# Opposition — Giliberto v. Compagnie Nationale Air France

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 441 U.S. 932

## Text

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

MAR—29 1979

In THE MICHAR, RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United. States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-1337

>
as

THE HONORABLE LOUIS J. GILIBERTO, JUDGE OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLI-
NOIS, ET AL., EITAN ARONOWITCH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
v.

COMPAGNIE NATIONALE AIR FRANCE and
SINGAPORE AIRLINES,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT AIR FRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Wru1M J. JUNKERMAN
Wii F. Martin, Jr.
One State Street Plaza
New York, New York 10004
Counsel for Respondent
Air France

Donautp M. Hasketi
MicuHast J. Senr
208 South LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
rece ec ute kiactcce ceive stscos 1
ai divs Jb vt od ik saecenbe eas see 00 2

Pornt I—All of petitioners’ claims against re-
spondent Air France arising out of the hijacking
to Entebbe are exclusively governed by the con-
ditions and limits set forth in the Warsaw
ED ik Case abGe bd ech ha ane od Wied deaaee 3

Point II—No authority exists for the interpretation
of the word ‘domicile’ in Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention asserted by petitioners ..,.... 6

Point I1I—The provisions of Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention clearly relate to subject matter
SEED? Sas S52 6 v'btib Ge 08.8 wae La niet es evRS bie 12

Porst IV—The provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion are clearly constitutional and, in any case,
the issue of the constitutionality of the Warsaw
Convention was not properly raised before the

Illinois Supreme Court ...................08. 16
Pornt V—As to the applicability of the doctrine of

forum non conveniens to this lawsuit .......... 18
ates bbe ss cd crowds sdess¥css ‘Vissdeseus 22
EE Mies dnckehdainchaase itd sé dadends det App 1

ii TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: ; PAGE

Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——
CUE 0 VANS <0 USac <% en evig dhe eneben eae 15, 16

Butz v. British Atrways, 421 F.Supp. i127 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd mem., 566 F. 2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977) 8,

9,14
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) .... 5
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Gp., 57 L.Ed.
BG SP ia dain cece cp cagvhsbeneiabesebeses 17
Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d.
CO: BOE ar tbh Vien i dciens Ses dstak Caskets 8

Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int. Airlines, 29 Misc.2d 499,
211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1961) ... 9

Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 183 Mise. 258, 50
N.Y.S.2d 250, aff’d, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.
2d 317, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, cert. denied, 329 U.S.
Vee CHE Ge cele Avantwdilon< ccsuleesgabudaet 17

Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ........ 20

Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F.Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240
COR CA GOOD .sieec i tdeivcuncnch dauwreensbeee 5, 6

Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v.
Pan American Airways, 58 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y.

BORED widnon con cinesnncinesccoedaasbannenseen 17
Kahn v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 9 Avi.

ET OT CRRA Es TOGR) oie ac cuss vecsecsdeweves 9
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427

F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ............... 5, 6, 9, 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii
PAGE
Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)... 17

McCarthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Avi.
17,385 -(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d

Re EE Gn Nooo dbavinaeediny oexn 14, 17, 18
Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge d’Exploitation, Etc.,

207 F.Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962) .............. 9
Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F.Supp. 486

GE ED ARs s 06 650. SPA bia wildinee... 17
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1978) ..........sceeeeees 17

Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 57 App. Div. 2d 370,
395 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep’t 1977), aff’d, 44 N.Y. 2d

PE Bettis ee eden hsde sa npere ts cones 14
Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798
& & > gee 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Varkonyi v. Impressa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense
(Varig), 71 Mise.2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup.
i ee cad scenes cccecs 15

Vergara v. Aeroflot “Soviet Airlines’’, 390 F.Supp.
ee pba pals censccccacees 9

Zimonyl v. Varig, court of first instance of Paris 12,
App. 5-11

Statutes and Rules:

United States Constitution, Article III ............ 14

I I ros cent cere cs ccc ccc cccn. 13, 20

Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 110,
ET EE elath k dee wh dias stn wate owe boos 12, 13, 15

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
Supreme Court of the United States:

SE SE EE ORE Vaveawacs essen ccaeencnes 2
GE: Graccaens Gttae s odatk Me 'b 55 CAME ED AES 2
eo ) DRA Sr Pon gee Ba OF 2
SG AS aie Bak os SRE baer ed 2

The Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air), 49 Stat. 3000 et seq.
Ser So RNG 7s en esa Se I ee passim

Other Authorities:
Shaweross and Beaumont, Air Law, Fourth Ed.,

1 SURE aR DS ant Tae Be oe ae | Oe Ce ee (Oe PC 10
15 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
SEND CSE cheba Ky RE ee Redigtbingetd moi 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-1337

—
Wi

Tue Honorasie Louis J. Gruwerto, JupGe oF THE CiRcuIT
Court oF Coox County, Inurois, et aL., Erran Arono-
WITCH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
v.

CompaGcnig NationaLe Alin France and
Sruveapore AIRLINES,
Respondents.

+
rv

RESPONDENT AIR FRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Counterstatement

One of the surprising aspects of petitioners’ lengthy
“brief” in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari
is that it extends over seventeen pages before even dis-
cussing the alleged legal issues involved. Nine of these
seventeen pages are devoted to an extended recitation of
the facts of the hijacking of June 27, 1976 and the nature
of the treatment accorded to petitioners during their in-
carceration at Entebbe. While such discussion might have
some import if the hijackers or the government of Uganda
were before this Court, it has no relevance whatsoever with
respect to petitioners’ claims against the respondents. The
result is that petitioners’ brief is impermissibly long, and

in flagrant violation of Rule 23 (1.(c) and (e); Rule 23(4);
Rule 40 1.(d)(1), and (f); and Rule 40(5) of the Rules of
this Court.

