# Petitioner for ReHearing — Holland v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioner for ReHearing
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 441 U.S. 905

## Text

78-1164 Fimo

the ED
, JAN 25 1979
Supreme Court... ...
of the

United States

October Term, 1978

No. A-426
BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,
Petitioner,
vs.
SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF
FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT

PODHURST, ORSECK & WALTER H. BECKHAM, JR.,

PARKS, P.A. ESQUIRE
25 West Flagler Street JOEL D. EATON, ESQUIRE
Miami, Florida 25 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33130
SUSAN GOLDMAN, ne
ESQUIRE Tel: (305) 358-2800
PH 1, Roberts Building LAWRENCE V. HASTINGS,
. 28 West Flagler Street ESQUIRE
Miami, Florida 33130 300 7ist Street, Suite 530
HASTINGS AND Miami Beach, Florida 33140
GOLDMAN Counsel for Petitioner

300 71st Street, Suite 530
Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Of Counsel

aA

INDEX

Page
Ne es a is ne oad mnie t Rea 2
SEE ho cos cus cub at pacwinds Routan na 2
I RENEE Oe 3
Statutes and constitutional
ee ilo se secede pecbcscsioe’ 4
SRMRRMNEIIE OT CO OIID oko sisi ses cnccccdopescess 5
Reasons for granting the writ ..................008- 12

1. The decision below defeats a federal right of
recovery under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act by application of restrictive local
pleading rules; conflicting with decisions of this
Court and other courts of appeals as to liberal
federal notice pleading ...................0005: 12

a. The decision below conflicts with decisions
of this Court holding that federal substan-
tive rights may not be infringed under local
practice — specifically holding that local
pleading requirements may not infringe
federally created rights ................... 19

INDEX (Continued)

Page

2. The decision below severely undermines the
force and effect of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act by holding that an erroneous ex-
clusion of one of the plaintiff's theories of
negligence is harmless errer, raising significant
problems insofar as assuring a correct and
uniform application of the FELA in State and
PORE CONTIN otic oN ex ceee ido: Sguite as

3. The exclusion of proof of a viable theory of
liability in an action arising under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, because of local
pleading rules, constitutes deprivation of right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States .........

4. The decision below conflicts with decisions of
this Court and courts of appeals as to the inclu-
sion of a jury charge on legal cause utilizing the
“but for’’ test of proximate cause, in a case un-
der the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. .....

NES ER PPE PR RR MU GENCE Sh Oh cei

il

22

26

28

CITATIONS

Cases: Page

Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R. Co.,
363 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, (1957) ... 2... coon

Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,
319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062 (1943) .............

Boston & M.R.R. v. Meech,

156 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. den. 329 U.S.

FO Nes tn FOROS OSs las cb ace dcsesaees

Brown v. Western Railways of Alabama,
338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105 (1949) ..........006.

Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957) .....

Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R. Co.,
342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398 (1952)

Eggert v. Norfolk & W.Ry. Co.,
GSS. Fe OOO (Oe CAR. ROTO) onc ncn s cme cnivcssinsis

Eglsaer v. Scandrett, ;
151 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1945) ........... ccc eeee

Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,
327 U.S. 108, 116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963) .....

Harris v. Pennsylvania R.Co.,
361 U.S. 15, 80 S.Ct. 22 (1959) ................

iii

20

14

25

19

13

20

CITATIONS (Continued)
Cases: | Page

Komer v. Shipley,
154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1946) ..0......ceceeeeees 13

Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,
257 P.2d 947 (Utals 19608) x. .iccise vas ccvee tices. 17

Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company,
430 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir. 1970) ............... 30

Rodriquez v. Delray Connecting Rd.,
473 F.2d 810: (Gthe Cie IB TED ois icine Sseedcassees 25

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,
352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 442 (1957) .............. 23

Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. v. Strickland,
80 So. 38 914 (ie: 21GB ais oe es Bi kis nes 15

Stone v. New York, C. & St.L.R. Co.,
344 U.S. 407 73 S.Ct. 358 (1953). .........0.... 25

Strickland v. Seaboard Airline Railroad Co.,
350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, (1955) ............. 15

Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018 (1949) ............. 20

iv

in the

Supreme Court

of the

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO. A-426
BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,
Petitioner
vs.
SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF
FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT

The Petitioner, BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,
respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the Judgment and Opinion of the District Court
of Appeal of Florida, First District, entered in this
proceeding on December 20, 1977.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the District Court of Appeal at 353
So.2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) appears in the Appendix
hereto. (A. 1-7) A timely Petition for Rehearing was
denied without opinion by the District Court of Appeal
of Florida, First District, on January 12, 1978. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court
of Florida on May 17, 1978; a timely Petition for Rehear-
ing was denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of
Florida on August 28, 1978.

JURISDICTION

The Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of
Florida, First District, was entered on December 20,
1977 and a timely Petition for Rehearing was denied on
January 12, 1978. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Florida was denied on May 17, 1978;
Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Supreme Court
of Florida on August 28, 1978. This Court entered its Or-
der on November 6, 1978 extending time to file the Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to and including January 26,
1979. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a Federal right of recovery under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act may be defeated by
local State rules of pleading and practice that are in con-
flict with Federal notice pleading.

2. Whether a local harmless error statute may be
applied in an action under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act so as to render harmless the erroneous ex-
clusion of a viable theory of liability from consideration

by the jury.

3. Whether the exclusion of proof of a viable
theory of liability in an action arising under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act constitutes deprivation of right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

4. Whether in an action under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act a jury charge on legal causation
utilizing the “but for’ test of proximate cause is
erroneous and constitutes reversible prejudicial error.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America providing in relevant part:

In Suits in common law. . . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved... .

2. Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A.,
Section 51, providing in part:

Every ... railroad ... shall be liable in
damages. . . for such injury or death resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of
the officers, agents, or employees of such
carrier, or by reason of any defect or insuf-
ficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track . . . or
other equipment.

3. Florida Statute, Section 59.041 (1975):

No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or
new trial granted by any Court of the State in
any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of
misdirection of the jury or the improper admis-
sion or rejection of evidence or for error as to
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in
the opinion of the Court to which application is
made, after an examination of the entire case it |
shall appear that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This Sec-
tion shall be liberally construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Proceedings Below

The Petitioner was the Plaintiff in Duval County
Circuit Court, in a personal injury action instituted pur-
suant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, and the
Federal Safety Appliance Act. The plaintiff was a
brakeman, who lost both legs in a switching movement
when he fell from a rear car on the train as it was back-
ing up to be coupled onto the remainder of the train
cars. The wheels passed over his legs, resulting in
amputation.

The incident occurred on the night of October 17,
1973 in Tifton, Georgia. The Petitioner alleged various
acts of negligence on the part of the railroad under the
Federal Employers Liability Act, and claimed various
violations of the Safety Appliance Act.’(A. 7-13). A jury
verdict for the defendant railroad was returned and final
judgment was entered. The motion of the plain-
tiff/Petitioner for a new trial was denied. (A. 13-19). The
plaintiff appealed to the First District Court of Appeal
and the judgment was affirmed. (A. 1-7) Plaintiff’s Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari was denied without opinion
by the Supreme Court of Florida.

2. The Facts Shown at Trial

The Petitioner, BOBBY HOLLAND, was working
as brakeman for the Respondent RAILROAD during a
pre-dawn switching movement in Tifton, Georgia, on
October 17, 1973. The train was headed in a southerly
direction. The engine unit and the front thirteen cars
uncoupled from the rest of the train and left the balance

of the train standing to the north of the sidetrack.
Twenty-six cars were located on the sidetrack and were
to be coupied onto the rear of the engine and thirteen
cars. The entire unit would then back up and couple up
with the balance of the train which had been left
standing a considerable distance to the north.

The engine and thirteen cars proceeded south past
the sidetrack and BOBBY HOLLAND got off the train,
threw the switch, and the engine and thirteen cars
backed up onto the sidetrack, coupling up with the
twenty-six cars. The train then proceeded off the
sidepass, onto the main track and northward, clearing
the switch; and BOBBY HOLLAND threw the switch
again so that the train (engine and thirty-nine cars)
could proceed backward on the main track to couple up
with the cars that had been left behind. Under the
switching movement as performed, BOBBY HOLLAND
was required to get onto a rear car to ride back to the
svanding cars far to the north, and would then walk the
length of the train to the lead engine to board. While the
train was proceeding backward, however, BOBBY
HOLLAND fell from the car and the train rode over his
legs, severing them.

BOBBY HOLLAND sued the railroad, ultimately
alleging in his Complaint, as amended, that the acci-
dent was caused through RAILROAD negligence, in,
among other things, utilizing unsafe equipment; im-
properly signaling HOLLAND as to the movement;
utilizing defective radio equipment; utilizing defective
brakes; proceeding backward and disregarding
HOLLAND’s signals; backing up in such a manner as to
cause excessive slack; failing to property communicate
with HOLLAND; “negligently failing to furnish the

plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work”’; and
“negligently instructing and/or directing the train crew
to pick up cars on the pass track in a manner and
method as was known by the defendant to be hazardous
when there was a safer alternative method of accom-
plishing the same objective.” (A. 7-13).

With regard to negligence in failing to furnish a
reasonably safe place to work and in negligently
directing the crew to pick up cars by a hazardous
method, when there was a safer alternative method of
accomplishing the same objective, BOBBY HOLLAND,
during discovery, inquired into existence of a growth of
weeds and accumulation of debris, adjacent to the main
tracks, just south of the sidetrack and switch. (A. 20-29).
BOBBY HOLLAND attempted to establish that the
RAILROAD, in permitting the accumulations and
weeds, prevented a safer alternative from being utilized;
and that this was relevant to his claim of negligent
failure to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe
place to wor’, and in negligently instructing the
hazardous method utilized when there was a safer alter-
native method of accomplishing the same objectives.

