# Petition — General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 441 U.S. 957

## Text

| FILED

;4

If Supreme Coust, U. a |

FEB 21 1979S!

: 5 a) he Sd

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 767, Affiliated With the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

VS.

STANDARD BRANDS, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

DAVID PREVIANT
6th Floor, Midland Bank Building
211 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

L.N.D. WELLS, JR.
G. WILLIAM BAAB
8204 Elmbrook Drive, Suite 200
Dallas, Texas 75247

214/620-3672
Attorneys for Petitioner
MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB, CLOUTMAN
& CHAPMAN, P.C.
Of Counsel
January, 1979
St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477

a

INDEX

Page
eee aaa e sk osha en es ek ec recosee 1
Sec hea Aide ab be Ges 564 ces vecdceses 2
EE Ee 2
oo” Eee ae 3
Cc Gb becerscccccccccsseccss 4
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................22005. 12
eae ab ae ken 06> o's 2 id 19
CCE SCs ace e Nh 6 pebachcesesuecce A-1 to A-109

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award, (9/20/75) .......... A-1
District Court’s Findings of Fact (10/16/75) .......... A-46
SN UE ROP TED occ cesses sccesens A-50
we TS le ae A-51
CER C ewe b oes 6.06664 vb es coeses A-54

Opinion of Court of Appeals—Reversing District Court
(10/11/77); 560 F.2d 700 Dissent 560 F.2d at — ... .A-55

En Banc Opinion of Court of Appeals (9/15/78), — F.2d

EE a De cdc ccc ces secccessceees A-75
Order denying Rehearing (12/28/78) ............... A-104
ee tad beh bee's ess ov ssecseces’s A-105

NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum re IAM With-
drawal of Charge, 1976-77 CCH NLRB 420,020 at p.
RES Se ae A-105

Cases Cited
Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964), 11 L.Ed.
EN is bk 46 5 WRN EV eV on AMEE TAR IANS CRETE WOES 16
Statutes Cited
BE Ss Eh REED NSS weed udeeeeureeescedeose's 2
Oe a ek re ere rire 10, 19
SE EE Deas ov Ga deecidseveangeuiexsats 3
fa | eee eee EERE ORT eee 3
Be Reece S BOD OP GIG bv cecv tease reccewveess 4,10
Other Authorities

“Business Loves the Sunbelt (and Vice Versa)” Fortune,
SUD IF Fs OR. TIRES oc eve vcicevccseccesecs 13

Committee on Education and Labor, House of Represent-
atives, on H.R. 76, the National Employment Priorities

Ast, Aipeh, Gile, BEte D, WGTS. i vk ccccsccenctees 14
Dallas Times Herald, January 21, 1979 .............. 14
“Employees' on Manufacturing Payrolls, by Region and

State, 1967-75,” Handbook of Labor Statistics ........ 14
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards on

the National Employment Priorities Act at p. 73 ..... 12

Maurice Fulton, New Factors in Plant Location, 49 Harv.
Bus.Rev. 4, 5-6 (May-June 1971) ............005. 14, 15

“Plant Relocation: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop,”
XIV Boston College Law Rev. 1135-1169 (1973) ....12, 18

Rifkin & Barber, The North Will Rise Again, Beacon
me ET rer ers Te eee eee 12

Scheinkman, “Plant Removal Under the National Labor
Relations Act,” 16 NYU Conf.Lab. 81 (1962) ......

The Law of Contracts, Baker Voorhis & Co., New York,
ee we eehae

“The Second War Between The States, Bitter Struggle for
Jobs, Capital, and People,” Business Week, May 17,
a PRE SA Piet a oe a TO oe ae

18

17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

rere

GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 767, Affiliated With the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

VS.

STANDARD BRANDS, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

Petitioner, General Warehousemen and Helpers Local 767,
affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (“Teamsters”),
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on September
15, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The findings, opinion and award of the arbitrator, Professor
Charles J. Morris, are unreported. They are reproduced in the
Appendix at p. A-1 through p. A-45. ws

aoe. enn

The unreported findings, conclusions, and order of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
denying enforcement of the arbitral award are reproduced in
the Appendix at p. A-46 through p. A-53.

The original opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, rendered October 11, 1977, enforcing the arbitral award
is reported at 560 F.2d 700. It is reproduced in the Appendix
at p. A-55 through p. A-70. The dissent appears at p. A-70
through p. A-73.

The en banc opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, rendered September 15, 1978, affirming the District
Court’s denial of enforcement of the arbitral award, and re-
manding to the District Court, is as yet unreported. It is re-
produced in the Appendix, Majority Opinion p. A-75 to p. A-99;
Dissent p. A-99 to p. A-103.

JURISDICTION

The order of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
refusing Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing was entered Decem-
ber 28, 1978, and this petition for certiorari is being filed
within ninety (90) days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This case presents questions as to the availability of specific
performance to enforce an arbitral award requiring an employer
to permit employees to transfer to a new plant at established
wages without loss of seniority.

The specific questions are:
1. May an employer who violates a collective bargaining
agreement (which provides that covered employees may follow

ey es

their work to a new plant) avoid specific performance of the
collective bargaining agreement by contracting with another
union at substandard wages and conditions to cover the work
at the new plant?

2. Does the arbitral award unlawfully infringe upon the
self-organization rights of the employees at the new plant to
the extent that the award must be denied specific enforcement,
either:

(a) as in conflict with the agreement between the em-
ployer and another union, executed during the pendency of
the arbitration, and providing lesser wages and conditions
at the new plant? or,

(b) as in conflict with NLRB certification of the other
union, based upon an election at which only the new
employees were allowed to vote?

3. Did the Court of Appeals err in limiting damages to those
incurred during the contract term; and in refusing specific per-
formance when the IAM contract and certification terminated?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, as amended, are:

29 U.S.C. § 173(d) which declares a national policy that:
“(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.”

29 U.S.C. § 174 “. . . employers and employees and their
representatives in any industry affecting commerce shall—(1)
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, hours and working conditions . . .”

or ce

29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) and (c), set out in the Appendix, (p.
A-105) provides federal jurisdiction of suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was brought under §301(a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §185(a)), by Petitioner
(herein “Teamsters”) to enforce a labor arbitration award
against Standard Brands, an employer, party to a Dallas, Texas,
collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration process was,
as the courts below found, “regular and has been pursued in
accordance with the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.”!

The arbitration findings and award (App. pp. A-1-A-45) con-
cern the opening of a new Standard Brands margarine plant in
Denison, Texas, and the closing of an existing margarine plant in
Dallas, Texas. The Dallas plant had long been represented by
Teamsters, and the collective bargaining contract there, as the
Court of Appeals found, contained provisions protecting the
rights of the employees if the Dallas operations should be
“transferred permanently to a new plant. . .”.

Standard determined, prior to 1974, to build a new plant in
Denison, some 75 miles from Dallas. When Dallas employees,
uneasy that their jobs were in jeopardy, sought assurance that
Standard would not eliminate Dallas jobs or transfer Dallas
operations to Denison, they were repeatedly assured that the
Dallas operations would not be affected. Actually, Standard
then intended to—and later did—close the Dailas plant. With-
out detailing all that is found in the arbitrator’s lengthy deci-

1 The pertinent provisions of the Dallas collective bargaining
agreement are set out in the arbitrator’s decision at pp. 3 to 8 of the
Appendix to this Petition. See footnote 1 to the majority decision,
en banc, below, App pp. 77 to 78, infra.

inh ais

sion (App. p. A-1 to p. A-45) it is clear (as the arbitrator found
and as the courts below accept?) that Standard “intended to
operate Denison non-union, and it especially tried to operate
it without the Teamsters Union and its contract.”*

The Denison plant opened in the fall of 1974. Teainsters’
written request for transfer rights as provided in the Dallas
contract was ignored; Teamsters filed a grievance which as-
serted that the operation of the new plant would result in
the closing of the old one—and requested, in that event, the

protection of the Dallas employees as provided in their con-
tract.*

The Dallas plant actually closed October 1, 1975. Mean-
while, the Teamsters’ grievance, denied by Standard Brands,
was submitted to the arbitrator, who after two hearings and
a plant inspection, issued the opinion and award which is the
subject of this litigation (App. 1-54).

The arbitrator found that Standard had engaged in a series
of specified violations of the Dallas collective bargaining agree-
ment, that Standard’s actions had been designed to assure op-
eration of the Denison plant “non-union” and had resulted in
“discrimination against the Dallas employees because of their
Teamsters Union membership.”

The arbitrator further specifically found Standard to have
violated that section of the collective bargaining agreement
which had assured the Dallas employees the right to fill jobs
at the Denison plant.®

2 App. p. 41, infra; 560 F.2d 701 (Sth Cir. 1977).
* Arbitrator’s Opinion, App. p. 42, infra.

* See contract provisions displayed in the arbitrator’s Opinion,
App. pp. 3-8, infra.

® See Arbitrator’s Opinion, App. pp. 41 to 42, infra.

parte yee

While the Teamsters’ claim was pending in arbitration Stand-
ard agreed with another union (IAM), over Teamsters’ objec-
tion, for NLRB to conduct an election at Denison. The elec-
tion agreement permitted only the newly hired Denison
employees to vote.

IAM won the election,® was certified by NLRB, and in less
than a month fror: the certification Standard had signed a
contract with IAM covering the Denison plant providing wage
rates “significantly lower than comparable rates in the Dallas
Teamsters agreement.”*

Having found gross violation of the Teamsters collective bar-
gaining agreement, the arbitrator sought to remedy the viola-
tions, and at the same time not to intrude upon the rights of
the newly hired Denison employees. The arbitrator accordingly
wrote; App. p. 42, infra:

What is an appropriate remedy? I have tried to balance
the contract rights of the Dallas employees with the in-
terest of the present Denison employees who are wholly
innocent in this proceeding. Had the Company not vio-
lated the agreement initially, the Teamster’s Union, prob-
ably under the same contract, would most likely be the
bargaining representative of the Denison employees, who
would. have been mostly former Dallas employees—the
record indicates that most of them would have accepted
transfer. I will not so order, however. Nor will I order
the Company to displace any present employee. As well
as violating other provisions, the Company did violate the
contractual counterpart of Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, for which affected employees would

6 Standard advised NLRB in late 1974 that “the Denison plant
is fully staffed,” although it only had 26 employees there, and several
major manufacturing lines were yet to be started up. Arbitrator’s
Opinion, App. p. 36, infra.

* Arbitrator’s Opinion, App. p. 37, infra.

a. oa

be entitled to be made whole as to their losses. So far,
however, there have been no losses; what we are con-
cerned with are future rights and the avoiding of losses.
Accordingly, subject to the limitations noted below, I hold
that all Dallas employees who desire to transfer may do
so and that they will acquire new seniority based upon
the first working day at the Denison plant (a day in late
October, 1974, as described hereinabove), and their rela-
tive same seniority date) will be based upon length of
service with the Company. The Company will be required
to provide suitable employment at the Denison plant, be-
ginning the first regular work day following the termina-
tion of their employment at the Dallas plant, to as many
of those Dallas transferees as are required for the opera-
tion of stick or bulk margarine operations,[*) provided,
however, that such operation shall include at least two
lines using Benhil equipment or the equivalent. If ad-
ditional operations are added, such as Morpak lines, with
or without whipped or bulk margarine production, any
Dallas employees not otherwise assigned will be assigned
to these jobs before employment is offered to anyone else.
And if vacancies o.cur in other production or maintenance
jobs at the Denison plants, such jobs are to be filled by
Dallas transferees, so long as they are available and quali-
fied to do the work. If there are any persons from the
Dallas plant desiring to transfer in excess of those required
for the aforesaid jobs, such persons shall be placed on a
preferential hiring list and shall have the rights of em-
ployees on permanent layoff under the contract herein.

It is recognized that the addition of these several manu-
facturing lines and newly transferred employees will ma-
terially alter the bargaining unit at Denison and that

% As made clear earlier in the arbitral decision, Dallas employees
had been manufacturing stick and bulk margarine. (Arbitrator’s
Opinion, App. p. 11, infra).

eventually the NLRB will have to determine the resulting
questions concerning representation. Until that time, how-
ever, the provisions of the present Teamsters contract will
govern the compensation and other benefits of the em-
ployees performing work of the same nature as the Dallas
operations. Such contract, however, will not govern any
other job in the plant even though such job may be filled
by a Dallas transferree, for such job would legically be
covered by the IAM contract.