As remarkable as petitioners’ “brief” may be for what it
does contain, it is even more remarkable for what it does
not contain. Nowhere in petitioners’ seventy-six pages is
there any mention of the fact that actions have been filed
against Air France in either Israel, France or Canada
on behalf of all of the passengers on the hijacked Air
France aircraft who are involved in this petition. In each
instance, these passengers, who are all non-residents of the
United States, have filed suit against Air France in their
country of citizenship. All of such actions were filed by
petitioners shortly before the running of the two-year pre-
scriptive period set forth in Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention [49 Stat. Part 2—3021]. A complete list of
these passengers on Air France flight 139 of June 27, 1976
who have brought suit against Air France in the courts
of Canada, France and Israel accompanies this brief as
“Appendix A’’. Accordingly, contrary to the false im-
pression created in the petition, the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court dismissing petitioners’ claims has not de-
prived petitioners of forums in which to litigate their
alleged claims against respondent Air France arising out
of the hijacking.

Question Presented

Should this Court review a decision of the Supreme
Court of Illmois which is in complete accord with United
States authority as to the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention to claims arising out of aircraft hijackings,
as to the interpretation of the permissible forums for suit
enumerated in Article 28 of the Convention [49 Stat. Part
2(1)-3020], and as it relates to the Illinois doctrine of
forum non conventens?

3

POINT I

All of petitioners’ claims against respondent Air
France arising out of the hijacking to Entebbe are
exclusively governed by the conditions and limits set
forth in the Warsaw Convention.

In Point I of their brief in support of the petition for
a writ of certiorari, petitioners allege that respondent
Air France argued before the Illinois Supreme Court,
and that court subsequently held, that petitioners were
and remained “passengers” of Air France at all times,
including the seven day period while they were impris-
oned in Entebbe, Uganda. This assertion is a complete
misstatement not only of Air France’s argument before the
Illinois Supreme Court, but of the express holding of that
court.

The scope of an air carrier’s liability for deaths or in-
juries sustained by passengers in international transporta-
tion is set forth in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
(49 Stat. Part 2—3018) :

“Article 17

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the death or wounding of a passenger
or any other bodily injuries suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”

Petitioners’ “passenger’’ argument is apparently based
upon the allegation that many of the injuries and deaths
occurred following petitioners’ disembarkation from Air
France’s aircraft at Entebbe. As the clear wording of
Article 17 demonstrates, however, the applicability of this
Article depends not on the location of the plaintiffs’
injuries, but on the location of the “accident” causing the

4

injuries. As long as the accident causing the injuries
takes place “on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking”, all in-
juries which flow from the accident are covered by Article
17 regardless of the particular location where these in-
juries occur. In this action, the “accident” constitutes the
hijacking of Air France Flight 139, which hijacking
obviously occurred while petitioners were on board Air
France’s aircraft. Accordingly, Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention comprehends all of the petitioners’ claims for
injuries and damages caused by that “accident”. The
common law question of whether the passenger/carrier
relationship continued to exist after petitioners’ disem-
barkation from Air France’s aircraft is, therefore, entirely
irrelevant to the determination of whether their claims
against Air France are governed by the Warsaw Conven-
tion. In discussing petitioners’ argument relating to the
non-applicability of the Warsaw Convention to petitioners’
injuries incurred after disembarkation from Air France’s
aircraft at Entebbe, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly
interpreted the scope of Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention as follows (74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 981):

“From more specific allegations made later in the
complaint it appears that some, at least, of the
threats and physical injuries to which the plaintiffs
were allegedly subjected may not have taken place
while they were aboard the plane but rather while
they were kept in detention at Entebbe. Assuming
that to be the case the Warsaw Convention would
not thereby be rendered inapplicable to this suit. Its
applicability, under Article 17, depends upon the place
where the ‘accident,’ rather than the resulting in-
juries, occurred, and the ‘accident,’ as already noted,
consisted of the hijacking itself.”

In support of its holding relating to the applicability
of the Warsaw Convention to the claims arising out of

5

the hijacking to Uganda, the Illinois Supreme Court cited
a number of recent federal court decisions which have
held the Warsaw Convention applicable to claims arising
out of aircraft hijackings and other intentional acts of
terrorism committed in the course of international flights,
including Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) ; Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F.Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); and
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427
F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E. 2d at
980.

In an attempt to discredit the Illinois Supreme Court’s
reliance on the above-cited cases, petitioners claim that the
facts in thix case are “materially different from the facts in
any of the decisions cited by the Illinois Supreme Court.”
This assertion is negated by the fact that the last decision
cited above, namely Karfunkel v. Compagnie National Air
France, arose out of this very same hijacking. In
Karfunkel, Judge Inzer Wyatt of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the claims of the two Karfunkel passengers on Air France
Flight 139 of June 27, 1976 upon the ground that that court
was not a permissible forum for their action against Air
France pursuant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.
Unlike any of the present petitioners, the plaintiffs in
Karfunkel were United States citizens, a fact which il-
lustrates that the citizenship of a plaintiff may not be a
relevant factor in determining the emia of a particular
forum under Article 28.

