Not Be Permitted to Vary Among Circuits

The decision below, as the Court of Appeals itself recog- °

nized, is in direct conflict with the decisions of another cir-
cuit. The Seventh Circuit, to date the only other circuit to
construe the ninety-one-day rule, held in 7'ri-State Bancor-
poration, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975), that ‘‘the 91-day
period of § 1842(b) [and § 1843(c)] begins to run when the
final material needed for the Fed’s decision is received from
the various interested sources outside of the Fed. ...’’ Id.,
at 566. The Seventh Circuit has adhered to this rule in sub-
sequent cases.”

The Second Circuit has only considered the ninety-one
day rule in this case, in which it held that ‘‘ordinarily the
91-day period does not begin until at least expiration of the
period for comments upon an application.’’ Citicorp v.
Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, App. A at 8a. In a footnote
following this holding, the Second Circuit set out the rule
of the Seventh Circuit, and then candidly stated: ‘‘Thus

* See, North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 553 F.2d 23 (7th Cir.
1977). »

7

it would appear that in that circuit the time period could
start earlier than the close of the comment period, see North
Lawndale, supra, 553 F.2d at 26-27 [7th Cir. 1977].’’
Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, n.9, App. A at 8a.
The import of this footnote is clear: the court concedes that
the measure of the ninety-one-day period varies depending
upon the circuit in which the issue is litigated.

The Seventh Circuit would have disregarded the January
27 close of the comment period (during which no comment
was received) and would have looked to the actual receipt
of relevant material. Such was the case in North Lawndale,
supra, in which the statutory period was held to commence
just four days following the announcement of a comment
period, which was the day when the final relevant submission
was received. (A comment period is generally thirty days
long. See, Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1188, App.
A at 9a.)

The Second Circuit, to the contrary, would not begin the
statutory count until the close of the comment period, with-
out regard to the receipt of any information. For the ap-
plicant this difference in interpretation is significant, as
the Second Circuit view can potentially add weeks of delay.

Congress commanded that the Board act within ninety-
one days. Those ninety-one days should be determined by
the same factors whether the bank holding company happens
to be located in the Second Circuit or the Seventh. The
resolution of these conflicting decisions is important. Bank
holding companies have a continuing need, incidental to
their growth and the expansion of the services they offer
to.the public, to apply for Board rulings under § 4(c) (8)
of the Act. It is essential that the ninety-one-day time limit
within which the Board must act be subject to uniform and
consistent administration.

8
vif

The Court of Appeals Wholly Disregarded
Facts That Are Part of the Record

The public comment periods are a creation of the
Board—not of the statute. The court below decided, how-
ever, that the statutory requirement of ‘‘due notice and
opportunity for hearing,’’ 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (8), signified
that the ninety-one-day period ‘‘does not begin until at
least expiration of the period for comments upon an ap-
plication.’’ Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1187, App.
A at 8a. Even assuming, arguendo, that this rule is con-
sistent with the statutory purpose, the panel’s ultimate con-
clusion that the ninety-one days commenced after January
27 entirely ignored the critical fact that January 27 was

the expiration of the second comment period regarding.

Citicorp’s application.

The Board’s rule about notice procedures applicable here
states :

Every such application shall be accompanied by a copy
of a notice of the proposal (in substantially the same
form as [form] F.R. Y-4B) published within the pre-
ceding 30 days in a newspaper of general circulation
in the communities to be served. The Board will publish
in the Federal Register notice of any such application
and will give interested persons an opportunity to ex-
press their views ....

12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2).

The recommended notice set forth in form F.R. Y-4B
contains the following language: ‘‘ Persons wishing to com-
ment on this proposal should submit their views in writing
within 30 days of the date of publication of this notice
to...’’ the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank. See, 3 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) {| 44,058 (1977).

9

Citicorp satisfied the notice provisions of 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(b) (2) before filing its application to retain Advance
on October 28, 1977. Citicorp’s notice, in the form pre-
scribed by the Board, was placed in 45 newspapers of gener-
al circulation in 25 states on or about September 28, 1977.
This notice invited comments, and asked that any comments
upon Citicorp’s application be directed to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York within 30 days of publication.