The parties are further required to appoint their represent-
atives under Part I, Section (j) as promptly as possible
for the purpose of implementing transfer and related
rights provided by Section 13, as interpreted by this
Award. I shall retain jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter of this grievance pending compliance with
this award.

IAM challenged the transfer and seniority provisions of the
award by charges before NLRB. Prior to trial of the charges
IAM withdrew them. The withdrawal was with the consent of
the General Counsel of NLRB, recorded in an opinion pub-
lished at 1966-67 CCH NLRB 4 20,020 at p. 32,030 App.
pp. 105-109, infra.

Teamsters filed this action to enforce the award, the Dis-
trict Court denied enforcement on the ground “that the arbi-
trator exceeded the scope of his authority since his award is in
conflict with the NLRB’s certification of the LAM in Denison.”®

The majority of the Fifth Circuit panel which first heard the
appeal (Judges Tuttle and Wisdom) noted that the “arbitration
decision has passed one test before the NLRB,” in that [AM’s
challenge by unfair labor practice charge of the propriety of
“bumping” Denison empioyees by transfer from Dallas was

% App. p. 47, infra.

=—

withdrawn—with formal opinion from the NLRB General
Counsel (560 F.2d 704, App. p. 62, infra) which the Court
noted, viz:

“The NLRB Division of Advice concluded that the Ma-
chinists should be permitted to withdraw the charge. One
basis for the Division of Advice’s reaction was the Ma-
chinists’ desire to drop the matter. But the Division also
commented that “the Employer’s actions in transferring a
Dallas employee to Dennison [sic] and applying Dallas
seniority to him were considered to have been in compli-
ance with, and therefore privileged by the arbitration
award .. .”1°

Judge Coleman, in dissent, 560 F.2d 709, App. p. 70, infra,
said that the “true issue is whether the District Court abused its
discretion when it denied enforcement”; he viewed the Union's

10 The majority opinion of the Circuit Court panel goes on to ob-
serve at 560 F.2d 704, App. p. 62, infra:

“The same NLRB memorandum, however, appears to question
the propriety of the award’s extension of Dallas contract terms
to Denison. The memorandum only approved of the award ‘as
modified’—an apparent reference to the decision by the district
court not to enforce the application of the Teamster contract at
Denison. Moreover, the Division comment that

‘If the Circuit Court is being asked by the Teamsters to apply
other provisions of the Teamster contract to the Denison em-
ployees so that the Machinists’ certification rights would be
undermined, the Machinists may wish to seek Board interven-
tion. Such a request would be forwarded to the Division of
Litigation.’

Id., at n.8.
Had the Board appeared in our case, its views would have re-
ceived careful consideration . . . It is one thing for a court to

refuse to enforce an arbitration award when the NLRB protests
that enforcement would impair Board processes. It is another
to ‘protect’ the Board’s processes when no unfair labor practice
charge is presently pending and no request for a stay of enforce-
ment has been heard from the Board.

== 10 —

actions as “merely attempts to subvert the NLRB order” (sic)"?
regarding “the proper bargaining unit”'*; and he urged that
effectuation of the award “would result in an unfair labor prac-
tice in violation of §158(a)(1,3) of the National Labor Manage-
ment Rel<*‘ons Act.” (App. p. 72).

Standard’s Motion for Rehearing en banc was granted, and
on rehearing the majority, now speaking through Judge Cole-
man, the original dissenter, held:

“|. that the remedy prescribed by the arbitrator re-
quired the employer to violate the terms of another of its
collective bargaining agreements with a bargaining unit'**
duly certified by the National Labor Relations Board.”
(App. p. 76 emphasis added).

The en banc majority stated the issue (erroneously, in our
view) at App. p. 89, infra:

“

. whether a federal district court can enforce the
remedial provisions of an arbitration award which would
require the employer to violate the terms of another col-
lective bargaining agreement.”

and defined “the nub of the dispute” as “if the Court directs en-
forcement of the arbitrator’s award it may be affirmatively
causing the employer to be ordered to commit an unfair labor
practice under 29 U.S.C. §158(1).1* This cannot be done”
(App. p. 90, infra, emphasis added).

Ostensibly eschewing a direct holding that to enforce the
award is to require the employer to commit an unfair labor

11 Actually, no NLRB “Order” was ever sought—much less—is-
sued. Presumably, Judge Coleman refers to the IAM “certification.

12 and 128 Presumably, Judge Coleman means bargaining “agent”.
13 In dissent, in panel, Judge Coleman had also argued §158(a)(3)

was violated. The en banc opinion, at footnote 7, eschews any deter-
mination as to §8(a)(3) violation.

a

practice, the en banc majority holds “that the award was re-
pugnant to the NLRA, and [we] accordingly affirm the District
Judge...” (App. p. 93, infra).

In short, the en banc majority views the arbitral award as (1)
requiring Standard to violate its contract with IAM, and (2) as
requiring Standard to take action which the Court viewed as
“repugnant” to the NLRA.”!4*

Five judges'® joined in dissenting, for in their view the award
does not conflict with the NLRB certification of the IAM, nor
does it require Standard to violate the terms of its agreement with
the IAM (App. p. 99, infra) .1°*

14 The en banc majority holds at App. p. 93, infra, that:

“Unions are vitally concerned, and properly so, with their right
to bargain over wages, benefits, seniority and working condi-
tions. Section 9(a) of the NLRA expressly recognizes such a
right for a union if it is certified by the NLRA. If a contract
or an arbitration award conflicts with that policy, the statutory
policy must prevail. We think that a contract specifying that an
employee transferring to another plant operated by the same
employer would continue to receive the same wages and bene-
fits that he received at the old plant, despite the existence of a
contract with another union at the new location would be un-
enforceable. It necessarily follows that an arbitration award
poo seeks to achieve the same impermissible result cannot be
enforced.”

4* Yet significantly, the Court did not itself hold that by taking
the action required by the award it would commit an unfair labor
practice. The majority, in agreement with the dissent recognized that
as a function of NLRB—not the Court.

19 Tuttle, Wisdom, Goldberg, Rubin and Vance.

*5* On June 9, 1978, upon expiration of the IAM contract with
Standard Brands in Denison, the NLRB conducted another election.
In this election IAM received only one vote, the Teamsters received
fifty-two votes, and thirty-four votes were cast for no union. Com-
pany objections to the election have delayed certification of the
Teamsters as the collective bargaining agent. A motion for rehearing
en banc presented the facts of this election to the court. The court
denied the motion without opinion. App. p. 104, infra.

—_,

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

l

The importance of the questions hete presented comes in
focus when the holding of the Court of Appeals is considered
in the context of the plight of workers, their unions, and the
economies of the North and Midwest from which their em-
ployers are moving to the “Sunbelt,” or to rural locations.
As the Court of Appeals wrote at App. p. 95, infra:

“The movement of plants from one location to another,
the transfer of functions between plants, and the movement
of workers between plants are subjects of vital concern
for both labor and management. Employees are interested
in continuity of employment, income, and seniority rights.
Employers, on the other hand, need flexibility to respond
to competitive forces and to increase efficiency. Such agree-
ments are important, perhaps necessary, features of the
modern mixed economy and are entitled to be respected.”

Accordingly, “. . . contractual provisions such as those at
issue in this case have become a common feature in collective
bargaining agreements nationwide.”'® They have long been
regarded as .a necessity in protection of employees against un-
scrupulous employer undercutting of their union wages and
conditions.'7 See, “Plant Relocation: Catching Up With the
Runaway Shop,” XIV Boston College Law Rev. 1135-1169
(1973).

Mobility of industry in this age is a commonplace. Move-
ment from the industrial (and organized) North to the Southern

16 Majority en banc opinion App. p. 95, infra.

17 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards on the
National Employment Priorities Act at p. 73. See also; Rifkin &
Barber, The North Will Rise Again, Beacon Press, (1978).

ae

(and unorganized) “Sunbelt” is increasing. Major changes in
plant locations have occurred in the last decade—and further
changes are imminent. Responsible publications proclaim that
there is a veritable reshaping of the demographic and economic
map of the nation. See “Business Loves the Sunbelt (and Vice
Versa)” Fortune, June 1977; pp. 132-146; and “The Second
War Between The States, Bitter Struggle for Jobs, Capital, and
People,” Business Week, May 17, 1976, p. 92 ff.18 Or as the
testimony before a Congressional Committee recently revealed:

“Here is a company that built a billion dollar corporation
because of the sweat, tears, and muscles of the Akron
employees. They have expanded to almost every State in
the Union, even to most foreign countries, and yet they cut
jobs from the very plant that gave them its beginning.
It’s sort of sad, isn’t it, Mr. Chairman? Here is a company
that over the years has not only raped the natural resources
of the community: The water, the air and the land, and
yet even the citizens, and has never really paid for its
fair share. Here is a company that really feels it has the

*8 “As long as the migration of industry and population was
gradual from what was a relatively rich Northeast to what was a
relatively impoverished South and Southwest, it helped to unify the
nation. But within the past five years the process has burst beyond

= bounds that can be accommodated by existing political institu-
ons.

Less than three years ago, the Commerce Dept.’s Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis published projections for 1980 and 1990 of the
population, personal income, and employment in each of the 50
states—Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Arizona,
Texas, ‘Utah, Alaska and Hawaii—had already exceeded their 1980
Projections in population, and one state—New Mexico—had already
surpassed the 1990 figure. By the same token, the shortfall in slower-
growing regions has been enormous. For example, New York was
expected to grow by 1.1 million people from 1970 to 1980, but thus
far the state has lost more than 100,000. Pennsylvania, slated to
” nearly 800,000 during the 1970s, has increased its population

y barely 30,000 thus far. This is virtually the same growth posted
by Illinois, where the BEA expected a rise of nearly 900,000.’

—_ en

right to destroy the families of thousands of its employees
simply by saying, ‘We are moving on.’ ”?®

In the past decade there have been two trends in plant reloca-
tion. Companies have moved from the north to the south and
from the cities to the suburbs, and now to small towns. (For
statistics on movement from north to south see Table entitled
“Employees on Manufacturing Payrolls, by Region and State,
1967-75,” Handbook of Labor Statistics, for numbers on urban-
rural movement see Maurice Fulton, New Factors in Plant
Location, 49 Harv.Bus.Rev. 4, 5-6 (May-June 1971).?°

As the industrial migration continues the rural South will
for sometime provide a large pool of inexperienced and willing
labor, abundant land, tax concessions, and state legislatures
attuned to providing industry a “healthy business climate.”

19 Hearings before the Subcommittees on labor standards of the
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, on
H.R. 76, the National Employment Priorities Act, Akron, Ohio,
May 9, 1975.

20 Headlines in the Dallas Times Herald, January 21, 1979 pro-
claimed: “Bill aims to stem Snowbelt exodus” and stated:

“Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., of New Jersey will introduce
landmark legislation later this month aimed at slowing the
exodus of industry from the Northwest and Midwest, it has
been learned.

The measure would require employers to provide for the
financial security of their workers before closing up shop or
moving to another state. =

The bill is —- to lead to one of the hottest labor-related
debates of the 96th Congress. Strong opposition is anticipated
from the business community and from the ‘Sunbelt’ states which
often are the beneficiaries of plant closings in the Northern
‘Sunbelt.’

Williams, a Democrat, is chairman of the Senate Human Re-
sources Committee.

A draft of the proposed legislation, obtained by the
Newhouse News Service, shows it would obligate an employer
to protect the ‘social and economic health’ of his workers in

—:

Energy savings resulting from environmental characteristics are
additional reasons to accelerate industrial movement.??

Organized employees, and the unions which represent them
protect against the employer who announces “We are moving

on,” by obtaining collective bargaining protections similar to
those at bar.

Yet, the Court of Appeals says, they are not to be specifically
enforced,?? and this is the Court which declares the law for that
portion of the Sunbelt which stretches from Florida to Texas—
the very area into which the nation’s industry is moving.

The rights here at issue—those of incumbents provided in
collective agreements—as well as those of new hires in low wage
areas to which industry moves—all evolve from the same federal
statute. The balance to be drawn requires definitive decision of
important questions of broad application. As we demonstrate,
the Court of Appeals’ holding that incumbent's contract rights

are obliterated by the employer contracting with others is plain
error.

the same way he now is required to protect the environment of
the area where the plant is located.