HOLLAND’s counsel emphasized this theory dur-
ing the pre-trial conference, on a discussion of
HOLLAND’s Motion to Produce certain matters which
would demonstrate RAILROAD knowledge of the weeds
and debris—and which in turn would reveal that the
RAILROAD, through permitting the condition to exist
to the south of the switch and sidetrack, precluded a
safer alternative. Counsel advised that riding a car at
night in a back-up movement was dangerous, and that if
the weeds did not exist just to the south of the track, the
safer method could have been utilized. (A. 20).

In short, had the weeds and debris not existed,
BOBBY HOLLAND would never have had to have rid-
den on the back of a moving car as it backed up in the
dark; he could simply have checked the coupling and
walked through the area to the engine. !

Again, in opening statement at the trial,
HOLLAND ’s counsel explained to the jury that a safer
switching movement could have been utilized whereby
BOBBY HOLLAND never would have had to ride
backwards in the dark but for the accumulation of
weeds and debris.

At the trial, the trial court excluded the evidence
which would demonstrate existence of weeds and debris
preventing the use of a safer alternative switching move-
ment. (A. 28-35). The trial court held that this theory
was an afterthought, not covered by the pleadings; was
inconsistent with the pleadings; and that the weeds and
debris existing south of the track was not a cause of the
accident at all. The evidence was excluded and
HOLLAND’s Motion for New Trial was ultimately
denied. (A. 13-19).

At the close of the evidence, the trial court in-
structed the jury improperly on legal cause in this
FELA-Safety Appliance Act case, as follows:

'In the Appendix is a copy of the diagrams which were con-
tained in the reply brief of Holland in the District Court of Appeal
proceeding. The diagrams illustrated the move as it was made and
the move as it could have been made but for the weeds and debris.
The diagrams reflect Holland’s theory as presented in the proffers
that were rejected; as compared to the move as actually made, as
the testimony reflects. (A. 36-41).

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-
rectly and in a natural and continuous
sequence produces, or contributes to producing
such injury so that it can reasonably be said
that but for the negligence, the injury would
not have occurred.

This charge was given over HOLLAND’s objection.

BOBBY HOLLAND appealed to the District Court
of Appeal, First District, urging that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error in rejecting the proffers which
would have shown that the weeds precluded a safer
method. The First District Court of Appeal held as
follows with regard to the evidence on the weeds and
debris:

a. The proffered evidence that the RAILROAD
failed to remove high weeds and debris adjacent to the
track and roadbed near the accident scene was not ad-
missible under any pleaded theory of negligence, in-
cluding allegations in HOLLAND’s Amended Com-
plaint that the RAILROAD failed to furnish a
reasonably safe place in which to work and negligently
directed the train crew to pick up cars by a hazardous
method when there was a safer alternative method of ac-
complishing the same objective.

b. The proffered evidence was not admissible to

_ prove that the RAILROAD failed to provide HOLLAND

a reasonably safe place to work, because HOLLAND
“did not traverse the area said to have been overgrown
with weeds and strewn with debris.”

c. The proffered evidence in support of
HOLLAND’s theory of liability — “that by permitting
an accumulation of weeds and debris, the Railroad
negligently foreclosed appellant’s use of that area of the
track which, if used, would have permitted a safer
operation than the operation actually employed” —
may well have been a potential theory of liability, ‘but
in causative terms, it was a step away from the pleaded
theory.”

d. “The bare mention of that theory of potentia!
liability in the pre-trial conference held a few days
before trial . . . did not amend the Complaint so as to
require expansion of the liability theories at trial.”

e. Any error, in any event, was “harmless” in
the context of the lengthy and complicated trial of
numerous liability issues and numerous theories of
liability, under Florida Statutes Sec. 59.041 (1975).
There is no miscarriage of justice after examination of
the entire record where the jury considered and rejected
HOLLAND’s proof that the particular method used to
move the train at the time and place of his injury was
unreasonably dangerous.

f. The charge on legal cause, incorporating as it

did the “but for’ test of proximate causation, was error
in a FELA or Safety Appliance Act case but was not of
“sufficient magnitude to require reversal, considering
the charge as a whole;” the error was “harmless”
because it was used only once during the charge. The
jury was also charged on the appropriate FELA or
Safety Appliance Act test — that is, causation would be
established if the alleged improper act on the part of the
RAILROAD “contributed in whole or in part’ to

HOLLAND’s injury.

10

g. The First District further held that the
prejudicial effect of the erroneous portion of the of-
fending instruction was obliterated by a following
paragraph stating that under FELA, the RAILROAD
was responsible if it were negligent and the negligence
played any part, however small, in producing the injury
for which damages are sought.?

3. How Federal Question is Presented

This action was brought under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act and Safety Appliance Act. In
Petitioner’s Suggestion For Certification, filed in the
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, seek-
ing to certify the decision to the Supreme Court of
Florida for certiorari review, upon the grounds that the
decision passes upon questions of great public interest,
Petitioner specifically stated:

* * * * +

Whether exclusion of proof of a viable theory of
liability, in an FELA case, because of local
pleading rules, constitutes deprivation of right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States?

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District,
denied Petitioner’s Suggestion For Certification.

Throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner has
asserted the applicable Federal FELA case law that had
heretofore been applied uniformly throughout the coun-
try to protect Petitioner’s substantive rights under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act.

?The concurring Opinion found no error with the “but for”
language of the charge, harmless or otherwise.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1.

THE DECISION BELOW DEFEATS A
FEDERAL RIGHT OF RECOVERY UNDER
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY
ACT BY APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIVE
LOCAL PLEADING RULES, CONFLICTING
WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND
OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO
LIBERAL FEDERAL NOTICE PLEADING.

The decision below holds that a potential theory of
liability under the FELA is properly excluded from con-
sideration by the jury where “in causative terms it was a
step away from the pleaded theories.”’ Included among
the allegations of negligence in this FELA action,
BOBBY HOLLAND asserted that the RAILROAD was
negligent in failing to furnish a ‘‘a reasonably safe place
in which to work” and “‘in negligently directing the train
crew to pick up cars by a hazardous method when there
was a safer alternative method of accomplishing the
same objective.”’ The District Court of Appeal, First
District of Florida, flatly held that the pleaded theory of
negligence was insufficient to permit the introduction of
evidence on the issue of the RAILROAD’s negligent
foreclosure of an area of the railroad track which, if
used, would have permitted a safer operation than the
operation actually employed; the proffered evidence
simply being inadmissible under the pleadings.

This application of a stringent and restrictive

pleading requirement in an FELA action, effectively
defeating BOBBY HOLLAND’s recognized theory of

12

liability, directly conflicts with the liberal notice
pleading rule set forth by this Court in Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957). In consider-
ing the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint for
declaratory relief, this Court announced:

* * * * *

.(T)he Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is
“a short and plain statement of the claim”’ that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests. . . Such simplified ‘‘notice pleading”’
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for
discovery and the other pre-trial procedures es-
tablished by the Rules to disclose more
precisely the basis of both claim and defense
and to define more narrowly the disputed facts
and issues . . . The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive
to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of ay rood is to pee a proper
decision on the merits.

Accord, Komer v. Shipley, 154 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1946). Indeed, the record herein reflects that pre-trial
discovery apprised the RAILROAD of HOLLAND’s
claim that the negligent accumulation of weeds and
debris prevented utilization of a safer alternative

method; in particular, at the pre-trial conference,
HOLLAND’s counsel discussed in depth the relevancy

13

of matters demonstrating the RAILROAD’s knowledge
of the accumulation of weeds and debris and its failure
to remedy same in connection with the claims of
negligence.

Under Federal cases and law, the amended
pleadings were sufficient to advance the theory,
recognized as a potentially viable one by the District
Court of Appeal, that, as the appellate court charac-
terized it, “the Railroad negligently foreclosed Ap-
pellant’s use of that area of the track which, if used,
would have permitted a safer operation than the opera-
tion actually employed.’’ The allegations of
HOLLAND’s amended pleadings alleging negligence in
failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work and in
directing a hazardous method where there was a safer
alternative method, under Federal notice pleading
necessarily incorporated this theory of negligence. In
this regard, the decision below conflicts with the opinion
in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry, 319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct.
1062 (1943). In reinstating the verdict for the plaintiff
railroad employee that had been vacated by the
Supreme Court of Vermont, this Court in Bailey, supra,
found the evidence of the railroad’s negligence in failing
to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work suf-
ficient to support the jury verdict. Of particular
significance here is the Court’s finding that evidence
presented to the jury of a safer alternative method of un-
loading the car, i.e., “the car could have been opened or
unloaded near the bridge on level ground,” was properly
considered by the jury under the allegation of plaintiff’s
complaint that the railroad had failed to furnish plain-
poo in “a safe place to do the work.” (319 U.S. 1063-

14

The decision below also conflicts with that of this
Court in Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.,
350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, (1955), where in a per curiam
opinion, this Court granted the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari and reversed a judgment for the railroad, citing
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry, supra. In the original ac-
tion before the Florida Supreme Court, Seaboard Airline
Railroad Co. v. Strickland, 80 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1955), an
action under the FELA, the plaintiff had secured a ver-
dict. The plaintiff had been injured while changing an
outside brake beam when he slipped and fell back
against the switchbox while performing his work in a
sitting, squatting or stooping position. Plaintiff had
produced evidence that he could have changed the beam
on a flat track over a pit while in a standing position
rather than under the pullman car. There was evidence
that it would have been safer to perform the work in the
pit and that under those circumstances, the plaintiff
could have had the assistance of a helper. The railroad
presented evidence, though, that traditionally the work
was done on a flat track and that had the pullman car
been moved over a pit “it would not have been possible
to get the trains out on time if they had to switch to a pit
each car that they had to be worked on.” (80 So.2d at
916).