The Court of Appeals ignored this first notice period,
certainly a significant omission. Instead, it erroneously
relied upon the second, and redundant, notice which ap-
peared in the Federal Register of January 9, 1978, more
than one month after Citicorp’s final relevant submission.
If, as the court below did recognize, the purpose of the
ninety-one-day rule was to encourage the expeditious dis-
position of applications, to eliminate ‘‘sluggish Board
action,’’ Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d at 1186, App. A
at 6a, and to require the Board to act with ‘‘reasonable
promptness”’ id., at 1188, App. A at 9a, duplicative and
time consuming procedures cannot be condoned. The court
adopted the theory that ‘‘the expiration of the period for
comments’’ was controlling, yet failed to apply this rule to
the facts in the record before it.

The Court of Appeals Misepprehended the Congressional
Purpose of the Statute Before It

The Second Circuit, in holding that the ninety-one-day
period did not commence prior to the close of the comment
period on January 27, and in suggesting that the time period
could not have commenced prior to receipt of the application
at.the Board’s office in Washington on or about December
13, has failed to recognize either the Congressional purpose
underlying the time limit or the chain of events surrounding
Citicorp’s application.

The legislative history of the ninety-one-day time limit
makes very clear that it was imposed to correct the Board’s
practice of unduly delaying the processing of applications.

10

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 91-387, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 13
(1970). Both the Second and the Seventh Circuits have
stated that the purpose of the time limit would not be
achieved if the Board or its agents retained the power to
control its passage: ‘‘The rule would lose much of its effec-
tiveness ... if the Fed had discretion to determine when
the 91-day period begins to run.’’ Central Wisconsin
Bankshares, 'nc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 583 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir. 1978) (cited
favorably in Citicorp v. Board, swpra, 589 F.2d at 1187,
App. A at 8a). Yet the two events which the Second Circuit
recognizes as potentially opening the ninety-one day period
are both within the absolute control of the Board or the
local Federal Reserve Bank, the Board’s agent by dele-
gation in the processing of applications.

One such event was the acknowledgement, ou December:

13, 1977, by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of the
prior receipt of the complete Citicorp application and the
announcement that the application had been transmitted to
Washington. The other such event, which the court below
recognized as paramount in this case, was the close of the
second comment period on the day fixed by the Board,
January 27, 1978, without any comment having been re-
ceived. It is plain that both of these events are within the
Board’s control, and thus afford it the opportunity to defeat
the legislative purpose underlying the statute. See, Tri-
State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board, supra.

The history of Citicorp’s application illustrates the ne-
cessity of a rule limiting the discretion of the Board and the
Reserve Banks to control the statutory clock. The New York
Reserve Bank took a total of 46 days to consider the applica-
tion before forwarding it to the Board. It had the initial
application for 21 days—from October 28 to November 18—
before it requested specific additional information from
Citicorp. The New York Reserve Bank then had the com-
plete application for an additional eight days—from Decem-
5 through December 13. Yet the Second Circuit would ex-

11

clude these 46 days of analysis and processing from the stat-
utory ninety-one days.

While the Second Circuit recognized that Congress was
aware of the practice of having a local Reserve Bank ‘‘clean
up’’ applications prior to transmission to Washington,
Citicorp v. Board, supra, 589 F.2d 1187, App. A at 7a, it is
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute for that court
to grant the Board a series of undefined and discretionary
‘clean up’’ periods outside of the ninety-one days per-
mitted under the statute. Such a view can only encourage
the ‘‘sluggishness’’ the statute was designed to eliminate.

CONCLUSION

This petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted,
and upon review the decision of the court below should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun E. Horrman, Jr.
Joun J. Rocus

Attorneys for Petitioner
53 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 483-1000

SHEARMAN & STERLING

Anprew S, O’Connor

Henry S. WeEispuRrG
Of Counsel

April 2, 1979

la

Appendix A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circuit

No. 103—August Term, 1978.

(Argued November 1, 1978
Decided and Filed January 2, 1979.)

Docket No. 78-4039

CrTIcorP,
Petitioner,
—against—
Boarp oF GOVERNORS OF THE
FeperAL Reserve System,
Respondent.

Before:
F'ernBerc, TimMBEeRS and Moore,
Circuit Judges.

Petition for review of order of Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System denying petitioner’s appli-
cation to retain ownership of a nonbanking subsidiary.

Joun E. Horrman, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Shear-
man & Sterling, New York, N.Y., John J.
Roche, Andrew S. O’Connor, of Counsel),
for Petitioner.

2a

Frepp: Liestern, Attorney, Appellate Section,
Civil Division, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. (Barbara Allen Babcock,
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald R.
Glanez, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil
Division, Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, D.C., Neal L. Petersen, General Coun-
sel, J. Virgil Mattingly, Attorney, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D.C., of Counsel), for Re-
spondent.