In holding that all of the Karfunkel claims against Air
France were subject to the terms of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and thus barred by the provisions of Article 28, Judge
Wyatt placed primary reliance upon the earlier decision of
that court in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., supra.
Husserl arose out of a hijacking in which a Swissair air-
craft was diverted to a desert airport in Jordan where the

6

passengers were forced to stay in the aircraft for approxi-
mately twenty-four hours and were then confined to a hotel
in Amman, Jordan for another four days. In commenting
upon this set of facts, Judge Wyatt in Karfunkel observed
that Husserl involved “a hijacking in all respects in-
distinguishable from that at bar.” 427 F.Supp. at 975.
Perforce, then, the facts in Husserl are equally “in-
distinguishable” from the facts of the hijacking involved
herein.

Since the Illinois Supreme Court was clearly correct in
holding that the Warsaw Convention is applicable to all
of petitioners’ claims against respondent Air France for
injuries arising out of the hijacking of June 27, 1976, it is
apparent that these claims are exclusively governed by the
conditions and limits established by the Warsaw Conven-
tion including (49 Stat. Part 2—3020) :

“Article 24

(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any
action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in
this Convention.

(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions
of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without
prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their
respective rights.”

POINT II

_ No authority exists for the interpretation of the
word ‘domicile’ in Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion asserted by petitioners.

Petitioners’ primary grounds for seeking review by this
Court of the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, as it
relates to the scope of Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, is their argument that the Illinois Supreme Court

7

erred in holding that the word “domicile” contained in
Article 28 does not mean any country in which the air-
line carries on business on a “regular and substantial”
basis.

Petitioners are unable to cite any authority for such
an interpretation of the word “domicile’’. The reason
for this lack of support is that no one has ever had
the temerity to suggest such a meaning. The fact that
no party, despite the multitude of United States decisions
concerning the interpretation of Article 28, has argued for
the meaning of “domicile” proposed by the petitioners is
ample demonstration of the absurdity of this argument.
On those occasions where courts have commented upon the
“domicile” provision of Article 28, they have unequivo-
cally stated that a corporation is domiciled at its place
of incorporation, a proposition previously considered not
worthy of even contesting. ,

The leading case in the United States concerning the
interpretation of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
is Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798
(2d Cir. 1971). That action involved a claim for personal
injuries sustained by a United States citizen on a flight
of Canadian Pacific, an airline incorporated in Canada,
between Vancouver, British Columbia and Tokyo, Japan.
The plaintiff’s contract of carriage had been purchased in
Vancouver. The facts of the Smith action are therefore
comparabie to the facts of petitioners’ claims against Air
France, in that the plaintiff in Smith was suing a foreign
airline for personal injuries sustained outside of the
United States, on a contract of carriage which did not in-
volve the: United States as a final destination and which
had not been purchased in the United States. As with
petitioners herein, the only basis upon which the plain-
tiff in Smith could allege jurisdiction in his action brought
in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York was that Canadian Pacific maintained
a ticket office in that jurisdiction and was generally sub-

8

ject to service of process therein. In Smith, the Second
Circuit dismissed plaintiff’s action for lack of jurisdiction
under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. In its dis-
cussion of the four forums enumerated in Article 28, the
Second Circuit held as follows with respect to the meaning
of the “domicile” forum (452 F.2d at 802, emphasis
supplied) :

“The domicile of Canadian Pacific Airways is in
Canada, where it is incorporated, a fact not disputed
by [plaintiff] appellee.’’

The Second Circuit then went on to specifically hold,
in discussion of a previous decision of that court in Eck
v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966),
that the presence of the defendant airline in the jurisdic
tion generally, without any other United States contacts
with the particular contract of carriage, would noi sup-
port jurisdiction under Article 28 (452 F.2d at 803):

“In Eck, the ticket for an international flight was
purchased in Oakland, California for a Switzerland-
Sudanese Republic trip. Relying on the purchase of
the ticket at a site within the United States, through
an agency of the carrier, plus the existence of a regu-
lar ticketing and booking office within the United
States, this court concluded that Article 28(1) was
satisfied. 360 F.2d at 814-815. Eck quite clearly did
not hold that suit in the United States would be
proper where the ticket was purchased outside the
United States and no United States contacts, includ-
ing but not limited to interline or intraline ticketing
arrangements, existed beyond the presence of a ticket-
ing and booking office of the carrier-defendant.”’

Numerous other cases have ruled that an airline’s domi-
cile for the purposes of Article 28 is its place of incorpora-
tion. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809
(2d Cir. 1966); Bute v. British Airways, 421 F.Supp. 127,

9

131 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir.
1977) ; Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427
F.Supp. 971, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (in which the attorneys
who are co-counsel to petitioners herein, in an action aris-
ing out of the same hijacking, conceded that the domicile
of Air France is its place of incorporation); Vergara v.
Aeroflot “Soviet Airlines”, 390 F.Supp. 1266, 1269 (D. Neb.
1975); Kahn v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 9 Avi.
17, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge
d’Exploitation, Etc., 207 F. Supp. 191, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ;
Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int. Airlines, 29 Mise.2d 499, 500,
211 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1961).

Petitioners’ asserted interpretation of “domicile” would
render meaningless Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
by reducing the question of jurisdiction under the Conven-
tion to a strictly local matter of in personam jurisdiction.
It would mean that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Smith v. Canadian Pacific Air-
ways, Ltd., swpra, and numerous other courts, had wasted
their judicial time by considering Article 28 since they
could have merely accepted jurisdiction in those cases
based on consideration of in personam requirements. The
Illinois Supreme Court clearly recognized the incom-
patibility of petitioners’ interpretation of the “domicile’’
forum with the jurisdictional scheme of Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention when that court observed that “piain-
tiffs’ request to adopt this basis of jurisdiction is in effect
a request to create a new jurisdictional standard for the
Convention.” 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 981.