‘Just as a firm must now recognize that its pollution is a social
cost for which the firm must take some responsibility, it is now
time to recognize that the relocation or ioee of a plant or
factory by a firm imposes costs on others for which the firm must
be in some part responsible,’ the draft states.”

21 See Fulton, “New Factors in Plant Location,” 49 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 4, at 5-6, reporting that more than 33% of the moves are to
small non-metropolitan areas. He predicts: “the trend is likely to
continue, particularly away from the largest cities.”

*2 Compare the Court of Appeals (at p. 7006):

“We think however, that if the Denison plant had not been
oo gen prior to the award it would have been readily enforce-
able in its entirety against Standard.”

am 16 —=

2

Quite aside from these important practical questions is ihe
necessity of providing guides as to the balance between rights
specified in lawful collective bargaining agreements and those
flowing from NLRB certifications. Not since Carey v. Westing-
house, 375 U.S. 261 (1964) 11 L.Ed.2d 320 has this court
addressed the questions of the respective roles of arbitration and
NLRB bargaining unit determinations. There this Court en-
dorsed arbitration as a means to solve either work assignment or
representation disputes. And though not there met with con-
flict with an NLRB Order, stated that in the event of such
conflict, the NLRB Order would prevail.

But does an arbitral award “conflict” with an NLRB § 9(c)
“certification” (as distinguished from a § 10 “Order”), when it
specifically enforces individual employees’ seniority and wage
rights provided in their Union agreement?

In Civil Rights cases this Court found no conflict with the
federal statute in honoring established and lawful seniority sys-
tems and “slotting” those workers who have been the victims
of unlawful racial discriminations in the bona fide seniority
systems provided by the collective agreement.

So here, there should be no impropriety in assigning metropoli-
tan employées who move to the new plant the seniority they
would have enjoyed had the employer not violated their con-
tract rights.

And “Red Circle Rates” are a commonplace in the world of
labor relations—i.e., the assignment of particular individuals
rates above the contract minimum is often done—and for a
variety of legitimate reasons. Does such assignment “violate” the
certification issued by NLRB?23 May a court, on speculation

23 As we have seen supra p. 11, both the LAM contract and the
NLRB certification expired in June 1978. There then could not be
“conflict” with the expired contract or the superceded certification.

— ee

that it might, refuse to vindicate by specific performance the
rights provided in a collective bargaining agreement which is
the favorite of the federal policy?

Both NLRB and arbitrators are essentials in the statutory
scheme by which workers rights are to be protected, and the
public’s stake in the stability of labor relations which flows from
enforceable collective bargaining agreements is to be vindicated.

The procedures and powers of both the administrative law
and the arbitral process are a necessity to promote the national
labor policy. Until and unless there is actual conflict, neither
should be required to give way to the other. Surely, the lower
court's general notion that to vindicate rights to jobs and wages
is somehow “repugnant to,” though not necessarily violative
of, the National Labor Relations Act ought not to stand.

3

The conventional remedy for violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is specific performance.24 Yet the remedy
is to be denied, says the majority below, because the employer
has now signed a contract with another. The conventional rem-
edy is denied because he who broke the agreement, has blocked
the remedy by subsequent contract with another union.

When S sells a house to B-1, he may not avoid specific per-
formance of his agreement to deliver the house to B-1 by his
subsequent agreement to sell it to B-2.?°

Labor relations policy considerations do not point to any
different result. Indeed, labor policy reinforces what would be

24 The majority en banc wrote at App. pp. 92-93, infra:

“. . . if the Denison plant had not been organized prior to the
award, it would have been readily enforceable in its entirety
against Standard.”

29 The Law of Contracts, Baker Voorhis & Co., New York, 1920,
$1429.

‘anak ME ati

the certain result in commercial law. Federal labor policy
encourages and protects the collective bargaining contract, pro-
vides for its enforcement by specific performance.

Federal labor policy protects against the runaway shop; for
as NLRB has redundantly held, plant relocation becomes
unlawful when the move is effected, as here, for anti-union mo-
tives. See “Plant Relocation—Catching Up With the Run-
away Shop,” XIV Boston Col. L.Rev. 1135 (1973); Sheink-
man, “Plant Removal Under the National Labor Relations
Act,” 16 NYU Conf.Lab. 81 (1962), and cases there cited.

Admittedly, specific performance of limitations on plant re-
moval provisions in collective agreements will have some ad-
verse affect upon putative or newly hired workers at the new
plant. These new hires have statutory rights to self organiza-
tion and collective bargaining. But to elevate the rights of the
new employees at the rural location above the contractual
rights of 30 year veterans is to turn the statute topsy-turvy.

The purpose of the statute is to promote the practice of col-
lective bargaining, to foster written collective agreements to
which all parties are to be bound. Rights so established should
not evaporate when an employer violates both his collective
bargaining agreement and the statutory rights of his employees.
Here, the move to Denison was (as the arbitrator found)*® for
the purpose of “going non-union,” and to discriminate against
the Dallas employees because of their Teamsters affiliation.

There is no suggestion here that NLRB viewed the enforce-
ment of the arbitral award as violative, either of its certifica-
tion, or as an unfair labor practice intrusion on the rights of
the rural employees. To the contrary, as the original opinion

26 The Circuit Court majority stated:

“.. . we are not unmoved by the employees’ situation. We also
accept the finding of the arbitrator and we do not condone the
company’s conduct. It is noteworthy that Standard itself does
not deny the contractual violations. . . .” (at headnotes 6, 7)
p. 7008.

am 19

of the Court of Appeals panel specified, charges of unfair labor
practice were withdrawn, with NLRB approval, upon the

NLRB counsel’s published opinion that no unfair practice was
shown.

The en banc majority does not dispute this—indeed, they
acknowledge (footnote 7) “. . . it would be difficult for the
NLRB to find the necessary discriminatory intent” to support
§8(a) (3) violation should the award be obeyed. The en banc
majority further is specific, at footnote 7:

“

. we certainly express no opinion as to whether en-
forcement of this award in the circumstances of this case
would constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of
29 U.S.C. 3158(a)(3). That is a task for the Board.”

It is, indeed. And unless and until the Board so finds, there
is no conflict with the arbitral award. In the absence of such
conflict, a valid award ought not be thwarted by a court’s
general notion that it is “repugnant” to the Act.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review

the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID PREVIANT
6th Floor, Midland Bank Building
211 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

L.N.D. WELLS, JR.
G. WILLIAM BAAB
8204 Elmbrook Drive, Suite 200
Dallas, Texas 75247

APPENDIX

ee

ay «ee

ARBITRATOR’S OPINION AND AWARD

In the Matter of the Arbitration Be- >

tween
Standard Brands Incorporated (Dallas Opinion

Margarine Plant) and

> Award
and (Denison Plant
Grievance)

Local 767, International Brotherhood

of Teamsters .

Before CHARLES J. MORRIS, Arbitrator selected by the
parties

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case concerns the opening of a new Standard Brands
margarine plant in Denison, Texas, and the closing of an exist-
ing margarine plant in Dallas. At issue are the rights, if any,
of the “production and maintenance employees and laboratory
testers” at the Dallas plant under a collective bargaining agree-
ment with Local 767, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
successor to Local 159, International Union of United Brewery,
Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. The Union contends that the Dallas employees have
job rights at the new Denison plant, which is located about 75
miles from Dallas. The Company disputes this, contending:
that the Denison plant produces soft tub margarine which the
Dallas plant has never produced, that “Denison is not equipped
to manufacture quarter pound stick or whipped stick product,”
which the Dallas plant produces, that “no operations at the
Dallas margarine plant have closed [and] no Dallas employee
with seniority has been laid off as a result of the opening of the

= ee

Denison plant.” The Company made these contentions in its
brief filed on May 1, 1975. Since that date, the record has been
reopened to receive evidence that the Company will “perma-
nently cease operations at the Dallas margarine plant at the
close of business on October 3, 1975.”

It goes without saying that this case is governed by the col-
lective bargaining contract. But because that contract incorpo-
rates certain pertinent requirements in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, I am especially mindful of the Arbitrator’s obligation
under the decisions in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955), and Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150
(1971). In Spielberg the National Labor Relations Board de-
fined the standard under which it would defer to the arbitration
process when arbitration issues under a collective agreement
overlap unfair labor practice issues; to wit, when “the proceed-
ings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed
to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.” In
Collyer, the Board reaffirmed the Spielberg doctrine and estab-
lished an additional doctrine: that it would withhold NLRB
processes in such cases prior to arbitration when the collective
contract made available a quick and fair means for the resolu-
tion of this dispute including, if appropriate, a fully effective
remedy for any breach of contract which occurred.”

The present case appears to meet the Collyer standards. Al-
though the Union claims that the Company had violated specific
contractual provisions, the conduct in question would also, if
brought to the NLRB, involve unfair labor practice questions un-
der Sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29
U.S.C. §141 et seq.) I am thus mindful of my responsibility to
the parties and recognize that this case severely tests the theory
and philosophy behind Spielberg and Collyer, for this decision
will, of necessity, treat such volatile issues as alleged discrimi-
nation against union membership, alleged denial of employment
on account of union representation, and alleged refusal to bar-

=<

gain in good faith—all however in the context of specific con-
tractual requirements. In attempting to meet the Spielberg
standards I do not lose sight of my primary objective, which is to
give effect to the contractual language which the parties have
negotiated.

GRIEVANCE—

The grievance herein was filed on November 21, 1974, and
reads as follows:

The union is filing a grievance on behalf of the Dallas,
Texas margarine workers. Cited in this grievance are Sec-
tion 13(E) and 13(F) of Part I and other pertinent clauses
covered by this contract. We feel these clauses cover these
employees because the building and opening of the new
margarine plant built in Denison, Texas will result in the
closure of the Dallas plant and will adversely affect the
employees covered by the current labor agreement now
in effect.

We further feel that the thirty people whose names were
submitted for transfer are covered by Section 14(E) of
Part I. We are requesting arbitration on these issues.

PERTINENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS—

The following provisions of the collective bargaining con-
tract are pertinent:

Part VIII, Section 1—

BARGAINING UNIT

The Company recognizes the Union as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent for all production
and maintenance employees and laboratory testers at the

_—

Company’s margarine plant at Dallas, Texas, excluding
supervisory, clerical and professional employees.

Truck drivers and helpers loading or unloading will be
permitted only in the immediate dock area. All orders
will be filled by Local 159 bargaining unit members.

Part I, Section 13—

SEVERANCE ALLOWANCE, PLANT
CLOSINGS AND TRANSFERS

(a) Before any plant or department is closed, the Un-
ion will, if possible, be given thirty days’ prior notice.

(b) Employees with ten years or more of service who
are permanently laid off for lack of work due to techno-
logical improvement, or changes in production methods
or processes including the method of shipping, receiving
or handling materials, the closing of a department or a
plant or part of a department are entitled to a severance
allowance of one week for each year of service to a maxi-
mum of thirty weeks. An employee with three but less
than ten years of service so laid off is entitled to a sever-
ance allowance of one week for each year in which he
worked one thousand or more hours and one-half week
for each year in which he worked less than one thousand
but more than two hundred hours and none for any year
in which he worked less than two hundred hours.

(c) A permanent lay-off is one which is expected to
last for six months or longer. . . .

(d) An employee paid a severance allowance shall cease
to be an employee of the Company and, if rehired, shall
be a new employee but have no rights under this provi-
sion based upon his service ante-dating receipt of his
Severance Allowance.

—

(e) Should the operation at any location be transferred
permanently to a new or existing plant the available jobs

~ at such plant will not be filled unti! employees of the

affected plant have been given reasonable notice and the
opportunity to fill them in accordance with their seniority
and to transfer to the new plant. In the case of existing
plant the foregoing provision shall be subject to the prior
seniority rights, if any, of employees in such plant. Upon
moving to the new location employees will be paid such
reasonable moving expenses as the Company and the
International shall determine. Any such payment to an
employee will be deducted from his severance allowance,
if any, and the balance of such severance allowance shall
be paid if such employee is thereafter permanently laid
off or if he thereafter quits within a year.

(f) In case of transfer to a new plant, if permitted un-
der the National Labor Management [sic] Relations Act,
that Part of this Agreement relating to the plant affected
shall cover such new plant.