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:

Citicorp, a bank holding company under the Bank Hold-.

ing Company Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1850, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, denying Citi-
corp’s application to retain ownership of Advance Mortgage
Corporation.' Citicorp contends that under a specific
provision in the Act, the application had to be deemed
granted by the Board’s failure to rule on it within the
statutory time limit of 91 days. Citicorp also argues that
even if the Board’s order was timely, the Board applied
incorrect legal standards in denying the application and
the order is. not supported by substantial evidence. For
reasons given below, we deny the petition for review and
affirm the order of the Board.

I

The Bank Holding Company Act generally prohibits
_ bank holding companies from engaging in nonbank activ-

1. This court has jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1848.

3a

ities. 12 U.S.C. § 1843. In 1970, the Act was amended to
cover for the first time one-bank holding companies such
as Citicorp. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, 84 Stat. 1760. Absent approval of the Board, these
companies must cease nonbank activities and divest shares
of nonbank companies by December 31, 1980.2 12 U.S.C.
§ 1848(a)(2). In ruling on bank holding company applica-
tions to retain ownership or control of a company engaged in
nonbank activities, the Board is instructed to vonsider vari-
ous factors affecting the public interest, more fully discussed
in Part III below. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(¢)(8). Section 4(c) of
the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(¢), provides that if the Board fails
to act upon such an application within 91 days, the applica-
tion is ‘‘deemed . . . granted.’’

In July 1970, petitioner Citicorp, now the second
largest banking corporation in the United States, acquired
all the voting shares of Advance Mortgage Corporation,
now the nation’s second largest mortgage banking company.
Citicorp applied to the Board in 1973 to retain Advance,
but was unsuccessful. In 1977, Citicorp again submitted
an application, the subject of this appeal.

At this point, the precise dates of various events become
potentially significant, so we will list them in more detail
than might otherwise be necessary. Citicorp submitted its
application to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on
October 28, 1977.4 On November 18, 1977, the Reserve

2. There are exceptions to the divestiture requirement not perti-
nent here.

3. The Board denied this application in December 1973, but the
ruling was without prejudice to renewal prior to the statutory deadline
should Citicorp believe more persuasive evidence of public benefits had
become available.

4. Board regulations require applications to be filed with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank in the district in which the applicant is located.
12 C.F.R. § 262.3(b).

4a

Bank requested additional information, which Citicorp
delivered to the Bank on December 5, 1977. On December
13, the Bank forwarded the application to the Board in
Washington, D. C., and sent Citicorp a letter formally
acknowledging receipt of the application. The Board’s
public notice, dated December 30, 1977, soliciting comments
on the application, was published on January 9, 1978 in the
Federal Register. On January 17, Citicorp released its 1977
year-end financial statements and routinely forwarded a
copy to the Board. Also on January 17, the Board received
a staff memorandum from the New York Reserve Bank
containing its analysis of, and recommendation on, Citi-
corp’s proposed retention of Advance. The public comment
period closed on January 27, 1978. Around February 3,
1978 the Board requested the 1977 year-end financial state-
ments of Advance, which Citicorp supplied on February 8,
stating that by doing so it did not acquiesce in the tolling or
re-starting of the 91-day statutory time limit. On March
10, 1978 the Board requested, and Citicorp furnished, infor-
mation concerning the extent of Advance’s dependence on
Citicorp for managerial resources.

The Board denied Citicorp’s application on March 13,
1978 for reasons discussed in greater detail below. These
may for present purposes be briefly summarized as holding
that Citicorp had not sufficiently justified an exemption.
Shortly thereafter, Citicorp filed its petition for review in
this court. .

II

As already indicated, the key provision of the Act on
this petition for review is section 4(c), which provides in
pertinent part: |

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on
any application for an order under paragraph (8) of
this subsection within the ninety-one-day period which

_—_—-

5a

begins on the date of submission to the Board of the
complete record on that application, the application
shall be deemed to have been granted.

The crucial question with regard to the timeliness of the
Board’s order under this section is when the 91-day statu-
tory period began, an issue not previously considered in this
circuit.’ Citicorp contends that since the Board received
no outside comments on the proposed retention of Advance,
the application itself became the ‘‘complete record on that
application.’’ Thus, the time period started running on
December 5, 1977, the date when Citicorp submitted the
final additions to the application to the New York Reserve
Bank, and the application was ‘‘deemed’’ granted 91 days
later, on March 6, 1978.