In its original decision, the Supreme Court of
Florida reversed a verdict and judgment for the injured
plaintiff holding that proof of a safer place to work had
no bearing on the issue of whether or not the method ac-
tually utilized, i.e., a flat track, constituted a reasonably
safe place for the operation in question and that the
evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. In particular, the Supreme Court
of Florida stated in its original opinion:

* * * * *

15

From what has been said, it is apparent that
the plaintiff sought to prove the issue made by
the pleadings — that is, whether the defendant
was negligent in failure to provide him with a
reasonably safe place to work — by showing
that the footing and lighting were better in a
pit, where plaintiff could have had a helper,
and that it was unreasonable — and thus
negligent — for defendant to require him to do
the work on a flat track when a pit was
available. There can be no doubt that there
were sufficient ‘probative facts’, if believed by
the jury, to show that it was easier and safer to
change a brake beam in a pit rather than on a
flat track. But we know of no rule of law which
requires ‘a railroad company to provide a
workman with an easier and safer place to work
if the one provided is, as a matter of fact,
reasonably safe. . . . (80 So.2d at 917).

The United States Supreme Court reversed under
the liberal interpretation of the FELA, citing Bailey v.
Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062,
(1943). On remand, the Supreme Court of Florida
necessarily decided, in accordance with the mandate,
that the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question

under the pleading alleging negligent failure to provide a
safe place to work.

‘Errors with regard to attorney conduct and admissibility of
other evidence resulted in reversal for a new trial (88 So.2d at 520-
524); but the Florida Supreme Court was compelled to hold and did
hold that a case of causative FELA negligence was made out by the
proof of the safer alternative — which was not used because the
railroad precluded it; it was not used because of railroad custom
and because it would not have been possible to get the trains out on
_ dime if the railroad had to switch each car which had to be worked
on to a pit.

16

The decision below also conflicts with a decision of
the highest State court of Utah, recognizing that allega-
tions of negligence in failing to furnish a safe place to
work in an FELA action are sufficient to permit
evidence of safer methods of work. In Mooney v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.Co., 257 P.2d 947 (Utah 1953), a safer
method of work was precluded by the railroad’s alleged
negligent scattering of tools throughout a railroad car
which necessitated the plaintiff working in a restricted
area while releasing a flat car handbrake. Because the
railroad had been negligent in permitting the tools to be
scattered throughout the car, the plaintiff had very little
room to stand and was unable to get directly behind the
brakestaff while performing his work. The Supreme
Court of Utah discussed the testimony regarding the
scattered tools and concluded that a jury instruction
outlining the plaintiff's claim of negligence against the
railroad for failure to furnish a safe place to work was
correct. The railroad challenged the instruction as ‘‘not
within the pleadings or supported by the evidence.’ The
Court rejected the railroad’s argument, reasoning that
testimony of the tools scattered throughout the car
precluding utilization of a safer method of operation
“present a jury question concerning negligence or non-
negligence in failing to furnish a safe working place, —
thus justifying the instruction mentioned.” (257 P.2d at
949).

The decision below also conflicts with the above-
cited cases regarding notice pleadings under FELA law
insofar as it holds that the fact that BOBBY HOLLAND
did not “traverse the area said to have been overgrown
with weeds and strewn with debris’ rendered the prof-
fered evidence inadmissible under a general pleading
alleging the RAILROAD negligently failed to provide a

17

reasonably safe place to work. Strickland and Pailey,
supra, allowed proof of an unused alternative method to
establish negligence in the method or area actually used.
Additionally, under liberal Federal notice pleadings an-
nounced by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, supru, the
District Court of Appeal’s narrow construction of
evidence that may be presented to prove “failure to

provide a reasonably safe place to work” cannot be
sustained.

18

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

HOLDING THAT FEDERAL SUBSTAN-

TIVE RIGHTS MAY NOT BE INFRINGED

UNDER LOCAL PRACTICE —

SPECIFICALLY HOLDING THAT LOCAL

PLEADING REQUIREMENTS MAY NOT

INFRINGE FEDERALLY CREATED -
RIGHTS.

In Brown v. Western Railways of Alabama, 338 U.S.
294, 70 S.Ct. 105 (1949), it was specifically held that
local rules of practice and burdensome ruies of pleading
could not be utilized to defeat a right of recovery under
the FELA and that the United States Supreme Court, in
an FELA case, would not and could not accept as final a
State Court’s interpretation of allegations in a com-
plaint asserting a right under the FELA. In FELA ac-
tions, Federal Courts interpret pleadings in the interest
of uniformity of Federally created rights. The Court
announced:

* * * * *

Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used
to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of
recovery authorized by Federal laws.
‘“‘Whatever springes the State may set for those
who are endeavoring to assert rights that the
State confers, the assertion of Federal rights,
when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be
defeated under the name of local practice.
(Citations omitted) Should this Court fail to

19

protect federally created rights from dismissal
because of over exacting local requirements for
meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in
adjudication of federally created rights could
not be achieved . . . (338 U.S. at 298-299).

The dismissal of a complaint under the FELA by
the State Courts of Missouri because of stringent
pleading requirements in Missouri was reversed in Urie
vu. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018 (1949). The
Court concluded that the allegations of the complaint
stated a cause of action for negligence under the FELA
pursuant to Federal law and that such a determination
should not vary in accordance with differing pleading re-
quirements under State and local laws. The Court
further noted that any purported insufficiency of allega-
tions in the complaint as to the particular type and
cause of a maladjustment in the equipment would not
accord with applicable Federal standards in such cases
and, in any event, “the matter was at most one for per-
mitting amendment or cure by proof.” (337 U.S. at 179,
F.N. 17)4 Accord, Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R. Co.,
353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, (1957); Dice v. Akron, C &
Y.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, (1952).

Here, BOBBY HOLLAND pled not only that the
RAILROAD was negligent in failing to provide a
reasonably safe place to work, but further pled that the

‘Similarly, if indeed Holland’s potential theory of liability that
was excluded by the Court below “was a step away from the
pleaded theories,” under liberal Federal practice applicable in
FELA actions, the pleadings should have been amended to conform
to the proof. See, Watson v. Canon Shoe Co., 165 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.
1948); Green v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 299 F.2d 837 (6th
Cir. 1962).

RAILROAD negligently directed the train crew to pick
up cars on the pass track in a manner and method
known by the defendant to be hazardous, when there
was a safer alternative method of accomplishing the
same objective. The pleadings were more than sufficient
under Federal law to allow the precluded proof — which
the First District Court of Appeal here acknowledged
might well have constituted “a potential theory of
liability.” BOBBY HOLLAND has been deprived of his
substantive rights under the Federal Employers
Liability Act through the restrictive pleading require-
ments announced by the District Court of Appeal.

21

2.

THE DECISION BELOW SEVERELY UN-
DERMINES THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY
ACT BY HOLDING THAT AN ERRONEOUS
EXCLUSION UF ONE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF’°S THEORIES OF NEGLIGENCE IS
HARMLESS ERROR, RAISING SIGNIFI-
CANT PROBLEMS INSOFAR AS ASSUR-
ING A CORRECT AND UNIFORM AP-
PLICATION OF THE FELA IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS.

The First District Court of Appeal of Florida held
that the exclusion of proof of the RAILROAD’s negligent
preclusion of a safer operation than that actually em-
ployed, even if admissible, constituted harmless error

under Florida Statute Sec. 59.041 (1975 ini
pre ( ). The Opinion

* * + + *

Moreover, when viewed in the context of a
lengthy and complicated trial of numerous
liability issues, any error in the trial court’s
refusal to permit exploration of yet another
theory was harmless. Sec. 59.041, Florida
Statutes (1975). The jury considered and rejec-
ted Appellant’s proof that the particular
method used to move the train at the time and
place of his injury was unreasonably
dangerous. We find no miscarriage of justice af-
ter examination of the entire record.

The District Court of Appeal’s Opinion in this case
has a far reaching impact on the issue of uniform treat-
ment of FELA actions filed in State courts. Relying
upon a State harmless error statute, the District Court
of Appeal of Florida has deemed the erroneous exclusion
of a potential theory of liability in an FELA action to be
“harmless error”, reasoning that the excluded liability
testimony was “‘yet another theory” in a “complicated
trial of numerous liability issues” where the jury had not
found the particular method utilized for the switching
movement to be “unreasonably dangerous.”

A State harmless error statute simply should not
apply in an FELA case so as to permit the exclusion of
proof of a viable, independent theory of FELA liability.

The error simply cannot be harmless where a
finding of an unreasonably safe place to work can arise
out of proof of a safer alternative, the use of which the
RAILROAD improperly foreclosed. Strickland v.
Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct.
157, (1955). Where a jury, as here, was presented with
the question of whether the method actually used was
unreasonably dangerous, proof of a safer alternative
method is directly relevant on the issue of negligence.
The proof of an alternative method, which the
RAILROAD through its own fault precluded, has a
direct bearing on jury evaluation in an FELA case, — es-
pecially in light of the slight evidence of causative
negligence that is required. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957).

The decision below, insofar as it holds that the ex-

clusion of a viable theory of negligence — negligent
preclusion of a safer alternative method — constitutes

23

harmless error under a State harmless error statute
directly conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit
in Eggert v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1976). The negligent preclusion of a safer method of per-
forming a particular railroad function was sufficient,
alone, to sustain a finding of negligence since it could
not be said that the negligent preclusion of the safer
method “‘played no part at all in the injury to plaintiff
and it was therefore error to prevent submission of the
issue to the jury.” (538 F.2d at 512). In Eggert, supra,
the plaintiff was the fireman for the railroad and was
responsible for transmitting signals from the ground
crew to the engineer. The plaintiff ordinarily sat in the
rear seat in the engine cab but since the front seat was
defectively turned to one side and would not swivel
properly, there was insufficient leg room to allow plain-
tiff to fit in the rear seat and he instead sat on the
broken front seat. Since plaintiff was not sitting on the
rear seat and the front seat did not swivel properly, it
was necessary for plaintiff to get up and walk to the rear
seat to look for the signal from the ground crew. While
the plaintiff was moving between seats, the “slack ac-
tion” caused by the momentum of the coupled cars
knocked plaintiff off-balance and he fell. The Second
Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the railroad since
a jury could reasonably find that, as here, a properly
functioning front seat would have permitted the utiliza-
tion of a safer alternative method. The Court further
reasoned that under the FELA, the right of the jury to
pass upon the question of fault and causation must be
most liberally viewed and, in that context, it could not
be said — while the evidence was perhaps “‘slim” — that
the broken seat played no part at all in the injury to
plaintiff. Therefore, it was error to prevent the submis-
sion of the issue to the jury.