(g) The provisions of this Section 13 do not limit dis-
cussion between the Union and the Company on questions
relating to the effect on Employees of plant or depart-
ment closings or transfers. To implement such discussion
the Company shall appoint one representative and the
International one representative to the Committee hereby
created to develop answers to the questions raised and,
if they don’t agree, they shall appoint a third and impar-
tial member to join the Committee as Chairman to re-
solve such disagreement. ,

—_ oe

Part VIII, Section 4—

SENIORITY

(a) Seniority shall be based upon length of service with

the Employer since the most recent hire.
e * * * * * *

(d) Should it become necessary to lay off employees,
they will be laid off in accordance with their plant-wide
seniority.

> * * od * * *

(f) Employees with seniority who are laid off shall be
recalled in reverse order to that in which they were laid
ee

. .. Seniority shall . . . cease under the following condi-
tions: . . . 4. Upon lay off for a period of twelve (12)
months or longer.

Part I, Section 14—

UNION SECURITY

(e) The Company will not interfere with the right of
the Employees to become members of the Union and will
not discriminate against any Employee because of such
Union membership or Union activities.”

Part I, Section 3—
DISCIPLINE

(a) Employees may be discharged or disciplined only
for fair and just cause. .. .”
Part I, Section 15—

0 ane Sg eee

DISPUTES

(a) This agreement, which includes all Agreements made
part hereof by reference and all Agreements herein referred
to, fixes all terms and conditions of employment for the
Employees whether or not specifically referred to, pro-
vided for or considered by the parties hereto and both the
Company and the Union specifically waive any and all
rights which each may have to compel the other to bargain
collectively during the term of this Agreement to change
or add to this Agreement on any subject matter not cov-
ered by this Agreement except as provided in Section 16
hereof.

(b) Since complete and adequate remedy is provided by
the terms of this Agreement, no alleged or other violation
of any provision of this Agreement shall give cause to sus-
pend, invalidate, violate or terminate any part of the
Agreement.

* * * * * * *

Part VIII, Section 9—

DISPUTES SETTLEMENT

(c) Any grievance, dispute or misunderstanding which
may arise concerning the interpretation or application of
the provisions of this Agreement shall be presented. . . .

(d) Upon the request of the Employer or the Union the
matter may be submitted to an impartial arbitrator. . . .

* * * * * * *

(f) . . . The arbitrator shall have no power to add to
or subtract from or modify any of the terms of this Agree-
ment, or any agreement made supplementary hereto.

_—

STATEMENT OF FACTS—

The facts were developed in two hearing sessions in Dallas,
Texas, at a visitation to the Dallas plant, and through submission
of additional documentary evidence by express or implied limited
motions to re-open the record. The formal hearing sessions
were recorded by a Court Reporter in 583 pages of tran-
script, and witnesses were sworn. Both parties introduced quan-
tities of written and photographic exhibits and filed comprehen-
sive briefs. The first hearing was held on February 28, 1975.
At the close of that session both parties rested subject to a visit
by the Arbitrator to the Dallas plant on March 5, 1975. At
the close of that visitation, the Company attorney indicated an
intent to file a motion to reopen the record, whereupon the rec-
ord was opened for further hearing on March 10, 1975, follow-
ing presentation on that day of the Company’s motion to reopen;
the Union’s objection to reopening the record was over-
ruled. Both parties filed briefs on May 1, 1975. Additional
documentary evidence submitted to the Arbitrator by appro-
priate letter or motion included copies of the following: (1)
the Intervenor’s [Teamsters’] Exception to Regional Director’s
Report on Objections with supporting brief in NLRB Case No.
16-RC-6822 dated March 17, 1975; (2) Decision and Certi-
fication of Representative in NLRB Case No. 16-RC-6822,
dated May 22, 1975; (3) Collective bargaining contract cover-
ing Denison Margarine Plant employees between Company and
Local Lodge 2082, International Associations of Machinists,
dated June 8, 1975; (4) Notice, dated September 2, 1975, from
Company to “Dallas Margarine Plant Employees, members of
Teamster Local 767,” advising that Dallas plant would close at
close of business on October 3, 1975.

The Dallas margarine plant is located in an old brick building
on the edge of the central business district of downtown Dallas.
The building was old when it was first used to manufacture
margarine in the late twenties or early thirties. Its construction

eS re

features suggest that it is among the oldest manufacturing plants
presently being operated in Dallas. The operation was acquired
in 1940 by the Standard Nut Margarine Company of Indiana-
polis, Indiana. Standard Brands Incorporated acquired Stand-
ard Nut in 1943, including the ownership of the Indianapolis
margarine plant and a lease of the Dallas margarine plant.
Standard Brands (hereinafter called the Company) has never
owned the property at the Dallas plant but has leased it from
1943 to the present.

In addition to the Dallas and Denison plants, the Company
also operates margarine plants in Oakland, California, Atlanta,
Georgia, and Pennsauken, New Jersey. Prior to the building
of the Denison plant, the newest plant was the one at Penn-
sauken, which was built by the Company in 1961 on land
owned by the Company, and it is the only one operated non-
union.

There are 48 regular employees within the bargaining unit
at the Dallas plant. As noted from the seniority list dated
January 14, 1975, 3 of these employees have 30 or more
years of service, 8 have 20 or more years of service, and 26
have 10 or more years of service. The complete list reads as
follows:

Employee Seniority Date: Employee Seniority Date:
J. P. Raulston 9/19/41 G. E. Phillips 9/13/56

W. T. Harrison 6/18/43 T. L. Hennig 9/30/57
G. Boon 10/04/45 H. E. Williams 1/21/58
O. M. Murley 9/16/52 E. Yarbrough 4/08/59
F. J. Gore 11/02/53 F. Weatherall 9/11/59
L. V. Thompson 5/11/55 D. P. Crow 1/04/60
Z. Sherrell 8/30/55 M. M. Van Briggle 1/05/60
W

. S. Jenkins 9/21/55 J. R. Brown 10/10/60
J. Lerro 1/09/56 F. Steed, Jr. 5/23/61

rs)

— A-10 —
Employee Seniority Date: Employee Seniority Date:
C. M. Clay 6/18/62 D. Mendoza 7/14/70
A. E. Rose 3/25/63 M. Pinkney 12/03/70
B. R. Dunn 3/26/63 J. B. Guillory 12/14/71
W.F. Manning 11/11/63 E. M. Browne 2/06/73
A. H. Brown 7/06/64 D. F. Richardson 2/06/73
K. Ridlehuber 7/27/64 B. J. Badgett, Jr. 2/26/73
J.C. Chambers 9/07/64 D. Dunn 7/30/73
R. C. Daugherty 6/03/65 H. F. Sangster 8/20/73
N. F. Rogers 7/15/66 T. C. Krase 8/27/73
L. Coleman 9/12/66 H. Simmons, Jr. 8/28/73
J. C. Ball 9/12/66 M.E. Wheeler 10/31/73
J. H. Durden 9/22/69 L. E. Hinton 11/08/73
A. Gonzales 9/30/69 C. A. Attaway 1/24/74
J. L. Thomas 10/06/69 J. P. Keen 9/13/74
J. L. Buckley 12/11/69 I. Anderson 9/13/74

I visited the Dallas plant in the presence of the parties and
also studied photographs of the interior of the plant and its equip-
ment and considered extensive testimony about the condition
of the plant and equipment. I conclude from such direct ob-
servation and evidence that the physical premises are in an
extremely run-down condition and that the equipment, with
minor exceptions, is quite old—most of it was there 23 years
ago when observed by one of the witnesses. There is almost
no new equipment in the plant, and what little there is, such as
a hot water heater, was installed on a replacement basis to keep
the plant operational. This is not to say, however, that the
Company has neglected essential maintenance or that the
premises are not adequate for the manufacturing operation per-
formed. The record does not reflect the exact size of the plant
area, but it is undisputed that the plant is already crowded and
that there is no room for addition of more manufacturing lines.
There are presently three manufacturing lines at the Dallas

— |

plant: 2 quarter-pound (stick) margarine lines and one whipped
(stick) margarine line.

Not only is there no room at the Dallas plant for expansion,
there is also the distinct possibility that some of the existing
property will be absorbed into the widening of Harwood street
on which the plant faces. This fact became known when such
widening was included in a city plan published in April, 1971.
Donald Williamson, manager of the Dallas plant, obtained the
plans when they were released and called them to the attention
of Company personnel at the New York headquarters.

The lease agreement covering the Dallas plant was originally
dated May 29, 1963. On January 16, 1964, it was amended,
and from that time until September 6, 1973, the Company exe-
cuted three extensions of three years each. The last such term
was executed on October 30, 1970. It was during that term
that the Company began seeking a new plant site in the vi-
cinity of Dallas. In September, 1972, the Company made in-
quiries of the Denison Chamber of Commerce concerning a
possible site location in Denison, and on October 14, 1973,
the Company announced selection of a tract at Denison on
Highway 84 just outside of Denison. Site preparation was sched-
uled for November, 1973, and on December 11, 1973, the
property was surveyed by a registered public surveyor. The
plant that was subsequently built at this location and formally
opened on November 1, 1974. One month prior to announc-
ing the Denison plant site, the Company entered into a letter
agreement with the owners of the Dallas plant property in
which, for the first time, only a one-year lease was signed. That
agreement also provided an option to renew for two additional
one year periods. On October 25, 1974, the Company exer-
cised its option, thereby extending the lease for a one year pe-
riod commencing on February 1, 1975, and terminating on
January 31, 1976.

— A-12 —

The evidence is overwhelming that the reason the Company
built the Denison plant was to replace and expand the produc-
tion of the Dallas plant. There were many reasons to anticipate
the closing of the Dallas plant, including the age of the plant,
the age of the equipment, higher utility charges, higher oil
freight rates, and the possibility of street construction on Har-
wood. Despite the Company’s efforts during the hearing to
treat the opening of the Denison plant separate from the clos-
ing of the Dallas plant, the Company’s Director of Labor Re-
lations, Byron Hawkins, conceded the linkage between the two
events. When asked by the Arbitrator if he knew why the Com-
pany decided to build the Denison plant he replied: “The higher
costs of freight from the Indianapolis area, the greater penalty
that was being paid by trucking down. There was no room to
expand the Dallas plant. The Dallas plant is a leased plant. Not
owned. It’s an old plant. It’s bounded by other buildings, by
highways.” (Emphasis added.) He explained that there were
“a number of uncertainties and concerns because of the age of
the Dallas plant, very real concerns . . . the marginal nature
of the plant, the fact that it does only have three lines of mar-
garine production.” Although he stated—erroneously as later
evidence showed—that the original design for the Denison plant
was to produce only soft margarine, he was careful to point
out: “I don’t think anyone is in a position to say that quarter-
pound margarine will not be produced in Denison with the big
new facility. One certainty is involved because of the age of
the [Dallas] equipment, the age of the plant, the highway con-
struction, and a number of other factors, utility costs and so on,
it’s entirely possible.” It was more than possible. Hawkins, who
was the Company’s only witness at the first hearing, admitted
that he was not a party to decisions regarding the opening and
closing of plants and transfer of production facilities; specifically
regarding the Denison plant he said that “people in the mar-
garine division and in the grocery products manufacturing di-
vision in New York would be the ones to make that decision.”