The Board argues that Congress intended the 91-day
period to commence only after all the data relevant to the
Board’s decision has been assembled. Thus, according to
the Board, the earliest the time clock could have begun to
run is December 13, when the application was forwarded
from the New York Reserve Bank to the Board in Washing-

5. The Seventh Circuit, however, had decided several cases rais-
ing similar issues. See Tri-State Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975)
(construing both § 1842(b) and § 1843(c)) ; First Lincolnwood Corp.
v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 546 F.2d 718 (7th
Cir. 1976) (construing § 1842(b)), modified en banc on other
grounds, 560 F.2d 258 (1977), reversed, —— U.S.——, 99 S.Ct.
505, 58, L.Ed.2d 484 (1978) ; North Lawndale Economic Develop-
ment Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 553
F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1977) (construing both § 1842(b) and § 1843(c));
Central Wisconsin Bankshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed-
eral Reserve System, 583 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1978) (construing
§ 1842(b)). In addition, one case on the issue is pending in the
Ninth Circuit. BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, Civ. No. 77-1005 (N.D.Cal.1977), appeal docketed,
No. 77-3629 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1977). See also Blackstone Valley Nat'l
Bank v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 537 F.2d
1146 (1st Cir. 1976).

6a°

ton. Since this was only 90 days prior to the Board’s
March 13 order denying the application, that order was
timely and the automatic grant of section 4(c) was not
triggered. The Board goes on, however, to suggest a
number of alternative theories which would start the run-
ning of the 91-day time period much later, e.g., publication
of notice in the Federal Register, expiration of the comment
period after such notice and receipt of the year-end finan-
cials of Citicorp and Advance, the staff recommendation
from the New York Reserve Bank and the information
concerning Advance’s dependence on Citicorp. Petitioner
replies that the dates proposed by the Board relate to events
within the Board’s control, and that use of those occur-
rences to trigger the 91-day limit would render the statutory
time constraint meaningless. Citicorp also asserts that the
year-end financial statements did not provide any new data

and that a Board request for irrelevant and unnecessary ©

material should not re-start the time period.

The issues raised by these volleys back and forth are not
simply resolved, since the language of section 4(c) is suscep-
tible of conflicting interpretations. But contrary to peti-
tioner’s contention, the phrases ‘‘complete record’’ and
‘‘submission to the Board’’ imply that Congress at least did
not intend the 91-day period to start as soon as a completed
application is filed with a local Reserve Bank. The leg-
islative history tends to support this view. The 91-day
requirement of section 4(c), enacted as part of the 1970
amendments, was obviously a response to sluggish Board
action in the past. See H.R.Rep. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1969). Cf. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d
500 (1978). Yet, even a chief proponent of the new rule,
when asked whether the 91-day period allowed enough time
for consideration of complex applications, responded that
the time would not begin to run until the application was

7a>

‘‘cleaned up.’ He explained that the statutory period
would start when ‘‘[the Fed] was ready to investigate at
the Board level and felt all they had to do was deliberate
and not hunt for additional facts and send it back.’ It is
apparent that Congress was aware of the practice whereby
applications were ‘‘cleaned up’’ by the local Reserve Bank
and then forwarded to the Board. In this context, the
words ‘‘submission to the Board’’ are significant, and we
reject petitioner’s argument that they mean ‘‘ receipt within
the Federal Reserve System.’’

A holding that the time period did not start until receipt
of the application by the Board on December 13, 1977 would
dispose of this case,* and it is tempting to stop there. We
believe, however, that sound judicial administration re-
quires consideration of at least one later starting point
suggested by the Board. The statute requires ‘‘due notice
and opportunity for hearing’’ upon an application such as
the one here involved. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). See also
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2). Even if no comments are received;
the lack of objection to the proposal is an important fact
for the Board, which is not confirmed until the close of the
comment period. Further, a rule that if there are no com-
ments the time period starts upon receipt of the applica-
tion, but if comments are received the time period is re-
started, would place the Board in somewhat of a dilemma.

6. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., testifying on behalf of the Associa-
tion of Registered Bank Holding Companies, Hearings On Bills to.
Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Before the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 961 (1970).