Petitioners, unable to find any United States authority
for their proposed interpretation of the “domicile” forum
contained in Article 28, make reference to the fact that in
certain foreign jurisdictions and treatises, the word “domi-
cile” employed in the official French text of Article 28 has
been interpreted as “ordinarily resident”. However, the
petitioners have cited this difference in translation in a

10

vacuum, and have come forth with no authority to indicate
that “ordinarily resident” would be given any different
interpretation by United States courts than “domicile” has
been. In fact, examination of the law of the United King-
dom, wherein “domicile” in Article 28 has been translated
to mean “ordinarily resident”, reveals that this translation
only serves to support the interpretation of the word
“domicile” that has been announced by United States
courts. The leading English treatise on air law, and in-
deed one ofsthe leading treatises in the world on this sub-
ject, is Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law.

In their Fourth Edition (1977), Shawcross and Beaumont
succinctly explain the meaning of ‘‘ordinarily resident” in
the following manner:

‘*T, WHERE THE CaRRIER IS OrnDINARILY RESIDENT.

439. One of the four bases of jurisdiction ap-
plicable to actions for damages under the Act is
that the court has jurisdiction ‘where the car-
rier is ordinarily resident.’ The notion of ordinary
residence is more often used in relation to in-
dividuals; but the carrier will generally be a
corporation, for which the notion is inap-
propriate. In tax cases, it has been held that a
company is resident ‘where the central manage-
ment and control actually abides;’ that a company
can be resident in two or more countries, provided
that central management and control is divided
between those countries. It seems likely that the
English courts would adopt # similar approach in
the present context, so that in almost every case
the question will be where does the board of di-
rectors have its seat.’?

Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, Fourth Ed., 1977, Vol.
1 at 413. It is beyond dispute that respondent Air France
is a French corporation, primarily owned by the French

11

government, with its headquarters in Paris. The “central
management and control” of Air France undeniably abides
in France. Examination of the law of a jurisdiction which
has interpreted “domicile” to mean “ordinarily resident”,
therefore, serves to underscore the complete lack of au-
thority for the interpretation of the word “domicile’’ in
Article 28 expounded by petitioners.

As a final attempt to submit some “authority” to this
Court for the interpretation of “domicile” that they
propose, petitioners have resorted to “authority’’ of their
own making, namely an affidavit from a “French expert’’
to the effect that the phrase “du domicile du transporteur”
contained in the official French text of Article 28 can be
interpreted to mean any place where the carrier carries on
business on a regular and substantial basis.

While the “bootstrap” nature of petitioners’ affidavit
is obvious, respondent Air France will additionally point
out that whatever credibility petitioners’ affidavit might
have is totally destroyed by the fact that the “domicile”
forum in Article 28 has specifically been the subject of
interpretation by the French courts. Set forth as “Ap-
pendix B”’ to this brief is a certified translation of @
decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris,
dated April 28, 1978, in an action entitled Zimonyl v.
Varig. That action, which arose out of the crash of a
Varig Airline Boeing 707 near Paris on July 11, 1973,
involved a claim for the wrongful death of a passenger
who was travelling on that flight pursuant to a contract
of carriage issued in Budapest, Hungary calling for trans-
portation from Budapest to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and
return. Plaintiff, while conceding Varig’s principal place

- of business was in Brazil, attempted to argue that the

“domicile’’ of Varig, for the purposes of Article 28, could
be regarded as Paris, since the airline had a ticket office
there. The Paris court specifically rejected plaintiff’s
contention, holding that a corporation can have only one

12

domicile, which in the case of Varig was in Brazil where
it was incoroorated and had its principal place of busi-
ness. It is apparent, therefore, that “du domicile du
transporteur” has been given the same meaning by the
French courts as ‘‘domicile of the carrier” in the United
States decisions.

Accordingly, no authority exists for the interpretation
of the word “domicile” propounded by petitioners. To
the contrary, authority in the United States and abroad
is unanimous to the effect that the “domicile” of an air
carrier is its place of incorporation, and does not consti-
tute any place where the carrier carries on business on a
regular and substantial basis.

POINT Ill

The provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Con-
vention clearly relate to subject matter jurisdiction.

Just as baseless and unfounded as_ petitioners’
‘*domicile” argument is their argument that respondent Air
France somehow waived the provisions of Article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention by not filing a special appearance
in the action instituted in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.

The circumstances under which a party must enter a
special appearance in an action in Illinois are specifically
set forth in the Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.,
Ch. 110, § 20(1) (1975) (emphasis supplied) :

“§ 20. Special Appearance. (1) Prior to filing any
other pleading or motion, a special appearance may
be made either in person or by attorney for the pur-
pose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant. A special appearance
may be made as to an entire proceeding or as to any
cause of action involved therein. Every appearance,

13

prior to judgment, not in compliance with the fore-
going is a general appearance.”

The essential problem with petitioners’ argument relating
to the manner in which respondent Air France originally
appeared in this action is that it does not involve an issue
which is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. There
has been no provision for a special appearance in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure since 1938. 15 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3829, at 196
(1976). Accordingly, the manner by which the [Illinois
courts interpret the provisions of Article 28 with respect
to the somewhat unique pleading practices of that state
can hardly constitute a federal question subject to review
by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

At any rate, as was aptly observed by the Illinois Su-
preme Court in its decision, petitioners have made their
argument relating to the nature of Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention “without citation of any supporting deci-
sion”. 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E. 2d at 983.