At the second hearing, Robert Olsen, Operation Manager for

— A-13 —

the Margarine Division, who was called by the Company as a
witness for the limited purpose of describing the efficiency and
operating conditions of the Dallas plant in comparison to other
Company facilities, supplied additional evidence on cross-exam-
ination and on examination by the Arbitrator about the Com-
pany’s object in opening the Denison plant. He said the “Den-
ison plant is supplying soft products for the same service areas
that are supplied by the Dallas quarter-pound, bulk and whipped
stick,” but such production represented only about 3% of the
Company’s total margarine production. When questioned as to
the efficiency of such a limited operation at such a large plant
—the Denison plant has 100,000 square feet of floor space and
a present capacity for 9 manufacturing lines only two of which
are now being used—-he conceded the possibility that at some
time in the future there would be a full line of margarine pro-
duction at Denison. At first he said—again erroneously, in view
of the evidence later developed—that “there was no long-range
projection as to what was plannned for Denison. It was planned
to produce soft products and to relieve the Indianapolis load.”
But when pressed he admitted that “sometimes in the future,
yes, I’m sure we will” put in some lines which will duplicate
some of the Dallas lines. (Emphasis added.) When asked if
this would involve. use of Morpak machines of the type used in
Dallas, he was able to suggest that Benhil rather than Mor-
pak machines would be used. Such specificity had a basis in fact,
as additional evidence later confirmed. Mr. Olsen further linked
the Denison and Dallas plants by his description of the common
marketing arrangements. The Company’s salesmen take orders
for products from both plants, and the orders are turned in to the
Dallas plant only “and the Dallas plant arranges to either load
their products first and then pick the balance up in Denison, or
they will contact the Denison plant to load their soft products
and finish the loading in Dallas going southbound.” He con-.
firmed that in terms of marketing the Denison plant is depend-
ent upon the Dallas plant in this same area, which is primarily
the southwest part of the United States, and that as far as the

— A-14—

salesmen are concerned the two plants are virtually operating
together. He further stated that if the Dallas plant were closed,
he knew of no reason presently why the bulk of the area aow
served by the Dallas plant would not be served from Denison.
Regarding his refusal in February, 1974, to assure the Union
that jobs at the Dallas plant would not be eliminated by reason
of operations at the Denison plant, which is discussed in detail
below, he testified that “eventually” some jobs at the Dallas plant
could be eliminated by reason of the Denison plant, and that
in his communication to the union at that time he had to take
into consideration the possibility of closing the Dallas plant,
which closing was “still a possibility.”

Mr. Olsen noted two economies associated with the Denison
facility as compared with Dallas: (1) the cost of oil was less—
this was confirmed by the fact that the major oil suppliers for
the company were Anderson-Clayton, whose plant was located
ten miles away, and Safeway, whose plant was only two
miles away; and (2) the per hour labor cost was lower at the
Denison plant than the Dallas plant. Also bearing on the Com-
panys’ intentions was Mr. Olsen’s responses to questions con-
cerning the cost of the Denison facility. Total acreage, estab-
lished earlier by a map and Mr. Hawkins’ testimony, was 63%
acres, of which 37 acres was deemed excess and was therefore
for sale. The plant of 100,000 square feet of floor space was
constructed from the Company’s own funds at a cost estimated
by Mr. Olsen at three and a half or four million dollars. He
indicated an additional one million dollars for cost of equip-
ment, bringing the total investment at Denison to four and a
half or five million dollars. Although no figures were introduced
to show profit and/or loss at that facility, it is obvious that
operation of only two manufacturing lines at such a large and
modern facility which has existing capacity for nine lines falls
far short of efficient and economical utilization.

a

— A-15 —

In response to a question on redirect examination, Mr. Olsen
said that there were no plans to close the Dallas margarine plant,
but on cross-examination he explained that although all sorts
of possibilities had been discussed, “no definite plans or time
table has been set for it;” in any event, however, he said he
would possibly not be privy to the final decision nor would he
be the one to make the final decision. His response to the Arbi-
trator’s final questions were frank and revealing:

Q. Were you privy to the original decision to open the
Denison plant?

A. I was involved in the original planning of the plant
premises, the equipment and so forth, the layout.

Q. And in laying out the plant it was laid out so that it
could accommodate a full line of margarine produc-
tion?

A. It was built for expansion, yes, and you could conceiv-
ably put everything into it.

Q. And not built for a limited line of just tub margarine?

A. No.

Those answers, though not brought out on direct examination,
stand in marked contrast to the Company’s efforts at the first
hearing to convey the impression that the Denison plant had not
been built to produce stick margarine; Olsen’s frank answers
contradicted the contrary testimony given by Byron Hawkins at
the first hearing. Hawkins had stated that “when the Denison
margarine plant was first designed it was clearly intended at that
time tobe a sixth margarine plant making only soft margarine,
only soft margarine.” (Emphasis added.) He partially modified
his position in later testimony but was still at variance with
Olsen’s answers and with subsequent evidence supplied by Jim
Windland, manager of the Denison plant. In Hawkins’ later state-
ment he said: “J think at the very outset [Denison] was planned

— A-16 —

primarily and perhaps solely as a soft margarine plant. I think
before it got very far along the plans were to put—to put a dif-
ferent formulation of quarter-pound margarine into that plant,
different formulations than what can be made on the Dallas
machines.” He acknowledged, however, that he was not really
privy to the decision of opening and closing plants and that he
personally did not know what the intent was.

The intent became crystal clear when Jim Windland finally
testified. Mr. Windland was not called as a Company witness;
when his testimony was requested by the Union, the Company at
first refused to produce him. Later, however, the Company re-
considered, and Mr. Windland drove in from Denison and was
called as an adverse witness by the union just prior to the close
of the hearing. Before referring to his testimony, however, an-
other statement by Labor Relations Director Hawkins should be
noted, for it was an additional statement in the pattern being
presented by the Company in order to show a separation be-
tween the Denison and the Dallas plants. He testified: “There
is no equipment in the Denison plant at this time for the making
of molded stick margarine.” As will be seen from Mr. Wind-
land’s testimony, that statement was not accurate. But the mak-
ing of the statement is important as corroboration of the Com-
pany’s intent to conceal the true molded stick margarine capa-
bility of the Denison plant.

Denison plant manager Windland testified that in the original
planning, quarter-pound lines were included “and we had even
got to the point of laying out the lines and so forth and it was
scrapped.” He said those original plans went back to October,
1973, which was the month when the Company formally an-
nounced the building of the Denison plant. He testified that the
plans were set aside but later revived. There is reason to be-
lieve, however, that corporate decision-makers were only post-
poning execution of the plans, not abandoning them. German-
made Benhil machinery for two lines of stick margarine produc-

— A-17 —

tion were actually ordered for delivery to Denison. The exact
date of the placing of the order is not known, but Mr. Windland
testified that “around nine months to a year” was required for
delivery, and delivery of the first line was made in late July or
August of 1974. Thus, either a new order for this equipment
had been placed in November, 1974, at the latest; or, more
likely, the original orders had never been cancelled. Mr. Wind-
land referred to the second plans for installation of these lines
and testified: “I’ve looked at so many plans and many things,
but there sticks in my mind a date of somewhere in the latter
part of May [1974], but now whether that’s on that, on the plans
on this second group of plans or whether it’s on a revision of some
other plans, I really could not definitely say.” He went on to
say, however, that a full line of Benhil equipment was received
and that the parts of that equipment essential for quarter-pound
production are still in Denison, though in storage. The facts
concerning the concealment of that equipment are detailed be-
low, but before examining those facts and other related events, it
is pertinent to ascertain the Company’s motive for certain actions
it took in connection with the plants in question.

The evidence in the record is clear and convincing that the
reason the Company did not promptly carry out its original
and ultimate plan to open the Denison plant as a full capacity
margarine facility—including production of stick margarine
which had been produced at Dallas, thereby transferring all
production from Dallas to Denison—was to avoid dealing with
the Teamsters Union and avoid application of Section 13(e)
of Part I of the Union’s collective bargaining contract. That
provision requires: “Should the operation at any location be
transferred permanently to a new . . . plant the available jobs
at such plant will not be filled until employees at the affected
plant have been given reasonable notice and the opportunity
to fill them in accordance with their seniority and to transfer
to the new plant.” (Emphasis added.) Had such transfer oc-
curred, the entire Dallas collective bargaining agreement would

— A-18 —

conceivably have continued to be effective at the new plant under
Section 13(f), although such a finding is not necessary to the
Award in this case for reasons discussed below. Section 13(f) is
pertinent, however, insofar as it sheds light on the Company’s
motivation.

Evidence bearing on the Company’s anti-union motivation
is undisputed. The last plant built by the Company, the one
at Pennsauken, is non-union. A decision was made at the corpo-
rate level that the Denison plant was also to be non-union. Jim
Windland understood that intention; he testified in response to
a question from the Arbitrator: “All of the plans that I have
ever discussed with anyone on the corporate level was to operate
the plant non-Union.” (Emphasis added). That intent was
corroborated by an early statement made by Howard Pines,
the Company’s Director of Employee Relations. On December
15, 1973, which was shortly after preliminary work on the
Denison building site had begun, Mr. Pines told James C.
Holden, the Chief Steward of the Union for the Dallas plant,
that he knew that the Company was going to attempt to operate
the Denison plant “non-union.” That statement was made in
the presence of the manager of the Company's Dallas yeast
plant, Mr. Corbitt. Although the statement was revealed at
the first hearing, neither Pines nor Corbitt was called as a wit-
ness to dispute its accuracy. It is thus uncontradicted from
statements by Windland and Pines that the Company intended
the Denison plant to be a non-union operation, and various
actions which the Company took can be satisfactorily explained
only on the basis of that intent.

The plant itself was built large enough to encompass the
present Dallas stick margarine production, in fact the entire
Dallas operation including quarter-pound, whipped, and bulk
production; and the original plans, including engineering draw-
ings, specifically called for the erection of two manufacturing
lines at Denison for production of stick margarine. The latter

ee ————

— A-19 —

lines would have substantially duplicated most if not all of
the Dallas operation. A decision was apparently made around
October, 1973, to postpone installation of those lines, which
may have been at about the time the Company made its deci-
sion to operate non-union. If the plant was to operate non-
union, introduction of the stick margarine lines would obvi-
ously have to be postponed to avoid the initial transfer of union
employees from the Dallas plant. Subsequent events established
that the original plan to transfer the Dallas operation to Deni-
son was never abandoned—only conveniently postponed. It
was the Company’s plan that by postponing the transfer of
operations, ultimate transfer would be to an existing plant
rather than to a new plant, thereby avoiding—or so the Com-
pany hoped—the effect of prior seniority rights which the Dallas
employees would have if Denison was treated as a new plant
under Section 13(f); transfer to an existing plant would limit
the Dallas employees to available jobs at the existing plant,
“subject to the prior seniority rights, if any, of employees in
such plant.”

To carry out this policy, the Company told the Union as
little as possible and staffed the jobs at the Denison plant with-
out giving employees at the Dallas plant reasonable notice
and opportunity to fill them, notwithstanding the requirement
of Section 13(3). The opportunity was denied both as to new
jobs, such as those on the soft margarine lines, and as to old
jobs on the stick margarine lines which were clearly being
transferred—though slowly—to the new plant.

As early as November 8, 1973, the Union began its formal
efforts to obtain information and arrange a solution to the
impending problem. On that day James M. Holden, the Local
Union representative, wrote Dallas plant manager D. R. Wil-
liams as follows:

The union has information that Standard Brands Inc.
is in the process of building a margarine manufacturing

—~

plant at Denison, Texas. We believe that this plant is
being built to replace the one now located in Dallas,
Texas. We are concerned about the employees covered
by Part VIII of our labor contract. Although the new
margarine plant now being built will not open for some
time, we feel that it is in our best interest to start nego-
tiating the rights of the Dallas margarine employees un-
der Section 13 of our national agreement immediately.

We would appreciate your answer to this letter as soon
as possible.

Shortly thereafter, in the latter part of November, 1973, Mr.
Charles Cunningham, a foreman at the Dallas margarine plant,
told Holden in a casual lunchroom conversation that there was
“no doubt in our mind that they are going to close this thing
down.” When called as a witness by the Company, Cunning-
ham did not deny having made the statement, but added that
he “had not been told the plant was going to close.” His state-
ment that the plant would close, which I find that he did make,
may have been only his opinion, but because he was a super-
visor and because he saw the signs which suggested closing of
the Dallas operation in favor of the Denison plant, the state-
ment was probative together with other circumstantial evidence
bearing on the Company’s intentions. His statement also indi-
cated what may have been a general belief among many em-
ployees of the Dallas plant at that time. Notwithstanding, the
Company was not in any hurry to respond to the Union’s
November 8 request for negotiations and information.

The Company had in fact been busy making plans that
would have been quite relevant to the Union’s inquiry, includ-
ing the preparation of engineering drawings and the ordering
and purchasing of Benhil equipment. Although the Union’s
request in the Nov. 8th letter for negotiations under Section
13 of the National Agreement (Part I of the Collective bar-
gaining contract) was a request for negotiations and informa-

— A-21 —

tion under the contract, it would also be a request pursuant
to Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (see
discussion of NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967), hereinbelow).

On December 13, 1973, Holden again wrote Williamson
as follows:

This letter is in reference to my letter dated November
8, 1973.