24

,

The conflict with Eggert is clear since BOBBY
HOLLAND’s proffered proof shows that the
RAILROAD’s negligent failure to eliminate the high
weeds and debris precluded a safer switching movement
which would have eliminated the need for BOBBY
HOLLAND to ride backwards in the dark for approx-
imately one-half mile. It was during this hazardous
back-up movement that BOBBY HOLLAND fell to the
ground and lost both legs. Under applicable FELA case
law, a jury verdict could be sustained on the sole issue of
the RAILROAD’s negligent preclusion of the safer
method of performing the switching movement so that
the exclusion of this theory from consideration by the
jury is necessarily prejudicial and the Florida harmless
error statute should not be applied to defeat Holland’s
claim. Accord, Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 257
P.2d 947 (Utah 1953); Stone v. New York, C. & St.
L.R.Co., 344 U.S. 407, 73 S.Ct. 358 (1953); Boston &
M.R.R. v. Meech, 156 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946) cert. den.
329 U.S. 763 (1946); Rodriquez v. Delray Connecting
Rd., 473 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1973).

3.

THE EXCLUSION OF PROOF OF A VIABLE
THEORY OF LIABILITY IN AN ACTION
ARISING UNDER THE FEDERAL EM-
PLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT, BECAUSE OF
LOCAL PLEADING RULES, CON.-
STITUTES DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES.

The decision below departs from the Rule pro-
nounced by this Court that an injured employee’s right
to a trial by jury in an FELA case cannot be defeated or
restricted by local rules of pleading and practice. Brown
v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70
S.Ct. 105, 106 (1949); Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,
319 U.S. 350, 354, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1064 (1943); Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y.R.Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363, 72 S.Ct. 312
(1952).

This Court announced in Dice, supra:

* * * * *

{

We have previously held that “‘the right to trial
by jury is ‘a basic and fundamental feature of
our system of Federal jurisprudence’ ”’ and that
it is “part and parcel of the remedy afforded
railroad workers under the Employers Liability
Act. Bailey v. Central Vermont R.Co., 319 U.S.
350, 354, 87 L.Ed. 1444, 1447, 63 S.Ct. 1062. We
also recognized in that case that to deprive
railroad workers of the benefit of a jury trial

26

where there is evidence to support negligence
“ig to take away a goodly portion of the relief
which Congress has afforded them.” It follows
that the right to trial by jury is too substantial
a part of the rights accorded by the Act to per-
mit it to be classified as a mere “‘local rule of
procedure” for denial in the manner that Ohio
has here used. Brown v. Western R.Co., 338
U.S. 294, 94 L.Ed. 100, 70 S.Ct. 105 (342 U.S.

at 363).

The decision below sanctions the elimination of a
viable theory of negligence from consideration by the
jury because of local pleading rules. This action con-
stitutes a denial of BOBBY HOLLAND’s right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.

4.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS
WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND
COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO THE INCLU-
SION OF A JURY CHARGE ON LEGAL

CAUSE UTILIZING THE “BUT FOR” TEST
OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, IN A CASE UN-
DER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’
LIABILITY ACT.

In charging upon the FELA, the trial court defined
legal cause as follows:

* * * * *

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-
rectly and in a natural and continuous
sequence produces, or contributes to producing
such injury so that it can reasonably be said
that but for the negligence, the injury would
not have occurred.

__ The First District Court of Appeal concluded that
“the instruction was incorrect, however, in charging the
jury it must find that ‘but for the negligence, the injury
would not have occurred.’”’ The Court further held,
however, that the charge was harmless error since
throughout the remainder of the charge, the jury was ap-
propriately instructed that it should find for the plain-
tiff if any improper act on the part of the RAILROAD
“contributed in whole or in part” to the plaintiff’s in-
jury. According to the Court, the error was not “‘of suf-
ficient magnitude to require reversal” and “we find the

| charge as given does not rise to the level of reversible
error.”

28

The decision below departs from decisions of this
Court announcing that under the FELA, if railroad
negligence played any part, however small, in the hap-
pening of the accident, the injured employee still could
prevail. As this Court held in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957):

+ * * we

Under this Statute (FELA) the test of a jury
case is simply whether the proofs justify with
reason che conclusion that employer negligence
played any part, even the slightest, in produc-
ing the injury or death for which damages are
sought .... The Statute expressly imposes
liability upon the employer to pay damages for
injury or death due “‘in whole or in part”’ to its
negligence.

The law was enacted because the Congress was
dissatisfied with the common-law duty of the
master to his servant. The Statute supplants
that duty with the far more drastic duty of pay-
ing damages for injury or death at work due in
whole or in part to the employer’s negligence.
The employer is stripped of his common-law
defenses and for practical purposes, the inquiry
in these cases today rarely presents more than
the single question whether negligence of the
employer played any part, however small, in
the injury or death which is the subject of the
suit. The burden of the employee is met, and
the obligation of the employer to pay damages
arises, when there is proof, even though en-
tirely circumstantial, from which the jury may

29

Min

with reason make that inference. (352 U.S. at
502-503).

In Rogers, the United States Supreme Court flatly
rejected the “but for’’ test that had been applied by the
Missouri Court, holding that language of proximate
causation (i.e., “but for’) simply does not belong in an
action arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act. Accord, Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 361 U.S. 15,
80 S.Ct. 22 (1959).

The “but for” proximate causation instruction to
the jury could not be harmless in this FELA case where,
as recognized by this Court, the crucial question is
“whether there was evidence that any employer
negligence caused the harm, or more precisely, enough
to justify a jury’s determination that employer
negligence had played any role in producing the harm.”’
Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 327
U.S. 108, 116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963). The applicable
standard, as expressed by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad
Company, 430 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir. 1970), in a FELA
case is that all that need be shown is that there be
greater than a “zero probability either of employer
negligence or that any such negligence contributed to
the injury of an employee”, to support a finding of
negligence and causation. Accord, Eglsaer v. Scandrett,
151 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1945).

~

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should issue
to review the Judgment and Opinion of the District
Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Respectfully submitted,

WALTER H. BECKHAM, JR.,
Esquire

JOEL D. EATON, Esquire

25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-2800

LAWRENCE V. HASTINGS
Esquire

300 71st Street, Suite 530

Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Counsel for Petitioner
PODHURST, ORSECK & PARKS, P.A.

25 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33130

SUSAN GOLDMAN, ESQUIRE
PH I, Roberts Building

28 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130

HASTINGS AND GOLDMAN
300 71st Street, Suite 530
Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Of Counsel

January 24, 1979

" $1

Appendix

Index to Appendix
Decision and Opinion of the District Court
of Appeal of Florida, First District, dated
ROE Bs BOT is hic hes be kviweee App. 1-7
First Amended Complaint .......... teisss ee. F-3S

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New
pe na EEE APU eo a Wore ee Te App. 13-19

Excerpt from Pre-Trial Conference of
Deve By 10 TG ai oo kcccccscckevedcs App. 20

Excerpt from Deposition of Roger Banks .. App. 20-21
Excerpt from Deposition of Shirley Davis.. App. 22-24

Excerpt from Deposition of William
BONIS 6.5 cee succeed ae wk cme be hae App. 24-26

Excerpt from Deposition of Earl Williams . App. 26
Excerpt from Deposition of James Sherrod App. 27-28
Proffer of Witness Zadnichick ............. App. 28-29
Proffer of Witness Thompson ............. App. 30-35
Diagrams from Appellant’s Reply Brief
Demonstrating Switching Move as Made,

and Alternative Safer Method Precluded by
PC i Naka Goke hak RENCE a UER ce Ow App. 36-41

App. i

4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JULY TERM, A. D. 1977

CASE NO. DD-152

BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,

Appellant,
US.
SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Appellee.

Opinion filed December 20, 1977.
ERVIN, J.

Appellant Bobby Holland brought this action under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for
grievous personal injuries suffered while an employee of
the appellee Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company.
He alleged numerous acts of negligence and statutory
violations that resulted in his injuries. The jury,
however, found for the railroad.

Appellant was injured in a switching movement. He
first contends the trial judge erred in excluding evidence
that the railroad failed to remove high weeds and debris
adjacent to the track and roadbed near the accident
scene, and that the weeds and debris made walking

App. 1

there at night dangerous. As the trial court held in its or-
der denying a new trial, the proffered evidence was not
admissible under any pleaded theory of negligence. Ap-
pellant’s amended complaint, as further amended,
alleged the railroad was negligent in several respects,
among them in failing to furnish appellant a reasonably
safe place in which to work and in negligently directing
the train crew to pick up cars by a hazardous method
‘when there was a safer alternative method of accom-
plishing the same objectives.”

The proffered evidence was not admissible to prove
the railroad failed to provide appellant a reasonably safe
place to work, because appellant did not traverse the
area said to have been overgrown with weeds and strewn
with debris. Appellant’s argument for the admissibility
of his proffered evidence is that by permitting an ac-
cumulation of weeds and debris, the railroad negligently
foreclosed appellant’s use of that area of the track
which, if used, would have permitted a safer operation
than the operation actually employed. That theory may
well have been a potential theory of liability, but in
causative terms it was a step away from the pleaded
theories. The bare mention of that theory of potential
liability in the pretrial conference held a few days before
trial, during counsel’s argument on the scope of proper
discovery in the latter states of preparation, did not
amend the complaint so as to require expansion of the
liability theories at trial.