The leading case involving the interpretation of Article
28 of the Warsaw Convention is Smith v. Canadian Pacific
Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971), already dis-
eussed at length in this brief. In reversing the district
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Second
Cireuit held (452 F.2d at 801):

“We agree, however, that Article 28(1) ‘... must be
considered as absolute and mandatory, on the national
level, in the jurisdictional sense, and be given [its]
proper status as a treaty obligation of our nation with-
out equivocation.’ The Warsaw Convention, by virtue
of its status as a treaty made under the authority of
the United States, is the supreme law of the land, equal
in stature and force to domestic laws of the United
States. U.S. Const. art. VI... .”

14

Having held that the provisions of Article 28(1) relate
to jurisdiction, the Second Circuit in Smith went on to
explain the manner by which courts must apply Article 28
to the faets of a particular action (452 F.2d at 802):

“We therefore look to the Convention to determine
its applicability here. Only if it does apply so as to
permit of treaty jurisdiction need we answer domestic
jurisdiction and venue questions. If treaty jurisdiction
under the Convention does not lie, federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which permits cases arising
under United States treaties, clearly cannot be estab-
lished. Similarly, if the Convention precludes suit, our
inquiry ceases without an examination of diversity jur-
isdiction under 28 U.S.C. 4 1332(a) (2); in other words,
treaty provisions, being of equal constitutional status,
may operate under article VI of the Federal Constitu-
tion as limitations on diversity jurisdiction, just as
the requirements of jurisdictional amount may so
operate.”

It is therefore apparent that the Second Circuit in Smith
referred to Article 28 as “treaty jurisdiction” merely to
differentiate the Article 28 limitations from the other limi-
tations on the subject matter jurisdiction of Federal Courts
that are based on Article IIT of the United States Consti-
tution and the jurisdictional provisions of the United
States Code.

In numerous decisions since Smith, courts have granted
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because of the operation of Article 28. McCarthy v. East
African Airways Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff’d mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Bute v. British
Airways, 421 F.Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem.,
566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977); Karfunkel v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 427 F.Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ;
Rinck v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 57 App. Div. 2d 370, 395
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep’t 1977), aff’d, 44 N.Y. 2d 714 (1978) ;

15

_Varkonyt v. Impressa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense

(Varig), 71 Mise.2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct., N. Y.
Co. 1972).

Therefore, no basis exists for petitioners’ interpretation
of the “treaty jurisdiction” term employed by the Second
Circuit in Smith. However, petitioners do more than
argue that “treaty jurisdiction” does not constitute sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. They assert, as they must in
view of the specific language of Section 20(1) of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act, that the provisions of Article
28 can be equated with jurisdiction over the person.
Such argument absolutely flies in the face of the specific
holding of the Second Circuit in Smith. That decision, in
its discussion of the jurisdictional nature of Article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention, declares unequivocally that the
concept of “treaty jurisdiction” empioycd by that court
with respect to Article 28 has absolutely no relation to the
domestic law notion of jurisdiction over the person (452
F.2d at 800, n. 4):

“No question of in personam jurisdiction was raised in
this case, although such jurisdiction is also an impor-
tant element of the power of a court to decide a case.”

Similarly, in Benjamins v. British European Airways,
572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——
(1979), a wrongful death action arising out of the crash of
a British Airways aircraft in England, the Second Circuit
made a parallel observation in discussing the application of
the provisions of Article 28 to the facts of that action (572
F.2d at 915, n. 4):

“Personal jurisdiction is not an issue in this case, as
each defendant has submitted to the in personam
jurisdiction of the court.”

No clearer indication of the fallacy of petitioners’ argu-
ment relating to the nature of Article 28 exists than the

16

above two quotes from the Second Circuit’s Smith and
Benjamins decisions. Petitioners have based their argu-
ment that the provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Con-
vention do not relate to subject matter jurisdiction pri-
marily upon the “treaty jurisdiction” language employed
by the Second Circuit in Smith. At the same time, peti-
tioners completely ignore Smith when they argue that the
provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention can be
equated with the domestic notion of jurisdiction over the
person.

POINT IV

The provisions of the Warsaw Convention are
clearly constitutional and, in any case, the issue of
the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention was
not properly raised before the Illinois Supreme Court.

Petitioners accuse the Illniois Supreme Court of “gross
misrepresentation’’ of the record which they assert “is
tantamount to an unconstitutional denial of due process and
equal protection to the plaintiffs.” It should be pointed
out that petitioners never moved in the Illinois Supreme
Court for a rehearing, in order to refer that court to its
alleged misrepresentation of facts in the record. Such a
petition is a pre-requisite to accusing the highest court of
the State of Illinois of “gross misrepresentation.”

Petitioners also include in their brief to this Court an
extended discussion of the alleged unconstitutionality of the
Warsaw Convention. Such discussion, however, was not
included in their brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, and
the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention was not
among the questions certified for review by the Illinois
Supreme Court from the decision of the Cireuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois. While the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court briefly discusses the allegation of uncon-
stitutionality of the Warsaw Convention, giving this allega-

17

tion the short shrift that it deserves, it is apparent that the
Illinois Supreme Court was of the opinion that petitioners
had “waived their point as to unconstitutionality in this
court under our Rule 341(e)(7) (58 Ill. 2d, R.341(e)(7))”.
74 Tl. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 984. It is therefore sub-
mitted that petitioners have failed to properly preserve
this issue for review by this Court.