The union still has reason to believe that the opening
of a Margarine Plant in Denison, Texas will seriously
affect the Dallas Plant. Since you have not seen fit to
answer my letter, we feel that the company is avoiding
the issue. We are therefore restating our position pertain-
ing to Section 13 of the national agreement. We are also
advising you that we fully intend to pursue our rights
under this section to the fullest extent that we are ca-
pable of doing. We would appreciate your answer as to
the Company’s position on this matter.

On December 15, 1973, during a discussion about matters
relating to the Company’s Dallas yeast plant, where Mr. Holden
was employed, Mr. Howard Pines, the Company’s Director of
Employee Relations, told Holden “that as far as he knew there
would be no loss of jobs or shutdown of this Dallas margarine
facility;” however, he said he was only conveying the informa-
tion as a “messenger” for he was not part of the Margarine
Division. When Holden asked him for some assurance regard-
ing these matters, he responded that he “couldn’t give .
any assurance on this thing, that he wasn’t part of that divi-
sion.” It was then that he volunteered the information that
the Denison plant would attempt to operate non-union.

On December 12, 1973, James C. Paradise, attorney for
the Brewery Workers’ Conference of the Teamsters Union,

— A-22 —

wrote a letter to Howard Pines regarding certain problems
requiring prompt consideration and resolution, one of which
was “the rights of the Union and the Dallas margarine em-
ployees in respect to the new margarine plant in Texas,” and
requested a meeting “as soon after January 10 as possible.”

On December 27, 1973, seven weeks after the union’s re-
quest of November 8, Mr. Pines finally responded to Holden’s
letters as follows:

This acknowledges receipt of your letters of November
8 and December 13, 1973.

These letters were answered in the meeting you and I had
in Dallas on Saturday, December 15.

Hope you and your family had a nice Christmas, and
my very best wishes to you for a happy 1974.

On January 4, 1974, Holden wrote Williamson again:

To date no answer has been given the local union
to our letters concerning the future of the Dallas mar-
garine workers. In previous letters we expressed concern
over the new plant being built in Denison, Texas.

I received a letter dated December 27, 1973 signed by
Howard Pines. Mr. Pines letter told us exactly nothing.
In previous discussion with Mr. Pines I was told verbally
that the Denison plant would have no effect on the Dallas
plant. Mr. Pines has no connection with the margarine
division and was acting as a messenger only. We still be-
lieve the Dallas plant will be affected, and insist on nego-
tiations for our right to transfer to the new plant.

I would appreciate an answer to this letter stating the
Company’s full position on this matter. Verbal reassurance
is not enough.

Williamson responded as follows:

— A-23 —

This letter will acknowledge receipt of your letter of
January 14, [sic] 1974. As you know, I recently under-
went major surgery on my back and I am way behind in
my correspondence. I hope you will accept my apology
for failing to personally answer your previous letter.

Please be advised that I have asked Mr. Howard Pines
to handle your letter and I ask that all future communica-
tions on this subject be directed to him. Mr. Pines is be-
ing sent a copy of your letter of January 4, 1974.

And on January 23, 1974, Pines wrote Holden:

Please be advised in regard to your recent letter to Mr.
Williamson, I have also received correspondence on the
same subject from Mr. James C. Paradise.

A meeting has been set up with Mr. Paradise for Janu-
ary 24, 1974, at which time the Denison and Dallas Mar-
garine situations will be discussed.

The meeting was held on January 24, 1974, the substance
of which is reflected in the following correspondence.

On January 28, 1974, Paradise wrote Pines:

At our meeting at Brewery Workers headquarters in Cin-
cinnati on January 24th we discussed the above plant and
its possible effect on the existing margarine plant in Dallas.

I told you that I would submit a number of questions to
you in writing and it was agreed that you would give me a
written reply. The questions are the following:

1. What is the expected date for the commencement of
production operations at the Denison plant?

2. What is the date on which you expect to start hiring
at the Denison plant?

3. What products are to be manufactured at that plant?

— A-24—

4. Will any products presently being manufactured at the
Dallas Margarine plant be manufactured at Denison?

5. Will any of the operations at the Dallas plant be trans-
ferred to Denison, either immediately or in the foreseeable
future?

6. Is there any reason to believe that any jobs at the Dal-
las plant will be eliminated, either immediately or in the
foreseeable future, by reason of the operation at the Deni-
son plant?

7. Will equipment be installed in Denison for the manu-

facture of the same type of margarine as is manufactured
at Dallas?

8. Is the Company able to give the Union a firm commit-
ment to the effect that no jobs at Dallas Margarine will

be eliminated by reason of the operation of the Denison
plant?

I would appreciate a reply at your earliest convenience.

On February 12, 1974, Pines responded to Paradise by en-

closing a copy of the following letter from Robert L. Olson,
dated February 11, 1974:

INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO Howard M. Pines Date February 11, 1974

FROM R. L. Olsen OFFICE Groc. Prod. Mfg.
Div. Hq.

Subject Denison, Texas Plant

The current situation in the margarine industry is the most
volatile we have ever experienced because, in addition to
the usual short- and long-term swings in consumer prefer-

— A-25 —

ence, we are also faced with shortages and sharp price in-
creases for corn and soybean oils, and shortages of various
packaging materials. Keeping the above uncertainties in
mind, following are the questions asked by Mr. Paradise
in his January 28 letter to you, and the answers to those
questions:

1. What is the expected date for the commencement of
production operations at the Denison Plant?
October 1, 1974

2. What is the date on which you expect to start hiring at
the Denison Plant? August 15, 1974

3. What products are to be manufactured at that plant?
Soft and quarter-pound margarine

4. Will any products presently being manufactured at the
Dallas Margarine Plant be manufactured at Denison?
Yes

5. Will any of the operations at the Dallas Plant be trans-
ferred to Denison, either immediately or in the fore-
seeable future? No

6. Is there any reason to believe that any jobs at the Dallas
Plant will be eliminated, either immediately or in the
foreseeable future, by reason of the operation at the
Denison Plant? No

7. Will equipment be installed in Denison for the manu-
facture of the same type of margarine as is manufac-
tured at Dallas? Yes

8. Is the company able to give the Union a firm commit-
ment to the effect that no jobs at Dallas Margarine will
be eliminated by reason of the operation of the Deni-
son Plant? No

— A-26 —

The margarine division fully intends, of course, to abide by
the provisions of the Dallas Margarine Plant labor contract.

Robert L. Olsen
Operations Manager
Margarine Division

The Union, however, continued to be suspicious, as indicated
by a letter dated March 25, 1974, from Holden to Thomas
Rusch, the Union’s Director of Organization. But Rusch was
then—but not later—inclined to accept Olsen’s assurance, say-
ing in his letter of March 27, 1974, to Holden that, based on
“reference to the Company’s position there will be no transfer
and there will be no loss of job, loss of any production or trans-
fer of work out of the plant operations at Dallas, Texas. /f this
is true we do not have an argument with the company.” (Em-
phasis added).

The Dallas employees and the Union representatives were not
assured, however; neither Olsen nor any other Company of-
ficial had disclosed to the Union what was really transpiring in
the planning and building of the Denison plant, and the Dallas
employees were fully aware of the visible limitations of the
Dallas physical plant.

As previously noted, the Company at that very time had an
order for delivery to Denison two Benhil lines which could dupli-
cate the Dallas stick margarine production; at the second hear-
ing Olsen confirmed that he was “sure” that the Company at
some time would put in lines which would duplicate some of the
Dallas lines and that the Denison plant was built so “you could
conceivably put everything in it.”

Olsen was therefore not being candid with the Union in his
letter when he advised that “in the foreseeable future” none of
the operations at the Dallas plant will be transferred to Denison.
Nor was he being candid when he stated that there was no rea-
son to believe that any jobs at the Dallas plant will be eliminated

— * ye

“in the foreseeable future, by reason of the operation at the
Denison plant.”

By May, 1974, as noted previously, the Company either re-
newed or revised original plans, or else drew a second set of
plans, for installation of the two Benhil lines in Denison to
produce stick margarine. In August, 1974, arrangements were
made for their installation.

At about that same time the Union began to make inquiry of
the Company through Dallas attorney James L. Hicks. On
August 8, 1974, he wrote R. A. Book, the Company's manager
of Employee Relations as follows:

On behalf of representatives of Teamsters Union 767,
please accept this letter as the Union’s inquiry regarding fu-
ture and further plans made by Standard Brands to change
operations at the existing Dallas facility. As we have previ-
ously discussed, there pends presently a grievance regard-
ing the company’s having changed the method of opera-
tion for delivery «f Standard Brands products. Please
advise me if there are any plans to alter in any way the pres-
ent method of operation at the entire Dallas facility. Al-
though not intended to limit the previous inquiry, we are
particularly concerned whether there are plans to sub-con-
tract or contract out any existing functions presently done
at the Dallas facility. Further, we wish to know whether
there are plans to move any of the existing Dallas functions
to the Dennison facility which we understand is presently
under construction.

.Please respond to this inquiry as soon as possible so that
if necessary we can begin implementation of our contractual
rights and negotiation of the impact upon potentially sepa-
rated workers.

Mr. Book did not reply until August 28, 1973, advising that
the “Company has made the union aware of any planned

|

— A-28 —

changes to the best of my knowledge,” (Emphasis added) in-
dicating that the matter was not in his area of responsibility.

Prior to Mr. Book’s reply, Holden had written Pines on Au-
gust 16, 1974, and on the same day Union director of Organiza-
tion Rusch also wrote Byron Hawkins, the Company’s Director
of Labor Relations. Holden write Pines as follows:

This letter is in regard to the Margarine Plant now under
construction in Denison, Texas.

The employees of the Dallas Texas Margarine Plant are
demanding to know what their status will be in relation
to the Denison plant. Will the Dallas plant be closed? Will
our people be given an opportunity to transfer to the
new plant pursuant to Section 13 of Part I? We feel we are
entitled to answers to these questions before the opening
of the Denison, Texas Plant. If we are not given written
answers to these questions we will take whatever action
necessary to assure the people in the Dallas plant of their
rights.

It is the opinion of the union that the company intends to
close the Dallas plant and will attempt to deny our people
their rights to follow the work.

We would like an answer to our questions immediately.
Time is growing short, since the Denison plant is sched-
uled to open October 1, 1974. We are also demanding full
union recognition for the Denison plant.

Rusch’s letter to Hawkins of the same date covered four sub-
jects, and including the following:

Dallas, Texas—Margarine—December 21, 1973—National
Agreement Sections 13 E and 13 F and Part VIII.

New Margarine Plant—Denison, Texas, which leaves no
doubt this new margarine plant will effect the employment

— A-29 —

Status and create undue hardship for the Dallas employees
and members of our Union. Dallas Local Union requested
negotiations for the transfer employment rights, etc., in-
cluding recognition December 21, 1973.

It is very obvious that the Company representatives in all
four situations have been stalling. They have not bargained
in good faith in the phasing out of the department closing
(Peekskill, New York) or the new plants being built in
Dayton, New Jersey or Denison, Texas.

We will not accept the continuous stalling tactics. We in-
sist On a settlement on all four problems.

Our Local Unions have made proposals to resolve some of
these issues and we get answers from Company representa-
tives in the negative. Therefore, I am recommending to our
attorneys immediate action for Unfair Labor Practice
Charges.

I think we have been more than patient, spent hours upon
hours getting no place on all four issues. It is about time
we clear up these important subject matters. I am sub-
mitting a copy of this letter to our Brewery and Soft
Drink Conference, 1.B.T. and the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (Washington, D. C.) for their review;
my recommendations may not be to your liking, but our
patience (members and Officers) are at an end.

Awaiting your response for action.

Notwithstanding that very little time remained before the
Denison plant would open, there was no prompt reply to either
letter. The plant itself had been completed, and equipment
installation was scheduled for completion on October 15, with
production to begin thereafter. A flurry of activity relevant to
the concerns of the Dallas employees had in fact been occurring
in Denison since May and was now ready for completion. That

— A-30 —

activity related to the planned installation of the two Benhil
stick margarine lines and the Company’s efforts to conceal the
equipment and plans from the Union.

Bids had been let for the installation of those lines and, ac-
cording to Mr. Windland’s testimony, the bidding closed the
latter part of August. Meanwhile, all of the machinery for one
of the Benhil lines had actually been delivered to the plant
and placed in the production area.