Moreover, when viewed in the context of a lengthy.
and complicated trial of numerous liability issues, any
error in the trial court’s refusal to permit exploration of
yet another theory was harmless. Section 59.041, Florida
Statutes (1975). The jury considered and rejected ap-

%
App. 2

pellant’s proof that the particular method used to move
the train at the time and place of his injury was un-
reasonably dangerous. We find no miscarriage of justice
after examination of the entire record.

Appellant’s second point concerns the jury instruc-
tion defining negligence. The trial judge charged:
‘Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it directly and in
a natural and continuous sequence produces, or con-
tributes to producing such injury so that it can
reasonably be said that but for the negligence the injury
would not have occurred.”

Since Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 352 U.S. 500 (1957), the test in FELA actions for
determining employer negligence is simply whether it
played any part, even the slightest, in producing the in-
jury for which damages are sought. The burden of the
employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to
pay damages arises when there is proof, though cir-
cumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make
that inference. This reasoning was adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958).
Therefore, the above quoted instruction is correct in say-
ing the railroad’s negligence is a legal cause of injury if it
‘produces or contributes to producing” such injury. The
instruction was incorrect, however, in charging the jury,
it must find that “but for the negligence the injury
would not have occurred.”

If our appellate task ended upon determining the
instruction was in part incorrect, a new trial would be
mandated. However, we must also determine whether
the error was of sufficient magnitude to require reversal,

App. 3

considering the charge as a whole. McCalley v.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 265 So.2d 11
(Fla. 1972). McCalley involved an alleged violation of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 USC §2, which
employs the same causal test as the FELA in determin-
ing an employer’s negligence. During trial the jury was
repeatedly instructed that a verdict should be returned
for the defendant if the alleged negligence was found not
to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The
Supreme Court found the concept of proximate cause
plays no part in an action under the Federal Safety Ap-
pliance Act, and further, the repeated use of the term
“proximate cause’’, together with an erroneous instruc-
tion from a 1933 pre-Rogers decision, constituted rever-
sible error.

We find the charge as given does not rise to the level
of reversible error. The offending “‘but for” language was
used only once during the extensive instructions to the
jury. The trial judge throughout his charge informed the
jury it should find for the plaintiff if any improper act on
the part of the railroad ‘‘contributed in whole or in part”
to the plaintiff’s injury. In order to determine if any pre-
judice resulted to Mr. Holland, we reviewed the argu-
ment of defense counsel and found no reference to the
“but for” test for determining the negligence of the
railroad. Defense counsel’s brief reference to causation
in his argument is consistent with FELA law: ‘They
have got to show that something is defective, something
isn’t working, that it played some part in the accident
here.” . :

Finally, the prejudicial effect of that portion of the
offending instruction is belied by the second paragraph
following it:

App. 4

‘‘Now, under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act the defendant Railroad Company is liable
if the defendant, his agents, servants, or em-
ployees, acting in the scope of their agency or
employment were negligent and the negligence
played any part, however small, in producing
the injury for which damages are sought.”

The jury, after nine days of trial, concluded the
railroad was guilty of no improper act making it respon-
sible for Mr. Holland’s injuries. We are sympathetic to
his plight. But we are compelled to find a fair trial was
conducted and a sufficient factual basis existed for the
jury’s verdict.

We have considered the remaining points on appeal
and find no error. The judgment is

AFFIRMED.

MELVIN, J., CONCURS. SMITH, Acting Chief Judge,
CONCURRING WITH OPINION.

SMITH, J., concurring:

I concur in the court’s decision and in all of Judge
Ervin’s opinion except that part which finds error, albeit
harmless error, in the trial court’s adaptation of
Florida’s Standard Jury Instruction 5.la to the FELA
context. Charge 5.la reads

Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it di-
rectly and in natural and continuous sequence
produces or contributes substantially to
producing such injury, so that it can

App. 5

reasonably be said that, but for the negligence,
the injury would not have occurred. (Emphasis
added.)

The trial court excised “substantially” from the charge
given the jury at this trial, thus properly accom-
modating the charge to an FELA case. The trial judge
might also have charged the jury, but was not requested
to do so, with an appropriate revision of charge 5.1b on
concurring cause:

In order to be regarded as a legal cause of in-
jury, negligence need not be the only cause.
Negligence may be a legal cause of injury even
though it operates in combination with some
other cause if such other cause occurs at the
same time as the negligence and if the
negligence contributes [omitting substantially]
to producing such injury.

In my view the “‘but for” language simply requires a
causative relationship which must be demonstrated
even in FELA cases. The feature that distinguishes
FELA cases from others is that the causative effect of
the railroad’s negligence may be “‘slight,”’ not ‘‘substan-
tial,” and yet be actionable. Other portions of the trial
court’s jury charge made that point clearly. I do not con-
ceive that the charge was error, harmless or otherwise.
See Funseth v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 399 F.2d 918
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1083; Spinks v.
Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing
identical causative requirements under the Jones Act); 3
Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instruc-
tions §94.13 (3d ed. 1977).

App. 6

The charge here did not speak in terms of “‘prox-
imate cause,”’ which the Supreme Court found offensive
in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct.
443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957). Rather, it further
ameliorated Florida’s SJI 5.1a on “legal cause,’’ which
itself ameliorated the more stringent requirements for
proof of “proximate cause.”

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

THE PLAINTIFF, BOBBY WADE HOLLAND,
sues the Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY, a railroad corporation, and
says:

COUNT I

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT, SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY, UNDER THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT.

1. At all times material hereto, the Defendant,
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
was a corporation having its office and principal place of
business at 300 Water Street, Jacksonville, Florida,
from which address it directs and controls its railroad
system.

2. At all times material hereto, the Plaintiff,
BOBBY WADE HOLLAND, was an employee of the
Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, acting in the course and scope of such
employment.

App. 7

3. At all times material hereto, the Defendant,
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
was engaged as a common carrier in interstate or foreign
commerce by a railroad, which embraced and included
the work and employment of the Plaintiff, and the
Plaintiff was engaged in an activity that affected
transportation in interstate commerce.

4. On or about October 17, 1973 at approximately
5:30 A.M., in the vicinity known as “School Bus Cross-
ing:, Tifton, Georgia, the Plaintiff was working as a
brakeman on SEABOARD COAST LINE train 305,
which operates from Albany, Georgia to Waycross,
Georgia, and was engaged in picking up approximately
26 cars at the Tifton pass track, during which pick-up
the Plaintiff was severely injured when the Plaintiff was
whipped and thrown from the last car in a group of ap-
proximately 39 cars being shoved back to join train 305
on the mainline track, and as a result the Plaintiff
struck the track on or between the rails causing the

wheels of approximately 21 cars of the train to run over
the Plaintiff.

_5. The Defendant, SEABOARD COAST LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY, and/or its agents, servants or
employees, were guilty of one or more of the following
negligent acts or negligent omissions which caused or
contributed to the cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and
damages as hereinafter alleged:

(a) In negligently constructing, or operating

or maintaining its said railroad cars,

engines, or other equipment, or other ap-
pliances.

App. 8

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(J)

In negligently failing to furnish the Plain-
tiff reasonably safe place in which to
work.

In negligently failing to furnish Plaintiff
respectively safe cars, engines, or other
equipment with which to do his work.

In negligently operating the said engine
shoving back the 39 cars without constant
radio communication with the Plainfiff
brakeman.

In negligently operating the said engine
with defective radio communication be-
tween the engineer and the Plaintiff
brakeman.

In negligently operating the said engine
contrary to the Plaintiffs signals.

In negligently operating the said engine in
disregard of the Plaintiff’s signals.

In negligently operating the said engine so
as to cause excessive slack action.

In negligently failing to give the Plaintiff
reasonable warning of a dangerous and/or
unsafe condition.

In negligently failing to supply and make
available proper radio appliances for use

by the Plaintiff.

App. 9

(k) In negligently failing to maintain a proper
radio communication system.

6. That as a result of the said event, the Plaintiff
sustained personal injuries to his head, neck, back,
shoulders, including body and extremities and injuries
to his nervous system, more particularly the loss of the
Plaintiff's right leg at the hip and left leg at the knee;
and including permanent scarring of the shoulders; and
other injuries not as yet diagnosed; said injuries and the
conditions resulting therefrom are continuing in their
nature, so as to cause him injury, pain and disability
and that the said conditions aforesaid will reasonably be
expected to continue for sometime in the future.

7. Asa result of his said injuries, the Plaintiff was
compelled to seek medical attention, hospitalization,
surgical procedures and to incur medical expense for the
treatment of his said injuries and for travel necessary to
secure such medical treatment; and that in the future he
will be compelled to incur similar expenses for such
medical care, hospitalizations, surgical procedures, and
travel.

8. As a further result of his injuries and the condi-
tions resulting therefrom, the Plaintiff's earning
capacity and working ability were impaired; and in the
future he will suffer future loss of his earning capacity
and his ability to work.

9. Asa further result of his said injuries, the Plain-
tiff suffered physical handicap and disability in connec-
tion with his usual activities and recreation, and will
continue so to suffer such handicap and disability into
the future.

? App. 10

10. As a further result of his said injuries and the
conditions resulting therefrom, the Plaintiff suffered
great humiliation and embarrassment; great mental
pain and suffering, and will continue so to suffer in the
future.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff sues the Defendant,
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
and demands judgment in excess of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($2,500.00) with interest
and the costs of this action; and demands trial by jury of
all issues triable as of right by a jury.

COUNT I

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY UNDER THE BOILER INSPEC-
TION ACT

11. The Plaintiff adopts and incorporates each

and every allegation of Paragraphs 1 through 4 above.