In any case, as the Illinois Supreme Court aptly ob-
served, the petitioners are unable to cite “any decision
holding the Convention invalid, either with respect to Ar-
ticle 28(1) or otherwise”. 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383. N.E.2d at
984. To the contrary, this Court, in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Env. Study Gp., 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), recently
commented that statutes and treaties such as the Warsaw
Convention, specifically as they relate to limitations on li-
ability, have “consistently been enforced by the courts”. 57
L.Ed.2d at 620-621, n. 32. On many other occasions the
Warsaw Convention has been held to be constitutional.
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 922 (1978); McCarthy v. East African Airways
Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d mem., 517 F.2d
1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 183
Mise. 258, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250, aff’d, 269 App. Div. 287, 55
N.Y.S.2d 317, aff’d, 295 N.Y. 852, cert. denied, 329 U.S.
741 (1946); Kelley v. Sabena, 242 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y.
1965); Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F.Supp. 486
(D.N.J. 1957); Indemnity Insurance Company of North
America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F.Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).

In fact, no appellate court, state or federal, has ever held
the Warsaw Convention to be unconstitutional. Nor has
this Court ever held any treaty of the United States in-
valid on constitutional grounds.

A constitutional challenge to the provisions of Articie
28(1) was clearly rejected in a decision squarely on point
with petitioners’ claim against Air France herein. Mc-

18

Carthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir.
1975). That decision emanated from the very sort of mo-
tion that was granted by the Supreme Court of Illinois—
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The
court in McCarthy granted the airline’s thotion to dismiss,
and in its decision the court rejected the same constitutional
argument relating to Article 28 that the pecitioners are
presenting to this Court (13 Avi. at 17,386):

“. , . [P]laintiffs’ argument that Article 28(1) of the
Convention unconstitutionally denrives them of the
right to litigate in the Federal Courts must fail. The
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts extends only as far
as Congress permits, which in some cases is less than
the limit of the federal jurisdictional power as set
forth in Article III of the Federal Constitution.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850); Jaconski v. Ad-
visun Corp., 359 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1966); Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). As a treaty provision
having the force and effect of the domestic laws of the
United States, Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion may and does constitutionally restrict the subject
matter jurisdiction of this Court.”

POINT V

As to the applicability of the doctrine of foram non
conveniens to this lawsuit.

Air France moved to dismiss this action upon the ground
that the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois lacked
jurisdiction of the action by virtue of Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention, and upon the further ground that the
suit should be dismissed under the doctrine of forwm non
conveniens. Singapore moved to dismiss the action upon
the latter ground only.

19

The Supreme Court of Illinois granted defendants’
motions and directed that the order of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois denying the motion of Air France
and of Singapore to dismiss the action be vacated and
the court remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook
County with directions to dismiss the action as to Air
France and Singapore. It is obvious that the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in dismissing the lawsuit against Air
France upon the ground that the suit was barred as to it
by the Warsaw Convention, felt it unnecessary to pass
upon Air France’s alternative motion to dismiss upon
the ground of forwm non conveniens. In fact the court
made that very clear (74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d at 984) :

‘*For the reasons given, we hold that the trial court
was in error in denying the motion by Air France
to dismiss it from the suit on the ground that suit
was barred by the Warsaw Convention.

While the foregoing discussion disposes of the appeal
by Air France, there remains to be considered the
appeal by Singapore, which, since the complaint did
not allege any injury to its own passengers, so as to
make the Warsaw Convention applicable, based its
motion solely on the ground that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens required dismissal of the case.

Our holding that the plaintiffs’ suit against Air France
could not be brought in Cook County because of the
Warsaw Convention would seem to diminish, if not
eliminate, the suitability of Cook County as a forum
for the plaintiffs. The dismissal of Air France from
the suit removes the base of the plaintiffs’ desire
to retain Singapore in the cireuit court of Cook
County.’’

The court thereafter reviewed the Illinois law with respect
to forum non conveniens and dismissed the lawsuit upon
that ground as to Singapore. It is obvious from the
opinion of the court that, had it not dismissed the ac-

20

tion against Air France on the basis that the suit against
it was barred by the Warsaw Convention, it would have
dismissed the action against Air France upon the ground
of forum non conveniens.

While the Illinois Supreme Court’s discussion of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens does not directly consti-
tute its grounds for dismissal of petitioners’ claims against
Air France, said respondent feels constrained to corhment
upon several of the points raised by petitioners in their
brief with respect to this issue.

First, petitioners appear to claim that the LIllinois
Supreme Court’s alleged failure to apply the forum non
conveniens principles announced in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947),
violated their constitutional rights. Petitioners are un-
able, however, to cite even one case which decided the
forum non conveniens doctrine on a constitutional basis.
Gilbert was not based on constitutional considerations, but
on the inherent discretion of federal courts of law and
equity to decline to exercise jurisdiction even where they
otherwise may have jurisdiction over the parties and sub-
ject matter; and where the venue of the action may other-
wise be proper. Petitioners attempt to raise the standards
set forth in Gilbert to federal constitutional dimensions.
No court has ever done so. The doctrine of forwm non
conventens is a doctrine based on equitable principles
within the discretion of each court system. As such, the
application of the doctrine by the Supreme Court of Iilinois
is a matter of state law and is not subject to review by the
United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

Second, petitioners’ entire argument concerning forum
non conveniens is grounded upon the allegation that no
jurisdictional barriers exist to suit against the three named
defendant airlines in the Cireuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois. However, discussion of the issue of forwm non
conventens in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court

21

does not even commence until after that court’s dismissal
of the claims brought against Air France for lack of
jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.
Since, as has beer. demonstrated in this brief, the Illinois
Supreme Court was clearly correct in holding that Article
28 precluded suit by petitioners against Air France in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, it is submitted that
petitioners’ entire discussion of the issue of forum non con-
veniens is based upon a false premise and is entirely
irrelevant.