7. Id.
8. Such a holding is apparently consistent with the Seventh Cir-

~s position. See North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 24,

8a:

In order to assure the full 91 days for careful deliberation,
the Board would have to assume that no comments would be
received and begin intensive deliberations during the com-
ment period. Then if there were comments that altered the
focus of inquiry or changed the information available to
the Board, the initial deliberations might become useless.
We do not think Congress intended to force the Board
either to waste time in possibly premature deliberations
or to sacrifice part of its 91 days for decision-making.
Thus we hold that ordinarily the 91-day period does not
begin until at least expiration of the period for comments
upon an application.?

We recognize that the purpose of the statute could be
undercut if the local Reserve Bank unduly delays in for-
warding an application to the Board, or if the Board delays

in publishing notice, or allows an unreasonably long period .

for comments. Concern with Board control of the com-
mencement of the time period also has been expressed by
the Seventh Circuit in its opinions dealing with the 91-day
time limit.'? Most recently, that court stated:

The purpose of the 91-day rule was to counteract
the dilatoriness of the Fed. The rule would lose much
of its effectiveness in serving this purpose if the Fed
had discretion to determine when the 91-day period
begins to run. (Citation omitted).

Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at
296.

9. The Seventh Circuit rule is that the time clock starts when
“the final material needed for the Fed’s decision is received from the
various interested sources outside of the Fed,” Tri-State, supra note
5, 524 F.2d at 566, followed in First Lincolnwood, supra note 5, 546
F.2d at 721; North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 28. Thus it
would appear that in that circuit the time period could start earlier
than the close of the comment period, see North Lawndale, supra, 553
F.2d at 26-27.

10. Tri-State, supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 566; North Lawndale,
supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 27.

9a

Although Congress did not place an explicit deadline
on completion of the Board’s pre-deliberation activities,
we think the Board’s discretion to determine the start of
the 91-day time period is limited by the implicit statutory
requirement that these activities be accomplished with rea-
sonable promptness. Since the Board has chosen to have
applications initially processed by local Reserve Banks, see
note 4 supra, it is the Board’s responsibility to oversee their
performance of this activity. Thus any undue delay at
the Reserve Bank level in forwarding the application should
be substracted from the 91 days allotted to the Board. It
is also the duty of the Board promptly to publish notice
upon receipt of an application and to provide for a reason-
ably short comment period. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b) (2).
We were informed at oral argument that an internal unpub-
lished Board regulation provides for publication of notice
within two weeks of receipt of an application and for a
comment period of thirty days.'' These objective guide-
lines adequately curtail the potential for Board control or
manipulation of the time limit. However, we suggest that
the Board add reasonably defined time periods to its al-
ready formally adopted and published regulations on this
topic so the public and applicants can be assured of no
undue delays.

11. A 1972 Federal Reserve opinion letter stated :

It should be noted that, at a minimum, the complete record
on a given application cannot be ready for submission to the
Board prior to the expiration of any comment period. Normally,
notice of an application is published in the Federal Register
within five to seven days following acceptance of the application
by a Reserve Bank. Generally 30 days are allowed for comment
from interested persons, from the public, and from Federal and
State supervisory authorities.

Letter from Federal Reserve System to Mr. Donald L. Rogers,
Executive Director, Association of Registered Bank Holding Com-
panies, Nov. 14, 1972, quoted in part in C. Blaine, Federal Regulation
of Bank Holding Companies at 3-7 (1973).

10a

The Board further suggests that after the period al-
lowed for notice and comment, there may be instances when
new data, such as the financial statements in this case, first
become available. Or, the Board may discover during de-
liberations that further information would be helpful. The
Board urges us to hold that the 91-day period does not
start to run until such additional material is received, a
position accepted by the Seventh Circuit so long as the
new material is both relevant and necessary to the Board’s
decision.'2 The case for insuring that the Board is able
to obtain and use such information after the close of the
comment period is obviously a strong one, but whether
receipt of such new data should re-start the entire 91-day
period is more questionable. The potentia! for manipula-

tion of the time constraint is greatest at this stage, as the
deadline grows closer.'? Moreover, as petitioner points out,

new financial statements become available every quarter,
and theoretically could be used to extend the time limit
indefinitely, thus nullifying Congressional intent. Although
the Seventh Circuit’s relevant and necessary requirements
in theory limit the Board’s power to re-start the time period,
in practical effect these restraints might be difficult to en-
force. Virtually all new data about an applicant will be
relevant to the Board’s decision. And, without performing
its own detailed analysis, and comparing the additional in-
formation with that previously available, it is difficult for

12. Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at
296-97 & n.3; North Lawndale, supra note 5, 553 F.2d at 27; First
Lincolnwood, supra note 5, 546 F.2d at 721; Tri-State, supra note
5, 524 F.2d at 566.