Thus, at the very time that equipment which would duplicate ,

the Dallas operation was being delivered and scheduled for
installation, the Company was receiving strong and persistent
requests from the Union for information and negotiations.
Although the Union was entitled to have such information as
discussed hereinbelow regarding contractual and National Labor
Relations Act requirements, the Company’s response was to
play for time. The Company evidently decided to postpone in-
stallation of the Benhil lines until after the plant was staffed
with new employees for production of soft margarine, a product
which was not being produced at the Dallas plant. In this man-
ner, the Company undoubtedly hoped to carry out its intention
of operating the Denison plant non-union. While the Union
was being stalled by delays in responding to correspondence and
by providing no new information when letters were finally an-
swered, the Company was busy covering up the tracks of the
Benhil activity. The Union's final communication in August
surely must have reinforced the Company in its resolve to post-
pone the stick margarine lines, or it may even have been the

final factor in that decision. On August 27, 1974, Holden wrote
Pines as follows:

The union is demanding recognition and job rights for all
laid off employees of the Dallas Margarine Plant.

We are demanding that these employees be employed at
the Denison, Texas Margarine Plant. Since I have re-
ceived no answer to my last letter dated August 16, 1974

— A-31 —

we are again demanding follow the work rights for all
employees employed at the Dallas Plant. We feel that these
employees will be affected adversely by the opening of the
Dension, Texas Plant. We are again demanding recogni-
tion rights for all our employees.

At about the same time that Holden’s letter was received, a
top-level decision was made to call a sudden halt to the in-
stallation of the Benhil machines. I find that the reason for that
decision was the Company’s desire to avoid transferring the
Dallas employees to Denison and operating the plant with
members of Teamsters Union 767. Evidence to that effect was
overwhelming; and contrary evidence, particularly as to the man-
ner and timing of the decision was non-existent. The fact that the
sudden decision was even made would not have been established
in the record except for the fact that the Union succeeded in
calling Mr. Windland from Denison as an adverse witness.
He testified that the Benhil equipment for one complete line
was received at the plant in August or the latter part of July,
1974. This was sufficient equipment for one line of quarter-
pound production. Similar equipment for a second line was on
order and would presumably have been delivered in time for
installation under the engineering contract being let. However,
at the end of August the plan was suddenly “scrapped”. Mr.
Ben Cutrone, then General Manager of the Company’s Grocery
Products Manufacturing Division, telephoned Windland and
told him not to install the Benhil machines. No reason was
given. His disposition of the machinery that had already been
delivered is highly relevant, however. He asked Windland if
the machinery had been uncrated, and when told it was still
crated,. “He said just move them out in the warehouse and
leave them and we'll tell you later what we want to do with
them.” Later he told Windland to ship the votator (which was
an item which could be used in either tub or stick margarine
production, as would be true of the other votators that remained
in Denison) to Pennsauken, and the remainder of the equipment,

— A-32 —

the items essential for stick margarine production, were to be
put in storage. Windland complied by storing the items, a
Benhil machine and a case packer, in a commercial warehouse.
At the time of the second hearing (and presumably at the present
time) that equipment was still in storage at a charge of $100
per month. It has been in Denison, unused, for over a year.
In view of the fact that the Denison plant has much unused
storage space in seven empty lines in the production area, plus
much unused space in its warehouse where this machinery was
originally moved when the installation was suddenly cancelled,
I can only infer, there is no evidence to the contrary, that
the Company was trying to keep knowledge of the presence of
this equipment from the Union. And because the equipment
remains in the Denison area the Company at all times relevant
to this grievance has had a current intention of installing the
equipment in Denison, the effect of which would have been
to displace the Dallas operation. Windland’s only explanation
for his having removed the items from the plant and having
put them into monthly storage at an unnecessary cost was:
“Because I was directed by my superiors to take ii out of the
plant, put it into storage and said we'll tell you what to do with
it later.” (Emphasis added). It is reasonable to infer that the
same arrangements would have been made for the second line
of Benhil equipment had it been delivered prior to the sudden
cancellation of the installation plans at the end of August.

While waiting for official replies to their now urgent re-
quests, the Dallas employees were getting unofficial informa-
tion which seemed to confirm their fears. In the latter part of
August, 1974, Mr. Bill Crow, production foreman at the Dal-
las margarine plant, told James Holden and Thomas Rusch,
“we know that it’s going to close, that it’s going to affect this
plant.” He said that “we have talked about it in the office and

. . Don [Williamson] is scared. . . .” The Company called
Crow as a witness and he did not deny having made the state-
ments, though he said he was just giving his “own opinion.”

— A-33 —

I find Crow’s remarks probative for to the same reason as
foreman Cunningham’s. Crow’s position was higher than Cun-
ningham’s, and he was reporting from discussions “in the of-
fice,” therefore his remarks carried even greater weight. Since
the Company did not call Mr. Cutrone as a witness, his actions
and intentions, which evidently were synonymous with the
Company’s, must be evaluated on the basis of other testimony
and overt conduct. Mr. Crow’s statement about the effect of
the Denison plant and about the Dallas plant closing was true
and fully corroborated by other evidence outlined herein. His
statement is admissible; the Company’s objection to it goes to
the weight of the evidence only. Had Mr. Cutrone testified
to the contrary, I would have carefully weighed and consid-
ered such testimony. The Company, however, called no wit-
ness with personal knowledge to explain the key events elicited
from Windland’s testimony or to provide contrary competent
evidence bearing on motive and intent.

On September 4, 1974, Union attorney Hicks wrote How-
ard Pines, stating substantially what he had previously written
to Book.

And at long last, on September 10, Pines responded to Hol-
den’s letters (a cryptic acknowledgment had been sent on
August 26), but all he said was the following:

I have reviewed my file, and in response to your recent
letters I wish to remind you that I met and discussed the
Denison Plant with you on December 8, 1973. Further-
more, Mr. B. T. Hawkins and I met and discussed the
Denison Plant with Mr. James Paradise and Mr. Thomas
Rusch on January 24, 1974. Subsequently, on January
28, 1974, Mr. Paradise wrote a letter on your behalf,
and attached is our response dated February 12, 1974.

Pines thus refused to acquaint the Union with the recent events
relating to the Benhil lines, and by referring with finality to
discussions which had taken place almost a year earlier, on

— A-34 —

December 8, 1973, and January 24, 1974, he was in fact
refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union over matters
as to which there was a duty to supply information and bar-
gain.

On September 16, 1974, Rusch again wrote Pines regard-
ing the Denison and Dallas margarine plants:

With reference to the Denison margarine plant, the meet-
ing we had in Cincinnati on January 24, 1974 had no
bearing whatsoever as to the settlement of the new mar-
garine plant.

We again raise the question as to whether you are going
to live up to Section 13 and its various paragraphs relat-
ing to plant closings, departmental shut downs and new
plant operations. The statements that you are referring
to at our meeting of said date do not excuse you from
your obligation to your present employees or laid off em-
ployees of the Dallas plant.

I do not care what Mr. Olsen informs you as operating
manager of the margarine division, I cannot accept these
answers and I will hold you and your company respon-
sible for making whole any loss of wages for any laid off
employees of the margarine plant while you are employ-
ing employees in the new Denison margarine plant. This
also relates to job opportunities for present employees
working in your Dallas margarine plant.

Unless you give us a written guarantee that there will be
no lay offs in the present margarine plant in Dallas, Texas
I will not accept the information Mr. Olsen has given
vou.

The Company apparently did not reply, for no reply was
introduced in evidence. The Company then continued with-
out assistance of the Union or the Dallas employees, to staff the
Denison plant. The plant began production in the later part of

— A-35 —

October, 1974, and formally opened with appropriate cere-
monies on November 1. After production had started, Com-
pany Officials did meet briefly with Union representatives at the
Airport Marina Hotel, at the Dallas-Ft. Worth Regional Air-
port. The meeting was evidently timed to coincide with at-
tendance of the Company officials at the plant-opening cere-
monies in Denison the following day. The Company was repre-
sented by Labor Relations Director Hawkins and Thomas
Scully, Jr., Director of Employee Relations, Grocery Products
Manufacturing Division. The Union was represented by Holden,
Busch, John Hoe (of the Brewery Workers Conference), Ray
Hilsheimer, President and Business Agent of Local 767, and
Charles Moore, Business Representative of Local 767. The
Union asked for some assurance that the people in Dallas would
not be affected by the Denison operation, specifically long-term
assurance was requested. Nothing came out of that meeting.
The Company officials merely stated that they “knew of no plans
to close the Dallas margarine plant at that time.” Mr. Hawkins
also made the statement that he was opposed to even one man
transferring from Dallas to Denison, a remark which was oc-
casioned by the fact that one Dallas employee, Ray Daugherty,
had attempted to transfer to or be hired at Denison. Over a
month later, on December 3, Mr. Olsen wrote Daugherty re-
fusing the request, giving as his reason the fact that on Novem-
ber 21, 1974, the union had filed its formal grievance. Daugh-
erty’s request, however, had been pending since May 31, 1974.

The events which followed seemed anti-climatic, for the Com-
pany by now had succeeded in keeping the Teamsters Union
and the Dallas employees out of the Denison plant and had also
avoided giving them accurate information bearing on the fu-
ture of the Dallas operation and providing the “reasonable no-
tice and opportunity” required in Article 13(e) for the Dallas
employees to fill the replacement jobs which had already been
planned for Denison. The time for reasonable notice and op-
portunity had thus passed.

— A-36 —

On November 15, 1974, Holden wrote Williamson requesting
transfer rights to Denison for 30 employees whose names were
attached, and on November 21, 1974, the Union filed its formal
grievance and also resubmitted the 30 names stating: “The union
is requesting transfer rights for these people and any other em-
ployees at the Dallas plant who wish to transfer to the Denison
plant unless you can give us a firm answer that the Dallas em-
ployees will not be affected.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly,
transfer rights, if applicable, would not be limited to the 30 em-
ployees who signed the petition attached to Holden’s letter of
November 15. The Union was bargaining agent for all of the
employees in the unit and its request and the “class action”
type request of the 30 named individuals was more than suf-
ficient to be applicable to all Dallas employees who desire
transfer.

The Company's position has remained inflexible, with the only
change being that it now places some reliance on the fact that
on May 22, 1975, an N.L.R.B. Certification of Bargaining Rep-
resentative was issued to the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, District 126, AFL-CIO (here-
inafter called IAM) for a production and maintenance unit at
the Denison facility. The record reflects that the IAM petitioned
for an election on December 6, 1974, and on December 20 the
[AM and the Company, over the Teamsters’ objections, waived
a hearing and entered into an agreement for Stipulation for Cer-
tification upon Consent Election, with the election set for Janu-
ary 23. The NLRB conducted the election and subsequent pro-
ceedings without benefit of an evidentiary hearing, relying ad-
ministratively on unsworn representations from the Company
that “the Denison plant is fully staffed,” although it only had 26
employees and several major manufacturing lines were yet to be
started up. Had the Board had the benefit of the information
contained in this arbitration record, it is quite likely that it would
have refused to hold the election among such an insufficient and
unrepresentative contingent of employees, and it is conceivable

ante MT ee

—perhaps even likely (since I have the benefit of this eviden-
tiary record and some hindsight) that the contract-bar doctrine
would have been applied—based on the Denison plant being
simply a new and enlarged version of the Dallas plant that was
already under contract with the Union herein. The representa-
tional egg has been scrambled, however, and it is not my province
to unscramble it. All of the rights which I find herein are based
upon the Company’s breaches of contract which occurred prior
to the filing of the IAM’s petition.

Notwithstanding its original intention to operate the Denison
plant non-union, the IAM petition and its not-surprising victory
in the election (which the Company apparently did nothing to
discourage since the Dallas employees were not allowed to vote)
seemed useful and perhaps even welcome to the Company. (But
I make no such finding, for the Company attitude toward the
IAM or the election has no bearing on this case.) The Company
has tried to obtain some legal advantage from the IAM certifi-
cation. Certification was issued on May 22, 1975, and the Com-
pany and the IAM quickly reached an agreement on a contract
dated June 8, 1975. The wage rates in that agreement appear
to be significantly lower than comparable rates in the Dallas
Teamster agreement, although I make no absolute finding to
that effect. The point is relevant only to show a possible eco-
nomic advantage to the Company in not dealing with the in-
cumbent Dallas Union.