Third, petitioners’ allegation regarding the amenability
to suit of the three defendant airlines in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, also conveniently ignores the
fact that the third defendant airline, Gulf Air Lines,
Inc., has filed a motion to dismiss petitioners’ actions
against it for lack of jurisdiction over the person. While
petitioners mention in their brief (p. 14) that decision on
that motion has been stayed pending the outcome of this
petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners’ brief is
written as though Gulf Air’s motion had already been
denied.

Finally, and most importantly, respondent Air France
must emphasize once again that petitioners have com-
pletely failed to mention in their brief that timely actions
have been filed against Air France in either Israel, France
or Canada on behalf of all the passengers of the hijacked
Air France aircraft who were named in the action brought
in the Cireuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. A complete
list of the passengers whose claims have been brought
against Air France in the courts of Israel, France and
Canada accompanies this brief as “Appendix A”.

22 App 1

CONCLUSION APPENDIX A

4 The petition for a writ of certiorari should be The following is a list of plaintiffs whose cases were
enied. dismissed by order of the Supreme Court of Illinois
Respectfully submitted, Conbaar Praney bared saitly hetion's the ipdases ip-
Wisi 3. Fénmeiens tive period expired under Article 29 of the Warsaw

Wit F. Martin, Jr. Convention.
One State Street Plaza
New York, New York 10004 MontrEAL, CANADA:
Counsel for Respondent

Ping antl Salomon Weizman

Anna Morina (Ninette Anna Benaroche)

Donaup M. Haskeun
MicHak. J. SEHR Paris, FRANCE:
208 South LaSalle
Chicago, Tllinois 60604 Sylver Ayache
Of Counsel Maurice Benshimon (Maurice Bensimon)
Sofie Zaoui Chamak (Sophie Chamak)
Jean-Mare Dahan
Miriam Field (Myriam Field)
Meudel Liebesman (Mendel Liebesmann)
Jocelyn Mounnier (Jocelyne Monnier Lanners)
Georgette Poilain (Georgette Poulain Bettleheim)
Solomon Rubin (Charles Salomon Rubin)
Regine Rubin
Dov Shlaen (Dov Boris Shlaen)
Elie Silvera (Claude Silvera)
Gilbert Weill
Héléne Weill (Héléne Rosenblum Weill)
” Oliver Cojot (Olivier Cojot)
Palu H. Baries, as administrator of the estate of
Ida Borukchovitch (Paul Baris, as adminis-
trator for the estate of Ida Boruchovitch)

App 2

Tex Aviv, Ispag.:

Eitan Aronowitch
Miram Aronowitch
Estate of Dora Block
Arieh Brodsky

Yael Brodsky

Anat Brodsky

Dana Brodsky

Estate of Pasco Cohen
Hannah Cohen
Yaakov Cohen
Tzipporah Cohen
Michael Cojot
Nahoum Dahan

Ichak David

Hadasza Agnes David
Uzi Davidson

Sara Davidson

Ron Davidson
Benjamin Davidson
Yehuda Gottlieb (Gotlieb)
Regina Gottlieb (Gotlieb)
Baruch Gross

Ruth Gross

Shy Gross

Tlan Hartuv

Itzchak Hirsh

Akiva Laxer (Avida Laxer)
Joseph Aboujdid
Ezra Almog

Janet Almog

David Benitah

Odette Benitah
Yoram Benitah
Esther Dahan

App 3

Alkeslassy Heftsibah (Eskelassy)
Arno Hilf

Nadia Israel

Zeev Josepovici (Iosipovic)
Hara Josepovici (Iosipovic)
Monique Khalepski-Epstein (Kaplansky-Epstein)
Jerachmiel Kiper (Kipper)
Rina Kiper (Kipper)

Lifsa Lazarovici (Lazarovicz)
Ada Lazarovici (Lazarovicz)
Chana Lenczner

Michael Livni

Michael Rabinovitz

Rivka Rabinovitz

Renata Reisfeld

Abraham Rubinstein

Gavriela Rubinstein

Michal Warshavsky

Elie Roger Zeitan

Aimee Aouva Zeitan (Zerbit)
Hana Zriehn (Zeritan)

Claude Rosenkovitch

Emma Rosenkovitch

Noam Rosenkovitch

Ella Rosenkovitch

Patricia Martell

Estate of Jean-Jacques Mimouni

App 4

APPENDIX B

BERLITZ TRANSLATION SERVICE
A Division of the Berlitz Schools of
Languages of America, Inc.

BERLITZ

No. 26734
40 West 5lst Street
New York, New York 10020
Telephone: (212) 765-1000

State or New York
Crry or New Yorx
County or New York

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation No. 26734
is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and ac-
curate rendition into English of a Judgment rendered in
the matter of Zimonyl vs. Varig Company, written in
French.

New York, New York, the 22nd day of June 1978.

Beruitz TRANSLATION SERVICE
EBH
Eileen B. Hennessy

Subscribed and sworn to before me
on this the 22nd day of June 1978.

Notary
(Seal)

AuBert J. LaMoTHE, JR.
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 30-7410630
Qualified in Nassau County
Certificate filed in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1980

App 5

Court or Fimst Instance or Paris
First Division
Section Two
Hearine or: April 28, 1978
In THE Matter oF: Zimonyl, widow of Hegedus

Agcarnst: Varig Co.
Sussect: Lack of Jurisdiction.