13. The Seventh Circuit has recognized this possibility and has
indicated that the Board cannot gain the benefit of the re-starting
doctrine if it is found to have acted in bad faith. Central Wisconsin
Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at 296 & n.3, citing Tri-State,
supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 567.

Ila

a reviewing court to determine whether the new data was
‘*necessary’’ to the decision."

It is arguable, therefore, that a request for new informa-
tion after the close of the comment period should not re-
start the 91-day period, but should merely toll the running
of that period until the information is supplied by the ap-
plicant." Such a tolling doctrine would still allow the
Board freely to obtain additional relevant information and
would encourage the applicant to comply with requests
promptly. However, there are problems with this view,
as well, not the least of which is that the Board may dis-
cover very late in the 91-day period that new information
might be significant in its decision, and then, after obtain-
ing the information, be left with only a few days in which
to decide. Under the circumstances, we leave resolution
of such issues to another day, when they are crucial to de-
termination of the case before us.

14. The Board has been upheld in the two reported decisions in
which it asserted that new information from sources outside the
Board re-started the time period. First Lincolnwood, supra note 5,
546 F.2d at 721; Central Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583
F.2d at 296-98. In North Lawndale, supra note 5, the court rejected
the Board’s argument that an oral conference between representatives
uf the applicant and Board personnel re-started the time period. 553
F.2d at 27. However, in that case the Board conceded that no new
facts were presented at the conference. Id. In Tri-State, supra note
5, 524 F.2d at 564, 566, the court rejected the Board’s argument that
staff reports re-started the time period, but the Board did not argue
that any new outside information had been received.

15. The Board itself adopted a tolling doctrine in its Nov. 14,
1972 opinion letter, supra note 11. However, the Board’s rule gave
its staff complete discretion to determine when the 91-day period
started, a position with which we disagree.

* The Seventh Circuit recently rejected a tolling theory, adopting
the re-starting doctrine discussed in text at notes 12-14 supra. Cen-
tral Wisconsin Bankshares, supra note 5, 583 F.2d at 296.

12a

We do believe it prudent, however, to dispose of the
further argument of the Board that the 91-day time limit
does not ordinarily begin to run until the Board receives
the staff reports of local Reserve Banks on an application
that has already been submitted to the Board. In Tri-State,
supra note 5, 524 F.2d at 566, the Seventh Circuit held that
reports from the Board’s own staff are not part of the
‘‘complete record’’ for purposes of commencement of the
91-day period. The Court reasoned that staff reports are
part of the decisional process of the Board and that allow-
ing their completion to determine the start of the 91-day
period would give the Board complete control over the time
period. We agree with this reasoning and think that it
applies equally to staff reports from local Banks after an
application is forwarded to the Board in Washington."®

We now turn to application of these general rules to the:

facts of the present case. We begin analysis with the date
of Citicorp’s submission of additional material for the ap-
plication, December 5, 1977. The New York Reserve Bank
forwarded the application to the Board within eight days
thereafter and we think this was a reasonable period in

which to examine the added material and determine that

the application was complete. It appears that the Board
received the application on December 14, 1977,'’ and notice
was published in the Federal Register on January 9, 1978.
Thus, it is apparent that the Board took a little longer to
publish notice than the two weeks specified in its internal
regulation. See text at note 11 supra. Under the Board’s

16. Since the report from the New York Reserve Bank was
received by the Board in this case prior to the close of the comment
period, the issue is not determinative here. However, since such
reports appear to be common, we think it wise judicial administration
to dispose of this issue now.

17. The copy of the application in the record appears to have been
stamped “77 Dec 14” and “Received Clearing Unit.”

13a

own internal policies, the notice should have been published
by December 28, 1977 and the comment period should have
closed around January 27, 1978. Therefore, we find that
the time period began no earlier than January 28, 1978 and
that the Board’s March 13 order, clearly within 91 days of
this date, was timely.

Ill

Petitioner also argues that the Board did not apply the
correct legal standards in denying Citicorp’s application
and that the order is not supported by substantial evidence.
We conclude that the Board correctly interpreted the sta-
tutory standards and that there is ample support for its
order.

The applicable provision of the statute is section 4(c) (8),
which provides that the prohibition on bank holding com-
panies’ ownership of nonbanking companies shall not
apply to:

shares of any company the activities of which the Board
after due notice and opportunity for hearing has
determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as
to be a proper incident thereto. In determining whether
a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or
managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding
company can reasonably be expected to produce bene-
fits to the public, such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that out-
weigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concen-
tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In

l4a

erders and regulations under this subsection, the Board
may differentiate between activities commenced de
novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in
whole or in part, of a going concern. ...