12. The injuries to the Plaintiff occurred as the
result of a defective engine radio receiver whereby the
engineer was unable to hear the Plaintiff’s signals.

13. The Defendants were in violation of the Boiler
Inspection Act and the Safety Appliance Act in the
following respect:

(a) That the locomotive radio was defective
and not serviceable for the use intended.

App. 11

(b) That the locomotive brakes were defec-
tive and inadequate.

(c) That the train brakes were defective and
inadequate.

(d) That the engine’s radio communications
system was defective.

14. The Plaintiff adopts and incorporates each
and every allegation of Paragraphs 6 through 10 above.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff sues the Defendant,
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
and demands judgment in excess of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($2,500.00) together with
interest and the costs of this action, and demands trial
by jury of all issues triable as of right by a jury.

MOTION TO AMEND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his
undersigned attorneys, and moves this Honorable
Court, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 1.190, for leave to amend
his Amended Complaint previously filed herein by in-
terlineation and to add thereto in Court I, paragraph 5
an additional allegation of negligence by subparagraph
(1), thereof, all of which is in the furtherance of justice
and which amendment reads as follows:

(1) In negligently instructing and/or directing

the train crew to pick up cars on the pass
track in a manner and method as was

App. 12

known by the Defendant to be hazardous
when there was a safer alternative method
of accomplishing the same objectives.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff's motion for new trial, after being twice
continued, was argued before this Court on May 27,
1976. The plaintiff has listed 28 reasons why the Court
should set aside the judgment entered on the jury ver-
dict on this case and grant a new trial. However, during
the arguments on the motion, plaintiff's counsel argued
basically three of these reasons, namely, Nos. 4, 7 and
21. However, the Court has considered all of the reasons
set forth in plaintiff's motion and has studied the cases
cited by the parties during the arguments, and after due
deliberation, the plaintiff's motion for new trial is
denied.

The Court feels impelled to detail its reasoning for
denying a new trial.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff in this case suf-
fered grievous injuries, and if the case were to be decided
on sympathy, there is no doubt but that a new trial
would be granted. But, of course, this is not the stan-
dard to be applied nor was it the standard for the jury to
apply in reaching their verdict.

Reason No. 4 in plaintiffs motion states that ‘the
verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence’’. However, the verdict is amply supported by
the evidence in this case and the jury could easily have
found that the railroad was not at fault. Reasons Nos. 9

App. 13

through 24 urge as error: failure of the Court to give
some of the plaintiff's requested instructions, failure of
the Court to give in their entirety some of plaintiff's re-
quested instructions, and the giving by the Court of
some of defendant’s requested instructions. Plaintiff
alleges that defendant was liable under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, Safety Appliance Act, Boiler In-
spection Act and the Power Brake Law. The instructions
as given to the jury adequately and properly instructed
them as to each of these statutory duties. 45 U.S.C.A.
§1, et.seq.; 45 U.S.C.A. §51, et.seq.; Rogers vs. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, 77
S.Ct. 443; Bertrand vs. Southern Pacific Co., 282 F.2d
569 (9th Cir., 1960); Idzojtic vs. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 431 F.2d 1029 (3rd Cir., 1970); Ely vs. Reading
Company, 424 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir., 1970).

Plaintiff's counsel has spent a great deal of time
urging upon this Court their contention that excluding
evidence concerning weeds and grass allegedly located
south of the pass track switch in Tifton, Georgia was the
reason that the jury returned an adverse verdict against
plaintiff. No doubt this will be the primary contention
on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel now claims that the entire
thrust of their case under the FELA aspect of the case
was their contention that weeds growing along the
mainline south of the pass track switch between Tifton
and Waycross, Georgia was the reason for the particular
move which was being made at the time of the plaintiff's
injury. Otherwise, they contend, it would have been
made differently as the defendant knew the move which
was made on the night of the plaintiff's accident was
unsafe.

App. 14

It is to be noted that this contention was not men-
tioned at all in the plaintiff's original complaint, Count I
(their FELA Count), which set forth eleven specific
allegations of negligence, none of which made any men-
tion whatsoever of weeds south of the pass track switch,
but rather the majority of them were allegations of
negligent train handling in contributing to the cause of
plaintiffs injury. The plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint which again set forth eleven allegations of
negligence, and again failed to mention anything about
weeds south of the pass track switch.

It is perfectly clear that their primary thrust in
alleging negligence dealt with train handling, negligent
communications and/or a negligent communication
system. Following this, the plaintiff further amended his
complaint on several occasions, supplementing their
allegations under their Counts dealing with Safety Ap-
pliance Act, Boiler Inspection Act and one further
allegation under their FELA Count which read:

“In negligently instructing and/or directing the
train crew to pick up cars on the pass track in a
manner and method as was known by the
defendant to be hazardous when there was a
safer alternative method of accomplishing the
same objective.” |

Plaintiff's contention also is not supported by piain-
tiff’s counsel’s opening statement to the jury. During his
opening statement he mentioned about fourteen
theories of liability under the FELA, Safety Appliance
Act, Boiler Inspection Act and Power Brake Law. Near
the end of his opening statement and while discussing
the alternative means by which the cars could have been

App. 15

picked up, plaintiff's counsel mentioned weeds south of
the pass track switch in a sense which virtually con-
tradicted his earlier statement that using that area was
an alternative method, as from his statement concern-
ing weeds it appeared that it was not a reasonable alter-
native. Thus, from the issues as framed by the
pleadings, as well as plaintiff's counsel’s opening state-
ment, it is clear to this Court that their present conten-
tion that the primary thrust of their case involved the
weeds theory is an afterthought when trying to review in
their minds why the jury returned an adverse verdict to
them.

During the trial, the testimony was uncontradicted
that the method which was being employed to pick up
the cars from the pass track had been used by the defen-
dant for over twenty-five years without any complaints
from employees or mishaps of any kind. Further, the
evidence at trial was undisputed that the track crew, of
which the plaintiff was a member, used the same
method on the morning of the plaintiff's accident. Dur-
ing arguments (held outside of the presence of the jury)
concerning this point, plaintiff's counsel was unable to
show that there was any connection whatsoever between
any weeds or lack of weeds located south of the pass
track switch and the method which was decided upon by
the plaintiff's crew to pick up the cars from the pass
track. It was not necessary to rule on the admissibility of
the profferred testimony relating to the defendant’s
knowiedge or lack of knowledge of any weeds south of
the pass track switch during a reasonable period prior to
plaintiff's accident (plaintiff proffered one or two letters
which predated the accident by four or five years) as
there is no question but that under the issues as framed
by the pleadings and testimony at trial that evidence of

App. 16

weeds or lack of weeds south of the pass track switch had
absolutely no relevancy or materiality in this case.

The plaintiff was allowed to put on testimony from
their expert who testified that the method being em-
ployed by the defendant at the time of plaintiff’s acci-
dent was unsafe and then testified as to four alternative
methods which would have been, in his opinion,
reasonably safe alternative methods which should have
been used. The jury was appropriately instructed to the
effect that the general custom of the defendant railroad
in picking up the cars did not justify or excuse
negligence and that in determining whether or not the
defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with a
reasonably safe place to work, etc., they could consider
the alternative methods. After carefully considering the
pleadings, trial testimony and the law, it is clear that
the plaintiff's attempt to pu‘ in evidence concerning
weeds which had nothing to do with the plaintiff's acci-
dent was properly excluded. Black vs. Penn Central Co.,
507 F.2d 269 (6th Cir., 1974); Smith vs. Illinois Central
R. R. Co., 486 F.2d 943 (5th Cir., 1974); Dobson vs.
Grand Truck Western Railroad Co., 248 F.2d 545 (7th
Cir., 1957); Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. vs. Darden,
216 F.2d 125 (5th Cir., 1954); Mensen vs. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co., 250 N.E.2d 303.

During the oral arguments on their motion for new
trial, plaintiff cited several cases in support of their con-
tention that the evidence concerning the weeds or lack
thereof should have been admitted at the trial, and I
have read those cases and feel that they are clearly not
applicable to this case. Cereste vs. New York, New
Haven and Hartford R. Co., 231 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir., 1956),
involved an employee who tripped over a lump of coal

App. 17

between a set of tracks, which is a situation almost com-
pletely opposite of that involved in this case, wherein
the plaintiff was riding a boxcar from which he fell.
Another case cited by the plaintiff during oral argument
was Chicago, B. & O. R. Co. vs. Kelley, 74 F.2d 80 (8th
Cir., 1934), which involved weeds that had accumulated
on tracks which then caused a braking locomotive to
slide further than normal into a cut of cars. The only
similarity between that case and this case is the word
“weed” as it is clear that in that case the weeds had
something to do with causing or contributing to the acci-
dent, whereas in this case there was no connection be-
tween the plaintiff's accident and any alleged weeds
south of the pass track.

The jury was told at the outset of the case that it
was expected that the entire trial would last approx-
imately three or four days. Actually, the plaintiff's case
lasted seven full days with the liability phase of their
case consisting of putting on testimony concerning
switching operations, braking systems (including very
detailed and technical evidence of engine and train
brake systems), radio systems (including very technical
aspects of radio sensitivities, gain, etc.) and the details
of the movements being made at the time of plaintiff's
accident. As the plaintiff's case wore on, it was obvious
that the jury of six women was becoming inattentive and
bored and I informed both counsel of this observation on
several occasions. It was obvious that the length of time
in which it took the plaintiff to present his case and the
type of testimony presented was completely boring to
the jury. On the other hand, the defendant’s case was
presented clearly, concisely and briefly and was listened
to most attentively by the jury.