No. 17.345/77
ASS/8-11-75
Lack of Jurisdiction

JUDGMENT RENDERED ON Aprit 28, 1978,
By tHe Court or First Instance or Paris

First Drviston—Seconp Two
PLAINTIFF:

Mrs. Emese Zimonyl, widow of Mr. Bela Hegedus, resid-
ing at Tusnadi u. 25, Budapest, Hungary,

represented by:
Joseph Caporal, Attorney at Law

DEFENDANT:

Vanic Airlines (Empresa pe Axzrea Rio GranpEsE), with
headquarters at 365 Avenue Almirante Sylvio de Noro-
anha, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and with‘its general agency
for France at 27 Avenue des Champs Elysées, Paris 8,

represented by:
André Garnault, Attorney at Law

Tue Pusiic ProsecuTor
Mr. Boittiaux, Deputy

App 6
MEMBERS OF THE CouRT

Magistrates sitting:

Mr. Metayer, Presiding Judge
Miss Cochard, First Judge
Mrs. Tarabeux, Judge

SecretTary-CLERK OF THE Division:
Mr. Michaud.

Puieapines: At the public hearing of March 17, 1978.

JupcMent: Pronounced in public session after hearing
both parties—subject to objection

x
x x

1) Facts anp PRockEDINGs

On July 11, 1975, Mrs. Emese Zimonyl, widow, served a
summons upon the Brazilian company Empresa De Viacao
Agrea Rio GranvesE ‘(logo Vania), for interim payment of
the sum of 4,200,000 Franes, representing damages occa-
sioned by the death of her husband, Bela Hegedus, in the
air crash of July 11, 1973, near Saulx-les-Chartreux (Hs-
sonne).

By Court document of June 16, the Varia Company, based
on the provisions of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention,

alleged:

1) Territorial non-jurisdiction of the Court of the First
Instance of Paris as against the Federal Court of Rio de
Janeiro;

2) Plea of suit pending elsewhere, the plaintiff having also

brought an action for the same claims before the Court of
First Instance of Corbeil.

App 7

In her pleadings of March 2, 1977, Mrs. Hegedus main-
tained that the Court of Paris did have jurisdiction, as the
Varia Company has a domicile at 27 Avenue des Champs
Elysées, Paris, where the summons was served upon it.

She further alleged that the existence of a rule of lis alibi
pendens between French and foreign courts was at the
very least questionable; and declared that she had no ob-
jection to postponement of a decision on her application

for relief until a decision was made on the actions pending
before foreign courts and contesting the lis pendens in
France, the summons before the Court of Corbeil not having
been returned.

In its answer, dated March 7, 1978, the Varig Company
declared that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention did not
place an agency on the same footing as the domicile of the
carrier, and that a mere decentralized office, such as
that of Paris, determined a special jurisdiction only if it
had issued the transportation contract concerned, which is
not the case here as regards Varig’s agency in Paris;

Wherefore it was pleading lack of jurisdiction.

II—ARGUMENT

Whereas Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, applicable
in France, provides that an action for liability must be
brought before one of four courts, restrictively listed, at
the choice of the plaintiff:

—That of the carrier’s domicile;
—That of the principal headquarters for its operation;

—That of the place where it has an office which entered into
the contract;

—That of the place of destination.

App 8

Whereas the plaintiff maintains that the Varig Company
has a domicile in Paris at its agency at 27 Avenue des
Champs-Elysées; whereas this domicile is of necessity sep-
arate from the principal headquarters of its operation,
since it is mentioned separately in the list of the places of
possible jurisdiction ;

Whereas Mr. Hegedus’s ticket was written in Budapest by
the Martev Company for a trip from Budapest and return
by way of Rio de Janeiro and Paris;

Whereas the principal headquarters of the defendant is at
Rio de Janeiro, and Paris is only one of its agencies and is
not the agency that made the contract;

Whereas, in contrast to Mrs. Hegedus’s allegation, Paris
cannot be the carrier’s domicile, as a person, whether
physical or legal, can have only one domicile, which in this
ease is Rio de Janeiro, the headquarters of the Varig
Company ;

Whereas Article 28 hereinabove cited uses the word ‘‘domi-
cile’’ in the singular, and does not take into consideration
the location of the establishment or agency unless the con-
tract was made there;

Whereas Mrs. Hegedus’s interpretation of the idea of
domicile actually refers to the so-called jurisprudence of
‘*principal stations,’’ which is an essentially domestic at-
tack on the principle of uniqueness of domicile and cannot
be internationally applied without a specific text; where-
fore Article 28 §1 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be
subjected to an incorrect extension that it does not have;

Whereas in this case the domicile of the Varig Company
is the same as the principal headquarters of its operation,
and is its corporate headquarters; whereas it is located at
Rio de Janeiro, which fact excludes any competence of the
Court of First Instance of Paris to be seized of Mrs.
Hegedus’s action for liability;

App 9

Whereas in these conditions the objection of lack of juris-
diction raised by the Varig Company should be admitted,
and in accordance with Article 96 $1 of the New Code of
Civil Procedure competence should be disclaimed ;

WHEREFORE
the Court, in public session, rendering judgment after hear-
ing both parties and subject to objection,
Disclaims competence,
Dismisses both parties,

Orders Mrs. Hegedus to pay the expenses that may be paid
directly by André Garnault, the attorney retained, pro-
vided he paid same out of his own pocket without advance
therefor.

So made and adjudged in Paris on April twenty-eighty,
one thousand nine hundred seventy-eight.

The Secretary-Clerk The Presiding Judge
Drawn up by: Mr. Metayer

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2550%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