This section has been interpreted to mean that the acquired
activity must be ‘‘closely related to banking,’’ and that the
reasonably expected public benefits of the particular pro-
posal must outweigh possible adverse effects. See, e. g.,
Ass’n of Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, 568 F.2d 549, 551-52 (7th Cir.
1978). The legislative history indicates that the burden is
on the applicant affirmatively to establish the net public
benefit of its proposal,'* and the Board’s findings may not
be overturned if they are supported by substantial
evidence.'® |

There was no serious issue before the Board with regard

to the requirement that the activities of Advance Mortgage
Corporation be ‘‘closely related to banking’’ since the Board
has determined by regulation that mortgage banking meets
that test. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) and (3). At issue before
us is whether the Board correctly applied the factors
specified in the second sentence of section 4(c)(8). The
Board found that the acquisition of Advance lessened com-
petition in the mortgage banking field by eliminating
Citicorp as a potential de novo entrant, that the combination
resulted in undue concentration of resources and that Citi-
corp’s interest in Advance weakened Citicorp financially.

18. See, e. g., H.R.Rep. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
(Conf.Rep.).

19. See 12 U.S.C. § 1848; Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents v.
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 533 F.2d 224, 246
(Sth Cir. 1976) ; Independent Bankers Ass'n of Georgia v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 289,
516 F.2d 1206, 1217 (1975). Cf. Board of Governors of Federal Re-
serve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., —— U.S. ——, 99 S.Ct.
505, 58 L.Ed.2d 484 (1978).

lida

The Board considered the public benefits which Citicorp
asserted the acquisition produced—Advance’s product inno-
vation, expanded services, commitment of funds to neigh-
borhood preservation projects and its countercyclical role
in mortgage acquisitions. However, the Board concluded
that some of the claimed benefits had anticompetitive effects,
that others could have been achieved through Citicorp’s de
novo entry into mortgage banking and that the actual public
benefits of the acquisition did not outweigh the adverse
effects.

Focusing particularly on the Board’s finding that the
acquisition would result in undue concentration of resources,
petitioner asserts that the Board improperly condemned
size alone and found no specific adverse effects flowing from
the concentration. But the specific statutory reference to
‘‘undue concentration of resources’’ as one of the ‘‘ possible
adverse effects’’ reflected a Congressional concern over
control of economic resources that contemplated a more
searching inquiry than the usual antitrust considerations of
ease of entry and relative market shares. Cf. H.R.Rep.
1747, supra note 18, at 17. We agree with the conclusion of
the Fifth Cireuit that ‘‘Congress believed that concentration
of economic resources in a single entity beyond a certain
point was harmful regardless of the proven existence of any
anticompetitive effects of such concentration.’’ Alabama
Association of Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, 533 F.2d 224, 251 (5th Cir. 1976),
amended and rehearing denied, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978).
Although this does not mean that Congress has condemned
bigness as bad per se,-we think Congress did commit to the
expertise of the Board the task of determining when size
alone makes the combination of banking and nonbanking
corporations against the public interest. With regard to

l6a

this factor, we conclude that the Board in this case applied
the proper legal standard and the record supports its
conclusion.

The Board also justifiably found that the combination
produced anticompetitive effects. It is clear that competi-
tion between Citicorp and Advance has been lost in the orig-
ination of construction and income-producing property
loans and that there was a basis for finding that the acquisi-
tion caused loss of Citicorp as a potential competitor in
the residential mortgage loan business. In determining
the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition, the Board
properly took into account the likelihood that Citicorp
would have entered into mortgage banking de novo or
through acquisition of a smaller firm. As indicated above,
the statute specifically permits the Board to ‘‘differentiate

between activities commenced de novo and activities com-.

menced by the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going
concern... .’’

The weighing of possible adverse effects against rea-
sonably expected public benefits is committed to the
expertise of the Board, and in this case the Board’s findings
are supported by the evidence. In conclusion, we hold that
the Board’s March 13, 1978 order denying Citicorp’s appli-
cation to retain Advance Mortgage Corporation was timely
and in conformity with the governing statutory standards
and the evidence. We deny Citicorp’s petition for review
and affirm the order of the Board.

17a
Appendix B

Portions of Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843.