App. 18

While there were numerous factual issued to be
resolved by the jury, perhaps the two most important
were: (1) Whether or not the engine and cars were han-
dled in a negligent manner and thus produced unusual
and severe slack action, or whether they were handled
reasonably and produced normal slack action, if any;
and (2) Whether or not the plaintiff was riding the side
of the leading boxcar, as he testified, or whether he was
riding the end of the leading boxcar at the time of his ac-
cident.

After deliberating for approximately three hours,
the jury returned their verdict resolving the factual
issues in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

I find no basis to disturb the jury verdict in this
case.

It is therefore

ADJUDGED that plaintiff's motion for new trial
be, and the same, is hereby, denied.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida,
this 29th day of July, 1976.

/s/ Marion W.- Gooding
CIRCUIT JUDGE

App. 19

EXCERPT FROM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

MR. HASTINGS: Your Honor, so you understand
what we are talking about, because this is a factual
situation, what it is in essence in this particular area
where this movement is taking place, there are high
weeds, we are alleging, and there is a lot of debris. As a
result of these extremely high weeds and debris, they
had to do the movement not the way we feel it should
have been done and we will produce evidence to say it
shouldn’t have been done because I say if you try to do it
in this area where weeds are, you are bound to fall or
trip. It is dangerous at night and an accident can hap-
pen. In any event, it is because of these weeds, that is
one of the causal factors of this accident. We want to
prove this is so through these particular communica-
tions we are talking about. Not only is this a dangerous
condition that existed there and caused that particular
movement to be necessary, but the railroad was warned
not once but told many times that these weeds were
high. There is debris. They were told many times and
the railroad has correspondence from the working people
to the effect that this condition is intolerably bad and
this should be cleared up or a different movement
should be made.

DEPOSITION OF ROGER BANKS
Q All right. Are you familiar with the area south
of the south pass — south switch of the south pass track
at Tifton as the same was in October, or on October 17th
of 1973, specifically on October 17th?

A Yes, sir, I am. I was there.

App. 20

Q Can you describe that area on the main line just
south of the south pass track?

A South of the south pass switch? Is that right?

Q_ Yes.

A Pretty well grown up, had some tie butts laying
on the right of way, weeds were approximately, I guess,
about waist high.

Q_ All right. Were the weeds thick?
A Yes, sir, they were pretty thick.

Q Did that affect the manner in which the pickup
of cars off that pass truck was conducted by your crew at
that time?

A Well, yes, sir, they would try to cut off to where
they didn’t have to walk through all of that. They tried
to cut off far enough back to where they could make the
pickup and then walk down the pass track.

Q_ Is that what requires a man to ride a car on this
movement, picking up cars off that pass track?

A That and the fact that you have that School
Bus Road crossing there. You have to leave that open at
certain times in the morning. And that requires him to
ride back to a make a coupling there and inspect the
brakes as he comes back forward.

App. 21

DEPOSITION OF SHIRLEY DAVIS

Q In discussing with Mr. Taylor, that you
described earlier, the conditions there around Tifton,
did you ever discuss with him the ground conditions and
overlying weed conditions and debris conditions?

MR. MELTON: I will have to object to the
vagueness of the question.

You can answer, Mr. Davis, if you understand it.

THE WITNESS: I understand the question, and
I’m not in a position to state now whether I did or didn’t,
because this is a problem that we are faced with over
almost 10,000 miles of railroad.

And the basic fact is that the American public is
just not willing to pay for us to maintain a 100-percent
control of weeds over our system.

BY MR. KIKER:

Q Would this have been a business decision again

relating to cost factors on upkeep of the maintenance of
way?

A Well, there again, those decisions are made on a
much higher level than I have yet achieved in this com-
pany. But the primary focus or the primary — let me say
the item that in my view would get the first priority
would be the actual maintenance of the track itself, for
therein lies the greatest danger to the employees, to the
equipment and to the traveling public.

App. 22

And it’s simply a question of economics, of how
much money you have to spend.

Q Wouldn’t you also be concerned with areas

' where the men were required to walk, specifically with

respect to the weeds and grass and debris that are in
those areas where the men have to walk day in and day
out?

A Yes. We give some consideration to that, too.
We certainly do. We operate a — basically a weedspray-
ing outfit over the entire system every year, to my
knowledge, spraying weeds along our entire right of way.
We have numerous mowing machines that are engaged
in mowing our right of way.

~

Q Do you also have men who clean up debris?

A Basically our section forces do that on a regular
basis. Now, I am not saying we pick up everything,
everywhere, every day.

Q You just want to clean up the major things that
the forces would see or be instructed to clean up?

MR. MILTON: Let me again object. I think, again,
this is out of Mr. Davis’ area completely. I don’t think he
is competent to be questioned along this line.

But you can give an answer, Mr. Davis, if you feel
like you have an answer.

-THE WITNESS: Well, your question is — appears

to me to be general in nature. But we certainly around
our major terminals are constantly faced with the

App. 23

problem of picking up pulpwood and other debris. And
we do this on a regular basis. It’s not as frequent as we
would like to do, probably. But there again, economics is
a factor in how much we are able to do.

And we certainly attempt to mow around our road
crossing and our sidings and give them more attention
than we do areas where normally there’s not too much
activity.

BY MR. KIKER:

Q Wouldn’t you consider crossties lying out beside
the track where the men have to walk a major item
which would need to be cleaned up and policed
regularly?

‘A There again, this-depends on the location of the
crosstie, how close it is to the track, and this and that
and the other. We frequently place crossties along the
track when we are starting up a program of tie renewal.

DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM HUCKEBA

Q And I assume, as far as the condition of weeds,
that this is a matter that you have to keep up with on a
regular basis?

A They will grow back.

Q And I suppose you got a lot of complaints over
the years about the weeds and —

A Yes, sir, weeds will grow, and it requires a lot of
work to keep them —

App. 24

Q Cut down?
A — cut down and under control.

Q And when you would receive such complaints,
you would handle them in the manner I think you ex-
plained before, that they were referred to the —

A We did something about it just as quickly as we
could.

Q Did you have some type of a program within
your supervisory personnel there to check these condi-
tions along the railroad?

A Oh, yes, trainmasters, road foremen, road-
masters, division engineer, myself, in covering the
railroad would check those conditions.

Q And if you found something that looked to be
dangerous or something like that, what was your
procedure?

A If we found a condition that appeared to need
attention, we set about having the matter taken care of
as quickly as possible.

Q How often would you make these inspections?

A Oh, a roadmaster would cover his territory
weekly, or more frequently sometimes. A division
engineer, every week or two. Of course, the trainmaster
and road foreman, they would make frequent trips. I
couldn’t say to the day.

App. 25

Q If they saw some kind of condition, they would
come back and either report it to your office or have it
handled in some type of manner; is that correct?

A Yes, that’s correct.

Q And I assume these individuals would be riding
the area that Train 305 covered from Albany to Tifton to
Waycross and be aware of conditions along that route?

A Yes.
DEPOSITION OF EARLE WILLIAMS

Q Had this type of movement ever been discussed
with representatives of the union and either yourself or
Mr. Huckeba in regard to alternate methods?

A You are speaking, sir, of alternate methods of
picking up from the siding at Tifton?

Q Yes.

_ A To the best of my knowledge, it was never dis-
cussed, brought up or considered.

Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Williams: Had
anyone, either in writing or to you verbally, complained
or mentioned the tall weeds that were present at the
pass track and also the debris and, I believe, some tie
butts and what have you theet

App. 26

DEPOSITION OF JAMES SHERROD
Q Were you ever made aware of any complaints in
regard to the weeds in the area of the Tifton pass track
prior to the day of the accident here?
A In that particular area?
Q Yes.
A No, sir.

Q Have you ever been made aware of any com-
plaints in regard to the use of radios and outside inter-
ference on the radios?

A No.

Q Do you ever get involved with your book of rules
and the violations of various rules or the implementa-
tion of new rules?

A Are you speaking of operating rules —

Q Yes.

A — or safety rules?

exactly — I can’t pinpoint the area that I looked at. I
looked at the area in general there.

Q I see.

A I could possibly have looked at this area.

App. 27

Q Do you know if there were any tall weeds in the
area east of the main line and just south of the switch of
the pass track?

A Ican’t remember, sir, if there was or not.

Q You don’t know then whether there were any
weeds there or not?

A That’s correct, I don’t know.

Q And the same would be true of the west side of
the track; is that correct?

A That’s correct, yes, sir.
PROFFER [ZADNICHICK]
BY MR. FEHNER:

Q Mr. Zadnichick, assuming that there were a
large number of weeds in this area south of the pass
track, and there were cut tie butts, for some con-
siderable distance down to the south of the switch, and

that, on the other side of the track there was a deep
ravine dropped off the side of the track.

Now, what effect would this have on any of your
movements here that required walking?

A They’d certainly be an impediment on the
movement of walking.

Q Let’s assume these were chest-high where it was
almost impossible for a person to walk?

App. 28

A Well, I wouldn’t consider that a safe condition
to walk under those circumstances.

Q And would it in any way affect the efficiency
and safety of the movement?

A Yes.
Q_ If those weeks began just shortly south of this
switch area, shortly south several hundred feet, would

that have any more effect on the movement?

A You say they did not exist until you reached a
distance some several hundred feet south of the switch?

Q No, more than that, possibly less of the switch.
A The conditions you described in a very un-
satisfactory working condition, whatever the location

may be.

Q What effect would that have on train handling
movement in that area?

A Well, certainly it would impede the efficiency,
it is not a satisfactory walking condition.

Q What about at nighttime?

A It is a hazard that is increased.

App. 29

DIRECT EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)
[THOMPSON]

BY MR. HASTINGS:

Q_ Sir, ’'m — ia there anything — to cut down to
the area where you make your cut and switch is, so that
they won’t have to make this 35-car ride or so down to
the school bus crossing, is there anything about that
area, rather than cut off at the switch, you know, to clear
the switch with standing cars they cut off — why they
cut off way down at that street crossing? That is, do — I
am talking about in the area, weeds or anything like
that?