On September 2, 1975, the Company finally announced the
closing of the Dallas margarine plant. The notice said opera-
tions would cease at the close of business on October 3, 1975.
The Union sought to reopen the record, but this was opposed by
the Company. The record was reopened for the limited purpose
of receiving the notice, which reads as follows:

— A-38 —

September 2, 1975

To: DALLAS MARGARINE PLANT EMPLOYEES
MEMBERS OF TEAMSTER LOCAL 767 ©

We regretfully must inform you of Standard Brands’ de-
cision to permanently cease operations at the Dallas mar-
garine plant at the close of business on October 3, 1975.

Our national margarine sales volume during 1975 is down
significantly from 1974 levels. This is a reversal of a pat-
tern of growth that continued for many years. It now ap-
pears to be unreasonable to expect any significant improve-
ment in our margarine sales volume and this coupled with
our utility service (refrigeration and steam) problems in
Dallas force us to the realization that we are no longer
able to sustain the Dallas margarine plant.

We have met with your union representatives this morning
and have informed them of the necessity for this decision.

We are pleased to be able to inform you, as we informed
your representatives, that we are able to offer all of our
regular employees at Dallas margarine the opportunity to
transfer to our other margarine plants located in Denison,
Texas and Indianapolis, Indiana. These are the plants to
which we will be transferring the production presently being
performed here at Dallas. Copies of the labor contracts
covering production employees at these plants are available
upon request.

Employees accepting transfers to either of these two loca-
tions who have not completed their vacations, will be given
lump sum payments for all unused vacation time.

The Company further recognizes its obligations under Part
I, Section 13 of the National Agreement, and has informed
your union representatives of its willingness to sit down
immediately to discuss these obligations.

— spe

On behalf of Standard Brands, we wish to personally thank
you for your past service and wish you the best of luck in
the future whether or not you elect to remain with the
Company.

D. R. Williamson

I make no finding regarding the alleged transfer of work to
Indianapolis, for there is no competent evidence to support the
Company’s self-serving statement to that effect, and the evidence
in the record would indicate that such disposition is unlikely.
I likewise do not rely on other self-serving statements as to the
reason for the closing. The Company does admit transfer of
work to Denison, which is supported by the record herein. Hav-
ing opposed reopening of the record regarding this notice, the
Company is not in a position to complain about the absence of
a finding concerning Indianapolis. I do find that the record
indicates there is no reason—unless it be motivated by an anti-
union desire to avoid the effect of Section 13(e)—to transfer
Dallas production anywhere except Denison.

CONCLUSION

I have purposely set out most of the material facts in some
detail, for the evidentiary basis for the conclusions herein should
be fully understood. I find and hold that the Company has vio-
lated the collective bargaining contract in several major respects.
Accordingly the grievance will be sustained.

The Company had an obligation under the contract and
under the law to recognize the Union and deal with it in good
faith regarding disputes for which the contract provides reme-
dial procedures. The failure to deal openly with the union, the
failure to provide honest and necessary information as to the
Company’s intentions and plans for the Dallas plant and the
effect which the Denison plant would have on the employment
status of the Dallas employees, the unexcused delays in re-

— A-40 —

sponding to the Union’s requests, and the Company’s refusal
to engage in meaningful negotiations, constituted violations of
Part VIII, Section 1 of the contract. The standard for dealing
with the Union under that clause, except insofar as the con-
tract specifically forecloses dealing, which would not be the
case here, is comparable to that required under Section 8(a)
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. This construction is
reinforced by Part I, Section 15(b) of the contract, which
stresses that “complete and adequate remedy is provided by
the terms of this Agreement.”

Had the Company dealt openly with the Union and pro-
vided accurate information instead of we-have-no-plans-at-this-
time responses—adequate and honest disclosures heing required
under the law (see the United States Supreme Court decision
in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); cf.
NLRB vy. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)— it is reason-
able to assume that the parties would have negotiated and
resolved their differences while protecting job and contract
rights which the Dallas employees had accumulated, some for
more than 30 years.

The naive approach which the Company asks the Arbitrator
to apply to Section 13 would make a mockery of the substan-
tial rights which the Union negotiated for the employees in
Section I3(e). The Company contended through witnesses and
counsel that if a plant was in existence, even though new, a
transfer of work to it from another plant only required notice
under Section 13(a) and no carrying of preferential job rights
by the transferring employees. The plain meaning of Section
13(e) cannot be so easily manipulated. Transfer of work “per-
manently” to a “new” plant refers to an opening and closing,
but it is unrealistic to require that the opening and closing
occur at exactly the same time. It is sufficient that the Denison
plant was built as a replacement for and an expansion of the
Dallas plant, and the evidence so indicates. Even if the Com-
pany had delayed introducing stick margarine lines into the

ne

— | een

new plant for good faith reasons, which I do not find to be
the case here, the Dallas employees would still have rights,
within a reasonable period of time, to have Denison treated
as a new operation rather than an existing operation. Other-
wise the protective language of Section 13(e) would be ren-
dered ineaningless, dependent either on the convenience of the
Company or the fortuitous circumstances that opening and
closing days would occur simultaneously. I therefore find that
the Company violated Section 13(e) by not giving the Dallas
employees reasonable notice and the opportunity to fill jobs
at the Denison plant. The contract may be read as referring
to the entire operation at Denison, including jobs which the
Dallas employees had not previously performed. However, since
there are already employees assigned to those jobs and neither
they nor the IAM participated in this proceeding, I do not
make a finding in this case that the Dallas employees have a
right to displace any employee presently engaged in soft-mar-
garine or closely related operations at the Denison plant;’ this
finding will be without prejudice to a construction of Section
13(e) in some other fact situation. But unquestionably the
Dallas employees have rights to perform jobs in stick and bulk
margarine manufacture and related operations of the type be-
ing performed at Dallas. Operation of both Benhil and Mor-
pak equipment would be of that type.

The Company also violated Section 8(f), for the contract
contemplated good faith negotiations as to transfer and plant
closing problems, and such negotiations were foreclosed by
the Company positions and actions.

Perhaps at the root of the problem is the Company’s viola-
tion of Part I, Section 14(e), which I find to have occurred in
that the Company discriminated against the Dallas employees
because of their Union membership and activities, a violation
which would be comparable to an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a)(3) of the N.L.R.A. It was undisputed that the
Company intended to operate Denison non-union, and it espe-

— A-42 —

cially tried to operate it without the Teamsters Union and its
contract. This resulted in discrimination against the Dallas
employees who were represented by: the Teamsters. To thi
end, the Company gave false information, concealed information,
and even hid equipment, to avoid giving knowledge of what
was an established fact—that from the very beginning and at
all times material hereto the Denison plant was intended as the
successor plant to the Dallas plant, and that its production was
intended to duplicate and therefore to displace the Dallas pro-
duction. I find that but for the Union and its contract, it is un-
reasonable to infer that on formal opening day, November 1,
1975, at least four lines, including two Benhil stick margarine
lines, would have been operating at the Denison plant. The
Dallas employees who desire to transfer to Denison are there-
fore entitled to have their Denison seniority begin on the first
working day any production or maintenance employee began
work in Denison. The evidence indicates that such day fell in
the latter part of October, 1974.

I also find that the seniority provisions of the contract were
violated by the Company’s actions. I shall not describe these
violations in detail, however, because I am not holding the
entire collective bargaining contract, with accumulated seniority,
applicable to the Denison plant. Such a holding may have
been appropriate before the egg was scrambled, but in view of
the interest of the present Denison employees and the IAM
I make no such holding and provide no such remedy.

AWARD AND REMEDY—

For the reasons outlined above, the Union’s grievance is
sustained. ~

What is an appropriate remedy? I have tried to balance the
contract rights of the Dallas employees with the interest of
the present Denison employees who are wholly innocent in this

—~

proceeding. Had the Company not violated the agreement
initially, the Teamster’s Union, probably under the same con-
tract, would most likely be the bargaining representative of the
Denison employees, who would have been mostly former Dallas
employees—the iecord indicates that most of them would have
accepted transfer. I will not so order, however. Nor will I
order the Company to displace any present employee. As well
as violating other provisions, the Company did violate the con-
tractual counterpart of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, for which affected employees would be entitled
to be made whole as to their losses. So far, however, there
have been no losses; what we are concerned with are future
rights and the avoiding of losses. Accordingly, subject to the
limitations noted below, I hold that all Dallas employees who
desire to transfer may do so and that they will acquire new
seniority based upon the first working day at the Denison plant
(a day in late October, 1974, as described hereinabove), and
their relative positions on the seniority roster (for all Dallas
transferees will now have the same seniority date) will be based
upon length of service with the Company. The Company will
be required to provide suitable employment at the Denison
plant, beginning the first regular work day following the termi-
nation of their employment at the Dallas plant, to as many
of those Dallas transferees as are required for the operation of
stick or bulk margarine operations, provided however that such
operations shall include at least two lines using Benhil equip-
ment or the equivalent. If additional operations are added,
such a [sic] Morpak lines, with or without whipped or bulk mar-
garine production, any Dallas employees not otherwise assigned
shall be assigned to these jobs before employment if [sic] offered
to anyone else. And if vacancies occur in other production or
maintenance jobs at the Denison plants, such jobs are to be
filled by Dallas transferees so long as they are available and
qualified to do the work. If there are any persons from the
Dallas plant desiring to transfer in excess of those required
for the aforesaid jobs, such persons shall be placed on a prefer-

— A-44 —

ential hiring list and shall have the rights of employees on
permanent layoff under the contract herein.

It is recognized that the addition of these several manu-
facturing lines and newly transferred employees will materially
alter the bargaining unit at Denison and that eventually the
NLRB will have to determine the resulting questions concern-
ing representation. Until that time, however, the provisions of
the present Teamster contract will govern the compensation and
other benefits of the employees performing work of the
same nature as the Dallas operations. Such contract, how-
ever, will not govern any other job in the plant even though
such job may be filled by a Dallas transferee, for such job
would logically be covered by the IAM contract.

The parties are further required to appoint their representa-
tives under Part I, Section (j) as promptly as possible for the
purpose of implementing transfer and related rights provided
by Section 13, as interpreted by this Award. I shall retain
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this grievance
pending compliance with this Award.

POSTSCRIPT—

A personal note. Labor Arbitration usually occurs between
parties to a viable collective bargaining relationship, and accord-
ingly the hearing and the awards are tolerable and generally
not unpleasant. I would have preferred that this case could
have fallen within that norm. I regret the necessity for making
sharp and specific findings which touch so closely on funda-
mental attitudes toward union-management relations. But I
felt I had no choice, considering my obligation to the contract,
other than to make the findings which were so ineluctably re-
quired by the evidence. It is my sincere hope, however, that
neither party will seek undue advantage and that both parties

- + = ow te

— A-45 —

will seek to establish a viable relationship based on mutual
trust. I say this without prejudice to the rights of the em-
ployees to select any representative of their own choice, but
this unsolicited advice should also apply to any union which
the employees should choose as their representative.

/s/ Charles J. Morris
Charles J. Morris
Arbitrator

Dallas, Texas
September 20, 1975

— A-46 —

DISTRICT COURTS’ FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Northern District of Texas
(Filed October 16, 1975)

The application for preliminary injunction of General Ware-
housemen and Helpers, Local 767, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America (hereinafter “Teamsters”) came on for con-
sideration before the Honorable Robert M. Hill, United States
District Judge. Having heard the evidence and arguments and
having considered the briefs and stipulations of the parties, the
court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

Findings of Fact

1. The plaintiff is a labor union who seeks to enforce a labor
arbitration award rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between the parties.

2. At the hearing before this court held on Friday, October
10, 1975, the parties stipulated to facts that provide the back-
ground for the present action. The stipulation was admitted
into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit No.1. The court has con-
sidered the facts stipulated therein and adopts them as findings
of fact. The stipulation without its exhibits is attached. Also
attached is the arbiter’s award.

3. A portion of the arbiter’s award ordered the company to
afford the Dallas transferees, if any, the wages and benefits
outlined in the Teamster contract in effect in Dallas until such
time as the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter

NB I

—S

“NLRB”) could determine “the resulting question concerning
representation.” (Arbitration Award, page 43).

4. The wage scales in the Dallas Teamsters contract are sub-
stantially higher than those in the IAM contract in Denison.

Conclusions of Law

1. The court has jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to the
provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

2. The company has agreed to comply with the arbiter’s
award with the exception of one provision; therefore, the court
limits its consideration to the disputed issue of whether that
portion of the arbitration award that gives the

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2517%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