Interest in nonbanking organizations—Ownership or
control of voting shares of any company not a bank; engage-
ment im activities other than banking

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no
bank holding company shall—

(1) after May 9, 1956, acquire direct or indirect
ownership or control of any voting shares of any com-
pany which is not a bank, or

(2) after two years from the date as of which it
becomes a bank holding company, or in the case of a
company which has been continuously affiliated since
May 15, 1955, with a company which was registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, prior to
May 15, 1955, in such a manner as to constitute an
affiliated company within the meaning of that Act,
after December 31, 1978, or, in the case of any
company which becomes, as a resul! of the enactment
of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, a bank holding company on the date of such enact-
ment, after December 31, 1980, retain direct or indirect
ownership or control of any voting shares of any
company which is not a bank or bank holding company
or engage in any activities other than (A) those of
banking or of managing or controlling banks and
other subsidiaries authorized under this chapter or of
furnishing services to or performing services for its

- subsidiaries, and (B) those permitted under paragraph
(8) of subsection (c) of this subject to all the conditions
specified in such paragraph or in any order or regula-
tion issued by the Board under such paragraph:
Provided, That a company covered in 1970 may also

18a

engage in those activities in which directly or through
a subsidiary (i) it was lawfully engaged on June 30,
1968 (or on a date subsequent to June 30, 1968 in the
case of activities carried on as the result of the acquisi-
tion by such company or subsidiary, pursuant to a
binding written contract entered into on or before
June 30, 1968, of another company engaged in such
activities at the time of the acquisition), and (ii) it has
been continuously engaged since June 30, 1968 (or such
subsequent date). The Board by order, after oppor-
tunity for hearing, may terminate the authority con-
ferred by the preceding proviso on any company to en-
gage directly or through a subsidiary in any activity
otherwise permitted by that proviso if it determines,
having due regard to the purposes of this chapter that
such action is necessary to prevent undue concentration

of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts

of interest, or unsound banking practices; and in the
case of any such company controlling a bank having
bank assets in excess of $60,000,000 on or after Decem-
ber 31, 1970, the Board shall determine, within two years
after such date (or, if later, within two years after the
date on which the bank assets first exceed $60,000,000),
whether the authority conferred by the preceding pro-
viso with respect to such company should be terminated
as provided in this sentence. Nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed to authorize any bank holding com-
pany referred to in the preceding proviso, or any sub-
sidiary thereof, to engage in activities authorized by
that proviso through the acquisition, pursuant to a con-
tract entered into after June 30, 1968, of any interest in
or the assets of a going concern engaged in such activ-
ities. Any company which is authorized to engage in
any activity pursuant to the preceding proviso or sub-
section (d) of this section but, as a result of action of
the Board, is required to terminate such activity may
(notwithstanding any otherwise applicable time limit
prescribed in this paragraph) retain the ownership or

19a

control of shares in any company carrying on such
activity for a period of ten years from the date on which
its authority was so terminated by the Board.

The Board is authorized, upon application by a bank hold-
ing company, to extend the two year period referred to in
paragraph (2) above from time to time as to such bank
holding company for not more than one year at a time, if,
in its judgment, such an extension would not be detrimental
to the public interest, but no such extensions shall in the
aggregate exceed three years.

Exemptions

(c) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to
any bank holding company which is (i) a labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organization and which is exempt from
taxation under section 501 of Title 26, or (ii) a company
covered in 1970 more than 85 per centum of the voting stock
of which was collectively owned on June 30, 1968, and
continuously thereafter, directly or indirectly, by or for
members of the same family, or their spouses, who are
lineal descendants of common ancestors; and such prohib-
itions shall not, with respect to any other bank holding
company, apply to— 7

(8) shares of any company the activities of which

the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing

_ has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as
to be a proper incident thereto. In determining
whether a particular activity is a proper incident to
banking or managing or controlling banks the Board
shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of

20a

a holding company can reasonably be expected to pro-
duce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that out-
weigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concen-
tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In
orders and regulations under this subsection, the Board
may differentiate between activities commenced de novo
and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or
in part, of a going concern....

In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any
application for an order under paragraph (8) of this sub-
section within the ninety-one-day period which begins on.
the date of submission to the Board of the complete record
on that application, the application shall be deemed to have
_ been granted. The Board shall include in its annual report
‘to the Congress a description and a statement of the reasons
for approval of each activity approved by it by order or
regulation under such paragraph during the period covered
by the report.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2743%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