A In other words, you are asking me why did we
stop back like this?

Q That’s right.

A_ To do our work?

Q Yes.

A South of this switch about four car lengths,
three or four, the shoulders of the railroad narrows up to
a standard roadbed, standard — according to this type
railroad. And, there is some — it is growth down there,
type grass that grows real fast, prolific, it’s that Sudan
grass, type of Sudan grass like.

Q Grow about waist high and thick and heavy?

App. 30

A It will get up above your knees, would get waist
high, yes, sometimes, but normally about a little above
your knees, around your knees.

Q_ And from there down to the next switch is about
40 or 50 cars, I believe you stated?

A Something in the neighborhood of that, yes, sir.

Q_ And that is the reason you cut off back there so
that people will have a clean place to walk?

(Nods.)

All right, sir.

Yes, sir.

Now, this grass is on both sides of the track?

Same thing on both sides, grass.

Te. SS ee

Yes, sir. And is that area lighted at night?

A Well, there is a little light that comes across
from these lights I was talking about, I could see across
through the engine, but it wouldn’t help in walking

purposes.

Q_ And is there a lot of scrap there or metal in that
area, scrap yard?

A There is a scrap yard there and we do get scrap

around out of the cars and occasionally you will see a
piece of scrap, you know, on the ground along there.

App. 31

Q_ And in — in your opinion with what you have
described there, would you feel that it’s an unsafe place
to walk?

A Well, that gets back to terminology. If a man
wanted to take his time and walk carefully, it would be a
safe place to walk. But, a man walking and trying to
check brakes, I would have to say that it would be a
hazardous walking.

Q Particularly at night, I would imagine?
A That is what I am talking about, night.

Q Allright, sir. And, sir, have you personally ever
requested the company to clean up that walkway so that
a movement could be made without having to have a
man hang on the side such as Mr. Holland?

A Yes. Yes. I— I once represented the firemen on
the organization and on this district and I had an access
to the superintendent on other — lots of other
businesses, and the brakemen would ask me to speak to
the superintendent and see if we couldn’t get the grass
cut down there, which I did on numerous occasions.

Q_ And, sir, was this in a — up to an area of the
time of this accident we are talking about, this is 1973
October area? '

A You mean had I spoken to the superintendent
previous?

Q No. Was this condition existing in October,
1973?

App. 32

A In October, ’73 they had came there that year
and cut the weeds with the lawnmower there that year
and cut the weeds with the lawnmower — I mean, a
mowing machine which cuts them about four or five
inches above the ground. But, that being that warm,
real warm under there, had gotten back up about
something like this.

Q About this, you are referring to how many —
About 14, 16 inches.
14 to 16 inches?

Yes, sir.

oOo F&- O& PY

All right, sir.

MR. HASTINGS: I think that is all. Thank you.
That is the proffer.

MR. MILTON: I have a few more questions on
redirect —

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. MILTON: I am sorry, on the proffer itself
you want me to ask?

THE COURT: I think you better straighten it out

for the record, this may go to appellate court, they may
think this occurred right at the place of the accident.

App. 33

CROSS EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)

BY MR. MILTON:

Q Mr. Thompson, is the area that you have just
been asked questions about by Mr. Hastings, is this
anywhere in the area where your move was progressing
at the time of Mr. Holland’s accident?

A No, sir. This area I discussed with Mr. Hastings
just previous to this was in the area south of the engine
after the coupling was made.

Q In other words, it would be considerably south
of, say, school bus crossing or the south pass track itself?

A Approximately three to four cars past the south
pass track switch, is where it starts.

Q_ And the walking area from the school bus cross-
ing to the south pass track is a good clean walking area?

A That’s right.
MR. MILTON: That is all I have.
MR. HASTINGS: One last question, I apologize.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION (ON PROFFER)
BY MR. HASTINGS:

Q_ So, sir, if you didn’t pull out, for example, with
your 39 cars here going forward, before you started shov-

App. 34

ing back, and if a man had to walk to the head end, he
would have to be walking through this region that we
have described that is south of the —

A Had I left my —
Q Switch.

A Had I left the train at the — in the vicinity of
the derailer you are talking about, and pulled the train
down in the clear?

Q_ Right.

A Clearing point? Yeah, he would have had to
walk in this area.

Q_ Had to walk?

A To get to the head end. Sure.

MR. HASTINGS: All right, sir. \
THE COURT: All right. Ask the jury to return.

App. 35

HOLLAND TO CUT
(UNCOUPLE) HERE---

L
1 mat NY
AYCKUSS

METHOD -

PREVE'NTED
Ww

, TALL GPASS

| ABE_DESETS

trAcre

AKIN

“CT TO SCALE

AAT

-$--Main Track
~Side Track

---Derail

MAN + Direction of Travel

OLLAND TO CUT
(UNCOUPLE) HERE ---

ore es

MM 4 - mngines Aue
BB 2 - Car Pickup
> - Firestone Cars

iH Rest of Train —*C+L
4

App. 36

wSchoo] Sus Road

ALTERNATIVE
METHOD -
PREVENTED
Y WEE

TALL GRASS

AND DEBRIS

School Bus Road

Ane
AMNAwW

+
AA Are
he hesias
AAcw

NOT TO SCALE

Nw |weens
&

-Main Track
“Side Track

HOLLAND
UNCOUPLES 13
FIRESTONE
CARS FROM
REST OF
TRAIN AND
RIDES 1/2
MILE TO
SWITCH.

---Derail

uiSchool Bus Road

HOLLAND
UNCOUPLES 13
FIRESTONE CARS
AND WALKS ABOUT |
150 FEET TO
SWITCH. ,

TALL
GRASS,

DEBRIS

+ Direction of Travel
Lo] 4 - Engines Se Aada da

| Pe - Car Pickuo
my: - Pirestone Cars
yres* of Train

5

AT

App. 37

Aan AcT [
aes,
_
Arce

---4Main Track
--Side Track

|
|

j—-—Switch

Aer

ALTERIATIVE
METHOD _-
PRFVE!:~

w
TALL GRASS
AND DEEFTS

School Bus Road

ANA

AAcKe

NOT TO SCALE

|Bchool Sus Road

------Main Track
-Side Track

HOLLAND HANDLES SWITCH,

-~-Derail

--Switch

Are “TALL

GRASS,

WEEDS
&

DEBRIS

AAwe

>» Direction of Travel

AAC pag 4 - msines Ae

i. | 26 = Car Pickup

i” | 13 - Firestone cars
ty Rest of Train

—--—-Main Track

6.

App. 38

ALTER?:), TIVE
METI!OD -

i TALL GPASS
| AND DEEFIS

School Bus Ryad

Aanere

Ae ANC | ents

MA” Fe

AA

Ane Err

NOT TO SCALE

iSchool Pus Road

------Main Track
--Side Track

ENGINES, FIRESTONE CARS AND
26 - CARS - RICKED UP PULL
OUT TO MAIN TRACK (WITH NO
MAN RIDING ON| END OF ANY
CAR). HOLLAND THEN HANDLES
SWITCH, ETC.

---Derail
--Switch

MAN

AnrANw

GRASS,

WEEDS
&

DEBRIS

ae Direction of Travel

AA ww 4 - Engines Sane)

26 - Car Pickup

13 ~ Firestone Cars
es ed

fl) Rest of Train y

App. 39

aie wb Track
e—Sice Track

i

ole

---Derail

--Switch

School Bus Road

AAW
AA

NOT TO SCALE

---+mMain Track
--Side Track

THE 1/2 MILE
WALK TO THE
ENGINE IS

THROUGH CLEAR

Atuirenc space.

che Ate

AA

A P'ATIV
METHOD -
PREVEZ:7ED
BY WrESs
TALL GPASS
AND DEE?TS

School =us Road

ENGINE BACKS
UP OR SHOVES
TO COUPLING
OF 39 CARS _
WITH REST OF
TRAIN, WITH
NO ONE RIDING

HOLLAND WOULD
THEN WALK 1/2
MILE TO ENGINE

EXCEPT FOR HIGH
WEEDS, ETC. SOUTH

er Direction of Travel
| 4 - Engines ATC
Bz - Car Pick Up

mg» - Firestone Cars

{TT}}®es* of Train
&

App. 40

----Main Track
--Side Trac}.
---Derail
—-—<-Switch
TALL
GRASS,
WEEDS
&
AAC 7

———— eo oe

ACTUAL RR
METHOD N
USED wee

School Bus Road

1/2 MILE

----| rMain Track
k—Side Track

s
ALBANY
t

DISTANCES

COMPAS

Ww
sehu
E

ALTERNATIVE
METHOD —
PRE‘JENTED

BY WEEDS

TALL GRASS
AND

chool Bus Road

ACTUAL METHOD
USED

1. REQUIRES
1/2 MILE
SHOVING -
RIDE ON
39th CAR
TO CHECK
COUPLING.

2. ALLOWS 1/2
MILE WALK

Derail

w
Switch-—

niernew

An Ae

AAW

An AN

NOT TO SCALE

4:

THROUGH
CLEAR AREA
TO GET TO
ENGINE
AFTER
COUPLING.

Aw

MAAN

Arnw

ALTERNATIVE METHOD
PREVENTE) BY WEEDS

1. REQUIRES 150
FOOT WALK TO
CHECK COUPLING.

2. ALLOWS 1/2 MILE
WALK THROUGH
CLEAR AREA TO
GET TO ENGINE
AFTER COUPLING
EXCEPT “HEN
TALL GPASS AND
WEE Ni
(DESPITE
REQUEST OF
THOMPSON, ETC) «
NO ONE EVER
HAS TO RIDE
THE 39th CAR.

AniAr

Anse

App. 41

ain Track
i--Side Track

~g-Derail
we 150 FEET
<a.--4-switen

AAT

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_2393%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
